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Roots of *Introduction*

Political Behavior

to Government and Politics

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SNYDER-WILSON: ROOTS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Made in the United States of America

PREFACE

This book represents an effort on our part to provide for an introductory course in political science which will offer to students certain basic tools of analysis. It may constitute heresy to convey to students the conception of unity within the social sciences; however, we have sought to indicate that a truly sophisticated understanding of political behavior and processes requires the use of materials from all the social sciences. Economics, demography, anthropology, psychology, sociology—all have a contribution to make. Instead of attempting a superficial survey of each of these disciplines, we have found it advisable, as a result of our teaching experience at Princeton, to select essays which bear specifically on the political behavior of men. Each chapter is designed to be suggestive rather than definitive, to propose useful approaches which both the instructor and the student may use as starting points from which to explore the various concepts of political behavior. No attempt is made in the various chapters to emphasize a particular economic, psychological, or sociological theory.

Frankly, this book of readings is an attempt to introduce the student to the forces and factors behind political institutions. It is in no way a repudiation of the institutional approach, but, rather, it is a supplement to it. Despite the omissions and shortcomings of this volume, we hope it will suggest other means of understanding political activity. This collection of original writings is only an approximation of what we hope to achieve. Therefore, we welcome suggestions for developing this general approach; we have attempted to provide a framework within which each instructor may develop his particular interests.


A deliberate effort has been made to keep to a minimum the inclusion of selections from sources readily available in every library. We have instead included items which seem to us to offer a fresh insight and which are frequently not available in convenient form for reference.

We wish to thank the Department of Politics at Princeton University for encouragement and for giving us a free hand in the development of the materials used. We also wish to thank the authors and publishers who have given their permission for the reprinting of various selections. Without the steady labor and the many talents of Muriel Wilson, the completed manuscript would have been unusually difficult, if not impossible, to compile.

To the students of Politics II at Princeton University in 1947-1948, we dedicate this book.

Princeton, New Jersey

R.C.S.
H.H.W.



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1

THE HUMAN EQUATION IN POLITICS

I

It is probably correct to say that in liberal democratic countries there has been a persistent tendency to exaggerate the role of intellect in determining men's actions. It is commonly assumed that men's actions are largely controlled by an intellectual process in which an end is selected and then means are found to attain that end. This assumption is reflected in the classical economist's creation, "the economic man" who knew his own economic interest and pursued it. And another supposition is revealed in the common assertion that men always act from a rational self-interest.

Perhaps it is this faith in reason which explains why we were for so long unable to comprehend what was happening in Hitler's Germany. With our conviction that men are primarily and fundamentally rational, we were incapable of grasping the implications of a regime which glorified and manipulated the irrational element of men.

Modern psychology and psychiatry have provided evidence that much, though by no means all, human conduct is based upon irrational forces and upon habitual responses. These disciplines have therefore suggested that it is in the emotional life of the individual that we must seek to find some sources of political conduct. This is not to deny in any way the importance reason and intellect must have in the control of human affairs. It is rather in the nature of an appeal, and of a warning, that in order to work out rational solutions to our problems we must be aware that these habitual and irrational responses must frequently be overcome. Nor does this imply a diminution of concern with the social and economic life of the community. On the contrary, it means an intensification of research into the contribution of such areas to the individual's emotional pattern and a concern with such questions as these: What conditions contribute to an individual's sense of security, or anxiety? What tensions and hostilities are produced which may be exerted against other groups or nations? How can democratic procedures be applied to alleviate the strain and frustration which lead to aggression?

Students of politics are interested in this general approach as one which may provide a keener insight into the actions and reactions of men. If it be true that "uncertainty leads to anxiety, which leads to aggressiveness and cruelty, to violent attacks against the representatives of the old and the new," then the student of politics must be concerned in an age of uncertainty and change. While recognizing man's innate hostility to change, his reliance upon habitual patterns of conduct and traditional institutional arrangements, we need to discover how this hostility may be alleviated in order to permit the fullest use of our scientific and technological knowledge.

II

Every man has a concept of "human nature" and that concept will color his whole political and social philosophy. It is characteristic, too, for a person to hold a view of human nature which serves as a means of rationalizing his particular social viewpoint. If it be suggested that social reforms be instituted to eliminate poverty, slums, or mass unemployment, there will always be those who deny the possibility of achieving such reforms because of "human nature." This approach serves effectively to prevent, or delay, institutional adjustments. To sustain such a concept one must ignore the changes in the attitudes and responses of men which have taken place from one historical epoch to another.

In fact human nature, i.e., the sum total of man's responses, is composed of two segments. One portion includes certain biologically determined elements, and the other reveals those characteristics which are group- and culture-determined. In the first group are those which reveal that the human being is a physical organism which has certain basic desires and needs: food, shelter, clothing, and sexual activity. In addition, humans have a variety of special capacities including among others the ability to use language and to generalize. Then each individual has personal temperamental and skill characteristics which explain why one man becomes a successful athlete and another attains renown as an artist. All these items are *biologically* determined, though the type of skill developed will be determined by cultural influences to a considerable degree. Finally, each individual has certain characteristic tastes, beliefs, values, and standards of conduct. It is important that these be recognized as *acquired* characteristics produced by a specific cultural environment. Since these acquired characteristics are culturally determined they are not fixed and immutable but are capable of adjustment to change in the culture pattern. The existence of these acquired characteristics constitutes a fact of supreme importance for the social scientist in his effort to devise techniques and procedures for the elimination of conflict in any society. It suggests that changes in the cultural environment, in home, school, church, and business, may provide opportunity for the development of the type of human nature demanded in our complex urban and industrial society.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the expression of even apparently innate biological characteristics is significantly modified by the cultural milieu. The

desire for security seems to be innate in man, but greed is not inborn and biological. It is a product of a particular social conditioning. For anthropologists have reported societies where social distinction is gained not by mere accumulation but through periodically giving away all one's wealth, or by publicly destroying it. Again it seems to be true that group loyalty is innate, for man is a social animal; but nationalism is the product of a specific social, political, and economic environment. This is demonstrated by the relatively modern development of national states and national sentiment. Hunger, thirst, sex, all basic needs of man related to self-preservation or self-perpetuation, are modified in their expression by culture. After all, the cannibal and civilized man do respond to the same urge!

It is also important to distinguish between two types of innate responses. Hunger, for example, arises spontaneously and demands periodic satisfaction no matter what external conditions exist. On the other hand there are those innate responses which are produced only as a reaction to an outside irritant, e.g., aggression in response to frustration, or fighting if attacked. This suggests that such "natural" responses as fighting and aggressive action in response to a denial can be controlled by providing creative outlets and minimizing or, if possible, eliminating the causes of frustration.

If it be true that an important segment of human nature—beliefs, standards, values—does change under the impact of a changed environment, man is given additional reason for believing that he can, if not master, at least direct his fate. Though this idea is obvious enough, it is important for us to be constantly aware that our ideas and attitudes reflect, and are formed by, our adjustment to the institutions and practices of a particular culture. It means that we do not look at other nations and societies with complete objectivity, but rather apply yardsticks of judgment which are provided for us by our culturally-determined traditions, institutions, and values. Unconsciously we are quite certain that our ways of doing are true reflections of "human nature" and therefore inevitable and "right." Thus the stress upon competition in our society leads us to assume that it is innate in all men and that any movement away from it toward greater co-operation is perverse and unnatural. Furthermore, it suggests that a democratic society must be concerned with the degree of authoritarianism which exists in the various component organizations. Kardiner has suggested that every culture produces what he terms "the basic personality structure," a product of the particular customs and institutions to which the individual in a given society is exposed. Since it is this basic personality structure which defines the ways in which men will respond to particular situations, in the United States we need to examine the significance of the fact that a very considerable proportion of each citizen's life is spent in a non-democratic environment.

It would seem to follow from this analysis that our ideas and attitudes will change as technological innovations modify institutions and cultural patterns. This is undoubtedly true over a period of time; but it is equally true that there

is a pronounced lag, that attitudes normally long survive the particular cultural pattern which called them forth. This may be seen, as Thurman Arnold has pithily demonstrated, in our applying to gigantic collectives the ideas and attitudes applicable to an economy of small, independent, competing producers. Politically this is significant because the discrepancy between our ideas and the reality of new conditions sooner or later produces a feeling of insecurity, dissatisfaction, and frustration. This may lead to an effort to "escape from freedom," finding surcease in reliance upon authority, or in an explosion of pent-up aggression directed at existing authorities, minority groups within the society, or against a foreign nation.

III

A study of history provides ample illustration of the fact that both aggression and peaceful co-operation seem to be universal forms of human behavior. Therefore to select one or the other of these characteristic responses as predominant and inevitable would be unrealistic and unhistorical. Without ignoring the persistence of conflict it may be suggested that if men were only competitive, ruthless, power-seeking animals, it would be difficult to explain the persistence of co-operation, of self-sacrifice and devotion. Our problem, therefore, is to discover how we may encourage peaceful co-operation within and between societies, while minimizing conflict. In a selection presented below, E. F. M. Durbin seeks to apply the insight gained from psychology and psychiatry in an effort to understand the problem of co-operation and conflict in modern society.

We have to face the fact that civilization itself constitutes a denial of unrestrained individual freedom of action. Any important amount of co-operation requires one to sacrifice immediate and solitary pleasure for the prospect of a greater satisfaction ultimately to be gained through co-operative effort. This may easily be seen in the process of learning to play group games, as contrasted with purely individual play. Or, on a higher level, as described by David Lilienthal, it is seen in the effort of farmers learning to plan together for the control of irrigation, soil erosion, or improved crop methods. That co-operation is difficult even when dealing with issues calling forth a considerable amount of fundamental agreement is revealed in Granville Hicks' account of the resistance generated in a small New York state town. Although democracy does provide a means for gaining a sense of participation, of being valued as an individual, and of willingly participating in the determination of group goals, it cannot operate in an atmosphere of cynicism or indifference. It cannot survive the corrosive impact of the refusal by individuals to accept responsibility that is revealed in the phrase, "I'm not sticking my neck out."

It thus becomes essential to devise methods which will stimulate voluntary co-operative endeavors. John Bowlby ("Psychology and Democracy") offers the experience gained from psychological investigation of human motivation. There seem to be certain definite principles which if followed lead to voluntary

co-operation. It is important, first, that there be popular participation in selecting group aims. This is, of course, one of the reasons why democracy seems to provide a sound basis for organizing human society. To the extent that public policy reflects the desires of a majority of citizens it would seem to be in accord with the basic principle. Secondly, Bowlby suggests that there must be an emotional response or attachment to a popular leader. This is revealed on the simplest and most direct level in the response of soldiers to an admired platoon leader or commanding officer, or in the response of students to a teacher. In a democratic society definite limits are placed upon this principle by a kind of natural skepticism regarding leaders and by an awareness that it is not sufficient to provide a continued stimulus to co-operation. Its weakness is revealed by the confusion which followed the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Too many people had no real comprehension of the program which President Roosevelt symbolized, with the result that his death was followed by uncertainty and apathy among those people who had only an emotional response to a dynamic leader. Perhaps ideally a third principle would be followed in democratic states, namely, a devotion to long-term plans and programs. Since this requires an uncommon degree of foresight and understanding it is usually necessary to associate a leader with a program, so that he may symbolize it for the majority of participants. Nevertheless, a democratic society should always insist that the leader and the program be combined so that there may be less danger that the purely personal ambitions of the leader will take precedence over group-determined long-range policy.

Not only in politics but in almost every sort of group activity from factories to schools it has been found expedient to study those factors which reduce opposition to voluntary co-operation. In politics President Roosevelt's fireside chats gave to millions of people a real sense of participation and of being valued as individuals. These highly personal talks also served to create some feeling of nearness to authority, to government, to the President of the United States. The former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, James Farley, made a practice of sending to every precinct worker a letter stressing the importance to the party of that precinct worker's task. This personal touch, strengthened by the signature "Jim," served as a magic bond between the individual and what might previously have seemed a remote and impersonal organization. In the Tennessee Valley Authority it has been found extremely important to provide opportunity for individuals and groups to participate in the determination of goals, to develop a feeling of participation in something important and socially significant, and to gain an awareness that "government" is not mysterious and remote but a useful instrument existing right there in the Valley. Finally, there must be a constant demonstration in any sort of human organization, private business or government, that the policies and programs are furthering group interests and not just those of the leaders. The importance of this approach is revealed by our industrial relations experience in wartime. Labor unions and management attained a remarkable degree of

co-operation in pursuing goals desired by both groups as citizens. Where there was friction, non-co-operation, i.e., strikes, it was frequently the product of skepticism concerning management's devotion to broad popular interests. Normally it is extremely difficult to attain a desired degree of co-operation in an area where private interests tend to take precedence over public interests. Thus after the war a series of strikes developed and a simple appeal to "public interest" failed to carry the weight it had in wartime when, nominally at least, all private interests were subordinated to the nation's survival. For with the coming of peace there was a clear-cut separation between the interests of labor and management, notwithstanding frequent assertions to the contrary.

It is therefore possible to conclude that the findings of psychology and psychiatry bolster the conviction that the politician in a democratic society must constantly seek to eliminate those insecurities which produce anxieties and lead to aggression, while simultaneously stressing procedures and techniques designed to strengthen the propensity of men to co-operate. This demands the attainment of full employment of resources without war or the threat of war; equality of opportunity in every aspect of life without barriers of class, creed, or race; measures providing insurance for the individual against the hazards of illness, old age, and unemployment; and a sense of individual participation in formulating group programs, not alone in politics, but in social and economic life as well.

Psychoanalysis and the Study of Politics

T. Maling, British psychiatrist, indicates the specific contributions which psychoanalysis can make to the understanding of political events. By examining the emotional forces operating within a community he suggests that it should be possible to project some valid generalizations about the way in which men react to social conditions. If this premise be correct, it would obviously assist social scientists and practical politicians in formulating public policy. To what extent is social and political life governed by irrational emotional forces? What does produce outbursts of persecution and aggression? What conditions in a society produce anxiety and insecurity?

Psychoanalysis is *par excellence* the science concerned with individuals and therefore the concern of the sociologist and the

historian, but above all of the political scientist.

The use of psychoanalysis by the his-

From "Psycho-Analysis and the Study of Politics," By T. Maling, *The Sociological Review*, April, 1939.

torian and the sociologist might uncover many of the causes of our "Modern Discontents." It certainly would afford us an opportunity of assessing, for example, the importance of economic factors in determining the course of history, if only by contrast with the other factors involved. Moreover, it would probably assist the psychoanalysts themselves in their own work.

The material which needs interpretation is either immediately ready to hand, or can be collected with comparative ease. It is impossible here to enumerate all of it that needs examination or that could be examined. But some of the problems raised by the amassing of material by other workers can be mentioned and the lines along which it might be examined. Thus constitutional lawyers have spent themselves on explaining the intricacies of the constitution of the British Commonwealth of Nations and on the determination of where sovereignty lies. We know the means by which ministers are made responsible to Parliaments elected by the people, but hold office from the King. But we do not know what emotional needs are satisfied by elaborate fictions which, while depriving the titular head of the State of power, maintain many of the forms and ceremonies of an ancient monarchy, and while protecting the King from attack, permit his ministers to be abused as freely as the Press and the public desire. We do not know whether the preservation of this anachronism is vital for the preservation of free institutions, or whether in fact from an emotional point of view it will endanger it. This, it might be suggested, is because we do not know what emotional reactions are set up by these fictions in the lives of the individuals who make up the community. But there is already in existence a body of psychoanalytical theory which purports to explain very similar phenomena, namely, a person's emotional relation to his father

or to father-figures such as schoolmasters, employers, and the like. Strikingly enough, it shows how frequent is the individual's attempt to associate all the good paternal qualities with one object and all the bad paternal qualities with another. It therefore only seems reasonable to examine the phenomenon of constitutional monarchy or, for that matter, constitutions such as the French in the light of this theory.

Possibly the two most significant features of European history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the emergence of religious toleration within the nation state and the growing national consciousness which culminated in the patriotic uprisings against Napoleon. But was not this in fact an exchange of "intolerances" obscured only by the attack on the Napoleonic despotism and by the adoption of liberal slogans by the national heroes of the period? Therefore, is it not reasonable to inquire whether "intolerance" of those of a different religious creed and of those of a different nationality does not serve the same purpose in the emotional life on any body of persons? Again psychoanalytical theory purports to explain similar phenomena in the lives of individuals. It finds, for example, that there is a tendency for individuals to associate all aggressive and hate feelings with one object, possibly in this case the nation or the church, and all love feelings with another, possibly the hated foreigner or the heretic. This is, of course, as in other cases, an attempt to solve the difficulty of both loving and hating the same object at the same time by attaching all love feeling to one person, thing, or ideal, and all hate feelings to another person, thing, or ideal.

The significance of persecutions would afford an interesting field for study whether in modern Europe or in Marian or Elizabethan England. It would be interesting to compare the environments in which they tended to emerge. It might be

asked whether they did not occur when, for some reason or another, a sense of guilt due to the infringement of a strict but possibly outworn moral code was to be noticed, and whether this did not generate a violent desire to blot out the very guilt itself by some cruel or aggressive act. This same national guilt feeling may be awakened possibly by some real or imagined defeat or humiliation and lead to the same results. In both cases a victim of persecution may well serve the dual purpose of affording an outlet for aggressive and hate impulses, and be also a kind of sacrificial atonement.

It is, of course, impossible to attempt to do more than suggest broad lines of inquiry and it is very improbable indeed that any historical phenomenon can be accounted for in terms of one individual emotional situation. But it is possible that work of this kind might throw interesting light on the persecutions mentioned, on the destruction of the Albigensians, the ferocious cruelty of the Thirty Years' War, and on the judicial murders and "blood baths" generally associated with violent revolution. It is at any rate almost impossible to overemphasize the need for an understanding of these outbursts of passion and persecution which make men fearful of change or force them to extremes. Certainly no political science of the moment affords an adequate explanation.

Psychoanalytical studies might well help to explain many of the features of our modern world, such as the power of advertisers, particularly of patent medicine advertisers, spending as they do £3,000,000 annually on advertisements in the National Press alone. Is this due to a widespread fear of death, or to fear of constipation, sexual impotence, or repulsiveness? Probably to a fear of all of them. How far then, for example, one may well ask is the fear of constipation based on a genuine anxiety or how far does it spring

from a lingering memory of childish admonitions and instructions which were accompanied by moral pressure and which may at an early period of life have appeared severe and thus caused its memory to persist? Another feature which might well repay investigation is the multiplication of religious sects and their equally rapid decay once they have exhausted their pristine enthusiasm and modified their tenets to meet the demands of the "world." . . .

Perhaps some adventurers and some of the modern dictators have stumbled almost accidentally on a discovery of how to manipulate some of the forces we have discussed. Other persons, from Alexander to the Crusaders, have doubtless done the same. This, of course, raises the further problem on which psychoanalytical studies might throw some light, namely, the assessment of the importance of particular historical personalities. It might help to explain the actions and fortunes of some historical characters.

The aim of some of these inquiries could be tentatively defined as discovering how far normal, social, and political life is governed by *irrational emotional forces*. These may be due to the fact that a whole people is unaware that it is allowing itself to be dominated by impulses which, if it perceived them clearly, it would not approve, or to the fact that its judgment of ordinary events and of other peoples is warped by its psychological state. Thus it may be dominated by what it adjudges to be a high moral purpose which may in reality be merely an aggressive impulse, or it may be so obsessed with the idea of its own humiliation that it misinterprets almost every action on the part of any other peoples as an aggression against itself. These judgments of course lead on to action, so that what we want to know is how often does the community lose its temper, as we say, without justification, how often does it sulk and how often go

into a blind rage, or, more correctly, how often does each individual in the community do it in such a way that it lends color to the assertion that the community is doing it? Above all, we must discover what the underlying causes are which release these moods in individuals and in the community. It would be necessary to determine whether they are similar in different historical situations. Superficially it seems probable that these causes often are similar.

A technique for making these inquiries will of course have to be evolved, but this should not present insuperable difficulties. The broad principles of psychoanalytical discoveries can be grasped if attention is paid to the literature of the subject. It remains for the historian, the sociologist, or the psychoanalyst himself to examine the historical or sociological material he may have amassed in the light of these principles, and after he has drawn his conclusions to see whether parallel examples to the mass emotional disturbances which he will doubtless find in society can be discovered in the case histories of individual patients. If this is so, he will have grounds for interpreting the emotional forces at work in society along the lines employed to interpret those that have been found in individuals.

In this way a historian who is acquainted with the psychoanalytical literature about guilt will examine the Elizabethan persecutions in this light. Doubtless he will find a society pulsating with the excitement of shaking off the shackles of the medieval papacy and passionate to taste the intoxicating new learning, but nevertheless reluctant to abandon entirely the tenets of the old religion and the old morality, and trying to create a new allegiance and to impose it on all and sundry with the moral weight of the old loyalty. Here, in fact, he will find a struggle and a conflict. Uncertainty leads to anxiety, which leads to aggressive-

ness and to cruelty, to violent attacks against the representatives of the old and the new, to sacrifices first to one dictate of conscience and then to another. Might not a parallel to this state of mind in the community be found in the experiences and difficulties of adolescence or of the child when it is attempting to free itself from the morality and preconceptions it has taken over from its parents, and to adjust this morality and these preconceptions to its own discoveries in an ever-widening experience of the world? Would not the conflicts of the *Œdipus complex* throw light on this situation showing how ambivalent is the attitude of the individual toward what may be either a mother or father figure, the Church? Is it not possible that a close examination by a historian of these events might not clear up some of these points after he had made a preliminary survey? He could but attempt it. If some of his assumptions proved to be correct, he might look for analogous cases in the history of other persecutions, and then attempt to determine what released these conflicts in a given situation and how far a knowledge that they would be released might have modified their force.

It is probable that in this kind of inquiry into the emotional forces at work in the community, it may be possible to obtain a much clearer understanding of political events. In this way the study of "politics" will cease to be so formal, and it will be possible to use historical knowledge scientifically. The gap which we found between the study of political institutions and the study of political ethics may be bridged. Both these studies will remain necessary. For a discovery of the forces which determine the forms of political institutions will not enable us to dispense with accounts of political institutions, nor an understanding of their legal and constitutional significance. Nor will such discoveries enable us to evaluate

political institutions and political actions without consideration of the ends which they serve. To do this we must turn to "political ethics."

We should thus have a political science which would give us a greater understanding of our own society than we now possess. It should be possible to enunciate

general laws about the manner in which men and women behave in society and about the behavior of those societies themselves. This would of course immensely facilitate the practical aspects of social and political reconstruction. Studies, then, of the sort we have outlined open up a wide field for exploration.

Don't Blame It on Human Nature

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Living as we do in the midst of numerous conflicts and of vague forebodings that even more and greater conflicts lie ahead, we are apt to wonder if the situation has to be as it is. Why is it that the only thing we can be sure about in tomorrow's newspaper is that the front page will continue the story of old frictions on the domestic or international scene or headline some new conflicts on the horizon? Why must men get themselves so embroiled? Is there something in "human nature" that makes all this trouble inevitable?

In critical times like these the phrase "human nature" is batted about by columnists, politicians, commencement orators, and spokesmen for special interest-groups who either openly or implicitly have their own versions of what man's nature is. Some see the reason for all our turmoil in "the cussedness of human

nature." Others assume that "human nature" is aggressive and pugnacious, thereby making conflicts and wars inevitable. Some think that man is by nature selfish and competitive and that the best we can hope for is to establish some fair rules within which man's "competitive instincts" will be forced to operate. Others, more sentimentally inclined, argue that man is by nature kind and co-operative but has been perverted by what they call modern civilization.

Whatever the views expressed, the chances are that they are rationalizations for perpetuating the system of ideas, institutions, or social and economic conditions that their exponents subscribe to. Occasionally they are assumptions on the basis of which a good-will reformer is urging a social change.

And while being assailed by all these theories as to what human nature is, we

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are also likely to hear from the rostrum, the pulpit, or the radio a repetition of the thesis that the physical sciences have far outstripped the social sciences so that what we need today is a more vigorous study of "human nature" to catch up with our knowledge of nature itself.

What can a psychologist say to all this? Or, to put it more strongly, what should a psychologist say to all this in his joint role of psychologist and responsible citizen? The psychologist has a self-appointed duty to try somehow to clarify the discussion of human nature, because he knows that much of the talk is potentially dangerous. He knows that some proposals for action, some important policies, are based on false premises concerning this thing called "human nature" and are therefore bound to turn into cruel illusions, bringing further conflicts and misery in their wake. On the other hand, some proposals promise more lasting progress because they are based on assumptions that square with what the psychologist and the social scientist know to be factually true.

What, then, is this thing we call "human nature"? Let's take a look at it the way a psychologist would.

He would point out first of all that "human nature" is an abstraction, one of thousands of abstractions upon which men unfortunately operate. The psychologist would say that this abstraction, like all other abstractions, can be understood only in relation to a specific individual or individuals reacting in certain concrete situations.

Take yourself, for instance. Presumably you are a living example of "human nature." What constitutes this "you"?

If we stick to a naturalistic explanation and avoid any easy supranatural or mystical generalizations, we find that this "you" consists of a physical organism endowed with a host of wonderful mechanisms and devices for adjusting to a certain part of

your physical environment. We find, too, that you have certain basic desires and needs—among them, sexual desires and a need for food and protection from the elements. Beyond a few such basic needs most psychologists cannot yet go. They cannot subscribe to the existence of a whole host of instincts or a long list of needs which some men have conjured up as "explanations" for the varied directions human activities take.

In addition to the basic needs, you have a number of capacities—among them the ability to use words and concepts—which distinguish you as a human being from all other living organisms. Biologists seem agreed that man as an organism is an emergent species endowed with certain capacities which are qualitatively different from those of his nearest neighbors in the evolutionary scale and which make him unique. (So any analogies of human behavior to the behavior of other animals are highly suspect.) In addition to these capacities and physical characteristics common to you and other human beings, you yourself have certain dispositions, certain temperamental characteristics, certain skills that are mainly biologically determined and that make you, as an individual, a unique personality, unlike all other people on the face of the earth unless you happen to be an identical twin.

In addition to these biologically determined drives and characteristics, you have certain tastes, certain standards, certain attitudes, certain beliefs, certain values and identifications. These are the things that give the direction to your behavior. These are the things that spell out what you regard as purpose, what you would consider as your own self-interest. The all-important point to remember is that these tastes and standards, these attitudes, beliefs, identifications, and values are things you have learned or that have been formed for good psychological reasons in the course of your life. They are not innate

and inborn in the sense that your sex and temperament are inborn.

You will know without being an ethnologist that tastes, standards, and values vary from one culture to another. And if you have walked on the other side of the tracks, visited other parts of your city, mingled at all with people not in your own social class or your own customary group, you will also know that tastes, standards, and identifications vary a great deal even within a single culture.

If "human nature," then, means anything at all, it must include not only the innate biological characteristics that make you not only a human being but a unique human being, but it must also include the direction of your individual or your group effort as learned or formed through the identifications you have made in your particular process of becoming a member of society.

An important and necessary part of the psychologist's account of human motivation is found in the individual's identification with a specific group. For it is this that gives him his status, that builds in him his ego-satisfaction. Thus he strives to maintain or enhance his status; he strives to place himself as far up as he can in that social hierarchy whose values have become his.

If we could get firmly into our minds this distinction between those characteristics of man that are biologically determined and those directions of his activity that are learned according to the particular ideas of the particular social and economic groups with which he has lived, a great deal of the vagueness surrounding the phrase "human nature" would then certainly disappear.

Examine, for instance, the statement that "human nature can't be changed." Obviously, we cannot change the genetic characteristics of man (except perhaps experimentally). We cannot create people with three eyes; we cannot create a third

sex; we cannot so change people that none of them has an I. Q. of less than 180. But this has nothing whatever to do with the potentiality of changing the *direction* of man's efforts.

Whether a man is going to be "competitive" or "co-operative"; whether he is going to be a Catholic, a Protestant, a Mohammedan, or an atheist; whether he is going to be a Republican or a Democrat—such things are almost entirely determined by the particular set of conditions and values the man has learned. These identifications, these modes of behavior, even if diametrically opposed to each other, all serve the same basic psychological function for the individual. We do not need to drag in any instinct of gregariousness or any innate drive for status to account for man's activities. Group identifications emerge inevitably because man lives, not in complete isolation, but with other men.

"Human nature," then, is anything but static and unchangeable. It can and does change with conditions. In fact, it is always changing. And not only is there gradual change, but frequently there is the sudden emergence of new qualities and characteristics formed when a single individual or group of individuals find themselves in a new set of conditions. Technological developments, for example, such as the steam engine, the airplane, the harnessing of atomic energy, at first provide some means to a specific end. Generally, however, they soon begin to affect and modify the ends themselves.

Take, for example, the following case of a complete "reversal" of "human nature" effected by a war-created situation in a normal American boy who was not "cruel" or "pugnacious" by disposition. The case was reported to me by one of my Princeton students who knew the captain he describes:

"The captain was a Southerner in his mid-twenties. He had been a rifle company

commander on the Western Front. He was very well liked by both his fellow-patients and the hospital personnel. His outstanding personality traits were modesty and the friendliness and kindliness of his disposition. As a boy he had been fond of duck-hunting but had given up the sport because as he said, 'I didn't see much fun in killing.' Once, during a discussion of war experiences, he told the following story:

He had commanded a company during the disastrous Battle of the Bulge, when the German Army had broken through the American lines in the Ardennes Forest. The captain found himself cut off from the rest of our forces and surrounded by the enemy. His situation was desperate. He had only about forty men left, no food, little ammunition and no idea where the American lines were. In addition to these difficulties, his company had a large number of German prisoners on hand. There was no way to get rid of the prisoners by sending them to a camp in the rear area. Guarding them with his depleted forces was out of the question.

Therefore, he determined to kill the prisoners. He and the sergeant took them out in the woods in small groups and shot them. Among the captain's group was a young boy, only about 15 or 16 years old. The captain concluded his story with this remark: 'He was crying and begged me to save him and I was kind of sorry I had to kill him.'

Hundreds of illustrations of this type could be given, with respect not only to individuals but to the changed directions of group activities such as occur in revolutionary situations. People are not gangsters or law-abiding citizens, Fascists or Communists, agnostics or believers, good or bad, because of innate dispositions. People's actions do not take the directions they do because people are blessed or cursed with a certain kind of "human nature." People's actions take the directions they do because a certain set of conditions has provided status, meaning and satisfaction, or, in critical times, because status, mean-

ing, and satisfaction must be sought in new ways.

Hence conflicts between one individual and another, between one group and another, are inevitable so long as conflicting identifications and conflicting purposes, springing from social conditions, continue to persist.

These conflicts will never be resolved by compromises or attempts to "change human nature" on any individualistic basis. They will be solved finally only when social, economic, and political relationships are so arranged that an individual, while retaining his own purposes, his own status, and his own ego-strivings, can identify these with the larger, all-inclusive goals of the whole society. Personal goals must become socially valuable goals and social goals must become personally valuable.

It should be stressed that this idea of a common purpose does not mean a leveling off of taste, interest, or performance with respect to the inherent and unique capacities and temperamental characteristics of the individual. For these differences in abilities and temperament will determine the specific role an individual can fruitfully play within his group and within the larger interests of society.

Someone is sure to ask the psychologist why, if he thinks he knows so much about human nature, can't he do something about it? Why must we endure unending conflict? Why can't the social psychologist tell people—especially those in power—what should be done?

Unfortunately, the psychologist knows that many people have so identified themselves with their own group standards that they would, literally, rather die than give up their identifications. Hence, we have conflicts between those human beings who identify themselves with capital and those who identify themselves with labor; between those who have become identified as Arabs and those who have become iden-

tified as Jews; between those who call themselves Moslems and those who call themselves Hindus.

In his recent address at Princeton's bi-centennial, President Truman said that "As we gain increasing understanding of men, comparable to our increasing understanding of matter, we shall develop, with God's grace, the ability of nations to work together and live together in lasting peace." But the psychologist must point out that since an individual is largely what he has identified himself with, and since his identifications define his purposes, no amount of purely intellectual understanding is enough to bring about any change in the direction of his activities. The sort of understanding that changes purpose is one that a person somehow gets below the neck.

In casually patterned societies such as ours is today, the psychologist and the social scientist are apt to be laughed off by the "man of affairs" as impractical and starry-eyed dreamers. We need not argue the claim that the physical scientists are ahead of the social scientists. It is difficult to know what measuring rod one should use. It might, however, be pointed out that the problems of man and his relationships are probably even more complex than the problems of nuclear physics and not so amenable to controlled experimentation.

But the main point is that we already know a great deal more about man and his social relationships than most people in

our casually patterned society are willing to use. And we also know why people aren't willing to pay attention to scientists who deal with people. Apparently we have to wait until people learn the hard way that real democracy and real world peace can come about only when human beings recognize their common purposes as human beings. Further, they must see that the dignity and uniqueness of every individual (pathological cases aside) can be preserved and enhanced without in any way running head-on into the common purposes of all men.

We can say, then, that there is nothing fixed, or static, or immutable about human nature. We can say that there is no one single accurate characterization of it. We can say that it is fluid, constantly changing, that occasionally, under a new set of conditions, it exhibits new and heretofore undreamed-of possibilities. When conditions are changed, human nature is changed.

Human nature as it characterizes any group at any given time is what it is because of the conditions under which the individuals in that group have matured. And the only way to bring about the human nature we want is to plan scientifically the kind of social and economic environment offering the best conditions for the development of human nature in the direction we would specify—a direction that spells freedom from group conflict and freedom for personal development.

Psychology and Democracy

John Bowlby, who is a practicing psychiatrist associated with the London Tavistock Clinic, in this article brings to the support of democratic procedures evidence from psychoanalysis and psychology. Pointing out that almost any form of co-operation demands some sacrifice of individual interest, he suggests here that democracy provides compensations which minimize acute frustration. A procedure for attaining maximum voluntary co-operation is outlined. Dr. Bowlby places emphasis upon the necessity for maintaining a maximum amount of individual freedom within the limits set by group goals. The great merit of democracy is that it encourages individual participation in selecting goals, provides an opportunity for personal contact with leaders, and offers a means for constructive criticism of procedures and leadership.

Hitherto liberty and democracy have been advocated on moral grounds. Freedom has been proclaimed one of the natural rights of man; the sovereignty of the people, like the divine right of kings, is a concept which appeals to ethics for its justification. It is true that since 1918 there has been a notion abroad that democracy is associated with peacefulness, but this has never been systematically explored. It is the purpose of this paper to consider the concepts of liberty and democracy from the psychological point of view, and to inquire what function they have in society and how they operate.

The hypothesis which is advanced is that the principles of liberty and democracy, stumbled upon in the course of centuries of social evolution, are amongst other things designed to regulate social relationships in such a way that co-operation within the community practising them is actively encouraged and this is attained without persecution of minorities or aggression against outside groups. It will further be maintained, though it is obviously impossible to prove by any

method short of a major research, that a co-operative, peaceful, and nonpersecutory society demands that personal and social relations within it be based on the principles of freedom and democracy. Since the valuation of a society of this kind is clearly a moral judgment, if it can be demonstrated that liberty and democracy are necessary for its existence, they cease to be merely desirable in themselves but are seen to be social and psychological techniques having as their purpose the creation of a society with certain particular valued attributes.

Although there is perhaps nothing new in these hypotheses, there are many good reasons for studying them further. First, recent developments in the psychology of personality strongly support them, and, secondly, if they are true, it is imperative that we study the social and psychological principles concerned in order that we may understand them better; for greater understanding will almost certainly lead to greater efficiency in their application. Meanwhile the necessity of humanity learning how to live together peacefully

and co-operatively has never been greater.

Before considering the role played by freedom and democracy, it is necessary to examine the psychological problem of ensuring persistent co-operative behavior. The type of society which we demand, internally co-operative and externally peaceful, is historically rare. It is evident, therefore, that it requires a balance of psychological and social forces not easily attained. The reason for this is that it is extremely difficult for the human organism to be co-operative all the time. Almost all communities permit of certain outlets for feelings of hostility, and it could probably be established statistically that there is a positive correlation between high degrees of co-operation within a community and legitimized social persecution or war. The Nazi regime in Germany and the militaristic in Japan are good examples of this relationship in modern times. The degree of internal co-operation within these regimes has been striking and so has their socialized hostility to other groups, either internal or external. Conversely the only peaceful groups known to anthropologists are a few primitive peoples who live in isolated family parties. Our problem thus becomes one of determining how a high degree of co-operativeness can be fostered without the community having to legitimize persecution and war.

Psychoanalysis has cast a very great deal of light upon the development and interrelation of co-operative and antagonistic attitudes in the individual. It seems probable that this knowledge is relevant for the understanding of similar problems in society. Let us begin, therefore, by studying some of the psychological characteristics of co-operative behavior. A particularly important feature is that co-operation almost invariably demands of the individual some degree of denial or frustration. This is brought home to anyone teaching two small children to play ball together. Co-operation requires that

each should forego the pleasures of monopolizing the ball for the ultimately greater pleasure of a game of catch. Each child's renunciation is difficult and will only occur willingly in special circumstances. Commonly it is made at the instance of a grown-up who is loved and trusted. Both children take it on trust from him that they will enjoy the game he is proposing and only renounce their private pleasures on this understanding. The important point is that these private aims are not renounced by any conscious effort of will on the part of the child; in fact, the very word "renounce" is quite inappropriate. The concepts of free will or moral effort are equally misleading. What happens is that a new emotional force is evoked in the child—the expectations of greater pleasure raised by a trusted grown-up—and this, if all goes well, becomes the dominant force in determining the child's behavior. Naturally, some degree of co-operation is discovered spontaneously by children, but as every nursery-school mistress knows, this is not of a very high order and all the more complex forms of willing co-operation follow the pattern outlined.

This willing co-operation is to be very sharply distinguished from the co-operation which is obtained by the use of threats. In the case of willing co-operation private wishes and aims are displayed by the wish to participate in a co-operative activity, vouched for as being worth while by a trusted adult or perceived as leading to greater degrees of satisfaction. The private wishes are not satisfied, it is true, but their denial does not lead to a sense of frustration and hostility because the goal with which they were incompatible has been accepted as more valuable. In the case of forced co-operation, however, the child's private wishes and aims are interfered with by an external and alien agency. They are not, therefore, relinquished and their denial leads to feelings

of frustration and of hostility toward both the interfering person and the co-operative activity demanded. Co-operative behavior of a free and willing kind is, therefore, a natural function of personality, but occurs only in certain conditions. Failing these the individual either reverts to those private aims which usually have a more immediate appeal, because their satisfaction is simple and more quickly attained, or else co-operates in a grudging way, harboring resentment and hostilities in his heart toward those with whom he is unwillingly co-operating.

The principal conditions for willing co-operation are thus that there should be a common aim, apprehended to some degree at least as being of value both to the self and to others who are loved, and that the individual or individuals who present this common aim and the plan for achieving it should do so in such a way that they are respected and trusted. This raises the question of the leader and the policy which he advocates. Normally, both require to be libidinized, that is, emotionally valued, if co-operative behavior is to result. Nevertheless, it is possible for a high degree of co-operation to be attained on the basis of the libidinization of a leader alone. There are many soldiers who have only a very dim idea for what they are fighting, who, none the less, play their part because of libidinal ties to their officers and comrades, supported in some measure by fear of punishment; indeed, it is on this basis that all regular armies are founded. This libidinization of leaders rather than policies has been characteristic of Nazi Germany. One reason for the libidinization of a leader and not of a policy is that it is both emotionally and intellectually much easier. In the first place, a plan may be very difficult to apprehend. Further, as will be described later, the capacity to libidinize originates in infancy in the child's feelings for his mother; persons are, therefore, the earliest

objects of libidinization. Easy though it be, the libidinization of leaders alone is, as we know, never socially satisfactory. For instance, a leader may die. Alternatively, if he finds he is followed irrespective of his aim, he will be tempted to forsake the group goal and seek one beneficial only to himself. Such a social situation is, of course, unstable. Once those following the leader realize that group goals have been forsaken, powerful forces of disruption are released. Whilst it is thus possible to obtain co-operative behavior on the basis of the libidinization of a leader, this is extremely liable to lead to a state of disequilibrium.

Libidinization of group aims without libidinization of the leader of the enterprise is less unsatisfactory but more difficult. It requires an effort both of the imagination and of the intellect so to value a long term aim that it is given precedence over more immediate interests. It is very difficult, for instance, for the small employer so to give priority over his immediate aims to the goal of full employment that he accepts the various controls necessary neither with irritation nor merely resignedly but with some degree of satisfaction. Indeed, it is a little difficult in 1945 even to imagine this happy state of affairs because normally it is only reached when the fruits of co-operation have been tasted, as has happened, for instance, in the case of food rationing which, in a state of food shortage, gives positive satisfaction to the modern housewife. Until this stage is reached it is normally only a minority who can really appreciate the value of the long-term plan. The majority, if they accept it at all, take it to a greater or less degree on trust from leaders who are respected and valued, in the same way that children will accept from a trusted adult that a game of catch is more fun than playing on one's own.

Normally, therefore, in a co-operative enterprise willingly undertaken those

private aims of the individual which would be inimical to it are outweighed and obliterated by the libidinization both of the group aim and of the leader who represents it. Moreover, the co-operating group itself comes to be emotionally valued. Although awareness of personal advantage enters into these libidinizations, it is noteworthy that very strong altruistic sentiments are also enlisted. The group is thought of as though it were an individual, and feelings of personal affection evoked. It is not for nothing that we talk about the honor of the regiment or that states are represented by such symbols as Britannia and Uncle Sam. Powerful emotional forces, partly selfish, no doubt, but partly altruistic also, are engaged in an enterprise in which all members of the group are co-operating willingly.

Since the capacity to libidinize the long-term ends, social leaders, and the group itself is clearly critical for all co-operative effort, it is essential we should know something of its nature and origin. The study of individuals who lack the capacity is particularly illuminating, since it throws into sharp relief some of the principal factors concerned. A recent investigation of children who were persistently delinquent, which is itself a state of non-co-operation and rebelliousness, revealed that more than half lacked completely the capacity to libidinize either people or group goals. They were characterized by indifference to their parents, brothers and sisters, and incapacity to make friends or to respond to other people such as schoolmistresses. The normal child is much influenced by being held in good esteem by the people he values, and responds in typical ways to encouragement or reprimand. These delinquent children showed no such reactions. They were described as wooden and hard-boiled, making no true friends, and going their own way irrespective of others. On investigating these children's histories one

constant feature appeared: almost without exception they had been separated for long periods from their mothers and been placed with total strangers when they were between six months and five years of age. The origin of these separations were various, but whatever the cause the result for the child was much the same—he lost his mother. That this separation was the cause of their affectionless characters was made the more probable both by internal evidence and by the finding that practically all the children who had suffered this experience had developed this type of character. This research merely confirmed and elaborated what had for long been known, namely, that the child's first libidinal relationship is to his mother, and that if this is interfered with, libidinal relations to others in later life are impaired. In the delinquent cases under review the development of libidinal relations with their mothers was interrupted abruptly by separation and this resulted in an inhibition of all further libidinal relationships.

Such gross impairments are, of course, rare compared with minor impairments. Feelings of love and valuation for the adults tending him (normally the physiological mother and father) develop spontaneously in the infant from about six months of age onwards, but their degree will vary with the proximity and attitude of the parents. Broadly speaking, one is only fond of people with whom one is, or has been, in close daily contact. "What the eye doth not see, the heart doth not long for." Parents who are not often seen by the child are not loved in the way that those who deal with him daily are. As regards their attitudes, the more they value the child and are in consequence spontaneously kind or encouraging, the stronger will be the feelings of love and admiration evoked in the child. Equally, the more sympathy and tolerance the parents show for the child's private interests and aims, the less will these positive

feelings be mixed with feelings of resentment and hostility. A reduced capacity for libidinization probably always results either from lack of affection on the parents' part or from their intolerance and lack of sympathy for the child's private concerns, leading in the child to a sense of frustration and hostility. In this connection the violence of children's feelings of hostility and the extreme frequency of unconscious hostile impulses in adults should be remembered.

Now it is on the basis of this simple family pattern that all later personal relationships rest. Individuals without a capacity to libidinize others are incapable of co-operation and frequently become habitual criminals. Those with a reduced capacity, whilst perhaps not fully criminal, will never really libidinize common aims or community leaders and will, therefore, never abandon those of their private ends which are inimical to the common goal. They remain fundamentally asocial and individualistic, incapable of willing co-operation. Even those with a generous capacity for libidinization will only come to value co-operative aims to the point where they are prepared to forgo those of their private interests with which they are incompatible provided such aims are not only felt to be in their real interests, but are presented in an attractive way by leaders who are sufficiently known to them to be trusted. Whilst an individual's basic capacity for libidinization, and, therefore, co-operation, depends greatly on childhood factors, the extent to which it is mobilized in his adult life will vary with the structure of the social field in which he finds himself as an adult. By and large the same factors which promote libidinization and co-operation in childhood, proximity of authorities, a sense of being valued, tolerance for private interests and so on, are those which also evoke co-operative attitudes in grown-ups. Unless such attitudes are evoked, the denial

of the immediate private interests of thousands of individuals which will be necessary if policies, so much and so generally desired even as full employment and world peace, are to be implemented will provoke crippling antagonism. Tolerance of such private frustration will only be made possible provided those sponsoring the necessary controls are trusted and valued to a high degree. Anyone who has had the experience of working in a highly organized and, therefore, controlled institution will recognize the sense of private frustration engendered and the great difficulty experienced in realizing that the complicated regulations encountered are designed to further sensible and agreed ends. This sense of frustration imposes a very severe strain, which can only be minimized and loyalty to the co-operative aim maintained provided both the common aim and the leaders responsible for the policy can be kept constantly in mind and libiditized. The human organism being what it is, this state of mind can only obtain in certain conditions. First, the leader must make himself personally known to those working for him; secondly, he must make them feel he values them; thirdly, he must place the aims of his policy before them so clearly that they are seen to be desirable; and finally, he must convince them either that the regulations necessary to achieve it are logically inevitable, a process of reasoning they may not be able to follow, or else that he is an honest man who would only introduce such regulations as were necessary.

These requirements are in essence the same as are those of the father teaching children to play catch. Unless the father is libiditized and the purpose of the rules he makes are at least dimly apprehended the children will not co-operate willingly. If these conditions are not fulfilled the motivation to co-operate is lost. In the case of the children, unless forced to play together, they will revert to private play;

in the case of the institution, where economic sanctions often force some degree of co-operation, work is carried out without interest and, therefore, perfunctorily and the workers suffer from a degree of frustration and purposelessness which manifests itself either in antagonism to the leaders or else in apathy, a state of affairs described as "bad morale."

The contention of this essay has been that willing co-operation is only evoked in certain particular "field conditions," to use the terminology of Kurt Lewin based on the analogy of the magnetic field. It is now time to return to the social principles of freedom and democracy to see in what ways they promote or militate against these conditions. There are certain freedoms, such as freedom of speech and publication, of political association and academic inquiry, which are essentials of democracy and can be considered with it. Apart from the promotion of democracy, probably its most important function, the purpose of the principle of freedom appears to be to ensure that the private ends of the individual are not forgotten in the enthusiasm for group goals, that every control necessary for ensuring the achievement of a group goal is scrutinized to ensure that it is not only necessary, but does not so conflict with the private ends of the majority as to call in question the desirability even of pursuing the group goal, or at least of pursuing it by that route.

In the present alignment of parties, the Tory party has come to represent private goals and the Labour party group goals. In their contempt for the Tory championship of the private concerns of a minority and their enthusiasm for achieving long sought social aims it is clearly important that the Labour party should not overlook the private concerns of the masses, their predilections in sport or entertainments, their desire to have a home and garden of their own in which they can do what they like and which they do not frequently

have to move, their preference in seaside resorts or Sunday newspapers. The principle must clearly be maintained of permitting as great a degree of freedom in all these fields as is consistent with the achievement of the group goals chosen by the majority. Unless this principle is steadfastly applied, not only will the lives of the individuals so affected be the poorer, but the sense of frustration and hostility engendered will imperil willing co-operation.

In this country, however, there is probably small danger of the individual's freedom to indulge his private aims being interfered with unduly by Socialism. The tradition of political and social freedom is a good and strong one. Much the greater danger is a failure to ensure an understanding and acceptance of the need for the inevitable controls required for the attainment of group goals such as, for instance, full employment, a maximizing of production by reorganization and increase of machinery, or a maximizing of personal efficiency through longer and more arduous education and other social measures. None of these co-operative ends can be achieved without very great sacrifice of private goals, all of which have the attraction of being immediately and simply achieved and, moreover, have the sanction of tradition behind them. Interference with these private ends can only lead to profound hostility on the part of all, with resultant lack of co-operation and sabotage, if it is not accepted, and accepted willingly, by those suffering it as inevitable if other and more-wished-for goals are to be achieved. It is in the induction of this frame of mind that democracy plays its supremely important part.

The term "democracy" covers a variety of social behavior. It may mean little more than permitting a relatively small proportion of a population to vote on relatively unimportant issues. Here, how-

ever, it will be interpreted in its widest sense to include any social process in which all or most of a social group are invited to participate in determining social goals and the men and the means to be used for achieving them. Under this interpretation, elections by ballot are seen to be only limited, albeit important, types of democratic process. Any conference in which an employer consults his work-people or a trade union official his members is essentially democratic. The same may be said of any other social process in which the socially dominant individuals invite the help and initiative of the less dominant.

All democratic processes of this kind have three principal psychological effects on those consulted, all making for greater libidization of the plan, its promoter, and the group as a whole (apart altogether from any effects which may come from the greater egalitarianism which commonly accompanies democracy). In the first place, the invitation to participate at once evokes a feeling in those consulted of being wanted. Secondly, it affords an opportunity for those consulted for close personal acquaintanceship with the plan and its promoter, and consequently of understanding the merits and defects of each. Thirdly, it affords an opportunity for criticizing both plan and promoter and, if necessary, of modification or even rejection. By these means the private interests of those consulted are taken into account and, if the plan is accepted, those inimical to it voluntarily abandoned. In this way the democratic process provides, and is probably alone in providing, the social field in which libidization of a common plan and of its sponsor can develop spontaneously, with the resultant mood of willing co-operation and an absence of feelings of resentment caused by the frustration of still valued private ends. Furthermore, by bringing the social leaders into close contact with

those whose co-operation is invited, an opportunity is afforded for counter-libidization, which will influence the leader to value and respect the wishes of his followers. This counter-libidization is, of course, of the greatest importance. It corrects to some degree the inevitable tendency for those in authority to exploit and frustrate those dependent on them. The absentee, whether he be manager, landlord, or staff-officer, is far more apt to exploit and frustrate those working under him than is one in daily contact with them.

It may perhaps be objected that in the foregoing analysis the processes of group co-operation towards a goal and democracy itself have been conceived too exclusively in terms of leaders and led. It might be maintained that goals and the plans to achieve them should spring from the people. This is probably a sentimental and unrealistic view of democracy. James Burnham has emphasized that the complicated techniques required for achieving the material group ends of modern civilization can never be mastered by more than a few, any more than modern armies can be effectively commanded by more than the few who have the brains and the knowledge of the strategic, tactical, and logistic techniques required. Further, it is only those with technical knowledge who know what is possible. The formulation of group goals and the means for achieving them must, therefore, in Burnham's terminology, be largely confined to the "managers." Nevertheless, this does not mean that the "managers" need necessarily become an all-powerful and selfish technocracy. It is just as possible, though perhaps not so easy, for them to encourage the participation of the non-technical workers in settling not only working conditions, but also to some extent the detailed application of technical advances and even the nature of the group goals. In fact, if they utilize the social sciences

as well as the physical they will realize that the exploitation of their position can lead to nothing but group disruption or powerful social hostility of uncertain direction, which can in the long run lead only to their own immolation.

However, it would clearly be mistaken to leave it to the "managers" to decide whether they cared to pursue the wise course of democratic procedure or not. There will always be a danger of groups in key positions pursuing their own ends and not those of the group: "power corrupts." For this reason the people constituting the social group must forever retain to themselves the right, so dearly won, of deciding who their leaders shall be. The exercise of this right, moreover, is not only a safeguard against exploitation but a necessary condition of the individual's developing a status of personal responsibility, without which there is little hope of his achieving any degree of public concern. Provided the technicians and managers play fair and recognize themselves to be as much the servants of the public as is the Prime Minister, they need have no fear that their skill will go unused.

Once appointed, one of the principle tasks facing the manager is to know the social techniques appropriate for dealing with different aspects of his task. The Tennessee Valley Authority, which perhaps more than any other public corporation has given thought to these problems, supplies useful illustrations. In respect of certain of the tasks a centralized plan of great dimensions was essential. Dams had to be created on the river which would permit the achievement of the threefold aim of providing power, controlling floods, and permitting of a navigable waterway. Their siting, design, and construction were clearly matters requiring the greatest technical skill and direction. In such matters the Authority itself had perforce to take the initiative and in doing so, even using as democratic a method as possible,

it aroused a very great degree of antagonism. With great wisdom, however, the Authority refrained from taking the initiative in other desirable, though less vital, directions. Whilst methods of soil conservation and improvement were encouraged, they were not enforced. On one occasion, even, the Authority refused to take the initiative in setting up port facilities at a certain place, though they were badly needed by the whole region, because the township was apathetic and showed no signs of participating. The decision indefinitely to defer building the terminal met with plenty of indignation, but also had the desired effect of stimulating local initiative. By adopting the methods which Lilienthal has described as "grassroots democracy," TVA not only avoided creating an excess of antagonism, but gradually evoked in the people of the valley a remarkable degree of willing co-operation and in so doing released undreamed-of reserves of social energy.

The reversal of these benefits of democracy may seem emphasizing the obvious. Yet the appreciation of the magnitude of the psychological forces which can either be tapped in this way for co-operative effort, or, failing it, turned into disintegrative channels is by no means universal. Were it so and were the appropriate steps taken, very many problems of morale and social dislocation would never arise. There is no mystery about the origin of Field Marshal Montgomery's effect on his troops. In the first place he was a man capable of producing a first-rate plan, and, in the second, he devised a very considerable organization to enable his troops to libidinize both the plan and himself, and in consequence the whole group to which they belonged. He created special units to carry the news of his intentions to the troops under his command. Before every battle, stretching considerations of security to the limit, he insisted that every soldier should know what was intended

and what his own particular role was to be. His efforts to ensure that the troops knew him and could libidinize him are well known. The result of this calculated programme was the tremendous morale of the Eighth Army. It is perhaps worth comparing these methods with the traditional methods of the British Civil Service or with our colonial administration. Until very recently the participation of the public in their plans has been little sought. Whilst dictatorship at least exploits the libidinization of individuals and even makes the masses feel they are wanted, bureaucracy uses none of the procedures for permitting the public to libidinize its ends and consequently enlists none of the psychological forces making for group co-operation. A principal reason for this is, of course, that the truly democratic process requires time and patience and effort and therefore money and, unless the value of such expenditure is clearly apprehended, it is not embarked upon. (There is perhaps a lesson here for the Treasury.) It is all too easy for the planner to become so preoccupied with his goal and the physical forces required for achieving it that he forgets to plan for the mobilization of the psychological forces also required.

One reason for so much bad administration is that administrators are not trained—they are expected to grow of their own accord on a diet composed largely of the classics. If public administration is to be properly conducted, administrators must receive a vocational as well as a general education. We do not dream of permitting doctors to practice medicine without their having had a long training in the relevant biological sciences. Similarly the engineer, the architect, and the sanitary inspector are required to have appropriate scientific trainings. Yet the public administrator, who should amongst other things be an expert in applied social psychology and applied economics, is

required to study neither. Clearly it is necessary to insist that administrators, in addition to the wide general education which is essential to all the professions, should have not less than two years of vocational training in the theory and practice of the social sciences.

It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the social sciences have it within them now to be truly scientific. For instance, we now have methods for testing experimentally all the hypotheses advanced in this essay. It is no longer necessary for political science to remain at the stage of unproved generalization. Interesting studies have been made in the British Army during the war into, for instance, the interpersonal relations within a platoon and methods of rehabilitating returned prisoners of war and soldiers suffering from psychiatric breakdown. In America exact research has been undertaken both in industrial communities and in boys' clubs. Since it is immediately germane to our problem, the study which Lewin's pupils, Lippitt and White, carried out on the behavior of eleven-year-olds in clubs organized along different lines—autocratic, democratic, and *laissez-faire*—may be quoted. The emotional climate was created in each instance by the leader who established the informal rules of the club. In the democratic group, the leader was an active and regular member of the boys' club, but all questions of policy were decided by the children themselves; in the autocratic group, the members were told what to do, how to do it, and with whom to work—all in a friendly way and without any active suppression of the individual, in the manner of a benevolent teacher who believes in strict discipline; in the *laissez-faire* club, the leader removed himself from the group as much as possible, remaining available for the giving of needed information if asked, but offering no encouragement to co-operative decisions. The children were apportioned

to the clubs to ensure a similar population in each. As might be expected, there were great differences in the behavior of the three groups. The autocratic group showed vastly more hostility within itself than either of the other groups, and on two occasions made scapegoats of its members and drove them out. In the democratic group co-operation between members developed spontaneously and was stable; in the autocratic group it neither developed spontaneously nor was stable when encouraged. There was a marked feeling of "We'ness" in the democratic group, whereas a feeling of "I'ness" predominated in the autocratic. The democratic group was more matter-of-fact and less concerned with personal feelings when criticism was offered. The group-products, theatrical masks as it happens, were better made and more highly valued by the democrats. Whereas the work deteriorated rapidly in the autocratic group when the leader left the room, it remained at a good level in the democratic. In most respects the *laissez-faire* group lay between the other two.

All these differences were carefully recorded by appropriate techniques and go far to confirm the hypotheses discussed in this paper. The need for further such experiments is obviously very great. It would, for instance, be possible to study and compare the output and the morale of factories organized according to different social techniques. Using methods such as the sociometric, indirect opinion surveys, or sample interviewing, the balance of the forces of co-operation and antagonism could be measured and compared within communities organized in different ways. By these means social psychology can progress from its present state of more or less plausible hypotheses to being a truly experimental science with all the certainty and vast power this always brings.

It is because the goals which socialists desire require for their achievement a very

high degree of co-operative effort that it is imperative that the psychodynamics of co-operative behavior should be most carefully studied. Social techniques for ensuring co-operation are fully as important and as difficult to develop as are the physical and biological techniques necessary for the great social projects envisaged. In the first place, education could be designed not merely to inculcate knowledge or even good intellectual habits but to provide a social field in which co-operative and peaceful human beings are encouraged to grow. As Lippitt and White demonstrate, co-operative and peaceful human beings do not grow in schools run on autocratic principles. Again, appropriate social techniques should be capable of enormously increasing incentive to work by enlisting not only the selfish motives which private capitalism has relied upon but also those powerful libidinal forces which bind men to each other and on occasion even make them lay down their lives for each other. The mobilization of these forces will not come about through the expression of pious hopes and exhortations or through warnings of calamity should we fail. Like the harnessing of the forces locked in the atom, intensive and prolonged scientific research will be necessary. We require to understand in far greater detail the psychological forces working for co-operation and those working against it, and of the field factors which favor the evocation of the one and the inhibition of the other.

That great forces for good and for evil exist in the hearts of men has been recognized for thousands of years. For the past two thousand we have relied on Christianity to promote co-operative attitudes of mind and on the fear of punishment to restrain antagonism. Whilst it would clearly be foolish to minimize their beneficial effects, it is evident that they have failed as yet to achieve what is required. Furthermore, we must note that, in

regard to individuals, both Church and Bench are turning more and more to the help of science. It is now widely recognized that there are certain types of miscreants who are deaf to moral exhortation and undeterred by the threat of punishment. When we reflect that of the men and women sent to prison in 1930 not only had half been there before but nearly one-quarter were going for at least their sixth time, we are impressed by the remarkable inefficiency of our present systems of curing the antisocial individual. We are, therefore, entitled to doubt whether moral exhortation and punishment will either ensure that a peaceful society remains so or will promote peaceful co-operation within a turbulent and warlike state.

In attempting the cure of a persistent delinquent the psychoanalyst uses neither moral exhortation nor punishment. Instead he tries to understand the nature and interrelation of the psychic forces composing the personality and to create a social situation between himself and the patient to effect a gradual change in the balance of these forces. He attempts to alter the balance within the personality by altering the nature of the interpersonal field in which the personality is operating. To achieve this, a high degree of goodwill on his part is clearly necessary, but goodwill by itself is not enough. A scientific appreciation of the forces involved and a

technique based on this appreciation are both essentials also.

There can be little doubt that it would profit us to adopt the same attitude toward the problems of society and also—what the psychoanalyst has done too little in the past—the experimental method. As already stated, all the hypotheses advanced in this paper are capable of being tested experimentally so that political science or social psychology, whichever we care to call it, need no longer remain relatively ineffectual in the practical world, but can become as powerful a force for the furtherance of our ends as any other of the experimental and applied sciences. The return to power of a Labour Government pledged to promote a high degree of internal and external co-operation would be an excellent reason for fostering further research along these lines. Such considerations attain even more urgent significance with the advent of the atomic bomb. All our previous experience points inescapably to the conclusion that neither moral exhortation nor fear of punishment will succeed in controlling the use of this weapon. Persons bent on suicide and nations bent on war, even suicidal war, are deterred by neither. The hope for the future lies in a far more profound understanding of the nature of the emotional forces involved and the development of scientific social techniques for modifying them.

Co-operation and Conflict

E. F. M. Durbin was a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the London School of Economics. During World War II he served in the economic section of the War Cabinet Secretariat and later as personal assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister. In 1945 he was elected to Parliament as the Labour Party representative from Edmonton. His book *The Politics of Democratic Socialism* from which this selection is taken is considered one of the most brilliant and original English studies of the subject. His interest in exploring psychology's contribution to an understanding of human society is further revealed in *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, which he wrote in collaboration with Dr. John Bowlby. On September 3, 1948, he lost his life while saving his daughter from drowning.

The greatest single achievement of science in the twentieth century consists, or so it appears to me, in the light that has been thrown upon the formation of personal character. As a result of the observations and reflections of the analytical psychologists, we are now in a position to understand in a way that was quite impossible before this work had been done the nature of the causes that determine the behavior of individual human beings.

But I am faced by an immediate practical problem. I think it obvious that psychological and anthropological studies contribute enormously to our understanding of every important social institution: the family, property, law, the distribution of authority and power in society, loyalty to the State, religion, co-operation, political conflict, and war. Indeed, I would go further and affirm that it is impossible to understand these things as fully as we might without some knowledge of the light thrown upon them by the most recent addition to the armory of the humane sciences. Those who still think that it is possible to study society without the

aid of individual psychology stand in the intellectual position of the doctors who refused to modify their views of human physiology and pathology for a generation after the discovery of the circulation of the blood or the existence of microscopic parasites. Intellectual conservatism is one of the most obstinate of vested interests.

I propose to consider the light thrown by psychological evidence upon *the causes of co-operation and conflict between individuals and groups in human society*. I have selected this particular problem for two reasons:

In the first place it is a central problem. All other questions of policy and history are subordinate to it. No society can continue to exist unless peaceful co-operation can be maintained within it. War is the negation of both community and society, at least between the groups taking part in it. In one important sense the maintenance of society is the maintenance of co-operation, and the dissolution of co-operative habits into conflict is the dissolution of society itself.

The over-riding importance of the deci-

sion between co-operation and war in the case of nations needs no emphasis from me. Our very lives depend upon it.

It is certain, therefore, that this is a central problem for the scientific study of society. For the same reason it is a central problem for the study of social policy. Few questions of policy, raised within or between the nation states that compose the modern world, do not involve at some stage in their development the choice between these two fundamentally different methods of achieving the purposes of individuals and of groups. The choice between individual and group co-operation on the one hand, or conflict on the other, is the first question that has to be decided in every discussion of political method. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance to understand the light that has been thrown by the recent advances in psychology and anthropology upon the forces that determine this choice.

The first point that emerges clearly from the evidence is the wide distribution in society of both these fundamental types of human behavior.

The extreme form of conflict between persons and between groups is that of *fighting*—conflicts in which force is used. Now fighting is plainly a common, indeed a universal, form of human behavior. It occurs in all periods of history and in the time before history—to judge by the behavior of primitive peoples. It occurs in all types of social groups, from the wars between civilized nations, through a descending order of civil war, riot, and public disorder to the personal fighting of adults and children. It is everywhere present, and cannot therefore be traced to the conditions created by certain forms of society, like those of capitalism and the nation state, whose distribution in space and time is much more limited than the distribution of fighting. The simple causes of fighting must lie in the character of human beings common to all periods of

history and all types of society—that is, to the qualities of human nature itself.

The same is true of the practice of peaceful co-operation. Fighting, or the extreme form of conflict, while universal in distribution, is not continuous in time. The most warlike groups and the most aggressive individuals spend considerable periods in peaceful toleration of, and positive co-operation with, other animals or persons. Most organized communities have enjoyed longer periods of peace than of war. The greater part of human activity—of man-hours—is spent, not in war, but in peaceful co-operation. The scientific problem is, therefore, twofold—why is there peaceful co-operation? And why does peaceful co-operation sometimes break down into fighting? The practical problem—at least, for lovers of peace—is how peaceful co-operation is to be preserved against the universal tendency exhibited in history for it to degenerate into war.

What then, does the evidence suggest, are the simplest causes of peaceful co-operation? Here it is necessary to distinguish between groups with and without “government”—that is, an apparatus of force constructed with the conscious and explicit purpose of preserving peace within the group. Clearly the existence of a powerful organization taking action to preserve peace constitutes in itself a strong and immediate cause for the appearance of peace.... For the moment, however, we are interested in a prior and more fundamental question. What are the causes of peace in a group without government or any effective machinery for the restraint of fighting? Why do animals co-operate in the absence of any agent powerful enough to prevent them from fighting?

Now a survey of the life of animals in general, and of apes and men in particular, suggests that the causes of peace in the absence of government are, for the extra-familial group, of three main kinds:

1. The obvious, most important, and overwhelming advantage to be derived from peace lies in the division of labor and the possibility of thus achieving purposes desired by the individual, but obtainable only by active co-operation with others. This is so plain in the case of adult human society that the point is scarcely worth elaborating. The whole of the difference in the variety of satisfactions open to the individual in isolation and the same person in the active membership of a peaceful society, measures the advantages to be derived from continuous co-operation between adults. The extent of co-operation in any groups other than adult human societies is, of course, much more limited. But groups of children co-operate in simple tasks, and in games that require a specialization of function between the individual members of the group. And there is some evidence to suggest that apes exhibit still simpler forms of co-operation, and that even mammals who hunt and live in herds develop simple differentiation of functions for various common purposes of defense or attack.

Co-operation extends enormously the opportunities for life and satisfaction within groups that have developed it. It is reasonable to presume that these advantages are also *causes* of co-operation, since many of the results of co-operation are of survival value. In any case, few persons would wish to deny that the sovereign advantages of co-operation are for adult human beings one of the main causes of voluntary peace.

2. In the case of apes, there is also evidence that satisfaction is found in the mere presence of others of the same species. Whether this satisfaction is exclusively sexual—i.e., whether the advantage lies in the possibility of varied relations with the opposite sex—there is not sufficient evidence to determine. In so far as it is sexual, such gregariousness may easily become a source of conflict within the group. This

we shall see in a moment. But in so far as pleasure is felt in the mere presence of other members of the group, there is a force binding those members together in peace.

The counterpart of the primitive sociability of the apes in children and adult human beings is obvious. Its relationship to sexual promiscuity remains as obscure in human beings as in apes, but the existence of a pleasure felt in the presence of human company could scarcely be denied. Sociability is therefore an independent cause for the existence and stability of society.

3. The reasons for co-operation so far mentioned are all self-regarding advantages. They derive their importance from the existence of kinds of individual satisfaction that can only be obtained with the aid of others. It is not, however, to be supposed that self-regarding ends are the sole causes of peaceful co-operation. It is obvious that in the development of the child there is to be traced the emergence of an interest in others for their own sakes, a gradual but growing recognition of the rights of others to the kinds of advantage desired by oneself; and finally in the fully developed personal relationships of friendship and love, the positive desire for the loved one's happiness as a good for oneself. From reflection and logic this care for the good of others can make the common good a personal end. The existence of a general desire for the common good is clearly a force making for peace in adult society. But its power will only extend as far as the idea of the common good extends. If the common good is only felt to reach to the limits of a racial, or a geographic, or a social group, there will be no force in this recognition of the limited common good within the group to prevent the use of force outside and on behalf of it.

The evidence taken from the observation of the behavior of apes and children

suggests that there are three clearly separable groups of simple causes for the outbreak of fighting and the exhibition of aggressiveness by individuals.

1. One of the most common causes of fighting among both children and apes was over the *possession* of external objects. The disputed ownership of any desired object—food, clothes, toys, females, and the affection of others—was sufficient ground for an appeal to force. On Monkey Hill disputes over females were responsible for the deaths of thirty out of thirty-three females in a short period of time. Two points are of particular interest to notice about these fights for possession.

In the first place they are often carried to such an extreme that they end in the complete destruction of the objects of common desire. Toys are torn to pieces. Females are literally torn limb from limb. So overriding is the aggression once it has begun that it not only overflows all reasonable boundaries of selfishness but utterly destroys the object for which the struggle began and even the self for whose advantage the struggle was undertaken.

In the second place it is observable, at least in children, that the object for whose possession aggression is started may sometimes be desired by one person only, or may be desired by him merely because it is desired by someone else. There were many cases . . . where toys and other objects which had been discarded as useless were violently defended by their owners when they became the object of some other child's desire. The grounds of possessiveness may therefore be irrational in the sense that they are derived from inconsistent judgments of value.

Whether sensible or irrational, contests over possession are commonly the occasion for the most ruthless use of force among children and apes.

One of the commonest kinds of object arousing possessive desire is the notice, goodwill, affection, and service of other

members of the group. Among children one of the commonest causes of quarreling was *jealousy*—the desire for the exclusive possession of the interest and affection of someone else, particularly the adults in charge of the children. This form of behavior is sometimes classified as a separate cause of conflict under the name of *rivalry* or *jealousy*. But, in point of fact, it seems to us that it is only one variety of possessiveness. The object of desire is not a material object—that is the only difference. The object is the interest and affection of other persons. What is wanted, however, is the exclusive right to that interest and affection—a property in emotions instead of in things. As subjective emotions and as causes of conflict, jealousy and rivalry are fundamentally similar to the desire for the uninterrupted possession of toys or food. Indeed, very often the persons, property in whom is desired, are the sources of toys and food.

Possessiveness is then, in all its forms, a common cause of fighting. If we are to look behind the mere facts of behavior for an explanation of this phenomenon, a teleological cause is not far to seek. The exclusive right to objects of desire is a clear and simple advantage to the possessor of it. It carries with it the certainty and continuity of satisfaction. Where there is only one claimant to a good, frustration and the possibility of loss is reduced to a minimum. It is, therefore, obvious that, if the ends of the self are the only recognized ends, the whole powers of the agent, including the fullest use of his available force, will be used to establish and defend exclusive rights to possession.

2. Another cause of aggression closely allied to possessiveness is the tendency for children and apes greatly to resent the intrusion of a stranger into their group. A new child in the class may be laughed at, isolated and disliked, and even set upon and pinched and bullied. A new monkey may be poked and bitten to death. It is

interesting to note that it is only strangeness within a similarity of species that is resented. Monkeys do not mind being joined by a goat or a rat. Children do not object when animals are introduced to the group. Indeed, such novelties are often welcomed. But when monkeys meet a new monkey, or children a strange child, aggression often occurs. This suggests strongly that the reason for the aggression is fundamentally possessiveness. The competition of the newcomers is feared. The present members of the group feel that there will be more rivals for the food or the attention of the adults.

3. Finally, another common source of fighting among children is a failure or frustration in their own activity. A child will be prevented either by natural causes such as bad weather, or illness, or by the opposition of some adult, from doing something he wishes to do at a given moment—sail his boat or ride the bicycle. The child may also frustrate itself by failing, through lack of skill or strength, to complete successfully some desired activity. Such a child will then in the ordinary sense become “naughty.” He will be in a bad or surly temper. And, what is of interest from our point of view, the child will indulge in aggression—attacking and fighting other children or adults. Sometimes the object of aggression will simply be the cause of frustration, a straightforward reaction. The child will kick or hit the nurse who forbids the sailing of his boat. But sometimes—indeed, frequently—the person or thing that suffers the aggression is quite irrelevant and innocent of offense. The angry child will stamp the ground or box the ears of another child, when neither the ground nor the child attacked is even remotely connected with the irritation of frustration.

Of course, this kind of behavior is so common that everyone feels it to be obvious and to constitute no serious scientific problem. That a small boy should pull his

sister's hair because it is raining does not appeal to the ordinary unreflecting person to be an occasion for solemn scientific inquiry. He is, as we should all say, “in a bad temper.” Yet it is not, in fact, really obvious either why revenge should be taken on entirely innocent objects since no good to the aggressor can come of it, nor why children being miserable should seek to make others miserable also. It is just a fact of human behavior that cannot really be deduced from any general principle of reason. But it is, as we shall see, of very great importance for our purpose. It shows how it is possible, at the simplest and most primitive level, for aggression and fighting to spring from an entirely irrelevant and partially hidden cause. Fighting to possess a desired object is straightforward and rational, however disastrous its consequences, compared with fighting that occurs because, in a different and unrelated activity, some frustration has barred the road to pleasure. The importance of this possibility for an understanding of group conflict must already be obvious.

These are the three simplest separate categories of cause we are able to observe in the evidence. One further point, however, remains to be made about the character of the fighting that occurs among apes. It is a marked characteristic of this fighting that, once it has broken out anywhere, it spreads with great rapidity throughout the group, and draws into conflict individuals who had no part in the first quarrel and appear to have no immediate interest whatever in the outcome of the original dispute. Fighting is *infectious* in the highest degree. Why? It is not easy to find an answer. Whether it is that the apes who are not immediately involved feel that some advantage for themselves can be snatched from the confusion following upon the rupture of social equilibrium, or whether real advantages are involved that escape the

observation of the onlooker, is not at present determined. Or it may be that the infectiousness of fighting is irrational in the same way that the irrelevant expression of aggression due to frustration is irrational. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that fighting spreads without apparent cause or justification. This excitability, and the attraction which fighting may possess for its own sake, is likely to be a source of great instability in any society. It is one of the most dangerous parts of our animal inheritance.

So much for the simpler forms of aggression. It is now time to consider the light thrown by anthropological and psychoanalytic evidence upon the behavior of adult human beings.

So far the material from which we have sought illumination has been derived from the simple behavior of children and apes. We must now consider more complicated behavior. There are, as we have already pointed out, at least two relevant studies—anthropology and the case histories recorded by psychoanalysts. It is impossible to survey the vast mass of anthropological material in detail, but even such a slight study as we have been able to make suffices to show the very great importance of other causes of fighting among primitive peoples.

Before we begin this task it is necessary to make one preliminary and simple observation about the nature of adult aggression in general. It is of first importance to realize that, as far as aggressiveness and fighting is concerned, there is no noticeable improvement in the *behavior* of adults compared with that of the most savage animals and children. If anything, it is more ruthless. The recent history of Europe establishes this conclusion with horrible insistence. There is no form of behavior too ruthless, too brutal, too cruel for adult men and women to use against each other. As I have pointed out in the introduction to this book, torture is be-

coming normal again; the knuckle-duster and the whip, other more refined instruments of flagellation, and the armory of mental pain, are the commonplace instruments of prisons and concentration camps from Japan to Spain. Men and women have been shot down without trial, soaked in petrol and burned to death, beaten to unrecognizable masses of flesh and bone, hanged by the hair and hands until they die, starved and tortured with fear and hope during the "Reigns of Terror" that have accompanied and succeeded the civil wars in Russia, Italy, Poland, Austria, Germany, and Spain. Cruelty knows no boundary of party or creed. It wears every kind of shirt. And over all of us there hangs, perpetual and menacing, the fear of war. No group of animals could be more aggressive or more ruthless in their aggression than the adult members of the human race.

Are there then no differences between the aggression of more primitive beings and that of adult men? We suggest that there are only two differences. In the first place the physical aggression of adults is normally a group activity. Murder and assault are restricted to a small criminal minority. Adults kill and torture each other only when organized into political parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is always made between the individual killing for himself and the same individual killing for some real or supposed group interest. In the second place, the adult powers of imagination and reason are brought to the service of the aggressive intention. Apes and children when they fight, simply fight. Men and women first construct towering systems of theology and religion, complex analyses of racial character and class structure, or moralities of group life and virility before they kill one another. Thus they fight for Protestantism or Mohammedanism, for the emancipation of the world proletariat

or for the salvation of the Nordic culture, for nation or for kind. Men will die like flies for theories and exterminate each other with every instrument of destruction for abstractions.

The differences of behavior are therefore not substantial. The form is the same, the results are the same. Group fighting is even more destructive than individual fighting. A machine gun or a bomb is no less lethal because its use can be shown to be a necessity of the Class War, or more noble because it brings the light of Italian civilization to the Abyssinian peoples. Now it might be argued that there is no continuity of character between the wars of civilized people and fighting of the simpler orders. We cannot, however, see any reason for supposing so. Indeed, the only question of interest appears to us to lie in the matter of causation. Are the causes exactly the same? Or are they changed in any important way by the greater powers and complexity of the adult human mind?

We are therefore brought back to the question: What are the causes of aggressiveness in adult human beings? I would maintain that anthropology and psychoanalysis suggest a number of ways in which the powers of the human mind change and add to the causes of aggression. There appears to be at least three different mechanisms discernible in the material of these two sciences.

The first and most obvious of these mechanisms is the cause of war revealed so very plainly by the study of primitive intergroup conflict. It consists in the universal tendency to attribute all events in the world to the deliberate activity of human or parahuman *will*. All happenings, whether natural or inevitable, or human and voluntary, are attributed to the will of some being either human or anthropomorphically divine. If a thunderstorm occurs, or a hurricane visits a village, or a man is killed by a tiger, the evil is

attributed either to the magic of a neighboring tribe or to the ill will of demons and gods. In the same way, good fortune, however natural, is attributed to the deliberate intention of some other being. This universal tendency in the human mind is termed *animism*.

It is certain that this imaginative tendency on the part of human beings leads to war. It is obvious why it should. If evil is attributed to the direct malice of neighboring and opposing groups, the only possible protection against further evil lies in the destruction of the source of ill will. It is, however, of great importance whether the supposed enemy is human or supernatural. If it is spiritual, the natural reply will be placatory sacrifices or the harmless ritual of beating or burning or making war upon the evil spirit. The evidence shows many amusing examples of ritual warfare against the spirits, undertaken by primitive peoples after some natural disaster. But if the supposed author of evil is not supernatural, but human, the results are neither harmless nor amusing. If the typhoon is attributed to the magic of neighboring peoples, or of dissident minorities within the tribe, then the destruction of the enemy, root and branch, is the only safe course. Hence, after a thunderstorm or an accident, the restless fears and hatred of the tribe will find expression in a primitive war against neighboring tribes, or the stamping out of some hapless group of victims within it. Enemies without and traitors within must be exterminated.

It is difficult to exaggerate the frequency and importance of this cause of fighting in human societies of all degrees of civilization. It is a universal tendency among the simpler people of all nations to attribute evil to some person or group of persons. It is present everywhere in party politics. Every evil is loaded upon political opponents. Socialists attribute all disasters, whether economic or political, to "capitalists" or "the capitalist class." Con-

servatives think it obvious that the last uncontrollable and world-wide depression in trade was due to the "bad government" of the Socialists in this country. Other movements find different and more peculiar scapegoats in "the bankers" or "the Jews" or "the Russians." In each case what is noticeable and dangerous is that a vast power and a deep malignity is attributed to the inimical group. The supposed malignity is often purely illusory. The attributed power transcends all reality. When the open conflict of party politics is suppressed by an authoritarian regime the tendency is exaggerated rather than reduced. Some unfortunate minority within the group—"the Jews" or "the kulaks"—become the source of all evil, the scapegoat of all disaster. Or an overwhelming hatred is conceived for another nation. Out of these real terrors and derivative hatreds merciless persecutions and international wars are likely to spring.

I shall go on to show that the sources of aggression among human beings are much more complicated than either the simple causes operating in animals or this common habit of attributing everything to some human agency. Yet it should be obvious that much of the behavior of large groups can be explained by the categories of cause we have already discussed. Possessiveness, frustration, animism are potent causes of conflict between groups, whether parties, classes, or states. After we have discussed the complex history of aggression within the individual we shall have reason to revert to these simpler forms of behavior. The behavior of the group is in an important sense simpler and more direct than the behavior of the individual. It seems probable that the complex character of the civilized individual undergoes a degeneration or simplification when he is caught up into, and expresses himself through, the unity of the group. But in the meantime we must consider the light thrown by psychoanalysis upon the

history and development of aggressive impulses in the civilized adult.

What light does psychoanalytic evidence throw upon the problem of adult aggression? It is, of course, impossible to consider at all adequately the mass of material and theory comprised in the work of this school of psychology. All that I can attempt at this point is a brief account of the main conclusions—as they appear to me—to be drawn from the evidence. It is scarcely necessary to point out that these views are only one interpretation of the data, and although I think this interpretation to be the most accurate, it could only be verified by an empirical investigation designed to show the existence of certain emotional mechanisms widely distributed in civilized societies.

I suggest tentatively, therefore, that the evidence of psychoanalysis justifies the following conclusions:

1. That the primary causes of aggression (and of peaceful co-operation) are identical among adult men with those of children and apes. The character of the *id*—or complex of instinctive impulses—does not change materially as the individual grows older. The same sources of satisfaction—food, warmth, love, society—are desired and the same sources of conflict—desire for exclusive possession of the sources of satisfaction, or aggression arising from a sense of frustration—are present. But in the life of most children there is a controlling or warping influence present in a varying degree—that of *authority*. The child is denied for various reasons—good or bad—an open and uninterrupted access to the means of its satisfaction. It is denied the breast or bottle, the toy or the company of adults, at the time or to the extent that it wishes. The evidence seems overwhelming that such frustration leads to a violent reaction of fear, hatred and aggression. The child cries or screams or bites or kicks. We are not for the moment concerned

with the question whether this frustration is desirable or not. We are simply concerned with its results. The result is "bad temper" or "naughtiness"—a resentment of frustration. This original resentment and the aggression to which it leads we would call *simple aggression*.

Further development turns, in my view, upon the way in which this simple aggression is treated. The statistically normal method of treatment is, we suggest, further frustration or *punishment*. The child is slapped or beaten or subjected to moral instruction—taught that its behavior is wrong or wicked. Again I am not concerned with the question of the rightness or wrongness of this procedure, but only with its consequences. I suggest that the result of punishment is to present the child with a radical conflict—either he must control the expression of his simple aggression or suffer the punishment and the loss of love that simple aggression in a regime of discipline necessarily entails.

This conflict in the child is in our view an important source of aggressiveness in the adult. The conflict itself is a conflict between a fundamental tendency to resent frustration and the fear of punishment or, what is just as important, the fear of loss of love. To the child the parent is both the source of satisfactions and the source of frustrations. To express aggression is to endanger the life of the goose that lays the golden eggs. Not to express simple aggression towards original objects is the task that faces the child. Now one result of the child's attempt to resolve the conflict is called *repression*. Much has been written about the nature and consequences of repression. The hypothesis of the existence and independent functioning of an unconscious mind has been elaborated to explain the analytical evidence, and a whole literature of theory has been built upon this idea. I am not here primarily concerned with psychoanalytic theory, but I am sure that the main contributions

of the evidence to an understanding of the sources of aggressiveness can be explained quite simply. The overwhelming fact established by the evidence is that aggression, however deeply hidden or disguised, does not disappear. It appears later and in other forms. It is not destroyed. It is safe to conclude from the evidence that it cannot be destroyed. Whether we conceive simple aggression stimulated by frustration as a quantity of energy that has to be released somewhere, or whether we imagine that a secret and unconscious character is formed that is aggressive, although the superficial character is peaceful, or whether we simply suppose that a certain kind of character is formed, peaceful in certain directions and aggressive in others—is a matter of comparative indifference and mainly, indeed, of terminology. The fundamental fact is that the punishment of simple aggression results in the appearance of aggression in other forms. The boy, instead of striking his father whom he fears, strikes a smaller boy whom he does not fear. Disguised aggression has made the boy into a bully. The girl who dares not scream at her mother grows up to hate other women. Again a character has been formed by a simple aggressiveness that has been controlled but not destroyed. And in the same way, revolutionaries who hate ordered government, nationalists who hate foreign peoples, individuals who hate bankers, Jews, or their political opponents, may be exhibiting characteristics that have been formed by the suppression of simple aggression in their childhood education. These aggressive aspects of adult character and the aggressiveness to which they lead we call *transformed aggression*. It is the displaced and unrecognized fruit of suppressed simple aggression.

2. The second great contribution of psychoanalytic evidence is to show the kind of transformations that simple aggression undergoes as the adult faculties

develop. The fundamental problem of the child is, as we have seen, a double one: that of self-control and of *ambivalence*. In order to escape punishment the child must prevent its aggressive impulses from appearing—it must control its natural aggression. But this is not the whole of the problem. The parent has become for the child the object of two incompatible emotions—love and hatred. As a source of satisfaction and companionship, the parent is greatly beloved. As a source of frustration and punishment, the parent is greatly feared and hated. The evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that such a double attitude to one person puts a terrible emotional strain upon the child. In the growth and development of character a number of imaginative and intellectual efforts are made to alleviate or avoid the severity of this internal conflict.

One other aspect of the subjective life must be mentioned before we examine the processes by which internal strain or anxiety is reduced to a minimum—and that is the question of *moral judgment*. I am not at this juncture concerned with the theories of the origin of what the moralist calls the conscience and psychoanalyst the *super-ego*. It is obvious that persons are deeply influenced in their behavior and their feelings by what they think they ought to do and ought to be—their “sense of duty.” I think it also clear from the evidence of psychoanalysis that the content of this moral sense—the total of the things a man feels to be his duty—is made up partly of objective moral judgments and partly of compulsions arising from the teaching and discipline of childhood. The moral sense is neither wholly rational nor wholly subjective and irrational. It is partly the one and partly the other. But, whatever the origin of the moral sense, there is conclusive evidence that it can become the source of immense burdens of shame and guilt, both to the child and to the adult. Again

I think that the available evidence demonstrates beyond question that such guilt in the adult is composed partly of a sensible consciousness of moral failure, partly of an irrational fear of punishment derived from the experiences and wild imagination of childhood, and partly of a half-conscious recognition of the dangerous aggressive impulses within himself. All these elements combine to make a considerable burden of guilt—acknowledged or unacknowledged—for most individuals, a burden that rises to intolerable levels for depressed and suicidal subjects.

There is, then, much support in the empirical work of character psychology for the theological doctrine of a “man divided against himself.” Not only do we both love and hate the same people, but we are divided into an impulsive and appetitive character, only part of which we acknowledge, on the one hand, and a stern and inescapable sense of duty, often partially unrecognized, on the other. These divisions of our being are at war with each other and are responsible for much of the unhappiness of individual life. They are the direct source of the universal phenomenon of *morbid anxiety*.

It is to reduce anxiety and guilt to a minimum, and to resolve the conflict of ambivalence, that the major psychological mechanisms are developed. These are of two kinds—*displacement* and *projection*: both of them are frequently used for the expression of transformed aggression.

(a) *Displacement*. This is perhaps the simplest mechanism of all. Several examples of it have already been cited. It is extremely common in political and social affairs. It consists in the transference of fear, or hatred, or love from the true historical object to a secondary object. The secondary object may be loved or hated for its own sake, but to the sensible degree of feeling is added an intensity derived from the transference to it of irrelevant passion. The child is thwarted

by its father and then bullies a smaller child. The father is reprimanded by his employer, of whom he is afraid, and then is angry with his son. A girl both loves and feels jealous of her mother. To deal with this situation she may direct her loving feelings toward her schoolmistress, and thus feel free to hate her mother more completely. A boy may hate his father through familial discipline and grow up to hate all authority and government. He would be a revolutionary under any regime. Children who both love and hate their parents grow up to love their own country blindly and uncritically, and to hate foreign countries with equal blindness and unreason. They have succeeded in displacing their opposite emotions to different objects.

The tendency to identify the self with the community is so common as to be obvious. The transference of the predominant feelings of childhood from parents to the organs of political life—to the State and the parties in it—is almost universal. Hence the importance of symbolical figureheads and governors, Kings and Führers. Hence the fanaticism and violence of political life. Hence the comparative weakness of reason and moderation in political affairs.

The advantage to the individual of these displacements or transferences of emotion from their historically relevant objects should be obvious. In the first place the confusion and strain of the ambivalent relation is often resolved. Instead of both loving and hating the mother, it is possible to love the schoolmistress and to hate more freely—however secretly—the person who was originally both loved and hated with equal intensity. Instead of both loving and hating the same adults, it is possible to love the nation or the Communist Party with pure devotion, and hate the Germans or the "Capitalist Class" with frenzy. In either case the world of emotional objects is

redeemed from its original chaos; simplicity and order are restored to it. Action and purposive life is possible again. In the second place the displacement is often, indeed usually, towards a safer object. It is safer to kick a smaller boy than to kick one's father. It is safer for the individual to hate the capitalists than to hate his wife, or to hate the Russians than to hate his employers. Thus fear and anxiety—though not banished—are reduced. Happiness is increased. Of course greater safety is not always reached in any objective sense. To join the Communist Party, instead of divorcing one's wife, may result in some countries in imprisonment and even death. To become a patriot may mean early enlistment and a premature grave, when the alternative was objectively less dangerous. But, unless we are to deny the teleological interpretation of human affairs altogether, it seems obvious that the internal conflicts of fear and guilt are alleviated by displacement. And there is ample direct evidence to support this view.

From our present point of view the importance of this mechanism can scarcely be exaggerated. Adult aggression, as we have seen, is normally carried out in group activity. Political parties make civil war. Churches make religious war. States make international war. These various kinds of groups can attract absolute loyalty, and canalize torrents of hatred and murder, through the mechanism of displacement. Individuals can throw themselves into the life and work of groups, because they find a solution to their own conflicts in them. The stores of explosive violence in the human atom are released by and expressed in group organization. The power of the group for aggression is derived partly from the sensible and objective judgments of men, but chiefly, in our view, by their power to attract to themselves the displaced hatred and destructiveness of their members. Displacement, though not the

ultimate cause, is a direct channel for the ultimate causes of social conflict.

(b) *Projection*. A second mechanism that is of the greatest importance in understanding individual and social behavior is projection. It is not so simple a mechanism as displacement, but the psychoanalytic evidence demonstrates that it is of frequent occurrence in social life. The mechanism consists in imagining that other individuals are really like our own unrecognized and unaccepted selves. It is the projection of our own characters upon others.

There are two parts of subjective character that the individual "projects upon" others in this way—two kinds of unrecognized motives of his own that he imagines are animating other people: first, his real but unrecognized impulses, and secondly, his unrecognized conscience. In the first case we suppose others to be wicked in ways wherein we do not admit ourselves to be wicked; in the second we suppose them to be censorious and restrictive, in ways wherein we do not recognize our own superego to criticize and restrain us.

(i) *The Projection of Impulse*. Examples of the way in which people project upon others the evil that is really in themselves are not far to seek. There are men and women who imagine that everyone's hand is against them; persons who are mean and parsimonious, and who assume that everyone else is seeking to swindle them. Persecution manias or *paranoia* contain, as well as simple animism, an element of this mechanism. In all these cases it seems obvious to us that the individual is either assuming that people will treat him as he wishes to treat them, or that he imagines them to be animated by the motives and impulses that are really his own. The miser attributes to others his own impulse to swindle. The paranoiac imagines the object of his fears to be animated by his own wicked and destructive passions.

Most cases of political persecution appear to be of this kind. We have already seen that much of this behavior can be explained in terms of the simplest animism—the tendency to blame some human will for all disasters. But the existence of such a tendency does not explain why persecution continues when no disaster is present or threatening. And yet it does continue after all reasonable occasion has passed. Almost all authoritarian regimes treasure a pet object of persecution indefinitely. The National Socialists persecute the Communists and the Jews; the Bolsheviks persecute the Trotskyists and the kulaks. It is commonly said that regimes "need a scapegoat." We suggest that over and above any objective reasons for persecution—the need for an excuse in case of failure or the desire to crush opposition by fear—and explaining the continuation of persecution long after the objective reasons have lost their force, there is an element of pure projection. The persecuted minorities are made to carry the projected wickedness of the dominant masses. They are truly the scapegoat of the people, not only in the sense that they are hated and despised, but also that they are made literally to bear the "sins of the people." We think it important to realize that the National Socialists seriously believe that the Jews are responsible for national degeneration—that the Communists seriously believe that the kulaks threaten the regime—and that they believe these things against all evidence, because they have successfully projected upon these groups so much of the disruptive elements within themselves. The hated minorities are genuinely thought to be the cause of disruption, because they have become the external symbol of internal wickedness.

The advantage of this mechanism is again obvious. It reduces anxiety to force the enemy out of the gate of one's soul. It is better to hate other people for meanness, and to bear the fear of their ill will,

than to hate oneself for being miserly. To see wickedness in others, though terrifying, is better than to be divided against oneself. It avoids the terrible burden of guilt.

The importance of projection for the understanding of group aggressiveness is also plain. If it is possible to project upon other groups all the evil within a group, then, as in the case of simple animism, the forces of hatred and fear against the external group will grow more and more intense. If Communists can persuade themselves that all aggressiveness and cruelty is with the Fascists, and Fascists that all treachery and destructiveness is with the Communists, then civil war can be fought with better will and greater ferocity on both sides. If Englishmen owning a quarter of the world can feel that all ruthless imperialism is exhibited by Germany, and Germany with the most powerful army in Europe can feel herself threatened by Russia, then the selfishness of the one group and the aggressiveness of the other can be justified without being reduced. Projection is an admirable mechanism for turning the other man into the aggressor, for making hatred appear as a passion for righteousness, for purifying the hate-tormented soul. By this means all war is made into religious war—a crusade for truth and virtue.

(ii) *The Projection of Conscience.* Finally, to complete the story, there is the projection of the conscience. In order to escape the pains of self-condemnation, the individual projects upon others the moral judgments and condemnation of his own heart. This leads to a particular form of paranoia or persecution mania, in which persons resent, not only the real, but also purely imaginary, moral judgments and legal restraints imposed by the State. It is particularly common among the revolutionary opponents of an existing order. Communists exaggerate enormously the degree and deliberateness of capitalist re-

pression. National Socialists in opposition exaggerated absurdly the oppressions of *das System*. Both parties, all the while, intended to create a far more repressive system themselves. This projection of internal moral censorship, while of great interest in explaining many of the phenomena of political life, is not of central importance in understanding the causes of international war. Displacement and the projection of impulse are the great channels of transformed aggression. The projection of the superego is chiefly a cause of revolution and civil war.

I have now completed my survey of the causes of aggression in human beings. I have suggested that there is no substantial difference in behavior between civilized men and other animals, that adults are just as cruel—or more so—just as aggressive, just as destructive as any group of animals or monkeys. The only difference in our view is one of psychological and intellectual mechanism. The causes of simple aggression—possessiveness, strangeness, frustration—are common to adults and simpler creatures. But a repressive discipline drives simple aggression underground—to speak in metaphors—and it appears in disguised forms. These transformations are chiefly those of displacement and projection. These mechanisms have as their immediate motive the reduction of anxiety and the resolution of the conflicts of ambivalence and guilt. They result in the typical form of adult aggressiveness—aggressive personal relations of all kinds—but above all in group aggression: party conflict, civil war, wars of religion, and international war. The group life gives sanction to personal aggressiveness. The mobilization of transformed aggression gives destructive power to groups. Aggression takes on its social forms. And to justify it—to explain the group aggression to the outside world and to the group itself in terms that make it morally acceptable to the members of the group—great struc-

tures of intellectual reasoning—theories of history and religion and race—are built up. The impulses are rationalized. The hatred is justified. And it is typical of the complexity of human affairs that something in these theories is always true. But most of it is false—most of it a mere justification of hatred—a sickening and hypocritical defence of cruelty. This is particularly true of the political persecutions of dictatorships. . . .

There are, I think, three important conclusions . . . that can be derived from this brief survey of the causes of co-operation and conflict among human beings.

The first of these is the ancient and obvious conclusion of political theory that the social institution of *government* is a potent cause of peace in society and therefore of incalculable benefit to mankind.

The evidence taken from the life of anarchical animal and human groups bears out the common thought of political philosophers. The absence of government means the absence of order. The alternative to efficient government is a brutal chaos of arbitrary power and gross injustice. In the hackneyed words of Hobbes "the life of man would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." This conclusion is, I am sure, sustained by the evidence.

Whatever our theory of the state may be, it cannot be denied that most of its labor is devoted to the organization of peaceful activities and to defining, without the use of force, the framework of laws and institutions within which individuals and smaller groups can work together in tranquillity. But the state has another and vitally important task. In all modern societies—whether democratic or dictatorial, capitalist or communist—the government and the apparatus of force that it controls, seeks to prevent the breakdown of social equilibrium into civil war. One of the worst crimes in any state is treason against it, and the vast and increasing power of the state is built up,

primarily in order to crush the various aggressive minorities who propose to resort to force in defiance of the law.

There is no pacificism within the state. If members of the criminal minority resort to force, force will be used against them. If larger groups threaten the peace by rioting, first the police and then the more heavily armed forces at the disposal of the government will be used against them. The theory and practice of government is, in part, the theory and practice of mobilizing an overwhelming force against anyone or any group that will not keep the law in peace. In my view it is therefore not surprising that the area of the strong nation state has been predominantly the area of peace. Of course, this is not always so. Civil war has broken out more than once in the strongest modern states. But almost all wars and all the largest wars have been between nations—that is, in the realm of anarchy outside the rule of law supported by force.

No doubt there exists another great force making for peace within the state—that is, the spontaneous acceptance of law, and the moral sanction that law *qua* law therefore possesses. Peaceful co-operation is preserved and the law obeyed, in the vast majority of cases, without the direct intervention or supervision of the police. Yet force, nevertheless, is present in the background. People may often obey the law because they wish to do so. But they must obey it whether they wish to or not—or go to prison. And, in fact, there is always a criminal minority who do not obey the law, and against whom force always is and must be used. There is always a disruptive tendency present in society—a tendency to form aggressive and revolutionary minorities—and, in so far as they are allowed to grow without the opposition of force, society draws nearer and nearer to civil war. The recent history of Europe offers many examples of such a development. Moreover, it seems easy to us to

exaggerate the strength of the feeling for the moral authority of the law. It seems straining the use of terms to say that the dissident minorities of authoritarian governments "accept the law." It seems plainly untrue that peasants admit the moral sanctity of oppressive systems of agrarian law, or that the organized proletariat of a capitalist system really *accept* the justice of the present laws of property. It may be that they feel that an unjust law is better than no law at all; but few dictators, at any rate, would willingly divorce themselves from the use of force or would expect internal peace to be preserved by the strength of moral sentiment alone.

The application of this view to international affairs and the problem of international war is obvious. Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations was and is, in my view, the only hope for the *peace* of the world. Until law is backed by force there seems to me no hope for law or peace. Law is not justice, but neither is war. Aggressive minorities will make international war and civil war, but they will not make justice. And while the achievement of justice will greatly aid the establishment of peace, the handing over of the world to the will of the minority of aggressive states, or of the state to the aggressive minorities within it, will secure neither justice nor peace. Thus, while the struggle for justice and for a system of law that is sufficiently just to be accepted freely by all men is one of the central tasks before this generation, the evidence suggests to the present writer most strongly that the organization of international force for the preservation of international peace and the fulfilment of international law is the most urgent task of all.

Of course, force will not cure the impulses of aggression. Some psychologists, impressed by this fact and also by the consideration that government is a symbol

to most people of their own projected conscience, have concluded that the organization of force is not favorable to peace. We should agree that force is not a therapeutic agent. A policeman will not cure a murderer of the desire to kill. An international air force will not cure Hitler or Mussolini of the desire to kill. But that, I feel, is not the point. The immediate problem is not to cure the aggressor, but to prevent the aggression, or to see that, if the aggression takes place, it can only lead to one outcome—the vindication of the law. That is the vital point. The problem is to see that the great majority of human beings who are peaceful, and the great part of human activity that is constructive, should be protected from the savage and destructive violence of the aggressive minorities. It is only if the lovers of peace and social reconstruction will use force to protect themselves that peace within and without the nation can be preserved.

To accept this gloomy, but in my submission fundamentally realistic, view of the necessity for government does not in the least mean that it is impossible to alleviate the pressure of aggressiveness within the social group. This brings me to the second of my relevant conclusions. The psychological and anthropological evidence suggests very strongly that one of the most important institutions determining the behavior of any social group is to be found in the type of *emotional education* characteristic of the group. The character of this institution determines the amount of aggressiveness generated within the group.

Transformed aggression is due, in my view, to the repression both by the self and by parental authority of simple aggression. Simple aggression, in its turn, I have argued, is due to the frustration of impulse. It would seem upon this analysis that adult aggressiveness could be diminished either by a reduction in the extent to which impulse is frustrated or by a

diminution in the extent to which primary aggression is punished. If children could be frustrated less frequently by being given more open access to the means of their satisfaction, or if they were punished less severely when they resented frustration; if, in short, they were allowed to express desire and anger more freely, it should follow, contrary to common expectation, that they would make more happy, more peaceful, and more social adults. The evidence shows overwhelmingly, as we have already seen, that the suppression of simple aggression does not kill it. It drives it underground and makes it far more horrible and destructive. It is only in the expression of it that it becomes diminished. It is only within the circumstances of freedom that social habits and a spontaneous desire to co-operate can flourish and abound. "Spare the rod and spoil the child"—as a quiet and convenient member of the familial group. Spare the rod and make a free, independent, friendly, and generous adult human being.

There are three points to be made in amplification of this suggestion:

1. A certain amount of frustration is inevitable and a certain amount of external repression is almost equally so. A child cannot have all that it wants. In the first place, the parents may not be rich enough to supply it even with enough to eat. In the second place, some of its desires—though we suspect they would be few except in the first few years of life—are contradictory and dangerous. A baby must be denied the fire that it wishes to reach, or the bright but poisonous berry that it wishes to suck. In the third place the satisfaction of some of its desires may make social life impossible or intolerable. The child cannot rampage when its parents are tired or ill. It cannot be taken for a walk when its mother must get the tea. Upon a thousand occasions frustration is inevitable. But I suggest that, even if frustration is inevitable, it should be re-

duced to a minimum and could be reduced enormously below its present level. The restraint of impulse is far too frequently carried out upon principle—as a desirable form of "discipline." Parents believe that children ought not to have what they want—that denial of impulse will make a good character. I hold that the opposite of this is the truth.

Nevertheless, some frustration is inevitable. What then can be done to alleviate its ill effects? I suggest that much more can be done by refusing to suppress and punish the natural resentment that frustration calls forth. This I feel to be the essential point. Take the child away from the fire, refuse to take it for a walk, deny it a second piece of cake; but avoid being angry or hurt or disapproving if a scream of rage or a kick on the shins is the immediate consequence of thwarting the child's will to happiness. To permit children to express their *feelings* of aggression, whilst preventing *acts* of irremediable destruction is, I suggest, one of the greatest gifts that parents can give to their children.

2. I believe the evidence suggests that such methods of education will have consequences precisely the opposite of those expected by the parent unaware of the evidence of modern analytical psychology. People greatly underestimate the rapidity and strength with which the social and affectionate impulses of the free child develop. And yet it is blindness to do so. After all, enormous advantages accrue to the child from co-operation. It is, as I have emphasized *ad nauseam*, the overwhelming impulse of human life. And I suggest that the child, freed from frustration and unsympathetic discipline, will in fact become the very opposite of the popular picture of the "spoiled child." Instead of violent and ungovernable anger, inordinate selfishness and vanity, the child who is not afraid to express feeling is likely to exhibit affection, independence, sociability, and courage more rapidly and more natu-

rally than a repressed child. Such children, the evidence suggests, become reasonable and sociable at a surprisingly early age. Family life with them is not a nightmare of disorder, or the false calm of strong discipline, but a moderately peaceful and very lively society of free, equal, and willing co-operation.

3. At the same time I do not wish to overdraw the picture. There are certain inevitable conflicts and sources of disturbance in individual and family life. Sexual jealousy, for one thing, is unavoidable. It seems unlikely that the strain between father and son, mother and daughter, can be wholly avoided. Nor does the reduction of external repression remove internal conflict. Self-repression—the fear that anger felt toward the source of satisfaction will “kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”—will still remain. Hence the reduction of repression is not a panacea. It will not produce heaven within the family or a race of perfect adults in a generation. Neurosis and aggressiveness will still be there. Social friction and the threat to peace will not be wholly eliminated. I only suggest that these things will be greatly reduced.

This doctrine is somewhat more speculative than the analysis of the causes of aggressiveness. It is not established by the existing evidence with the same degree of certainty. The number of children educated more freely is still small. No society has embarked upon the experiment of a wide and rapid change in the technique of parental control. No generation has yet grown up that has been influenced by the spread of these ideas. It is, therefore, too soon to say whether a change in the educational environment can bring about a substantial reduction in the aggressiveness of adults. I personally feel that the evidence gathered from the treatment of children is overwhelmingly on one side. I believe it to be almost certain that if children were actually brought up more

freely they would be much happier, much more reasonable, and much more sociable. It is obvious that social and international relations would greatly benefit if people were happier, more reasonable, and more sociable. But this belief is still in the realm of probability rather than fact. It is, of course, a purely empirical question. Will a certain form of education make human adults less aggressive without making them less strong? It is the combination of strength with reasonableness, of power with affection, that I think desirable. I have no faith in, nor desire to educate, a pacifist generation. I believe the rejection of force, and the passive acceptance of other people's aggression, to be as profoundly neurotic as the manifestation of transformed aggression itself. But with the subject of pacifism we are not concerned. I only wish to emphasize that I do not expect to arise from a better form of emotional education a generation of persons unable or unwilling to protect themselves, who kneel down before the aggressor and fling wide their gates to his attack, but a generation of men and women who will defend their rights and yet willingly concede equal rights to others, who will accept the judgment of third parties in the resolution of disputes, who will neither bully nor eat humble pie, who will fight but only in defense of law, who are willing and friendly members of a positive and just society.

Unfortunately this hope is not for us but only for a posterity that shall come long after us. We have not the time nor the opportunity to do these things. It would take decades to affect the course of political relations by emotional education. And, in any case, there is not the remotest possibility of beginning now. Half the nations of the world are in the grip of regimes in which this type of education, so far from being encouraged, is being destroyed. Even in democratic communities there is no widespread belief in the

kind of argument we have been advancing; much less is there any serious attempt to reform family practice in this direction. Even if there were, the successful execution of a new technique of parental guidance requires a new and less neurotic generation to carry it through. Improvement in the emotional atmosphere that surrounds the representative child can only be brought about slowly, and from generation to generation, as each group of parents brings to its children a less warped and aggressive personality. It is possible to begin, but not to proceed rapidly, with this basic social therapy. In the meantime, if this is all the hope there is, we shall have perished by half a dozen wars. And each war, by strengthening the fears and hatreds inside national groups, will make the task of better education more difficult. What therapy cannot cure, government must restrain.

Thus, as I see it, there are two ways, and only two, in which social conflict can be reduced in its frequency and violence—one slow, curative, and peaceful, aimed at the removal of the ultimate causes of war in human character by a new type of emotional education; the other immediate, coercive, and aimed at symptoms, the restraint of the aggressive minority by force.

Finally, there is a third conclusion, more general than the other two, that stands out clearly from the evidence. It is the importance of the *irrational* and the *unconscious* in social life. We are not what we seem to be and think we are. We do not even want the things we say we want, nor seek the ends we seem to seek. No theory of human society or history based upon a doctrine of rational or conscious purpose can contain the whole truth. To understand why people behave as they do, we must remember the things that they have forgotten, the motives they dare not confess, the springs of action they cannot admit. The ideology of any movement or of any

society is only half the story. The other half, and for us the most important half, lies below the surface.

The result of accepting this part of the evidence of analytical psychology is most important for my purpose. It introduces a new perspective into social study and political reflection. Nothing is quite the same as it was before. Those who come to see themselves, their friends, and the societies in which they live, through the categories of modern psychology experience the same kind of shock as those who look for the first time at some common object through a microscope, or at the moon through a telescope. In one sense everything is the same, in another sense everything is changed. What appeared to be simple is shown to be complex, and yet things that were previously unintelligible now become simple and clear. Floating unsuspected in the blood are the essential animalculae of life and death, and mysterious markings upon the face of the moon are seen to be the shadows of great mountains.

The social scientist must look through the psychological microscope; so must the politician. They will then see the real, but macroscopic, institutions of government and property, party and revolution, with which they deal and must continue to deal, dissolve into a thousand fragments of personal ambition and patriotism, of secret love and hatred, unconscious purpose and need. Systems of thought can then be traced to secret emotional roots, and great institutions, rich in dignity, to the primitive fears of childhood and the jungle. Ideas will lose a little of their importance; but the structure and laws of our emotional life, previously mysterious and unintelligible, will be flooded with light.

Nothing that men say of their purposes can be accepted at its face value. This is so because men and women do not even know what they are doing, nor are they

conscious of the ends that guide their action. Many of the paradoxes of history disappear in the light of this simple but revealing principle. Some of the most outstanding mysteries of the relation between thought and action exhibited in history become far less unintelligible.

The Christian Churches, founded upon a doctrine of love and preaching a gospel of mercy, have nevertheless used every refinement of torture and every instrument of pain—from the rack to the stake—in order to break and crush opposition to their interests or dogmas. Communists, with the high words of human equality and human brotherhood upon their lips, have shot and tortured, imprisoned and starved, the powerless masses that they have controlled. Democracies, paying solemn lip-service to the cause of equality between the nations and of government over them, have nevertheless divided the world as they chose while their enemies were weak, and have betrayed the doctrine of collective security when their enemies became strong.

All these things, the crude and often horrible paradoxes of history, become intelligible as soon as we realize that the conscious purpose and the real purpose of individuals and of groups need bear no direct relationship to one another. Human beings may say that they want one thing and really want its opposite, and do this, not because they are rogues or hypocrites, but because the human mind possesses a dangerous power to disguise even from the thinking and willing agent the clear purposes of its own thought and action. We do not know ourselves. We are not the simple creatures of rational purpose that we think we are. The springs of our action lie hidden, like corpuscles and phagocytes, secret but dominant, in our spiritual blood.

It is therefore necessary to assess ideas and theories in the light of the emotional life of the ideologists, and to judge every institution and system of thought by the emotions that are involved in it and justified by it. "By their fruits ye shall know them."—"Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?"

Democracy at the Grass Roots

David E. Lilienthal is a lawyer and career public administrator, a former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and at present the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In this selection which is based upon his experience in directing the TVA, Mr. Lilienthal describes a practical technique for developing co-operation among men of varied experience and background which simultaneously encourages the development of individual talents. This experience in the Tennessee Valley seems to support the contentions of psychologists that it is possible to encourage responsible citizenship.

FOR THE PEOPLE AND BY THE PEOPLE

*It is not the earth, it is not America who is
so great,
It is I who am great or to be great, it is You
up there, or any one,
It is to walk rapidly through civilizations,
governments, theories,
Through poems, pageants, shows, to form
individuals.*

*Underneath all, individuals, I swear nothing
is good to me now that ignores indi-
viduals....*

—Walt Whitman

People are the most important fact in resource development. Not only is the welfare and happiness of individuals its true purpose, but they are the means by which that development is accomplished; their genius, their energies and spirit are the instruments; it is not only "for the people" but "by the people."

The purpose of resource development must be more than the mere physical welfare of the greatest number of human beings. It is true that we cannot be starving and cold and still be happy. But an abundance of food, the satisfaction of elementary physical needs alone, is not

enough. A man wants to feel that he is important. He wants to be able not only to express his opinion freely, but to know that it carries some weight; to know that there are some things that he decides, or has a part in deciding, and that he is a needed and useful part of something far bigger than he is.

MAN AS AN INDIVIDUAL

This hankering to be an *individual* is probably greater today than ever before. Huge factories, assembly lines, mysterious mechanisms, standardization—these underline the smallness of the individual, because they are so fatally impersonal. If the intensive development of resources, the central fact in the immediate future of the world, could be made personal to the life of most men; if they could see themselves, because it was true, as actual participants in that development in their own communities, on their own land, at their own jobs and businesses—there would be an opportunity for this kind of individual satisfaction, and there would be something to tie to. Men would not only have more things; they would be stronger and happier men.

From *TVA: Democracy on the March*, by David E. Lilienthal. Copyright, 1944, by David E. Lilienthal. Harper & Brothers, publishers. (Footnotes omitted.)

Resource development need not be held fast by the dehumanizing forces of modern life that whittle down the importance of the individual. Surely it should be freed of their grip, for they are the very negation of democracy. "...nothing is good to me now that ignores individuals."

It is the unique strength of democratic methods that they provide a way of stimulating and releasing the individual resourcefulness and inventiveness, the pride of workmanship, the creative genius of human beings whatever their station or function. A world of science and great machines is still a world of men; our modern task is more difficult, but the opportunity for democratic methods is greater even than in the days of the ax and the hand loom.

A method of organizing the modern task of resource development that not only will be based upon the principle of unity but can draw in the average man and make him a part of the great job of our time, in the day-to-day work in the fields and factories and the offices of business, will tap riches of human talent that are beyond the reach of any highly centralized, dictatorial, and impersonal system of development based upon remote control in the hands of a business, a technical, or a political elite.

It is just such widespread and intimate participation of the people in the development of their valley that has gone on here in these ten years past.

"BY THE PEOPLE"

The spiritual yield of democratic methods, a renewed sense that the individual counts, would be justification enough. But there is yet another reason, a practical one, for seeking at every turn to bring people actively into the task of building a region's resources; there is, I think, really no other way in which the job can be done. The task of harmonizing and from time to

time adjusting the intricate, detailed maze of pieces that make up the unified development of resources in a world of technology is something that simply cannot be done effectively from some remote government or business headquarters.

The people must be in on that job. The necessities of management make it mandatory. Efficiency, in the barest operating sense, requires it. There is nothing in my experience more heartening than this: that devices of management which give a lift to the human spirit turn out so often to be the most "efficient" methods. Viewed in any perspective there is no other way. No code of laws or regulations can possibly be detailed enough to direct the precise course of resource development. No district attorney or gestapo could, for long, hope to enforce such a regime. No blueprints or plans can ever be comprehensive enough, or sufficiently flexible, as a matter of management, for so ever-changing an enterprise. It is the people or nothing.

From the outset of the TVA undertaking it has been evident to me, as to many others, that a valley development envisioned in its entirety could become a reality if and only if the people of the region did much of the planning, and participated in most of the decisions. To a considerable degree this is what is happening. Each year, almost each month, one can see the participation of the people, as a fundamental practice, grow more vigorous, and, although it suffers occasional setbacks, it is becoming part of the thinking and the mechanics of the development of the Tennessee Valley.

...I shall illustrate how TVA has undertaken its job of region-building at the grass roots, and how regional decentralization is at work in almost every side of the valley's life—among farmers, workmen, businessmen, local officials, and in TVA's relations with state and local governments. In telling how these ideas have

been put in practice, I have chosen to begin with the story of how TVA has applied grass-roots democracy to the job of rebuilding the land.

WHAT THE PROBLEMS WERE

The farmers—there are about 225,000 farms in the watershed of the Tennessee River, with 1,350,000 people living on them—have long seen that their lands were in trouble. They knew, almost all of them, what they wanted. They knew that what was needed was to increase the productivity of their lands, to heal the gullies, to keep water on the land, and to prevent the soil from washing away. Like almost everyone else they were reluctant to change their habits of doing things. They wanted to have a say-so about changes, they had to be “shown”; but when their confidence had been earned they were enthusiastic, and they were generous of spirit.

The farm experts, both in the Department of Agriculture’s scientific bureaus in Washington and in the state agencies of the Tennessee Valley, had known most of the technical answers to the *separate* problems of soils, of fertilizer, of terracing, and had known them for a good many years. They were competent in their special fields, and devoted to their work. Nevertheless farm income in the valley as in the whole Southeast continued at a low ebb; in some counties the average cash income for a farm *family* was less than \$150 a year. Soil losses were appalling. Farm tenantry increased. Changes in farming favored by the technicians, away from cotton and corn, for example, did occur, but the pace was so slow that the direction on the whole continued downward. Entire rural counties, the towns included, were without a single telephone, a mile of farm electric line, a public library, a newspaper, a hospital, a single public health officer.

The technical knowledge of farming problems in the agricultural agencies, state and federal, was extensive, but it was largely generalized. It was not based on the needs of a particular farm or farming community. When this knowledge did reach the farmer, through reports of scientific results on experimental plots, in pamphlets, or by word of mouth through one of many agencies, it was usually a succession of separate bits of knowledge, and it was often remote from the farmer’s individual problems. He was likely to be confused by the multiplicity of “remedies” and the more than a score of different governmental agencies with which he must deal on agricultural problems.

What was needed was not alone more technical information, but that *on the farm itself* there should be a unification of all the available knowledge and skills. The technical knowledge of all kinds available at the various state university agricultural experiment farms had somehow to be moved to thousands of valley farms, actual farms. What happened at a beautifully equipped experiment station or in a laboratory was one thing; what would happen on a man’s farm was quite another. The laboratory had to be taken to the farm; the whole farm as a business was the farmer’s problem.

THE DEMONSTRATION FARM PROGRAM

Furthermore, as TVA saw it, and as the agricultural colleges were quick to confirm, the individual farmer was the only one who could *apply* all this available expertness. He must therefore become the center of the scheme of education in new methods. We did not want a method of restoring soil whereby the farmer would be ordered; he would learn *by doing*, on his own place; his neighbors would learn by watching him and adapting what “worked out.” Nor did we want a mere

false front, using the outward form of voluntary and educational methods to disguise actual coercion, or "uplift," or narrow political purposes.

After some searching the method that was worked out, with state, local, and federal agencies as co-operating parties, centered about "whole farm demonstrations" on tens of thousands of dirt farms. The results in physical terms I have already summarized. On the land of these demonstration farmers two ideas met and were combined in action: the idea of unity, and the democratic idea that much of the planning and execution of resource development must be in the hands of the people.

These thousands of typical working farms are the schoolrooms of the valley. Here farmers, their wives and children, with their neighbors learn and demonstrate the unity of resources, learn and demonstrate the principles of grass-roots democracy. Here there is brought to them the fruits of the technical man's skills. In each of the valley's counties there are one or more Farm Improvement Associations, with a total membership of more than 32,000 farmers. These associations are organized by the farmers and operated entirely by boards of trustees elected by them.

The demonstration farm program of the Tennessee Valley began, back in 1935, in this way: The farmers in a community, called together by their county agricultural agent, selected several of their own number who were willing to have their farms serve as a "demonstration" for the rest. Later on it became apparent to farmers and technicians that all the farms in a community usually constituted a more useful unit for demonstration than one farm or a scattered few. As a consequence what are called "area demonstrations" were set up by the farmers' associations. Some counties contain twenty such community-wide demonstrations,

with as many as eighty families in such a single "little valley."

Phosphate, Key to Life.

The hub about which these demonstrations turn is the soil mineral *phosphate*. (In some of a thousand other valleys, differently situated, the use of water for irrigation, say, or electric power might be that hub.) The technicians in the state institutions had long known that most of the valley land was deficient in phosphate; it is coming to be recognized as a deficiency of most American farming land. More than a generation ago the pioneer conservationist Charles Van Hise had said that the depletion of soil phosphates "is the most crucial, the most important, and the most far-reaching problem with reference to the future of the nation." This the technicians had long known. But the drain has gone on, at unabated pace. My associate on the Board, Dr. Harcourt A. Morgan, a leading agricultural scientist, knew more about the almost magic effect of adding this mineral to "poor" soils than any man in America. But he knew, too, and patiently taught that what was necessary was not merely adding phosphate to the soil but a change in the entire management of individual farms. In that change phosphate could be a fulcrum for other needed adjustments, a central vantage point from which to see and to learn the lesson of the seamless web.

Between the expert and the farm was a crucial gap which the methods of the past left unfilled. What TVA has done is to throw a bridge across that gap.

Furthermore TVA has brought together and concentrated upon the solution of the problems of these typical farms technical and scientific forces of every kind, and not just those usually deemed "agricultural." The inventor, the engineer, the transportation expert, and the businessman have all had a hand in the work of farm adjustment. As important as any of these

"outsiders" were the chemical engineers. The adequate use of phosphate in the past had in part been impeded by its cost to the farmer. A group of TVA chemical technicians, aided by every other source of expertness in Washington and the Tennessee Valley, was set to work in 1933 to reduce the cost by producing this fertilizer in *highly concentrated form*, thereby making large savings on transportation and bagging costs.

The huge munitions plant at Muscle Shoals, inherited by TVA from World War I, became the center of technical research of this kind. By 1935 a wholly new electric-furnace phosphate process had gone through the pilot plant stage and was technically proven. TVA subsequently constructed a plant capable of producing 150,000 tons a year of new and improved plant food for the land from the fossilized bones of animals which lived in the sea that once covered middle Tennessee—for that is what phosphate ore is. The resulting granules of one form of these products were four times as concentrated as what had previously been in general use.

The state agricultural agencies and TVA, working together, showed that this new form of chemical, applied to the land, in combination with ground limestone (a cheap and plentiful rock), would enable clover and other legumes to grow where before the soil would not sustain them. These legume plants, such as clover, bear on their roots tiny nodules, rich in another element, nitrogen, drawn by the tiny bacteria in the nodules from the inexhaustible supply in the air. Three pounds of nitrogen could thus be "manufactured" out of the air, on the farmer's land, for every one pound of phosphorus he put on the soil. Phosphate and lime, through legumes, would thus add nitrogen. The three together meant a revitalized fertile land.

A soil badly deficient in these three basic elements is dead, sterile. No seed would ever grow to cover it against the six thou-

sand tons of water that fall each winter on every valley acre. A soil rich in these elements could, with planning and with "know-how" in the farmer's hands, be made part of a valley-wide scheme to conserve the soil and the streams, and thereby to strengthen the people.

Use of the Tools.

Here were new, modern technical tools: a concentrated mineral phosphate, and the experts' generalized knowledge of what science could do to help increase productiveness of land. But it was the people on the farms who must use these tools. And to use them effectively meant that the individual farmer must plan ahead, adjust and readjust the management of his entire farm, as a plant manager must plan and readjust his whole operation to a radical new machine. It meant that in that planning he needed technical counsel, as the problems arose. He ought to have the advice of the ablest farmers in his neighborhood. Before he could "realize" on these new tools he would have to surmount all manner of barriers, physical and economic. And, finally, if the community and national interest were to be served by this technical advance, the farmer on his land must learn the truth of unity in resource development: that his farm was not only a field or two, woodland, a pasture and a house and barn, but a unit; that likewise the land and water, forests and minerals, power and industry were all inseparable parts of his own work and life; that on that farm he is part of the cycle of nature.

There, on that land, the farmer would see how science affected his own daily life. In this way the chemical plant at Muscle Shoals, the great turbines at Norris Dam, the laboratories of the state universities, in short, the world of science, would come to have meaning to the man who after all was their "boss." Science, if brought thus close to him, would enable the average

man (on a farm or in the town) to learn what it is that technology makes feasible, for him, what, in short, are *the people's alternatives*; without that knowledge what reality is there in the free man's democratic right to choose?

The benefits of such grass-roots thinking are almost as great for the scientist as for the layman. Technology is never final. What the farmers themselves observe, in the actual use of a soil mineral on their land, is of great value in laboratory research to open new doors to ever new discoveries. And this has actually occurred at TVA's Muscle Shoals plants and laboratories where farmers have stood at the elbow of chemical engineers while they designed new equipment for new products adapted to the farmers' actual observed needs. Keeping open a living channel of communication *between the layman and the technician*, a needed stimulus to science, invention, and industry, is another yield of grass-roots methods.

The Farm-Schoolroom.

To return to the demonstration farm. Once selected, the first step was to map and inventory this farm schoolroom. These maps and inventories are not "documents," built up by questionnaires from a distance, nor are they "professional." They are made by the farmer and the committee of his neighbors. Then the farmer, the technicians, and the county agent and his demonstration assistant "talk over" that map. They walk over the place, map and inventory in hand, often several times, still talking it over. A new management plan for the farm is the result, reduced to writing. In return for the use of his farm as a schoolroom and for his promise to keep detailed records so that others may profit by his experience, the demonstrator is supplied without cost (except freight) with TVA concentrated phosphate minerals sufficient to carry out the "new plan." He agrees with his neighbors to

use these minerals on crops that will further the building of the soil and store more water in it, and not otherwise. For all the other adjustments he must pay his own way: the needed lime, terracing, cattle for the pasture that takes the place of the cotton field, and fencing for that pasture; the sheds and barns and necessary machinery. Most of these farmers had depended for their cash upon the soil-costly crops: cotton, corn, tobacco. They embarked upon a change that would rebuild the soil. Most of them had little if any working capital. What they put in, out of meager resources, was "venture capital," and too they risked the loss of their source of cash income to carry the family through the winter. But they tried it voluntarily, more than 20,000 of them in the states of the Tennessee Valley alone, and succeeded.

Most demonstration farmers have succeeded in increasing their capital resources, many have increased their income in cash received or in a rising family living standard; at the same time they have conserved and revitalized their soil. This is important because this method, being voluntary with no powers of enforcement in anyone, depends upon hitching together the farmer's self-interest and the general public interest in the basic resource of the soil. The individual has made himself one with the common purpose which the TVA idea holds for all individuals, the development of the resources upon which all stand. Self-interest here has served that public interest.

For a time these new ways of doing things were viewed with some suspicion. All kinds of rumors spread through the countryside. One story was that, once a farmer put this TVA phosphate on his land, the land would thenceforth belong to the "gov'ment." But when on one side of a line fence there grew little but worthless sedge grass, and on the other the field was heavy with crimson clover and alfalfa,

a change in attitude and interest took place. The demonstration farms became places to visit, to study, to emulate. The greatest effect in spreading new farming practices has been among those who have never been selected as demonstrators at all. Hundreds of farmers, nondemonstrators, will spend a day going from one of these farm schoolrooms to another.

A report from Virginia shows that large proportions of the "students" went home and adopted some or all the changes on their own farms. I have attended some of these all-day meetings where scores of farmers gathered in the fields, earnestly observing, asking questions, arguing, prodding the "experts" for an answer to this difficulty or the "why" of this or that.

Thomas Jefferson, also a Virginia farmer, saw that education is the foundation of a democratic nation; what was true in the eighteenth century is doubly true when technology of a hundred kinds must be at the hand of every citizen. At these meetings one man steps up and tells his experience; then another adds his story. One man's planning is compared with another's. The "lessons" learned are taken back to be tested at home.

THE RESULTS

At one meeting in northern Alabama, for example, three hundred farmers from eight different counties gathered on the Aaron Fleming farm in a single day's meeting. As a result of what they saw at this one session alone 150,000 acres of the land of nondemonstrators were affected; 10,000 Alabama acres were for the first time put under a protective cover of legumes against the washing of winter rains; and so on with other changes—restoring and saving soil, storing water on the land, increasing by 30 to 100 per cent the efficiency in production of once almost exhausted American soil, providing new

business in the neighboring towns and in manufacturing centers far away.

First of course the farmer thought about his own land, his own family, then about his neighborhood. He began to work with his neighbors. First they concerned themselves with farming, then community forest-fire protection, then the school, the community's health problems, the church. Thus what begins as "soil building" or "better farming," by the inevitable force of unity of resources and men, soon "touches and gives life to all forms of human concerns," to use language of the President's original message concerning the TVA.

Farmers began working together, concentrating their efforts upon a matter far more important than any one man but in which each individual was deemed an essential part. The single farm demonstration developed into area demonstrations, these into county-wide associations, with trustees elected from all parts of the county. From phosphate and lime other common interests grew, such as livestock and its improvement, since without cattle and sheep no farmer could utilize the forage of his pastures and meadows.

What about refrigerating some of the meat produced on these pastures? The technical men were called upon, a simple matter since they were close at hand. Agricultural engineers worked out an answer: a walk-in locker refrigerator that would accommodate a dozen families. No fancy and expensive gadget; the experts were too close to the people to wander off into such professional perfectionism. This cooler was so simple that any community carpenter could build it at a low total cost. One was set up for a demonstration at White Pine community. It worked, was practical, became accepted, was purchased from TVA. Then it was adopted, on their own, by many communities. Hundreds of thousands of pounds of meat are being stored in them. Income increased. The diet

of thousands of farmers was improved, not merely by preaching about the need but by setting the experts to work figuring out a *workable alternative* by which the people could make their choice of better diet a reality.

In much the same way a number of other technical answers which the valley's experts have devised have been tested by groups and organizations of farmers acting together: food dehydrators (a field in which the Tennessee Valley had already produced practical results before the war gave the subject such urgency); portable irrigation; a simple low-cost electric barn hay drier; new farm uses for small electric motors; a portable thresher; quick-freezing, and so on. Each of these technical efforts to make it possible for a farmer to afford doing what he wanted to do, i.e., farm so that his soil would be conserved, was tried out on actual farms by a group of farmers studying the "contraption" together, making suggestions together, and later often ordering one of the appliances for their own community use.

Buying feed or fencing, and selling eggs or berries or cattle, by individual farmers quite naturally gave way in many counties to group purchasing and marketing through the same association which administered the demonstrations. Today, through this natural evolution, the Farm Improvement Association has become more and more a medium for initiating many other projects for building rural life.

REVITALIZING THE COMMUNITY

In the Tennessee Valley the effect of working together, building a fertile soil, and finding ways to protect it and keep it strong is not merely a matter of men's livelihood. Revitalizing the soil has done things to the people and their institutions quite as much as to the land. Schools have been painted, lighted, or rebuilt, church and community activities stimulated; the

effect is felt in a score of people's activities which they share in common. Only cynics will find this surprising. To those with faith in humankind it is natural enough that when men adopt a common purpose so deep and broad as that of working with nature to build a region's resources there ensue inevitable consequences to the spirit of men. These indeed may be the most important result of all.

Similar consequences in the rural life of this valley have followed upon another fruit of technology: electricity. Here again farmers worked together, organizing their own electric co-operatives, sometimes against the opposition of private agencies. Electricity became a fulcrum, as did phosphate, for many changes. Electricity induced changes in farm management practices; soil conservation was encouraged. The portable electric motor, the refrigerator, electric cooling of milk, and soil heating by electricity meant increased farm income, and so the farmer could afford to buy more phosphate at the store, bid in more cattle at the auction, put in more grass, winter grain, and legumes, less corn and cotton.

And, as in the case of the technical lever of phosphate, electricity's part in furthering unified development of resources through human understanding went far beyond the business of making a living. The coming of electricity has had an important effect upon standards in rural schools, for example. Similarly in farm homes. When an electric range or refrigerator comes into a farm kitchen the effect is always much the same: the kitchen gets a coat of paint, is furbished up; not long after, the rest of the house spruces up; a new room is built on, pride begins to remake the place—pride supported by the added income that comes from "smart" use of electricity for farm purposes. You can follow the trail of new electric lines in many sections by observing the houses that have been thus tidied up.

THE LARGER PURPOSE

When the principles of grass-roots democracy are followed, electricity, like soil minerals, provides men with a stimulus in their own lives, as well as an opportunity to work together with others toward a purpose bigger than any individual. By that act of joint effort, of citizen participation, the individual's freedom is strengthened and his satisfactions increased.

A common purpose furthered by grass-roots methods not only draws neighbors together in a community, then in a county and a group of counties; as time goes on the whole region, from one end to another, has felt the effect. The North Carolina farmers in the high mountains of Watauga or Jackson counties are brought closer to the Virginians and to the Alabama and western Kentucky farmers of the red clay flatlands. A common purpose is making us one valley.

Nor is this cohesive effect confined even to the Tennessee Valley. In twenty-one states outside the Valley, seventeen of them outside the South, similar demonstration farms using TVA phosphate, now numbering 5,000, have been organized by the farmers and the institutions of those states and are operating along similar lines, though on a less extensive scale.

Not long ago two busloads of farmers from the great dairy state of Wisconsin came to the valley "to see for ourselves." Something had gone wrong with their own lands. They spent days walking over Tennessee and Alabama demonstration farms. Today, in Wisconsin, TVA phosphate is being used in the same kind of demonstrations in twenty-seven counties of that state. For me one of the pleasantest experiences of these years was the sight of a Wisconsin farmer sitting on an automobile running board with an Alabama cotton farmer, both completely absorbed, talking over together their experiences with their land. Their grandfathers may

have fought against each other at Shiloh. These citizens, however, would never think of Alabama and Wisconsin in the same way again. Not even the visits to the valley of hundreds of earnest "learners" from Mexico, China, Brazil, Australia, and a dozen other foreign lands has more meaning than the meeting of those two men on that Alabama farm.

THE RELEASE OF HUMAN ENERGIES

The story of TVA at the grass roots is not merely a story of soil conservation. It is an account of how through a modern expression of ancient democratic principles human energies have been released in furtherance of a common purpose.

The human energies that can build a region and make people's lives richer in the doing are not confined to any one kind or group of men. There is, essentially, no difference in this respect between farm people and industrial workers, businessmen, librarians, ministers, doctors. All who live in the valley are needed in varying degrees, in this task of resource development.

The individual satisfactions that come to a man from actively participating in such a basic undertaking are great whatever his calling. Working on one's own farm or upon a TVA dam affords such an opportunity, and so do public or private industrial research and development, or furthering the use of the new TVA-made lakes as a transportation resource. The principles of democracy at the grass roots remain throughout the same; every plan and action must meet the test of the question: Does this activity in furtherance of unified development employ *methods that bring in the people*, that give the people themselves, in this fundamental task, the fullest opportunity for the release of the great reservoir of human talents and energies?

I'm Not Sticking My Neck Out

Granville Hicks is a successful novelist, biographer, and literary critic. He has taught English courses at Smith College, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Harvard University. In his book *Small Town* he reports in interesting fashion his experience as an active citizen in a small New York state community. In contrast with Mr. Lilienthal's optimistic account of successful co-operation, Hicks found a general reluctance to accept civic responsibility and a widespread cynicism toward the motives of those who did. What conditions in modern life produce the inhibiting sense of inadequacy among young people? Why is apathy and resentment so common? Can a democracy long withstand the withering influence of these forces? In nontechnical language there is here revealed another facet of the problems to be faced in our efforts to conduct human affairs by democratic procedures.

Most people, in any time and place, dodge responsibility, and the inefficacy of good intentions is proverbial, but I wonder if it is common for inaction to be so directly traceable to fear of criticism. In the PTA, the Defense Council, and the fire company, when a decision had to be made, I have again and again studied the doubtful faces as everyone waited for someone else to take the lead. At town board meetings I have seen the justices and the councilmen glancing shiftily about the table. Invariably people have opinions, and invariably the opinions are privately expressed, with more or less conviction, but a clear, unqualified public statement is rare.

"I'm not sticking my neck out." That, we have sometimes felt, might be the motto of the town. An apparent corollary of the refusal to take responsibility is sharp criticism of the people who do. This criticism merges into an intense suspiciousness of motives, which may in part serve as a defensive rationalization of inaction. A town official once told me that after he had done several favors for an old woman,

she said to a neighbor, "I'll never vote for Vincent again. He didn't charge me a cent. He must be making plenty out of the town." Suspiciousness is sometimes part of a more general cynicism. It was one of the least savory of the town's politicians who said to us when we were first active in civilian protection, "I don't see why you do all this work for nothing. I bet the higher-ups are getting plenty of money." And on one of the many occasions when Dorothy was sweeping the town hall in preparation for a PTA meeting, a political hanger-on said, "Why do you have to do all the work? You don't get any more out of it than anybody else, do you?"

All this explains why organizational leadership is usually left to outsiders. The native, when asked to take an office, is immediately aware of the kind and quantity of criticism to which he will be subjected. Far better than the outsider he knows how his actions will be scrutinized and how they will be misrepresented. He knows that his failures will be jeered at

and his successes belittled. He knows, too, that he can scarcely avoid giving offense to persons he has to associate with daily. On the other hand, if he accepts no responsibility, he will not only be safe from criticism himself; he will have all the pleasures of criticizing others. If the outsiders are fools enough to stick their necks out, let them do it.

If, however, natives are seldom found in positions of leadership, one can almost always discover some of them among the hard workers. These, however, must be divided into two groups. There are those who do their work conscientiously and quietly, whether it is preparing for a supper, canvassing for the Red Cross, or managing a dance. But there are also those who will work only if they are praised for everything they do. I have never seen such an appetite for flattery as some of the natives exhibit, so naïve and naked a yearning for assurance and recognition. And it is coupled, as of course it would be, with a touchiness that makes the smallest enterprise a diplomatic feat. "You have to butter them up," the experienced say. Harvey Dakin, however, expounds a doctrine that seems to work equally well: "Just treat 'em rough and they'll respect you all the more for it." As a matter of fact, whether they are buttered up or treated rough, sooner or later they get their feelings hurt, and sooner or later they can be lured back for more work, more praise, and more quarrels.

These are some of the elements that enter into the life of the community, and whenever there is a job to be done, one sees them in operation. In the autumn of 1945 the board of fire commissioners of the newly established Roxborough Fire District presented to the voters two propositions calling for the issuing of bonds to buy a fire truck and build a fire house. Although we had prepared a statement that seemed to us clear and comprehensive, we heard plenty of rumors of growing

opposition, and we were not surprised when the propositions were defeated. What made our proposition almost hopeless was the fact that we were never able to meet the objections squarely. One opponent, possibly piqued because he was not a member of the board, left behind him a trail of rumors and charges in the barber shop, the beer joints, and the stores, but it was as impossible to involve him in direct debate as it was to catch up with all his stories. While we were convincing one individual that we hadn't made a deal to purchase a certain expensive tract of land, and hadn't the power to make such a deal if we wanted to, a dozen individuals were being told that their taxes would be doubled or that the money would be used to pay the commissioners' exorbitant salaries. While we dealt with the few concrete objections that were mentioned to us, a great body of vague but damaging charges circulated in the untouchable region of private whispers.

Possibly the propositions would have won if we had conducted our campaign more energetically and more realistically, relying less on what seemed to us to be the obvious and overwhelming merits of our case. At best, however, there were four powerful factors working against us. In the first place, most of the commissioners were outsiders who had been active in community affairs of one kind or another and had thereby invited criticism and made enemies. In the second place, the prevailing suspiciousness of motives led to ready acceptance of the most fantastic and most discreditable stories. In the third place, the old-timers' perpetual resistance to change made most of them easy victims of the active opponents of the measures, a fact that the opponents were quick to take advantage of. Finally, and most important of all, the habit of avoiding direct public discussion did us irreparable damage. If the people who didn't want fire-fighting equipment had had to

come out publicly and say so, I think we should have won.

One cannot say that these people are in any literal sense inarticulate, for in private they can express their grievances eloquently if not logically, but there is a kind of unwillingness to confront issues squarely.

All this raises the question of the connection between articulateness and a sense of adequacy. In any given instance it is hard to tell what is cause and what is effect, but it seems to me that most men are articulate when they feel adequate to a situation and that most men feel adequate to a situation in which they can find the right words. One thing I have noticed and that is that in general the old-timers seem to be more articulate than their sons. I do not mean that they are any more forthright about the kind of community issue I have been discussing but merely that one rarely finds them ill at ease. The explanation seems to be simple: they are still living in a world to which they have proved themselves adequate, and they are seldom called upon to discuss topics with which they feel incompetent to deal. Political issues are apparently as simple to these men as they were in the days when they cast their first votes for Garfield or Harrison. They have no businesses to acquaint them with the complexities of government regulations or the power of monopolies, and they have never seen the inside of a modern factory. In general the things they talk about are the things they know well, and the many things they do not know well infrequently impinge upon their consciousness.

If this analysis is sound, it would seem to follow that the relative inarticulateness of the middle-aged and younger men must have something to do with their exposure to a more complicated life.

A guest of ours, after attending a square

dance in Roxborough, said that there were just two expressions: apathy and resentment. This is much too simple—perhaps too literary—an account. What looks like apathy is often enough a kind of mask, and one has to guess what is behind it by catching a twist of the mouth or a brightness in the eye. But conscious as I am of the complexity of Roxborough characters, I cannot gainsay that apathy and resentment are common expressions—and common attitudes, too. What I do maintain, however, is that apathy and resentment are also common expressions on the streets of Troy and the streets of New York City. A great many people, in other words, seem to feel that they are being pushed around, and either they have grown used to it and expect nothing else, or they are perpetually sore about it.

What interests me is that in Roxborough I can see some of the forms that the pushing around takes. In the first place, the economic factor is smaller than I would have supposed and probably smaller than it is in the cities. That is to say, the people as a rule are not worrying about losing jobs or feeling sore because they are underpaid. They were pleased to be making good wages during the war, and there has been some griping as wages have fallen off, but they got along with very little in the early thirties, and they can do it again if they have to. I do not doubt that my fellow citizens would be different, and might very possibly be better and happier, if they had had nothing but healthy food in childhood, if they had been given adequate medical care, and if they had received the best possible education, but to say this is not quite the same thing as saying that their problems are primarily economic. In the second place, I do not think my neighbors are suffering chiefly from the blows of fate or fortune or providence or whatever it is they believe in—physical disasters, that is, ill health, the death of relatives. It has always seemed to me that

the lower classes take such blows more philosophically than the upper classes do, and people in Roxborough are certainly philosophical. Most of my neighbors regard death as a natural—or a divine—phenomenon, not as a personal affront. No, if people in Roxborough feel that they are being pushed around, and many of them do, the forces that are doing the pushing are social forces. These are in part the very forces that hold the community together: it is a strain to live constantly in the face and eyes of your neighbors, and I suppose it always has been. For the rest, they are the large and certainly mysterious forces that lie outside the community and are more and more strongly impinging upon it.

The absence of any very acute sense of social responsibility is sufficiently demonstrated by the attitude most Roxborough men take toward the law. I can understand their indifference to game laws, their feeling that these apply only to city slickers. I can also understand their disregard for traffic laws and similar regulations, since in this respect their attitude is merely that of the majority of Americans. What bothers me is a more general cynicism. I am not naïve enough to be unaware that this kind of cynicism is widespread, and I would expect to find it in such a metropolitan area as William F. Whyte describes in his *Street Corner Society*, but I am a little surprised to discover how easily it has naturalized itself in a community that might be expected to have some defenses against it. It is, of course, good American doctrine that every man should look after himself with the

devil taking the hindmost. In many relationships this doctrine is less thoroughly applied in Roxborough than in most of the cities I have known: self-seeking is at least curbed by the obligations of neighborliness. But every predatory pioneer instinct goes into operation when the average native is confronted with his government—town, state, or federal. Governmental bodies apparently exist to be cheated, and regulations were made to be evaded. It is no wonder that during the war the black market had its Roxborough customers. Many of those who bought in the black market were intensely patriotic, and not merely in words, but they followed their deepest convictions and got theirs when and where the getting was good. The fact that in getting theirs they were putting something over on the government did not diminish their pleasure.

There is not much to be said for the values of the majority. They are purely personal or at most can be stretched to include a family or a small clique. Measured by whatever principle one chooses—the ethical teachings of Christianity, the public school conception of the good citizen, even the utilitarian doctrine of rational self-interest—they stand hopelessly low. I once would have said that these people have no values, but I know that is wrong. What I can say is that their values are almost entirely unformulated and are never subjected to rational examination. I can say, furthermore, that they are not values on which a civilization of any very notable quality is likely to be founded.

Words: Tools or Barrier?

Daniel Katz is chairman of the Department of Psychology at Brooklyn College, a member of the editorial board of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and president of the Division of Personality and Social Psychology, American Psychological Association. In this essay Professor Katz suggests some of the difficulties arising out of the nature of language: the failure to relate language to reality; the reliance upon stereotypes; and the impact of personal experience on our ability to comprehend. Even though nominally speaking the same language, do we understand one another? Does "security" mean the same thing to the farmer and the building trades laborer? What meaning does "free private enterprise" convey to the factory worker and the Chicago wheat pit speculator? If these problems complicate the solution of domestic problems for people living under relatively similar conditions, it is obvious that they compound the difficulty of dealing with other countries with different traditions, cultures, historical experiences, and languages.

Accurate and adequate communication between groups and peoples will not in itself bring about the millennium, but it is a necessary condition for almost all forms of social progress. Physical barriers to communication are rapidly disappearing, but the psychological obstacles remain. These psychological difficulties are in part a function of the very nature of language; in part they are due to the emotional character and mental limitations of human beings.

THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE

Much of our communication in the great society must of necessity be by formal language rather than by visual presentation or by the explicit denotation or pointing possible in small face-to-face groups. Formal language is symbolic in that its verbal or mathematical terms stand for aspects of reality beyond them-

selves. Though onomatopoetic words are an exception, they constitute but a small fraction of any modern language. Because of its symbolic nature, language is a poor substitute for the realities which it attempts to represent. The real world is more complex, more colorful, more fluid, more multidimensional than the pale words or oversimplified signs used to convey meaning.

Nor is there any easy solution of the problem. A language too close to perceptual reality would be useless for generalization and would, moreover, ignore complex forms of experience. Language enables us to transcend the specificity of the single event and makes possible the analysis and comparison of experiences. But the abstraction and generalization through the use of symbols which has given man his control over the natural world also makes possible the greatest distortions of reality. Many language signs

From "Psychological Barriers to Communication," by Daniel Katz, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1947. (Footnotes omitted.)

may in fact be completely lacking in objective reference. The semantic movement is the current effort to cope with the woe-ful inadequacies inherent in the symbolic nature of language. Thus far it has contributed more to exposing the inaccuracies and weaknesses in language than to developing a science of meaning.

The imperfection of language is not due solely to the weakness of its representational quality. Viewed realistically, language as a living process has other functions than accurate communication. It did not arise in the history of the race, any more than in the development of the child, solely in the interest of precise interchange of information. Language as it exists is not the product of scientists trying to perfect an exact set of symbols; it is the product of the arena of everyday life, in which people are concerned with manipulating and controlling their fellows and with expressing their emotional and psychological wants. The prototype of language as a functioning process can be seen in the child's acquisition of words and phrases to extend his control of his environment beyond his limited physical reach. Similarly, adults use language to obtain sympathy, bulldoze their fellows, placate or embarrass their enemies, warm and comfort their friends, deceive themselves, or express their own conflicts. Language in operation is often intended to conceal and obscure meaning. Hence as an instrument for accurate communication it suffers from emotional loadings, polar words, and fictitious concepts.

Even the will to interchange factual information, therefore, is embarrassed by the heritage of a language developed for other purposes. This is one of the reasons for the slow growth of social science compared with natural science. Once the physical and biological sciences had got under way, their data were so far removed from everyday observation that they were free to develop scientific terminology and

concepts. But this initial step is much more difficult in the social realm because we already have a well-developed popular language applying to social events and relationships. For example, F. H. Allport demonstrated some twenty years ago the scientific inadequacy of the popular concepts of "group" and "institution" through which we personify the group and, in the manner of the cartoonist, speak of a paranoid Germany, a schizophrenic France, or a megalomaniacal Russia. But his warning went unheeded because social scientists have been unable to shed the habitual modes of thought arising from their language and their culture.

These general considerations concerning the psychological nature of language are the background against which more specific difficulties in communication can be understood. The following specific obstacles merit special attention: (1) the failure to refer language to experience and reality, (2) the inability to transcend personal experience in intergroup communication, (3) stereotypes: the assimilation of material to familiar frames of reference, and (4) the confusion of percept and concept: reification and personification.

RELATION OF SYMBOL TO FACT

Psychological research abounds with illustrations of the principle that analytic thinking occurs not as the prevalent mode of human response but as a limited reaction under conditions of block or need. Men think critically and precisely only under specific conditions of motivation, and then only in reference to the particular pressing problem. Ordinarily they respond according to the law of least effort. In the field of language behavior, this appears at the most fundamental level in the tendency to confuse words with the things or processes they name. The word and its referent are fused as an un-

analyzed whole in the mind of the individual. Among primitives, for example, it is not permitted to mention the name of a person recently deceased. Since there is deep fear of the spirit of the departed, it is dangerous to bring up his name, fundamentally because the name and the person named are psychologically confused. Even in our own society, many obscene and sacred words are taboo because the name is regarded as the equivalent of the object or process for which it stands.

This inability to grasp the difference between the symbol and its referent is one reason for the failure to check back constantly from language to experience and reality. Much has been said about the virtues of scientific method, but one unappreciated reason for the tremendous progress in natural science has been the constant referral of scientific language to the realities which it supposedly represents. Without such an interplay between symbol and experience, distortion in the symbol cannot be corrected.

Another difficulty is that the average man has little chance, even when motivated, to check language against the facts in the real world. In our huge, complex society the individual citizen often lacks the opportunity to test the language of the politicians, statesmen and other leaders by reference to the realities involved. Walter Lippmann has presented this problem brilliantly in the *Phantom Public*, in which he shows how little possibility exists for the man on the street to participate intelligently in the political process. But it is also true at the leadership level that the individual official or leader accepts reports of the working of his policies which are gross oversimplifications and even misrepresentations of the facts. The leader lives in a world of symbols, as do his followers, and he comes to rely upon what appears in newsprint for the facts instead of upon direct contact with reality.

In the world of social action the newspaper has been the most important single medium in our culture for relating symbol to fact. In theory, the newspaper has a staff of trained observers and fact finders who constantly make contact with the real world to give accuracy to the symbols presented in news columns. Though the newspaper has functioned surprisingly well, its limitations for fact finding and presentation are obvious. On many problems, research has shown that there is a wide discrepancy between the real world and the world of newsprint. Up until the action of Congress in undercutting the Office of Price Administration in July 1946, the history of price control is an interesting example of this point. The newspapers presented a story of public impatience with bureaucratic bungling during the very period when nation-wide polls, even those conducted by commercial agencies, indicated an overwhelming popular support for price controls and the OPA, and majority satisfaction with their actual functioning.

Polls and surveys have opened up new possibilities for leaders to refer words to the world of fact. During the war many governmental agencies discovered that they could learn more about the functioning of their policies through surveys using scientific samples and firsthand accounts than through press clippings or through the occasional visit of a high official to the field.

EXPERIMENTAL LIMITATION

The important psychological fact that men's modes of thinking—their beliefs, their attitudes—develop out of their ways of life is not commonly and fully appreciated. Their mental worlds derive from everyday experiences in their occupational callings, and they are not equipped to understand a language which represents a different way of life.

Because language is symbolic in nature, it can only evoke meaning in the recipient if the recipient has experiences corresponding to the symbol. It will not solve the problem of the basic difficulties in communication between the peoples of the world to have them all speak the same tongue if their experiential backgrounds differ. The individual lives in a private world of his own perception, emotion, and thought. To the extent that his perceptions, feelings, and thoughts arise from similar contacts with similar aspects of reality as experienced by others, the private world can be shared and lose something of its private character. But language itself, even if exact and precise, is a very limited device for producing common understanding when it has no basis in common experience. The linguists who argue for a world language neglect the fact that basic misunderstandings occur not at the linguistic but at the psychological level.

A dramatic example of the inability of verbal symbols to bridge the gap between different experiential worlds is the current lack of understanding between returned servicemen and civilians. Since foxhole existence has no real counterpart in unbombed America, American civilians are at a great disadvantage in understanding or communicating with returned combat servicemen. In the same way the peoples of the world living under different conditions and undergoing different types of experience live in worlds of their own between which there is little communication. Even in our own society, different groups are unable to communicate. The farmer, whose way of life differs from that of the coal miner, the steel worker, or the banker, is as much at a loss to understand their point of view as they are to understand him or one another.

Labor-management controversies illustrate the gap between groups speaking different psychological languages as a

result of following different ways of life. Granted that industrial disputes have as their bedrock real and immediate differences in economic interest, it is still true that these differences are augmented by the inability of each party to understand the opposing point of view. The employer, owner, or superintendent, through his executive function of making daily decisions and issuing orders and instructions, acquires a psychology of management. He can understand, though he may dislike, a union demand for more wages. But when the union requests, or even suggests, changes in the conditions of work or changes in personnel policy, he grows emotional and objects to being told by subordinates and outsiders how to run his own plant. For their part, the workers have little understanding of the competitive position of the employer. Since the employer enjoys a way of life luxurious in comparison with their own, they find his plea of inability to pay a higher wage laughable.

The role of imagination in bridging the gap is important. This, however, is largely the function of the artist, who has the sensitivity and the willingness to seek experience beyond his own original environment. By personalizing the experiences of people in plays, novels, and pictures, the artist often does more to develop mutual understanding between groups with divergent experiences than does the social scientist, the reformer, the politician, or the educator.

More and more, however, are psychologists and practitioners coming to realize the importance of common experience as the real basis of communication. Group workers and experimental educators are emphasizing the importance of role playing in true education. By assigning a person a new experiential role to play, it is possible to increase his understanding in a fashion which no amount of preaching or book learning could do. The modern trend

in education, which emphasizes learning by doing, laboratory projects, and a mixture of work experience with book learning, is a recognition of the inadequacy of any language divorced from experience to achieve much success in communication.

Surmounting the Difficulty.

The difficulty of communication between people of different experiential backgrounds is augmented by the distinctive jargon which seems to develop in every calling and in every walk of life. Though groups may differ in their experiences, there is generally more of a common core of psychological reality between them than their language indicates. A neglected aspect of communication is the identification of these areas of common understanding and the translation of the problems of one group into the functional language of another. It is sometimes assumed that limitations of intelligence prevent the farmer or the worker from understanding the complexities of national and international affairs. Anyone, however, who has taken the trouble to discuss with the shipyard worker or the coal miner the economic and political factors operative in the worker's immediate environment will realize the fallacy of this assumption. Within his limited frame of reference, the coal miner, the steel worker, or the dirt farmer will talk sense. But he is unfamiliar with the language used by the professional economist or the expert on international affairs. He is capable of reacting intelligently to matters in this sphere if they are presented to him in terms of their specifics in his own experience. This translation is rarely made, because the expert or the national leader is as uninformed of the day-to-day world of the worker as the worker is of the field of the expert. And often the person most interested and active in talking to laymen in an understandable experiential language

is the demagogue, whose purpose is to misinform.

STEREOTYPES

One aspect of the limitation imposed by one's own narrow experiences is the tendency to assimilate fictitiously various language symbols to one's own frame of reference. The mere fact we lack the experience or the imagination to understand another point of view does not mean that we realize our inadequacy and remain open-minded about it. Whether or not nature abhors a vacuum, the human mind abhors the sense of helplessness that would result if it were forced to admit its inability to understand and deal with people and situations beyond its comprehension. What people do is to fill the gap with their preconceptions and spread their limited attitudes to cover all the world beyond their own knowledge.

In an older day it was popular to refer to this phenomenon through Herbart's concept of the *apperceptive mass*; later Lévy-Bruhl, in his anthropological interpretations, spoke of *collective* representations; twenty years ago psychologists embraced Walter Lippmann's notion of *stereotypes*; today we speak of assimilating material to our own frame of reference. Thus the farmer who knows little about Jews save from his limited contact with a single Jewish merchant in a nearby trading center will have an opinion of all Jews, and in fact of all foreigners, based on this extremely narrow frame of reference. In the same way he will feel great resentment at the high wages paid to the city worker, without any realization of the city worker's problems. The average citizen may assimilate all discussion of the Negro-white problem to the fractional experiences he has had with Negroes forced to live in slum areas.

Nor need there be even a fragmentary basis in personal experience for the stereotype. The superstitions of the culture

furnish the individual ready-made categories for his prejudgments in the absence of any experience. Research studies indicate that people in all parts of the United States feel that the least desirable ethnic and racial groups are the Japanese, the Negroes, and the Turks. When asked to characterize the Turk, they have no difficulty in speaking of him as bloodthirsty, cruel, and dirty; yet the great majority who make this judgment not only have never seen a Turk but do not know anyone who has. An Englishman, H. Nicolson, has written entertainingly of the stereotyped conception of his people held by the German, the Frenchman, and the American. He writes:

Now when the average German thinks of the average Englishman he . . . visualizes a tall, spare man, immaculately dressed in top hat and frock coat, wearing spats and an eyeglass, and gripping a short but aggressive pipe in an enormous jaw. . . . To him, the average Englishman is a clever and unscrupulous hypocrite; a man, who, with superhuman ingenuity and foresight, is able in some miraculous manner to be always on the winning side; a person whose incompetence in business and salesmanship is balanced by an uncanny and unfair mastery of diplomatic wiles; . . .

The French portrait of the Englishman . . . is the picture of an inelegant, stupid, arrogant, and inarticulate person with an extremely red face. The French seem to mind our national complexion more than other nations. They attribute it to the overconsumption of ill-cooked meat. They are apt, for this reason, to regard us as barbarian and gross. Only at one point does the French picture coincide with the German picture. The French share with the Germans a conviction of our hypocrisy. . . .

To the average American, the average Englishman seems affected, patronizing, humorless, impolite, and funny. To him also the Englishman wears spats and carries an eyeglass; to him also he is slim and neatly dressed; yet the American, unlike the German, is not impressed by these elegancies; he considers them ridiculous; . . .*

Though the oversimplified and distorted notions of racial and national groups are usually cited as examples of stereotypes, the process of assimilating material to narrow preformed frames of reference is characteristic of most of our thinking: of our judgment of social classes, occupational callings, artistic and moral values, and the characters and personalities of our acquaintances.

Motivation of the Stereotype.

Stereotyping applies primarily to the cognitive weakness or limitation in our intellectual processes. But this stereotyped prejudgment has an emotional dimension as well. Many of our stereotyped labels or frames carry heavy emotional loading and so are the more resistant to fact and logic. Emotion attaches to them in many ways. Because they give the individual a crude and oversimplified chart in an otherwise confused universe, they afford him security. They tie in with his whole way of thinking and feeling and acting. To abandon them would be mental suicide. A famous British scholar, completely committed to spiritualism, enthusiastically witnessed a mind-reading performance by the magicians Houdini and Mulholland. When they tried to explain to him afterward that it was all a cleverly designed trick, he would have none of their explanation, and insisted that it was a clear instance of spiritualistic phenomena.

Emotion clings to words through association with emotional events which are never dissociated from the label itself. The feeling of dependence and affection that the child has for his mother saturates the words "mother" and "home" and related phrases. These conditioned words can then be used to call up the old emotions in logically irrelevant situations. In the same way the child acquires emotional content for the stereotypes of his group. If the hierarchy of social status is built on stereotypes about Negroes, foreigners, and the

* From *Time*, July 15, 1935, p. 26.

lower classes, then these stereotypes are not neutral but are invested with the emotional color associated with the superiority of the upper groups.

This last example suggests a further motivational basis of the stereotype. People cling to their prejudiced beliefs in labels because of the specific psychic income to be derived from the stereotype. If people the world over are to be judged solely on their merits as human personalities, there is little ego-enhancement in belonging to an ingroup which bestows superiority upon its members merely through the act of belonging. The poor whites in the South are not going to abandon their notion of the Negro when this stereotyped belief itself makes them superior to every member of the despised group. The more frustrated the individual, the more emotionally inadequate and insecure, the easier it is to channelize his dissatisfaction and aggression against a stereotyped target.

THE USE OF REIFICATION AND PERSONIFICATION

The oversimplification of the stereotype is equalled by the extraordinary opportunities which language provides for reification and personification. We easily forget the distinction between words which refer to percepts, or aspects of perceived experience, and terms which designate concepts and abstractions. As a result, we take a concept like the state, which stands for many complexities of human interrelationships, and make that concept into a thing or person possessed of all the attributes of the object or person. Thus the state, like the individual, does things. It takes the life of a criminal, it glows with pride at the patriotic sacrifices of its citizens; it can grow old, become feeble, or wither away and die. When pressed, we readily admit that we do not mean to be taken literally, but are speaking metaphorically

and analogically. Yet our thinking is so shot through with personification and analogy that the tendency is a serious impediment to our understanding and to our intelligent handling of important problems.

The problem of German war guilt is an interesting example. One school of thought made all German crimes the action of the German state; hence it was the state that should be punished, not individual Germans. The standard defense of high-ranking German generals, admirals, and officials was that they were mere servants of the state, who faithfully followed its orders. An opposed school of thought, likewise accepting the fallacy of a personified German nation, identified every German as a miniature of the German nation and so considered all Germans equally guilty. Our first treatment of the Germans was based on this logic. American troops, under the fraternization ban, were forbidden so much as to speak to any German man, woman, or child. This was mild treatment for leading Nazis, but relatively harsh treatment for German children.

In the same way, the original American information policy in Germany was to hammer away at German guilt and to make the German people feel guilty about concentration camp atrocities. But this blanket conception of German guilt took no account of the complex realities involved. It not only failed to take into account quantitative differences in guilt between high Nazis and lesser Nazis; *qualitative* differences between active leadership in atrocities and passive acceptance of or irresponsibility about them were also ignored. The type of guilt of the Nazi leaders who set up and ran the concentration camps was of one order. The social cowardice, political passivity, and irresponsibility of the German people, who were afraid to voice objection, or who were indifferent, is guilt of another order.

Distorted Pictures.

In place, then, of communication through accurate descriptions and conceptions, we reinforce and magnify for ourselves a distorted picture of the universe by our tendency to reify and personify. Perhaps the most effective account of this process is in the following by Stuart Chase:

Let us glance at some of the queer creatures created by personifying abstractions in America. Here in the center is a vast figure called the Nation—majestic and wrapped in the Flag. When it sternly raises its arm we are ready to die for it. Close behind rears a sinister shape, the Government. Following it is one even more sinister, Bureaucracy. Both are festooned with the writhing serpents of Red Tape. High in the heavens is the Constitution, a kind of chalice like the Holy Grail, suffused with ethereal light. It must never be joggled. Below floats the Supreme Court, a black robed priesthood tending the eternal fires. The Supreme Court must be addressed with respect or it will neglect the fire and the Constitution will go out. This is synonymous with the end of the world. Somewhere above the Rocky Mountains are lodged the vast stone tablets of the Law. We are governed not by men but by these tablets. Near them, in satin breeches and silver buckles, pose the stern figures of our Forefathers, contemplating glumly the Nation they brought to birth. The onion-shaped demon cowering behind the Constitution is Private Property. Higher than Court, Flag, or the Law, close to the sun itself and almost as bright, is Progress, the ultimate God of America.

Here are the Masses, thick black and squirming. This demon must be firmly sat upon; if it gets up, terrible things will happen, the Constitution may be joggled. . . .

Capital, her skirt above her knees, is preparing to leave the country at the drop of a hairpin, but never departs. Skulking from city to city goes Crime, a red loathsome beast, upon which the Law is forever trying to drop a monolith, but its Aim is poor. Crime continues to rear its ugly head. Here is the dual shape of Labor—for some a vast, dirty, clutching hand, for others a Galahad in armor.

Pacing to and fro with remorseless tread are the Trusts and Utilities, bloated unclean monsters with enormous biceps. Here is Wall Street, a crouching dragon ready to spring upon assets not already nailed down in any other section of the country. The Consumer, a pathetic figure in a gray shawl, goes wearily to market. Capital and Labor each give her a kick as she passes, while Commercial Advertising, a playful sprite, squirts perfume in her eye.*

The personified caricatures of popular thinking appeal not only because of their simplicity but also because they give a richness of imagery and of emotional tone lacking in a more exact, scientific description. Nor is the communication of emotional feeling to be proscribed. The problem is how to communicate emotional values without sacrificing adequacy and validity of description.

RESEARCH NEEDED

In brief, the psychological barriers to communication are of such strength and have such a deep foundation in human nature that the whole problem of social communication between individuals and groups needs to be re-examined in a new light. No simple formula will solve the problems arising from the many complex causes and widely ramifying aspects of the limitations of the symbolic mechanism and other psychological processes. The older attempt at an easy solution was the study of the dictionary. One instance of this type of thinking was the college faculty committee which tried to discover the dividing line between legislative matters of policy and executive matters of administration by looking up the words involved in the dictionary. The newer approach of the semanticists, though more sophisticated and promising, sometimes ignores the psychological difficulties and begs the question in an uncritical operationalism.

* Stuart Chase, *Tyranny of Words* (Harcourt, Brace; 1938), p. 23.

Perhaps the whole problem of communication is inseparable from the larger context of the over-all social problems of our time. There might well be possibilities of significant advance, however, if we were to employ the research methods of science in attacking the many specific obstacles to communication. Procedures

are already being worked out on the basis of research evaluation for the alleviation of minority group prejudice. Studies now in contemplation would provide functional dictionaries to supplement the standard etymological works. The process of interpersonal communication has been the subject of some research in studies of rumor.

2

THE STATE AND GOVERNMENT

I

What, precisely, do the terms "state" and "government" mean? Such a question may appear to invite a dull discussion of terms which are so much a part of everyday speech that they are largely taken for granted. But words have a way of obscuring reality; if belaboring the obvious is the partial price of understanding political phenomena, it is a price worth paying. Nearly everyone has a concept which comes to mind when these two words are used, and this concept will influence his thinking. To the extent that the nature of government is misconceived, political thinking is likely to be faulty. Because we are compelled to reduce a multitude of actions to useful descriptive phrases, we must necessarily employ abstractions; but the use of an abstraction in no way minimizes the importance of basing it on reality. Persons who consider the state to be inherently evil, persons who praise the state as the highest achievement of civilized man, and persons who believe government to be an unfortunate barnacle on the body politic, will all naturally judge issues of public policy differently. Furthermore, those who have no idea of what the words mean may be victimized by those who do.

For centuries, from Plato onward, great philosophers and common men have theorized and argued about the nature of the state and government: the origins and evolution of states, what they did and did not do, what they should do and could do. Generally speaking, these are some of the questions which comprise political theory—a fascinating branch of political science in which men of every country and age are interested.

An excursion into historical political theory at this point, however, would carry us somewhat afield from our immediate purpose which is to explore a simple and suggestive concept of what is represented in modern practice by the terms "state" and "government" and to learn what trustworthy writers have to say concerning the origins of political institutions. Many essays in theory take a definition of state and government for granted. An additional source

of confusion has been introduced because state and government have become synonymous.

Most of the considerations touched upon in this introduction are discussed more fully in the readings which follow.

II

Whatever difficulties may stand in the way of setting forth a generally accepted explanation of the meaning of state and government will be lessened if we start at the right point, if we emphasize at once a basic theme which dominates the selections below. We begin with the fundamental fact that men must live in association with other men; few men live in complete isolation. It is not a matter of individual choice or even a matter of what is desirable or undesirable. Man is by nature sociable; he is driven into human contacts by his own instinctive activity. Moreover, technological conditions render most men dependent, in one degree or another, upon their fellows.

Man therefore lives in society—society being a sum total of human relationships in any given context: tribe, club, city, nation, and so on. There are various devices through which these relationships may be regulated. One of the first things which might be said about the state is that it is *one way* of regulating some phases of human behavior.

There are approximately sixty states in the world. What are the conditions or elements which must be present before a state exists? It is almost self-evident from current practice that there are three requisites: a defined territory, a population sharing at least some common allegiance, and a government. The government which wields political power in a particular territory must be *independent* in the sense that all major decisions can be made by it. Now of course all governments are subject to external pressures and influences—some more than others. In a sense it becomes a matter of interpretation whether, for instance, the government of Poland is in fact independent. But the criterion is that the existence of state depends upon whether it is generally recognized that political decisions are nominally and ultimately self-determined. Thus Poland is accepted as a state despite its susceptibility to Soviet pressure; Poland is not actually governed from Moscow. On the other hand, Puerto Rico is not a state despite the existence of territory, population, and even local government, because legally major policy matters are determined in Washington, D. C.

Lest the essential elements of this entity we identify as the state in the modern world seem based on legal hair-splitting without much real meaning, attention should be called to the important human destinies involved. Consider how much it means to native Puerto Ricans that they cannot make certain political decisions themselves; for the time being they do not have full control over conditions vitally affecting the great majority of them. It is worth noting too that the situation is of immense consequence to the sugar interests controlled from the United States.

Again, observe the case of defeated Germany. Hitler's Third Reich has disappeared as a result of military defeat; at the time of this writing there is no German state because, while there is still territory and population, there is no German government. Whatever future political regime is established for Germany as a whole will be the result of a sovereign act by the victorious Allies who since surrender have exercised political authority. Contrast this with the case of Japan. It seems the Japanese state did not disappear with military defeat though its character has been altered somewhat by a new constitution and American occupation. Peace arrangements will undoubtedly be accepted by a Japanese government for the Japanese state.

The possible significance of this difference may be grasped when it is remembered that one of the factors which weakened the new republican regime in Germany after World War I was that it could be accused (wrongfully) of selling Germany out in the Versailles Treaty. This accusation was possible because the Reich had not disappeared and because a German government negotiated the treaty. This time (if the Allies can agree) a new German state will be created and a government which will be in no way responsible for the new political arrangements will administer it.

In addition to having certain obvious prerequisites, the modern state has important distinguishing attributes. For certain purposes it is supreme over all other groups in any given society. If the term "sovereign state" means anything at all, it means that in a particular territory the *political power* of the established state is unchallenged. Certain rules can be made and absolute obedience can be required. The state can, and does, levy contributions of a monetary and military sort upon its citizen members. Furthermore, most states reserve the right to prescribe the conditions under which membership may be attained and given up. Resident aliens may be expelled under certain circumstances.

The state has definite functions or purposes which it alone is capable of fulfilling or for which it must assume responsibility. Among these are: protection against external enemies (a right usually reserved explicitly to the state) or, to put it a little differently, the preservation of national security; the maintenance of law and order or internal security (the state enlists private support in specific instances, notably arrest of one citizen by another); the setting up of enforceable rights and obligations—justice; the guarantee of certain freedoms; and the achievement of general welfare. Every state, regardless of form and character, is dedicated to these purposes; states differ only in the *techniques* and *processes* by which they attempt to realize these purposes. However states may differ in structure and method, their *raison d'être* in each case would seem to be that the state performs some of the functions required in society more efficiently than other social agencies.

The goals of external and internal security, general welfare, justice, and freedom are obviously broad terms; in each state implementation must come through specific laws and policies. Citizens will effectively express their wishes and interests through whatever forceful pressure and other means are available.

The ways in which individual citizens and private groups exert influence on the activities of the state will largely determine its character. If the state expresses the interest of a particular group—as in the case of the domination of German policy for many years by the Prussian Junker class—it is usually because such a group has access to economic power; such a state would be described as an oligarchy. This is the purport of Harold Laski's thesis (advanced below) that the nature of a state will be significantly related to its economic structure.

We have said that the state is one means of social regulation. There are others: the family, the church, the economy, beliefs or value systems, and culture (customs). Social regulation becomes political when a *central* agency is required, when one of the other forms of guiding human conduct no longer functions adequately. Two suggestive points emerge: since government (regulation) of some sort is required wherever man lives socially, it is really of two kinds, public and private; second, since social regulation (private government) is transformed into public government by the necessity of a central agency (the state) it follows that the state (or government) must broadly reflect the patterns of regulation which it takes over from other agencies. As MacIver makes clear, the accuracy of this reflection will help determine the strength of government. It might be argued that the Weimar democracy in Germany failed in part because it was not sustained by the concepts and practices inherent in German society.

Definitions always leave something to be desired; few in the social sciences are satisfactory. Withal, when they clarify thought, definitions are sometimes useful supports for understanding. In this spirit we may attempt a formulation of the meaning of the term "state." *A state is a sizeable society of men organized politically which has established control over a definitively marked portion of the earth's surface and whose political regulation is the outgrowth of an underlying set of relationships peculiar to that society; the state is a society in its political aspect.*

Applying this to the political society which we call the United States, the following formulation is suggested: One hundred and forty-five million people occupying a specially characterized geographical area and bound together by a complex set of social relationships (family, religious, cultural, economic, ethnic, ideological) who have, over a three hundred year period, developed common needs and interests which have necessitated a political structure (state, government, constitution, customs) which reflects the needs (purposes of the state) and methods (laws, procedures, and policies) peculiar to this people and which also reflects their power to translate needs into action.

If the foregoing analysis is reasonably well founded, then it would appear logical to insist that if one is really to understand the political structure of any modern society, he must study individual and group behavior (the human equation as presented in the preceding chapter), social organization and disorganization, geography (both regional and federal aspects), population

characteristics and policy, the role of ideas as conditioned by experience and environment, the economy (including science and technology), and, finally, national traits. As John Dewey emphasized, "the consequences of conjoint behavior"—that is, men living together with many kinds of relations in common—will depend upon a combination of these factors. In sum, the nature and role of the state will depend greatly on time and circumstances, and states differ from one another accordingly.

Because the state embraces all the citizens of any given society and because its authority is coterminous with the territory controlled, it is easy to fall into the error of assuming that the state is all-powerful, that it is above, or superior to, the society which it helps to regulate. This is not the case. There is a crucial distinction to be made here. The state is only superior to other regulatory agencies (family, church, etc.) in those matters for which it is responsible. Some societies (nations) grant, or tacitly approve, or are compelled to accept, the grant of more power to their political arm than others. Theoretically there would seem to be no limit to the functions which might be assigned gradually to the political structure of a society. The state is a regulatory agency and it does not do all the regulating (or governing).

When a state is democratic in character, this does not mean that there are some things which its people cannot do politically. Rather, it means that the decision as to what the state should do will rest with the people as a whole. It also means that such a decision will be taken by certain unalterable procedures. When, therefore, rationing and price control are condemned in the United States as "police state" policies, the implication is simply that it is undesirable to have the inflation problem attacked by this type of political solution. It does not follow from this view that the American people, as an organized society, cannot undertake to regulate their collective relationships in any way which seems fitting. Thus voluntary rationing and price control represent individual or group self-regulation rather than political regulation. To say that any society is limited in its capacity for many kinds of regulation is to deny the accumulated experience of mankind. Men have differed as to how regulation might best be accomplished, but humanity would scarcely have survived without ability and willingness to do it in some way.

What now is the relationship between state and government? Probably MacIver's interpretation is most acceptable: government is the administrative organ of the state. The state is the society (or people) politically organized, representing the definite capacity for self determination through a chosen type of central agency. Hence, as Laski says, "The state is, for the purposes of practical administration, the government." In this sense, government is social control which has "acquired a definite institutional organization and operates by means of legal mandates enforced by definite penalties." So far as the United States is concerned, the public political governmental machinery broadly includes all those officials who exercise the power of the state as well as the rules or laws

which they enforce, create, or are themselves guided by; more specifically: Congress, state legislatures, all courts of law, political parties, members of all national, state, and local executive agencies. The political structure of American society (the society organized for political purposes) will consist of the state (as embodying the sovereign power of the people), the Constitution (as directing how the power of the state shall be exercised), formal organization (Congress, courts, administrative agencies, etc.), informal organization (certain aspects of party activity), laws (statutory, common, administrative, constitutional, international), and political customs and traditions. At his discretion, the student may wish to label all this "government"; he should be careful to distinguish between the broad and narrow senses of the term in his own mind.

III

National sovereignty can be better explained in view of the preceding analysis. A territorially and politically organized social grouping (a state) has power to administer itself, define its interests, and pass its own laws within its boundaries without interference from external sources. To this extent the modern nation state is indeed a law unto itself. This primary fact of international life is considered an anachronism in an age when the world is one unit in so many ways, when the peoples of the world have developed so many common interests but no common political process for the protection of such interests. And in addition, the fact that each nation defines and pursues its own interests obviously prepares the way for conflict. Loyalties come to be formed around the state, as around other forms of human association, and tend to take on an absolute quality especially when called into question or threatened by other states.

Sovereignty is sometimes condemned as a device of willful and irresponsible statesmen who use it deliberately to avoid the ways of peace and to protect what they individually believe the interests of the nation to be. This may have been true in some instances and it is undeniably true that the practice of national sovereignty—mitigated somewhat by voluntary international agreements and the influence of United Nations' agencies—creates a kind of anarchy in which war is the ultimate political arbiter. Nevertheless, we must probe more deeply in order to see the real nature of this problem. Actually, as we have remarked, the modern citizen looks to the state for the satisfaction of primary needs: external security, internal safety, welfare, justice, and freedom. In his eyes there is no other way at the moment in which these needs could be satisfied. This process of relying on a central agency has gone on for several hundred years. By a day-to-day acceptance of the regulation of individual conduct, the citizen strengthens the very quality of the state—its unchallenged power in various domains—which apparently is a source of danger to other states. Viewed nationally, the state performs services without which life in a complex society would be virtually impossible. Viewed internationally, this complete self-rule

of a society constitutes a menace to other societies because there is no actual limit to what the state may do vis-à-vis other states in the carrying out of its internal functions. In other words, the security of one state—a purpose which its citizens conceive to be clearly proper and necessary to survival—may mean the insecurity of another.

Yet, where would the citizen of today look for security, or the performance of any of the tasks undertaken by the political branch of his society? Even though he may be aware of the dangers of unlimited sovereignty in an atomic age, he strengthens his state by his obedience and demands. So much a part of the citizen's thinking has this relationship become that he probably takes it for granted. Now one of the points made above was that regulation in society may be done in several ways and that over time certain types of regulation were vested in the political agency of society rather than in the church or the economy or in other social groupings. This would seem to suggest that if the nation-state is to be replaced in some of its functions, some other agency must arise to command the obedience and loyalty of the citizen. What agency? If an international agency (with real power), what social grouping will it act for: *all* present national societies, *some* of them, or something called an international community? These are difficult but pertinent questions. The answers lie in the kinds of relations men will have with one another for the next hundred years and in the opinion of men as to the way these relations can best be conducted. The present nation-state may perhaps involve fictional concepts; nonetheless, the things expected of the state are very real in the minds of its citizens. Men will have to think differently before the state will disappear or be drastically modified.

IV

One of the great political issues of our day concerns the proper role of the government in everyday life. As Justice Frankfurter proves below, the government today is complex and powerful because over the years society has made increasing demands upon it. There is no better way to appreciate how important a social instrument government has become than to glance at the federal budget proposed by President Truman in January 1948. Total expenditures called for were \$39.7 billions. Specific items included: National security, \$11 billion; conduct of our relations abroad, \$7 billion; social welfare, \$2 billion; conservation of natural resources, \$1.6 billion; and education and research, \$400 million. The causes for the presence and size of various items in the federal budget are many and complicated. Basically, they all reduce pretty much to the internal needs of the American society and to the impact of historical events. If modern government appears to be an overwhelming factor in everyday living, it is because it has grown out of a total social situation; it was not grafted on to society through an unfortunate conspiracy.

When the student thinks about particular political problems and about the possible role of the government, it will be helpful if he visualizes several regu-

latory institutions upon which men have relied. The functions assigned to each or absorbed by each will depend upon their respective competitive strength, upon time, and upon circumstances. At one time or another in history a wide range of activities has been controlled by each. To say that some functions are appropriate or inappropriate for a given agency is a relative judgment. Whether the government is the appropriate agency to assume responsibility for a social problem will depend upon the social environment and the nature of the problem. With respect to an economic problem, for example, the choice between public and private government should be made on the basis of which will be more practical in view of what is to be accomplished, the obstacles to be overcome, and the conditions to be reckoned with. Those who believe that there are some things government can never do, and those who believe there are some things which business must never do, place an unfortunate limitation on their choice of solutions. They also ignore the fact that economics and politics have become inextricably interwoven. In thinking about the role of government vis-à-vis other social agencies, it would be well to avoid on the one hand, as Charles E. Merriam so aptly said, the notion that government is an unworthy social instrument and on the other, that it is the lord of all earthly destiny.

The Roots of Government

R. M. MacIver is Lieber Professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology at Columbia University. In this book, the author tries to place the origins of authority and government in their proper perspective. He explores fallacies in the several theories which have, in one form or another, been either fashionable or accepted as self-evident, namely: divine right, force, and social contract. As a scholar who happily combines the training of both sociologist and political scientist, Dr. MacIver is able to bring to bear on his analysis knowledge of the whole realm of social institutions and their relevance for understanding the roots of political regulation.

Government is a phenomenon that emerges within the social life, inherent in the nature of social order. Man's social nature is a complex system of responses and of needs. In the relation of man to man everywhere there is the seed of government. It takes different institutional shapes according to the interplay of these

relations. Sometimes, in the simplest communities, it has no ministers or agents, but is sufficiently maintained by the spontaneous reaction to the prevailing folk-myths. Always it is guarded by these myths, however elaborate the machinery through which it operates. Wherever man lives on the earth, at

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whatever level of existence, there is social order, and always permeating it is government of some sort. Government is an aspect of society.

Since we know of no more universal or more elemental form of society than the family, we can learn some primary lessons about the roots of government if we begin by observing how within that minimum society the rudiments of government are already present.

... when we speak of government without a qualifying adjective, we mean political government, the centralized organization that maintains a system of order over a community large or small. Political government is one form of social regulation, but by no means the only form. This point must be remembered when we raise questions about the origins of government. Regulation is a universal aspect of society. Society means a system of ordered relations. The system may be informal, folk-sustained, uncentralized, and without specific agencies, or it may be highly organized. But social regulation is always present, for no society can exist without some control over the native impulses of human beings. Political government appears when social regulation is taken over or begins to be presided over by a central social agency. At first the business of regulation is mainly a family concern, broadly protected by the custom of the inclusive group. To ascribe the beginnings of government to force or to contract or to some particular conjuncture is to ignore the fact that already in the family, the primary social unit, there are always present the curbs and controls that constitute the essence of government. Government is not something that is invented by the cunning or the strong and imposed on the rest. Government, however much exploitation of the weak by the strong it may historically exhibit, is much more fundamental than these explanations imply. It

is the continuation by the more inclusive society of a process of regulation that is already highly developed within the family.

The family is bound up with all the great crises and transitions of life. It is the focus of the most intimate relationships, those in which the personality of man and of woman is most profoundly expressed and most thoroughly tested. It is the primary agent in the molding of the life-habits and the life-attitudes of human beings. It is the center of the most impressive celebrations and rituals, those associated with marriage, with death, and with the initiation of the child into the beliefs and ways of the community. It is the hearth, the home, the place where the generations are brought continuously together, where old and young must learn to make their ever changing adjustments to their ever changing roles in the life-cycle.

The same necessities that create the family create also regulation. The imperative of sex has for human beings no pre-established harmony with longer-range imperatives, with the upbringing of the young and the maintenance and enhancement through the generations of the mode of life that the group, on whatever level, has acquired. The long dependence of the human young necessitates the establishment of some kind of control over sexual relations. There must be rules, and against so powerful an appetite, against the recklessness and the caprice of desire, these rules must be guarded by powerful sanctions. They must have back of them the authority of the community, bulwarked by such myths as the prevailing culture can devise against so formidable a danger.

Here is government in miniature and already government of a quite elaborate character. For sex is so closely inwrought with other concerns, and particularly with those of possession and inheritance,

that its control carries with it a whole social code. The existence of the family requires the regulation of sex, the regulation of property, and the regulation of youth. If we briefly examine what is involved in these three types of regulation we shall see why the family is everywhere the matrix of government.

Let us consider the regulation of sex. It has a number of aspects. First there are mating rules, determining who may enter with whom into the kind of sexual union that contemplates the establishment of family life. Mating is hedged about by restrictions and conditions. There is generally a circle beyond which one may not mate and there is always a circle within which one may not mate. The former sustains the coherence of the community or class, the latter sustains the coherence of the family itself. There are "prohibited degrees" of kinship or family relationship within which mating is prohibited. Beyond this provision there are endless varieties of regulation exhibited by different human groups.

Then there are rules restricting sexual relations outside of mating. The main function of these is again to preserve the integrity of the family. Foremost among them is the practically universal incest taboo. If there is one rule that is common to all the endlessly divergent human societies that the earth knows or has known, it is this. It applies to sex relations between brother and sister, between son and mother, and between father and daughter, extending with somewhat less rigor to a kin group variably defined. The breach of this taboo arouses peculiar abhorrence, and it is so deeply embedded in human culture everywhere that it must have conveyed to the young the most profound sense of what government means. We need not, however, in reaching this conclusion, go so venturesomely far as Freud, who was satisfied to make one aspect of the incest taboo,

that involved in his "Oedipus complex," the very source and condition of all government. Aside from other objections to this theory, there is the obvious consideration that other aspects of the incest taboo are equally impressive. Thus the brother-sister taboo prevails everywhere—although there are quite exceptional instances where families of the reigning dynasty, as in ancient Egypt, were permitted to disregard it to preserve the magic of the royal blood—and it sometimes takes the most extreme and inconvenient forms, as in certain communities of the Solomon Islanders, where the brother is forbidden to converse with, meet, or even mention the name of the sister throughout his whole life.

The restriction of nonmarital sexual relations establishes a network of regulation taking many different patterns in different cultural milieux, and subject to considerable changes with the changes of civilization. One form of it applies to premarital relations. It operates most strongly with respect to the unmarried girl, since extramarital pregnancy is a menace to the social order that is founded on the authority and prestige of the family. Among many peoples female premarital chastity has also a property value. There are, however, some tribes that permit rather freely the sexual intercourse of the unmarried young but still visit premarital pregnancy with severe social penalties—a seeming inconsistency that is somewhat of a puzzle to anthropologists.

The family system is hedged round by another set of restrictions on sex relations, those directed against the disintegration of the family unit through aberrant sexual connections on the part of the spouses. What is aberrant is again determined by different standards in accordance with the cultural conditions. Complete marital fidelity may be demanded or there may be custom-sanctioned exceptions, such as the wife-

lending practices of certain tribes of Africa and of Arctic Siberia.

If we pursued this subject further, we should find that under all conditions the family takes its particular form from the system of rules that prescribes and limits sexual relations. The family may be patriarchal or matriarchal, may be monogamous or polygamous, may conform to one or another of all the possible patterns of mating. The one universal principle is that it finds its being as well as its specific character within the shelter of a strongly sanctioned, highly authoritative code. Wherever the family exists—and it exists everywhere in human society—government already exists.

The code of the family inevitably stretches far beyond mere sexual regulation. The primary responsibilities and obligations of human beings are bred within the family. The relation of man to man is insubstantial and emotionless compared with the relation of spouse to spouse, of mother to child, of father to the household he maintains, of sibling to sibling, of children to parents, of blood-brother in the larger kin to blood-brother. These are the relations that in the context of the simple community confer on each his place and station, that animate and give meaning to his labor and his leisure, that raise a thousand questions of responsive behavior. The family is itself a way of living, and the way of living is always governed by a code.

We select from this pervasive code the regulation of property. The first form of property is land, and in all civilizations except the highly industrialized type in which we live land is overwhelmingly the most important form of property. The land belongs to the group, and the unit property-holder is the family. Each family has its plot of earth, its habitation, its home. Family and family earth are one. The mode of possession varies, and often is highly complicated. There are

also generic differences characteristic respectively of hunting, fishing, pastoral, and agricultural peoples. But usually the land is divided between families rather than between individuals. The head of the family controls, rather than owns in his exclusive right.

This nexus of family and property is attested by the rules of inheritance, which generally require that on the death of the head of the family the land and other primary possessions pass to the children or the next of kin. An exception is sometimes found in the case of nomad tribes devoted to hunting or cattle-raising, where there may be considerable freedom in the disposal of property to outsiders. But in the great majority of cases, where tribes are settled and engaged in the cultivation of the land, the family is closely associated with the particular soil. The land is then the family heritage; under the patriarchal system it is the patrimony, handed down from the fathers to the sons. It cannot be freely disposed of, it is virtually inalienable. The principal mode of transferring property beyond the immediate family is as dowry, bride-price, or other conveyance attendant on the inauguration by marriage of a new family.

Furthermore, the economy of the simple community is a family economy. What is produced is shared within the family; what each provides is his or her contribution to the common stock. So much is true in degree of the family everywhere, but in the simpler community the family is a joint producer, not merely a beneficiary of the joint product. The family is, particularly in the agricultural economy, the functioning microcosm; within it there is division of labor, beyond it there is generally little. The primal division of labor, between the child-bearing female and the sustaining male, is developed and elaborated in the processes of family life. The routines of

work and the customs of the economic scheme of things are learned, directed, and administered under the aegis of the family.

Thus we see that one of the major functions of government, the regulation of property, has its early locus in the circle of the family and the near-of-kin. The form of the family, whether it be matriarchal or patriarchal, monogamous or polygamous, endogamous or exogamous with respect to specific social groupings, unitary or composite; and so forth, is functionally interdependent with the code of property. This code is administered within the family and in dealings between families. It is family government and interfamilial government. So in the course of things the heads of families, the *patres*, become the council of the community.

In showing how the nature of the family necessitated the regulation of sex and the regulation of property and how the family itself was the primary agent in the maintenance of the customary law that determined its particular being, we have not yet fathomed the significance of the family in the generation of the habits and patterns of government. Nor would that significance be adequately revealed if we went on to explain how the family was the locus of the altar as well as of the workshop, of the school as well as of the tribunal. Beyond all such associations there lies the elemental fact that man is born the most helpless and unwitting of animals, the least armed with ready instincts to fit him for survival, the slowest to develop his potentialities of autonomy; and at the same time the most receptive, the most imitative, the most educable, the most richly endowed. The family receives this amorphous being and through the long years of childhood shapes the mentality and orients it into social attitudes, imprinting on the impressionable organism the habits

that become the foundation for all its later activities.

Even before the child is conscious of a self that self is being molded within the family. There are two main aspects of this process. One is the subtle unconsciously registered interaction of the nascent being with the family members, pre-eminently at the first with the mother, as through the satisfaction of its animal needs it awakens gradually to a sense of social relations, of self and otherness, of dependence and demand, of love and anger. The child *makes* the first coherent society, for its coming transforms the fugitive relations of sex into the stability of the home. Of the society thus created the child is also the product. Modern social psychology and the intimations of psychoanalysis are revealing how deeply the effects of this interaction become rooted in the context of the growing personality, how they control dispositions seemingly developed in later situations, and how they manifest themselves in the conflicts and tensions, in the acceptances and rejections, that constitute the selective experience of the adult being.

With society, as always, goes regulation. This is the other aspect of the molding of the child. The home is the world of the child, and it is a governed world. Regulation is operative from the first, in the sequences of feeding and cleaning. Presently the child is disciplined in the exercise of his bodily functions. He is, so to speak, "house-broken." He is taught that this is right and that is wrong. As he learns the speech of the folk he learns the values that are conveyed by words. This is good and that is bad; this is honorable and that is shameful. So the long process of indoctrination and habituation begins. The child is governed in its going out and in its coming in, in its rising and in its lying down, in its learning and in its playing, in its doing and in its thinking, in its hoping and in its fearing.

The child knows no other world, no other values. In the circle of the home affection and authority are combined, whatever the proportions may be. They are not likely to be wholly reconciled, for authority represses native inclinations. But the authority is final, as authority. There is no alternative, and there is no appeal. It may be disobeyed, but that is evasion. It may be defied, but that is rebellion. Here the authority is absolute. No other is even conceivable. Other authorities may rule outside, but to the child the outside is another world. The world of the child is a closed world of absolute authority, mitigated by affection.

We are considering the normal situation, not the exceptions. The exceptions—where, for example, the child is allowed to dominate, where by resort to tantrums and to tears it can generally win its will—are less frequent in the more prolific custom-ruled families of a simpler age. Under earlier conditions, still prevailing in many parts of the earth, there was no contrast between the ways of the family and the ways of the community, between the lore of the family and the lore of the community. The two were integrated in a manner that is impossible in the multi-group societies of modern civilization. The family was the building block of society in a much more specific sense than it now is. No power external to it limited or interfered with its authority. There were no conflicting *mores* of the outside world to disturb the process of indoctrination, to weaken the assurance of the parents, and to affect the child through the school, the playground, or the street. There was no clash of alien doctrine against the truth enunciated by the elders.

So far as the child is concerned the imperium of the home is always absolute at the first, and only the length of time through which it holds undisputed sway differentiates in this respect one form of

culture from another. For the child the magic of the law begins as soon as it becomes aware of others and of its relation to others. What is right and what is wrong, the things it must not do and the things it must do, are delivered to it from on high, as the law was delivered to Moses. It is so ordained, it is the eternal way of things. It is incorporated in the rites and religious observances of the community. Beyond it there is no other law.

It is easy then to see how "the habits pertaining to government" are bred in childhood, and how the family itself is always, for the child at least, a miniature political realm. In earlier cultures it was so also for all who dwelt within the household. The scheme of control was different in the patriarchal and in the matriarchal (or matrilineal) family. It was different under various conditions of family structure and family environment, but always an all-pervading system prevailed, maintaining ordered relationships between husband and wife, between parents and children, between the nearer and the further kin.

In the light of these facts we see also how superficial and inadequate are those doctrines that find the origin of government in some particular occurrence or conjuncture, such as war, conquest, or exploitation. The danger of these doctrines is that by presenting government as something that supervenes in human society, something merely accessory to it, or something that actually perverts it, they misinterpret the service and minimize the necessity of government. They give plausibility to the absurd notion of anarchism, to the deluding fancy of a "stateless society." So men can cherish the dogma that in some happier future the state will "wither away" and government as an organizing principle cease to control. But no one who cares to examine the role of government in the primal and

universal society of the family can be so grossly deceived.

We have been speaking about "government," but the word "state" has crept into the argument. What is the difference? When we speak of the state we mean the organization of which government is the administrative organ. Every social organization must have a focus of administration, an agency by which its policies are given specific character and translated into action. But the organization is greater than the organ. In this sense the state is greater and more inclusive than government. A state has a constitution, a code of laws, a way of setting up its government, a body of citizens. When we think of this whole structure, we think of the state. Later on we shall see that the *political* structure is not co-extensive with the *social* structure but is a particular system relative to and dependent upon a more inclusive system. But for the present we are content to point out that the political structure itself, with its usages and traditions, with its framework of institutional relationships between the rulers and the ruled, should not be identified with its organ of government.

Under certain social conditions, particularly in the simpler societies, it is not appropriate to speak of a state. The political structure may be embryonic or rudimentary. Similarly there may be no structure properly called a church, even though a religion prevails and there are special officers of religion, priests or prophets. The terms "state" and "church" apply to specific associational forms that emerge at a later stage, and characterize more complex societies.

First comes the function, carried on by the undifferentiated community with little assistance from officials or special agencies within the community. There is religion without a priest. There is customary law, group-enforced, before there are judges

or courts of law—such, for instance, is the situation among some Melanesian peoples. The function is signalized by particular ceremonies, often quite elaborate ones, which seem to be sufficiently directed and controlled by the tradition of the folk. But some members of the group are always at least the informal and occasional leaders at the performance of social functions, the knowing ones, the elders, the heads of families. We may presume that beginning in this way leadership becomes institutionalized. The medicine man becomes an institution, the priest is designated, the chief and the council of elders emerge. The communal functions now receive specialized direction. The organs of communal government are elaborated. But we are still some way from anything corresponding to a state in the proper sense. The process must advance much further before the political organization, with its seat of government, its continuity of office, its code of laws, and all the rest becomes sufficiently differentiated to have its own unity, its own being, and to be called a state. We may observe in passing that while social regulation can be carried on in the household or in the simple custom-ruled community without the necessity of the state-form it is quite otherwise under the conditions of a complex society. There the conduct of government requires the presence of the full-grown state.

In the simplest societies we know the main locus of government is the family circle. This circle is more inclusive than the unitary family of modern civilization. It is a primary kin-group fulfilling the functions essential to the family and many others besides. It has a definite head, whether the paterfamilias, the patriarch, the maternal uncle, or some other member. Within this circle the specific business of government is carried on. It makes and enforces the rules that are needed to meet the various contingencies that arise. Its

ability to do so depends, of course, on the customs that are common to a community composed of a number of such families. The community is held together by the understanding that each family exercises this role, and since the community is itself a more inclusive group of the kin there is an accepted mode in conformity to which the role is exercised. This mode is authoritative, as the result of the sociopsychological processes of adaptation that have worked continuously on the kin-group. But the authority is guarded by the rule of custom as it is applied by each family unit. The operations of government are not yet centralized. If there is a headman, or chief, he is not yet a ruler but only *primus inter pares*, a man of somewhat higher prestige or distinction. But his functions tend to increase as changes bring new problems, as the size of the community grows, as relationships with neighboring tribes become more difficult or more important, and so forth.

We cannot cope with the ramifications and vicissitudes of the process in which government became institutionalized, in which the state-form emerged. It is a process that begins before there is any light of history and it is one that is still far from being fulfilled. Under endlessly varied circumstances the "habits pertaining to government," which at first were centered in the family and the kin-circle, found a locus in the inclusive community. We must be content to take a few glimpses, perhaps sufficient to show the more obvious steps that led to the extension and centralization of authority.

Frequently we find that the government of a tribe or of a locality is in the hands of the "old men," or, in patriarchal society, of "the fathers." In many languages, as in our own, such expressions as "the elders," "the city fathers," "the seignior," "the senate," and so forth, connote authority. It is easy to understand how the heads of families would come

together to discuss and administer inter-family concerns, or perhaps first to settle some trouble or compose some quarrel arising between members of their respective households. In such meetings some patriarch, some forceful personality, would assume the role of leader. The meeting becomes a council, and the leader becomes its head, the chief. As chief, he superintends the organization of the community for particular purposes, to carry on a trading expedition, to stage a festival or a ritual, to arrange a hunt, to reallocate lands, to seize some booty from a neighboring tribe, to defend the community against enemies. For these purposes the chief at length gathers about him a group of assistants or henchmen, a bodyguard. So he becomes elevated above the other "fathers." His prerogatives become gradually defined, his particular honors, his lion's share of the booty, the ceremonies proper to his office. Custom is always at work turning example into precedent and precedent into institution.

An important step in this process is the turning of chieftainship into hereditary office. An aggressive or ambitious leader is likely to use his prestige so as to favor the appointment of his son or near-of-kin as his successor. Thus one family is singled out from all the rest, the ruling family. With this elevation the distinction between chief and subjects is developed, the distance between the chief and the other "fathers" is widened, with consequent new accretions of ceremony and ritual to corroborate the change.

Along such lines the institutions of government must have developed, though with many variations.

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Many kinds of law hold within society—the law of the state, custom, religious ordinance, tradition, the rules of the particular associations to which people belong, the modes or styles that characterize the

groups, the period, or the hour. All these in some sense put constraint on men, are superimposed on their native inclinations. Their desires and aims are brought into some degree of conformity with this complex web of controls. Law does not so much direct their actions as keep them within bounds, on the hither side of some margin of tolerance. This statement applies particularly to the law of the state. Men obey it but they also evade it and sometimes they violate it. There are many actions, many social relations, that this kind of law cannot touch, and many others that it can control only partially, and when it tries to go further it does so with great difficulty, disturbance, and cost.

Since the law of the state, with its peculiarly coercive quality, most obviously imposes strong restraints on men, there are two large questions that have engaged attention. One is: Why *ought* men to obey the law, how far and under what conditions are they obligated to obey it? The other is: Why do men actually obey the law? The first is the question of political obligation. "Man is born free," said Rousseau, "and everywhere he is in chains." And he proceeded to ask the question: "What can make it legitimate?" He answered in terms of right and obligation. The second question is one of social psychology, of the motives and interests that incline men to law-abidingness. This question has been much less discussed.

Our concern here is with the second question, but as a preliminary to answering it we shall observe that different schools of thought have offered very different answers to the first question. In his book *The Sanctity of Law* J. W. Burgess pointed out that men have rested the obligation to obey on two main grounds. One is the legitimacy of the source from which law proceeds, in other words the right ascribed to the law-making authority, whether divine appointment, constitutional right, or some contractual agreement

between ruler and subject. The other is the rationality of content, in other words the intrinsic merit of the law itself, its contribution to the system of values we uphold or cherish. The two grounds are often conjoined, and often no distinction is drawn between them. But the answer so far given remains inadequate. There is very often considerable division of opinion about the merit of particular laws, and they are nevertheless accepted and obeyed. On the other hand, even if the legitimacy of the source is acknowledged, that does not preclude the recognition of other authorities or other obligations, with the demands of which the law of the state may be in conflict. The issue of the primacy of one authority over another has constantly arisen. Should Antigone obey the command of her king or the contradictory command of her religion and of her kinship bond? Should we obey conscience against law or law against conscience? And so forth. Some, like Plato and Hobbes and Hegel, have made the law of the state paramount over all others. Many have placed "the law of God" above the law of man. Some, like Protagoras, Nietzsche, Sorel, have denied that there is any inherent legitimacy in government—at least unless it is the particular kind of government they advocate. They have claimed that governments rule in the interest of a group or class and that obedience is more a matter of expediency than of obligation. Others, like Harold Laski in his *Grammar of Politics*, have held that the citizen is obligated to obey a particular law only if that law satisfies his own sense of justice. Others—and with this view the present writer is in sympathy—hold that obedience is obligatory except when in the considered judgment of the citizen disobedience promotes the greater welfare of the society as a whole in which he lives. It is clear, however, that on a question such as this there is no hope of consensus. The answers given will differ not only

with the kind of government under contemplation but also with the value-system of the respondent.

No similar difficulty need arise in answering the second question. It is true that groups of different backgrounds and different indoctrinations will have different standards of law-abidingness. It is true that the kind of government will affect in some measure both the degree and the spirit in which men obey the laws. But we are here asking a question whose answer depends sheerly on our knowledge of group psychology. In every society, save during the throes of revolution, there is a firmament of order. The acceptance of its terms is an expression of the sentiments that bind men everywhere in social union. They obey the law not merely because they recognize the legitimacy of its source, nor mainly because they are convinced of the rationality of its contents. They obey not merely because they consider it their obligation to the state. And they certainly do not obey solely because they fear the sanctions attached to the law, the "fear of the consequences" on which Thomas Hobbes laid such stress. Neither the fear of punishment nor the fear of the larger consequences of law-breaking to society can explain the common observance of the law.

All the motivations we have here mentioned are involved but they do not operate in their simplicity, as single and sufficient determinants of men's behavior. A group, for example, that regards the violation of law as abhorrent when the law or the government is congenial to them will change its attitude when the situation is reversed. Under one set of conditions they will maintain that disobedience is treason, under another set they will sympathize with the law-breaker. A revolutionary group that denies the primacy of law-observance will when in power insist upon it as the first duty of the citizen. In short, the sense of obligation

must be fortified by various other considerations in order to prevail. Take again the fear of punishment. The frequent failure of Draconian penalties to diminish seriously the amount of crime and the very high proportion of recidivists among convicted lawbreakers show that the deterrent effect of punishment is never by itself enough to ensure respect for the law.

The vast majority of men have the habit of law-abidingness. They don't obey all laws equally. They try to ignore some and to evade others. There is a margin of indifference and a margin of tolerance. But in the main, unless they are unmoored by catastrophic events or by social convulsions, they are law-abiding. Law-abidingness is a habit; Aristotle said that "the law has no power to command obedience except the power of habit." The habit is responsive to the totality of social conditions. Men obey because they are social beings—or, if you prefer it, because they are socialized beings, trained and indoctrinated in the ways of their society. All the motivations that are evoked and active in their social circle conspire to make them, on the whole, law-abiding. We cannot then answer the question why men obey the law by adducing merely *political* considerations. Law-abidingness is the pragmatic condition of and response to the whole firmament of social order.

We can, of course, single out some specific considerations that induce men to observe the law, apart from their respect for authority, their sense of duty, and their fear of legal sanctions. We may cite the desire to stand in well with their fellows and not to incur the obloquy of the law-breaker. We may cite the particular interests that attach them to the observance of particular laws. We may cite the convenience, the avoidance of personal molestation, that law-abidingness conveys. We may cite the sheer inertia that prefers the line of least resistance along the routine of entrenched habit. But no listing of

specific motivations will completely answer our question. All the ties that hold men together in any society, all the needs and all the hopes that depend on their society for realization, prompt them to law-abidingness.

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Authority exists in every sphere for every group according to its kind. There is authority in religion, in education, in business, in science, in the arts. There is authority within every organization, or it could carry on no function whatever. There is authority inside the groups that fight against authority. There is authority among the boys who skirmish with the boys in the next street, and there is authority in an anarchist assembly. There is no order without authority. This authority is vested in persons, whether as accepted superiors or as the agents of organized groups. We speak broadly of a man as being an authority if his word carries weight with others. Thus a man may be an authority on the nature of God, on astrophysics, on cuneiform inscriptions, on the language of the Bantus, on the playing of bridge, and so on endlessly. But in the stricter sense an authority is a man or a body of men vested with the right to make decisions and to maintain the order that prevails within any system or area of social organization. In this sense an authority does not act in his private capacity, but always by virtue of a right conferred upon him for this purpose by society.

Our concern here is with the political system, the system that comprehends the fundamental order of a community. Here authority is as fundamental as the order it sustains. But one very important consideration emerges when we ask: what

authority, whose authority sustains this fundamental order? We turn our eyes to the order that prevails in simple societies and find that in many of them the chief or the council of elders lays down no laws but merely settles incidental disputes that occur among the folk—sometimes there is not even a chief, not even a judge, and yet the order of the community is fulfilled. Or we look on the old-style empire, and find that it consists of a congeries of local communities that uphold their folkways, their fundamental order, without any recourse to the over-all imperial authority. Or we look on a modern democracy and find that the authority of parliament or congress, of president or king, is set up and pulled down by the verdict of public opinion.

The conclusion immediately follows that the authority of government does not create the order over which it presides and does not sustain that order solely by its own fiat or its accredited power. There is authority beyond the authority of government. There is a greater consensus without which the fundamental order of the community would fall apart. This consensus plays a different role under different forms of government. Sometimes it has nothing to do with the processes that make or unmake the princes or potentates who rule the people. Sometimes it has no mode of expression, should the ruler get out of hand and violate the fundamental order he is presumed to protect, save the rare violence of revolution. Sometimes it is alert and sensitive to all that government does and sets its seal of approval or disapproval on the policies that government pursues. But always, whether mainly acquiescent or creatively active, it is the ultimate ground on which the unity and the order of the state repose.

The Nature of the Modern State

Harold Laski is a name which should be known to all students of political science. Whether one agrees with the emphasis he places on the facts he presents or with his interpretation of facts, his thoughts are always suggestive and stimulating. Mr. Laski has not only written extensively on politics as a scholar and teacher but in his native land, England, has been an active participant; he is an active member of the Labour Party. Substantially left of center, he has been called the "intellectual conscience" of his party. In this selection, Mr. Laski, as a keen observer of political institutions, analyzes the state in terms of its functions and in terms of those groups whose voice is most effective in determining how these functions are discharged.

Every citizen of the modern world is the subject of a state. He is legally bound to obey its orders, and the contours of his life are set by the norms that it imposes. These norms are the law, and it is in the power to enforce them upon all who live within its boundaries that the essence of the state is to be found. For whereas all other associations are voluntary in character, and can bind the individual only as he chooses membership of them, once he is a resident of some given state, legally he has no choice but to obey its commands. These are superior in their legal claim to the demand upon him of any alternative body. The state, so to say, is the crowning-point of the modern social edifice, and it is in its supremacy over all other forms of social grouping that its special nature is to be found.

The state is thus a way of regulating human conduct. Any analysis of its character reveals it as a method of imposing principles of behavior by which men must regulate their lives. The state orders us not to steal; it punishes us for a violation of its order. It lays down a system of imperatives, and uses coercion to secure obedience to them. From its own stand-

point, the validity of those imperatives is self-derived. They are legal, not because they are good, or just, or wise, but because they are its imperatives. They are the legal expression of the way in which men should act as laid down by the authority which is alone competent to make final decisions of this kind.

But legal imperatives neither state themselves nor are self-enforced. They have been willed by some man, or by some body of men, and by some man or by some body of men they must be enforced. When we examine the states of the modern world, we find that they always present the spectacle of a large number of men obeying, within a defined territory, a small number of other men. We find, also, that the rules made by this small number, whether, as in Great Britain, they are omniscient (the King in Parliament) or, as in the United States, are limited both as to the subject matter about which they can command obedience and the methods by which this is achieved, nevertheless possess this quality that, should they be violated, this small number of men can use all the coercion that is necessary to vindicate

their authority. Every state, in short, is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, the government being a body of persons within the state who apply the legal imperatives upon which the state rests; and, differently from any other body of persons within the territorial society, they are entitled to use coercion to see that these imperatives are obeyed.

In every state, this is to say, there is a will which is legally pre-eminent over all other wills. It makes the final determinations of the society. It is, in the technical phrase, a sovereign will. It neither receives orders from any other will, nor can it finally alienate its authority. Such a will, for example, is that of the King in Parliament in Great Britain. Within the confines of its territory, whatever it decides is binding upon all residents within that territory. They may consider its decisions immoral or unwise; they are nevertheless legally bound to obey them. A British subject who disliked some decision of his church might leave his church; it would be unable to enforce his acceptance of its decisions. But a British subject who disliked the law relating to the income tax would nevertheless be legally bound to obey it. His attempt to challenge its efficacy would be met at once by compulsory subjection, in one form or another, to its consequences.

The state is thus a society of individuals submitted, if necessary, by compulsion, to a certain way of life. All conduct in the society must conform to that way. The rules which settle its character are the laws of the state, and, by an obvious logic, they have necessary primacy; they are, that is to say, sovereign, over all other rules. In this society, the individuals who make and enforce the rules are termed the government; and that portion of the rules which settles (a) how such rules are to be made, (b) the manner in which they are to be

changed, and (c) who are to make them, is called the constitution of the state.

This is, of course, to view the state as a purely legal order. It is simply a description of the way in which social relationships are geared together in a modern community, without regard either to the way in which the present system has developed, the purposes that it serves, or the value and dangers which attach to it as its functions.

Obviously enough, all of these are important. The character of the modern state is the consequence of the history through which it has passed, and it would be unintelligible save in the light of that history. The power of the state is not exerted in a vacuum. It is used to achieve certain ends, and its rules are, in their substance, altered to secure the ends deemed good at some particular time by those in possession of the legal right to operate its power. Our sense, again, of the value and dangers of the state as thus conceived will clearly depend very largely upon our view of the ends it is seeking to serve, and the way in which it seeks to serve them.

With the history of the state I cannot here pretend to deal. It must be sufficient only to emphasize that its character as a sovereign body was the product of a long chain of historical circumstances of which the most important was the need, at the time of the Reformation, to find a plane of organization to which all claims to authority could be referred for ultimate decision. The state secured its primacy over all other associations because, at that period, it offered prospects of ordered peace such as no other body could pretend to secure. The anarchy of religious faiths seemed to promise little save conflict; economic organization was too local and atomistic in character to be capable of making general rules. The state emerged as the one association ca-

pable of laying down legal imperatives which the mass of men would respect. It was able to order life because, without its commands, there would have been no order. Its triumph was inherent in its ability to enforce its will upon all men against competitors who strove not less ardently for their allegiance.

Why was it able to enforce its will? At this point, we pass from the nature of the state viewed as a purely legal order, to the state as a subject of philosophic analysis. Here, clearly, we must look at it from two different angles. We have to explain what the purposes of the state seem, in general fact, to be: what, that is, explains the character of the legal imperatives it imposes at any given time. We have, also, to search for criteria which will enable us to determine what, again in general terms, the character of those legal imperatives ought to be. What, in a word, explains the habits of some given state, say those of the France of the *ancien regime*? What causes us to make the judgment that the French state of the *ancien regime* was inadequate, in its operation, to the purposes for which a state should exist?

The authority of a state is a function of its ability to satisfy the effective demands that are made upon it. Its subjects desire, for instance, security for their persons and property. The legal imperatives of a state are then directed to satisfying that desire. Its subjects wish to worship God in their own way, without the imposition of prohibitions upon any particular form of religious belief. If the demand cannot be gainsaid, the state makes religious toleration one of its legal imperatives. The reason for the French Revolution was simply that, under the system of legal imperatives maintained by the *ancien regime*, it was impossible to satisfy the demands made upon the institutions of the state by its members.

Legal imperatives, that is to say, are a function of effective demand. They will correspond to the desires of those who know how to make their wishes felt at the center of political power. The laws of any given state will be an effort to respond to those desires; and their efficacy will depend upon the degree to which that response is successful. From, that is, the vast and competing welter of desires which the state confronts among its members, some, and not others, are selected for translation into legally imperative terms. The principle of selection is not a constant one; either time or place determines its operation. We cannot conceive of a state in Western Civilization which does not tax its members to support a system of national education. Yet, less than a century and a half ago it would have been unthinkable that any state should have compelled its members to contribute to such a purpose. A demand which was then ineffective has become, in the process of time, irresistible.

Why? Clearly, because those who exercise the authority of the state have judged it necessary, or wise, or just, to yield to a demand for a national system of education. But we have to discover what it is which makes such a demand effective at a given time and place. The answer, obviously, cannot be that the demand was reasonable: the state has often refused effect to reasonable demands, and accepted those which, on their face, reason could never justify. Nor can it be the wisdom of their substance, since statesmen do not always act wisely. Necessity is a more obvious cause; but we then need to know why one demand is, at some given time and place, deemed necessary by the state, and not another.

The motives, doubtless, which lead statesmen to action are far too complicated to permit of simple explanation; no one cause is finally exclusive of others.

Yet it may be taken as a general rule that the character of any particular state will be, broadly speaking, a function of the economic system which prevails in the society it controls. Any social system reveals itself as a struggle for the control of economic power, since those who possess this power are able, in the measure of their possession, to make their wants effective. Law then becomes a system of relations giving the expression of legal form to their wants. The way, therefore, in which economic power is distributed at any given time and place will shape the character of the legal imperatives which are imposed in that same time and place. The state, in these circumstances, expresses the wants of those who dominate the economic system. The legal order is a mask behind which a dominant economic interest secures the benefit of political authority. The state, as it operates, does not deliberately seek general justice, or general utility, but the interest, in the largest sense, of the dominant class in society.

We must be careful not to read into this view either more than it means or more than it can justify. It explains the general character of a state; it does not explain the details of its actions. It argues broadly that privilege usually goes with the possession of property, and that exclusion from property will be exclusion from privilege. It argues that as the balance of ownership is altered in a society, so the balance of state-action will alter to meet the new equilibrium. That alteration, of course, is rarely immediate, and never complete; there is a time lag in historic movements which makes all adaptation partial. Few classes which have attained power ever utilize it in an extreme way. They have to purchase the consent of their opponents to the new equilibrium; and they will themselves not seldom feel that their own admission to power is in itself satisfactory without an

effort at that exclusiveness from which they had previously suffered. But no one who studies the legislation of a state can doubt its relativity to the demands of the class which acts in its name. The history of trade-union law in England, of freedom of contract in America, of agrarian legislation in Prussia, are all instances of the way in which a dominant economic class uses the state to make ultimate those legal imperatives which best protect its interests.

This is not to deny for one moment a desire in the governing class to act reasonably or justly. But men think differently who live differently; and in the approach to the problem of what legal imperatives are ultimately desirable in the interests of the community as a whole, each class approaches the question with an unstated and half-conscious major premise at the back of its mind which is of fundamental importance to its view of reason or justice. Rich men always underestimate the power of property to secure happiness; religious men always overestimate the influence of faith upon morals; learned men usually attach undue importance to the relation of scholarship to wisdom. We are the prisoners of our experience; and since the main item in our experience is gained in the effort to make our living, the way in which that living is earned is that which most profoundly shapes our notions of what is desirable. John Bright could never see the value of Factory Acts because, as an employer, they contradicted the experience he had most keenly felt; and a landowner, like Lord Shaftesbury, who had no difficulty in seeing the elementary justice of factory legislation, could never see the justice of regulating the conditions of agricultural labor. The slaveowners of the Confederate states believed in all sincerity that a system of slavery was in the interest of the slaves themselves.

It is sometimes said that this theory may hold of a community in which power is oligarchical in character; an England, for example, in which the franchise is confined to the middle class, naturally promotes legislation of a predominantly middle-class character. But where the state is a democracy based upon universal suffrage, the fact that the governors of the state are chosen by the community as a whole makes an economic interpretation obsolete which rests upon the theory that the power of property mainly determines its character.

The objection, however, is less substantial than appears upon the surface. It is true that a democratic state will be, in general, more generous to the multitude than an oligarchical state; the difference between English legislation in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries makes this self-evident. But those differences do not touch the root of the matter. Power depends for its habits upon a consciousness of possession, a habit of organization, an ability to produce an immediate effect. In a democratic state, where there are great inequalities of economic power, the main characteristics of the poor are exactly the want of these. They do not know the power that they possess. They hardly realize what can be effected by organizing their interests. They lack direct access to those who govern them. Any action by the working classes, even in a democratic state, involves risk to their economic security out of all proportion to the certainty of gain. They have rarely in their hands the instruments necessary to secure their desires. They have seldom even learned how these may

best be formulated and defended. They labor under the sense of inferiority which comes from perpetual obedience to orders without any full experience of the confidence which comes from the habit of command. They tend to confound the institutions they have inherited with the inescapable foundations of society. There is, in fact, every reason to expect that a state built upon universal suffrage will be responsible for wider concessions to the multitude than will be granted under any alternative form; but there is no historic reason to suppose that such a state will be able of itself directly to alter at the root the social results of an economically unequal society.

We conclude, that is, that the nature of the legal imperatives in any given state corresponds to the effective demands that state encounters, and that these, in their turn, depend, in a general way, upon the manner in which economic power is distributed in the society which that state controls. It then follows that the more equally economic power is distributed, the profounder will be the relation between the general interest of the community and the legal imperatives imposed by the state. For, obviously, equal economic power means equal effective demand; and the will of the state is then not specially biased in one direction rather than in another. And if the state is an organization for giving effect to demand, the more equally distributed the power that it encounters, the more total will be its response.

That, at any rate, seems the general experience of history.

The State as an Organized Public

John Dewey is America's greatest living philosopher. He has attained, through many years of teaching at Columbia University, through platform lecturing and many books, an enormous recognition and influence. He has become known as a philosopher of democracy. If Dewey's philosophy contains argument—as indeed it must—it is argument rooted in the world we all live in; his system of thought about the world begins and ends in common human experiences; the number of angels which can dance on the head of a pin or the activities of man in a so-called "state of nature" exemplify the kind of question Dewey avoided. It is important, and somewhat comforting, to follow this great thinker as he attempts to distill the idea of the state from the observable conduct of men.

If we look in the wrong place for the public, we shall never locate the State. If we do not ask what are the conditions which promote and obstruct the organization of the public into a social group with definite functions, we shall never grasp the problem involved in the development and transformation of States. If we do not perceive that this organization is equivalent to the equipment of the public with official representatives to care for the interests of the public, we shall miss the clue to the nature of government. The wrong place to look is in the realm of alleged causal agency, of authorship, of forces which are supposed to produce a State by an intrinsic *vis generatrix*. The State is not created as a direct result of organic contacts as offspring are conceived in the womb, nor by direct conscious intent as a machine is invented, nor by some brooding indwelling spirit, whether a personal deity or a metaphysical absolute will. When we seek for the origin of States in such sources as these, a realistic regard for facts compels us to conclude in the end that we find nothing

but singular persons, you, they, me. We shall then be driven, unless we have recourse to mysticism, to decide that the public is born in a myth and is sustained by superstition.

There are many answers to the question: What is the public? Unfortunately, many of them are only restatements of the question. Thus we are told that the public is the community as a whole, and a-community-as-a-whole is supposed to be a self-evident and self-explanatory phenomenon. But a community as a *whole* involves not merely a variety of associative ties which hold persons together in diverse ways, but an organization of all elements by an integrated principle. And this is precisely what we are in search of. Why should there be anything of the nature of an all-inclusive and regulative unity? If we postulate such a thing, surely the institution which alone would answer to it is humanity, not the affairs which history exhibits as States. The notion of an inherent universality in the associative force at once breaks against the obvious fact of a

plurality of States, each localized, with its boundaries, limitations, its indifference and even hostility to other States. The best that metaphysical monistic philosophies of politics can do with this fact is to ignore it. Or, as in the case of Hegel and his followers, a mythical philosophy of history is constructed to eke out the deficiencies of a mythical doctrine of statehood. The universal spirit seizes upon one temporal and local nation after another as the vehicle for its objectification of reason and will.

Such considerations as these reinforce our proposition that the perception of consequences which are projected in important ways beyond the persons and associations directly concerned in them is the source of a public; and that its organization into a State is effected by establishing special agencies to care for and regulate these consequences. But they also suggest that actual States exhibit traits which perform the function that has been stated, and which serve as marks of anything to be called a State. Discussion of these traits will define the nature of the public and the problem of its political organization, and will also operate to test our theory.

We can hardly select a better trait to serve as a mark and sign of the nature of a State than a point just mentioned, temporal and geographical localization. There are associations which are too narrow and restricted in scope to give rise to a public, just as there are associations too isolated from one another to fall within the same public. Part of the problem of discovery of a public capable of organization into a State is that of drawing lines between the too close and intimate and the too remote and disconnected. Immediate contiguity, face-to-face relationships, have consequences which generate a community of interests, a sharing of values, too direct and vital to occasion a need for political organization. Connec-

tions within a family are familiar; they are matters of immediate acquaintance and concern. The so-called blood-tie which has played such a part in demarcation of social units is largely imputed on the basis of sharing immediately in the results of conjoint behavior. What one does in the household affects others directly, and the consequences are appreciated at once and in an intimate way. As we say, they "come home." Special organization to care for them is a superfluous. Only when the tie has extended to a union of families in a clan, and of clans in a tribe, do consequences become so indirect that special measures are called for. The neighborhood is constituted largely on the same pattern of association that is exemplified in the family. Custom and measures improvised to meet special emergencies as they arise suffice for its regulation.

For long periods of human history, especially in the Orient, the State is hardly more than a shadow thrown upon the family and neighborhood by remote personages, swollen to gigantic form by religious beliefs. It rules but it does not regulate; for its rule is confined to receipt of tribute and ceremonial deference. Duties are within the family; property is possessed by the family. Personal loyalties to elders take the place of political obedience. The relationships of husband and wife, parent and children, older and younger children, friend and friend, are the bonds from which authority proceeds. Politics is not a branch of morals; it is submerged in morals. All virtues are summed up in filial piety. Wrongdoing is culpable because it reflects upon one's ancestry and kin. Officials are known, but only to be shunned; to submit a dispute to them is a disgrace. The measure of value of the remote and theocratic State lies in what it does *not* do. Its perfection is found in its identification with the processes of nature, in virtue of which

the seasons travel their constant round, so that fields under the beneficent rule of sun and rain produce their harvest, and the neighborhood prospers in peace. The intimate and familiar propinquity group is not a social unity within an inclusive whole. It is, for almost all purposes, society itself.

At the other limit there are social groups so separated by rivers, seas, and mountains, by strange languages and gods, that what one of them does—save in war—has no appreciable consequences for another. There is therefore no common interest, no public, and no need or possibility of an inclusive State. The plurality of State is such a universal and notorious phenomenon that it is taken for granted. It does not seem to require explanation. But it sets up, as we have noted, a test difficult for some theories to meet. Except upon the basis of a freakish limitation in the common will and reason which is alleged to be the foundation of the State, the difficulty is insuperable. It is peculiar, to say the least, that universal reason should be unable to cross a mountain range and that objective will should be balked by a river current. The difficulty is not so great for many other theories. But only the theory which makes recognition of consequences the critical factor can find in the fact of many States a corroborating trait. Whatever is a barrier to the spread of the consequences of associated behavior by that very fact operates to set up political boundaries. The explanation is as commonplace as is the thing to be explained.

Somewhere between associations that are narrow, close, and intimate and those that are so remote as to have only infrequent and casual contact lies, then, the province of a State. We do not find, and should not expect to find, sharp and fast demarcations. Villages and neighborhoods shade imperceptibly into a political public. Different States may pass through

federations and alliances into a larger whole which has some of the marks of statehood. This condition, which we should anticipate in virtue of the theory, is confirmed by historical facts. The wavering and shifting line of distinction between a State and other forms of social union is, again, an obstacle in the way of theories of the State which imply as their concrete counterpart something as sharply marked off as is the concept. On the basis of empirical consequences, it is just the sort of thing which should occur. There are empires due to conquest where political rule exists only in forced levies of taxes and soldiers, and in which, though the word "State" may be used, the characteristic signs of a public are notable for their absence. There are political communities like the city-States of ancient Greece in which the fiction of common descent is a vital factor, in which household gods and worship are replaced by community divinities, shrines, and cults: States in which much of the intimacy of the vivid and prompt personal touch of the family endures, while there has been added the transforming inspiration of a varied, freer, fuller life, whose issues are so momentous that in comparison the life of the neighborhood is parochial and that of the household dull.

Multiplicity and constant transformation in the forms which the State assumes are as comprehensible upon the hypothesis proposed as is the numerical diversity of independent States. The consequences of conjoint behavior differ in kind and in range with changes in "material culture," especially those involved in exchange of raw materials, finished products, and above all in technology, in tools, weapons, and utensils. These in turn are immediately affected by inventions in means of transit, transportation, and intercommunication. A people that lives by tending flocks of sheep and cattle adapts itself

to very different conditions than those of a people which ranges freely, mounted on horses. One form of nomadism is usually peaceful, the other warlike. Roughly speaking, tools and implements determine occupations, and occupations determine the consequences of associated activity. In determining consequences, they institute publics with different interests, which exact different types of political behavior to care for them.

In spite of the fact that diversity of political forms rather than uniformity is the rule, belief in *the* State as an archetypal entity persists in political philosophy and science. Much dialectical ingenuity has been expended in construction of an essence or intrinsic nature in virtue of which any particular association is entitled to have applied to it the concept of statehood. Equal ingenuity has been expended in explaining away all divergencies from this morphological type, and (the favored device) in ranking States in a hierarchical order of value as they approach the defining essence. The idea that there is a model pattern which makes a State a *good* or true State has affected practice as well as theory. It, more than anything else, is responsible for the effort to form constitutions offhand and impose them ready-made on peoples. Unfortunately, when the falsity of this view was perceived, it was replaced by the idea that States "grow" or develop instead of being made. This "growth" did not mean simply that States alter. Growth signified an evolution through regular stages to a predetermined end because of some intrinsic *nisus* or principle. This theory discouraged recourse to the only method by which alterations of political forms might be directed: namely, the use of intelligence to judge consequences. Equally with the theory which it displaced, it presumed the existence of a single standard form which defines *the* State as the essential and true

article. After a false analogy with physical science, it was asserted that only the assumption of such a uniformity of process renders a "scientific" treatment of society possible. Incidentally, the theory flattered the conceit of those nations which, being politically "advanced," assumed that they were so near the apex of evolution as to wear the crown of statehood.

The hypothesis presented makes possible a consistently empirical or *historical* treatment of the changes in political forms and arrangements, free from any overriding conceptual domination such as is inevitable when a "true" State is postulated, whether that be thought of as deliberately made or as evolving by its own inner law. Intrusions from nonpolitical internal occurrences, industrial and technological, and from external events, borrowings, travel, migrations, explorations, wars, modify the consequences of pre-existing associations to such an extent that new agencies and functions are necessitated. Political forms are also subject to alterations of a more indirect sort. Developments of better methods of thinking bring about observation of consequences which were concealed from a vision which used coarser intellectual tools. Quickened intellectual insight also makes possible invention of new political devices. Science has not indeed played a large role. But intuitions of statesmen and of political theorists have occasionally penetrated into the operations of social forces in such a way that a new turn has been given to legislation and to administration. There is a margin of toleration in the body politic as well as in an organic body. Measures not in any sense inevitable are accommodated to after they have once been taken; and a further diversity is thereby introduced in political manners.

In short, the hypothesis which holds that publics are constituted by recognition of extensive and enduring indirect

consequences of acts accounts for the relativity of States, while the theories which define them in terms of specific casual authorship imply an absoluteness which is contradicted by facts. The attempt to find by the "comparative method" structures which are common to antique and modern, to occidental and oriental States, has involved a great waste of industry. The only constant is the function of caring for and regulating the interests which accrue as the result of the complex indirect expansion and radiation of conjoint behavior.

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In conclusion, we shall make explicit what has been implied regarding the relation to one another of public, government, and State. There have been two extreme views about this point. On one hand, the State has been identified with government. On the other hand, the State, having a necessary existence of its own, *per se*, is said then to proceed to form and employ certain agencies forming government, much as a man hires servants and assigns them duties. The latter view is appropriate when the casual-agency theory is relied upon. Some force, whether a general will or the singular wills of assembled individuals, calls the State into being. Then the latter, as a secondary operation, chooses certain persons through whom to act. Such a theory helps those who entertain it to retain the idea of the inherent sanctity of the State. Concrete political evils such as history exhibits in abundance can be laid at the door of fallible and corrupt governments, while the State keeps its honor unbesmirched. The identification of the State with government has the advantage of keeping the mind's eye upon concrete and observable facts; but it involves an unaccountable separation between rulers and people. If a government exists by itself and on its own account,

why should there be government? Why should there persist the habits of loyalty and obedience which permit it to rule?

The hypothesis which has been advanced frees us from the perplexities which cluster about both of these two notions. The lasting, extensive, and serious consequences of associated activity bring into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By means of officials and their special powers it becomes a State. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the State; there is no State without a government, but also there is none without the public. The officers are still singular beings, but they exercise new and special powers. These may be turned to their private account. Then government is corrupt and arbitrary. Quite apart from deliberate graft, from using unusual powers for private glorification and profit, density of mind and pomposity of behavior, adherence to class-interest and its prejudices, are strengthened by position. "Power is poison" was the remark of one of the best, shrewdest, and most experienced observers of Washington politicians. On the other hand, occupancy of office may enlarge a man's views and stimulate his social interest, so that he exhibits as a statesman traits foreign to his private life.

But since the public forms a State only by and through officials and their acts, and since holding official position does not work a miracle of transubstantiation, there is nothing perplexing or even disturbing in the spectacle of the stupidities and errors of political behavior. The facts which give rise to the spectacle should, however, protect us from the illusion of expecting extraordinary change to follow from a mere change in political agencies and methods. Such a change sometimes occurs, but when it does it is because the social conditions, in generating a new public, have prepared the way for it;

the State sets a formal seal upon forces already in operation by giving them a defined channel through which to act. Conceptions of "The State" as something per se, something intrinsically manifesting a general will and reason, lend themselves to illusions. They make such a sharp distinction between *the* State and *a* government that, from the standpoint of the theories, a government may be corrupt and injurious and yet "The State" by the same idea retain its inherent dignity and nobility. Officials may be mean, obstinate, proud, and stupid, and yet the nature of the State which they serve remain essentially unimpaired. Since, however, a public is organized into a State through its government, the State is as its officials are. Only through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by citizens can a State be maintained in integrity and usefulness.

The discussion also returns with some added illumination to the problem of the relation of State and society. The problem of the relation of individuals to associations—sometimes posed as the relation of *the* individual to society—is a meaningless one. We might as well make a problem out of the relation of the letters of an alphabet to the alphabet. An alphabet *is* letters, and "society" is individuals in their connections with one another. The mode of combination of letters with one another is obviously a matter of importance; letters form words and sentences when combined, and have no point or sense except in some combination. I would not say that the latter statement applies literally to individuals, but it cannot be gainsaid that singular human beings exist and behave in constant and varied association with one another. These modes of conjoint action and their consequences profoundly affect not only the outer habits of singular persons, but their dispositions in emotion, desire, planning, and valuing.

"Society," however, is either an abstract or a collective noun. In the concrete, there are societies, associations, groups, of an immense number of kinds, having different ties and instituting different interests. They may be gangs, criminal bands; clubs for sport, sociability, and eating; scientific and professional organizations; political parties, and unions within them; families; religious denominations; business partnerships and corporations; and so on in an endless list. The associations may be local, nationwide, and transnational. Since there is no one *thing* which may be called society, except their indefinite overlapping, there is no unqualified eulogistic connotation adhering to the term "society." Some societies are in the main to be approved, some to be condemned, on account of their consequences upon the character and conduct of those engaged in them and because of their remoter consequences upon others. All of them, like all things human, are mixed in quality; "society" is something to be approached and judged critically and discriminately. "Socialization" of some sort—that is, the reflex modification of wants, beliefs, and work because of share in a united action—is inevitable. But it is as marked in the formation of frivolous, dissipated, fanatical, narrow-minded, and criminal persons as in that of competent inquirers, learned scholars, creative artists, and good neighbors.

Confining our notice to the results which are desirable, it appears that there is no reason for assigning all the values which are generated and maintained by means of human associations to the work of States. Yet the same unbridled generalizing and fixating tendency of the mind which leads to a monistic fixation of society has extended beyond the hypo-statizing of "society" and produced a magnified idealization of "The State." All values which result from any kind of

association are habitually imputed by one school of social philosophers to the State. Naturally, the result is to place the State beyond criticism. Revolt against the State is then thought to be the one unforgivable social sin. Sometimes the deification proceeds from a special need of the time, as in the cases of Spinoza and Hegel. Sometimes it springs from a prior belief in universal will and reason, and a consequent need of finding some empirical phenomena which may be identified with the externalization of this absolute spirit. Then this is employed, by circular logic, as evidence for the existence of such a spirit. The net import of our discussion is that a State is a distinctive and secondary form of association, having a specifiable work to do and specified organs of operation.

It is quite true that most States, after they have been brought into being, react upon the primary groupings. When a State is a good State, when the officers of the public genuinely serve the public interests, this reflex effect is of great importance. It renders the desirable associations solidier and more coherent; indirectly, it clarifies their aims and purges their activities. It places a discount upon injurious groupings and renders their tenure of life precarious. In performing these services, it gives the individual members of valued associations greater liberty and security: it relieves them of hampering conditions which if they had to cope with personally would absorb their energies in mere negative struggle against evils. It enables individual members to count with reasonable certainty upon what others will do, and thus facilitates mutually helpful co-operations. It creates respect for others and for one's self. A measure of the goodness of a State is the degree in which it relieves individuals from the waste of negative struggle and needless conflict, and confers upon them positive assurance and re-

enforcement in what they undertake. This is a great service, and there is no call to be niggardly in acknowledging the transformations of group and personal action which States have historically effected.

But this recognition cannot be legitimately converted into the monopolistic absorption of all associations into "The State," nor of all social values into political value. The all-inclusive nature of the State signifies only that officers of the public (including, of course, lawmakers) may act so as to fix conditions under which *any* form of association operates; its comprehensive character refers only to the impact of its behavior. A war, like an earthquake, may "include" in its consequences all elements in a given territory; but the inclusion is by way of effects, not by inherent nature or right. A beneficent law, like a condition of general economic prosperity, may favorably affect all interests in a particular region, but it cannot be called a whole of which the elements influenced are parts. Nor can the liberating and confirming results of public action be construed to yield a wholesale idealization of States, in contrast with other associations. For State activity is often injurious to the latter. One of the chief occupations of States has been the waging of war and the suppression of dissentient minorities. Moreover, their action, even when benign, presupposes values due to nonpolitical forms of living together which are but extended and re-enforced by the public through its agents.

The hypothesis which we have supported has obvious points of contact with what is known as the pluralistic conception of the State. It presents also a marked point of difference. Our doctrine of plural forms is a statement of a fact: that there exists a plurality of social groupings, good, bad, and indifferent. It

is not a doctrine which prescribes inherent limits to State action. It does not intimate that the function of the State is limited to settling conflicts among other groups, as if each one of them had a fixed scope of action of its own. Were that true, the State would be only an umpire to avert and remedy trespasses of one group upon another. Our hypothesis is neutral as to any general, sweeping implications as to how far State activity may extend. It does not indicate any particular polity of public action. At times, the consequences of the conjoint behavior of some persons may be such that a large public interest is generated which can be fulfilled only by laying down conditions which involve a large measure of reconstruction within that group. There is no

more an inherent sanctity in a church, trade union, business corporation, or family institution than there is in the State. Their value is also to be measured by their consequences. The consequences vary with concrete conditions; hence at one time and place a large measure of State activity may be indicated, and at another time a policy of quiescence and *laissez faire*. Just as publics and States vary with conditions of time and place, so do the concrete functions which should be carried on by States. There is no antecedent universal proposition which can be laid down because of which the functions of a State should be limited or should be expanded. Their scope is something to be critically and experimentally determined.

The Demands of Society upon Government

Felix Frankfurter, formerly professor in the Harvard Law School, is now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court where his keenly analytical mind and candid expression of his views have helped make deliberations of the court lively if not always harmonious. This excerpt from a series of lectures which has become a minor classic in political science was prepared more than twenty years ago, but if anything, Justice Frankfurter's words are more apt today. He makes an effort here to put the evolution of modern government in its proper perspective, to strip away theory and to state an important fact. Who or what has been responsible for the functions of government?

Perhaps the dominant feeling about government today is distrust. The tone of most comment, whether casual or deliberate, implies that ineptitude and inadequacy are the chief characteristics of government. I do not refer merely to the current skepticism about democracy, but to the

widely entertained feeling of the incapacity of government, generally, to satisfy the needs of modern society.

But the fact is that we ask more from government than any society has ever asked. At one and the same time, we expect little from government and pro-

gressively rely on it more. We feel that the essential forces of life are no longer in the channels of politics, and yet we constantly turn to those channels for the direction of forces outside them. Generalizations like these elude proof because they are usually based on very subtle factors. But the large abstention from voting in our elections must certainly bespeak an indifference not without meaning.

The paradox of both distrusting and burdening government reveals the lack of a conscious philosophy of politics. It betrays some unresolved inner conflict about the interaction of government and society. I suspect that it implies an uncritical continuance of past assumptions about government and about society. We have not adjusted our thinking about government to the overwhelming facts of modern life, and so carry over old mental habits, traditional schoolbook platitudes and campaign slogans as to the role, the purposes, and the methods of government. Perhaps such confusion is part of the process of travail toward a more conscious attitude. Certainly there is a great deal of speculative writing about the state. Theories range all the way from a revival of philosophic anarchism to an all-absorbing collectivism. These theories are in part at least illustrated by novel forms of government, like those of Russia and Italy; in part philosophic theories are merely partisan justifications of such experiments. Certainly theory and practice interact. Political societies represent dominant contemporary forces, dominant practical demands made upon government by society. But theories, intellectual systems, notions about what is desirable and what is undesirable, may themselves create demands or determine their direction. Ideas and books have played their share in the drama of government. Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau were thinkers who greatly affected action. They determined political forces; they did not merely articulate

them. Yet even these men were expressive of their times; they did not derive their views from abstractions. It is not without significance that the most profound contribution to political thought in America, namely, the *Federalist*, was not the work of doctrinaire thinkers but of men of affairs. The *Federalist* was a lawyer's brief by the framers of the Constitution in support of their handiwork.

Solid thinking about politics demands an essential measure of disinterestedness and detachment. But it must not be detached from the circumstances of time and place which condition government. Nor must the disinterestedness of the thinker fail to take into account those human interests here and now, the accommodation of which is the essential task of politics. I shall therefore put on one side all abstract or *a priori* speculations about the state, its scope and limits.

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Instead, let me ask you to bring into sharp focus what it is that a modern state like our own government is actually called upon to do. Before we can consider the aptness of political ideas or the adequacy of political machinery, the relevance of past experience or the promise of new proposals, we must be fully alive to what might be called the raw material of politics—the nature and extent of the demands made upon the machinery of government, and the environment in which it moves.

Startling transformations in the outward face of society are taking place under our very eyes. The great material inventions that are giving life itself the aspect of a cinematograph are innovations of today, at most of yesterday. These new material forces and devices are having their reflex upon finance, upon industrial organization, upon law and government, upon the manner of man's thoughts in ways and to an extent that we have

hardly begun to understand. Because of these swiftly moving changes of today, there is an illusion that the society which preceded airplanes and television had always been, relatively speaking, the same, and presented therefore the same situations to government. In our own day we make such rapid adjustments to drastic novelties in the world of matter, that we do not take in the full significance of the profoundly far-reaching changes that have occurred within the last century, and their effect upon the tasks of government.

Let me recall a few aspects of the society of a hundred years ago, compared with our own, in those manifestations which inevitably impinge upon politics. Consider the nature of the community over which government exercises control. I put aside for the moment the mere problem of size—the fact that our national government rules a continent. This element of size is perhaps the single most important fact about our government and its perplexities. Its conditions, interests, opinion, administrative capacity. But it raises issues that demand a separate series of essays. My immediate concern is with the distribution of the population upon which depends the nature of its interconnections, the extent and intensity of its social problems. The population of the entire Union, in 1790, was 3,919,625. There were only six towns with a population of 8,000 or over, making a total urban population of 131,472 or a little over three per cent of the whole. The fifth census in 1830 reported 12,866,020 people in the United States, with twenty towns of over 8,000 and an urban population of 864,509, not quite seven per cent of the entire population. By 1880, the population had grown beyond 50,000,000, of which 22.7%, or more than 11,000,000, dwelt in 286 towns. This constant shift to the cities and the very big cities, steadily grew until the 1920 census found 46,307,640 people, or 43.8%, of the total

population of 105,710,620, living in 924 cities. One may safely forecast that the 1930 census will show a still greater concentration of city life. In fact, to a considerable measure, the United States is in process of becoming a congeries of metropolitan areas.

I shall not attempt a survey of all the activities of government but shall confine myself to lawmaking. Legislation is the most sensitive reflex of politics. It is most responsive to public needs and public feelings, and largely determines the orbit within which the judiciary and the executive move. What government today is called upon to do will appear most vividly from its comparison with the business of government in the early days of the Union. To this end, I shall make a brief survey of the volume and content of legislation for five early years by the Congress of the United States.

This early legislative picture I shall put alongside the stuff and scope of present-day legislation. We shall then have not speculation about government, not theories of what it should and should not be, but an inventory of what it does, leading to a consideration of how it works and the forces it encounters.

All the laws passed by Congress for the first five years are contained in a single volume of 320 octavo pages. There were twenty-six acts passed in the 1789 session, sixty-six in the session of 1790, ninety-four in 1791, thirty-eight in 1792, and sixty-three in 1793. And these were the years when the new government was put on its feet, the whole machinery for its existence devised. For a single session of the Seventieth Congress there were 993 enactments, contained in a mastodontic volume of 1,014 pages, quarto not octavo!

The bulk of this early congressional legislation concerned the creation of executive departments and the details for

carrying on the government. The legislation dealt with the treasury, the judiciary, foreign affairs and war, and their administration. Taxes and methods for collecting them required laws, and the first of our great public utilities, the Post Office, was established. As aids to the foregoing, record systems were provided and the Bank of the United States was established. Congress also had to legislate for the vast unsettled territories, and from time to time created new states. Navigation received attention through numerous laws dealing with lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and public piers. A patent law had early passage and the decennial census had its beginning. The Revolutionary War, like all wars, led to many pension laws. In fact, government bounties, pensions, land grants, provisions for government officials, formed the subject matter of a large proportion of the total legislation. Apart from taxes and tariffs, the regulation of fisheries, and measures dealing with the coastwise trade, there was hardly any manifestation of active intervention by government in the affairs of men.

The stream of events cannot be broken into definite epochs without artificiality and distortion. Nevertheless, one may mark McKinley's administration as the end of a period of *laissez faire*—the termination of a narrow and negative conception of government—and the entry of government into all the secular affairs of society. Following the Civil War there was an almost magical industrial growth. Radiating railroads are the muscles which have pulled into an articulate body the detached and sprawling members of our great domain. A vast nervous system of telephones and telegraphs and wireless has, on the surface at least, electrified the scattered regions of the country into a self-conscious whole. The concentration of life in big cities has made of them working ganglia of the nation. A relatively

homogeneous population with restricted disparities of wealth, has been transformed into a cumbersome democracy drawn from many peoples, containing some forty million wage earners, with great inequalities in wealth and increasing pressure of conflicting interests. Vast physical forces have produced great social changes. They have been fertilized by theories concerning man and society. Radical ideas let loose by the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the revolutionary movements of 1848, have slowly but profoundly affected men's desires and their demands upon government. All this ferment has been greatly reinforced by the dissolving consequences of the World War. The Great Society, with its permeating influence of technology, large-scale industry, progressive urbanization, accentuation of groups and group interests, presses its problems upon government.

I recall these elementary facts precisely because we are too prone to dissociate problems of law and government from the general texture of society. The tasks of government have meaning only as they are set in the perspective of the forces outside government. Modern society is substantially reflected in legislation. Roosevelt's "big stick" was wielded largely to secure from Congress legislation to control Big Business and to promote social legislation. Government is no longer merely to keep the ring, to be a policeman, to secure the observance of elementary decencies. It is now looked upon as one of the energies of civilization. It is being drawn upon for all the great ends of society.

Beginning with Roosevelt's days, there has been exuberant efflorescence of congressional lawmaking. The Safety Appliance Act, the Hours of Service Law, an invigorated Interstate Commerce Act, the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the Meat Inspection Law, the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, the Mann Act, the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Transportation Law,

the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Grain Futures Act, are only a partial recital of the legislative product of a generation. With increasing impact, taxation has been utilized not as an irreducible exaction from citizens for the irreducible costs of government, but as an instrument of social policy, and more particularly as a conscious control in the distribution of wealth. Since 1900, successive Presidents of the United States have been inveighing against government by commission, while at the same time, we have had a steady extension of commissions. To them vast powers have been intrusted which heretofore had not been exercised by government at all, or when exercised, had been vested in courts and Congress. The establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, with a mild sweep of powers, dates the break with the simplicities of the past; it begins the new era of governmental regulation and administrative control.

Active regulation, erected by Roosevelt into a political philosophy, has been pursued by all succeeding Presidents. Whatever may have been their traditional theories and their political prejudices, in practice each President has been an instrument of forces greater than either. Before he was President, Wilson rebuked government by commission. As President, he added his signature to more enactments for the regulation of business and conduct through boards and commissions than did Roosevelt. Harding entered the Presidency with two dicta: that government, after all, is a very simple thing and that what was needed was more business in government and less government in business. How deeply he was disillusioned of his romantic notion concerning the simplicity of government, we can only surmise. But it is a matter of history that he found that while government could keep out business, business could not keep out government. Nor was the extension of governmental

activity curtailed or arrested in the Coolidge era, however much it may have conflicted with Coolidge's theories of government. Finally, Herbert Hoover, who has put his philosophy of individualism into a book and who directed one of his few campaign speeches against socialism, marked the first year of his administration by the creation of the most far-reaching political machinery for economic purposes and the most daring attempt; certainly in peace times, to control the free play of economic forces.

There is something touching about the Congressman who only the other day introduced a joint resolution for a Commission on Centralization which is to report "whether in its opinion the Government has departed from the concept of the founding fathers" and "what steps, if any, should be taken to restore the government to its original purposes and sphere of activity. . . ." One suspects that the Congressman is descended from King Canute and Mrs. Partington. But he is merely ingenuously acting upon a view of government which Presidents and eminent lawyers and leading industrialists voice from time to time, unmindful of the facts which have made such views the cry for the return of the stagecoach and the peaceful countryside.

While the energies of the federal government have thus expanded since their origin beyond all recognition, the activity of the states has not contracted. Undoubtedly many transactions within a state now touch commerce outside it, so as to give a national aspect to what in earlier days had merely local meaning. Thus, it has come to pass that through the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, national laws and national administration have vastly extended their sway. But what is left to the states and undertaken by them, affects the center and circumference of affairs. In the unexciting pages of con-

temporary session laws, one finds that nothing that is human is alien to the legislator. Callings are regulated, conduct is prescribed and proscribed. Private enterprise is subjected to a network of public control. Practically the whole gamut of economic enterprise is under the state's scrutiny by an intricate administrative system of licenses, certificates, permits, orders, awards, and what not.

The *Index to State Legislation* recently published by the Congressional Library reads like an inventory of all of man's secular needs and the means for their fulfillment. Thus, under the heading of food alone, one finds legislation regulating bakers and confectioners, beverages, canneries, cold storage, commission merchants, dairy products, eggs, fish, flour and meal, frogs and turtles, fruits, game, grain, hay and straw, ice cream, kosher food, markets, meats, nuts, restaurants, saccharin, salt, vegetables, and vinegar. In addition there are laws fixing standards for apples, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, cottonseed, canned fruit, condensed milk, butter and cheese, anthracite coal, grapes, grain, gasoline, oil, fertilizer, maple syrup, and a host of other commodities. There are statutes regulating advertisements, and blue sky laws for the protection of the investing public. Workmen's compensation acts have practically everywhere replaced the inadequacies of the common law of master and servant. This is only one aspect of the gradual reliance upon the principle of insurance for many problems engendered by modern industry. In its relation to unemployment, it is part of the movement for enforcing minimum social standards through government. This is the ultimate philosophy behind the great body of industrial legislation. Again, the early simple regulation of gas and water companies has expanded into the intricacies of modern utility regulation. Many conflicting interests have to be reconciled, and intricate technical

problems to be solved. Here we touch some of the most perplexing and contentious problems of modern government which we shall later consider in detail. Suffice it to say that through its regulation of those tremendous human and financial interests which we call public utilities, the government may in large measure determine the whole social-economic direction of the future. The most acute aspect of this problem arises in connection with the development of electric power and the profound implications of power upon the country's development. Law and legislation must deal with a world transformed by engineering science.

Even subtler intellectual and spiritual forces confront modern government when faced with the problems presented by the movie and the radio. As to movies, some states have already met these demands by commissions regulating the conditions of exhibition and have attempted to formulate moral standards. Broadcasting over the continent is regulated by a national commission.

The real difficulty appears to be (I quote from Senator Root) that the new conditions incident to the extraordinary industrial development of the last half-century are continuously and progressively demanding the readjustment of the relations between great bodies of men and the establishment of new legal rights and obligations not contemplated when existing laws were passed or existing limitations upon the powers of government were prescribed in our Constitution. In place of the old individual independence of life in which every intelligent and healthy citizen was competent to take care of himself and his family we have come to a high degree of interdependence in which the greater part of our people have to rely for all the necessities of life upon the systematized co-operation of a vast number of other men working through

complicated industrial and commercial machinery. Instead of the completeness of individual effort working out its own results in obtaining food and clothing and shelter, we have specialization and division of labor which leaves each individual unable to apply his industry and intelligence except in co-operation with a great number of others whose activity conjoined to his is necessary to produce any useful result. Instead of the give and take of free individual contract, the tremendous power of organization has combined great aggregations of capital in enormous industrial establishments working through vast agencies of commerce and employing great masses of men in movements of production and transportation and trade, so great in the mass that each individual concerned in them is quite helpless by himself. The relations between the employer and the employed, between the owners of aggregated capital and the units of organized labor, between the small producer, the small trader, the consumer, and the great transporting and manufacturing and distributing agencies, all present new questions for the solution of which the old reliance upon the free action of individual wills appears quite inadequate. And in many directions the intervention of that organized control which we call government seems necessary to produce the same result of justice and right conduct which obtained through the attrition of individuals before the new conditions arose.

Political man has on the whole merely the limited resources of the past. In native intelligence we can hardly be said to excel Aristotle, and in the field of political ideas man's inventive powers have been pitifully meager. Not only have the burdens cast upon politics immeasurably increased; the environment within which politics operates immensely increases the difficulties. Pitiless publicity has its beneficial aspects.

But when everything is done under blare and noise, the deliberate process is impaired and government becomes too susceptible to quick feeling. It is, I believe, of deep significance that the Constitution of the United States was written behind closed doors, and it is well to remember that earth was thrown on the streets of Philadelphia to protect the convention from the noise of traffic. Again, we talk glibly about the annihilation of distance, and in many ways we do gain from speed of communication. But we must not overlook the moral cost of these triumphs of science. The mobility of words at the present time brings in its train what might be called immobility of reflection. The extent and influence of the conscious manipulation of these forces by movies, chain newspapers, and lobbying organizations are still obscure. That these constitute powerful elements in the complexities of modern government, no one will gainsay. The interplay between government and the complicated structure of industrial society demands as never before men of independence and disinterestedness in public life. You remember the role of a legislator as Burke conceived it. "Your representative owes you," he told his constituents, "not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." Against this responsible exercise of judgment, the whole current of American life is unconsciously in conspiracy. A thousand pressures dissipate the energies and confuse the judgment of public men. The tasks society lays upon them make heavy demands upon wisdom and omniscience. Yet most public men are too distracted to acquire mastery of any political problem and seldom feel free to give us the guidance even of their meager wisdom.

All I have said is indeed merely a laborious reminder of some of the basic conditions of contemporary government.

3

THE NATURE OF POLITICS

I

Talking politics probably comes close to being a major pastime in the United States; indeed, most of us are introduced to the subject this way. There is always open season on political questions and dogmatic assertion and sweeping generalizations are the weapons. What people lack in precise knowledge they more than make up in the enthusiasm of their talking, arguing, or discussion. At least three basic themes run through most private discussions of politics: disillusionment, denunciation of sordidness, and fascination with the Great Game and its players. There is more. Political argument is a safety valve, an unconscious reaction against having a bit—perhaps a large bit—of one's destiny in the hands of a person or persons unknown.

Despite the bewildering mixture of unsupported opinion, superficial detail, half truths, facts, charges, counter-charges and myths, it would be an error to ignore this custom or to suggest as some have, in despair, that conversation be de-politicalized in an effort to save friendships and conserve energy. To borrow a phrase from Wordsworth, politics "is too much with us, late and soon." Nor is it well to dismiss political discussion as meaningless—even when it appears to have little direct effect on political activity. Thousands of discussions help create a climate of opinion. And the inclination to talk politics is proof both of its universal human quality and of man's political consciousness. Nothing is more important to a democratic system than that the level of discussion among the great masses of people be as high as possible. One purpose of this chapter is to suggest some general considerations which it is hoped will help the student acquire a critical attitude toward all the phenomena included in the term "politics."

II

The *Dictionary of American Politics* defines politics as:

That part of political science dealing with policy making. It concerns itself with the agencies and instrumentalities which establish policy, including the legislature and all but the purely administrative functions of the executive, together with the electorate,

political parties, etc. It is also concerned with the results which flow from this stage of government activity. Politics is primarily identified with public objectives and administration with method, although there is a growing interpenetration between the two branches of political science.

Catlin, the English writer, refers to politics "as a study of the act of control, or as the act of human or social control." Harold Lasswell sees it as the "... study of influence and the influential." Again, V. O. Key says, "... politics deals with human relationships ... of dominance and submission, of the governors and the governed." Joseph Roucek's definition is broader: "Politics embraces every social phenomena characterized by the struggles of groups or individuals to gain or retain power or influence over others."

It will be useful, however, to define politics more fully while, at the same time, avoiding the inclusion of *all* human activity in which influence or power is exercised or the exclusion of many of the most interesting and significant aspects. A definition, though always hazardous, is a convenient method of indicating the wide variety of activity properly described as political and the difference between political and nonpolitical relationships.

Briefly, *politics is an unending process in which individuals or groups seek to control public power (the power of the government) or influence those who exercise public power, temporarily or regularly, to accomplish certain things or to prevent certain things from being done—all within a legal framework.* This definition will embrace most of the political activity which takes place on the domestic scene; it does not account for violent revolution (which is a political process), but it seems justifiable to add the phrase "within a legal framework" because for the most part the political process operates according to rules of the game, whether the form of government be democratic or totalitarian.

To expand the above definition, it should be remembered first that in the previous chapter it was suggested that the correct point of departure for political analysis is society. Society is made up of individuals and groups (the mass of voters, the CIO, the farmers, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the Association of American Railroads, the League of Women Voters, the Zionists, the American Veterans Committee, and so on). These individuals and groups are motivated by certain drives: greed, power, security, welfare, or advantage—personal or otherwise. One of the most complicating factors in politics is the diversity of motives in any situation and their varying importance. To these individuals and groups are available various kinds of private power, namely, votes, persuasion, coercion, or economic pressure; for example, organized labor may threaten bloc voting, a Congressman may be persuaded by some part of his constituency, or support may be purchased by offer of a reciprocal favor. These techniques are generally brought to bear on the wielders of public power—the judges, administrators, legislators, elected political leaders, and executives on all levels of government, national, state, and local. In turn, the policy-makers have at their disposal sev-

eral kinds of power: custom, law, leadership, consent, force, and symbolism. The final stage in the process is when the objective is attained: an act of Congress, a political office, a job, a court decision, an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling, a favor, or simply power for its own sake.

The political process is therefore one in which social (individual or group) needs are translated into social action (public policy). To simplify further: someone wants something which can only be obtained through the political arm of society; there are reasons for what is wanted and techniques for making effective demands upon those who hold public office. The "someone" may be an individual, a group, or the nation as a whole (or majority of it), and the "something" may range from avoiding a parking fine to an insistence on universal military training.

Two further points must be noted. In the first place, the cause and effect process just analyzed may operate the other way; the actions of government or policy-makers have an effect upon private individuals and groups. For example, the Taft-Hartley Labor Law of 1947 somewhat altered the nature of the power possessed by organized labor by depriving it of one means of persuasion or purchase, namely, contributions to political campaigns. Secondly, within the government structure itself there will be rivalries which are certainly a part of the political process: the struggle between the President and Congress; the struggle between administrative agencies; and the relationship between the judiciary and other branches. On occasion, the urge to translate a goal into policy or to achieve a political objective may originate entirely inside the governmental system.

The basic elements in the political process are, on the one hand, men, their motives, their techniques, and their objectives, and, on the other hand, public power and those who exercise it. Politics is concerned with these questions: what goals do men have and why, what means for obtaining these goals are available, who translates aims or interests into public policy, and how is political power transformed into the realization of goals?

As defined, politics is pretty much the same in Great Britain, France, or the Soviet Union. The primary difference—and it is a crucial one—lies in the rules of the game, the methods of adjusting conflict. Viewed in this light, international politics is likewise a process consisting chiefly of the application of means to ends. The nations of the world have needs and interests which must be satisfied and promoted. These also range widely, from survival to economic advantage, from minor accommodations to the spread of cherished political institutions. Usually such objectives can be attained only by exerting influence upon, or control over, other nations or by curbing the influence and control of other nations. As is true of domestic politics, there are many kinds of power which may be employed, the most important being conveniently classified under the three heads of military, economic, and propaganda.

III

Power is a significant key to politics; in politics something is happening and something must make it happen. Citizens cannot make their demands upon the state effective without power, and conversely, the state cannot discharge the functions attributed to it without power. But how does one identify the power which is present in the political process? Two extremes beckon here, each equally misleading; power may be defined so broadly that it has no meaning at all, or, a narrow conception of power would base all politics upon force or threat of force. The latter is only one kind of power.

Power is, in MacIver's terminology, multiform; it varies from situation to situation. Power is means. In this study, we are concerned with two kinds of exercises of power which can properly be termed political: all the acts of government and those private acts which are directed toward the attainment of political objectives. A manufacturer may buy out a competitor in order to extend his market. This is the use of economic power for economic ends. If the same manufacturer uses his influence or his financial resources to convince the public or Congress that a certain piece of legislation is desirable, such would represent economic power wielded for political ends, and hence momentarily political power materializes in one of its many forms and in a specific situation. Power is therefore political only in certain circumstances.

It should not be concluded that in *all* political phenomena the relationship will be one of dominance and submission, someone submitting to authority or yielding to pressure; this will be true in some cases. In others, co-operation or mutual adjustment will characterize political activity. Even so, persuasion in one of its many guises will be present. Whether one's bargaining position is strong or weak will partly determine what concessions he can demand and what concessions he must give up.

Stress is laid on this question of power in the readings presented below. The student is not, however, being invited to accept a naked power concept of politics in which everything is interpreted as the result of the strong dominating the weak. An intelligent comprehension of the political process must, nevertheless, begin with the realization that without power or means, politics would be a restricted activity indeed. Power in itself is neutral, it is neither good nor evil. How man generates and uses power is what counts. Speaking of individual men, one may largely agree with Lord Acton that "power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely," and still insist that only through the proper mobilization and direction of social power can the necessities of organized and interdependent life be satisfied.

In our day, "politics" and "power politics" have become terms of implied condemnation. Politics and politicians are contrasted with statesmanship and statesmen; international issues are framed as peace and humanity versus power politics. A subtle confusion of language arises. It is potentially dangerous because judgment of a reality is mistaken for the reality itself. The only real sense

which can be attributed to these distinctions lies in the *manner* in which power is exercised. For surely world peace requires that power, not force alone, support agreed norms of conduct among nations, and the statesman would be helpless without power—a statesman is one who for a number of reasons finds himself in a position of power. He is judged on the basis of how he handles his responsibility. Thus a more useful distinction is between responsible and irresponsible uses of power. When it is said that someone is “playing politics,” what is really meant is that his means or ends or both are selfish and unworthy, that he is employing power harmfully. Similarly, when a nation is accused of “power politics,” it usually implies a quest for power for power’s sake or the pursuit of exclusively national interests at the expense of other nations.

IV

There are always potential limitations on political power (power dedicated to political ends) whether its expression be the carrying out of the will of the government or persuading the government to take a particular action. These two kinds of political power may check each other. Since the power of government differs from the private power which may at any moment have access to it, a situation may develop in which private power (political in nature because of what it seeks) may prevent the exercise of government power. For example, at several periods in the last years of the last war, restrictive labor legislation (which the government had power to enact) was postponed because of the fear of strikes in critical industries, notably coal.

Governmental power is generally exercised under certain rules: the Constitution describes the general nature of governmental power in the United States and the purposes for which it may or may not be used. And, as remarked in the last chapter, the power of the state is only supreme in its own sphere, that is, in the fulfillment of those objectives for which it was established. One reason for making this rather obvious comment arises out of the recent growth of the power of all modern governments. It is perfectly accurate to say that the growth of state power is one of the most significant developments of this century, but two qualifying comments are in order. One is that it does not follow that the modern state is all-powerful in the sense that it reaches deeply into *every* phase of human activity. The other is that it makes some difference whether the state has added new functions or whether it simply requires greater power to carry out old functions.

It must always be remembered that power does not exist until it is generated; power doesn’t have an independent life of its own, it is not “on hand” waiting to be seized and used. There are scores of statutes giving the President emergency powers, awaiting only his declaration of the conditions required to put them into operation. Such powers were accessible to President Truman during the inflation crisis of 1947-1949, but it would have been difficult if not impossible for him to have exercised them. To generate power means that more than

legal authority is required to put a command into action; there must be general acceptance by the public, by those who might thwart it and by those whose retaliation would be intolerable.

The converse of this point is that those holding government office sometimes actually accomplish a political objective without having legal sanction to do so. The President of the United States has *influence* as well as *power*; his pre-eminent role in foreign affairs provides him with the means to make policy quite apart from any statutory or constitutional provisions. Being chairman of a committee gives a Senator or a Congressman a "positional power" with no legal basis over some phases of legislation.

Getting things done politically depends on control over a number of personal relationships and factors. A politically powerful person is one who has effective control. Before power is effective, conditions must be right. In a complex situation, however, no one's control is so impregnable that from one source or another limitations upon the exercise of power may not arise.

Modern society is characterized by a proliferation of groups, by new devices of private power, and by divisions between and within economic groups. Herein lies another set of limitations on the power which might be mobilized on behalf of political goals or which might successfully seize public power. The very number of group interests in the United States makes it difficult to unite them; class lines have been blurred by technology and the development of skills. The CIO-AFL split clearly diminishes some of the political power organized labor might otherwise command. The farm group has lost its former position of political pre-eminence because industrialization has created newer and more powerful groups. These changes, operating continuously, shift the balance of private political power as well as cause its fragmentation.

V

Americans generally are inclined to be cynical about politics; warmly expressed indignation is directed at the figures who manipulate and engage in political strategy. Prominent political figures are ridiculed and joked about. The editorial page of the daily paper would not be complete without the cartoon showing a stout individual, in a tall silk hat and with a black cigar, squeezing the taxpayer or otherwise undermining the interests of decent citizens. Politicians like "Big Jim" Folsom of Alabama, "Pappy" O'Daniel of Texas, Boss Hague of Jersey City, Senator Bilbo of Mississippi are special targets of clever news writers. For each line of type on the virtues of a politician like Senator Arthur Vandenberg there are columns devoted to the buffoons, harmless and otherwise. One has the impression from the way politics is discussed that chicanery and corruption are the rule. The seamy and sensational side is always newsworthy, the other side is not.

It would be absurd to deny that graft, special privilege, inefficiency, selfishness, and other undesirable activities take place in politics. But should one's

thinking stop here? What socially necessary functions do politics and politicians serve? What is the effect upon a democratic society of a widespread cynicism concerning public office? It is all very well for the nation's muckraking instincts and its need for scapegoats to have an outlet. Yet the leaders in a democracy must be recruited from the people and the general attitude toward a career of public service will influence the type of person who will be attracted to it. Some light is thrown on this problem in a poll taken by the National Opinion Research Center (Denver, Colorado) in November, 1943. The question was phrased as follows: "If you had a son just getting out of school, would you like to see him go into politics as a life work?" Sixty-nine per cent answered "no"; this result was confirmed in 1945 by a Gallup poll in which 68% replied in the negative to the same question. When broken down into rough income levels, the poll indicated 78% in the upper brackets admitted they would not like to see their sons go into politics, while 54% in the lower brackets would not approve such a choice. In contrast, the British Institute of Public Opinion found that only 48% answered "no," and 32% of the upper income group looked with favor upon a son's entering a political career. The student may ponder his own interpretation of this result. It might be suggested in passing that one implication is that lower income groups look more favorably upon politics as a vocation because it offers them one of the few avenues to higher social status.

What socially valuable functions do politicians perform? Some are obvious, some are not. For one thing, the politician represents; he represents his constituents, particular groups, and, to an extent, he helps to represent the whole country. The climate of prevailing opinion must be interpreted both with respect to what the government can do or ought to do and with respect to techniques the government should employ to build public support for agreed policy. In other words, the politician helps to educate the public and he is a kind of salesman. An excellent example of this were the hearings held on commodity prices in several important points throughout the nation by Republican Senator Flanders of Vermont in 1947; only ordinary citizens were consulted and apparently difficulties on both sides were explored in informal exchanges which received little notice in the press. The politician occupies a unique vantage point to take the public pulse.

Most important, someone has to choose among the many conflicting demands made upon the government; all these demands cannot possibly be satisfied. There must be some independent agency to help establish that common ground without which legislation would be impossible. Furthermore, politicians render many social services on all levels of government. In Washington, Congressmen and Senators must bridge the gap between the ordinary citizen and an impersonal government; a farm organization may want information on price policy from the Department of Agriculture or someone may want a business courtesy from the Treasury Department. On the local level, the district leader will see that needy families have coal and food and that a new young breadwinner finds employment. The ward heeler also appears in court when neighbors are in

trouble, speeds the granting of building permits and may help to produce bond in automobile accident cases. Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Finally, without political machines elections would probably not be held. Edward Flynn, for many years Democratic boss in Bronx County, summarizes the point well:

Very well, then, suppose you do away with machines. Without them you . . . as an "average" voter interested only in good government, would have to devise some alternative means of discovering, before each election, the men and women best qualified for public office. Could you, out of your present knowledge, choose a city-wide slate on which your neighbors could agree?

Obviously you would have to talk things over with your neighbors. But since every New Yorker has eight million "neighbors," and since the city boasts no hall that will accommodate eight million persons, even if they would turn out, doesn't this suggest some system of representation? Who would represent your building at the block meeting? Your block at the inevitable and interminable series of district meetings to iron out differences that would be bound to arise? Would you be willing to drop your business every two years to devote full time to attending meetings, canvassing potential candidates, canvassing voters from door to door, raising the indispensable campaign funds? Of course you wouldn't. One evening of it would convince you that politics is a full-time job, not a hobby.*

A good many facetious remarks are made about these activities of politicians—some of them deserved, for the public obviously allows, or participates in, the election of mediocre public office holders and grafters. Politicians often fail miserably in one or more of their functions. There is little doubt that society pays a high price for the performance of these tasks which are absolutely necessary in mass democracy under prevailing conditions. In evaluating this situation several points should be kept in mind. A distinction should be made between corruption or graft on the one hand and waste and inefficiency on the other. For corruption there can be no tolerance, though the actual amount of it is probably exaggerated. It is much more likely that most of the price paid for the social services of the politician is made up of inefficiency—delay, wasted effort, and partially realized objectives.

If the present system were abolished, who would assume the tasks of the politician? Where would the marginal social groups go to find the help they need without expending more than a vote? It is clear that the politician gains and maintains power by performing services in return for votes. A large portion of political power in the United States is based on personal, face-to-face relations between politician and voter. Thus there are 2,704 Republican local committeemen (ward heelers) in Philadelphia alone; each ward consists of a small system of personal power, so to speak. The pattern is repeated the country over. At the top, a Jim Farley will hold the national machine together by a combination of unusual insights and personal magnetism. Another question arises: with all its inefficiency and maneuvering, is not a decentralized system of power

* Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York; Viking, 1947), p. 20.

based upon the exchange of votes and services less dangerous than one in which power can be completely controlled from the top down and in which the citizens have little or no personal contact with political leaders? Are not some aspects of politics which are criticized most bitterly merely the price of liberty? Could they be completely eradicated by any method except giving up the fundamentals of our system?

The essence of what we have been saying is this: the political process is one thing, the *way* it is used is another; politics can be clean and reasonably competent or it can be graft-ridden and inefficient. Ultimately the voting public can control who shall carry on the process. It is proper and necessary to criticize individuals who are unworthy of office, but their success should be partially attributed to the tacit consent of voters when they feel their interests are being served. The way to improve politics is to improve politicians. Politics will always be necessary as long as society requires that social objectives be achieved through the exercise of public power.

VI

The student of politics and government should try to cultivate a critical attitude. To this end some suggestions which might contribute to sound political thinking are in order.

Obviously one ought to begin by laying a firm factual foundation for his opinions. This is not easy and it may come as a shock to learn that some trusted sources of information are not completely reliable, not because they falsify but because they do not tell the *whole* truth. Two questions might be kept in mind: where can one discover the facts about a particular proposition or policy? And, if these data are true, what *else* is true? Furthermore, it is useful to distinguish between fact and *interpretation* of fact. That monopoly exists in several forms and degrees in the American business structure is a fact. Several interpretations or conclusions are possible: this *is* a dangerous situation; this *is not* a dangerous situation; the Department of Justice ought to take action; monopoly is politically undesirable. Strictly speaking, there can be no disagreement over facts, while there may be wide differences over what the facts mean or what should be done about them. Related to this distinction is the one between fact and inference. British psychologist MacCurdy in 1946 wrote: "If by some miracle of education the general public could be trained to note whenever an inference was treated as a fact in the course of argument, and having noted it, to laugh at the speaker, then a large measure of our social, political, and international problems would be on the way to solution."

A basic requirement for the avoidance of fuzzy political thinking is an insistence upon facts and the necessity for being objective; upon entering the study of political phenomena one should try to eliminate or suspend his preconceived notions. Nor is this objectivity easy; the things one takes for granted are usually thought to be beyond further question. Failure to be objective

may cause a problem to be defined in such a way that much relevant data is excluded or intellectual curiosity discouraged. In a word, the objective temperament is one which is constantly asking questions, constantly asking for re-evaluation of things long accepted.

Also, one should acquire as soon as possible a knowledge of human nature—including the necessary minimum physiological and psychological data—and the numerous other factors which help explain human behavior. Underlying most political argument will be found lurking someone's conscious or unconscious concept of what man is. The accuracy of such concepts, or the mass acceptance of inaccurate concepts, has been at one time or another influential in the destinies of millions.

Values are essential. One ought to believe in standards of political morality. And one ought to understand the role which moral values play in politics. In applying standards to questions of policy one ought to realize always that social consequences may enforce a legitimate modification of what one considers to be right or wrong in a particular case. An absolute moral value, as Dorothy Fosdick pleads below, ought not to force a person to withdraw from political discussion or strategy, nor ought it to cause a confusion between ultimate objectives and momentary action.

Finally, the complexity of politics as part of a total situation ought to breed a reluctance to fall into extremes in the judging of political behavior—cynicism or humorous disinterest, undue optimism or pessimism. Momentarily, these moods may engulf us, but the continuous effort to be detached and balanced will make political thinking more effective. If it is asked, why try to become a reasonably straight thinker when one will only be engulfed by thousands of the untutored, the answer is that responsible citizenship consists in trying to leaven the loaf through personal contact, actual participation, and through the many channels of communication. If we declare this to be an impossible task, we come perilously close to admitting bankruptcy where we can least afford it.

Politics: Art or Science?

Alpheus Thomas Mason is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University. He is the outstanding authority on Justice Brandeis, his latest on that subject being *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life* (Viking, 1946). In this essay Professor Mason takes the realistic view toward politics as practiced; it is an intensely human activity in which possible acts and reactions are almost infinite. Politics cannot be controlled as the scientist controls his experiments in the laboratory. But Dr. Mason is not saying that the study of politics cannot be scientific, or reasonably so. What consequences flow from the recognition of politics as an art?

If vagueness and doubt enshroud the subject matter of politics the reason is not that philosophers and statesmen have been more careless and lazy than scientists, but rather that political conclusions are so frequently predetermined by the particular facts examined. There is perhaps an even stronger reason, and one which needs special emphasis—the peculiar nature of politics itself.

However widely and carefully the material be gathered, it is doubtful whether politics can ever be a science as botany, chemistry, or mathematics are sciences. The point has been often emphasized and explained but never quite so well as by Edmund Burke. A statesman as well as a philosopher, with scarcely an equal in his understanding of the complexity and ever-shifting combination of political facts, Burke observed:

The lines of politics are not like the lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom. They are a matter incapable of exact definition.

Disraeli put words not unlike these in the mouth of the cynical old statesman

in his novel, *Contarini Fleming*: "Few ideas are correct ones, and what are correct no one can say; but with words we govern men."

There are reasons other than the nature of the subject itself that may account for this unscientific quality. Few subjects have suffered so much from prejudice, partisanship, fear of change, the greed for power, and the habit of hasty inference and rash conclusion. Nearly every political thinker whose writings have stood the test of time wrote under the compelling and even heating influence of events of his own day. Rarely has political speculation been motivated by true scientific purpose. Thomas Hobbes wrote the *Leviathan* in 1651 in order to establish the claims of absolute government on grounds other than divine right; John Locke in 1690 produced the second treatise of civil government for the deliberate purpose of justifying the glorious revolution of 1688; in 1790 Edmund Burke wrote his *Reflections on the French Revolution* in an effort to stay the threat of revolutionary doctrine then gaining such headway because of the dramatic force with which Rousseau had voiced

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his doctrines of liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty. All these political thinkers, curiously enough, employ very much the same terminology—liberty, property, equality, sovereignty, rights, law—but seldom are these words intended to convey the same meanings.

What has been said doubtless raises in one's mind the question whether the materials of politics, the thoughts of men, their habits, customs, and institutions, are such as to be incapable of scientific treatment. Just because politics is not a science like mathematics or chemistry is no reason for concluding that no scientific deductions may be made from its study. There is in the phenomena of human society one constant, one element or factor which is practically always the same and therefore forms some scientific basis for politics. This is Human Nature itself. "The tendencies of human nature," James Bryce wrote in 1920, "are the permanent basis of study which gives to the subject called political science whatever scientific quality it may possess." Men have like passions and desires; they are stirred by like motives; they think along similar lines. Human nature is that basic and ever-present element in the endless flux of social and political phenomena which enables us to deduce certain general principles that hold good everywhere.

If this is true, it becomes pertinent to consider those traits of human nature on which certain rules of political action can be based. What qualities are there stout enough to bear the weight of general conclusions? The most fundamental one is the individual and collective instinct for dominion over others. The means by which men seek such dominion is force; force of mind; force of body; force of wealth or property. The primary trait of man, according to this theory, is the *will to power*, and this *will to power* is an innate human quality. Thus a non-political society is incompatible with

what we know of ourselves. Since every individual whether acting singly or in groups shows the same tendencies or traits, there is bound to be a clash; conflict ensues between individuals and groups of individuals. This struggle for power constitutes the very essence of politics as we see it in history. The 17th century political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, had noted this underlying aspect of politics when he wrote: "Happiness itself is a perpetual and ceaseless desire for power that ceaseth only in death." Every person from childhood to death uses a force of mind with which to think, to know and to persuade; a force of body with which to act, to attract and constrain the bodies of others; finally, a force of wealth (money, lands, stocks, bonds, lucrative jobs) by means of which he may control others. There is considerable difference of opinion among writers as to which of these various forces is the most effective control over one's fellows.

John Stuart Mill placed great store on the power of opinion, belief, and persuasion. He stated this view very pointedly in his *Representative Government*: "One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interest." Mill cites compelling examples to show how far mere physical and economic power is from being the whole of social power. The history of all peoples records strong illustrations of this. It was not by any change in the distribution of material interests, not by physical force, but by the spread of moral and rational conviction that negro slavery was destroyed. It was not battalions and armies that enabled the frail and shrunken Gandhi to win his way in India; it was belief in a principle which even Great Britain at last had to respect. That little "saint in politics" by merely sitting quietly and holding doggedly to a belief, sometimes with no food save a bit of parched corn and goat's milk, succeeded in arousing

political consciousness and finally in dominating 350 million people when others with greater physical, economic, and intellectual power had failed to move them.

Alexander Hamilton and many other wise men have believed that economic power alone is basic in politics. Power over a man's pocketbook, Hamilton wrote in the *Federalist*, amounts to control over his will. Madison, too, although at odds with Hamilton on many points, agreed that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." Some of the greatest names in the literature of politics, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Harrington, Burke, Marx, and others testify to the deep impress of economics on politics.

Physical force, violence, and resort to arms, has in many periods of history, been recognized as basic in politics. Some have gone so far as to contend that force, superior physical power explains the origin of civil society itself.

Quite apart from the relative strength of these human factors in politics, it is undoubtedly true that every man and woman uses one and perhaps all of them to obtain dominion over others, to live more securely, to satisfy his or her desires—whether good or bad. The strip cartoons show that every day. And, interestingly enough, these tactics by which power is gained are in as common use among men who have won places in formal political government as among those seeking to oust them. There is no situation where a single one of these innate human qualities has been eliminated from the political struggle. The rule of a Mussolini, a Hitler, or a Roosevelt may appear well-established, but it is not difficult to find these men resorting to the power of wealth, the power of persuasion, as Mr. Roosevelt's broadcasts, the power of force, as the terrorist

methods of Hitler and Stalin. And, of course, the underdog is hopefully using the same tactics to put himself on top. Politics, in short is a struggle for power among men who do not respect power. It results from the effort of each human being or group to induce, persuade, or compel other human beings to do his will, and conversely, not to be himself induced, persuaded, or compelled into doing theirs. This struggle is always going on and can never be brought to any conclusion.

The political association known as the state is not the only grouping in which a few men control others. Government is not so exclusive and peculiar an institution as has been pictured. It is only one of a series of control systems such as the trade-union, the church, the social, industrial, and economic groups. Each of these has its own internal machinery of control, constitution, by-laws, officers, and so on. There are any number of men, and women too, who are not on a borough council or in a legislative or judicial body, and yet they assume some form of group responsibility, and thus exercise what really are functions of government so far as their own particular group is concerned. They consult, deputize, administer, and enforce the rules of their organization. Sometimes such authority may be exercised arbitrarily. Just the other day a rival labor union criticized President William Green for his alleged dictatorship in the councils of labor. Churchmen too have been severely criticized for their arbitrary dominance in the affairs of their associations. Each of these groups, whether trade-union, manufacturers' association, or church, seeks to make its influence felt; each tries to deflect the course of formal political government for the benefit of its own interests. Each is demonstrating that desire for power and dominion, which in Hobbes' words, "ceaseth only with death."

The means employed are always the same: power of mind, persuasion and propaganda; power of body, physical force and violence as in racketeering; power of wealth, which may take the form of bribery or a fat contribution to the political campaign funds.

Political government does not always have dominion. Certain important groups deliberately avoid responsibility, do not try to elect their own political representatives. Our trade unionists, for example, have never formed a Labor party, but seek to gain their ends by "rewarding friends and punishing enemies" within the established parties. It results that political government may be in actual subservience to a power stronger than itself; so that by acquiescing and deferring to this or that interest, certain outside or private persons achieve real authority.

No one has probed more deeply into the subtleties of politics than the 16th century Florentine philosopher, Machiavelli. It was he who inspired Mussolini. But many other politicians have successfully followed his advice without being aware they were doing so. Machiavelli's advice to his imaginary prince is as frank as it is subtle. In telling the prince, once established, how best to maintain his power, Machiavelli warns him to take account of the conflict of classes out of which political power springs and to pit one against the other, leaning to the right or to the left as occasion demands. By this shifting of "affection" or preference or favor, the prince is told he can cause the passions and ambitions of each class to nullify those of the other, and so keep himself secure in power. Machiavelli's specific advice was as follows: "As cities are generally divided into guilds and classes, the prince should keep account of these bodies and occasionally be present at their assemblies, and should set an example of his affability and magnificence,

preserving however always the majesty of his dignity."

This advice was given holders of high political office nearly 300 years ago but it is faithfully followed today by our own statesmen from the President down to the mayor of the smallest hamlet. Some may recall that General Hugh Johnson made one of the main speeches at the 1933 A. F. of L. convention. Donald Richberg spoke frequently to all sorts of economic and industrial groups. In the autumn of 1934 President Roosevelt addressed the American Bankers Convention in Washington and the degree of his "affability" was evidenced by an editorial in the New York *Herald Tribune* which discussed his address under the euphonious title, "Buttering the Bankers."

Might and power in the threefold sense in which I have used them make not right—but law. The peculiar quality of the State is that within it certain persons have achieved by means, fair or foul, a monopoly in matters of law-making. Justice consists not in the conformity of a rule to an ethical idea, but rather in rigid enforcement of law, law made by those who have achieved power and dominion over others, and see it as a means of their continuance in office.

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I should not like to leave the impression that every individual in society has an insatiable will to power. Any country may be divided, generally speaking, into three groups: the dominant group, consisting of those who for the time being have gained power; the beaten or defeated group, those who are struggling for power; and the disinterested or passive masses who take little or no active part in politics.

The art of politics consists also in controlling, by whatever means will work, this indifferent or supine element

in society. And in the exercise of this all important art, unfounded beliefs are quite as important as sound ones. F. D. Roosevelt's talk about the "forgotten man" no less than Huey Long's "share-our-wealth" patter were designed and calculated to gain the attention and support of the masses. Politicians understand that it is "with words we govern men." Nor need the words they use be either sincere or intelligible. Politicians seem always to recall the observation of Machiavelli: "It is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities (fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion) I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them." It is equally unnecessary that the words of politicians be understood; indeed their effectiveness may consist in no small measure in their vagueness.

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The conclusion is that politics is a science only in a very limited sense. In the political process there is no way of controlling conditions, a control so necessary for the establishment of scientific conclusions. Even if the conditions could be fixed, human beings, unlike atoms and electrons, cannot be expected to act and react in the same way. The appeal "back to normalcy" was strikingly effective in 1920, but there can be no assurance that at any future time it will again achieve

the result desired. No prediction can be made save that the struggle for power is unending. As to the form that struggle will take, we can only say with Bryce, that it will differ from the past.

Politics is art rather than science, an art which has never been codified or completely explained; nor can it really be learned by people lacking in what may be called the political sense, which presupposes native talent and highly intuitive technique. Any concrete political situation, however seemingly transparent, cannot be dealt with by reason alone; it can only be grasped by a process similar to artistic perception. How, in a given situation to seize power or extend one's dominion; how to stage an election at the right moment, heat up a campaign to the proper point; how to confuse the ignorant by specious oratory, bold misstatements of fact, misleading nomenclature, emotional and moral appeals to indwelling prejudice; how to invoke the taboos of public morality and sectarian religion; how to establish political structure and party machinery; how, in a word, to make the most for one's own purposes out of all available human elements inherent in a given political situation—all this has never been hidden from the acute, the astute, and the daring. Such knowledge is gained by instinct and experience; for reason helps little or not at all.

The Function of the Politician

Nicholas Doman is a political scientist and author of *The Coming Age of World Control* (Viking, 1942). He was formerly lecturer on government at the College of William and Mary and a member of the research staff of the University of Chicago. Dr. Doman is here asking for an awareness of the critically important role served by the politician, not a whitewash of politicians or their methods. In effect, the author is saying, "Judge the politician by all means, but be sure that the criteria applied are appropriate." The points raised in this article are also related to the problem of recruiting the most effective persons for public office.

Is politics discredited in the mind of the honest citizen? Does the politician deserve our scorn? Should we delegate legislative duties to a body composed of businessmen, labor leaders, and economic experts? These questions are the subject of this article. When using here the term "politician" we do not think so much of the ward heeler or the precinct captain as of the person whose task it is to master public affairs on a larger scale. Public affairs and politics are synonymous terms. An effort is made here to restore the word "politician" to its original meaning and to rid it of its unsavory and greatly unjustified connotations. The politician is the man who participates in the direction of public affairs.

The value of a man in public life is often measured according to his success or lack of success in private life, particularly success in the economic sphere. It is a sad truth that ability to overcome economic competition in private business has become the criterion of aptitude for public service. If monetary success in business is a criterion of political ability, then we have been erring in not calling on men such as Du Pont, Rockefeller, Sloan, Morgan, Thyssen, Krupp, and Deterding

to assume their role at the top of governmental hierarchy.

Political leadership requires a disposition and a psychology different from those of any other profession. Only one unacquainted with the nature of political process would venture to measure political aptitude by the number of dollars and cents earned in the law office, the bank, the insurance company. Just as the best students in school do not always make the most successful men in practical life, so success in nonpolitical life is no guarantee of political magnitude.

On the basis of civilian accomplishment, Adolf Hitler would never have become Chancellor and Reichsführer of Germany. His record in painting, drawing, or any other profession would never have earned for him his unique role in politics. Hitler cannot be compared with Jan Paderewski, the world-famous pianist, who was lifted by his musical fame and talent to the presidency of the Polish Republic. Musicians take no undue pride in the political recognition accorded to Paderewski. It is unlikely, however, that the guild of painters or postcard artists would beam with glory at the meteoric

From "Politics for Politicians," by Nicholas Doman, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, October, 1943. Reprinted by permission of Duke University Press and the author.

rise of Adolf Hitler in public life, and consider his political success a manifestation of the painter's genius. According to the meager testimony at our disposal Hitler was not even a mediocre painter. If our society were governed according to the tenets of corporate fascism, he would have never been elected to the corporate parliament as the representative of his guild.

But the German people, very cleverly, have been able to differentiate between artistic talent and political genius. Had Hitler been a successful painter and had he felt the artistic urge to create, his attention would perhaps not have been turned toward public life. His dismal failure in his original profession drove him along a trail for which—on the basis of his popular successes—he was much better qualified.

The sphere of politics has seldom enjoyed the same respect and recognition as have other professions and business. But today it has reached a stage of disrepute such as never before has been attained. There are many who deny the existence of a separate calling termed "politics"; in their eyes politics is merely another channel for those individuals who have reaped success in other fields, or it is an opportunity for parasites to prey on public funds. The faults and blunders of individual politicians are imputed to our institutions; and instead of trying to do away with those who have abused their prerogatives and privileges in political positions, we turn our wrath against the whole governmental machinery.

The politician is the most convenient scapegoat for popular anger. The expert and specialist whose faulty advice and shortsighted suggestions misled the politicians escape unscathed, while the politician has to play the unhappy role of the whipping boy.

A parallel to this situation is found in the relationship between the military and

the politician. Seldom are the army and navy exposed to popular criticism or official reprehension. The "unpolitical" armed forces are beyond reproach. Not the generals but the politicians are the chief sufferers of military defeat; it is against the latter that the arms of justice, in moments of retribution, are turned. At the Riom trial only one general, Gamelin, was found among the defendants. Gamelin's predecessor, Maxime Weygand, and the latter's successor, Pétain, were of course not among the accused. Pierre Cot and Guy de la Chambre, ministers of air in several republican cabinets, figured among the targets of the Vichy government. But none of the aviation experts, military or civilian, have been dragged before the Riom court to be confronted by charges of negligence, ignorance, or incompetence.

The attitude of the Vichy government is a typical example how a political regime capitalizes on a military disaster in order to discredit its ideological rival. Through the trial of a few outstanding politicians such as Reynaud, Blum, Mandel, and Daladier, the Pétain clique hoped to administer a coup de grâce to the parliamentary regime of Republican France. The politicians of France were adjudged as being "wrong" because France had been defeated on the battlefield.

In times of grave crisis or military disaster the military man comes to the political forefront. National unity is fostered by giving political leadership to a prominent representative of the army, supposedly nonpolitical. In the more feudal countries retired army officers in their older days took up political careers; while they spent their evenings at the club, they preferred to dally by day in that great political club, the parliament. This symptom has been particularly prevalent in Poland, Germany, the Baltic countries, Hungary, and Rumania.

The military technician often has had a

better chance of gaining the confidence of the electorate than has the professional politician. But whether the soldier has been the Pétain of France, the Hindenburg of Germany, the Franco of Spain, the Pilsudski of Poland, the Horthy of Hungary, or the Antonescu of Rumania, he has revealed little or no political talent. The military man often represents the symbol of past glory, but even more often he desperately lacks that sagacious insight which the charting of the future demands. Steeped in an atmosphere of rigid discipline, he is devoid of the mental panorama needed for a political career.

Men of this type have failed to comprehend that politics is neither a mystical abstraction nor a mechanical gadget. The invasion of the military technician into political territory has been no more conducive to seasoned and judicious politics than has the meddling of other experts and technicians. It must be emphasized, however, that the absence of the military mind in American politics and the strictly defined line of demarcation between military and political matters have been highly beneficial in protecting the armed forces from political muddling and politics from military pressure.

The future of American democracy demands that politicians shall not interfere with technical military operations and that military technicians shall not assume leading political positions. For the sake of political democracy and for the respect of the army the modern hero would fare better by following the example of the victorious Cincinnatus, who modestly returned to ploughing his farm.

At times politics was the preserve of the Men of the Bible; at times it fell to the Men of the Sword. Not rarely the Men of the Land had a mortgage on it; at moments it was threatened with invasion by the Men of Money. In civilizations imbued with theocracy the priests enjoyed more of a lien on a political career than did any

other group; Mazarin and Richelieu are noted examples of the hold of clergy on public affairs. And the Man of the Sword often attempted to step into the political shoes of the Man of the Bible. But since the nineteenth century, the predominance of the lawyer seems to outweigh the influence of any other profession. Of the thirty-two Presidents of the United States, twenty-two were members of the legal profession.

While the influence of the lawyer on politics is acknowledged by all, there are many who think his mortgage on public affairs is on the eclipse. But in spite of the rise of other professions the legal mind still directs the political scene. Let us recall that in 1940, besides President Roosevelt, most of the other aspirants to the Presidency—John Garner, Paul McNutt, Millard Tydings, Burton Wheeler, Democrats; Wendell Willkie, Thomas Dewey, and Robert Taft, Republicans—have been products of legal training.

It is illuminating to compare the number of lawyers in Congress with the non-lawyer members. Businessmen, engineers, and others have not yet succeeded in displacing the lawyer from political leadership. It cannot be asserted that the public prefers to put its trust into the hands of men with legal training rather than into the hands of others. How can it be explained then that lawyers are most successful in securing election to the legislative body of the political system? This phenomenon is all the more surprising since engineers and other experts enjoy more esteem, particularly among the younger age groups, than do lawyers.

It seems that the choice of the electorate is limited by the background of the candidates presented to them. It has always been the lawyer's tradition to assume an active role in politics; members of other professions have seldom exceeded the limits of their calling and ventured into legislative work. Apparently there

has been a tacit recognition that legal training and knowledge of the rules governing society are prerequisites for the establishment of new rules. The lawyer is treading familiar ground when he turns to politics; the farmer, the businessman, the laborer overstep their particular territories when they seek membership in the legislative body. The study of law has usually been regarded as a stepping-stone to public affairs. Those who want to win a place ultimately in politics seldom turn to architecture, chemistry, or the medical profession, but rather to law and related fields. It must be noticed, however, that the newspaperman and the professional social scientist now share, in some measure, the prevalence of the lawyer in public affairs.

The legal profession itself tends to develop an inclination to draw up rules rather than to quote or apply them. No legislative body would have any difficulty in selecting a sizable Judiciary Committee; but trying to erect a Medical Committee, a Construction Committee, or a Rubber Committee, it would not find even a handful of experts among its members.

The *Congressional Directory* of May, 1943, gives the following division of professions:

Total number of Senators and	
Representatives	530
Plus 1 House seat vacant	
Lawyers	300
Nonlawyers	178
Profession not indicated	52

That means that 56.6 per cent of the members of Congress had graduated from a college of law or practiced law.

According to general assumption lawyers are inclined to be conservatives; in politics, therefore, they would be expected to gravitate more heavily to the Republican party than to the Democratic. This might be the case if we tried to find the political affiliation of all members of the

bar. But let us look at the figures for Congress. Of a total of 265 Democratic Senators and Representatives there were 174 lawyers, 73 nonlawyers, and 28 whose profession is not indicated. On the Republican side the total number of Senators and Representatives was 250: 133 lawyers, 104 nonlawyers, and 23 whose profession is not indicated.

It appears from these figures that while the Democrats outnumber the Republicans, there are considerably more nonlawyers among the latter than among the former. Particularly predominant is the number of lawyers in the South. In twelve Southern states—Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky—out of a total of 138 Senators and Representatives, 102 are lawyers, 23 are nonlawyers, 13 who do not indicate their profession.

What is the explanation of the fact that the South chooses its Congressional representatives from the legal profession? Is it respect for law? Or is it a relic of the past, when politics was a quasi monopoly of those trained in the arts of jurisprudence? The South, less industrialized than other regions of the country, will less probably choose business executives or labor leaders as political trustees. Among Southern Congressmen there are few businessmen, like the junior Senator from South Carolina, who is a cotton merchant, or the junior Senator from Texas, an ex-flour salesman. In the tradition-respecting South even the white man may seem to "stick to his place" in society. If he is not a lawyer or a newspaperman, he usually keeps out of active participation in politics. In the North, however, representatives of business and labor, farmers, newspapermen, schoolteachers, physicians, engineers, venture freely into politics. But because of their lesser experience in public life and because they are handicapped by

the psychology of the specialist, they are less equipped to compete with those who are veterans in public affairs and masters of the legal rules of our society.

The United States has not been too fortunate with those of its political leaders who were reared in a nonpolitical atmosphere. But this holds true of other countries also. Ebert, the first President of Weimar Germany, was a distinguished harnessmaker. An honest man, he faced a constant dilemma—whether he should represent first the Republic, or his own economic class. When he tended to neglect the interest of the latter, the union of harnessmakers excommunicated him. Little political vision was displayed by Field Marshal Hindenburg in his capacity as president of the German Republic. Technician of the battlefield, victor of many battles, expert in modern warfare, he was a pitiful figure as chief of state.

Painlevé, the French Prime Minister, was a distinguished mathematician. As a politician he failed to comprehend the operation of social forces. But it was not his fault that human beings do not behave as mathematical signs. The electorate and those responsible for his position are to be blamed for having selected a man of such limited vision. Albert Lebrun, last President of the French Republic, was an outstanding mining engineer before he became a member of the French Senate and later president of the Third Republic. The French apparently attributed so little influence to the top position of their political system that they ventured to fill it with an engineering technician, a man lacking political experience. Lebrun never exhibited statesmanlike vision, and yet he succeeded in attaining the post which was denied to Aristide Briand, the astute lawyer, the politician of long and varied experience.

Neville Chamberlain, the man of Munich, grew up in the commercial atmosphere of teeming Birmingham. His

mind was trained to take care of the intricacies of an average business concern, but not of the life problems of a great power. He could not comprehend that a country cannot be run on the same basis as a business establishment. He believed in "talking business" to Hitler, in combating the political and ideological tornado of the Nazi movement and the Axis aggression by economic concessions. Winston Churchill, on the other hand, was trained for politics. He is no genius in economics, not even in military affairs. Yet, unlike his predecessor, he does seem to possess a vision of world dimensions.

In the United States Zachary Taylor, Ulysses Grant, and Herbert Hoover are among those who became President after brilliant careers in their own professional field. Taylor and Grant distinguished themselves on the battlefield, while Hoover commanded widespread respect for his accomplishments as mining engineer and as food administrator in the first World War. As President all three failed to display the vision and perspective that characterized them in their original professions.

It is difficult to see why the public expects the successful financier, labor leader, cattle farmer, engineer, physician to excel in the political field. Montaigne, the French philosopher of the sixteenth century, claimed that to understand the intricacies of politics and to master them require a mystical quality, one so rare that, so far as concerns its occurrence, it comes next to the diamond.

Eminent specialists whose names are connected with accomplishments and positive successes, and who have moved in their spheres of life with the infallible security of instinct, have appeared, in the political sphere, to be pitiful creatures gasping with clumsy gestures in an atmosphere alien to them. Because they have found brilliant solutions to problems in their own fields they make believe to

themselves, and unfortunately to others, too, that with the X ray of their science or knowledge they can throw light on substances that are more complex, more delicate than those they have hitherto mastered.

We do not expect statesmen to possess pugilistic qualities, though such abilities are often useful in heated parliamentary debate, or to compete for the world boxing championship. But we welcome heavyweight boxing champions for tackling heavyweight political problems. We do not trust the devising of strategic military plans to politicians, but we surrender the ship of state to military experts—the Hindenburgs, the Pétains, the Antonescuss, the Badoglios. No one would expect the President of the United States or the Prime Minister of Great Britain to discover a remedy for cancer or engines for superplanes, but we seem to expect medical and aeronautical geniuses to become talented and resourceful politicians. The man who displays genius or obvious knowledge in the most narrow field is permitted by our public opinion to exploit these powers in utterly unrelated fields.

Judgment of the domestic and foreign policies of a nation and charting of its future postulate a type of mind different from that which can prepare budgetary balances at a writing desk and estimate the maximum tax burden of society. The mental attitude needed by the economic expert or the financial technician to open up new sources of revenue for the government is totally different from the one required for choosing among political tendencies under the influence of public opinion and for protecting society from the whirligig of collective passion. Politics needs a mind which can maintain permanent contacts with the emotional tensions of the people; failing in that, the prerequisites of democratic government or popular approval will slowly wane.

In the world of facts and figures, polit-

ical passion and intrigue do not disturb the atmosphere. In the heated air of politics there are divergent views of the same interest, and the role of passions and emotions is equaled by the power of political realities. The expert is a dictator in the empire of his exact substances and methods, at least within the limits of human capacity; the writing paper is very tolerant to all kinds of experiment. The substance and material of the politician is the extremely ticklish human skin. The expert can freely speculate upon the laws and consequences of his facts. The politician in his equation must consider also other elements besides realities, such as nerves, sentiments, geographic differences, imagination, traditions, instincts, and prejudices.

The expert, whether the chemist or the engineer, can hardly escape from the dogmatic prejudice which he draws from his own substances and theses. The universal and objective equilibrium of the statesman is perturbed if he sees only one of the many instruments, possibilities, methods, and attributes to this one a decisive influence over all others. One of the most important tasks of the statesman is not only to fathom his own armory but also to reckon with the attitudes of his opponents, his associates, and the public. He must know not only his own intellectual arsenal but also the war potential of his adversaries. The expert meets only with the resistance of his own material. The statesman or politician cannot afford to neglect the traps and hindrances that his opponents might use against him. Politics is not an exact science; it is an art. There is no politics of great design without imagination, instinct, and inspiration.

There are many defects in our representative political system which follow the seemingly outdated geographic pattern. Ideological and economic factors are more potent than geographic interests.

And this is exactly the reason why we should try to attenuate the dead weight of ideological and economic frictions by resorting to representation based on the geographic principle. Though a congressional district might be predominantly agricultural or predominantly industrial, heavily conservative or heavily radical, the different antitheses are tuned down by our appeal to an other than economic or ideological principle. We are ready to fight and sacrifice against those who profess another creed—today a political and ideological creed, not so much religious—or who endanger our economic interest, but we are reluctant to join battle against those who happen to have committed no crime other than to live in another geographic region within the national boundaries.

Why inject and legalize the glowing controversy of capital and labor or management and labor in the political sphere? Why give legal recognition to pressure groups representing economic interests? We do not need civil engineers in Congress to decide on the desirability of expansion of public power projects. The duty of Congress is not to calculate the quantity or the price of hydroelectric power, but to use the findings of others—of the experts—in the interest of the political community. We do not need professors of economics to sit in our legislative body to argue pro and con sales tax. *Objective amateurs are preferable to subjective experts.* The professor of economics will get an airing of his views in the lobby and he can share the platform with the representatives of the Chamber of Commerce during commission hearings. There is no telling how many professions we should have to admit if we resorted to professional representation in politics.

A Fascist corporative constitution championing the representation of economic groups, interests, and classes can be conducive only to dictatorship or civil

war. Without an ironhanded executive dictatorship the emissaries of economic groups would tear each other to pieces. Politicians representing a whole gamut of knowledge on human affairs can be expected to agree more than can brilliant doctrinaires and practitioners of economics.

Let us assemble the experts in government offices and assign to them administrative tasks. Our technological civilization needs them badly. Utility experts will be happier and more useful to the community by offering their services to a government department than by invading the political arena. Experts of all types in administrative positions can provide a stable background for politics which is in perpetual flux. The expert in his own limited field is superior to anybody else. In politics he becomes pitiful and ridiculous.

The training and experience of the expert are needed in times of prosperity just as well as in times of depression. For instance, the expert on price control will find more territory for his imagination and efficiency in an administrative post than in the legislative body, where he would be only one of *boi polloi*. His services would be needed by the nation whether there were a Democratic or a Republican majority in Congress.

France has had a hectic political history. The Bourbons were succeeded by the Republic, Bonaparte again by the Bourbons, Louis-Philippe of Orleans by another Bonaparte and the Third Republic. The composition of the political leadership of France changed constantly. But she was governed for centuries by permanent officials. The bureaucrat of the Third Republic was the son of the bureaucrat of the Bourbons. Even the Soviets had inherited a considerable part of the Tsarist bureaucracy. The politicians had to pay with their heads for enjoyment of the mighty career of politics. But not even a revolution can afford any more to chase

its experts away without damaging its own objectives.

The expert, the specialist, in many cases is the servant of all political regimes. He cannot afford to be the exponent of political or other ideologies. Clandestinely he professes his political creed, lest he fall into disfavor with his superiors. The expert, whether he is the scientist or the bureaucrat, is too often politically unreliable. Sometimes he is a chronic apostate who would sell his political views, if he has any, for a mess of pottage. He is first of all a worshiper of economic security, and would serve almost any master who tolerates him and offers a chance for a decent living.

Very few of the bureaucrats and Aryan scientists left Germany because of their dislike for the Nazi regime. While hundreds of lawyers, newspapermen, artists, writers, and university professors went into voluntary exile, the bulk of the officials, scientists, and engineers continued to return to their desks or laboratories, to work in the shadow of the swastika. The specialist, the engineer, the expert, even many non-Aryan, endeavored laboriously to supply the Nazi regime with the products of their technical skill. The experts on price control gladly offered their schemes to the Hitler government; engineers and chemists labored to submit more efficient means of warfare to the regime. Just as previously they had sold their knowledge to the Weimar government, so now they sell it to its successor. After the eventual fall of totalitarianism they will offer their services to whatever regime comes along. Whether it is democracy or dictatorship, Communism or Fascism, monarchy or republic, the great majority of the experts will work for any, without too much hesitation.

Shall we throw our political machinery into their hands? Shall we intrust our cherished political institutions to those who lack the psychology to comprehend

the substance of politics? We might have efficiency in government run by experts and specialists but we should negate our political ideals and desert those of our ancestors.

In spite of all the scorn to which the politician is subjected, politics is still the most intriguing career. Fortunately there are people left who believe that politics is an art to be mastered by artists, the statesmen or politicians. These artists are not without blame. Corruption and graft in politics is no argument for denying its right of existence. Because of blunders of engineers or the collapse of a building no one would suggest outlawing engineering or prohibiting the erection of new buildings. When the medical profession fails to find a cure for cancer, nobody would recommend that shoemakers take over the curing of disease.

It is the task of the politician to coordinate, to mollify pressure groups, and to conciliate divergent and hostile interests. If he is successful, a major factor in his triumph is his understanding of the variety of points of view, passions, and prejudices. His is the not enviable problem of gauging the reactions of the public at the time when a crucial decision is to be made, and also of projecting the popular response toward his choice to the time when he will again need the confidence of the electorate. If he becomes too much of an expert or specialist on a limited scale, he may fail to observe the human reactions and interests which happen to be outside his field. His intuitive reaction is usually the product of his ability to observe and to gauge the behavior of economic and social forces.

There are no such laboratories for the use of the politician as for the physical scientist. It is he who must discount future changes, evaluate the irrational elements of society, and be always ready to account for his acts and decisions. In our democratic system anybody can be-

come a politician. Some individuals with control of money or with support of party organization succeed in attaining political position without being qualified for the task. But to be a good politician and to pilot with intelligence the destiny of the community which is intrusted to him, the politician needs something else besides money, influence, or party support.

He needs moral authority, versatile intelligence, and a secure sense in the political labyrinth. Without knowing the expert's field, he must size up the expert's work. He must decide whether the skill

of the latter is desirable in the long run for the larger political community he represents. Without being a savant in the field of any of the many experts he has to harmonize the findings of all of them. He has to discard what might be faultless scientifically but prove harmful for human society.

If a man knows everything of something, he might be a brilliant expert but will be a failure in politics. If he knows something of everything, he will be a miserable expert but a good politician.

The Impulse to Power

Bertrand Russell is an outstanding British philosopher, mathematician, and sociologist. He began his academic career at Trinity College, Cambridge, England, and he has been visiting professor at Harvard, Chicago, and California. He is noted for his wide range of interests and for progressive views on social questions. One may recognize the great importance of the point Lord Russell is making in this selection without necessarily completely agreeing with his emphasis. In an age when the economic explanation of political events has been stressed, it is well to be reminded that there are other motives and basic drives involved.

Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory. These are not identical, though closely allied: the Prime Minister has more power than glory, the King has more glory than power. As a rule, however, the easiest way to obtain glory is to obtain power; this is especially the case as regards the men who are active in relation to public events. The desire for glory, therefore, prompts, in the main, the same actions as are prompted by the desire for power, and the two motives may, for most practical purposes, be regarded as one.

The orthodox economists, as well as

Marx, who in this respect agreed with them, were mistaken in supposing that economic self-interest could be taken as the fundamental motive in the social sciences. The desire for commodities, when separated from power and glory, is finite, and can be fully satisfied by a moderate competence. The really expensive desires are not dictated by a love of material comfort. Such commodities as a legislature rendered subservient by corruption, or a private picture gallery of Old Masters selected by experts, are sought for the sake of power or glory, not as affording comfortable places in

which to sit. When a moderate degree of comfort is assured, both individuals and communities will pursue power rather than wealth: they may seek wealth as a means to power, or they may forgo an increase of wealth in order to secure an increase of power, but in the former case as in the latter their fundamental motive is not economic.

Like energy, power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one form from which the others are derivative. The attempt to treat one form of power, say wealth, in isolation, can only be partially successful, just as the study of one form of energy will be defective at certain points, unless other forms are taken into account. Wealth may result from military power or from influence over opinion, just as either of these may result from wealth. The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power, not in terms of this or that form of power. In former times, military power was isolated, with the consequence that victory or defeat appeared to depend upon the accidental qualities of commanders. In our day, it is common to treat economic power as the source from which all other kinds are derived; this, I shall contend, is just as great an error as that of the purely military historians whom it has caused to seem out of date. Again, there are those who regard propaganda as the fundamental form of power. This is by no means a new opinion; it is embodied in such traditional sayings as *magna est veritas et prevalebit* and "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church." It has about the same measure of truth and falsehood as the military view or the economic view. Propaganda, if it can create an almost unanimous opinion, can

generate an irresistible power; but those who have military or economic control can, if they choose, use it for the purpose of propaganda. To revert to the analogy of physics: power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from any one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations. The attempt to isolate any one form of power, more especially, in our day, the economic form, has been, and still is, a source of errors of great practical importance.

There are many ways in which different societies differ in relation to power. They differ, to begin with, in the degree of power possessed by individuals or organizations; it is obvious, for example, that, owing to increase of organization, the State has more power now than in former times. They differ, again, as regards the kind of organization that is most influential; a military despotism, a theocracy, a plutocracy, are very dissimilar types. They differ, thirdly, through diversity in the ways of acquiring power; hereditary kingship produces one kind of eminent man, the qualities required of a great ecclesiastic produce another kind, democracy produces a third kind, and war a fourth.

Where no social institution, such as aristocracy or hereditary monarchy, exists to limit the number of men to whom power is possible, those who most desire power are, broadly speaking, those most likely to acquire it. It follows that, in a social system in which power is open to all, the posts which confer power will, as a rule, be occupied by men who differ from the average in being exceptionally power-loving. Love of power, though one of the strongest of human motives, is very unevenly distributed, and is limited by various other motives, such as love of ease, love of pleasure, and sometimes love of approval. It is disguised, among the

more timid, as an impulse of submission to leadership, which increases the scope of the power-impulses of bold men. Those whose love of power is not strong are unlikely to have much influence on the course of events. The men who cause social changes are, as a rule, men who strongly desire to do so. Love of power, therefore, is a characteristic of the men

who are causally important. We should, of course, be mistaken if we regarded it as the sole human motive, but this mistake would not lead us so much astray as might be expected in the search for causal laws in social science, since love of power is the chief motive producing the changes which social science has to study.

The Origins of Political Power

Charles E. Merriam is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Chicago. He has long been one of America's distinguished students of politics, as well as having had much practical experience in local politics in Chicago. Political power is a subtle thing; it is law, elections, decisions, but it is more than these. How is it that some men give political orders and others take them? What are the types of circumstances under which political power is effective? Does Professor Merriam's essay help explain why crises are sometimes necessary to mobilize fully the power of a people?

How does political power come into the world? Of what situation is it born?

Many answers to this question have been made. The fatherhood of power is found in violence, in the raw will to dominate; in some divine sanction which makes of power a second religion; in some moment of contract between members of the incipient political society. These answers are impressive and important. I do not underestimate their importance in the life of mankind. But for the moment I address myself to the somewhat different problem; what are the situations under which political power develops in human relations?

The busy ant, the chesty ape, the massive bull, the squealing stallion, the primitive chief, the hoary elders, all had

leadership long before systems of philosophy appeared. There was power long before there was a written word for it.

What then are these situations from which authority emerges? They may be grouped for purposes of convenience, but without too great emphasis on this special form of classification, under three main heads:

(1) The social group tensions which give rise to the need for organized political action.

(2) The personality types to be adjusted and adapted in social living.

(3) The power hungry, the leaders, who are ripe for these group situations and these personality arrangements.

In the interplay of these factors, the birth of power may be observed, and its

essential characteristics and processes discovered. Power is first of all a phenomenon of group cohesion and aggregation, a child of group necessity or utility, a function of the social relations of men. Perhaps the sociologist may say that the social situation is a matter for his technique to analyze and interpret; and perhaps the psychoanalyst may declare that the individual relation falls within his *fach*. I may cheerfully concede that they are both right, but that the inter-relationship between these intensive and extensive factors is precisely the political; and I welcome the much needed aid of both the sociologist and the psychoanalyst in the understanding of this complex problem, so long a puzzle to mankind.

The social situation constantly involves the maintenance of equilibrium between groups, classes, factions, by whatever term denominated. These groups are held in combination by custom projected through time, by living interests, by symbols and associations of divers colors and force, by physical proximity and familiarity, by violence, by all the bonds that may draw men together in communities of interest. In broad and general terms these various groups may be classified as: ethnic, religious, economic, regional, cultural.

The problem of cohesion in the modern state involves the relationships between, say, two or three ethnic groups, two or three religions, three or more economic classes, several well-defined geographical regions, and a mass of cultural groups of innumerable types. Even if there were a community with only one ethnic stock or culture, one common religion or none at all, one economic class, there would still be regions no matter how small the state, and a wide variety of cultural groups, and there would be sharp clashes of interest among producers and consumers regarding the equitable intervaluation of

their services. There is the possibility within the groups themselves of further differentiation into many minor groups which break up *ad infinitum* into yet more minute splinters. And if there were no groups there would still be individuals, as aggressive and *difficile* as groups themselves.

The accommodation of these groups (and of the individuals within them) produces a situation from which political authority emerges, either in dire distress as a last resort, or as a constructive adjustment of a co-operative type, perhaps rationalized as the optimum condition of life.

Once the need or advantage of a power situation is generally recognized, whether through consent, duress, prestige, or what not as an element of cohesion, the governmental power comes into being, and its personnel and its functions are regularized. If a parliamentary situation is set up, the group struggle may be continued with some vigor but broadly, within the boundaries of the legal order. If the type of cohesion is not so developed as to warrant such forms of pressure, there remain the roads of war and violence, until separate states are set up or some common authority wins its way to the generally accepted status of government.

When once the power situation is set up, the incidents of authority already described in previous paragraphs come into life: the generality of a residual common purpose, the defense against external groups, the maintenance of a state of order and justice, the monopoly of legality, the prestige and symbolism of political power. All forms of government, whether paternal, maternal, or fraternal, profess these broad purposes and employ forms of instrumentation and symbolism. The inner content of power does not vary so much as the tension situation and the special form of the

social malaise or milieu or utopia arousing general interest and concern.

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The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium, adjustment, *modus vivendi* between the various groups and individuals of the community. as a substitute indeed for force in many cases. Not only the anarchist but many others, individualists so-called, make the same fundamental error in analysis of the power situation in society, of overstating the role of violence.

The distinguished apostle of socialism, Karl Marx, likewise gravely erred in his conception of the essential nature of the meaning of the political in human association. The state he looked upon as the result of the war between economic classes, in this case the *bourgeoisie* and the proletariat. "The state is the official form of the antagonism between classes," and when the class war ends and there appears a one-class society, proletarian in composition, the state will disappear, since the occasion for its existence has gone. True, if one defines the state in this manner, the conclusion follows. But what shall we call what remains, as in Soviet Russia at the present moment? The political association or situation is far older than the "class" under capitalism, and arises under a wide variety of conditions. Many of these are instances of other forms of exploitation under different forms of economic organization from the present, but it is as difficult to think of the state as arising solely from these relations as it is to imagine the disappearance of the function of the political order when the present economic crisis is adjusted in some different manner. But in general the political acumen of Marx is far less penetrating than his insight into economic relations, and his avoidance

of the organizational implications of the principles he expounded is evident throughout his writings. Certainly there is nothing in the contemporary activities of socialists or communists, or in earlier experiments of the same type, to indicate the withering away of the political aspects of association; and there can remain only the fainthearted expression of the distant expectation that at some time in the vaguely unspecified future the element of government may disappear from social organization.

From one point of view, then, the power situation involves a series of inter-group relations, calling for a balance and ordering of some type, which will be preferable to the distress caused by lack of common arrangements and understandings. There are also, however, the relations of a group of external political groups; and by this road we come into the field of interstate or international arrangements and understandings, seriously complicating the symmetry of the simpler local situations. This becomes all the more intricate when we observe that many of the local intrastate groups have extensions outside the boundaries of the political association, as ethnic, cultural, religious, etc., and the web is correspondingly more involved as the number of possible interrelations increases. The task of political association is thus a manifold one, of reconciling the interests of the internal groups and at the same time the external groups, and simultaneously the internal projected into the external inter-relationship. This may be illustrated by observing the difficulties of a multiethnic or other group state, such as Switzerland, when it undertakes to deal with other powers as represented, let us say, in the League of Nations.

Significant as are the group accommodations just discussed, the adjustments of personalities in the general framework of

a social milieu are of equal meaning. If one looks objectively at government, he may observe a mass of personality reconciliations which must somehow be effected, somehow reconciled to the general set of understandings, experiences, institutions which make up society. The biological and social heritage of the group throws forward a broad variety of different types of individuals who must in one way or another be set in the whirling web of social and political relations, without tearing it or themselves or too many of them to pieces.

If we can lose sight for a moment of the social interests and ideologies upon which governments and societies are ostensibly constructed, democracy, fascism, communism, absolutism, we may see that the basic political problem may be viewed in quite a different light from that of the common institutional mechanisms or the historic and traditional group power struggles.

The aristocrat, the democrat, the communist, the nationalist, after the noise and shouting of the battle die away and victory makes possible responsible direction, each finds the problems of personal claims, values, modes of life, springing up. The same problems remain for every victor to consider and perpetually balance in the unending series of adjustments arising out of the differing personality patterns of the citizenry. The special form of social interest or the special type of ideology will supply the key to various forms of action, but there will remain the perennial problems of millions of varying personalities struggling for expression and recognition; for the realization of the special values in life which they cherish and adore.

Types of personalities must be adapted and adjusted under all systems by whatever means are available—by force, custom, persuasion, social pressure, individual reorientation; otherwise the con-

cern will not go forward, will not function. And this adaptation of value systems constitutes one of the great tasks of social control, and more specifically of political organization and control. This lies at the heart of the power problem under all forms of political and other social organization—the staple of their activities, after the argument over the ideologies and the group interests has been for the moment disposed of.

These multifarious types of personalities, centers of their little worlds, whirling among millions of others at lightning speed, carry infinite possibilities of collision, confusion, destruction. There is in gregariousness, especially as observed in subhuman groups, an automatic form of tropism which seems to protect them against each other and to organize itself in working patterns, although rival groups seem more disposed to struggle and destruction. And perhaps underneath the surface and all unknown to us, there are similar basic social tropisms which take care of humans, as of the distant nebulae.

Not only are there many widely varying types of men amongst whom the conduct and objectives of the government must be adjusted; but the attitudes of the same persons change from day to day and still more from one mode of experience to other modes and shades of social contact. There are those who cling to life as if shipwrecked in some great storm, concerned only with the problem of holding on to a thin rope of existence which may at any moment part. Others are full of the *joie de vivre*, with every step and every breath a joy that radiates throughout the being and which questions nothing in such a world of sheer delight of existence.

Much of the personality adjustment is indeed effected without the aid of government, some through other members of

the family of power—the family, the church, the occupation, the gang—others through less organized forms of orderly association. But many adjustments require the assistance of the political power group to effect the reconciliation of competing claims and interests. The values of the producers as against those of the consumer, of seniority and youth, of ins and outs, the secure and the insecure—these are balanced by a variety of methods. But one of them is the political, in which are embedded many of the main elements in adjustment, as in the case of inheritance, trade regulation, minimum standards of existence, boundary lines not only of land, but of reputation, privacy, rewards of invention and enterprise, interchange of values in a wide-ranging series of instances. The standards of responsibility, the limits of permitted deviation, the care for a wide group of defectives, dependents, delinquents, without special regard to the group from which they hail—these are tasks often devolved upon the government; and this whether it is bourgeois, proletarian, tribal, theocratic, or otherwise.

Not only is this true, but the governmental mechanism must further take account of the development of the personality through various stages of growth and change, the varying age groupings, the changes that take place as the individual advances from one stage to another of the great life drama. The problem of the child in relation to association and authority, the shift to adolescence and its vital implications for social adjustment or maladjustment, maturity, and senescence; these represent important variations of the personality with direct bearings upon the problem of adjustment and adaptation in a political and social framework. Each stage and group must be carefully considered with reference to the position of the power situation and

the growth of sub-, super-, and coordination in the political association. The genetics and the dynamics of personality must be brought into view for the finer adjustment of the governing function in a community.

Here we find the birth of power, apart from the world of ideologies and interests in one sense, although in another inseparably united with them; for what we know is that all of these factors are parts of one indivisible problem, however they may be differentiated in ordinary observation and thinking.

Economic, religious, racial issues come and go, but these personality types and problems of adjustment recur through the centuries and linger far beyond the life of any ordinary social issue, however revolutionary its implications may be. The struggles and wars which are the outcome of the clash of group interests and the brutality of their solution, the valiant efforts of the power hungry, are in a real sense only episodes in the long struggle for the adjustment and adaptation of the conflicting types of human personalities which spring from our social and biological inheritance and from their modifications by social experiences of infinite variety. They are the eternal stuff of which government is constructed; the continuing factors in a world of changing forms, leaders, and processes political.

But the birth of power presumes not merely a situation in which a form of arrangement and understanding is ripe for development, but likewise individuals or groups of individuals who are ready to utilize the opportunity afforded by this conjunction of circumstances. Out of this whirl of events there come leaders, governors, specialists in the art demanded or made possible by the social environment of the moment: those who know how and have the urge to act. I do not raise here the age-old question whether

the situation makes the man or the man makes the situation. It is sufficient for my present purposes to find that they work together in the formation of a power complex, without deciding which of them came first or whether there is any general rule of precedence.

But what manner of men are these governors? It is not a satisfactory answer to say, as has often been asserted, that we are ordained, or that we are elected, or that we are the elite, as determined by ourselves. We already know that you are, but we raise the query what manner of persons you are or how you came to be; or how your special faculties and dispositions were adapted to the *entourage* in which they are found.

In this attention to the interrelationship between the social situation and the qualities of the leaders lies our surest safeguard against the pitfalls that mark the way toward objective knowledge of the power complex. Otherwise we may fall ready victims to the common forms of dogmatism regarding types and capacities of leaders and governors, which may be little more than the projection of the selfish interests of those who advance them as generalizations. That men hold power because they are of divine descent or special divine authorization may satisfy the Lord's anointed, but not the scientist; or that they come of a special pedigree of family or tribe, eugenically anointed as it were; or that seniority or wealth or other status has raised them where they are; for from these same

interesting backgrounds there emerge asses as well as lions in a frequency distribution which raises serious doubts in the mind of the skeptical as to the infallibility of the process. These apologia are important as propaganda tools, but not as serious credentials. They are projections of prestige in the hope of mass acceptance, and it must be said in many cases they serve their purposes well as measured by pragmatic standards.

But what shall we say of the obvious fact that not infrequently the ass does actually have the power, or at any rate wears the lion's skin? The nominal power holder may be by common consent a fool or an incompetent, apparently incapable of defending himself against any aggressor except as he is surrounded by a system. Outside the walls, he becomes a harmless old gentleman, to be viewed with reminiscent interest rather than with fear or adoration, a lion we may touch without fear.

If we examine our rules more carefully, it becomes evident that the qualities of leadership are found in a group of individuals who together are able to function as a politicizing instrument for the community and for themselves. The nominal bearer of the externalia of power may be in fact powerful *per se*, or he may be the representative of a larger group of persons better qualified to understand and execute. Councils, courts, cabinets may contain the wisdom which really rules through a prestige instrument, a sounding board rather than a voice.

Power Politics

Martin Wight took first class honors in Modern History at Hartford College, Oxford University, England. For a dozen years he has been a participant in the study groups at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. He was Diplomatic Correspondent and special United Nations Correspondent of *The Observer*, 1946-1947. In this unusual essay, Mr. Wight not only defines power politics and places it in its proper historical setting, but he goes on to raise a crucial issue of our time: the relationship between power and morality. How can power and morality be so combined in a political process that needs are reasonably satisfied, needless conflict avoided, and peace maintained? Why have eras dominated either by power with little morality or morality with little power been temporary and unbalanced? What is the essential conflict between power and morality?

"Power politics" means the relations between independent Powers. This implies two conditions: independent units which acknowledge no political superior, and continuous and organized relations between them. We take this state of affairs for granted. We have the independent units, which we call states, nations, countries, or *Powers*, and we have a complicated system of relationships between them, now peace, now war.

It will, however, help us to understand this state of affairs better if we recall that it is by no means the rule in history. The present system in Europe has existed roughly since the Reformation, and we have the illusion that it is normal. But looking farther back, we can see it preceded by something quite different. In the twelfth century there was a single juridical unit in Western Europe, where in 1920 there were twenty-six: a single unit known as Christendom or the Christian Republic, which was ruled by two authorities, the Pope in religious affairs and the Emperor in secular affairs. The innumerable

principalities and feudatories and cities of which it was composed, despite their constant strife, were not independent units acknowledging no superior. Again, Christendom had relationships—trade and war—with the Mohammedan Powers across the Mediterranean and with the Byzantine Empire across the Ionian Sea; and these relationships showed glimmerings of the same principles as those of modern nations; but they were not continuous and organized. Looking still farther back (across an interval of confusion and migrations), we see something quite different again: another single unit, occupying a rather different geographical position from Christendom—the Roman Empire. This was a highly organized and centralized state instead of a loose confederation, with a single, absolute divine ruler instead of two equal, limited rulers. It too had diplomatic relations and wars with the Parthian and Persian Empires across the Euphrates, and it traded with China; but these contacts, like those of Christendom with the Byzantines and

From "Power Politics," by Martin Wight, *Looking Forward* series, 1946. By permission of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Footnotes omitted.)

Moslems, were distant and irregular. But looking back once more beyond the Roman Empire we see the familiar sight of a multitude of independent units, brilliant cities and large kingdoms, each jealous of its freedom and ambitious to expand, fighting and intriguing, making alliances and holding conferences, and all of them, in the end, conquered, pacified, and swallowed up by Rome, which had begun by being one of them. This political kaleidoscope of the great Greek and Hellenistic ages looks modern to our eyes, while the immense majesty of the Roman peace and the religious culture of medieval Christendom seem remote and alien. But a similar sequence of periods can be traced in the histories of Islam, India, China, and other parts of the world.

What we mean by power politics, then, came into existence when medieval Christendom dissolved and the modern sovereign state was born. But what was the revolution in politics that occurred at this time? In the medieval world there were already growing up feudal, tribal, and national authorities which developed into the modern nations of Europe; these fought constantly among themselves; and the two highest authorities, the Pope and the Emperor, waged an almost continuous two hundred years' war at the zenith of the Middle Ages to decide which of them was supreme. The change that culminated in the Reformation (it had begun about two centuries earlier) was fundamentally moral and psychological. First, it was a revolution in loyalties. Medieval man had a customary loyalty to his immediate feudal superior, with whose authority he was in regular contact, and a customary religious obedience to the Church under the Pope, which presided over every aspect of his life; but his loyalty to the king, whom he probably never saw and was seldom aware of, was weaker than either. In due course the king suppressed the feudal barons and challenged the power

of the Pope, becoming the protector and champion against oppression and disorder at home and against a corrupt and exacting authority abroad. The common man's inner circle of loyalty expanded, his outer circle of loyalty shrank, and the two met and coincided in a doubly definite circle between, where loyalty before had been vague. Thus the modern state came into existence: a narrower, and at the same time a stronger, unit of loyalty than medieval Christendom. Modern man is in general far more conscious of loyalty to the state than to church or class or race or anything else. A Power is a modern sovereign state in its international aspect, and it might almost be defined as that ultimate loyalty for which men today will fight. With this shift in loyalties came a change in the character of politics. Medieval Christendom was a static, agrarian society whose politics were concerned with defining and interpreting a system which everybody theoretically agreed upon, and in which Pope, feudal lord, burgher, and peasant each had his place. Modern times have been a dynamic, tumultuous period of economic expansion and social change, during which agreed moral standards and political beliefs have become increasingly rarefied, as a multitude of Powers have each claimed independence of the rest and driven forward upon their own paths. "Medieval history," said the historian Stubbs, "is a history of rights and wrongs; modern history as contrasted with medieval is a history of *powers*, forces, dynasties, and ideas. . . . Medieval wars are, as a rule, wars of rights: they are seldom wars of unprovoked, never wars of absolutely unjustifiable, aggression; they are not wars of idea, of liberation, or of glory, or of nationality, or of propagandism." The contrast has not become less remarkable in the sixty years since he wrote.

There are several misunderstandings against which we must guard at the outset. First, a Power is not identical with a

nation. Nationalism was the main force that broke up Christendom, and most European Powers have in fact been nations; but nationality has not always crystallized into a state, and states have not always been the political expression of a single nationality. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the Habsburg Power that guarded Central Europe against the Turks was a dynastic union of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary; in the next three centuries it accumulated Ukrainian, Rumanian, Italian, and Yugoslav provinces; and it was not until 1918 that its inhabitants finally transferred their loyalty and readiness to fight from the Habsburg Emperor to the nationalities that composed his heterogeneous dominion. The identification of Powers with nations reached its climax in the Peace Settlement of 1919, which was based on the principle of national self-determination, i.e. the right of every nationality to form a state. But subsequent history has largely undone this. The three surviving Great Powers today, Russia, the United States, and the British Empire, are, each in its different way, multinational units; indeed Britain itself is the political union of the English, Welsh, and Scottish nations.

Secondly, it must be emphasized that when we personify Powers, saying that *Britain's* policy is this, *America* demands that, and the *Soviet Union* does something else, we are in fact using mythological language just as much as if we speak of John Bull, Uncle Sam, or the Russian Bear. "Britain" in such a connection is a kind of algebraical symbol to denote an immensely complex process which includes the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic Service, the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the House of Commons, the living electorate, and the dead generations who have made the national tradition, combining and recombining in an infinite number of variations of mutual influence. These

shorthand terms are of course unavoidable in political writing, but they are dangerous if they lead us into thinking that Powers are inscrutable and awesome monsters following predestined laws of their own. A Power is simply a collection of human beings following certain traditional ways of action, and if a sufficient number of them choose to alter their collective behavior, they may succeed in doing so.

Thirdly, we must note the significance of the fact that the phrase "power politics" in common usage means, not just the relations between independent Powers, but something more sinister. It is indeed a translation of the German word *Macht-politik*, which means the politics of force—the conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force without consideration of right and justice. As Mr. Roosevelt said in his last Annual Message to Congress, "In the future world *the misuse of power* as implied in the term 'power politics' must not be the controlling factor in international relations." It would be foolish to suppose that international relations are governed exclusively by force, and that statesmen are not moved by considerations of right and law and justice. But as we have seen, what distinguishes modern history from medieval history is the predominance of the idea of power over the idea of right; the very term "Power" to describe a state in its international aspect is significant; and the view of the man in the street, who is perhaps inclined to take it for granted that foreign politics are inevitably "power politics," is not without a shrewd insight. It is wisest to start from the recognition that power politics as we defined it at the outset is always inexorably approximating toward "power politics" in the immoral sense, and to analyze it in this light. When we have done this, we can more usefully assess the moral problem. But the latter will always be at our elbow, and we will consider it by itself in the final section.

In the study of international politics we are dogged by the insistent problem, whether the relations between Powers are in fact more than "power politics" in the popular sense of the term, and whether they can become more. From one point of view, the central question is how far Powers can be said to have interests in common. We have seen that the international anarchy is restrained and to some extent systematized in practice by two opposing kinds of common interest, pulling alternately to and fro. The first is the common interest of all Powers in their freedom, of which they are faintly conscious in peace, and assert at the eleventh hour in war by an armed coalition against a common danger. The second is the kind of common interest represented by successive Dominant Powers. For their predominance has generally safeguarded real values, and offered real benefits, for other nations, and sometimes they have wielded an international ideology as their most potent weapon—as the Habsburg Powers were the protagonists of the Counter-Reformation, as Napoleonic France was the carrier of the French Revolution throughout feudal Europe, as Britain in the nineteenth century was the champion of liberalism. In the same way Russia in the twentieth century has represented the ideal of socialism. A Dominant Power that is thus able to give its policies the added momentum of an international ideal becomes a tremendous force, whose limits are reached only if it provokes the counter-interest of general freedom. Nor is it impossible that Powers may henceforward increasingly regard their deepest common interest as being the prevention of war and liberation from anarchy, and that this will only prove obtainable by acquiescence in a common government provided by the strongest Power.

But the idea of common interest can never have much vitality if it is separated from the idea of common obligation, and

here we touch a more fundamental issue. There has always existed a theory of international relations which asserts the primacy of common conceptions of justice, right, and law. There was an ancient tradition, dating back through the jurists and theologians of the Middle Ages to the jurists and philosophers of antiquity, of Natural Law or the Law of Nature. It taught that man is a rational and social animal, that there is a moral order in the universe to which his rational nature bids him always and everywhere to conform, that the true interests of human societies therefore do not conflict, and that they are bound together by obligations of law and morality. This tradition was the source of international law, which was developed in the seventeenth century to restrain the anarchy into which the states of Europe had fallen, and which used to appeal to "the common standard of right prevailing throughout the Christian world." But it was eclipsed by the new revolutionary creed of progress at the end of the eighteenth century, just at the time when the European Powers, as a consequence of the industrial revolution, were beginning to establish a material unification of the world.

The expansion of Europe itself weakened the tradition of Natural Law, by admitting states that had not been schooled in it to the international community. Of the two new Great Powers of the eighteenth century, Prussia was at the extreme limit of Western Christendom, and had been in many ways scarcely touched by its characteristic culture; and Russia is the heir and champion of the very different traditions of Byzantine Christendom. In the nineteenth century international intercourse was extended far beyond the Christian world, at the same time that Christian political theory was at a greater discount inside the Christian world than it had ever been before. In 1856, at the conclusion of the Crimean War, Turkey

was admitted for the first time to the community of nations; but it was a passive and not an active member; and it is from the emergence of Japan as a Great Power—the first Great Power that was wholly non-European and non-Christian in its traditions—that we may date the effective transformation of the international community from one based on a common ethos to one whose principle is inclusiveness. Attempts have been made since the French Revolution to find an alternative common ethos in political creed instead of moral tradition. The Vienna Settlement was based on the principle of legitimacy; the Versailles Settlement was based on the principle of self-determination; the Yalta Declaration of 1945 enshrined the principle of “democracy.” But in each case these formulae have reflected only a transient moment on the surface of affairs, concealing differences rather than expressing “a common standard of right,” and they have soon dissolved and been superseded. It may indeed be asked whether an effective common ethos is likely to grow up again without an effective common government.

Though the tradition of an international community with a common standard of obligation and justice has faded, however, it has not altogether disappeared. It is the main influence that has modified, and can yet modify, the operations of power politics, and it still gleams faintly in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. In countries whose culture and politics are favorable to its survival, it can create a “moral climate” of opinion that will affect politicians who are quite ignorant of any traditional political theories. The extent to which it may do so in practice is highly controversial, and every historical example that may be brought forward in this light will lead to the kind of argument in which there can be no clear-cut and final conclusion, because it depends not on the establish-

ment of facts but on the exercise of moral insight and political judgment.

It is sufficient to instance two statesmen whose beliefs were saturated with conceptions of Natural Law, and whose politics were grounded on its traditions, Gladstone in nineteenth-century England, and Franklin Roosevelt in twentieth-century America; nor is it any accident that each of these men in his generation had a moral ascendancy and a power over the public opinion of the world, evoking a trust and loyalty far beyond his own country, which was unapproached by any other contemporary political figure. (The devotion inspired abroad in the intervening generation by the supreme revolutionary statesman, Lenin, was perhaps more passionate in its quality, but it was limited and sectional by comparison in its range.) This is not to say that Gladstone and Roosevelt were not assiduous, subtle and far-sighted power-politicians. But their politics had overtones that are absent from the politics of a Theodore Roosevelt or a Cecil Rhodes, a Lloyd George or a Clemenceau, a Bismarck or a Cavour. When we consider the foreign policies of the latter we think in terms of patriotism, of grandeur of conception, of brilliance, of virtuosity, above all of success or failure. Most people would agree that Gladstone's Irish policy or Roosevelt's Latin-American policy (like, in another way, Lincoln's Civil War policy) were different in quality from these, the fruit of a richer conception of politics, which made power an instrument and not an end, and subordinated national interest to public justice.

Nevertheless it is always well to be skeptical of statesmen, and as Lord Acton insisted, to “suspect power more than vice.” It is particularly necessary to guard against the notion that morality in politics is a flower that blooms especially or exclusively in Anglo-Saxon gardens. The first thing to remember about the policies of Gladstone and Franklin Roosevelt is

that Gladstone's Britain and Roosevelt's America were Dominant Powers. This will remind us of the great truth that morality in international politics is not simply a matter of civilized tradition, but is equally the result of security. If British policy in the nineteenth century showed in general perhaps a greater degree of enlightened self-interest than that of any other Great Power in modern history, it was because Britain then enjoyed perfect security. "We could afford the luxury of gentleness," as Mr. Harold Nicolson has said, "because we were completely unafraid."

Once security is destroyed, all the higher objects of politics are swallowed up in the struggle for self-preservation, a tendency seen in every war. "A great and civilized Power like England," said a distinguished writer before the War, "should strive for a margin of security big enough to make a certain bias in favour of an ideal policy possible, a bias that may never show itself in any specific political action but will inform the manner or spirit of her international conduct." Yet since it ceased to be Dominant Power, Britain's margin of security has shrunk, and the possibility of an *independent* ideal policy has correspondingly dwindled. This is the vicious circle of power politics: morality is the fruit of security, but lasting security as between many Powers depends on their observing a certain common standard of morality. The League of Nations in theory transformed it into a virtuous circle, by making collective security a moral obligation. But the solution presupposed a degree of enlightened self-interest among the Great Powers that did not exist.

The modern substitute for the Law of Nature might be called the Law of Common Material Interest. Contemporary writers on international politics are increasingly driven to place their hopes for future peace on the universal demand for social justice and a rising standard of living, which implies the growth of new

economic and social relationships between peoples, and co-operation between Powers "for the planned development of the economies of geographical areas and groups of nations." The reality of this common interest is profound, but it does not touch the problem of power. The world community is still an anarchy, lacking a common superior, and international politics are still power politics. Every Power has an interest greater than welfare, an interest on which it believes that welfare depends and to which welfare must in the last resort be sacrificed—the maintenance of power itself.

It is true that there was equally anarchy in the period when men talked in terms of the Law of Nature, so that its influence upon politics was tenuous and remote. Yet in the long run the idea of a common moral obligation is probably a more fruitful social doctrine than the idea of a common material interest. As the French philosopher Julien Benda has said, mankind has always betrayed its obligations, but so long as it continues to acknowledge and believe in them, the crack is kept open through which civilization can creep. Powers will continue to seek security without reference to justice, and to pursue their vital interests irrespective of common interests, but in the fraction that they may be deflected lies the difference between the jungle and the traditions of Europe. The outstanding contrast between the mood of 1945 and the mood of 1918, which is reflected in the contrast between the United Nations Charter and the League Covenant, is the absence of optimism, the greater realism. Realism can be a very good thing: it all depends whether it means the abandonment of high ideals or of foolish expectations.

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Political Leadership

Charles E. Merriam discusses below one of the most compelling forces in politics. Leadership may be good, poor, or utterly lacking. But no one can doubt the necessity of it under any form of government. In mass democracies the factor of leadership is indispensable. Representation is of course essential; yet it is not sufficient in itself to bridge the gap between the unorganized public and decisions which must be made or carried out. A country without leadership can hardly mobilize its full strength or focus its strength on desired objectives. Why is leadership necessary? What function does it perform? What emotional ties exist between the leader and led? What personal qualities identify the successful leader? The reader should recall in this connection the article by John Bowlby in Chapter One.

Types of leaders differ with the social relationship in which they are set, with the tensions within these types, with the varying requirements of prestige and of ideology. The leader is a function of the social pattern and cannot be understood apart from it. And as there are many types of situations, and many degrees of tension, and many different ways of meeting the same problem; as, further, there are distinctions to be drawn between those who hold the power nominally and those who function through them, the conclusion is inevitable that there are many kinds of leaders and many qualities, dispositions, aptitudes, characteristic of these power possessors.

We must further reckon with the fact that the scientific knowledge of human personality is only in its infancy. The proper study of mankind is man, but the more intimate study of human personality in the light of, and with the aid of, modern scientific techniques has barely begun, and none are more modest in judgment upon personality than those who have penetrated farthest into the

dimly explored domains of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychobiology, psychology, psychophysical constitutionalism, social psychology, in which there seems to lie so much of the secrets of human life. Psychoanalysis alone has already even in its infancy revealed truths of basic importance for the complete understanding of the processes of social control, and its scroll is not yet unfolded. When the "constitutional" background and the social experience of the individual are more fully understood and more expertly related than now, it may be possible to comprehend more fully the predispositions toward politics which now obsess so many individuals.

What do they seek, those with this power hunger, in this field of government, consciously or without appreciation of what they strive toward? And what types most readily find expression and satisfaction in varying situations? And what may we seek in them to satisfy the different equations in human political behavior most effectively? What modifications of the splendid description of

guardians made by Plato in the dawn of political inquiry will be made by modern science? To these fundamental queries only the most tentative answers may be given.

What we now know is that leader types vary widely:

(1) With the social situations and tensions they serve.

(2) With their specific function in each special situation, as general, drill sergeant, judge, parliamentarian, dictator, king.

And what we further know is:

(3) That a distinction must be observed between the prestige projectors and those ruling through the prestige agencies.

(4) That potential leadership is not uncommonly distributed through society, available either for the old or for new types of situations and tensions.

It is not generally recognized that leadership is not something wholly unusual and amazing. Quite the contrary, political leadership is conditioned upon the prevalence of like qualities within the community in which it is exercised. This is evident enough when we consider that a great general does not commonly emerge from a nonmilitary people, or a great parliamentarian from a people not habituated to such procedure, or a great judge where there is no refinement of the juristic techniques. The leader is original, perhaps, but not too original, otherwise he cannot be understood or followed or supported by his potential group. He leads by and through a set of key persons who approach him in equipment and understanding. Through them is filtered into another stratum not too far removed the meaning of the situation. The leader leads not because he is entirely different from the others, but because he is much like the others and may symbolize and fuse their aspirations and desires.

Many political leaders seem to have a high degree of social sensitivity, sensing what goes on around them in the field of

political and social power. It was once said of President McKinley, an adroit reader of public opinion, that he had both ears to the ground all the time; and of Hitler that he said, "I may not possess your governing ability, but I can at least tell you how to make up the public mind." The leader is likely to feel the weather and know the tides that come and go in human affairs, and to be able to measure the effect of special pleas directed toward representing or influencing these movements and potentialities.

The leader is likely to possess a high degree of facility in personal contacts with a wide variety of persons, enabling him to meet them without effort and with conspicuous success in case after case. When the cause is lost, perhaps the personality himself may save the day in many instances. It is one of the interesting phenomena of politics that individuals are often strongly attached to leaders with whom they disagree on every major issue—attached for personal reasons, as the phrase goes. A bold, aggressive, or sympathetic idealistic type of man may gather around him a following concerned not with alleged goals but with his own form of public activity, or perhaps one seeing in him a reaching out toward a goal to which they themselves would go if only the way were shown.

The leader is further likely to have great facility in group contacts, ability to know and reckon and deal with a considerable number of interest groups whose aims conflict but toward whom there must be a sympathetic attitude. This group diplomacy is of the very essence of high politics and the practitioner in this field is well equipped for that reorganization of perplexing situations which is the very task of politics on so many dark occasions. The various races, the religions, the classes, the regions, the innumerable culture groups which everywhere abound—these the skillful

leader understands how to conciliate or to unite in victorious combinations, if all cannot be drawn in. Thus Laurier, a Frenchman in Canada, Sonino, an Egyptian-born Scotch-Jew in Italy, Hitler, an Austrian in Germany, Lloyd George, a Welshman in England—these illustrate the possibilities of group reconciliation, even under somewhat unpromising initial conditions. For some purposes the outsider, or the one a little to the side, may be a better conciliator, than the insider to the manner born, just because he is somewhat apart from the vested and larger interests at war.

From the foregoing it is clear that the leadership group must possess the facility of dramatic expression. This may take the form of the voice of the orator, or the pen of the author, or the dramatization of the behavior seen in large and swift adventurous movements, signalizing the individual as an unusual personality in his experience if nothing more. Roosevelt, Mussolini, Hitler, Bismarck, Clemenceau rank as masters in this field. And for this reason it not infrequently happens that persons without any other special qualifications than the drama of their lives are precipitated into important political positions, as in the case of Paderewski, in generals of many lands, great men so-called, especially great in some form of celebrity, it matters not what. The dramatic situation comes with special power to the average man, who reads into his leader's life the unfulfilled aspirations and dreams of his own more drab existence. In the dramatic leader he follows in a way the beckoning of his own revery life. The instinct or aptitude for dramatics fits well into the modern demand for slogans and devices lifting the individual above his daily tasks.

In view of the conciliatory nature of many power situations, it is important that leaders possess some facility in invention, whether of formulas, policies,

ideologies, which may satisfy the requirements of difficult situations into which the groups have come, and from which it seeks a way out. It is quite possible that the nominal leader may not be the actual inventor of the new law, or the new treaty, or the new plan, or the new slogan, but it will be imputed to him, even though it has been whispered in his ear by some subtler and more cleverly reorganizing mind; and in any case, he is entitled to the credit of recognizing a good suggestion and accepting and incorporating it in his political system. Perhaps Napoleon was not the author of the code that bears his name, but at any rate he listened to the suggestions and approved and acted. Certainly Jefferson disclaimed originality for his Declaration. Recent research shows that some of the most interesting speeches of Mirabeau were prepared by none other than Jeremy Bentham, but not every statesman had the wit to find or use a Bentham.

Naturally the inventiveness, real or imputed, of the leader must not go too far along the path of originality, or he might lose the "common touch," and become incapable of those broad and sweeping symbolisms which reach the "heart" of the masses and upon which his power may rest. He must "edge in" as a motorist cuts into traffic. He must be inventive within the framework of the power interests for whom he functions, whether as reactionary, radical, or revolutionary. If nothing is to be done in the given situation, he must invent plausible reasons for doing nothing; and if something must be done, he must suggest the something. The unpardonable sin is to propose nothing, when action is imperative.

The group leader ordinarily possesses an unusually high degree of courage. This is contrary to the common impression that politicians are timid and even cowardly in conduct. It is often their *raison*

d'être to be conciliatory and compromising, since the knots they seek to unravel are not so easy to loose. But a closer view of the lives of leaders shows that from time to time they must throw down the gage of battle and risk their all in uncertain combat. Just as a financier does not become rich by loaning money on perfect security at a low rate of interest, so the political leader can never enjoy security and quiet, except at the price of inferior position, compensation, and authority. Within and without the party and within and without the state, there are hostile groups seeking to destroy him; and while conciliation and patience may avail on many occasions there are times when these fail, and the appeal to arms, politically speaking, is the only alternative. In fact, the reputation for willingness to do battle may itself save many a struggle. It is doubtless true that the conciliator may so long pursue the processes of conciliation that he may neither recognize another situation nor be prepared to have a heart and will for it; but, if not, his life and tenure are in peril, and the adventuresome spirit of someone who has nothing to lose and all to gain may drive him back from the lines of power.

The force of prestige is supplemented by the living qualities of *emprise*, tact, humor, which tend to blend into a combination of qualities useful for the power group in the exercise of their functions. With initial impetus of prestige the re-enforcement of manner transforms an original investment into a growing business.

What is expected appears in the flesh, and the anticipation is agreeably translated into realization. The great man, the great orator, the great figure in whatever order, with the manner of greatness is impressive, if he carries himself with the appropriate pose. Or he may appear in an entirely different order, as in the case of Lenin and Gandhi, who did not corre-

spond to the traditional figures of power but whose unique quality made them impressive and whose manner continued the impression of the unusual, the profound, the great.

The *emprise* is by no means purely physical; it connotes a symbolic type with reflections in the lives of others; it connotes a form of what has sometimes seemed radiation or magnetism of a sort which is undefinable but felt in some fashion by those in contact with the personality. In the traditional ruling classes this quality takes the form of a gracious and pleasing paternalism, with arrogance and *hauteur* in reserve if need be; in democratic systems the form of a commonness and pervading sympathy with others. To act as a lord and a commoner are varying patterns of behavior adapted to different phases of human social organization.

In military groups harshness and external authoritarianism survive, as evidences of the belated character of the organization of control in a system which proceeds upon the assumption that fear and brute force are the controlling impulses in mankind—yet not without a touch of paternalism in the case of the genuine leaders of men whether high or low, but always with careful preservation of the externalia of prestige and dignity of demeanor. In modern systems of cinema representation these personal qualities may now be exhibited to thousands somewhat more intimately than in earlier times when they were limited to the relatively few.

Allied with this division is the faculty which goes under the name of tact. In this the quality of personal and social sensitivity is combined with that of related conduct based upon the perceptions and feelings without confusion or misunderstanding of the essential relations. It is a type of chart upon which are plotted the dangerous reefs and shoals;

and likewise the clear channels of navigation. Touch is an elusive quality which puzzles observers in more than one field of action; the *tactus eruditus* of the physician may determine the difference between success and failure. The touch of the artist differentiates him from the crowd of those who fall short at just this point. The touch of the economic bargainer may mark the difference between the successful accumulator and the one doomed to toil without special benefit of the bargaining faculty. In somewhat similar manner the touch of the political leader or manager may readily mark the line between the likeable and the disliked. An intellectual slow-movie would perhaps reveal more precisely the exact nature of these differences in action and attitude patterns.

In the case of personal relations or of crowd relations as with the orator the time factor enters in an important way and makes imperative the quick decision and action; but in the larger frame of social relationships of the family of power this may be by no means so important, for the long-run events may at times swing around slowly. Whereas when the speaker is confronted with a question in the presence of an excited throng he must make an instant determination of a course and as instantly execute it, the diplomat may have many months in which to calculate the wisest course of national behavior or in the same way the administrator may meet alike the emergencies one way with an instant decision and the long-time problems in another manner.

Ethical Standards and Political Strategies

Dorothy Fosdick is a member of the faculty of Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts. She is the author of several works in the field of political theory. This selection emphasizes the obvious importance of moral and religious values in politics. It ought to be emphasized that Dr. Fosdick is not pleading for the elimination of value judgments from political life, but is urging that they be so used that social benefits are possible and so that standards of political conduct will be raised. One of the great tragedies of our day is that moral values have set men at one another's throats, have compelled goodhearted, capable individuals out of politics, and have actually hindered progress toward the realization of certain ideals. This author clearly shows at least one reason why such has come to be true.

A dangerous assumption about the nature of morality lies at the root of the more disastrous political strategies of our time. To assume the existence of an

absolute ethic, to interpret right behavior as conformity to unconditional rules of good conduct has serious results. . . .

There are today two types of men who

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presuppose such an ethic, and thereby tend to disqualify themselves for making political decisions. On the one hand, there is the man who is confident that categorical rules of right behavior can be followed and so insists on literal obedience to them. On the other hand, there is the man who is convinced that such rules cannot be followed, and so advocates that they be ignored.

To the first class belong our modern monks, and what Alfred Zimmern happily calls our "part-time monks." These men want to live strictly according to an absolute ethic. They intend to love their neighbors "with a passionate literalness of approach." They do not propose to lie, or to kill, or to steal. Indeed in their eyes moral rules must be respected regardless of the cost either to themselves or to society. The monks, unwilling to make any compromise with the prudential ethic of the world, draw apart into a simpler sphere of their own, living in isolated communities where they can find their neighbors and be of service to them, or joining monastic groups where they have no wife or child of their own to monopolize their love. The part-time monks are willing to make some concessions to expediency and continue to live on in the world, sharing, however, only in those activities which promise not to involve them in a compromise with what they believe is an essential and inviolable element of their code. They will not take life, or they will not lie. At some point they say: "Here I stand before an absolute; this is unconditionally forbidden." Like the man who announced he would never learn to drive an automobile for fear he might become involved in an accident and kill someone, at one stage they withdraw from the world to remain true to their code.

At their best the monk and the part-time monk play a constructive part in community life. They often represent a

quality of living which by its attractiveness condemns conventional practices and lifts the moral standards of a whole group. Moreover, their moral earnestness and continual concern for improving the quality of social relationships constantly lead to beneficial social practices. But these qualifications do not lessen certain unfortunate effects of their position on political strategy.

In the first place, they are unable to take full-time responsibility for political activity. The monk renounces responsibility for major political decisions altogether; the neo-monk accepts part-time responsibility up to the point where his essential rule of action is not violated, or is not likely to be violated. So the monk ignores the crucial political problems. Living in Utopian communities he comes to think in perfectionist terms and disregards the immediate problem of raising the level of conditions in society as a whole. He plays no part in the making of political decisions, and it is possible that his very neutrality on those matters may in fact encourage a course of events which leads to conditions that are worse than before.

More serious still, however, is a second result which follows from the literal application of an absolute ethic. In so far as the monk and quasi monk deal with political problems, they cannot handle them objectively. They approach most problems with a preconceived idea of what ought to be done. Convinced of the a priori rightness of one alternative, they do not consider frankly the social consequences that may be involved in it. They tend to adopt a strategy without regard for its effects. So the purist of "international law" believes his country should strictly observe the rules, no matter what another country does, or what the consequences. So absolute pacifists do not sanction the use of violence

or the initiation of moves which might culminate in violence, even when to refuse to do so quite clearly increases the amount of violence that must ultimately break out. In Germany during the early twenties they did not support the proposal to form a republican army composed of people whose deepest interests would have led them to maintain the Republic against the threats of tyranny, and so Hitler came to power. In May, 1933, they did not encourage England to join France in intervening in Germany to prevent her rearming, and so Hitler was able to start what promises to be the most disastrous of all wars. While the part-time monks are not by any means altogether responsible for the turn of events, they are in part responsible; for in periods of crisis their action tends to be defensive rather than objective. They are apt to avoid facing the consequences of their decisions, for fear of being shaken in their *a priori* judgments. So often they are more concerned to safeguard their moral position than to improve the objective situation, like some absolute pacifists, who today spend greater energy in avoiding participation in violence than in doing what they can to increase the possibilities of a just peace. There is of course the other type of absolute pacifist thoroughly committed to the task of building a better world by nonviolent methods. It is likely that men who resist all war hysteria will be able to devote their attention to the needs of a peace settlement with greater objectivity than those who have been primarily concerned with getting military victory. Some pacifists make this the utilitarian justification of their position. On the other hand, it is also probable that the judgment of a pacifist regarding postwar political organization will remain warped by his irrevocable opposition to certain political methods.

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To the second class of men who start with the assumption of an absolute ethic belong our modern Machiavellians and our neo-Machiavellians. They believe they violate *a priori* rules of right conduct every day of their lives. They may be able to avoid violence or lying in their private and intimate relations, but in their public relations they find themselves inescapably involved in unrighteousness. They therefore acknowledge that an absolute ethic is inapplicable to the tasks of politics. Since the only ethic for the pure Machiavellians is this absolute one, they abjure ethics altogether in their political dealings. Agreeing with their famous master that right and wrong have nothing to do with politics, they concern themselves with the success of their schemes and not their moral quality. The neo-Machiavellians, on the other hand, invent a special kind of ethic to apply in political matters which, unlike the absolute ethic, is expressed in adjustable rules of behavior. While they agree with the pure Machiavellians that no political acts are right, they maintain that some acts are *relatively* better than others. The relative worth of a choice is to be measured by its contribution to certain explicit political ends such as social order or social justice.

The advantages of a Machiavellian position in dealing with political tasks are obvious. Both the Machiavellian and the neo-Machiavellian give themselves wholeheartedly to political activity in a way not open to either the monk or the part-time monk. Furthermore, they are able to meet political crises with far greater objectivity and flexibility. Unimpeded by the concern to adhere strictly to a rule of proper action, they are free to consider the social consequences of their policies, and to mold those policies accordingly. Yet their position, also, has its calamitous effects upon political strategy.

In the first place, they usually content themselves with the conventional patterns

of political behavior. The Machiavellian takes to current practices, no matter what their quality, without qualm of conscience; the neo-Machiavellian takes to them also, though with some misgivings. The Machiavellian does nothing to raise the level of political strategy. While continuing to be optimistic about the possibilities of improving the quality of his personal relations he becomes pessimistic and defeatist about political behavior. "For the manner in which men live is so different from the way in which they ought to live, that he who leaves the common course for that which he ought to follow will find that it leads him to ruin rather than to safety." In the attainment as well as in the maintenance of power the modern Machiavellian justifies any strategy. He makes violence normative, commonly advocating the final extermination of his enemies. In the guise of a patriot he calls for the deliberate killing of noncombatant enemy women in order to bring the war home to their husbands, and for "the wiping out of every last German."

On the other hand, while the neo-Machiavellian is not an outright cynic regarding the possibilities of improving the quality of political behavior, his position easily generates a similar defeatism. For he substitutes the goal of social justice or order for the Machiavellian principle of power, and justifies whatever is necessary to promote that end. The quality of the end he is after makes a good deal of difference to the strategies he adopts. So a modern Lutheran, who believes social order and peace are the highest political goals, advocates submission to the Hitler tyranny rather than nonviolent resistance or war. Or a Christian Socialist, who believes social justice is the more worthy goal, advocates resistance to that tyranny no matter if it does mean war. The danger here, however, is not that passive submission or overt violence may at times be

advocated, but that no tests are recognized by which some strategies are explicitly discouraged because of their devastating social consequences. . . .

A second consequence of the position taken by the Machiavellians and neo-Machiavellians is no less unfortunate. They tend not simply to accept conventional political practices, but they also tend to discourage the improvement of the ends of strategy. The pure Machiavellian eliminates all ethical considerations not only in selecting his means but also in choosing his objectives. He takes for granted that achieving political power is unconditionally worth while, and dismisses any criterion for testing that aim in relation to others. In contrast to the monk who urges obedience to an absolute *rule* of conduct, the Machiavellian thus advocates loyalty to an absolute *objective* of conduct, a position which has its special perils. For if no ethical principle is recognized as a guide in selecting political objectives, their choice remains an wholly arbitrary matter. Moreover, the a priori selection of power as an aim is singularly capricious, since power is a neutral condition that can be used to promote any cause. A singlehearted devotion to the task of making America strong may in the long run assure the collapse of Hitler's tyranny, but it may also produce a new and devastating democratic imperialism. The Machiavellian is not merely helpless in forestalling this outcome but he even tends to encourage it. Admitting no principle in terms of which he can criticize and reject the baser objectives of power, he supports a strong America, no matter what it does. While the monk typically distinguishes himself by an overcritical attitude toward every political movement, the Machiavellian characteristically follows the crowd, shouting "America, right or wrong."

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When the Machiavellian and his fellow travelers were confined to a ruling class or the entourage of a prince they were not so dangerous as their modern representatives. They could be ruthless on the stage of politics while most of the people quietly continued to preserve a more respectable morality. There could be a division of moral responsibility whereby the prince was a cruel fighter and his subjects humble and hard-working folk. But now the bulk of our people are politically active and many of them have discovered the secrets which once belonged only to their leaders. Under ancient tyrannies "robber morality" was held to be justified only in extreme cases and then solely for the ruling groups, but today, under fascist tyrannies, "robber morality" is publicly acknowledged to be proper for whole nations of men that are striving for status. In more democratic states waging modern war, increasing numbers of common men and women are tempted to see violence not merely as an unfortunate last resort but as the norm of all political behavior. When the Machiavellian and the neo-Machiavellian are as plentiful among us as they already are today, their patent cynicism may finally corrupt our political task.

The primary difficulty with the position of both the monk and the Machiavellian is their initial assumption of an absolute ethic; for the belief that rules of conduct are unconditionally right or wrong involves the confusion of two distinct ideas: the good and the right. The good is what is worth while for its own sake, what a man conceives to be of unqualified value. There are things good in themselves which a man enjoys here and now on their own account, if he is not to be forever caught in the pursuit of means. There is also the good which he believes ultimately desirable, the love of God, peace, truth, or beauty. However the good is defined, and on whatever level of experience, it has the

quality of being worth while as an end in itself. The right on the other hand is the best way of promoting the good. It is the choice among available alternatives which is most likely to further the final value. To one it is a service to his neighbor, to another a diligent effort to develop non-violent techniques of resistance to evil, to still others a long and arduous research task, or the painting of a picture. These activities are not right in themselves, but only in so far as they promote what is considered ultimately desirable. A man thus derives his idea of the right from his conception of the *summum bonum*. The common mistake of the monk, the part-time monk, the Machiavellian, and the neo-Machiavellian is to identify these two logically derivative ideas. They define the good as an ethical imperative. Whether they interpret the good as perfect disinterestedness, or peace, or truth, they call it an ethic of right action. One ought to be wholly disinterested, one ought to avoid all violence, one should tell the whole truth. They identify what they are ultimately after with what they believe ought to be done at the moment.

This identification of the good and the right gravely imperils the functions which these two ideas serve. The good is above all the criterion in terms of which right actions are distinguished from wrong. The right is the action one ought to choose among the possibilities which are open. The one is a criterion of value, the other an ethic of action. These two functions are what the neo-Machiavellian tries to provide for when he postulates two kinds of ethics; his absolute ethic serves in part as a criterion, while his interim political ethic indicates the relatively better choice among actual alternatives. But the position of the neo-Machiavellian is inadequate on two scores. In the first place, he wrongly attributes to a criterion the character of an ethic. The good is not an actual alternative of action. Opportunities do not

present themselves to love perfectly, or to act wholly disinterestedly. It is impossible to escape indirect participation in the taking of life, or the expression of partial truths. Even the highest-minded monk does not avoid implication in exploitation and violence, nor escape either passion or bias simply by thinking them away. While the neo-Machiavellian admits that an absolute ethic is universally violated in political life, he does not go far enough in admitting that such an ethic is never a choice in any relationship. If the good is then not an alternative of action, and yet, according to the neo-Machiavellian, it is right to choose the good, everything we do is wrong. When the impossible becomes an ethic, we are put forever in a position where nothing we can do is right. The only logical conclusion of the matter is that there are no ethics at all.

In avoiding this disastrous inference the neo-Machiavellian falls into a second error. He proposes to leave personal concerns to the jurisdiction of his absolute ethic while recognizing a special political ethic made up of adjustable rules of action. In fact, however, such adaptable rules constitute the only sort of ethic that exists in any sphere of experience. There are not two kinds of ethics, an absolute one for one sphere and a relative one for another; there is only a relative ethic. For in all actual situations, rules of conduct clash with one another, and we must continuously choose between them. Shall we protect the naughty child sought by his father by hiding the truth of his whereabouts or shall we tell his whereabouts and be responsible for his punishment? Shall we practice nonviolence, and let a neighboring nation be destroyed, or shall we attack first and preserve its independence? Shall we send an Expeditionary Force to Europe and thereby lose large numbers of young Americans in an effort to shorten the war, or shall we withhold such a force while the war is prolonged and more

Europeans are killed? Given limited alternatives of decision, we cannot escape weighing one rule against another and choosing whichever alternative seems the best solution of the dilemma. There is no difference in this respect between a man deciding which of two girls he is going to ask to marry him, and a statesman deciding between alternative strategies. Some pragmatic pacifists, disassociating themselves from their absolute brethren, claim that participation by the United States in war is wrong, because the effects of war are more disastrous than the results of refusing to fight. Whatever the wisdom of their judgment, they justifiably hold that the rightness or wrongness of a strategy depends upon its social consequences.

Any way one approaches the matter, a basis for wise political strategy is difficult to arrive at, unless one starts with a clear distinction between the good and the right.

In what situation, then, do we find ourselves when we make this distinction and thus deny an absolute ethic as the basis of our conduct? The monk would have us believe that on that account our actions become unprincipled. But certainly this does not follow. We must bear in mind the difference between an absolute ethic viewed as a system of specific rules considered right in themselves and an absolute value held to be good in itself and therefore unqualifiedly worth working for. While we reject the system of rules, we can at the same time affirm the validity of a universal value as the ultimate criterion for our practical choices. We can acknowledge an ideal good beyond the partial values of political life, and thus recognize a universal standard for discriminating between goals and means of strategy. So, avowing the ultimate worth and dignity of human personality, we can pledge ourselves to the creation of conditions where every person will be able to

develop freely to his fullest capacity. While, in the light of this value, no political objective is unqualifiedly worth while nor any tactic categorically right, some objectives become more worth while than others and tactics which are most likely to promote those objectives become right. The terms "right" and "wrong" are then not merely convenient variants for "expedient" and "inexpedient," "successful" and "unsuccessful." They refer to those strategies which show promise of promoting conditions where every man, woman and child can live according to his own highest ideals.

In practice this means two things. In the first place, political goals are tested to discover those which promise to be most conducive to the good. The validity of a choice cannot be finally proved, but its significance can be checked on the basis of experience. So we select the objective of social justice and not merely social order, since order may be based on an

exploiting tyranny. We aim for equal economic opportunity and not economic liberty, since the latter may allow a few to monopolize the limited opportunities of life. In the second place, intermediate norms of conduct are formulated to serve as guides in choosing the means to these objectives. These norms include what experience indicates on the whole promotes the good: respect for the plighted word, the treatment of men as ends and not as means, acknowledgment of the solidarity of all nations and races, and the equal claim of all to share in the chances of life. Strategy is not slavishly bound to these principles, but they are taught and used as leads in selecting practices that violate as little as possible the final good. So if violence is necessary as a final resort to keep open the channels for increasing justice, we do not altogether shrink from it, but we normally advocate nonviolent tactics to promote justice because such tactics do not destroy life.

4

SOCIETY AND POLITICS: GENERAL

I

Politics and political behavior grow out of social environment and are partly determined by that environment. Social factors are only one of the several important roots of political thought and action. Once more, a theme reappears: man lives in society; this is the proper starting point for political analysis. While it is impossible to describe the relevant features of modern society with any completeness in chapters four and five, the following question can be posed and answers suggested: what is there in the social relations of men which helps to explain why they politically act and react the way they do?

For analytical purposes we separate human activity into artificial categories or compartments. In point of fact, of course, no such neat separation exists. One kind of activity spills over into another. Different activities have a strong mutual impact upon one another, even though it may be difficult for the individual to see precisely how his various pursuits are interrelated. We speak of economic man, political man, social man—each phrase a fiction, a convenient way of making an observation about certain behavior. Social and political phases of life are interwoven. So subtle are some facets of this interrelationship that it is far easier to perceive its existence than to define it.

There are more specific links between any given social setting and its politics. Chapter three suggested that the political process consisted, among other things, of the application of private power to political ends. To understand the nature of private power and its wielders in any nation, it is necessary to know something about the social structure, the functions most essential to organized living, and who performs these functions. Furthermore, for many individuals in society the only way to improve their social position—prestige, function, income, and so on—is through a political career. An influential political position can be the key to, or a substitute for, a desired social position. A successful politician can, if he is clever, have access to privileges and to people which might otherwise be denied to him.

It is obvious also that government must of necessity be either ally, enemy, or umpire vis-à-vis group conflict. As one of the selections below points out, it is virtually impossible for the government to escape one of these roles. Further complications arise from the fact that over a period of time the government may assume any one of these roles with respect to a particular group or set of groups. Nor is this all. When the government is attempting to play the part of an umpire, or is trying to devise rules which will equalize the contestants, it may at the same time be accused of being an enemy or ally. Specific applications or examples of this struggle will be indicated in the next chapter and in chapters seven and eight. Suffice it to say here that one self-evident link between politics and the social structure is the relationship between the political power of society and dominant groups which seek to use it, or to prevent its use. All of us are caught up in the problem of liberty versus order, of how to preserve the largest opportunity for the development of the individual while at the same time maintaining the restrictions which organized living renders necessary. It is, once again, easier to state the problem than to indicate even the direction of solutions to it; the problem is, perhaps, the crucial issue facing mankind. It refers to the conduct of individual nations in a world community and to the conduct of the individual within the national community. It is a problem both of political theory and of practical politics.

Anyone who has taken more than a casual glance backward over our accumulated political experience must admit that government—that is, kings, nobles, dictators, ruling classes, and even representative bodies—has periodically encroached upon personal liberty. But formal acts of government have also been indispensable in the struggle to protect some men from the selfish exploitation of other men. To designate the struggle between liberty and order, freedom and authority, freemen and slaves, oppressed and oppressor, as a struggle only between individuals and government is a gross oversimplification. One of the things to be said about the modern state is that it is not the only source of regulation. Rules governing human conduct may originate in private sources. Never let it be forgotten that oppression is itself a form of rule; private agencies have had few peers in depriving some of the individuals in society of their liberties. Therefore, a study of the social background of politics may enable us to separate real from fictional threats to freedom, to identify threats inherent in social relationships which may be just as serious as the threats offered by public government. The question is: What is there in any social structure which unnecessarily deprives some people of liberties and opportunities? What, if any, should be the policy of government toward such situations? If one argues that abusive features of private social regulations—for example, racialism—should be allowed to be self-correcting, what are the risks involved? Are the risks greater or less than might accompany public intervention?

II

For the most part, the population of the Western world dwells in a very complex pattern of civilization—big cities, big production, big business, big government. Indeed, the "littleness" of the individual stands in stark contrast to the "bigness" of society. Who has not experienced this sense of being overpowered by the kind of world in which he lives? Without trying to introduce a "common man" or "average man" concept into our discussion, but using the above as a starting point, the following propositions would seem to be in order.

The individual—the little man—in society is anonymous, numerous, and he is virtually helpless without some organization, from the church to the political party, to provide for his needs. Yet organization tends to dominate the individual. Man is little, not in a physical way, but because he does not control the radio, the labor union, the political parties; he has little or no feeling of participating in political decisions; events and policies come in on him from afar; newspaper headlines and radio reports swirl about him as though he were an inanimate object. Two hundred years ago, the individual had direct or indirect contact with a few hundred or at most a few thousand other people; today the individual is connected, whether he is aware of it or not, with some two billion of his fellows.

One point which emerges from these well-known facts is that many of the important things which befall the individual have their origin in an impersonal world beyond his sensory perception. It is extremely difficult, and for the great body of citizens almost impossible, to assess responsibility for political actions. To this must be added the peculiarities of the American system of government; in the case of foreign policy—particularly in a day when much of our policy must be underwritten by appropriations—responsibility can be divided between the parties or factions in Congress, between Congress and the President, or between the many executive agencies which might have a momentarily strong voice.

Given the difficulties in assessing responsibilities for public decisions, the individual man is open to several dangers. He is more easily susceptible to an appeal to blame something or someone for what happens; scapegoats occasionally take the form of persecuted minority groups. The danger is that the individual may unwittingly become part of a political conspiracy which only dodges, but does not solve, the problem of responsibility. If there is no solution found readily, the individual simply despairs of placing responsibility and therefore stops trying. No one knows how many unnecessary political acts involving great public expense and waste have been perpetuated behind the shielding curtain of irresponsibility.

A more serious danger is that in the face of bigness, of confusion, of real ignorance of what is happening, individuals may be ripe for oversimplification. Because there is so much in politics which seems to be beyond the grasp of the

individual, a blue print or a glib phrase is unconsciously welcomed. This sort of practice is dangerous when it becomes a substitute for, rather than an aid to, political thinking. It may be easier to gain public support for a foreign policy which rests upon a campaign to stop communism. "Anticommunist" is a convenient label for a number of important issues which never filter down to the individual—partly because he is not inclined to think behind the label itself, and partly because he feels helpless anyway. What does it matter what he as one individual thinks?

In chapter one, a human tendency toward irresponsibility, toward letting others take the initiative on public questions, was noted. Now we add to this the inertia and frustration which arises because men are swept along in a stream of events over which they apparently have no control. Since a healthy democratic society depends on intelligent participation of the masses, the vacuum created by mass disinterest or helplessness becomes very significant. An objective observer of the American scene in the years 1947, 1948, and 1949 had the impression that "little men" were waiting in quiet, insecure expectancy for the issues and events surrounding the atomic bomb and the threat of the American-Russian impasse to envelop them. The factor stressed here was only one of several, but taken in conjunction with psychological, ideological, economic, technological, and governmental factors, there was no denying its effect.

III

A further point is relevant here. Most people really live in two worlds—a *personal* world and the *impersonal* one discussed above. The personal world revolves about the individual's life, his family, and his friends. It is an immediate world and part of his consciousness. It is a local world, centering usually in his town or neighborhood. It is a world of sentiment and feeling, the individual being attached to it by emotional ties. Generally speaking, this is a world deeply linked to the past, more likely to be static than dynamic, and the individual is inclined to try to keep this world true to what he thinks it should be. He will try to conserve the conditions in which he feels comfortable.

The impersonal world clearly has a tremendous impact on all the private worlds. One aspect of this relationship concerns a kind of continuous conflict. The motif of the external world is change, while the motif of the local world is stability and resistance to change. Intellectual understanding is necessary if the external world is to be meaningful, while such understanding is not as essential in the personal world—except perhaps in connection with the earning of a livelihood.

There are many implications in this duality, this living in two worlds whose boundaries, incidentally, are not precise and differ for each individual. Among others, three possible political implications may be suggested. First, the kind of thinking required to get along in the personal world is quite different from what is required for a satisfactory adjustment to the impersonal world. In the

latter, its dynamic nature requires flexibility of mind, a willingness to accept new views, and a capacity to welcome change as an element of progress. It is difficult for most individuals to make the transition. Instead, the tendency is often to apply personal and local thinking to the impersonal and cosmopolitan world. Few could be convinced that they ought to re-examine the values which cement their human relations in the local world; yet it may be vitally necessary that this be done with respect to the external world. Rare indeed is the person who can face both ways, simultaneously and successfully. What we have come to in the modern world is a civilization which is so many-faceted that in the minds of men some real distinction must be drawn between the different "levels of living"—local, national, and international; and the most intelligent responses thereto should be chosen with care.

Second, the dynamic quality of the impersonal world from time to time produces feelings of strain and insecurity in the impersonal. One result is an inclination to judge political events and policies in terms of their effect upon the latter. This is natural and there is nothing wrong with it per se. However, from one point of view, the external world is more than a natural world which other people inhabit; it is an independent social world consisting of the mutual impact of a number of private worlds (or the acts of individuals which affect other individuals) and separate from any one of them. Thus some legislative act which is designed to keep this social world stable and peaceful may have adverse influence upon some personal worlds. Since most are more sensitive to the effect of stimuli on the subjective, personal, emotional world than on the objective, nonemotional world, and since the two worlds are inextricably linked, the fact that the individual is more firmly rooted in his local world may cause him to act and react politically in a manner contrary to his best interest.

Third, and akin to the last point, political leadership seems to operate on the assumption that people are concerned primarily with their immediate lives. Political appeals distort the true nature of public issues when attempts are made to show that policies recommended for the external world are going to be of direct benefit to the individual. The result is that an unsound basis of support is established. In point of fact policies of the external world more and more are likely to require serious adjustments in the individual's private life. If not, it is usually true that no connection can be seen. Either way disinterest or disillusionment may be inspired.

Another equally unfortunate type of distortion is exemplified by the insistence upon income tax reduction in the spring of 1948 prior to national elections. Of course a tax reduction appears in visible form in the individual's check book. But the world situation required that the same Congress establish a tremendous military budget. In spite of talk of a 20 billion dollar military appropriation, the tax cut went through. That there was any contradiction involved was never made very clear to the voters. It is too simple to say that people are selfish and ignorant, that they have to be bribed; and it is too simple to say that this sort of thing is always done at election time. All this may be

true. Nevertheless, the fact is that the two worlds we have broadly defined are sometimes in conflict. On certain issues there is no way of completely reconciling the interests of the subjective and objective worlds. The necessity of building political support among all the individual worlds for policies needed in the social world has created a fiction. Big society, in part, means complexity which admits of no simple integration of different phases of organized living.

IV

So far, the analysis has been overly simple in order to discover some useful generalizations. Actually, the individual is absorbed in society through his activity in institutional patterns of behavior and through his membership in various groups. Society is comprised of institutions and groups. What is meant by "institution"? It is a term which appears frequently in the reading below and occurs frequently in political discussion. Institution is not a substantive term; it denotes nothing tangible. It is merely a way of recording our observation that individuals are living and working together in certain ways. The primary institutions in society—church, school, family, state, and economic organization—refer to those purposeful and enduring actions which dominate much of the individual's life. In a given society, economic organization comprises the different ways people behave in earning a living; a particular company, like United States Steel, is a secondary institution or, better still, a group which is related to a primary institution. The Baptist church would bear the same relationship to the church (or organized religion). A group may be differentiated from an institution by defining it as "a number of persons whose joint actions express the policies of a directing will."

It is clear that there is a two-way relationship between individual men and the institutions and groups which constitute society. People are subject to a great number of influences: the government, vocational situation, education, friends, lodges, clubs, mores, values, traditions, customs, and ideas—in sum, a culture. Therefore, behavior cannot be explained solely in terms of individual psychology; the variety of environmental factors to which he is subject makes him biosocial. It is worth reiterating a cardinal point made in chapter one, namely, that the individual's personality will tend to reflect the culture in which he lives.

For the moment, however, the significant implication of the institutional and group framework is that society is fragmented, diversified and in some respects disconnected. No one institution or group or influence expresses or dominates the whole man all the time. In addition, groups embrace different people. There is no way of knowing how many groups—major groups and subgroups—exist in American society. An impression can be gained from the fact that a recent compilation lists some twelve hundred "societies and associations" ranging from the Academy of Medicine to the Zionist Organization of America and also some 275 different religious bodies.

How does social fragmentation on such a scale relate to politics? Diversification makes unity—temporary unity behind certain policies or permanent unity behind national interests—difficult. Groups not only conflict but much energy is wasted through parallel efforts. America is noted as a country in which freedom of speech and organization has produced a kind of anarchy; people have become accustomed to thinking in terms of a segment of their interest in public affairs as expressed through their membership in a trade union, a company, or a professional association instead of their relationship to a larger grouping. The view which citizens have of national problems can thus be colored by group affiliations. Not only is this true, but a "nation of joiners" may have little energy left over for organized political activity and necessary consideration of public issues.

On the other hand, a proliferation of groups may be a source of political strength. For one thing, social groups perform many functions which otherwise would have to be undertaken at public expense. The educational activities of private groups have augmented the public school; service clubs buy and equip ambulances for small towns; the American Bar Association has rendered substantial technical legal aids to government; and recreation facilities have been created by hobbyists and enthusiasts who have given freely of their time and labor. Again, there is no better training in practical democracy than is provided by group enterprises. In constructive group endeavors the individual learns "to make social aims personally attractive" and learns to appreciate the value of submerging his ego-drives for the broader purposes and aims of the whole group.

Americans have been characterized as nonpolitical; they appear to be anti-government, skeptical of the demagogue, resistant to mass political movements. Is it not worth suggesting that one of the reasons why personalized tyranny has never gained much headway in the United States lies in the fact that so great a proportion of the energies of the people are absorbed in multitudinous social groups? America is probably crisscrossed with more groups than any other country.

Fragmentation suggests a truth about politics in a complex social situation. Some social conditions will aid the political process and will strengthen the state politically; others will cause disintegration and leave the door open to unwanted political developments. To argue for abolition of the groups which destroy political unity is to argue also for the abolition of healthy diversification and nonpolitical outlets for human energies. The conclusion is that a close examination of the nature of society will throw a somewhat different light upon the definition of political problems.

If the individual is partially involved in a number of institutions and groups, the answer to the problem of unity may not lie in the reduction of the number of groups; it may rather be a matter of, first, persuading individuals to evaluate their institutional and group loyalties—in other words to see themselves as split personalities with segments of their behavior influenced by different

phases of society—and then to assign them priorities. This might be supplemented by discovering interests common to all groupings.

V

Every society has a power structure. This means that social conditions in the broad sense give one group relative power over another. Social changes—population growth, invention, economic development, cultural migrations—are constantly altering the power structure. At that period in world history when land was one of the chief natural resources and elements of wealth, landowners were close to the top, if not at the top, of the power scale. Later those who controlled commerce and manufacturing tended to replace the landowners who still were superior to peasants and artisans. And modern complex conditions have brought their own peculiar stratification in each society.

Social stratification is a difficult concept. All we can do here is to set forth a few nontechnical definitions which may be useful to the student of politics. The definitions are based upon an analysis by Professor Kingsley Davis, noted sociologist of Columbia University.

Everyone has a social position, that is, a place in a given social structure. *Position* is comprised of status and office. *Status* means a set of powers, privileges, and functions recognized and supported by society as an institutional system. *Office* refers to a position in a deliberately created organization. Hence status is exemplified by professor, lawyer, or accountant; office means Professor of English at State University, corporation counsel for Acme Products Inc., or executive analyst for Mutual Insurance. *Station* may be employed to denote a "cluster of positions": professional men, skilled laborers, clerical workers, and so on. *Stratum* means a mass of persons in roughly the same station. A class might be defined as a stratum where positions are acquired at birth but may be altered by achievement, in contradistinction to a caste where social position is decreed and fixed by descent. In various societies, social position may come from age, sex, or kinship on the one hand, or it may be earned on the other.

But what lends power to a particular social position? On what basis do we say society is stratified and some people are more powerful and influential than others? Why does status confer power? Professor Davis declares that the measure of power conferred by status lies in the importance of the function performed, scarcity of means of performing it, and the number of persons to be controlled by the person holding a given status. Society has a proved vital need for doctors and clergymen; therefore they are relatively high in the positional scale—meaning they are accorded respect or influence or wealth or all three. In the case of skilled technicians, such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, or engineers, native talent is scarce and long expensive training is required. The third criterion is met by the labor union leader in whom thousands of workers place confidence and who in consequence wields considerable power in industrial society.

Stratification, then, inherent in every society, rests upon the relative values attached by society to different attributes (wealth, character, personality) or functions. In other words, social evaluation bestows status to persons and groups. Stratification may be rigid or flexible, sharp or blurred. A characteristic of democracy is that the "main lines of power are mobile"; class position and political power do not necessarily coincide. Nonetheless, even in a political democracy, stratification will give some individuals and groups access to greater private—and hence public—power. Some types of public office holders will be more powerful than others.

Applying the above analysis to American society at the present time, what kind of a power pattern emerges? Who rules America? It is not easy to be precise about this, numerically or otherwise. A list of America's rulers is a matter of individual interpretation. However, John Gunther has advanced a list in an interesting article in the September, 1947, issue of the magazine '47, and it is revealing to break his suggestions down on a positional basis. In a group of 64 who he feels really rule this country the following are included; fourteen elected political leaders, two local bosses, eight national administrative officials, a Negro leader, leaders representing the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths, eight labor leaders, one leading spokesman each for farmers and manufacturers, thirteen industrial executives and financiers, two scientists, one leader in communications, one public opinion expert, five newspaper editors and publishers, and two political leaders "without portfolio" (Dulles and Stimson).

Mr. Gunther disagreed rather strongly with a list of 64 made up in 1930 by James W. Gerard, former Ambassador to Germany and a leading financier for a generation. Mr. Gerard's list reflected a tendency to attribute positional power to wealth, since his selections comprise an oligarchy which he thought controlled the nation because they controlled its purse strings. Not a single political leader was included and William Green and Matthew Woll seem to have been tacked on as an afterthought.

Clearly Mr. Gunther's list reflects the functions to which American society has assigned a high value: political leaders, men of science, military leaders, labor leaders, administrators, managers and executives, editors and publishers. One might wish to add or subtract particular personalities, but it must be agreed that Mr. Gunther has correctly chosen the types of positions which carry power and authority with them. Lower down in the scale would come the professional groups, skilled laborers, and clerical workers. At the bottom would come those of negligible positional power—unskilled laborers, outcasts, restricted and marginal groups of all kinds.

The way in which social change shifts the position of individuals and groups is amply demonstrated in the recent rise of scientists and the military. Twenty years ago, the military's social position would have been relatively low in the scale; today, not only is the military an important functional unit of our society, but a handful of top military leaders exert a tremendous influence on domestic and foreign policy. The prestige and social value of the scientist—

never very high in the power structure—have risen rapidly since the development of the atomic bomb (and its related weapons). Scientists have become policy-makers and advisers on great public questions. Correspondingly, the old influence of Wall Street has been visibly reduced through the New Deal and World War II periods.

Thus at any particular time in any particular society the question must be asked: Who wields private social power and who stands behind those who make decisions? The answer lies in functions and control. Whoever performs socially valuable tasks is in a position to ask for considerations, for privileges, and he will be listened to. Whoever controls the important elements of organized living—the media of communication, techniques of scientific development, production, resources, labor, and political power—really rules. More often than not it will be groups who rule—their natural leaders representing others of the same station or stratum in society.

VI

In the light of the preceding, it is proper to speak of a kind of class structure in the United States. Immediately it must be added that for the most part if a person is born into a certain stratum of society, he is not *necessarily* doomed to remain there; he can move up and down in the scale depending on his achievements or lack of them. The system of public education aids in this process because there are opportunities to become a skilled or semiskilled laborer at public expense. State universities admit students without reference to social status or family income. America is, par excellence, a society which usually recognizes achievement; political, artistic, business, intellectual, and scientific success will be rewarded in one degree or another. Rigidities in the American class structure unfortunately appear in the case of caste groups such as Negroes and in the case of minority groups for whom certain privileges and status are denied by prejudice or other forms of group tension.

Two political consequences of the first order of importance are derived from the relatively fluid nature of the power structure in the United States—aside from the noteworthy fact that with few exceptions a person still has a vote no matter how low he is in the social scale. Political conflict does not center on the resentment of respective positions in the social scale. Head-on clashes between upper and lower strata of society have never dominated American politics. Group solidarity—meaning the institutionalization of common aims and values to the extent that group ends become personal ends—is very much a part of the political scene, but it may run vertically through several strata as well as horizontally through one stratum.

Another factor—a vital factor—in the stratification of American society is the degree of “middleness,” both in actuality and in the minds of citizens. Americans are consciously middle class. A survey reported by Professor Handley Cantril in the January, 1943, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* bears

this out strikingly. His findings indicate that 90% of the people "identify themselves with some category of the great middle class." Even 70% of those in the "low" income group so identify themselves. Another significant conclusion of Professor Cantril's was that there is a tendency "for people to regard their social class as higher than their economic group." There seems little doubt that this "social class middleness" of the American people has been a stabilizing factor in politics and has introduced a blurred quality to the power structure. The lack of extremes of wealth and poverty affecting the great bulk of the population and the fact that income or wealth is not the only criterion for high social status have reduced frustrations and have altered greatly the role of politics in social conflict.

VII

Obviously a person's socioeconomic status will have a direct bearing upon his voting behavior. To be explicit on this point is not easy. Existing data, presented below and in chapter six, is trustworthy though not as complete as might be desirable. It would be unwise to lay down specific causal relationships to fit all cases. How direct is the connection between a person's income and his party affiliation or vote on any issue; between his own estimate of his social status and his political thinking? Does an individual's religious affiliation or racial origin affect his vote? If so, under what conditions? We know these are important questions, but there may not be any answers which would apply accurately to more than one situation at a time. It isn't often that "social" factors can be sufficiently isolated in a given vote to warrant a verifiable conclusion. Occasionally this does happen. Early in 1948 a special election in the 17th Congressional district in the Bronx, New York City, resulted in a triumph for Leo Isaacson who successfully bucked Boss Flynn's Democratic machine in a startling upset. Certainly one of the most important, if not the most important, consideration was the disapproval by the Jewish population of the district of the way Democratic President Truman had handled the Palestine problem.

We have already remarked that the individual is constantly adapting to, or responding to, numerous stimuli in the social environment. We have also said that the individual is the product of a culture. Consequently it follows that socioeconomic status will be a compound, a battery of influences. To single out any one of these, except under very limited conditions, would be a distortion; the factors shaping political behavior are, to repeat, too many and complex to admit of any neat formulas. No one socioeconomic influence can explain voting behavior.

It would seem admissible, however, to accept the notion that a person tends to think politically as he is (or thinks he is) socially. Social status, income, family, vocation, religious affiliation, racial background, geographical location, neighborhood will all not only partly determine habits of thought but will determine those with whom the individual will have close personal contact.

A young member of a farm family living in a rural community in Iowa will make up his mind about political questions differently from a young member of a business family living in New York City. People who live together under similar external conditions are more likely to develop similar needs and interests. Another way of putting this is that the degree of political homogeneity of large groups will depend on the number of common influences to which they are subject. Regional influences may counterbalance common economic interests. Dominance of the male parent in a family may override the influence of college or vocational associates. Much will depend on who the candidates are and the way issues are put to the voters.

We have called attention briefly to some of the politically relevant data to be found inherent in man's social relations. Such data is bound up with other roots of behavior having to do with psychology and economics. Such data might be applied differently to each political problem requiring analysis. Social phenomena, furthermore, range from the impact of impersonal society upon the individual to the structure of power, from the relationship between man and institutions to middle class politics.

The selections which comprise the remainder of the chapter are designed to explore the points raised in this introduction and to add materials with which the student should be acquainted.

Institutional Rivalry in Society

Frank Tannenbaum is Professor of History at Columbia University. He is especially noted as an authority on Latin-American history and institutions. His most recent books have been concerned with some phase of social history. In the stimulating essay which follows, Professor Tannenbaum analyzes society from the standpoint of the different behavior patterns which dominate men's lives. Conflict between primary institutions—as defined in the introductory essay—arises because changing conditions present choices among ways of accomplishing socially necessary functions. Once functions have been transferred from one institutional agency to another, a new balance has been established. Yet the conflict never ends and Dr. Tannenbaum argues it is healthy conflict. The potential danger of tyranny and possible resulting revolution lies in the complete domination of men by one institution—the state, family, church, or the economy. How does this analysis apply to the political scene in the United States? What are the political implications of the gradual decline of the family and church? What is the effect of “normal” institutional conflict on politics? Does the conflict between labor and management, between government and business, look different in the light of Professor Tannenbaum's thesis?

Society is not completely malleable to the hand of man. On the contrary, society is possessed by a series of irreducible institutions, perennial through time, that in effect both describe man and define the basic role he plays. Even in his most primitive state man is always and only found in a community. We do not know him in isolation. More than that, we always find him possessed of a language, for without it he could not symbolize the universe about him, and if he could not do that he would not be a man. But he is not merely a member of a community. The antithesis between man and society is, like so many other intellectual constructions, a delusive and, in fact, a mischievous simplification; for every society, even the most primitive, is always

possessed of a number of institutions, organic to the society itself. The family, the church, and the state, to mention only the most obvious, are inherent in the pattern, inclusive in their claim upon the individual, and each in turn the visible structuring of an incommensurable experience. Man, as we know him, is therefore not merely the product of society; he is the very child of a complex institutional system that conditions his survival and sets the stage for the drama of life itself. These institutions, prevailing through time, manifest themselves in almost infinitely variable forms, but always fulfill the same role—the structuring of incommensurable human experiences and needs, and giving them a visible role in the culture. The family, in

From “The Balance of Power in Society,” by Frank Tannenbaum, *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1946.

all of its innumerable designs and complexities, has always fulfilled the task of rearing the children, educating and preparing them for incorporation into the larger community. The community may have been savage, primitive or civilized, simple or complex, sedentary or wandering, organized into small villages or great nations; but always a well-defined series of relationships, responsibilities, commitments, and expectancies defined how and by whom the children were to be cared for, brought up and instructed. The family may have varied in form and size, but it always fulfilled the same function in relation to the society. The very survival of the society itself was conditioned by the performance of these responsibilities.

If the family has persisted through time, so has the church. The church is here defined as that series of experience, beliefs, attitudes, taboos, and practices that, taken together, give man a sense of identity within the universe, for he has always had an implicit or explicit description of the world and of his place in it and has always had a pattern of behavior that symbolized that relationship. The religious, like the family, experience is incommensurable with any other. The mystical Chichicasteñango Indian, who ascends the church steps, sometimes on his knees, swinging an incense burner, and, once inside, bows before his special saint, spends an hour talking to him, arguing with him, pleading, begging, or, in angry gesticulation, almost shouting, and sometimes in excitement throwing the rose petals he has brought, up at the saint as if in defiance, then humbly kissing the saint's feet, lighting a number of candles in front of him, and, as if that were not enough, asking permission from one or another group of Indians, who are kneeling and praying in some specially sacred spot, to join them in their devotion—that Indian can find only in the

church the embodiment of his faith. This sense of humility, isolation, and loneliness in the world can find strength and peace only through a constant series of acts and practices that make for a sense of continuous contact between man and the unknown. The church has fulfilled this role in the life of man from the beginning, and, in the nature of the case, this function could be fulfilled by no other institutions. Like the family, it has survived a thousand different cultures, and in each of them in varying form fulfilled the same inevitable and organic need—of giving life meaning by making man a part of the universe.

If the family and the church have proved perennial in the experience of man, so has the state. In one or another of a thousand variables, the state has performed the same basic functions—the defense of the community against outside enemies, and the maintenance of a semblance of peace internally. The effectiveness of the state has varied, but the expectancy, the habit, and the implicit or explicit structuring of society to perform these ends have been conditions of social survival. The inner patterning that defined the responsibility for the fulfillment of these necessary tasks has called into being a great variety of types of state, but, regardless of the structure, the essential need and experience which it embodied have remained the same.

If the institutions have always been multiple and proved irreducible, it is because the experiences they embody are incommensurable. They have been, however, not merely multiple and irreducible, but also competitive. Each of the institutions in its own inner logic tends to be all-embracing, laying claim to the entire man, and showing an impelling tendency to assume all responsibility for the governance of society. A glance at the role of any one of these institutions under conditions that favored its full develop-

ment will illustrate the issue in hand. If we take the European church at the height of its power, how vast is its role, and how varied its responsibilities. What was there that did not fall within the province of the church? From the time the child was born—or even before that, because marriage could take place only within the church—to the time the man was buried, because he could be buried only by the church and in a cemetery sanctified by the church, the individual lived within the orbit it prescribed. His beliefs were inculcated by the church; his morals, ethics, politics, law, theology, and philosophy came to him at the hands of the church. In his social life, the church defined his holidays, saints' days, and prescribed the form and character of the festivals; it influenced the games he played, the dress he wore, the food he ate. In his economic life, it imposed a tax (one-tenth) upon his income, it defined the permissible and nonpermissible in business activity—such as limiting the rate of interest—it influenced property distribution by abstracting part of the property from the ordinary tax laws, by accumulating property and removing it from private ownership and from the market, by collecting money for the building of churches, monasteries, cathedrals, and convents. In law, it claimed through the development of the canon law an increasing role in defining and punishing a great variety of civil and criminal acts. In politics it took on the role of crowning kings and freeing subjects of their allegiance to the crown—thus actually playing the part performed by a revolution. The church was the great patron of the arts—painting and music were influenced by it and performed for its greater glory. The church set the style in architecture. Its many cloisters, monasteries, and colleges became the centers of learning, and all learned men were beholden to it and lived their

scholarly life within its folds, both physically and spiritually. The church, too, was the great source of social welfare: the hospitals were under its control and staffed by special groups of trained nurses organized in religious orders; it supported orphan asylums and homes for the aged; the unfortunate—the weak, the blind, the lame, and the poor—found refuge under its roof and succor in its establishments. Nothing in the society went on outside the orbit of the church.

If we turn now to examine the contemporary state, it is clear that it lays claim to all the mundane responsibilities, prerogatives, and powers once exercised by the church. The state, like the church, casts a protective mantle over the individual before he is born by insisting that it alone can legitimize a child by marriage, and by imposing, normally, very serious handicaps upon the illegitimate. Marriage can be performed only by persons licensed by the state and upon the payment of a fee legally prescribed. The child can be attended at his birth only by a midwife, nurse, or doctor licensed by the state; and the state assumes powers over the child in case of neglect or incompetence of the parents. In certain extreme cases it can take the child from its parents and raise it at public expense, farm it out, and permit its adoption by foster parents. At a tender age the state compels the child's attendance in school, prescribes the course of study, trains, licenses, and pays the teachers, provides the buildings where the instruction is given, chooses the textbooks the child may read, maintains a clinic to guard the child's health, and may even provide food, not to mention transportation to and from the school. It specifies and attempts to control the ideas in which the child may be reared and the essential loyalties with which he is to be endowed.

The state, like the church in an older day, influences what the individual may

or may not do, the amount he can earn, the profession he may follow. The range, number, and variety of rules by which the state shapes the economic activities of the individual are almost beyond enumeration. They include the kinds of vocational, professional, and cultural training offered in schools, the multiple systems of licensing, degrees, and examinations which determine competence for the earning of a living as a doctor, teacher, lawyer, engineer, or chauffeur—for one cannot even drive a car without an examination and a special license. The state licenses the butcher, baker, and candlestick maker; and the beggar must have his official tag before he can exhort the passer-by to remember the virtue of Christian charity. The state influences and limits what a man may earn by open and hidden systems of taxation, such as tariffs, quotas, income and consumers' taxes. It limits or encourages production, it grants patents, it controls prices, it prescribes the rate of interest, it withholds or grants credit, and it interferes in the commercial relations between men by prescribing forms of contracts and by forcing upon the banks specified policies intimately affecting the economic relations between men. It sets limits to the transfer of property from parents to children by inheritance taxes, fixes wages and hours of labor, directly or indirectly influences prices, prescribes the permissible in food distribution thus affecting the diet by a whole scheme of regulations governing the production, sale and distribution of foods and drugs.

So, too, in the social life of the individual, it sets limits to the permissible in styles and behavior by laws prescribing what is or is not decent; it censors movies, plays, and the printed word; it licenses public halls and amusement places; it watches over family relations, interferes between parents and children, and between man and wife; it attempts to con-

trol gambling, drinking, and extralegal sex relations. The universities have fallen to the state; so have the hospitals, infirmaries, orphan asylums, and homes for the aged. Even charity has become a function of the state on a large scale, and the poor, the weak, the halt, and the blind, once the concern of the church, have now become a special province for the exercise of those efficiencies and skills that come under the heading of a "Department of Public Welfare."

The state, too, like the church of old has become a patron of the arts; and public buildings are decorated, sometimes with surprising results, by artists hired at public expense. The state provides public concerts, supports the opera, and finances national, state, or city orchestras. In many places, the entire range of aesthetic and artistic education is in the hands of the state.

This cataloguing could go on indefinitely, for there is nothing in the life of man upon which the sovereign state does not lay a claim, or with which it does not in effect interfere. It is perfectly clear that what the church took for its province in the past the state has now taken for its own; and modern means of communication and control have probably increased the "efficiency" and minuteness of the state's interferences.

But these supervisory and all-embracing claims upon man have been, and in places still are, exercised by the family, where the family is powerful enough. When conditions have been propitious, the family, as in China, in certain parts of Brazil, in Scotland, or even in Kentucky, has had an inclusive influence in shaping the destiny of the individual. The powerful family, as we know it, in a hundred different places and at different times has claimed for itself a complete control of the individual. Such a family is always large, possessed of innumerable relatives, associates, and dependents.

Through intermarriage the family name is spread over an entire province, and there are none who dispute it in its own territory. If the state is strong enough to name a governor for the province, he is always a member of the family. The local militia is in the hands of the family, the judge is a relative, and the tax gatherer, if he dare show his face, closely related. All of the economic activity of the region is in the family's hands. The priest is some promising and likely son purposely trained to fill that post to the family's great honor. The church is built on family ground, at family expense, and the priest receives his stipend at the family's hands. The stranger is an outsider, an itinerant soul who lives in the area or passes through the family's domain by special sufferance. The law, justice, order, and social disciplines are within the hands of the family, and younger children are sent to school, married, put to vocations, and allotted their places as a matter of course. The more distant relatives and retainers find their role within the pattern and accept it as part of the immutable rule of life itself. In innumerable instances, in many parts of the world, membership in such a family was all the honor a man needed, and it exacted and received a devotion as great as that ever received by church or state. There was a time, and not so very long ago, when one would rather be a member of one of the great Scottish clans—a Douglas, for instance—than a native of Scotland itself. Just as the church and state have at different times encompassed the individual from cradle to the grave, and prescribed his spiritual as well as his material destiny, so the family, too, in its turn has played the same historical role.

These perennial institutions, structured about the incommensurable experiences of man, all in their turn claim him as their own. He is a member of each of

them and cannot escape them. The very content of life is found within their framework, and their claim upon it is in each case a total claim. Quite without deliberate intent, these institutions in turn, in the unplanned insistence to fulfill the need represented by the unique experience around which they are structured, tend to embrace all of the life of man. They compete not merely for his loyalty, but also for the exercise of the innumerable responsibilities and functions, and the satisfaction of the innumerable needs and aspirations that the life of man generates in a living world. The difficulty lies in the fact that the field, though it be complex, is limited, and that whatever one institution performs, and takes upon itself to perform, is at the expense of another. When the state takes over the educational system, it takes it away from the church; and when it takes upon itself the right to compel the schooling of the children, it takes the power of decision away from the family. What is true of education is true of marriage, what is true of sumptuary rules is true of the care of the young and the old. Every time the state assumes a new responsibility previously exercised by another institution, it is at the expense of that other institution in a material as well as a spiritual sense. As the state grows strong, the church and the family grow relatively weak; and as the church or family is strong, the other institutions are relatively weak.

These institutions, all at the service of man, are competitive with each other, and the conflict between them is, in fact, irremediable. Institutional friction and instability are, therefore, the normal state of society, and the hope of peace and quietude is an idle dream. Competition, imbalance, and friction are not merely continuous phenomena in society, but in fact are evidences of vitality and "normality." They reveal a healthy competi-

tive institutional relationship in which no one is permitted completely to dominate the scene; for, in the circumstances, the peace represented by the dominion of one institution over all of the others is unhealthy; it is evidence of lack of resilience on the part of the other institutions and is a sure sign of a spreading tyranny. The formal peace represented by the power of one institution over all of the others is synonymous with death. It is no accident that Hitler undermined the family and the church, and stripped them of all those functions that described them as family or church. It is no accident, because tyranny is the child of the preponderance of one institution over all of the others. Complete suppression and destruction of the other institutions have never occurred, and, in the nature of the case, cannot occur, for the experiences these institutions represent are both irreducible and incommensurable. But if these institutions cannot be completely suppressed, there is ample historical evidence that one or another can be so weakened that resulting imbalance manifests itself as tyranny, and ends—as it always has—in violence, convulsion, revolution, and, in the current scene, in war between nations. The weakening of the other institutions normal to a healthy society seems to be accompanied by a series of political passions and moral perversions that distort the simple values consistent with a balanced social order, and the consequent disorder seems to become all-embracing.

But if instability, competition, and friction between the institutions are inevitable and continuous, what happens to the theory of progress? It is evident that the state progresses at the expense of the church and the family, the church at the expense of the state and the family, and the family at the expense of the other two institutions here under consideration. There is no way in which all

of the institutions can grow—that is, increase the range of their activities and influences—at the same time. The contemporary “progress” of the state and its increasing absorption of the activities and the functions of the other institutions natural to man and society are steadily reducing the role of these other institutions in society.

What is now said about the state could in times past have been said about either the church or the family. The balance between these institutions is always uneasy and always changing. Social “progress” as an all-embracing concept becomes a snare and a delusion. The easy self-delusion men indulge in—the happy tendency to assume that what men do now is better than what they did before, that contemporary slogans have some peculiar excellencies in them denied to slogans of yesteryear—makes it almost impossible for men whose heads have been filled from childhood with the gospel of “progress” to face the possibility that the “progress” they are making is at the expense of other institutions equally important to social well-being, and equally dear to the hearts of men.

The difficulty lies even deeper than this: it lies in the fact that for many generations men have assumed that “progress” is linear, is always going up, and is in its very nature all-inclusive and endless in time. It is another instance of the taking over of a seemingly acceptable description of what seems to occur in the sciences—the progressive accumulation of knowledge, skills, and insight into the ways of nature, and the cumulative competence to do better today the task done yesterday. The increasing effectiveness of weapons of war from the wooden club through the bow and arrow, the pike, the gun, the cannon, the machine gun, and the atomic bomb, each more efficient and more destructive, up to a

point where the use of the atomic bomb might "progress" the very race of men from the face of the earth can be spoken of as linear progress in an endless chain toward infinite success. So too, perhaps, it can be said of the course of invention in transportation, where men began on foot, tamed and mounted a beast of burden, invented a wheel and constructed a carriage, a bicycle, an automobile, and more recently an airplane, each in turn increasing the distance he could span and reducing the time required to span it, until contemporary speeds are such that there is a possibility that a projectile hurled into space will travel with such speed that it will have reached its destination in a time span so small that its arrival and departure will seem simultaneous. This, too, may perhaps be described as linear progress, infinitely cumulative. The natural and comprehensible carrying over of these notions has obscured the issue that, material changes apart, institutional growth occurs only in a competitive institutional setting, and takes place only at the expense of other equally important social institutions. The concept, if it is to be used at all—and, in the Western world it would seem almost impossible not to use it—can only be made to mean movement toward equilibrium among social institutions. If each of the basic institutions is structured about an essential and noncommensurable experience, then the good life is possible only in a world where men can live at peace within all of the institutions organic to society, and progress could then come to mean progress in the method of reducing the area of imbalance that is always present. Though perfect equilibrium is not achievable, a working equilibrium is possible; and attainment of that might well be considered the great task of statesmanship, the true purpose of government, and the major problem of political theory and social ethics.

If the idea of progress becomes subject to profound modifications in the light of the irreducible friction between the basic social institutions, the nature of the role of property, so closely identified with the idea of social progress, is similarly subject to reconsideration. When the church is strong and growing stronger, then it accumulates, and has to accumulate, an increasing share of the wealth and income of the community. The building of churches, monasteries, hospitals, universities, orphanages, and homes for the aged, their support and their staffing, and the hundred other obligations and functions which naturally fall to the church, when the church is a great and growing institution, call of necessity for a cumulative control of the available capital and income of the community. When the state grows powerful, it proceeds to absorb an increasing share of the property and takes it away from the other institutions. It takes it away from the church—by force if necessary—by diverting income from church sources, by syphoning off, through licensing and other means, of income that might and would have gone to the church, and finally, it acquires it from the family, by taxation in a thousand ways—from a tax on cigarettes to inheritance taxes. If the state is going to support the schools, universities, hospitals, orphanages, old-age pensions, and many other activities, it can do it only by securing for itself an increasing proportion of both the property and the income of the community. There is, in fact, no alternative to the process except not to assume such multiple responsibilities.

This process is, of course, also visible in the history of the family. Where the family is powerful and preponderant, it is rich and holds for itself all of the property that it can. There is seldom such a thing as a powerful and poor family. Power goes with responsibility,

and responsibility with the exercise of infinitely variable functions; and that rule is conditioned by the possession of property and income. Property is instrumental to the institution. It is not a thing in itself. But if the major historical role of property is instrumental to the institution, then the economic interpretation of history, the theory of the class struggle, and the concept of dialectical materialism are all subject to reconsideration.

The continuous technological changes are important in their bearing upon the relative role of the various institutions, facilitating their growth or decline. While technology is not the only course of social change in the sense of enhancing the powers of growth of one institution against another—as, for instance, communication has clearly facilitated the growth of the power of the modern state—it is still a very important source of such change. To that extent, at least, it would seem true to say that a changing technology, leading to a changing position of the institutions in regard to each other, also affects the transfer of property from one institution to another; for the exercise of responsibility involves the accumulation of property, and the accumulation of property facilitates the increasing exercise of responsibility. This is, however, a very different thing from saying that a changing technology induces a changing class structure and a new kind of class struggle.

The very idea of the class struggle is subject to revision; for the concept is a verbal formula derived from older ideas inherent in European theology and has nothing to do with the description of industrial society, though it may have some reference to a more static agricultural community. It is a verbal construct fitting a preconceived notion of the nature of "progress," and has within it the commitment to historical inevitability.

It is really a part of European theology translated into mundane terms.

If the idea of a horizontal division of society into classes is an inadequate description of social conflict, this does not deny that conflict exists both between the institutions and within them. Between the institutions the conflict is moral, psychological, and political, for the guidance and governance of the whole man. Internally, within the institutions there is a many-sided contention which might be considered a conflict of numerous interests. But these conflicts are continuous and irreducible. There is the difference in the family between the old and the young, the well and the sick, the children and the parents, and the strife embraces all of the issues that life presents. Nor is there any way of writing finis to this internal strain. In the church the laity and the clergy, the upper hierarchy and the parish priesthood, and the different orders of the church as well are continuously warring with each other. Here again the conflict is philosophical, moral and political, and not merely economic. There is always the question of how much and what kind of responsibility different individuals and groups within the institution should exercise, and on what moral ground their power can be justified.

What is true of the family and the church is also evident within the state. The citizens are critical of the government, oppose its tax policies, resent conscription, and flout price control. The friction between the citizens and the state is continuous. Within the government itself, the civil servants are resentful of the elected officials, the younger bureaucrats condemn the older ones, and departments compete for power, for an increasing share of the budget, and for public influence. No department ever feels that it can fulfill its proper task with the money and personnel available to it. But

the conflict here is not merely economic. It is also moral, political, and ideological. Strife is within the institutions, but it is in the nature of a family quarrel.

Revolution is therefore the result of the excessive power of one institution. In a well-balanced society, where the institutions keep each other in check, man lives in comparative peace. His great problems are relative, his conflicts are over details, and the opponents live together as friends, belong to the same club, go to the same church, and marry into the same families. But as soon as one of the institutions, be it the state, the church, the family or the economy, becomes so strong as seemingly to threaten the very survival of the others, then the issues cease to be petty, capable of compromise, and the arguments become preludes to civil wars and revolutions. The contentions between the partisans of one or another institution take on an ideological character, the contrasts between them seem absolute, and the petty quarrels become symbolic of the greater conflict. People begin to talk as if the end were in sight, as if doom were awaiting them at the next turn, and hope of peace—the older peace—fades, and with it tolerance, gentleness, and human sympathy. Life ceases to seem important or to have any special value. The cause, whatever it may be, or whatever its name, takes precedence over all else, and men make ready for death—either their own or that of their enemies—as if the earth were not sufficiently broad to contain them both.

Civil war and revolution come almost as a relief, for now it seems that the issues will be finally settled, for all time. In that situation there is no compromise, and rebellion, revolution, and civil war are a logical, inevitable, and supposedly necessary consequence of the claims to absolutism in the name of one of these

institutional interests. Some sort of equilibrium is ultimately re-established among the various forces at play, and life can go on again in a normal way—with petty quarrels over immediate issues, and nothing seems so profoundly tragic as to require the destruction of those who disagree with you.

It is, of course, true that all of the institutions have this germ of over-all sovereignty in them; but, if the opposition is effective, then society can live on indefinitely in peaceful friction, in a world which seems to be going nowhere, and which seems to have no all-dominant philosophy or faith, no impassioned ideal that drives it beyond human reason and beyond human frailty, and gives some of its leaders the assumption of acting like gods, of acting for eternity, of being moved by voices and intuition to compel men to accept the new faith in the state or the church or the economy at any cost, at any sacrifice.

The road to social peace is the balance of the social institutions, and a wise statesman would strengthen those institutions that seemed to be losing ground, even if he were not addicted to them; for the only way to peace in this world of fallible human nature is to keep all human institutions relatively strong, but none too strong, relatively weak, but not so weak as to despair of their survival. It is thus only that peaceful irritation and strife, so essential to social and individual sanity, can be maintained.

For this purpose democracy is the natural vehicle, for it is essentially a process rather than a doctrine. It is a way of evaluating human experience and bringing it to bear upon the issues at hand. The sense of meaning and insight each man's life represents reflects a unique view of the universe. The sum of these views becomes the source determining government policy. The fact that the individual experiences are frequently con-

tradictory and their sense of meaning incompatible with that derived from other experiences gives the democratic process its proper role. The process is, in fact, the patterning together of all the contradictions of life's experience, and by trial and error discovering what meaning and direction the basic conflict reveals. The government is, therefore, the funnel for all of these values, that is, the sense of direction implicit in the total social experience. The lack of certainty that may be revealed is but an evidence of the inner contradictions, and the changing policy resulting from changing experience is both the necessary and essential method of democracy. The chief function of government is to help keep the balance. At best, it would be a neutral instrumentality representing all of the institutions and their total impact upon society. It would effectuate a daily compromise between them.

Society, however, is not merely composed of a number of separate institutions in constant conflict with each other. It also consists of men who are members of all of these institutions, each of whom reflects in his character, beliefs, and ambitions the variable imprint that life's experience has given him. He does not merely live in a number of institutions, he really lives in a society made up of these institutions. But the institutions themselves contain innumerable groups

and individuals whose experience is variable, whose needs are private, and whose ends are particular. Society is, therefore, the framework for all their effort, and they, each in turn, seek to mold the social structure to their private, group, or institutional ends. The individual, the group, or the institution may be assertive and purposeful, but society is neither one nor the other. It is the sum of all the past and present forces at play, of the ambitions in operation, of all the movements in conflict. Society is the recipient as well as the mold, but the mold gives the content a sort of inner cohesion. It is not just a vacuum. It contains the residue of all the past experience. This residue is the ethos, and every society has a distinguishable ethos of its own. Society is, therefore, not something formless, rootless and uncrystallized, or just put together of a number of institutions. On the contrary, while it has no purpose or direction of itself, it does have a content derived from the past labors of uncounted human strivings, of hopes achieved, and of failures. This content, this ethos, becomes the frame for the present and future activities of all its members, all its groups, all its institutions; for, without attempting to define the ethos of the time, it does in its turn define the objectives and gives direction to the will and labors of all the men and institutions composing the society.

Man as a Product of Culture

Ruth Benedict as Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University was also a psychologist, sociologist, and philosopher. Dr. Benedict actively tried to apply the results of her scientific investigations to politics; she made an integrated approach to human behavior. The selection which follows should demonstrate that everyone lives in a certain cultural pattern, that this pattern not only strongly influences his behavior but differentiates him from others. One aspect of society in general which relates to politics is then the diversity of ways in which men live. The reader should try to view himself objectively as a product of a particular environment and to remind himself that his view of life is only *one* view. It is an error to generalize the values of one's own culture to the point where one judges all other human beings in terms of those values. There is no suggestion in Dr. Benedict's essay that environment is the only factor shaping behavior or that we cannot change what we do or are because we have little control over environment. How does culture breed ideas? How does culture generate political conflict?

No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his philosophical probings he cannot go behind these stereotypes; his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to his particular traditional customs. John Dewey has said in all seriousness that the part played by custom in shaping the behavior of the individual as over against any way in which he can affect traditional custom, is as the proportion of the total vocabulary of his mother tongue over against those words of his own baby talk that are taken up into the vernacular of his family. When one seriously studies social orders that have had the opportunity to develop autonomously, the figure becomes no more than an exact and matter-of-fact observation. The life history of the individual is first and foremost an accommodation to the patterns and

standards traditionally handed down in his community. From the moment of his birth the customs into which he is born shape his experience and behavior. By the time he can talk, he is the little creature of his culture, and by the time he is grown and able to take part in its activities, its habits are his habits, its beliefs his beliefs, its impossibilities his impossibilities. Every child that is born into his group will share them with him, and no child born into one on the opposite side of the globe can ever achieve the thousandth part. There is no social problem it is more incumbent upon us to understand than this of the rôle of custom. Until we are intelligent as to its laws and varieties, the main complicating facts of human life must remain unintelligible.

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We are quite willing to admit now that the revolution of the earth about the sun,

or the animal ancestry of man, has next to nothing to do with the uniqueness of our human achievements. If we inhabit one chance planet out of myriad solar systems, so much the greater glory, and if all the ill-assorted human races are linked by evolution with the animal, the provable differences between ourselves and them are the more extreme and the uniqueness of our institutions the more remarkable. But *our* achievements, *our* institutions are unique; they are of a different order from those of lesser races and must be protected at all costs. So that today, whether it is a question of imperialism or of race prejudice, or of a comparison between Christianity and paganism, we are still preoccupied with the uniqueness, not of the human institutions of the world at large, which no one has ever cared about anyway, but of our own institutions and achievements, our own civilization.

Western civilization, because of fortuitous historical circumstances, has spread itself more widely than any other local group that has so far been known. It has standardized itself over most of the globe, and we have been led, therefore, to accept a belief in the uniformity of human behavior that under other circumstances would not have arisen. Even very primitive peoples are sometimes far more conscious of the rôle of cultural traits than we are, and for good reason. They have had intimate experience of different cultures. They have seen their religion, their economic system, their marriage prohibitions, go down before the white man's. They have laid down the one and accepted the other, often uncomprehendingly enough, but they are quite clear that there are variant arrangements of human life. They will sometimes attribute dominant characteristics of the white man to his commercial competition, or to his institution of warfare, very much in the fashion of the anthropologist.

The white man has had a different experience. He has never seen an outsider, perhaps, unless the outsider has been already Europeanized. If he has traveled, he has very likely been around the world without ever staying outside a cosmopolitan hotel. He knows little of any ways of life but his own. The uniformity of custom, of outlook, that he sees spread about him seems convincing enough and conceals from him the fact that it is after all an historical accident. He accepts without more ado the equivalence of human nature and his own culture standards.

Yet the great spread of white civilization is not an isolated historical circumstance. The Polynesian group, in comparatively recent times, has spread itself from Ontong, Java, to Easter Island, from Hawaii to New Zealand, and the Bantu-speaking tribes spread from the Sahara to southern Africa. But in neither case do we regard these peoples as more than an overgrown local variation of the human species. Western civilization has had all its inventions in transportation and all its far-flung commercial arrangements to back up its great dispersion, and it is easy to understand historically how this came about.

The psychological consequences of this spread of white culture have been out of all proportion to the materialistic. This world-wide cultural diffusion has protected us as man has never been protected before from having to take seriously the civilizations of other peoples; it has given to our culture a massive universality that we have long ceased to account for historically, and which we read off rather as necessary and inevitable. We interpret our dependence, in our civilization, upon economic competition, as proof that this is the prime motivation that human nature can rely upon, or we read off the behavior of small children as it is molded in our civilization and recorded in child clinics, as child psychology or the way in which

the young human animal is bound to behave. It is the same whether it is a question of our ethics or of our family organization. It is the inevitability of each familiar motivation that we defend, attempting always to identify our own local ways of behaving with Behavior, or our own socialized habits with Human Nature.

Now modern man has made this thesis one of the living issues in his thought and in his practical behavior, but the sources of it go far back into what appears to be, from its universal distribution among primitive peoples, one of the earliest of human distinctions, the difference in kind between "my own" closed group and the outsider. All primitive tribes agree in recognizing this category of the outsiders, those who are not only outside the provisions of the moral code which holds within the limits of one's own people, but who are summarily denied a place anywhere in the human scheme. A great number of the tribal names in common use, Zuni, Déné, Kiowa, and the rest, are names by which primitive peoples know themselves, and are only their native terms for "the human beings," that is, themselves. Outside of the closed group there are no human beings. And this is in spite of the fact that from an objective point of view each tribe is surrounded by peoples sharing in its arts and material inventions, in elaborate practices that have grown up by a mutual give-and-take of behavior from one people to another.

Primitive man never looked out over the world and saw "mankind" as a group and felt his common cause with his species. From the beginning he was a provincial who raised the barriers high. Whether it was a question of choosing a wife or of taking a head, the first and important distinction was between his own human group and those beyond the pale. His own group, and all its ways of behaving, was unique.

So modern man, differentiating into Chosen People and dangerous aliens, groups within his own civilization genetically and culturally related to one another as any tribes in the Australian bush are among themselves, has the justification of a vast historical continuity behind his attitude. The Pygmies have made the same claims. We are not likely to clear ourselves easily of so fundamental a human trait, but we can at least learn to recognize its history and its hydra manifestations.

One of these manifestations, and one which is often spoken of as primary and motivated rather by religious emotions than by this more generalized provincialism, is the attitude that has universally held in Western civilizations so long as religion remained a living issue among them. The distinction between any closed group and outside peoples becomes in terms of religion that between the true believers and the heathen. Between these two categories for thousands of years there were no common meeting-points. No ideas or institutions that held in the one were valid in the other. Rather all institutions were seen in opposing terms according as they belonged to one or the other of the very often slightly differentiated religions: on the one side it was a question of Divine Truth and the true believer, of revelation and of God; on the other it was a matter of mortal error, of fables, of the damned and of devils. There could be no question of equating the attitudes of the opposed groups and hence no question of understanding from objectively studied data the nature of this important human trait, religion.

We feel a justified superiority when we read a description such as this of the standard religious attitude. At least we have thrown off that particular absurdity, and we have accepted the study of comparative religion. But considering the scope a similar attitude has had in our civilization in the form of race prejudices, for

example, we are justified in a little skepticism as to whether our sophistication in the matter of religion is due to the fact that we have outgrown naïve childishness, or simply to the fact that religion is no longer the area of life in which the important modern battles are staged. In the really live issues of our civilization we seem to be far from having gained the detachment that we have so largely achieved in the field of religion.

There is another circumstance that has made the serious study of custom a late and often a half-heartedly pursued discipline, and it is a difficulty harder to surmount than those of which we have just spoken. Custom did not challenge the attention of social theorists because it was the very stuff of their own thinking: it was the lens without which they could not see at all. Precisely in proportion as it was fundamental, it had its existence outside the field of conscious attention. There is nothing mystical about this blindness. When a student has assembled the vast data for a study of international credits, or of the process of learning, or of narcissism as a factor in psychoneuroses, it is through and in this body of data that the economist or the psychologist or the psychiatrist operates. He does not reckon with the fact of other social arrangements where all the factors, it may be, are differently arranged. He does not reckon, that is, with cultural conditioning. He sees the trait he is studying as having known and inevitable manifestations, and he projects these as absolute because they are all the materials he has to think with. He identifies local attitudes of the 1930's with Human Nature, the description of them with Economics or Psychology.

Practically, it often does not matter. Our children must be educated in our pedagogical tradition, and the study of the process of learning in our schools is of paramount importance. There is the same kind of justification for the shrug

of the shoulders with which we often greet a discussion of other economic systems. After all, we must live within the framework of mine and thine that our own culture institutionalizes.

That is true, and the fact that the varieties of culture can best be discussed as they exist in space give color to our nonchalance. But it is only limitation of historical material that prevents examples from being drawn rather from the succession of cultures in time. That succession we cannot escape if we would, and when we look back even a generation we realize the extent to which revision has taken place, sometimes in our most intimate behavior. So far these revisions have been blind, the result of circumstances we can chart only in retrospect. Except for our unwillingness to face cultural change in intimate matters until it is forced upon us, it would not be impossible to take a more intelligent and directive attitude. The resistance is in large measure a result of our misunderstanding of cultural conventions, and especially an exaltation of those that happen to belong to our nation and decade. A very little acquaintance with other conventions, and a knowledge of how various these may be, would do much to promote a rational social order.

The study of different cultures has another important bearing upon present-day thought and behavior. Modern existence has thrown many civilizations into close contact, and at the moment the overwhelming response to this situation is nationalism and racial snobbery. There has never been a time when civilization stood more in need of individuals who are genuinely culture-conscious, who can see objectively the socially conditioned behavior of other peoples without fear and recrimination.

Contempt for the alien is not the only possible solution of our present contact of races and nationalities. It is not even a scientifically founded solution. Tradi-

tionally Anglo-Saxon intolerance is a local and temporal culture-trait like any other. Even people as nearly of the same blood and culture as the Spanish have not had it, and race prejudice in the Spanish-settled countries is a thoroughly different thing from that in countries dominated by England and the United States. In this country it is obviously not an intolerance directed against the mixture of blood of biologically far-separated races, for upon occasion excitement mounts as high against the Irish Catholic in Boston, or the Italian in New England mill towns, as against the Oriental in California. It is the old distinction of the in-group and the out-group, and if we carry on the primitive tradition in this matter, we have far less excuse than savage tribes. We have traveled, we pride ourselves on our sophistication. But we have failed to understand the relativity of cultural habits, and we remain debarred from much profit and enjoyment in our human relations with peoples of different standards, and untrustworthy in our dealings with them.

The recognition of the cultural basis of race prejudice is a desperate need in present Western civilization. We have come to the point where we entertain race prejudice against our blood brothers the Irish, and where Norway and Sweden speak of their enmity as if they too represented different blood. The so-called race line, during a war in which France and Germany fight on opposite sides, is held to divide the people of Baden from those of Alsace, though in bodily form they alike belong to the Alpine subrace. In a day of footloose movements of people and of mixed marriages in the ancestry of the most desirable elements of the community, we preach unabashed the gospel of the pure race.

To this anthropology makes two answers. The first is as to the nature of culture, and the second is as to the nature of inheritance. The answer as to the na-

ture of culture takes us back to prehuman societies. There are societies where Nature perpetuates the slightest mode of behavior by biological mechanisms, but these are societies not of men but of the social insects. The queen ant, removed to a solitary nest, will reproduce each trait of sex behavior, each detail of the nest. The social insects represent Nature in a mood when she was taking no chances. The pattern of the entire social structure she committed to the ant's instinctive behavior. There is no greater chance that the social classes of an ant society, or its patterns of agriculture, will be lost by an ant's isolation from its group than that the ant will fail to reproduce the shape of its antennæ or the structure of its abdomen.

For better or for worse, man's solution lies at the opposite pole. Not one item of historical social organization, of his language, of his local religion, is carried in his germ cell. In Europe, in other centuries, when children were occasionally found who had been abandoned and had maintained themselves in forests apart from other human beings, they were all so much alike that Linnæus classified them as a distinct species, *Homo ferus*, and supposed that they were a kind of gnome that man seldom ran across. He could not conceive that these half-witted brutes were born human, these creatures with no interest in what went on about them, rocking themselves rhythmically back and forth like some wild animal in a zoo, with organs of speech and hearing that could hardly be trained to do service, who withstood freezing weather in rags and plucked potatoes out of boiling water without discomfort. There is no doubt, of course, that they were children abandoned in infancy, and what they had all of them lacked was association with their kind, through which alone man's faculties are sharpened and given form.

We do not come across wild children

in our more humane civilization. But the point is made as clearly in any case of adoption of an infant into another race and culture. An Oriental child adopted by an Occidental family learns English, shows toward its foster parents the attitudes current among the children he plays with, and grows up to the same professions that they elect. He learns the entire set of the cultural traits of the adopted society, and the set of his real parents' group plays no part. The same process happens on a grand scale when entire peoples in a couple of generations shake off their traditional culture and put on the customs of an alien group. The culture of the American Negro in northern cities has come to approximate in detail that of the whites in the same cities. A few years ago, when a cultural survey was made of Harlem, one of the traits peculiar to the Negroes was their fashion of gambling on the last three unit figures of the next day's stock turnover. At least it cost less than the whites' corresponding predilection for gambling in the stocks themselves and was no less uncertain and exciting. It was a variation on the white pattern, though hardly a great departure. And most Harlem traits keep still closer to the forms that are current in white groups.

All over the world, since the beginning of human history, it can be shown that peoples have been able to adopt the culture of peoples of another blood. There is nothing in the biological structure of man that makes it even difficult. Man is not committed in detail by his biological constitution to any particular variety of behavior. The great diversity of social solutions that man has worked out in different cultures in regard to mating, for example, or trade, are all equally possible on the basis of his original endowment. Culture is not a biologically transmitted complex.

What is lost in Nature's guaranty of safety is made up in the advantage of

greater plasticity. The human animal does not, like the bear, grow himself a polar coat in order to adapt himself, after many generations, to the Arctic. He learns to sew himself a coat and put up a snow house. From all we can learn of the history of intelligence in prehuman as well as human societies, this plasticity has been the soil in which human progress began and in which it has maintained itself. In the ages of the mammoths, species after species without plasticity arose, overreached itself, and died out, undone by the development of the very traits it had biologically produced in order to cope with its environment. The beasts of prey and finally the higher apes came slowly to rely upon other than biological adaptations, and upon the consequent increased plasticity the foundations were laid, bit by bit, for the development of intelligence. Perhaps, as is often suggested, man will destroy himself by this very development of intelligence. But no one has suggested any means by which we can return to the biological mechanisms of the social insect, and we are left no alternative. The human cultural heritage, for better or for worse, is not biologically transmitted.

The corollary in modern politics is that there is no basis for the argument that we can trust our spiritual and cultural achievements to any selected hereditary germ plasms. In our Western civilization, leadership has passed successively in different periods to the Semitic-speaking peoples, to the Hamitic, to the Mediterranean subgroup of the white race, and lately to the Nordic. There is no doubt about the cultural continuity of the civilization, no matter who its carriers were at the moment. We must accept all the implications of our human inheritance, one of the most important of which the small scope of biologically transmitted behavior, and the enormous rôle of the cultural process of the transmission of tradition.

The second answer anthropology makes

to the argument of the racial purist concerns the nature of heredity. The racial purist is the victim of a mythology. For what is "racial inheritance"? We know roughly what heredity is from father to son. Within a family line the importance of heredity is tremendous. But heredity is an affair of family lines. Beyond that it is mythology. In small and static communities like an isolated Eskimo village, "racial" heredity and the heredity of child and parent are practically equivalent, and racial heredity therefore has meaning. But as a concept applied to groups distributed over a wide area, let us say, to Nordics, it has no basis in reality. In the first place, in all Nordic nations there are family lines which are represented also in Alpine or Mediterranean communities. Any analysis of the physical make-up of a European population shows overlapping: the dark-eyed, dark-haired Swede represents family lines that are more concentrated farther south, but he is to be understood in relation to what we know of these latter groups. His heredity, so far as it has any physical reality, is a matter of his family

line, which is not confined to Sweden. We do not know how far physical types may vary without intermixture. We know that inbreeding brings about a local type. But this is a situation that in our cosmopolitan white civilization hardly exists, and when "racial heredity" is invoked, as it usually is, to rally a group of persons of about the same economic status, graduating from much the same schools, and reading the same weeklies, such a category is merely another version of the in- and the out-group and does not refer to the actual biological homogeneity of the group.

What really binds men together is their culture—the ideas and the standards they have in common. If instead of selecting a symbol like common blood heredity and making a slogan of it, the nation turned its attention rather to the culture that unites its people, emphasizing its major merits and recognizing the different values which may develop in a different culture, it would substitute realistic thinking for a kind of symbolism which is dangerous because it is misleading.

The Social Background of Recent Political Changes

Sir Ernest Barker is one of England's most celebrated literary figures. He is a distinguished historian and political scientist whose original writings and editing of the great philosophical and political classics are known the world over. His translation and commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* are hailed by many as the definitive effort. Sir Ernest sets forth below the kinds of social phenomena for which one must look if he wants a reasonably complete explanation of political behavior. The reader should bear in mind that the factors stressed by the author are only part of the story. It is not necessary—indeed it would be dangerous—to say social conditions are the sole or even the most important causation in politics. Much will depend on whether one is searching for useful generalizations or analyzing a specific situation at a specific time.

It is not necessarily Marxianism to interpret political changes in the light of social factors. What is peculiar to Marxianism is the tendency to interpret political changes in no other light. As long ago as Aristotle, we find political forms and political changes ascribed to social causes. Speaking of political forms, Aristotle notes that:

Oligarchy exists when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy in the opposite case, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers.

Speaking of political changes, or, as he calls them, revolutions, he notes particularly the changes or revolutions which come from the increase, or the decrease, of one of the social factors in the State:

A State has many parts, of which some one may grow imperceptibly . . . revolutions arise from this cause in democracies as well as in other forms of government.

If we follow Aristotle in seeking to explain political changes, we shall thus take into

account, of course among other causes, the cause which is to be found in these imperceptible growths of social factors, and in the subsequent shifting of what may be called the social balance. The same lesson was taught, still more imperatively, by one of our English political thinkers in the seventeenth century. James Harrington, in the introduction to his *Oceana* of 1656, which he dedicated to Cromwell, laid down the principle: "As is the proportion or balance of Dominion, or property in land, so is the nature of the Empire." Confining his attention to land, the great and visible form of wealth in his day and generation, he argued that the Crown was now impoverished, the middle classes were wealthy, and a commonwealth or republic must therefore take the place of monarchy. "Let the King come in," he prophesied (according to a story told by Aubrey) on the eve of the Restoration, "and call a parliament of the greatest cavaliers in England, so they be men of estates, and let them sit but seven

From "The Social Background of Recent Political Changes," by Ernest Barker, *Sociological Review*, April, 1936.

years, they will all turn Commonwealth's men." It would take a good deal of argument to decide how far Harrington was right, and how far he was wrong, in this prophecy. There was certainly a Whig party established by 1675, and there was certainly a Whig Revolution in 1688. On the other hand there was a contemporary of James Harrington who also based his philosophy on the middle classes, and who reached what seems to be a diametrically opposite conclusion. This was Thomas Hobbes. He argued that what the middle classes wanted, *sua si bona norint*—if only they knew their own interests—was a good strong government which policed their property. He put that argument definitely in an appeal to the middle classes—perhaps it would better be called a definite scolding of the middle classes; and it is not a bad answer to Harrington.

If we sought to argue on the most modern and up-to-date terms, we might substitute Pareto for Aristotle and Harrington, and talk about "the circulation of elites" as the true social background of political change. Perhaps it is better to argue in nobody's terminology, but to begin by defining the terms which we are using ourselves. On that basis we must notice the width of meaning of the term "social background." Instinctively, and at the first blush, we interpret that term in reference to the distribution of property, the system of classes determined (or mainly determined) by that distribution, and the social balance between the different factors in that system. This is the interpretation followed, in different ways, by Aristotle and Harrington, as it is also followed, in his own peculiar way, by the Marxian. But there is also a larger interpretation of the idea of social background, which befits the sociologist, and indeed must necessarily be followed by the sociologist. On that interpretation we shall include in the social background of political changes not only the distribution of

property, the system of classes, and the the shifting of the balance of classes, but a number of other factors. In the first place, we shall include the mere size and mass of population—in itself, and regardless of the particular way in which it is distributed in different classes. The mere number of the population is in itself a social factor of the first magnitude. A vastly increased population, such as the nineteenth century produced, will ultimately entail problems of political organization which involve changes of political method—new forms, for example, of party machinery, to manipulate the new numbers: new forms of the general drill and discipline of life, to regulate the new movement of great crowds along its routes. The factor of population, in all its ramifications, not only internal but also external, and in its bearing on emigration and general expansion, is one of the greatest factors in the social background of political change. There are other factors which have also to be counted. There is, for example, the increase and the speeding of communications—both physical communication by new methods of transport, and mental communication by telegraph, telephone, and wireless. These things affect and alter the pace of politics; and an alteration of the pace of politics is already a political change, which may bring other changes in its train. Again, the alteration of the family may produce alterations in the State. If the family becomes less of a solid unit, and less responsible for its members, the State will be charged with greater responsibilities and become more of a paternal authority. It is not always the encroachment of the State which diminishes the area of the family; the reverse may be the case, and the shrinkage of the family may involve the increase of the State. Similarly, the development of education, in itself a form of social change and an alteration of the social background, may involve political consequences and

changes. If, for example, there is a large resort to the Universities, and if the result is the production of an unemployed intelligentsia, or of an intelligentsia not employed in the ways and on the standards which its members feel entitled to expect, there will arise a new social factor which is particularly likely to make political demands and to precipitate political changes.

Before we turn to examine the political effects of the social background in this broader and more general sense, we may pause to inquire whether we can trace, behind any of the recent political changes in Europe, social causes of that more specific character which we associate with the conception of class. "Class" is a dangerous word. There is hardly any community which can show a definite system of classes, or even anything approaching such a system. Occupations and professions are definite things, but class is a term of rhetoric rather than a term of art. When we speak of class-feelings and class-movements, we are postulating a unit, and a unity of that unit, which reality seldom warrants. Even the working class, which is most definitely a class, is a collection of different feelings and different movements; and when we turn to the middle class, or the middle classes, we are turning to something which is even more indefinite. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which we say that Fascism and National Socialism are movements of the middle class, including in that term partly the members of the professions and those who expect to enter the professions, partly the independent artisan and the shop-keeper, and partly the middle interests in the world of agriculture. It is difficult to test such a generalization in any scientific way. We should need, for that purpose, a social census of the membership of each party concerned; and even that would not give us sufficient data unless we could weigh, in some way, the relative influence

of the different sections. There was an occasion, about 1921, when the Secretary of the Fascist party in Italy gave an account of the social composition of one half of his party; and it is significant that the greater part of that half—some 90,000 out of a total of 150,000—could be classed as independent or professional. The origins and the careers of the leaders are another index. It is true that a victorious party, once in power, recruits all sorts of adherents, who follow the banner of success: it is also true that, once in power, it may adjust its policy to the exigencies of its new position, and incorporate plans and aims which do not belong to its own beginnings. That only makes it the more necessary to go back to the party beginnings in order to understand the social background from which it came and the social needs and desires which impelled it to seek political change. If we go back in that way to the origins of National Socialism, we shall find that, like Italian Fascism, it appealed to the middle interests of society, severely shaken and battered by the hurricanes of the currency, and barred from its hopes of professional advancement by a regime in which posts seemed destined wholly for another class. One of the original twenty-five points of the party programme demanded the creation and maintenance of a sound middle class, the socialization of the large stores and their rental at low cost to small traders, and special consideration for such traders in purchases made on behalf of the State. Another, addressed to the middle interest in agriculture, demanded land reform suitable to the national needs, the enactment of a law for the expropriation of land for social purposes, the abolition of rent on land, and the prevention of all kinds of speculation in land.

Why should there have been this insurgence of the middle classes in Germany and Italy? We are driven back on a simple cause—the convulsion of the war. The

war had shaken irreparably the position of the governing class, or perhaps we had better say the governing element, under the shelter of which the middle classes had gone their way and preserved their respectability and their self-respect. A new governing element had emerged, or threatened to emerge, from the ranks of the working classes who followed the creed of socialism. The new governing element imperiled their advancement in the service of the State—a service which bulks more largely on the Continent than it does with us in the prospect of a career; and in any case, it imperiled the maintenance of self-respect. A country which is ready to accept and respect a labor government must have gone a long way in the recognition of the principle that a man's a man for a' that. It must also have gone a long way in the recognition, and the practical application, of the principle that the permanent service of the State is divorced from all social favor, and is freely open to all capacity, irrespective of social convention. If this way has not been traveled, the imminence of a labor government will convey a double threat to the middle class—a threat to its self-respect and sense of personal dignity: a threat to its hope of advancement and prospects of a career. The insurgence of the middle classes is the answer to that double threat.

It is difficult to understand contemporary Italy and Germany without remembering Russia, and without reflecting on the different development of Russia. Russia supplied the bugbear which served to frighten millions into the fold of a warm and comfortable middle-class State. But why did Russia herself, under the impact of a similar cause—the convulsion of the war—follow a line of development so peculiar, and so different from that of other States? The answer is naturally found in the difference of the social background of Russia. An amorphous but

plastic society of little farming communities had long been shaped by a governing bureaucracy, with a large foreign element in its composition, and by a landed nobility. The system had been shaken by war in 1905; it was finally destroyed by war in 1917. What was to take its place? There was only one social element which offered itself. This was the element of industrial labor in the towns and factory settlements which had grown up in Russia during the latter half of the nineteenth century. There was no other social element of sufficient volume and strength—no middle element of the professions, or in the country-side, or in the world of trade and business, in which, from the eighteenth century onwards, a number of foreign interests, English among the rest, had always been mainly active. The element of industrial labor—a minority, but an active minority, with definite objects and a definite leadership—surged to the front. The amorphous but plastic society found a new control. The ideals of industrial labor became dominant; and the little farming communities were shaped into accordance with them.

If there were time and space, the analysis of the social background in terms of class, and of the effects of that background in producing political change, might be carried further. We might speak, for example, of the resurgence of the old peasant culture in the Danubian lands; of the development of peasant proprietorship, since the war, in large areas of those lands; and of the political consequences of that development in the States in which it has taken place. The terms of property and of class which belong to urbanized, industrialized, and commercialized communities are not proper to agricultural communities; and it is dangerous to import any common scheme into the interpretation of the varied face of Europe. But it is time to turn to those broader aspects of social life and the social back-

ground which still remain for our consideration. Beyond the play of property and class, there is also the play of other forces. There is the great population: there is the great change of communications; there is the stirring of society and the social process by a new diffusion of education. Can we trace the effects of these causes—these elements of our contemporary social background—in any of the political changes of our times?

One of the political portents of the present time—perhaps the greatest of them—is the magnification of party. When Bryce published his *Modern Democracies* in 1921 . . . , he was alarmed by the growth of parties and party-spirit, and anxious to find checks to their growth. The parties of our day are giants to what they were when he wrote. In Russia, Germany, and Italy, however much they may be divided otherwise, there is one common fundamental political fact. That fact is the integration of the State in a party, the domination of the State by a party—a single party; a party of a closed membership, though the membership may run to two or three millions; a party which gives its members a special status, dignity, and privilege. There are differences between the formal position of party in any one of these States and its formal position in others. In Russia the Communist party is formally separate from the State; and though its members actually inspire all the action of the State, the party itself, *de jure*, has no lot or part in the Constitution. In Italy, the Fascist Party is a part of the Constitution: it has a formal right, under the law of May 1928, to take a legal part in the conduct of parliamentary elections; it has also a formal right, under another law of December 1928, to give its advice on constitutional changes—including, under that head, "international treaties which involve a renunciation of the acquisition of territories"—and to suggest to the Crown the names

of persons for the office of Prime Minister. But these differences, important as they are, do not abolish a fundamental identity. Formally, or informally, a single organized party, of a closed membership, controls the destinies of these countries. Not content with its own membership of adults, the party proceeds to incorporate youth, adolescence, childhood, and even infancy, in its ranks. In Italy, for example, as it was announced in *The Times* of January 24, a pre-Balilla of boys under six is now being added to the Balilla for children from six to fourteen, the Avanguardista for adolescents from fourteen to eighteen, and the Young Fascists for youths from eighteen to twenty-one.

What is the Social background from which this portent comes? Why has this factor of party, once a voluntary association parallel to other voluntary associations, and moving like them within the framework and shelter of the State, shot into the foreground, captured the State, and proceeded to organize the whole of life? It is a difficult and complicated question. But there are some factors in recent social development which suggest something of an answer. In a great population men diversify their lives by taking "sides." They may simply espouse an athletic side, and become the fans of a team. In the circus of the great and populous Constantinople there were already Blues and Greens fourteen hundred years ago; and the Blues and Greens, from being circus-factions, spilled over into politics and shook the throne of Justinian. There is no "side" more fascinating than the political, and nothing more calculated to diversify life, especially if it be organized with pomp and banners and uniform. As soon as the electorate increased in size and became the electorate of a great population, the party organizer was at work. In England the second Reform Bill of 1867 was followed at once by the Liberal Caucus and Mr. Schnadhorst; and an eruption and

insurgence of party seemed imminent, particularly when Lord Randolph Churchill, in the early eighties of the last century, threw himself into the task of galvanizing the National Union of Conservative Associations into a fervent activity. But in a homogeneous country, accustomed to conduct disputes between sides by rules of the game, or at any rate professing that object, the fervor of a party-side, however hotly it boils for a time, tends ultimately toward a moderate temperature. Where society is less homogeneous, the temper of the side prevails. It is this prevalence of the temper of the side which has been so marked a feature of so many Continental countries in the post-war years. Nowhere, perhaps, was it more marked than in Germany. The party-side became a total focus of life. The party-creed developed into a general *Weltanschauung*; the party sought to provide for its members the whole apparatus of life—mutual benefit education, sport, military exercise, whatever the mind can crave. When parties thus become total, there is, in the last resort, only room for one. And when one total party triumphs, the State goes—or rather, as the current phrase runs, it becomes—“totalitarian,” which is only to say that it becomes the subject and the plaything of the total party.

No doubt it is questions of property and the interests of social classes which help to precipitate parties. But they are not the only questions. What makes the side, and maintains the side, may be primarily questions of national position and national prestige, even if questions of property and the interests of social classes are also mixed in the tissue. In any case, the problem before us is not so much that of the grounds on which parties are formed, as that of the causes which give them—whatever the grounds on which they are formed—the intensity, the totality, the dominance which they nowadays tend to assume. These characteristics will

not readily develop except in a heterogeneous society; but the fact of social difference and social cleavage is not, in itself, sufficient to explain them. We must also take into account the great population. We must equally take into account the new powers and processes of manipulating emotion which are furnished by the multiplication of communications. The modern leader, flying by airplane, is ubiquitous. His voice can become familiar to millions over the wireless; his face and his mannerisms are diffused to millions by the film. The power of organizing sides has been vastly increased by the mechanical development of our civilization. It is somewhat terrifying to reflect upon the repercussions of these mechanical developments on politics. On the one hand they make it easy to assemble gigantic combinations, tuned in eye and ear to a dominant mode. On the other hand, when once such a combination has been established, they make it difficult for any vestige of opposition even to appear. The tendency to take sides defeats itself; it ends by producing a solitary side, which, because it is solitary, is not a side. One can hardly imagine a modern Garibaldi. He would be defeated at once in a modern world where light is such that every movement is instantaneously visible and sound is such that every stirring is immediately audible. He would be overwhelmed at once by an instantaneous concentration of airplanes.

If we may count in the social background the two factors which have just been mentioned—the factor of numbers and the factor of their methods of communication—we begin to see more of the far-spread roots of recent political change. But these factors are only a part, and a tolerably simple part, of the whole matter. Shaken societies are seeking to reform themselves. Some substitute has to be found for the old governing stratum and the old governing elements. Where this has happened, men are going through an

experimental stage, in which a party combination offers itself, or obtrudes itself, as a substitute. In the period of effervescence, the party combination reaches down into the depths for its leaders and its adherents. The young men from the schools and the Universities, the teachers and the journalists, many sorts and conditions of men, see a rising star. Both those who wish to receive and those who wish to give and to make an offering rally to the cause of party. It was an impressive thing to one who talked with the young men in a German University, two years ago, to see how their hopes were set on party. Not advancement in a profession, not entry into the professional service of the State, not a parliamentary career (how could there be one?), but enlistment in the party, and a happy combination of personal advancement and service to the community through such enlistment—these were the terms in which the eager and ambitious were thinking. The party is at once a career and a dedication; it unlocks the doors, *per me si va nella citta godente*. We can not realize the zest of party unless we also realize that party seems an entrance to a new world, a new America, in which careers abound and jobs spring brightly from the soil like wild flowers.

In conditions such as these there is something apocalyptic, something (if the word may be permitted) "revivalistic," in the glorified party of our days. Those who saw the great crowds—moving by their grandeur, and yet also, in their mass, terrible—which assembled on the funeral day of our late King will understand the sense of apocalypse and the feeling of revival. This is what the great population and the whirring shuttle of its communications can produce. It is a sort of mysticism, suprarational or infrarational, according as you choose to regard it. With us this mysticism seems to gather about existing institutions, and especially the

monarchy. That is the lesson of last May and this January. Will it endure, and what are the forms which it will eventually take? I do not know; I only hold my breath. Elsewhere, with existing institutions less stable and less magnetic, the mysticism has gathered around new centers, and has precipitated itself in mystical parties. There is the center of class, and the mystical party of Communism. There is the center of race, and the mystical party of the National Socialists. There is the center of the "national organism," as it appears in the very first article of the Italian Charter of Labor, and there is the mystical party of Fascism, engaged in what the Greeks called *proskynesis* at the feet of the organism. Every center has its incarnation in a hero: each mystical party has its Duce, or Führer, or, as he is more modestly called in Russia, its Secretary. When the great population swarms, it must have its queen bee. When the side emerges, it must cluster round the emergent leader; and you will have what I cannot but call—vulgarly, but I think truly—the cult of the "boosted hero."

When one thinks of such things, and when one looks at the social background in this fierce light, the future cannot but appear cloudy. Perhaps the great population will decline and dwindle; perhaps, in the days of our great-grandchildren, there will be vacant spaces—abundant room—airy interstices in what was once a warm and serried mass. Perhaps the speed of the whirring shuttle will ease its strain; perhaps we shall be trained, by a process of adaptation, to its stress, and no longer be excited and dazzled by the whirr. Meanwhile, we live in the age in which we live. We have to understand it in order to master it: self-knowledge is the only way to self-control. To understand our age in terms of economics—if by economics we mean the distribution of property and the system of classes—is to understand it only

in part. There are other things also afoot. Our numbers, our communications, the temper and tempo of life which spring from our numbers and contacts—these also count, and count very greatly.

Take, for example, the sphere of the external relations of States. Hitherto we have been looking at the State "at home"—the State in its own multifarious and crowded house. But suppose we imagine it walking abroad, traveling, prospecting—like that old race which anthropologists call the Prospectors. What will it find? Still more important—what will it *want* to find? Well, it will want some things which are definitely economic. It will want emigration areas; and it will find the gates of the old areas shut, except for a little wicket-gate labeled "Quota." It will want areas, or it will think it wants areas, for the supply of new materials; and it will find a world pre-empted and preoccupied. But is this all it will want, and are these the essential things which, in its heart of hearts, it really wants? If we are thinking of the party State—the State with the social background and the temper of life of which we have just been speaking—the answer will be "No." The background of its foreign policy will be more than economic, and it will trans-

cend considerations of emigration areas and areas for the supply of raw materials. Because such a State is a "side" at home, it will move as a "side" when it goes abroad. Its fundamental consideration will be, in a word, prestige. It will desire to count. These great self-conscious populations move out into the world with their self-consciousness upon them. That they should argue their case in terms of any international system, or at the bar of any international organ, is already for them a surrender of the thing for which they are contending—the respect they desire to impose and the prestige they desire to assert. They may use economic terms; but they seek a supereconomic reality, which is nonetheless a reality for them because it is an intangible matter of status and consequence. There is nothing very new about the desire of States for status and consequence. The old dynastic States had that desire. The new thing about the new party States is that their desire for status and consequence is not the calculation of diplomats but the mysticism of masses. The Duce of Fascist Italy is different from Bismarck; and a place in the sun means more today than it meant—or at any rate it means something different from what it meant—thirty years ago.

Social Status and Political Behavior

Gerhart H. Saenger is a sociologist. He has written chiefly for the periodicals in that field of study. The author has attempted to verify certain general statements about the relationship between social status and voting by the application of scientific techniques. It is a very enlightening study, given its limitations. Some caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from it although it is obvious that this analysis has a validity beyond its own specific focus. But it is limited to New York City and there are other social factors besides rent, religion, age, sex, and residence. Dr. Saenger's work, taken in collaboration with other similar studies, proves conclusively that people do feel a direct connection between their social position and the outcome of a given election. Most of us take this sort of thing for granted. It is well, however, to have a more precise conception of what the situation actually is. What are the conclusions which can be drawn legitimately from the data presented?

All recent studies in the field of public opinion stress the high correlation between the voter's socioeconomic status and his voting tendency. The importance of the voter's economic status and his party preference is not necessarily known. The recent study by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, established the significance of religion and residence as well as economic status in predicting a person's vote.

The present study is an endeavor to find whether the same factors operating in midwestern Erie County, with its half-rural, half-small-town population, are effective in a large metropolitan community. It inquires into the influence of socioeconomic factors on political awareness and political action as well as the relative importance of party programs and the voters' opinions with regard to the main national and international issues

on the decisions of New Yorkers. Finally, the relationship between voting trends in the last three presidential elections and socioeconomic factors is analyzed.

POLITICAL AWARENESS AND POLITICAL ACTION

Political awareness. Political activity among different groups of the population may be assumed to be related to the significance its members ascribe to political events such as elections. The analysis of voting behavior in different socioeconomic groups is, therefore, preceded by a study of the relative importance different groups attributed to the 1944 presidential election.

Not all New Yorkers considered the election to be of real importance for the nation or themselves. Approximately seven out of every ten thought that it

From "Social Status and Political Behavior," by Gerhart H. Saenger, *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1945. (Footnotes omitted.)

TABLE 1 *
POLITICAL AWARENESS BY RELIGION AND BY EDUCATION

Religion	Percentage of Persons Stating That Outcome of Election Makes a Difference			Percentage of Persons Stating That Outcome of Election Affects Them Personally		
	Grammar School	High and College	Total	Grammar School	High and College	Total
All religions	67	77	72	23	34	30
Catholic	51	70	61	15	24	20
Protestant	77	72	73	20	34	30
Jewish	95	89	91	37	43	41
No. of cases	184	306	490	184	302	490

* This table gives only the percentage of persons in each group who believe that the outcome of the election makes a difference. The figure in the grammar-school column for Catholics means that 51 per cent of the total group think that it makes a difference who wins, while the 49 per cent who did not think so are omitted from the table. The same procedures have been used for Tables 2 and 3.

would "make a real difference who wins in the present election." Only three out of ten believed that the "outcome of the election would affect them personally" (Table 1).

As would be expected, the amount of education is related to the extent of political awareness. However, differences in religion were far more important than educational differences in determining the extent of a person's political awareness. On each educational level the Catholics were least impressed by the significance of the election, and the Jews the most convinced that the outcome of the election was of importance to the nation and to themselves.

Political activity. The extent to which any group becomes politically active is determined not only by political awareness but also by the amount of time and energy specific activities require. While 84 per cent of all New Yorkers interviewed voted in the last presidential election, only 15 per cent had "ever written letters to their congressmen" and a mere ten per cent were "members of any political club or organization."

The present study does not indicate

whether participation in terms of letter-writing or membership in political organization has risen among various social groups during the last decade. However, there is evidence of an increased participation in political action in the steadily declining proportion of nonvoters.

The increase in the proportion of voters between 1936 and 1944 was greatest among Jews of low and medium income, followed by Catholics of middle and upper income groups. Only Protestants with low incomes fail to show an increase in the proportion of voters.

The nature of this trend becomes even more apparent if we disregard differences in economic status. In 1936 the Protestants were the most frequent voters, but in 1944 theirs was the largest proportion of nonvoters. A partial explanation may be the impact of the war on both religious minorities. Jews and Catholics in New York City are first- or second-generation Americans. As such, they are more closely identified with the population of their home countries and may be more aware of the effect of recent political events abroad and at home.

The Jews, particularly, became ex-

TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF NEW YORKERS WRITING LETTERS TO THEIR
CONGRESSMEN, BY VOTE AND RELIGION

Economic Status	Religion			Persons Voting For:		Total
	Catholics	Jews	Protestants	Roosevelt	Dewey	
All income groups.....	12	20	8	18	10	15
Low.....	10	23	0	18	2	14
Medium or high.....	13	17	19	16	16	16
Number.....	166	141	88	260	125	385

TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF VOTERS IN SIX STATUS GROUPS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, BY ROOSEVELT AND DEWEY VOTERS

Voters	Low Income			Medium and High Income		
	Catholics	Jews	Protestants	Catholics	Jews	Protestants
Percentage of members.....	12	8	0	11	3	19
Roosevelt voters.....	10	8	0	11	3	7
Dewey voters.....	2	0	0	0	0	12
No. of voters reporting....	106	50	32	57	88	57

tremely conscious of the Fascist danger. Among the Catholics, foreign events appear to have had a more indirect influence. In comparison with the Jews they show a low level of political awareness. The proportion of Catholics who thought the outcome of the election in 1944 was important was smaller than that of the two other religious groups. Moreover, many of the "new Catholic voters" did not think that the outcome of the election made any difference. Therefore, the increase in political activity among Catholics can hardly be attributed to the direct impact of foreign events. Foreign events, however, could still have had an indirect effect on the Catholic group, perhaps through the personal solicitation of politically conscious leaders among them.

The greater interest in voting among religious minorities in 1944 is paralleled

by the greater proportion of "letter-writers" among Jews and Catholics. While there are practically no differences in the proportion of lower- and upper-class New Yorkers writing letters to their congressmen, it is interesting to note the absence of letter-writers among Protestants of low income as well as the fact that only Republican voters with higher incomes write to their congressmen (Table 2).

Membership in the major party organizations in New York City is also definitely aligned along the lines of social status. Most members of the Republican party organizations supporting Dewey enjoy the highest social status: the middle- and lower-class Protestants. None of the lower-class Protestants or middle- and upper-class Catholics reported membership in political organizations (Table 3).

Among the Roosevelt voters who be-




CHART 1. Proportion of Democratic and Republican votes in New York City by income and by religion, 1944.

longed to a political organization, Catholics formed the majority, particularly in the group with lower incomes. In the groups of middle and upper income, participation exists on a somewhat broader basis, although Catholics again constitute the majority of club members. The Jews, in spite of their high level of political awareness or political interest, are less organized than either Catholics or Protestants. Relatively very few Jews belong to political organizations.

The distribution of club members no longer parallels the distribution of the Democratic and Republican vote in the city. Since voting along class or status lines was more distinct in 1936 and 1940 than in 1944, club membership in former years conformed more to the actual vote distribution than today. Perhaps the failure of the voters among Republicans of low status to become members of Republican organizations or to write letters to their congressmen represents but another example of cultural lag. Perhaps political control is more stable than fluctuations of the vote. Whatever the reason, we find that social status is definitely related to political activities. Among the Republicans those of highest status, the wealthier

Protestants, were found to be most active. Catholics and Jews of low income were more active among the Democratic voters.

SOCIAL STATUS AND THE VOTE

The vote follows status lines. Social status, defined by income and religion, also determines voting behavior. Lazarsfeld and his associates state that "social characteristics determine political preference." Party preferences of the 1940 Erie County voter were determined to a large extent by religion and income. Low income predisposed a person to vote Democratic; high income, to vote Republican. Catholics tended to vote the Democratic ticket more often than Protestants. A Catholic of low income, therefore, would be more strongly predisposed to vote Democratic than a Catholic of high income. The latter, in Lazarsfeld's words, would be exposed to "cross pressures." As a Catholic he would be inclined to vote Democratic; as a member of the group with high income, to vote Republican.

The same factors operating in midwestern Erie County, with its half-rural, half-small-town population, were found to operate in metropolitan New York. In the




CHART 2. Proportion of Republican voters in the last three Presidential elections by income and by religion.

last three presidential elections Catholics tended to vote Democratic more often than Protestants. Voters of low income were more likely to vote for Roosevelt than for his opponent (see Chart 1).

The changing vote and socioeconomic factors. Gallup believes that the pronounced differences in the class composition of Republican and Democratic voters, conspicuous in 1936, are slowly disappearing. To discover whether this is true of New York City, the election returns of the last three presidential campaigns were compared (see Chart 2).

During the last decade the proportion of Republican voters climbed steadily in New York City, as in the rest of the nation. Yet not all groups changed to the same extent. The ratio of increase in the

proportion of Republican votes in the period between 1936 and 1944 was twice as high among Catholics as among Protestants. Within both religious groups changes were most pronounced in the middle-income group (Table 4).

Income and the changing vote. The fact that the greatest increase in Republican votes appeared in the medium-income group is consistent with the hypothesis that the tendency to vote Republican increases with rising income. The predisposition toward the Democratic party is greater among the group with low income than among those with middle incomes; the former group is more resistant to change.

The group with middle income tends to identify itself with that group with lower

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE AND RATIO OF INCREASE OF REPUBLICAN VOTES BETWEEN
1936 AND 1944, BY RELIGION AND BY INCOME

Religion	Percentage Increase			Ratio of Increase		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Catholic	24	46	43	1:2.7	1:10.0	1:5.3
Protestant	14	38	13	1:1.5	1: 2.3	1:1.3

incomes more during periods of depression such as existed before the 1936 election. In 1936 the Democratic party had just completed its unprecedented relief and public works program. It had offered assistance to those who needed help, mainly members of the low and middle groups.

During periods of relative economic security, however, the group with middle incomes tends to identify itself more with the wealthier. During the last two presidential elections the war boom had brought prosperity. The depression had largely been forgotten, and, by and large, people were optimistic about the postwar world. Therefore, the customary identification of the middle class with the upper class, which tends to vote Republican, could become effective.

Religion and the changing vote. Catholics showed a greater tendency toward change than Protestants. The Catholics are most heavily represented in the low and middle incomes. Therefore, a shift in the Catholic vote toward the Republican party suggests a greater similarity in the composition of the two major parties. An increase of Catholics in the Republican party in New York City means an increase in the number of Republicans with low and medium incomes.

How long this tendency to similarity between the two parties will continue depends upon two circumstances. In conformity with their economic status, poorer Catholics are inclined to vote Democratic. Catholics as a whole now tend toward the Republican party. The question will be whether the relative influence of economic status or the relative influence of religious affiliation (membership in the Catholic group) is stronger in the long run. The answer to this question depends on the proportion of unemployed during the postwar reconversion period. Much will depend upon the relative prosperity of the coun-

try as well as upon the leaders and molders of opinion among closely knit religious groups.

There is so far no ready explanation for the greater increase in the proportion of Republican votes among Catholics generally, particularly in view of the low level of political awareness. To shed further light on the question of vote changes, we proceed next to examine the party platforms as related to the attitudes of the voters with regard to the major international and domestic issues of our time.

THE MAIN ISSUES OF THE ELECTION

The party platforms. The most conspicuous element in the last presidential election was the relative absence of any outspoken difference in the campaign propaganda of both major parties. Republicans as well as Democrats advocated far-reaching international co-operation and a continuation, if not extension, of our social security system. The Democrats emphasized their past record both in domestic and in foreign affairs. The Republicans emphasized the "need for a new man," for a change, and accused the administration of bungling and waste. The Democratic party stressed the "necessity to continue an experienced man in office during the critical period of the war"—a man "who enjoyed confidence" and "would be able to make a good peace." The Republican party claimed that a Republican administration would have the "confidence of business" and "insure prosperity after the war."

The propagandistic difficulties facing the Republican party as a result of the administration's war record were emphasized in the 1944 *Fortune* poll. Of the two-thirds of the population who expressed a definite opinion, a large majority believed that the Democrats would




CHART 3. Recognition of party differences on questions of "International Co-operation" and "Social Security," by proportion of Roosevelt and Dewey voters recognizing or failing to recognize a difference.

make a better peace and be more capable of preventing unemployment after the war. Thus, a considerable proportion of Republican voters either had more confidence in the Democratic party or was at least uncertain which party would best be able to solve the major problems of war and peace.

These results suggest that other factors than the problems of an enduring peace or full postwar employment were instrumental in causing many voters to change toward the Republican party, because there is little doubt that the voters of both parties agreed as far as these major issues are concerned.

Public desire for international co-operation. Both Democrats and Republicans expressed themselves in favor of international co-operation and, therefore, followed the public will when they came out for international co-operation in the 1944 election.

However, until recently, the Republican party in Congress had pursued a more isolationist policy than the Democrats. How did the Republican voter reconcile his vote intention with his knowledge of the party's past record? One may argue that people do not pay

much attention to congressional action or manage to forget it soon. Actually, the Democratic voters in New York City recognized a difference between the two parties on that score, while the Republican voters concluded that the difference between the two parties had disappeared. It is improbable that the Republican voters forgot their party's past record while the Democrats remembered it. This is particularly unlikely in the light of the results of the *Fortune* poll. The Republican voters simply decided that the difference between the two parties had disappeared, while Democratic voters, confronted with the same evidence (most Democrats and Republicans read the same newspapers), had come to the opposite conclusion (see Chart 3).

One may well ask whether the argument precedes or follows a person's decision in voting. Does the voter first decide whether the parties differ on questions of vital importance to him and then make up his mind on the basis of his conclusion? Or is his opinion a mere rationalization in support of an already-made decision? The Republican voter who genuinely favors international co-operation has to believe that his party, too, favors

TABLE 5

SUGGESTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN VOTERS FOR THE PREVENTION
OF UNEMPLOYMENT AFTER THE WAR, BY ECONOMIC STATUS IN PERCENTAGES

How Can Unemployment After the War Be Prevented?	Democrats			Republicans		
	Low	Medium and High	Total	Low	Medium and High	Total
Change system, take over plants	13	1	9	0	7	3
New Deal measures, government help, public works, planning, government- sponsored housing	59	69	62	65	38	52
Government co-operate with business and help business	17	8	13	5	11	7
New markets, domestic and foreign . . .	11	21	15	26	25	26
Government must leave business alone and lift restrictions	0	1	1	4	19	12
No. of suggestions	90	56	146	60	65	125

co-operation; otherwise he would be plunged into a serious mental conflict.

The issues of social security and government planning. An appraisal of voters' opinions on social security and full employment after the war leads to the same hypothesis. Although differences between both parties were more pronounced than on the question of foreign policy, a majority of Democrats (92 per cent) as well as of Republicans (64 per cent) believed that the "government should provide jobs through public works programs for the unemployed" after the war. The prevalence of a so-called "New Deal" philosophy among the followers of both parties became even more apparent when the respondents were asked: "What could be done to prevent unemployment after the war?" A majority of Republicans (52 per cent) as well as of Democrats (62 per cent) recommended "government planning," a "public works program," an "extension of the social security system," and "government-sponsored housing," to prevent future unemployment. A small minority, mostly Republicans of medium and upper income, stated that unemployment could be prevented only if "govern-

ment left business alone." Only among upper-class Republicans would a majority (55 per cent) rely on business rather than on government help for the postwar period. However, the majority of all Republicans spontaneously approved of "New Deal" measures (Table 5).

The wishes of the large majority of Republicans again are at odds with the actions of Republican congressmen. The discrepancy between the voters' opinions and congressional action in the field of foreign policy is apparent also with regard to domestic issues. The majority of Republican representatives has consistently voted against New Deal measures favored by their constituents.

Republican voters, particularly those in the lower income brackets, would have voted against their convictions, unless they believed that the Republicans, too, had accepted the New Deal philosophy in fact though perhaps not in name. To be consistent, they chose to believe that the two parties had the same outlook on questions of social security. The Democrats, on the other hand, in spite of the similarity of the party platforms, refused to accept Republican claims. They argued

that the two parties differed fundamentally on these issues. The voter's previous decision to vote for his candidate or party again appears to have determined his belief concerning the presence or absence of a genuine difference between the parties; his opinions are shaped by his decision.

The voter's arguments. If voting behavior could be traced to the voter's deliberations rather than to group membership, direct questioning might furnish a clue to the real motives behind his decision. We have seen that the decision how to vote can hardly be attributed to differences on major questions of foreign and domestic policy between the parties. One cannot be surprised, therefore, to find that the overwhelming majority of arguments centered around the personal qualities of the candidates. As could be expected from the way the campaign was conducted, most of these personal arguments were concerned with Roosevelt rather than with Dewey. Democrats were pro-Roosevelt rather than anti-Dewey; Republicans, anti-Roosevelt rather than pro-Dewey (Table 6).

TABLE 6
PROPOSITION OF ARGUMENTS FOR OR AGAINST
ROOSEVELT OR DEWEY AMONG ROOSEVELT AND DEWEY VOTERS

Type of Argument	Roosevelt Voters	Dewey Voters
Pro-Roosevelt.....	61	6
Pro-Dewey.....	3	24
Neutral (need change, new man).....		16
Anti-Roosevelt.....	3	45
Anti-Dewey.....	33	9
No. of arguments.....	180	133

Of particular interest was the relatively large number of arguments of a "neutral" character among the Republicans. Many simply stated that we "need

a change" or a "new man," that "Roosevelt was too old." There may be some people who voted Republican for no other reason than a belief in periodic change or in the prerequisite of youth for political efficiency. It seems somewhat more likely that in the majority of cases this argument constitutes but another rationalization for a decision already made and does not explain why the person actually voted Republican.

The arguments of most Democratic voters in support of their candidate centered around "Roosevelt's greater experience." He was considered "indispensable for the winning of the war" or the "making of a good peace." These arguments were expressed relatively more frequently by Democrats with higher incomes. Among the other Democrats one finds a substantial minority arguing in terms of class differences: "Roosevelt is good for labor" and "minorities"; Dewey, "too much under the influence of business" or "capitalists." These arguments again point to the strong influence of income in determining voting. Traditionally low income and minority groups tend to vote the Democratic ticket. Predisposition seems to be less effective among the wealthier Democrats. More predisposed toward the Republican party, they argued almost exclusively in terms of Roosevelt's greater experience.

The influence of predisposition was clearly discernible also among a considerable proportion of the Republicans with middle and upper incomes, who were quite conscious of their class interests. They stated that "Roosevelt was bad for business," while "Dewey favors business" and would "guarantee full employment" and a "prosperous economy."

The Republicans of low income, persons ordinarily inclined to vote Democratic, either argued almost exclusively in terms of the "need for a new man" or stated that "Roosevelt craved for

TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF "CHANGERS," "NEW VOTERS," AND "CONSISTENT
VOTERS" BELIEVING THE TWO PARTIES DIFFER WITH REGARD
TO THEIR DOMESTIC PROGRAM

Do Parties Differ	Changers	New Voters		Consistent Voters	
	Democrats as of 1940 Who Voted Republican in 1944	Nonvoter Democrat	Nonvoter Republican	Democrat, 1940 Democrat, 1944	Republican, 1940 Republican, 1944
Yes	32	49	32	67	44
No	47	6	27	15	32
Don't know	21	45	41	18	24
No. of voters	43	33	34	99	57

power," "would become a dictator," and "favored the Communists." While the first argument probably does not indicate the real motivating factor, the fear of "dictatorship" or of "communistic influences"—expressed by one-third of this group—deserves serious consideration. It is possible that this fear caused many persons, usually predisposed to vote Democratic, to vote against Roosevelt.

The readers of Democratic and Republican papers. The overwhelming majority of both Democrats and Republicans were exposed almost exclusively to Republican press propaganda. Four times as many Democrats read strongly Republican papers as strongly Democratic papers. This ratio was even larger among the group with low incomes, which does not usually listen to the more evenly distributed campaign propaganda of the radio.

Both Democrats and Republicans were thus exposed to propaganda calling Roosevelt a "dictator," "power-crazy," and "under Communist influence" and, for years, attacking his domestic and foreign policy. Yet, in 1944, about one-half of the Catholic and Protestant voters who were exposed to the strongly anti-Democratic *News*, *Mirror*, and *Journal* voted for Roosevelt. Those who had de-

cided to vote Democratic simply failed to accept their arguments. Even among Republicans only a small proportion quoted the arguments handed out by their favorite papers as main reasons for their decision. Therefore, it is very unlikely that voting in general and the recent shift in particular can be attributed to newspaper propaganda.

SOCIAL STATUS AND THE VOTING TREND

The "changers." The most significant evidence supporting the hypotheses that neither specific objective arguments nor the belief that one would fare better under a new President were responsible for the shift in the New York vote is furnished by those who changed parties between 1940 and 1944. A comparison between the "changers" and the consistent voters (see Table 7) indicates that the changers were politically the least alert and least interested of all voters. Only one-half of all changers believed that the outcome of the election was at all important, as compared with two-thirds of the total number of voters studied. Only 14 per cent of them thought that the outcome of the election

would affect them personally, as compared with 25 per cent of the two religious groups in which most changes occurred.

Less than one-third of all voters who changed their party affiliation in the past four years believed that the two parties differed with regard to their foreign program. The "changers" also included the smallest proportion of voters who thought that the two parties differed with regard "to their attitude toward a public works and social security program." They are followed closely by the "New Voters," most of them persons who could have voted in 1940 had they so desired. The decision to change parties or to vote for the first time is obviously not the result of an awareness of the difference between the two parties.

Social status and the voting trend. One must, therefore, conclude that the trend in voting is not related to differences in party programs or differences in the opinions of the voters concerning the intentions of the presidential candidate. Instead, the trend depends on factors such as religion and income and is a function of status or group affiliation. It is most outspoken among groups who, in Lazarsfeld's words, were exposed to "cross pressures." If the poor traditionally tend to vote Democratic and if there is now a tendency among Catholics to shift toward the Republican party, richer Catholics would obviously be more likely to shift than poorer Catholics.

Some tentative hypotheses. Although an explanation of this trend in voting

cannot be given within the framework of the study, some tentative hypotheses for further investigation may be offered. The failure of the respondents to recognize any difference between the parties, together with their appreciation of the Administration's accomplishments during the war, points to the working of personal influences within closely knit groups rather than to exposure to parties and propaganda. It is likely, therefore, that a shift in opinion among the leaders of any group would be followed by a similar trend in voting among the group members, the more so if they do not comprehend its significance. This mechanism is most likely to work among groups under "cross pressure," which means groups predisposed toward both parties. Group resistance toward change is likely to be greater where several factors combine to predispose a person in favor of one party.

The slow disappearance of distinct status lines in the composition of the two major parties in New York City may be a passing phenomenon due to the operation of specific historic factors. In a depression the identification of the Democratic party with social reform will be more impressed upon the public than in times of prosperity, when the public is likely to forget past hardship. Another depression, therefore, may lead again to a sharper crystallization of class lines in terms of party preference, unless the propaganda and actions of both parties with regard to the issue of social security and a public works program remain alike.

The Middle Class in the United States

Lewis Corey, Professor of Political Economy at Antioch College, has written five books and many articles for scholarly periodicals on political and economic subjects. The American Middle Class—real and fictional—is so important to an understanding of politics in this country that it is necessary to have some factual basis for discussing it. Professor Corey provides one such foundation in this article. How is Professor Corey using the word “class”? It may be that when one speaks of “class” in the United States he employs a special meaning of it, and it should be made clear what that meaning is. Several suggestive considerations flow from this article. First, it shows the impact of technology upon politics—the new middle class is the product of new industrial developments. Second, the figures demonstrate that the bulk of the population do not own property (productive capital) or their own businesses. Third, the new middle class perhaps has a psychology different from the old: in what respects and why? Fourth, what is the effect of Professor Corey’s analysis on the Marxian prognostication of a steady dividing of humanity into just two classes, proletariat and *bourgeoisie*?

There are, obviously, specific economic problems of the peace that must be tackled and solved. But they cannot be separated from the historical drive toward over-all changes in economic institutions and values. Nor can these changes be separated from changes in class relations and in class-political power, among other reasons because the *direction* in which social change moves is affected by human consciousness and action.

What labor and the farmers decide to do on the specific and over-all problems is important. But just as important is what the middle class decides to do. While the old middle class of small independent enterprisers may not be much of an economic power, because of monopoly domination, it is still an influential ideological

and political force. And the new middle class of salaried employees, especially the technical-managerial and professional personnel, possesses the technical, administrative, and educational skills without which the old society cannot carry on or a new society be built. The middle class will face specific postwar economic problems of its own. Will small enterprise shrink still more or grow again? Will economic expansion be enough to bring full employment for technical-managerial personnel and higher pay for white collar workers? Will rising incomes multiply the demand for professional services, including the services of teachers? Finally, will the technical-scientific and educational talents of the new middle class be used for peace or war? All these specific problems of the

From “The Middle Class,” by Lewis Corey, *Antioch Review*, Spring, 1945. (Footnotes omitted.)

middle class tie in with the larger problem of over-all social change.

Class relations have developed differently from the expectations of the early democratic and socialist philosophers. Democrats foresaw the continuation and expansion of a middle-class democracy of small independent producers, in which a majority of the people draw their livelihood from property which they work and own. The early socialists, including Marx, prophesied that middle-class democracy was doomed by the concentration of industry and of property ownership, and the prophecy is largely fulfilled. But the Marxists were wrong, too, for there is no fulfillment of their prophecy of a rapid, inevitable polarization of classes into proletariat and *bourgeoisie*, with the virtual eclipse of the middle class.

Evidence is overwhelming that the early democrats were wrong. The middle class of small independent enterprisers grew in absolute numbers from 1870 to 1910 but underwent a relative decline; since 1910 the numerical size of the class has remained virtually stationary while it has considerably shrunk as a proportion of all gainfully occupied persons (Table 1). Its economic power has shrunk even more than its numerical strength because of increasing monopoly domination.

But while it has declined, the old middle class has not disappeared; and it is still a class-political force to reckon with. Moreover, a *new* middle class of salaried employees has come into being that, since 1870, has grown faster than the proletariat.

Let us look at Table 1 again. The working class increased slowly from around 53 per cent of all gainfully occupied persons in 1870 to a peak of 57 per cent in 1910; then it fell to 55 per cent in 1920, was stationary in the 1920's, and rose again to 57 per cent in 1940. But "working class" includes farm laborers and workers in domestic and personal service, while the "proletariat" in the

Marxist sense is composed of industrial workers. The industrial proletariat reached its numerical peak in 1920 and has been almost stationary since, but its relative weight has fallen. From around 55 per cent of the working class in 1870 the industrial workers rose to a peak of 66 per cent in 1910 and 67 per cent in 1920, falling, however, to 62 per cent in 1930 and 55 per cent in 1940. This relative shrinkage in the proletariat appears clearly from another angle: as a proportion of all gainfully occupied persons the industrial workers rose from around 30 per cent in 1870 to 37 per cent in 1910 and 1920, falling to 34 per cent in 1930 and 31 per cent in 1940.

Two major factors underlie this shrinkage of the proletariat: the growing trend toward use of automatic machines and automatic plants, which displaces manual workers while it multiplies the number of technical-managerial and clerical employees; and the constant growth of professional and personal services, much of them to serve workers themselves as their living standards and leisure rise.

While the working class multiplied six times from 1870 to 1940, the middle class as a whole multiplied eight times and *the new middle class sixteen times*. The absolute numbers of the industrial proletariat has remained virtually stationary since 1920 while the new middle class scored an increase of 50 per cent. From an almost negligible proportion in 1870 the new middle class moved up to become 25 per cent of all gainfully occupied persons. Technical-managerial and professional employees alone have multiplied thirteen times since 1870, from 330,000 to 4,772,000.

This tremendous growth of the new middle class is an integral part of basic economic changes in the structural setup of capitalism:

(1) The growing technical-scientific nature of industry, which calls for con-

TABLE I
CLASS DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1870-1940

(in thousands)	1940	1930	1920	1910	1870
I. Farmers	5,265	6,012	6,387	6,132	3,100
1. Owners	3,227	3,463	3,954	3,864	2,325
2. Tenants	2,038	2,549	2,433	2,268	775
II. Working Class	29,518	25,813	22,665	19,730	6,035
1. Industrial	16,124	16,198	15,118	12,982	3,225
a) Manufactures	9,250*	9,150	9,450	7,425	1,812
b) Mining	824	887	982	862	179
c) Transportation	2,950*	2,961	2,386	2,204	465
d) Construction	3,100	3,200	2,300	2,490	768
2. Farm Laborers	2,312	2,606	2,217	2,658	1,500*
3. Other Workers	11,082	7,456	5,329	4,089	1,310
III. Middle Class	16,633	14,884	11,682	8,870	2,289
1. Old—Enterprisers	3,863	3,751	3,350	3,261	1,532*
a) Business	3,382	3,304	2,943	2,895	1,304
b) Professional	481	446	406	366	128
2. New—Salaried	12,769	11,580	8,332	5,609	756
a) Technical—M'g'rial	2,062	1,966	1,527	999	129
b) Professional	2,660	2,413	1,581	1,179	204
c) Clerical	3,889	3,345	2,719	1,403	68
d) Salespeople	3,347	3,003	1,877	1,595	282
e) Public Service	439	418	290	208	48
IV. Upper "Bourgeoisie"	240	300	200
Total	51,656	47,457	40,935	34,733	11,424

* Partly estimated

The final totals are all persons "gainfully occupied" or "the labor force" (new Census terminology) minus unpaid family farm workers. "Labor force" and "gainfully occupied" are not strictly comparable; the 1940 total is "labor force" and would be slightly higher if the older concept had been used. *Note:* The decrease in the number of farmers for 1940 would not be as large as it is if changes in classification had not excluded from enumeration a considerable number of people counted as farmers in earlier Census reports.

Under "manufactures" are included some workers not working in factories. "Transportation" includes workers in communication industries. "Farm Laborers" includes only hired wage-workers. The "salaried" total includes "Unspecified" salaried employees and telephone and telegraph operators (see Table 7). "Salespeople" includes "clerks" in stores. "Public Service" includes federal, state, and local officials, police personnel and probation officers; it excludes doorkeepers, laborers, and other wage-workers; and does not include the much larger total of salaried professional and clerical employees in government service.

Source: Compiled, computed, and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

stantly greater numbers of technical employees.

(2) The increasingly complex nature of production and distribution, and the separation of ownership from management

in collective enterprise, which calls for constantly greater numbers of managerial employees.

(3) The growing amount of planning, regulation, and control within industry,

and the consequent need for more administration, which calls for constantly greater numbers of clerical employees.

(4) The multiplication of goods and leisure, which calls for more employment in distribution and trade and for more personal and professional services, the performers of which are primarily members of the new middle class. The proportion of people employed in the production of physical goods fell from around 75 per cent in 1870 to 50 per cent in 1940. If incomes and leisure go up again, as they can, it will mean more employment in the performance of services.

(5) The growth in the economic functions of government and of public services, which has brought the grand total of all public employees, federal, state, and local, from around 175,000 in 1870 to 3,100,000 in 1930 and 3,200,000 in 1940, exclusive of relief workers. The small increase shown in 1940 over ten years earlier was due to contraction in state and local employment; federal employees rose from 580,000 in 1930 to 1,000,000 in 1940. Around one-third of public employees are workers (including mail carriers); the balance of two-thirds are technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees.

The economic basis of early middle-class democracy was the widespread ownership of small independent property in a society of small producers. But small ownership was disastrously limited by the onswEEP of industrialism. In the America of the 1820's around 80 per cent of the people owned property from which they worked a livelihood; in the 1940's only 20 per cent do so, the great majority being now dependent on income from a wage- or salary-job.

Ownership of farms was the basis of earlier economic democracy. The absolute number of farmers kept on increasing until 1910, although they move downward in a relative sense. But for twenty years thereafter the number of farmers remained

stationary while population grew; and in 1940 there were fewer farmers than in 1910. Farmers today are not much more than 10 per cent of the gainfully occupied.

The number of enterprisers (Table 2) increased from 1870 to 1910, from 1,404,000 to 2,895,000; there was a small rise to 3,304,000 in 1930 and hardly any change in 1940. The trend for the old middle class as a whole, including professionals, was pretty much the same, with a small increase from 1910 onward but a very large decrease as a percentage of all gainfully occupied persons. It is important to observe, however, the relative and absolute decline in the number of independent *industrial* enterprisers (manufactures, construction, mining)—from around 425,000 in 1910 to 390,000 in 1930 and 257,000 in 1940. The statistical decline may be a bit more than the actual decline, because the different years do not seem wholly comparable and because some of the 1940 decline may have been a temporary depression result, yet the downward trend is definite. Many independent industrial enterprisers have been wiped out by the war. Whether or not they stage a comeback depends upon postwar economic conditions and what kind of policy the middle class pursues.

Small independent enterprisers have held their own in numbers only because of the very large increase in trade and personal services (some of which in 1940 was, however, a hangover of people opening small stores to escape unemployment during the depression of the 1930's).

Independent professionals, interestingly enough, have made little contribution to an increase of small enterprisers (Table 3). They made considerable gains from 1870 to 1910, multiplying nearly four times, but the later gains are small compared with the great gains of salaried professionals (Table 6). Among professionals, too, employment becomes increas-

TABLE 2
INDEPENDENT ENTERPRISERS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Manufactures.....	145,000*	207,901	235,618	47,000
Building.....	100,000*	167,512	174,422	
Mining.....	12,000*	15,511	14,287	
Trade.....	1,926,000	1,800,000	1,278,000	440,000
Laundry, etc.....	53,694	49,461	30,000	1,000*
Entertainment.....	70,844	67,744	34,347	1,185
General Services.....	535,000	467,000	390,000	110,900
Garages.....	100,000	95,000	18,000	2,000*
Professional.....	481,121	446,738	366,223	128,175
Unclassified.....	439,590	434,332	720,734	802,014
Total.....	3,863,249	3,751,199	3,261,631	1,532,774

* Partly estimated

Under "Laundry" are included laundry, cleaning, dyeing and pressing establishments. "Entertainment" includes theatres and motion picture houses, pleasure resorts, race tracks, etc. "General Services" includes hotels and boarding houses, eating and drinking places, barber and beauty shops, etc. "Garages" includes cab and truck owners, and, for earlier years, livery stables. "Professional" includes self-employed performers of professional services. "Unclassified" includes, especially for the earlier years, independent artisans and artisan shops.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

TABLE 3
INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONALS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Physicians.....	165,629	153,803	145,000*	60,000*
Dentists.....	70,601	70,344	39,597	7,988
Other Medical.....	48,458	48,187	19,755	5,585
Lawyers.....	180,483	160,605	114,704	39,791*
Architects.....	21,976	23,100	17,444	2,039
Photographers.....	37,641	32,805	31,775	7,652
Artists.....	62,485	57,253	34,094	4,120
Authors.....	14,126	12,325	4,324	1,000*
Total.....	481,121	446,738	366,223	128,175

* Partly estimated

Under "Physicians" surgeons are included. "Lawyers" include judges. "Other medical" includes veterinarians, osteopaths, chiropractors, and healers. "Artists" includes sculptors and teachers of art. No attempt is made to classify other and newer professions.

The totals are functional, not arithmetical; they assume that an overall average of 10% of professional persons were salaried employees in 1910 and an average of 20% in 1930 and 1940.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

TABLE 4
TECHNICIANS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Chemists.....	60,005	48,009	16,598	774
Civil Engineers.....	105,486	102,086	52,031	
Electrical Engineers...	55,667	57,259	15,125	7,094
Mechanical Engineers...	85,543	54,356	14,514	
Chemical Engineers...	11,600	11,970	6,930	
Mining Engineers....	9,773			
Industrial Engineers...	9,803	3,261		
Laboratory Technicians	17,246	8,288	4,000	250
Total.....	355,123	285,229	109,198	8,118

Under "Chemists" are included assayers and metallurgists. "Civil Engineers" includes surveyors. "Laboratory" includes technicians and assistants; 1940 data is not comparable with earlier years.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

ingly institutional. Yet they make up a powerful, strategic group that is influential far beyond its numbers.

In some of its functions the new middle class of technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees is not altogether new. There were office workers, public employees, a smattering of technicians and managers in early capitalism, some also in the commercial civilizations of antiquity. But their numbers were small and they were significant mainly in the repressive bureaucracy of the state. The new middle class is new in its numbers, in the variety and significance of its occupations, and in being a typical class product of large-scale collective economic activity.

The slowdown in expansion of the new middle class, as a result of the depression of the 1930's, was temporary unless there arises a new economic crisis. But a new crisis will engulf the working class, too. And the problems of policy created by the new middle class will become acute. Trends in the over-all class development since 1870 may be summed up:

The working class has grown propor-

tionately more than twice as fast as the independent enterprisers.

The middle class as a whole has grown around 50 per cent more than the number of workers.

The new middle class has grown more than three times faster than the working class, eight times faster than the number of enterprisers, and two and one-half times faster than the middle class as a whole.

These are clear indications of the strength and significance of the new middle class. Its functions arise out of changes that have transformed capitalism and that carry into the future. They have brought a great increase in the number of technicians (Table 4). This increase is underestimated by the Census, which often classifies technicians as "officials" and sometimes as "clerical." Yet the Census figures show an increase of forty times in the number of technicians, with 700,000 as the probable 1940 total. The greatest expansion has been since 1910 and there was no serious slowdown in 1940 because of the depression.

While the majority of technical engi-

neers (electrical, mechanical, mining, civil) are in industry, 26.5 per cent of them were engaged in professional service in 1930, and 12.2 per cent in public service. They are active in every field of activity.

Any expansion of industry must necessarily increase the number of technicians and enlarge their strategic importance. Industry becomes more and more dependent on the possessors of technical knowledge and skills while the manual labor force dwindles, with increasingly more skilled workers being transformed into "junior technicians." The technician is master of the mysterious processes of a system of production which is infinitely more complex than production in the early stages of the industrial revolution. And the strategic importance of the technician grows, socially as well as economically, as people become more technology-conscious and are influenced by the technician.

Technicians merge into the managerial group, which has grown fourteen times in number since 1870 (Table 5). Managerial employees are important in every field of activity, including government, although the largest proportion is engaged in manufactures. The slight gain registered in 1940 expresses the depression failure of industry to expand, not any decline in the importance of managerial personnel.

Around two-fifths of managerial employees are in the upper group composed of officials and managers. The top layers of this upper group, the administrative officials, may be called "institutional capitalists" (for whom, however, power is a greater motive than profit, which largely explains why they merged so easily into fascism). They are identified with monopoly capitalism, and imperialism and are, by and large, the heart of reaction. But this is not true of the whole managerial group, especially its lower

layers which are frequently in conflict with the upper (evident today in the struggle of foremen to unionize against administrative opposition). A progressive potential exists in management alongside reactionary attitudes and practices.

In objective functional aptitudes and interests the technical-managerial personnel is not capitalist. It has a sense of workmanship, which calls for doing a job of production, and its economic interests in terms of employment and income are promoted by full utilization of productive resources and their expansion. The progressive practitioners of management recognize it can become a liberating force. One writes:

In the increasing specialization of management, and in the consequent increasing infiltration into managerial personnel of technically trained persons whose prime interest and desire are production rather than profit, one may perhaps see an agency for a new industrial revolution and for a conversion of industry into an agency for social welfare rather than for individual profit.

Salaried professionals scored an increase of thirty times from 1870 to 1940 (Table 6). They increased much more, and more rapidly, than independent professionals. They include not only groups specified in the table but also salaried physicians, surgeons, architects, lawyers, and others. The largest increases were scored by actors, teachers, and editor-reporters, the smallest by physicians and clergymen. A wholly new group emerged, professional social workers. Many professionals are in the upper layers of management, while accountants are part of the administrative bureaucracy of corporate business. At least 125,000 salaried professionals (including technical-scientific personnel) are in the employ of the federal government, with many more, among them 1,100,000 teachers, employed by states, municipalities, and townships.

Among salaried professionals are the

TABLE 5
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Agriculture.....	62,778	70,583	52,811	2,000*
Upper.....	37,503
Lower.....	25,275
Manufactures.....	654,457	651,260	301,691	16,000*
Upper.....	312,000*	312,756	125,694
Lower.....	342,457	338,504	175,997
Mining.....	48,345	49,671	34,285	7,580
Upper.....	16,101	15,385	10,947	580
Lower.....	32,244*	34,286	23,338	7,000*
Railroads.....	111,311	153,996	113,003	25,000*
Upper.....	32,242	34,132	19,805
Lower.....	79,069	119,864	93,198
Other Transport.....	102,826	119,927	82,211	10,000*
Upper.....	50,882	63,352	34,490
Lower.....	51,944	56,575	47,721
Communication.....	40,024	34,182	16,551	300*
Upper.....	23,301	18,957	10,089
Lower.....	16,723	15,225	6,462
Construction.....	99,932	68,818	40,000*	12,000*
Upper.....	25,269	23,492	15,000
Lower.....	74,663	45,326	25,000
Trade.....	89,124	82,658	45,274	7,500*
Upper.....	50,000*	45,000*	25,000*
Lower.....	39,124	37,658	20,274
Motion Picture.....	2,100	1,923
Garage.....	21,250	19,247
Banking.....	95,000	93,356	56,059	15,000*
Insurance.....	39,735	33,997	9,501	1,000*
Unclassified.....	340,694	301,271	142,481	25,000*
Total.....	1,707,576	1,680,889	893,867	121,380

* Partly estimated

"Upper" managerial—managers, officials; "Lower"—foremen, overseers, inspectors.

"Other Transport" includes street railways, bus, taxicab, trucking, and shipping. "Communication" includes telephone and telegraph only. "Motion Picture, Garage, Banking, Insurance" include managers and officials only.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

shapers of opinion and ideas: the teachers, editors, and reporters who, along with writers and artists, are the architects of ideology. They are the intellectuals—successors to the priests and medicine men of earlier religious civilizations. All intellectuals, conservative, liberal, and radical, are members of the new middle class.

Many technical-managerial and professional employees are, from the angle of

their incomes, nearer to the workers than they are to members of their own class. In fact, millions of skilled union workers earn more than millions of lower-salaried employees. Nevertheless, technical-managerial and professional employees are members of the new middle class. Most of them earn more than the workers; their occupations, their functions, and their potential (if not actual) incomes differentiate them from the workers. A

TABLE 6
SALARIED PROFESSIONALS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Teachers.....	1,203,622	1,124,520	614,905	128,265
Designers.....	111,805	102,730	47,449	1,291
Reporters.....	63,493	51,844	34,382	5,375
Musicians.....	161,536	165,128	139,310	16,170
Clergymen.....	140,077	145,877	118,018	
Religious Workers....	35,172	31,290	12,970*	44,934
Social Workers.....	75,197	32,241	3,000*	
Actors.....	40,000*	37,993	28,297	2,066
Librarians.....	38,607	29,613	7,423
Trained Nurses.....	371,066	294,189	82,327	1,204
Accountants.....	190,000*	191,571	39,239
Unclassified.....	110,000*	95,239	12,061	5,000*
Total.....	2,540,575	2,302,235	1,139,381	204,305
Additional.....	120,268	111,684	40,470
Grand Total.....	2,660,843	2,413,919	1,179,851	204,305

* Partly estimated

Under "Teachers" college professors and presidents are included. "Designers" includes draftsmen. "Reporters" includes editors. "Unclassified" includes professional apprentices and assistants and "other professional occupations." "Additional" is the sum of the assumptions made in Table 5 regarding the number of independent professionals who are salaried employees. Excluded are laborers and other wage-workers, keepers of billiard rooms and dance halls, and managers and officials which the Census lists under "Professional service."

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

worker who earns around \$3,000-\$3,500 a year knows that is the limit: he can earn more only by ceasing to be a worker. Technical-managerial and professional employees may earn only \$2,000 a year, but they know they can earn more and they need not get out of their class to do so. No more than one can say that a worker who earns \$3,000 yearly is a member of the new middle class can one say that technical-managerial and professional employees who earn \$2,000 yearly are members of the working class. The appeal for progressive action to technical-managerial and professional employees must be made in terms of their functional interests and class as part of the over-all struggle for reconstruction.

This problem of class appears more sharply in the case of white collar workers, whose numbers jumped from around 375,000 in 1870 to 7,600,000 in 1940, an increase of twenty times (Table 7). Many white collar workers are difficult to classify. Salespeople and clerks in stores might be assigned to the working class, bookkeepers to the class of lower professional employees. Yet objective and psychological considerations that are determining factors should be borne in mind.

One objective distinction can be made: the amount of education and training that is needed to qualify for a particular occupation. The professionals need more education and training than the white collars, and white collars (most of them

TABLE 7
WHITE COLLAR WORKERS: 1870-1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Bookkeepers, etc....	741,308*	739,077	447,411	38,776
Clerks.....	1,973,604	1,795,000	639,000	29,801
Steno-Typists.....	1,174,886	811,190	316,693	154
Clerks (store).....	525,591	401,991	387,183	80,000*
Salespeople (store)...	2,200,000*	1,988,322	877,238	160,000*
Commercial travelers..	256,000*	223,732	163,620	7,296
Sales Agents.....	366,312	389,358	167,578	35,000*
Operators.....	250,821	316,638	137,684	8,406
Unclassified.....	118,000*	117,397	85,240*	15,000*
Total.....	7,606,522	6,782,705	3,221,647	374,433

* Partly estimated

Under "Bookkeepers" cashiers are included. "Clerks" excludes shipping clerks, who are listed with wage-workers. "Sales Agents" includes insurance and real estate agents. "Operators" includes telephone and telegraph operators. "Unclassified" includes railway mail clerks, etc.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*, published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table).

at least) need more than the workers. An important class-psychological distinction is this: the white collar occupations (most, if not all, of them) were occupations that represented an upward move in the world, an escape from the working class. They were cleaner, with better hours and pay; they provided more security, social prestige, and chance to get ahead. In general the white collars developed within the middle class, as its lower layers, and with the psychological attitudes of that class. Hence their resistance to unionism, which is only slowly breaking down.

The white collars are workers? Even if all white collar people are assigned to the working class there still remains a solid core of 9,000,000 members of the middle class, among them 5,000,000 technical-managerial, professional, and public employees. The total becomes larger as farmers (who are middle class, being proprietors) are added. Nothing is gained, and much is lost, by juggling

with distortions of the concept of class, or by stretching the meaning of "working class" and "proletariat" until they become all-inclusive, meaningless concepts. That does not conjure away the numbers or strength of the middle class; nor the important problems of differences in functional occupation and interests, the differences in historical background and psychology.

Yet it must be recognized that salespeople in stores are most akin to workers and that the relative position of white collars in general has seriously deteriorated since 1870. The wage-workers have moved upward, the white collars downward. Division and subdivision of labor among clerical workers make their jobs more routine and uninteresting; a modern office more and more resembles a factory as machines in use multiply (office-machine operators almost doubled in 1930-40, rising from 36,162 to 64,178); opportunities to get ahead are increasingly limited; differentials in pay shrink, and

constantly larger numbers of wage-workers are better paid than most white collars. Finally, economic security is crumbling; in the depression of the 1930's, unlike the experience in previous depressions, nearly as many white collars, proportionately, were thrown into unemployment as wage-workers. The general situation is thus summed up in a Census analysis of the white collar worker:

The average salary is only enough to meet demands of a very moderate standard of living. Little is left for savings. He lives all too frequently—as do many workers—face to face with the hazard of unemployment and with the risk of dependency in his old age. . . . [White collars] are a class between the usually better-educated and better-paid professionals and the less well-educated but better-paid skilled workers. The skilled workers (and increasingly other workers too) often belong to unions, and many of the professional persons belong to the professional societies, but only a small proportion of the clerical workers are organized. As a class they are not yet fully group conscious. Until recent years and in many cases until the present, the relation of clerical workers to their employers has been largely a personal relation. But the clerical class is becoming group conscious, it is beginning to organize. When it becomes thoroughly group conscious and completely organized it can exert a great influence on social and economic questions.

The failure of socialism to grow among the American people, which always puzzled and irritated Marxists, becomes understandable in part as the changes in class relations are considered. Much of the socialist agitation was based on the argument that "opportunity has come to an end." But the emphasis always was on the opportunity to become independent businessmen. In this connection the socialist argument was largely true after 1910, although up until that year the opportunity, while diminishing, was still there. But a whole new field for "oppor-

tunity to rise in the world" was opened up by the astonishing expansion of technical-managerial and professional employment (in which may be included the upper layers of white collar workers). The form was new but it *was* opportunity and it offered "careers open to the talents." This, along with other factors—no American feudalism, the measurable completion in the 1820's-30's of the struggle for political democracy, the unparalleled economic expansion which brought to the American people the highest living standards in the world—distinguished this country from Europe and explains the failure of socialism. Its lessons must be learned to understand the present and to project the future.

These new functional groups, moreover, were never brought within the Marxist class concept. They were, by and large, identified with the *bourgeoisie* as "class enemies." The theoretical expression of this was the Marxist analysis of surplus value (meaningful enough if it is broadened to include all useful labor, not only the manual industrial workers), which meant that, since the industrial proletariat alone produces surplus value, the useful functional groups of technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees, without whom production cannot carry on, are like the capitalists in being exploiters of labor! As the new middle class multiplied, the Marxists, especially the communists, tortured the class concept by insisting that most members of the new class were workers. A class concept was tortured to maintain its schematic purity. No effort was made to study concretely and objectively the new class relations; to modify the class concept, and the consequent social-economic program and action, to meet the new conditions. The new middle class remained, by and large, immune to unionism and socialism.

Sociology and International Politics

Helmut G. Callis is Professor of History at the University of Utah. This rather unique article by him calls attention once again to a fundamental fact: the student of politics must go not only to the political scientist but to the sociologist, psychologist, the geographer, the anthropologist, the philosopher, the economist, and other specially trained observers. It has already been noted that the world is composed of many cultures—some of them embodied in the framework of superior national power, some not. Any system of world order will have to be based upon the cultural diversity of mankind. What can the sociologist tell us about the relationship between a nation's values, its ideology, and its ways of providing life's necessities or its assumptions about life? What is "acculturation" and what is its effect upon politics? Can the sociologist suggest peaceful means whereby different cultures may adjust to one another? The significance of the sociologist's approach to international politics rests in looking at the latter in terms of conflicting values, institutions, and behavior patterns. The sociologist therefore sees other than political causes for international rivalry, and he also sees other than political foundations of peace.

With regard to the practical form studies in the Sociology of International Relations may take, it has been proposed to initiate exhaustive research into the present character of doctrines and values of great as well as smaller powers; for as every basic value has its set of norms of conduct, national action, as any other type of action, cannot be understood apart from a system of ultimate values. The task suggested is more difficult, however, than may first seem on the surface. In order to discover what the doctrines and cultural values of a people are, "to estimate their strength and the degree of their plasticity," it appears necessary to scrutinize closely the institutions, creative works, and aspirations in which values are embedded.

Values are intangibles; they must be

studied through forms of their materialization and behavioral expression, while due attention must be given also to their causal relations with history, environment, and economic resources. Moreover, the conscientious scholar can neither permit his investigation to be colored by the views of politicians and politicizing laymen who habitually look at foreign cultures with the lenses of their own; nor can he afford the risk of an equally popular and dangerous oversimplification, namely, of taking into account merely the prevalent opinions or majority opinions of the time, or predominant ideologies as may be peculiar to a leading class or to a government in power. Karl Mannheim's point is probably well taken that "people tend to imitate the actions and opinions of the ruling classes" and that

From "The Sociology of International Relations," by Helmut G. Callis, *American Sociological Review*, June, 1947. (Footnotes omitted.)

"national character in this sense is really the behavior which is characteristic of the ruling classes and is gradually adopted by their subordinates."

Nevertheless, the social scientist who studies living societies in their entirety and is interested in the dynamics of their movements should not lose sight of ideological undercurrents and of the growth or the disintegration of social groups, regardless of whether these groups happen to be minorities or whether they are leading, led, or suppressed. Open-mindedness in this respect will be an invaluable aid to gauge the strength of ideological currents and the tendencies of institutional change. In particular, the modern sociologist, in due appreciation of the growing interdependence of contemporary world affairs, needs constant awareness that "the culture of the world is not a mere sum of its parts . . . the behavior of any local portion is a function not merely of its own traits and ideological assumptions and attendant values, but also of an interaction of these with the quite different ones of other cultural elements and nations." Analytical observation of actual interaction to determine the elements operative on each side and their consequences is not easy to execute, but recognition of its necessity is the condition of adequate judgment of actual social events.

Research into national structures and values must be looked upon only as a first and preparatory step, to be followed up by a second, even more difficult one, namely, of suggesting ways and means of adjusting national cultures to each other. In this connection Robert C. Angell points to the great difference between the national and international spheres. Within a nation the political process is guided by law, and law in turn is based on fundamental values commonly accepted by the people. In the international realm, by contrast, mores have not developed to

the point of providing standards for either politics or law.

Keeping this in mind, the suggestion that the establishment of "one world" should begin with the drafting of a world constitution appears utopian, for such an approach disregards the fact that a constitution grows out of the common assumptions of the human beings to whom it applies. Until those assumptions actually exist, any constitution will not be much better than a piece of paper. The American colonies and states could be united under a constitution because they recognized that they belonged to a common culture. The nations of the world, by contrast, do not yet recognize that they belong to a common culture.

Facts such as these suggest that the attack on the problem of cultural accommodation must begin with assimilating basic values rather than with trying to impose common law from above. On the other hand, nobody will suppose that all existing national ends and values can be or ought to be harmonized. Here Northrop's observation is in order, that certain nations or cultures may be found to rest on different but compatible assumptions; others, upon different but contradictory ideals. In the case of compatible cultures the task will then be that of correctly relating the compatible elements of the two cultures by enlarging the ideals of each to include those of the others so that they enforce, enrich, and sustain rather than convert, combat, or destroy each other. Between contradictory doctrines, as for example Anglo-American and Russian economic theory, the problem will be to provide foundations for a new and more comprehensive theory.

A great deal can be learned of the process of assimilation from instances where cultural accommodation has taken place and is taking place within particular nations. Angell specifies several pertinent problems, such as what has

happened in large American cities where contrasting cultural threads have been woven together into a single fabric. How has this come about? In what manner does accommodation take place? Inquiries of this kind can be undertaken by sociologists with presently proved methods, and actually have been made in Hawaii. Investigations of the accommodative process in Switzerland, Belgium, and the Soviet Union might provide useful data which if used with discernment may well enlighten the student of international affairs.

Conversely, examples will also be worth studying where accommodation failed or remained imperfect. Here Germany's ambivalent role in Western civilization may deserve close scrutiny. The war years have thrown an interesting light on Japan's rather technical adjustment to Western ways, and there is strong evidence that the Japanese case reflects a more general danger in the relations between East and West. Nationalist policies and colonial administrations offer numerous examples where acculturation of the subjects was more or less systematically discouraged and, in some cases, even punished, with the result that learning did not take place or took place only partially. In such cases accommodation may affect only those ideas, attitudes, and habits of the individual or group which center around some special interest, such as religion, politics, or economic concern. Even if allowed to respond freely to the differences encountered, individuals will frequently imitate only skills, food habits, and attitudes which satisfy their own culturally acquired drives. However, genuine assimilation, Kimball Young warns, must "reach into the deeper and wider areas of personality involving fundamental values and attitudes."

On the basis of such rather thorough assimilation, which would involve the sharing of common experience, a new

culture may gradually develop which is a synthesis of the old and of the new formed in the very process of cultural contact and growth. In our time nothing less than that will probably be required to attain a truly "one world." Even if our civilization survives the atom bomb and is allowed to enjoy continuous cultural growth, the process cannot be magically telescoped. The more necessary, however, that it be intelligently promoted and scientifically guided.

It needs no special emphasis that cultural assimilation can be achieved without attempting to obliterate cultural differences indiscriminately. There are many different values which can well exist side by side, and which give peoples character and color. Fortunately, most values which can be shared and would enrich those who do share them are expressed in human endeavors of the spirit, intellect, and the arts. There are less desirable values, however, which are disruptive and mutually exclusive by their very nature, such as chauvinism of all types, racial prejudice, religious intolerance, and, generally, belief in force. Again other ends and aspirations would have to be molded by wise, scientific and educational leadership so as to fit together. Disinterested scholars, drawn from many different lands, could best consider how their several cultures can support each other and the common good and, returning to their homes, teach their findings.

It has already been mentioned that mutual adjustment of national cultures is not merely a matter of change in values but also of change of institutions in which traditional values have become crystallized. Institutions in any given society, we are reminded by Talcott Parsons, are closely interdependent and form a compact system of great rigidity; institutionalized patterns "mobilize a combination of forces in support of their maintenance" and are, in addition, usually

backed up by "vested interests." Often these vested interests thrive on ideologies and prejudices which they themselves create and maintain. Some of them are traditionally founded and bolstered by time-honored "legitimacy," such as in Shinto Japan or dynastic India; others are of very recent origin, such as the official communist doctrine of the Soviet Union. But whether traditional or not, these vested interests have the common characteristic that they have a stake in the *status quo* and that, in their fear of its disturbance, they tend to close themselves up by mental and material means against outside influences. By so doing they build formidable barriers against institutional change and international adjustment.

It is significant that the strong moves toward closed societies, conspicuously increasing in the last decades, are spearheaded by governments, a fact which may raise doubts as to whether governments will eliminate the ideological barriers in the future which governments erected in the past. In this connection the point made by Parsons is noteworthy that "ideological formulation often reflects a need to justify, which may imply a sense of insecurity," and that "consciousness of contrasts with other societies is one major factor in this." The wilful avoidance of contact with, and adjustment to, a changing situation surrounding such a closed society creates in turn "strains," leading to a pronounced proclivity to take offense and, under certain circumstances, to aggression.

If social disaster is to be avoided, the vicious circle must be cut somewhere. Fortunately, rational adaptation to new situations is a fundamental component of human social behavior. As cognitive enlightenment can often affect important changes, organized science can become a vehicle to bring such enlightenment. Social science can uncover the nature and

the principal components of the forces maintaining antiquated institutions. It can make society conscious of the inevitability of change in a fundamentally and permanently changed situation. It can show "flexible" points, where principal openings for institutional change and control of a social system are to be sought. It can discover "allies" on the side of change which every complex society contains. Quite generally, it can strengthen rationality in the conduct of social affairs. As soon as we then have the courage and character to apply scientific knowledge to our social relations, man, the creator of culture, should also be able to find cultural means to attain for humanity the maximum rewards in living.

Discussions of different nations and plans for their future are often carried on with too much emphasis on political and economic machinery, while too little understanding is manifest of the social structure of society. Indeed, preoccupation with political and economic factors and the spread of nationalism, attendant upon the predominance of the European culture in the last two centuries, has obscured the fact that the sixty or more major nations of the world fall culturally and historically into six main categories. These six culture areas may be briefly described as follows:

(1) The European culture area. It is divided into a southern or Latin branch and a northern or Germanic branch, the latter including America and the member states of the British Empire.

(2) The Russian culture area. It includes the East-European and Asiatic nations which, grouped around a racially Slavic nucleus, are now ideologically integrated through the doctrine of communism.

(3) The Chinese culture area. It includes all nations of the Far East and Southeast Asia that historically derived

their philosophy, script, and learning mainly from Chinese sources.

(4) The Hindu culture area. It includes mainly the provinces and states of India.

(5) The Islamic culture area. It is now politically organized around the Arab League but has cultural affiliates in India and Indonesia.

(6) The Hispano-Indian culture area of Mexico, Central, and South America. Other groups are culturally and politically of minor importance or include tribes along the margins of civilization.

The study of nations in their cultural context seems to constitute a profounder and more systematic approach to the problem of international relations and adjustment than any other so far attempted. It is based on the recognition that every political society, from the nomad tribe to the sovereign nation, builds up its own ethos and distinctive culture, and that national cultures are not self-sufficient and isolated phenomena but related to others in culture families. Hence, cultural ideology gives a key to the understanding of the social structure and action of nations and, by the same token, offers an organic basis for ordering their relations. Political, legal, and economic agreements of reasonable permanence will be relatively easier where cultural and ideological affiliation is close. The relations between Canada and the U.S.A. or between the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations are impressive examples.

In our thinking of the conduct of nations we must therefore realize that the psychological and cultural factors are in the long run essential. It is hardly to be expected that sixty sovereign states can be brought directly into a working world federation; but five or six culture regions, each with a structure of its own, might conceivably effect such an organization. In due consideration of this important

circumstance Lundberg, among others, is emphatic in recommending research on cultural regionalism. It would, he explains, "provide means and instruments for the determination of local and regional equilibria in different parts of the world, after which we might discuss with some semblance of intelligence subjects of world organization." Today, he adds, we seem to be committed to prevent regional integration at all costs, while at the same time we profess to be interested in world organization and peace.

Research in the comparative science of national cultures and their interaction may well be undertaken in three successive steps.

First, examination of the ideology and social structure of individual nations. These would be descriptive and analytical studies of national ideologies, institutions, social groups, and national aspirations.

Second, comparative study of nations in the context and as subspecies of their respective culture area. Such comparisons should be made with a view of those nations' political, economic, and cultural integration into that area. For example, Germany's role and problem of adjustment to other Western nations may be examined, or Japan's adjustment to nations of the Chinese culture circle.

Third, a comparative study of world culture regions and of the problem of their integration and mutual accommodation, such as between Russian and European cultures, Hindu and Chinese civilizations, or, broader still, East and West. After a wealth of basic data has been gathered, this final step may then lead up to "the making of suggestions and the working out of tentative schemes for world cultural accommodation."

At present, world cultural integration is a far-off ideal, and the consciousness of irreconcilable differences is rather conspicuous everywhere. Squarely facing this

contemporary dilemma; F. S. C. Northrop has the great merit of having put forward in a revolutionary manner the problem of how world cultures may supplement each other so as to form a basis for world understanding. One such possibility is seen by him in a synthesis of the scientific, "theoretical" component of the Occident with the "aesthetic" component of the Orient, where "universal sensitivity to the beautiful" and the "calm joy of the spirit" were traditionally cultivated. While contemporary diplomats and statesmen grope somewhat helplessly and negatively with the problem of removing conflicts, and while there is little practical evidence for real understanding in the realm of politics, social scientists can in this way prove their leadership by laying the foundations for such understanding in the future.

Several main factors have been suggested as qualified to aid in the transformation from national and regional cultures into one-world culture:

The first of these factors is the traditional similarity of the social ideals of the great world religions. Their aim and ethos is basically the same all over the globe. It is the sublimation of passionate self-concern in a wider fellowship of men and of the spirit, the altruization of men. By extending civilized standards of conduct from small local groups to ever wider circles of believers, the great world religions have been in the past the most important factor in making men social-minded. It would be a mistake to minimize the rôle played even today in the Western civilization by what are vaguely called "Christian ideals" or "Christian ethics." There is here a source of common feeling, which, however obscure and inarticulate, helps to keep in being an underlying sense of common values and of affinity between Western peoples.

However, it is characteristic of our time that the great traditional religions

have been thrown into retreat and decay in all regions of the world. They all have been defiled by the shortcomings of those who practice them and watered down by contacts with other creeds. They are overgrown with superstitions and have taken on local color and prejudices incompatible with their assertions of universality. In particular, they all greatly suffer now from the clash of their revealed truth with the empirical truth of modern science. For all these reasons they have lost much of their former ability to perform the ethical function of altruization and social integration, although this function seems to be more necessary today than ever before in human history.

In view of the totally new situation that men face in the modern era, it is probable that religious creeds will have to be resurrected in new form rather than revived in their old. "But the very number and diversity of conceptions of what the good and the divine is give the lie... to the ever present proposal that a return to the traditional morality and religion is the cure for our ills. All that such proposals accomplish is the return of each person, each religious denomination, each political group or nation to its own pet traditional doctrine. And since this doctrine (or the sentiments which it has conditioned) varies at essential points from person to person, group to group, nation to nation, and East to West, this emphasis upon traditional religion and morality generates conflicts and thus intensifies rather than solves our problem." * Therefore, there must be recognition that true universality, an indispensable prerequisite of "one-world" culture, cannot be achieved by any contemporary branch of religion without merging into the unity of a profounder and more comprehensive faith. Such unity in turn, cannot be attained without reconciliation with the

* F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (Macmillan; 1946), p. 6.

second factor of equally universal character and equally qualified to assist in the formation of world culture; modern science.

P. A. Sorokin rightly emphasizes that "from the integralist standpoint, the present antagonism between science, religion, philosophy, ethics and art is unnecessary, not to mention disastrous." The fact that modern scholarship ignores morality, while morality is unaware of scholarship, is called by A. Meiklejohn a "radical defect of most of our current educational work." To heal the unwholesome breach between science and religion, science must shake off its own orthodox belief that values have no reality because they defy, as non-sensory intangibles, the test of the laboratory.

To become an integrating and constructive factor in world culture modern science, similarly as traditional religion, must first struggle through to a broader outlook than the present separation in branches and departmental divisions seems to permit. Modern science must rebuild its own divided house, particularly by overcoming the current schism between its natural and its social science branches. The first step toward that goal requires wider comprehension of the fact that man and social events, since they are part of nature, cannot themselves be but subject to universal natural law. It follows that only knowledge of and respect for these laws will open scientific avenues for the control of human nature and hence of men's social affairs.

As acceptance of scientific truth spreads to all parts of the globe, men, instead of remaining creatures of their respective regional cultures, can become, with the aid of science, the conscious creators of a universal culture of the race. Therefore, no other single factor could be as important for the formation of world culture as the unification of scientists everywhere, under the pilot of what

Thorndike termed "scientific ethics." A united front of the world's intelligentsia, loyal to nothing but to scientifically verified truth, may have a voice strong enough to insist successfully—even against governments—on intelligent conduct in social affairs. Such a united front would, of course, be enormously strengthened by a firm coalition between natural and social scientists in the service of human welfare instead of national power. In our Western civilization the memory of the medieval community of Christian scholars, when all learned men had a language in common and conferred freely as members of one spiritual and intellectual body, still stirs the imagination. It may well be that in our time that community must be revived on a world scale as the first real step on the road to cultural world unity.

In addition to religion and science there is another movement today purporting to offer a universal purpose prerequisite to the creation of world culture: communism. Communism, like religion, has suffered much from the fanaticism and imperfections of those who practice it. Communism, unlike religion and, in accordance with its nineteenth century tradition, expresses itself in terms of a materialistic process rather than a moral end. But its materialistic doctrine, neglectful and disrespectful of values other than its own, shares with the contemporary divisions of religion and science the defects of being a "system of one-sided truth"; however, seen in the proper perspective of its limitations, the contribution of the communist doctrine to future world understanding may be recognized to the extent as it extolls and realizes the universal principle of greater material equality within and among nations; for there can be no doubt that world culture is dependent on peace, and peace will be hazardous without a reasonable amount of equality in economic development and opportunities.

The question has been discussed recently whether or not mass production and industrial standardization, after having swept beyond America and Europe and imposed similar technical modes of living on the rest of the world, will not lead automatically to cultural standardization. It has been argued that "when the Frenchmen, Americans, Russians, and Italians use much the same machinery, light their homes with identical electric lamps, use similar telephones and regulate their lives in much the same way, they necessarily think alike about many essentials. And when alien peoples think alike about the same things, dress themselves in more or less the same kind of clothes, look at the same movies, and listen to the same music, they are well on the road to thinking alike on political, economic, and social problems." However, as long as people, though they may bathe in bathtubs of the same make, may still hate each other, it will be wise not to put too much trust in beneficial and automatic social effects of our

technical modes of living. Also, in view of what has happened in our technically highly advanced Western civilization, still reft apart by nationalisms, it may be suspected that social integration must take place in higher reaches of the human mind than are engaged in using standardized gadgets.

Finally, it should be realized that inquiries into the basis of world understanding must be conducted with a positive aim in view. Attainment of understanding and peace, if they mean no more than the absence of war, are merely negative accomplishments. Indeed, nowhere is a more perfect peace to be found than in a cemetery. World understanding should be the basis of something positive if it is to be worthwhile. The ideal to be sought after is a cultural synthesis, a community of values, a cooperative worldwide endeavor in technical, economic, scientific, and artistic accomplishment, incomparably superior to those of the national and regional cultures in our day.

5

SOCIETY AND POLITICS: THE GROUP STRUCTURE

I

Groups constitute one of the most important organizational features of modern society. When human associations become somewhat formalized, when there is genuine cohesiveness, and when there is a group will and directing force, a "free standing" group is said to exist. Without some such definite concept of group, the term might embody all associational relationships from those involving everyone with red hair to those in which people speak of themselves as "we."

To be more precise, there are broad major types of groups: economic, political, racial, social, religious. The CIO is an economic group; so is the National Association of Manufacturers. The nation is a political group; the Republican Party in America and the Labor Party in Great Britain are political groups. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a racial group. The Methodist Church is a religious group. The American Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A. are social groups. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

These groups can be differentiated on another basis. Six kinds of groups may be distinguished: capitalistic enterprises; struggle groups; governmental units; benevolent groups; churches; and clubs, associations, and co-operatives. "Struggle groups" is clearly a term which includes political parties, economic pressure groups, and ideological groups—groups directly engaged in the struggle for political power or advantage. Ideological groups are those with definite theories, social ideals, slogans, and symbols. Such groups may comprise formal political parties or they may be outside the political party structure, and may differ widely as to methods; but ideological groups—liberal, conservative, socialist, communist, military, to name a few—have one thing in common: they wish in some way to modify the existing social and political order. As cleavages of opinion over the nature of the good society have become more pronounced, these groups have become more clearly defined and important. It may seem as though we have introduced kinds of thinking or shades of opinion into a discussion of groups which are organized and tangible. It is therefore necessary

to point out that specific working groups give expression to ideological interests. The Progressive Citizens of America and Americans for Democratic Action express liberal views and objectives. The Communist Party, some trade unions, and the American Student Union reflect communist ideology. A conservative ideological group is the League for Constitutional Government. The Fabian Society in England was one of the first ideological groups to represent socialist theory.

II

Among the methods or techniques available to groups in the pursuit of their aims are the political. Increasingly, groups have chosen to use political methods. Why? It will be useful at this point to draw a line between groups whose objectives are political—the ideological groups for example—and those which have nonpolitical objectives. For the former, the answer to the question is self-evident, but for the latter, the question has important implications. The complexity of society has created a situation wherein groups find it difficult or impossible to protect themselves or achieve their ends using only their own resources. The farmer contends he needs government subsidies to protect him from the actions of other economic groups. Labor is guaranteed the right to bargain collectively with management. To compensate the employer for higher wage rates government may be compelled to facilitate a rise in prices or to forego price control. Small business will insist upon the use of public power to ameliorate the competitive practices of big business. Minority groups demand the insertion of equal rights clauses in national laws. Business in general will solicit government standards to testify to the quality of products, standards which the consuming public will accept.

Groups represent a series of smaller wills. The question is often asked: "Why is it that narrow, selfish group interests triumph over the general interest and welfare?" There are several answers, some of which are analyzed below, but two concern us here. People are astonished at the way an Antisaloon League or an Association of American Railroads or an Association of Real Estate Boards can actually write legislation and shape public policy in spite of either majority disinterest or opposition. In the previous chapter a point was made of the lethargy and tendency toward political irresponsibility of the mass of individuals; a point was also made of the present political complexities which obscure who is doing what and why. Vacuum and confusion make fertile soil for the group which seeks only its own welfare. Again, the American system is so constructed that local group interests have a powerful voice. Senator Hiram Johnson of California used to say "I just can't afford to take a 'national' view of a proposed tariff on olive oil." He was perfectly sincere and was simply admitting one of the facts of political life. Above all, it is organization which is the key to group success. The question put, then, should be rephrased to include the idea of organized interest or will against unorganized interest or will. Whatever one may have thought of the Eighteenth Amendment (Prohi-

bition) it is a tribute to the success of a relatively small, tight organization which was proficient in technique and steadfast in purpose—the Antisaloon League.

Not all group activity is antisocial or selfish. We have already suggested that groups take some of the burden off the state by performing regulatory functions or in supplementing government regulation. Furthermore, a study of congressional hearings (with all their circus aspects and other defects) is partial, yet convincing, proof that groups may help opinions to coalesce, may really represent public opinion in all of its directions and lines. Public opinion polls will one day be, if they are not already, important democratic devices. However, as long as society is fragmented, groups will continue to undertake an indispensable representative function. The League of Women Voters is an outstanding example of this. Indeed, one might ask, how could individual needs be known to government except by formulation through various groups?

III

America is passing through a critical period in her history; it is more than ever necessary that the American people be united behind a common set of values, that national morale be strong, and that nothing impair the discovery and support of common aims. Do the great number of "free standing groups" constitute a barrier to the unity of American society? Previously an affirmative answer was indicated. Specifically, why must such be the case?

The very existence of so many groups, even when they are not in conflict, tends to emphasize *non*common goals rather than common goals. Despite common values—democratic ideology—groups may not agree on common action. The American Council for Judaism and the Zionist Organization may be said to share the same basic values, but they disagreed sharply on the desirable settlement of the Palestine question in 1947 and 1948.

Aside from sheer numbers of groups, another difficulty is that groups are disconnected; it is awkward to wield groups with common aims into smoothly operating teams. Where coalitions are formed, it isn't long before some group is going off again on its own. The ninety-odd groups who threw themselves behind the campaign to sell the United Nations under State Department guidance in 1944 and 1945 was a standout exception. In addition, few groups take on the task of speaking for the whole society.

IV

More serious perhaps is group conflict. It is well to note the variety of group conflict; conflict which embraces nation versus nation, racial antagonism, ideological clash (totalitarianism versus democracy) and diverse interests: labor versus management, small business versus large, rural versus urban, and so forth. The possibilities of group conflict are almost limitless.

However, it should be recognized that not all group conflict is dangerous or unhealthy; disagreement is a normal human trait and is the product of biological and social differentiation which is inherent in the world as it is. Not all public questions directly involve the clear interest of the whole as over against any of its parts. All groups are not of the same magnitude in their disruptive effects. Peace and stability do not consist in the total absence of group opposition. Instead, the key to stability is to be found in the methods by which group cleavages work themselves out, in building bridges of understanding across group lines, and in the development of national leadership which has as one of its skills the maintenance of a rough equilibrium between groups. The late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whatever other faults he had, could compel labor leaders to back down on unreasonable or politically unwise demands without losing labor's confidence. The real problem is disruptive, socially wasteful conflict.

The sources of group conflict are critically important and will be probed fully in one of the selections to follow. Groups which strike out at one another usually do so out of one kind of fear or another. Short of such an outbreak, emotional insecurity of individuals may find outlet in prejudice and discrimination. Differences in culture may become the basis for "in-group" and "out-group" feelings. Certainly one prolific source of international friction is the tendency of many of us to believe, for instance, that because competition in all things is so much a part of the American culture it is a universal human trait; and where competition is not practiced, an abnormality has crept in. It is disturbing to realize that the first earthly breath we draw finds us born into a given culture; automatically and without any decision on our part, the foundation is laid for possible hostility between ourselves and someone born into a different culture.

On a different plane, groups may covet the same prize. Labor and capital have gradually come to the point in their rivalry where they are—not exclusively, of course—contending for shares in the fruits of production: profits. Sources of conflict of this kind also are expressed in lesser magnitude: the CIO and the AFL may want to unionize the same workers. A clash of aims between the League to Promote Decency and the American Civil Liberties Union is not without political implications.

If fear begets group conflict on the national level, its counterpart, threats to security, operates similarly on the international level. The cold war between Russia and America is a struggle to lay hold upon elements of security deemed essential to each. An assumption underlying the whole bipolar rivalry is that the leadership in the two nations appears convinced that the one is a menace to the security of the other. Several significant factors determine the foreign policies of the two great powers, but both undoubtedly are influenced by fears and weakness. Military insecurity is only part of the picture. The political methods and values espoused by the Russians cut directly across unsolved problems in the United States, and it may be surmised that subconscious awareness

of our failures has made us unusually sensitive to the propaganda line taken by the USSR—particularly in countries we would like to regard as our friends. On their side, the Russians haven't been able to quite shrug off the practical achievements of "dying capitalism" and the immediate industrial superiority of the United States, as well as the substantial freedoms enjoyed in American society.

A final source of group conflict is rooted in the maneuvering of leaders to recapture, preserve, or augment their power. It is one of the tragedies of human history that masses of men have paid the high price for personal ambition and vanity indulged in by leaders great and small. Examples are manifold. There is always a lurking suspicion that recurring "crises" or prolonged tension are deliberate devices of forces already in power to create an artificial need for their continuance in office and for further sufferance of their methods. The career of John L. Lewis suggests periodic strategies which added not one whit to the strength of his unions but which fortified his personal position. The social cost of this has been considerable. Father Coughlin and others like him have set faith against faith, social group against social group in order to build an organization of private power. Church groups have been split wide open for more than doctrinal reasons. The struggle over unification of the armed services of the United States involved a rivalry between Army and Navy top brass for positional power under the new organization. Myths, ideologies, and programs will often drive the leadership struggle into the background. A sophisticated view of politics will seek to identify the personal equation in group conflict.

V

In what ways does group conflict achieve political significance? To begin with, groups, as stated, employ political means to further their ends. Organized labor—one branch of it—has established a Political Action Committee designed to generate voting support for suitable (pro-labor, or at least not anti-labor) candidates; the door to door solicitations and educational campaigns have been unique in American political history. While there is no such thing as a labor bloc vote including all labor, the effectiveness of the PAC in certain districts is beyond doubt. Negroes have been kept in restricted status by political devices—poll tax, white primary, literacy tests. Butter interests have consistently deprived the margarine interests of a worthwhile market by the expedient of a legislated tax on margarine.

Group tensions are so serious in modern society that government power is almost bound to be involved. A recurring problem is how to balance group and group, and how to balance group interest and general welfare. Shall Catholic school children be carried in busses financed by public funds? Shall there be an import tax on wool to protect a small group of domestic wool growers? Shall insurance companies be exempted from operation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act? Courts, administrative agencies, and Congress are pondering issues

like these constantly. Few of them can be solved by private regulation or co-operation.

Minority groups who are guaranteed basic civil liberties by the Constitution of the United States are daily deprived of those rights by practices of social groups. Private agencies censor freedom of speech; advertisers exert pressures upon radio and newspapers. Negroes are discriminated against in voting and employment. Jews are excluded from professional schools. Prejudice is one thing—a serious thing; but discrimination may mean someone's livelihood is jeopardized. Public enlightenment is a tedious remedy for such illegal conduct; the only recourse minority groups have is judicial or political action. That issues of this kind can reach deep into practical politics is borne out by President Truman's Civil Rights Program announced in February, 1948. Southern Democrats responded violently and immediately. If adopted, the Truman program would have at least partially altered the Negro's position in the South, a result which would have run counter to the bicultural tradition. Obliteration of political rights by social group action is one more facet of the connection between group rivalry and politics.

Group tension in the United States, in addition to the discrepancy between our avowed policy of equality and our apparent racial discrimination, has embarrassed the United States abroad. The USSR has managed to conquer this problem through cultural autonomy and racial tolerance. Since the two countries are in a sense competing for the political allegiance of the rest of the world, the larger proportion of which is not white, the United States suffers some disability. Particularly is this true in the Orient where so much is at stake for America. Lest this be suspected as an academic point, let two facts be remembered. First, Walter White, secretary of the American Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the United States, submitted a several hundred page report on the caste status of the American Negro to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1947. The report was officially accepted by that body and circulated to the membership. Second, late in 1946 the United States opposed the United Nations' taking cognizance of a complaint by India that Hindus in the Union of South Africa were being subjected to racial discrimination. The Soviet Union supported the resolution introduced by India and the stand of the United States was repudiated.

Group conflict within nations can be used as a weapon of international diplomacy. The communists have systematically exploited the ideological differences between the Rightists and the Socialists, differences between urban and rural interests—as they do in France. Hitler's propaganda evidenced a certain insight into the weakening cleavages in the western democracies. Organized groups representing interventionist and isolationist points of view kept up a vigorous combat which temporarily helped to paralyze American foreign policy. German agents here and abroad shrewdly perceived the nature of this split and used it to their purposes.

Finally, group rivalry is related to politics because public policy in a state

where groups are permitted free expression must be largely based on a common ground which can be distilled out of diverse interests. For years—and it is still somewhat true—the American tariff was a matter of putting the demands of producers for protection within a single legislative act; naturally, a good deal of “log rolling” was necessary. The Taft-Hartley Act was not entirely a victory for the forces of management. It represented also some labor bargaining power. The balance of power among group shifts over time, and group legislation (or legislation affecting groups) will reflect it.

The Anatomy of Group Conflict

Robin M. Williams, Jr., is a member of the faculty at Cornell University. He prepared this survey as a result of deliberations by a Committee on Techniques for Reducing Group Hostility established by the Social Science Research Council in 1945. The section quoted below reflects the focus of the report on relations among racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the United States. Actually the analysis would be appropriate for any national political scene. Numerically more of the human race is associated in racial, ethnic, and religious groups than in political or economic groups. In discussions of the political implications of group conflict, the tendency has been to concentrate on “pressure groups” as such. Such emphasis has created an oversimplified idea that group conflict is simply a matter of groups wanting the same things or wanting something which is injurious to another group—in other words, conflict of interests. Mr. Williams shows that intergroup hostility is more subtle than that. Among other lessons in this study is the important one that insofar as intergroup tensions and rivalries do comprise a major segment of politics the latter becomes very complicated indeed. The analysis to follow is in general terms and the reader should provide his own application of it and relate it to his own experience.

Few things are more obvious in present day society than the great prevalence and intensity of hostility and conflict among various types of social groups. On the one hand, within a period of less than forty years there have been two world wars, a number of major revolutions, and dozens of undeclared wars, insurrections, rebellions, *coups d'état*, and other disorders of

a mass-political character. On the other side, during this comparatively short period of recent history there has occurred an enormous proliferation of race riots, anti-Semitic disturbances, strikes and other labor-management conflicts, ethnic group clashes, and many disruptive movements based on systematic philosophies of hate and violence. Nazi systematization

From *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, by Robin M. Williams, Jr. Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57, 1947.

of "racialism," for example, posed a threat to fundamental democratic tenets and liberal institutions. Hardly anywhere in the major societies of the world could one find today a person who has not been touched by the crosscurrents of intergroup antagonism and conflict. These extraordinary demonstrations of human capacities for conflict could scarcely have failed to attract the attention of social scientists, statesmen, religious leaders, industrial and labor leaders, and many other responsible persons in the role of private citizens.

Hostilities and conflicts among intranational groups have evoked serious thought in recent years. When such hostility has taken the form of ethnic, religious, or racial cleavages it has had a particularly sharp impact because of its incompatibility with some of the most important historical values and cultural axioms of Western society. The incongruities are very clear in the United States. In the value-system which has been at least nominally dominant throughout most of American national history, a central element has been what may be called a "universal" ethic. This ethic formally enjoins certain important rules of behavior which are supposed to apply to everyone regardless of his particular status or group membership. At its most explicit level this type of principle appears in the Golden Rule, in the categorical value placed on honesty and fair play, in Constitutional and other legal requirements which stress rights and duties regardless of color, creed, class, or national origin. It is manifest likewise in the belief that individuals should be rewarded according to their personal qualities and achievements, rather than on the basis of birth in a particular group or class. Its ramifications can be traced in such seemingly unrelated things as competitive examinations for civil service positions, the one-price system, the code of being a good loser in competitive activities, the disapproval of nepotism and

favoritism in public office, and a great variety of other beliefs and practices which are generally taken for granted. Discrimination and hostility among intranational groups identified on the basis of race, national origin, or religion thus come into conflict with a central theme of what Myrdal has called the American Creed.

The marked development of sentiments of nationalism in the modern world has likewise sharpened awareness of internal conflict as a problem. In World War II recognition of the need for national unity in a warring world and of the threat of "divide and conquer" techniques called forth strong emphasis upon common American values and destinies. But the unifying sentiment that "we are all Americans" has often met qualifying and divisive definitions when applied to particular subgroups and classes: Negroes, Mexican or Spanish-Americans, Jews, Catholics, Japanese-Americans, and many others.

Aside from their importance in such considerations of unity, intergroup relations within the United States have possible repercussions in international relations. In connection with such world events and issues as colonial problems, the great ferment in India, the "Asiatic solidarity" propagandized by the Japanese, the widely publicized policies of the Soviet Union toward minorities, and the question of Palestine, the role of the United States in the international scene may be profoundly affected by developments in the relations of domestic groups. American statesmen who deal with world problems have to contend with world-wide press coverage of intergroup relations in the United States.

On another level intergroup hostility has aroused concern because of its challenge to a pervasive strain of optimism, belief in progress, and faith in the perfectibility of human society which have deep roots in American culture. Belief in progress is an unstated assumption which

underlies a common tendency of Americans to face social ills as problems and to say, "Let's do something about it." Serious problems of internal conflict are a fundamental challenge to this optimistic and activist orientation.

Current problems of intergroup relations are further thrown into sharp relief by their existence against the background of a long period of great technological advance and rising levels of material welfare. Even with the cohesive pressure of war, there are such outbreaks as race riots in the most highly developed industrial and economic centers. Such contrasts raise questions as to the possibilities of understanding and control in the area of intergroup relations. The immediate postwar period accents this uncertainty; for wartime solidarity is always subject to strains as the external pressures are relaxed, the external outlets for aggression are reduced, and the sharing in a dramatic common effort is succeeded in some measure by the resurgence of separate interests and divisive claims.

All these facets of intergroup tensions are colored by their distinctive American context, a central aspect of which is the extraordinary heterogeneity of the people. All Americans, save the American Indians, are recent immigrants—as Will Rogers aptly pointed out with reference to the *Mayflower* tradition when he said that his ancestors "met the boat." The varied cultures from which our population stocks have come have made intergroup tolerance, at least, not just a virtue but in some senses a societal necessity. Insofar as the melting pot is a mythical concept—and certainly there is far from complete assimilation of all groups into a homogeneous way of life—some basis for intergroup tolerance and collaboration has been essential for the nation's existence as a social system. So long as each year brought large number of new immigrants, a shifting and flexible hierarchy could develop

in which each new group entered at the bottom of the "pecking order" only to move up later to a position of dominance over newer groups. The diffuse character and shifting foci of many of the intergroup tensions which developed in this situation greatly mitigated their seriousness. In some respects also tensions were eased by an open economy with an expanding industrial system and large unexploited natural resources.

As a result of the cessation of large-scale immigration the racial, ethnic, and religious composition of the population is now becoming relatively stabilized. In the case of many population elements a gradual process of assimilation is blurring and erasing group differences. But certain other groups remain distinctive, either because of physical traits or because cultural traits of high visibility have been retained. Meanwhile, the national economy and social organization are beginning to exhibit traits of "maturity" and rigidity. In this situation intergroup tensions stand out with particular sharpness and, partly because of this, the impression that wholly new problems are emerging tends to develop.

The recognition of group conflicts in recent years has thus led to a sense of crisis which must be evaluated against historical perspective. There is a strong tendency in American thought to ignore or minimize the very considerable amount of international group conflict which has appeared in various periods of our history. Yet an examination of the record will show that internal hostilities and disorders have been by no means infrequent.

There were many instances of organized violence in the early periods of "political" disorder, e.g., Bacon's Rebellion in 1667, the Revolution, and the series of insurrections in the early days of the Republic. Numerous slave revolts occurred before the Civil War. Antiforeign and anti-Catholic agitation was more or less en-

demic for long periods, finding such expressions as the Know-Nothing movement of the middle nineteenth century. By the 1870's industrial strife had become important, exploding in the "Great Riots" of 1877 and again in the Pullman strike of 1894. Strikes with violence have appeared year after year. The long history of lynchings is well-known. There have been three periods of race riots: in the first decade of the 1900's, immediately after the First World War, and during World War II.

Such sporadic outbreaks of open violence may be regarded as the more obvious "fevers" symptomatic of deeper, more widespread, and persistent hostilities and conflicts. The increasingly penetrating scientific analyses of the last few decades have made a substantial beginning toward discovery and description of the chronic situational factors linked to these continuing hostility patterns. In addition, there is increased understanding of the role of temporary changes conducive to intergroup tension. It is known that there is a minimum of group conflict, however difficult to specify, which arises from relatively permanent features of our society, such as the type of economic system, certain patterns of child training, and the way in which our distinctive family system is related to the competitive occupational structure. Further, this structural conflict is sometimes greatly exacerbated by social changes and temporary strains which are, so to speak, superimposed upon the more permanent sources of tension. World War II and its aftermath represent one such period of rapid change and correlative strain and tension. It is understandable that certain types of intergroup conflict might become conspicuous in this situation. Awareness of the seriousness and urgency of its problems is not incompatible with recognition that the problems are old, in kind if not in quantity, and that research and other action may well be

focused on the continuing as well as the temporary features of the situation.

.....

In its broadest meaning prejudice may be considered simply as a *prejudgment* of individuals on the basis of some type of social categorization. A prejudice is thus a generalization which operates in advance of the particular situation in which it is manifested. An illustration is a stereotype which attributes a cluster of traits to individuals as representative of a group; it is thus in one aspect a cluster of cognitive judgments, implying a set of behavioral expectations. In another aspect it involves a set of evaluations. That is, the prejudice is not simply a set of expectations; it is also a set of evaluations of good and bad, superior and inferior. Thus a prejudiced individual brings to the immediate situation certain beliefs as to the traits of others, coupled with a positive or negative predisposition toward these traits.

Prejudice, in the general sense, is an inevitable and universal feature of social life. What is significant as a variable is the basis upon which any particular prejudice rests. The crucial distinction lies between prejudices which are based upon functional position in the social order or real differences in values, and those which emphasize stereotypes centered on symbols such as skin color which have no intrinsic functional importance. Thus, all prejudices represent action-sets of a categorical rather than situational or *ad hoc* character. But there is a great difference between "prejudices" against social positions such as employers, ministers, labor leaders, radio commentators, bootleggers, professors, landlords, etc., on the one hand, and prejudices against racial or cultural groups, on the other.

The particular type of prejudice which is important in understanding hostility and conflict among ethnic, racial, or reli-

gious groups is a *negative attitude which violates some important norms or values nominally accepted in the culture*. As a matter of fact, group prejudice has been defined as "a common attitude of hostile nature whose manifestations conflict with some aspects of the basic value framework of the society in which they occur."¹

Even in this narrower meaning prejudice is a blanket concept, covering a variety of concrete phenomena. The prejudice may be mild or violent. There is a contrast between prejudice manifested against groups with whom one has had no personal contact, and against those with whom contact is intensive and continuous. There is the prejudice of the provincial—to anything strange, different, "foreign"—and the rather different prejudice of the dweller in cosmopolitan centers. We may note in this connection that anthropologists have been able to make predictions about the behavior of nonliterate tribes in contact with Europeans simply on the basis of the absence of certain behavior patterns in the native culture. There is perhaps a closely analogous situation in the cases of persons who have spent their entire lives in communities with definite patterns of intergroup discrimination and prejudice. A radically different pattern is unknown; they have neither the motivations nor the social skills to deal with intergroup relations except in accordance with the traditional patterns of their local social system. Even with a large fund of "good will" such persons may be expected to show awkwardness, insecurity, and erratic shifts in behavior (and its accompanying affects) when they attempt to act in ways foreign to the accustomed and sanctioned modes. Prejudice in this context is certainly not the same concrete phenomenon as the

"deliberate" prejudice of the sophisticated urbanite.

Again, there is prejudice based on conformity to the social customs of a group as against the prejudice, anchored in deep aggressive needs in the personality, which may persist even in the face of group pressure. There is the prejudice of economic or political opportunism, often calculating and impersonal, in contrast to the fanaticism of the religious or cultural zealot. There is the prejudice manifested in a specific *idée fixe* concerning a particular group, on the one hand, and the prejudice expressive of generalized antipathy to out-groups, on the other. Even the prejudice which arises primarily out of individual psychological needs appears in many forms; it may serve, for example, as a projection of repressed hatreds and other "antisocial" urges of the individual, a prop for ego-level or sense of self-esteem, a defense against repressed sexual drives, or a method of winning group approval.²

Furthermore, although prejudice is often analyzed as if it were a unitary phenomenon—essentially the same whatever the particular groups in question—we are not yet convinced that this basic assumption has been proven valid. For example, Ichheiser³ has presented a rather plausible case for the view that anti-Negro and anti-Jewish prejudices are partly based upon, or at least "rationalized" in terms of, different sensed threats. His argument is, in part, that "fear of the gangster" is the more important component in the case of anti-Negro feeling whereas "fear of fraud" is dominant in the anti-Semitic complex. This suggestion needs further refining and testing,⁴ but

² Cf. Fritz Redl's discussion in *Intercultural Education News*, 7(4):3-5 (1946); also, G. W. Allport, *A B C's of Scapegoating* (Chicago: Central Y. M. C. A. College), pp. 15-23.

³ Gustav Ichheiser, "Fear of Violence and Fear of Fraud," *Sociometry*, 7:376-383 (1944).

⁴ Allport and Kramer report that students who said they were more afraid of "swindlers" than of

¹ G. H. Grosser and S. J. Korchin, "Some Theoretical Aspects of Group Prejudice and Conflict" (mimeographed paper from the Harvard University Seminar on Group Prejudice and Conflict, fall term, 1944-45), p. 2.

there is much evidence that the specific content of prejudice against Negroes differs from that against Jews, and these in turn from that against Catholics.⁵ To take only one illustration, a major theme for rationalizing anti-Negro feeling has been that of alleged intellectual incapacities or general biological inferiority; but one of the important elements in anti-Jewish stereotypes is just the opposite, namely, an emphasis upon alleged mental agility, shrewdness, and competitive success.

Our emphasis upon the fact that the concepts of prejudice or hostility merit further analytical dissection is by no means merely a matter of verbal quibbles, for the definition of the concepts inevitably involves different modes of action. If it were assumed that prejudice against each of the various minorities in the United States is "the same thing," it might be decided, for instance, that one line of therapy would be to furnish information about a group's accomplishments and to disseminate propaganda stressing the distinguished individuals in the group. Would the results be the same for Jews as for Negroes? For Mexican Americans as for Japanese? Or, suppose prejudice is conceived so broadly as to imply no difference between the prejudice of an Ozark farmer in a county having no Negroes in its population, and the prejudice of an Alabama planter in the Black Belt. It is surely possible that a program of amelioration based on this conception would have different results in the two cases. And to the degree that such differences may be anticipated, research

needs and possibilities become clearer and more significant.

It is clear from comparative study of situations involving intergroup relations that prejudice is not perfectly correlated with discrimination or conflict. Discrimination in some degree always accompanies prejudice, but a given state of prejudice may be accompanied by greatly varying degrees and types of discrimination. The latter may be generally defined as the *differential treatment of individuals considered to belong to a particular social group*. Like prejudice, discrimination in this sense is an inevitable and universal feature of social life. The social groups may or may not have a biological basis, and if they have, the biological referents may or may not be functional. The "discrimination" against women in public life, for example, is based in part on a biologically functional referent. Discrimination against Negroes, on the other hand, is based upon the culturally imputed significance of certain traits such as skin color which have no demonstrated relevance to biological function. Again, there is discrimination against religious, occupational, ethnic, and other groups which have no real or assumed biological referents. To arrive at a definitive view of discrimination it must be pointed out that in the context of intergroup relations the word ordinarily refers not merely to selective or differential behavior, but to such behavior *insofar as it violates important institutional standards* which usually are obligatory in certain areas of conduct. Thus, except for the probable deviations around such social norms, it is expected in our society that occupational opportunity will be available on the basis of merit or ability, that all citizens are entitled to specified legal rights, that economic transactions will be carried out according to the rules of the market. Discrimination may be said to exist to the degree that individuals of a given group who are otherwise formally

"gangsters" had higher prejudice scores *in general*. The authors suggest that a "suspicious philosophy of life" goes along with greater generalized prejudice toward outgroups. ("Some Roots of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology*, 22:9-39)

⁵ Studies reviewed by Arnold Rose (*Studies in Reduction of Prejudice*, *op. cit.*) indicate that changes in attitude toward a given minority group are not necessarily transferred to attitudes toward other minorities.

qualified are not treated in conformity with these nominally universal institutionalized codes.

A high level of active hostility shading into open intergroup *conflict* is still a third type of problem, not necessarily coextensive with the other two. Prejudice unquestionably is sharpest just prior to, during, and sometimes immediately after a conflict situation. But prejudice may exist in the absence of direct contact between groups, as formerly against the "terrible Turk" when there was no actual opportunity for direct conflict. Also, it must be remembered that a firmly established caste system, which in some respects represents an absolute maximum of prejudice, may operate with little open or no conflict.⁶

Now, taking conflict alone as the final expression of prejudice-hostility, we may distinguish at least three major types of "realistic" conflict, which differ in their bases of origin: conflict of interests, of values (cultural conflict), of personality types.⁷ Any intergroup conflict ordinarily involves all three types in varying proportions. With groups which are already culturally identified by clear symbols, the competition of members of the different groups for wealth, work, power, and various symbols of status and success defines a "realistic" conflict of interests. Similarly, there are often real intergroup differences in values, beliefs, personal habits, and customs. Such cultural differ-

ences may and often do lead to tangible disagreements on matters of considerable emotional importance to individuals; and both parties may be convinced of the rightness of their own positions. Third, because of varying modal patterns of family conditioning and perhaps other factors, different groups may contain different proportions of various personality types—a fact which does not appear to be wholly reducible to differences in the formal content of group culture. Insofar as such differences exist, interpersonal contacts may lead to irritation, hostility, and conflict.

In addition to these three main bases of "realistic" conflict, group hostility typically involves certain "unrealistic" components. At least three may be considered to have practical importance: ignorance and error, deflected hostility, historical tradition.

The influence of ignorance is widely recognized and is the object of much educational effort. Sheer unawareness of other groups' characteristics, especially lack of acquaintance with individuals, is conducive to exaggeration of intergroup differences and to receptivity to hostile propaganda. Erroneous judgments may be made even with fairly complete knowledge, if incorrect inferences are drawn from known facts. This is especially important in the case of imputations of "responsibility," e.g., when a decline in material rewards arising from complex forces in our economic system is imputed to specific groups which do not have any significant causal role in the situation.

Deflected hostility takes two main forms: projection and displacement. In the first, unacceptable elements in the personality are attributed to others; thus it is the other group which is said to be hostile, or scheming to exploit, and so on. In the second, hostility is directed against a source other than that which originally created it. In intergroup relations deflected

⁶ This example is enough to demonstrate that the mere minimization of *conflict* alone is not the goal of most groups concerned with intergroup relations in the United States. The problem is much more complicated. What many representatives of minority groups are actually seeking is a minimum of prejudice, together with a minimum of conflict, and a minimum of discrimination. At least in the short run, these objectives are not necessarily mutually compatible. For instance, the attempt to eliminate discrimination often leads directly to increases in hostility and conflict; efforts to avoid conflict, conversely, may perpetuate or reinforce patterns of discrimination.

⁷ Adapted from Gustav Ichheiser, "The Jews and Anti-Semitism," *Sociometry*, 9:92-108 (1946).

hostility may result in "overdetermined" reactions in which the hostility is out of all proportion to the realistic basis. This situation depends upon a complex set of factors . . . , but an essential element is the existence of much hostility which can not be directly expressed or otherwise dissipated within the groups in which it originates. The persistence and virulence of intergroup hostility is certainly not explicable without taking deflected aggression into account.

The factor of historical tradition must be accorded the status of a variable. Old rivalries, conflicts, and traumas are remembered, and traditional prejudices may tend to be perpetuated well beyond the point at which they cease to have any intrinsic relevance to current situations.

To appraise the relative importance of realistic and unrealistic components or of interests versus values in intergroup tension would be a very hazardous undertaking at the present stage of our understanding, although such appraisals are often given with surprising confidence and conviction. We can be reasonably sure, however, that any explanation of intergroup hostility in terms of a single factor like "purely economic competition" represents an oversimplification which is likely to encourage ill conceived action. Further, the known facts create a strong presumption that a main source of the persistence of intergroup hostility is precisely the *interlocking and mutual reinforcement* of cultural differences, other visible differences, realistic interests, deflected aggression, and other factors. In short, the most important questions may concern not the influence of particular factors but the way in which mutual reinforcement operates, and determination of the strategic factors in a plan for shifting the resultant pattern. In this connection, there is a definite possibility that the factors which are most important in producing hostility and conflict are by no means the same as

those which are most important *for control purposes*. Thus, the roots of intergroup hostility may lie in the early socialization of children in the home. But this process is so inaccessible to direct external control that other, even seemingly far removed, approaches may be much more promising for immediate action.

Such considerations as those sketched above are essential to fruitful orientation of research on techniques for reducing or controlling intergroup hostility. They indicate clearly, for example, that action programs may deal with either realistic or unrealistic components or both, and that the predicted effects may be expected to vary with the choices made. To take another application, the present analysis implies that even complete intergroup knowledge could not by itself eliminate group hostility. It implies, also, that indirect approaches which attack the realistic bases of conflict, perhaps without even ostensibly dealing with intergroup relations as such, have as valid a claim for consideration as do direct education or propaganda approaches.

Definitions.

In view of the need for rigorous conceptual distinctions, indicated in the preceding paragraphs, it is obligatory here to define the usages of certain key terms which will be followed in the remainder of the discussion. There probably is not as yet any one best definition for some of these terms; the usefulness of a particular definition often depends upon the context in which it is to be applied. Accordingly, the present formulations⁸ are regarded as tentative and there is no presumption of universal applicability:

⁸ These definitions have been markedly influenced by the discussions of Grosser and Korchin, *op. cit.*, and Talcott Parsons, "Racial and Religious Differences as Factors in Group Tensions," in L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein and R. M. MacIver, eds., *Approaches to National Unity* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945), pp. 182-199.

- (1) *Ethnic group*: one possessing continuity through biological descent whose members share a distinctive social and cultural tradition.
 - (2) *Racial group*: one whose members through biological descent share distinctive common hereditary physical characteristics.
 - (3) *Religious group*: one whose members share a common orientation (set of beliefs and values) toward real or imaginary things and events considered to be outside the area of ordinary human practice and control.
 - (4) *Group prejudice*: a common (shared) attitude of hostile nature toward a social group, whose manifestations conflict with some aspects of the basic value framework of the society in which they occur.
 - (5) *Group hostility*: a common (shared) attitude, as defined by verbal and non-verbal acts, which consists of tendencies to insult, disparage, ostracize, deprive, threaten, or inflict other physical or social injuries upon members of a social group *by virtue of membership therein*.
 - (6) *Group discrimination*: the differential treatment of individuals, insofar as this is based upon their membership in a given social group, which conflicts with important institutional rules within a society.
 - (7) *Competition*: a continuing struggle for scarce, distributive values in which the focus is upon reaching a goal rather than removing competitors, and which is regulated by rules prohibiting forceful removal of competitors. It may be completely impersonal and outside personal awareness.
 - (8) *Conflict*: a struggle over values (distributive or nondistributive) in which the immediate aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Conflict results from the conscious pursuit of exclusive values.
 - (9) *Aggression*: an act whose end is the belief that injury to or destruction of a person or his values and symbols has been achieved.
-

I. ORIGINS AND PREVALENCE OF HOSTILITY

1. It is a fact of observation that all individuals brought up in human society manifest some hostility toward other individuals or social groups.

It would seem a safe estimate that at least four-fifths of the American population lead mental lives in which feelings of group hostility play an appreciable role.⁹

In every known human society there appears to exist a varying amount of "free-floating aggression." This is thought to be mainly the product of the painful restraints put upon all immature human organisms during the socialization process *and* of the deprivations and frustrations which are incident to adult social life in all societies.¹⁰

...almost every intimate emotional relation between two people which lasts for some time...leaves a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which have first to be eliminated by repression.¹¹

2. The amount of hostility at any given time varies greatly among individuals, among specific groups, and among social systems. ("Amount" is defined by observable "manifestations"—ranging from group conflict in a physical sense to the analysis of dreams in personality study.)

3. The amount of hostility varies greatly for given individuals, groups, or social systems at different points in time.

General principle. Hostility is universal, but has a wide range of variation in intensity and incidence.

4. In all known social systems individuals conceive of themselves as belonging to certain groups to which they owe

⁹ Allport, G. W. and B. M. Kramer. "Some Roots of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology*, 22: 9-39 (1946), p. 9.

¹⁰ Kluckhohn, Clyde. "Group Tensions: Analysis of a Case History," in Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, *op cit.*, p. 224.

¹¹ Freud, S. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, London: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922, p. 34.

loyalty and within which there is an obligation to repress hostility. Invariably, repressed or suppressed hostilities generated in such we-groups are to some degree directed outside to other groups.

... whatever is different in social custom always arouses attention and tends to set up antagonisms.¹²

The identification of the individual with the group gives the emotional satisfaction of the ego urge, without the pang of conscience which accompanies it apart from the group.¹³

The greater and more intense the group feeling, that is, the stronger the identification between members of a group, the greater is the strength of the prejudice against the alien group and against those who are not members of one's own group.¹⁴

5. Infants and preschool children typically do not exhibit prejudice toward ethnic or racial groups. Prejudice is learned. (Horowitz and many others)

6. Prejudice may be relatively independent of the direct personal experience of the individual: definite prejudices often exist in the absence of any direct contact with members of the pre-judged group. (*Idem*)

... racial attitudes are not necessarily a function of "contact experience."¹⁵

II. TYPES OF HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT

7. Hostility directed outward from the self may operate at three (or more) levels of specificity: (a) generalized, "free-floating" aggression, (b) fixation on

¹² Young, Kimball. *Social Psychology*. New York: Crofts, 1935, p. 489.

¹³ Miller, H. A. *Races, Nations, and Classes*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1924, p. 134.

¹⁴ MacCrone, I. D. *Race Attitudes in South Africa*. London: Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 249.

¹⁵ Nettler, Gwynne. "The Relationship Between Attitude and Information Concerning the Japanese in America," *American Sociological Review*, 11:177-191 (1946), p. 182.

specific individuals, (c) fixation on social categories of persons (group hostility).

8. An important factor in racial or ethnic conflict is the pattern of *deflected aggression*. Some of the conditions defining this pattern are:

- (a) Frustrations or deprivations are imposed by sources which are either:
 - (1) difficult to define or locate, or
 - (2) persons or organizations in a position of power or authority over the individual, or
 - (3) persons to whom the individual is closely tied by affectional bonds.
- (b) Aroused hostilities are blocked from direct expression against the sources of frustration.
- (c) Substitute objects of aggression are available and are:
 - (1) highly *visible*, and
 - (2) *vulnerable*, i.e., not in a position to retaliate.

It appears that in the case of direct aggression there is always some displaced aggression accompanying it and adding additional force to the rational attack.¹⁶

This is a widespread, recurrent, and important pattern of emotional structuring in human society and is widely recognized on the level of common-sense observation. Ordinary examples are legion: the child punished by his parents destroys a toy or maltreats his pet; the employee humiliated by his superior "takes it out" on his family; the defeated small businessman joins an antiminority movement.

III. FACTORS IN THE INCIDENCE OF HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT

Question: What factors are associated with high or low intensity or incidence of hostility?

9. Hostility is a function of *frustration*; under certain conditions, the more

¹⁶ Dollard, John. "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," *Social Forces*, 17:15-26 (1938), p. 19.

frustration of important drives or socially induced needs, the more hostility. (Dollard and others...)

10. "Frustration" differs in its effects depending upon whether it is a mere "need-deprivation" or a sensed "personal-ity-threat." (Maslow...) Maximum hostility may be expected to result from frustrations which combine these characteristics: (a) they violate normal expectations which are felt to be morally justifiable; (b) they are felt to be unnecessary and avoidable; (c) they are perceived as a threat to the security system of the whole personality. (This usually means, a threat to the individual's sense of status. It is thus quite different from a simple deprivation of a segmental need.)

11. Hostility is a function of "insecurity"; the greater the insecurity, within limits, the more hostility.

If there be one established generalization from clinical psychology and psychiatry, it is that those who are insecure themselves manifest hostilities toward others.¹⁷

...anxiety is generated by a repressed hostility and...it in turn again generates hostility.¹⁸

12. Whatever its sources, hostility does not automatically lead to interpersonal or intergroup conflict. Instead, it may be structured in a variety of ways which, however, are not indeterminate but are the outcomes of specific types of social situations.

13. Once generated, hostility is structured intrapersonally through such familiar psychological mechanisms as repression, projection, and displacement.

Aggression, whether overt or masked, is not, to be sure, the only possible adjustive response. Withdrawal, passivity, sublimation,

conciliation, flight and other responses are sometimes effective in reducing the motivation of those who have been deprived or threatened.¹⁹

14. The amount or frequency of interpersonal or intergroup overt aggression varies inversely with the strength of the anticipatory responses regarding punishment.

Assumption: There is usually greater anticipation of punishment for overt than for non-overt aggression or substitute responses.

15. The overtness of aggression varies positively with the strength of instigation to a frustrated goal-response.

Assumption: Overt aggression is more satisfying to the individual than non-overt aggression.

16. The frequency of substitute responses varies positively with the strength of anticipatory responses to punishment-for-being-aggressive.

17. The frequency of substitute responses varies inversely with the strength of instigation to a frustrated goal-response.

Assumption: Direct aggression is more satisfying to the individual than indirect or displaced overt aggression.²⁰

18. Whether hostility becomes focused upon groups is in part determined by:

(a) *Visibility* of groups

(1) Physical appearance: color, physiognomy, dress, etc.

(2) Social definition (including "propaganda" emphasizing differences)

(b) *Contact* of groups

(c) *Competition* of groups

(d) Differences in *values* and behavior patterns considered as expressing values (language, sex mores, manners, personal aggressiveness, etc.)

¹⁹ Kluckhohn, Clyde. "Navajo Witchcraft," *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁷ Kluckhohn, Clyde. "Navajo Witchcraft," *Harvard University, Papers of the Peabody Museum*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1944), p. 51.

¹⁸ Horney, Karen. *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1937, p. 89.

²⁰ Cf. Doob, L. W. and R. R. Sears. "Factors Determining Substitute Behavior and Overt Expression of Aggression," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 34:293-313 (1939).

19. Minimum conditions for conflict include (a) contact, (b) visibility, and (c) competition. (Reductions in the values of these variables will, in certain combinations, reduce the probability of conflict. Under some circumstances conflict seems to be facilitated by minimal "impersonal" contact, inhibited by close "personal" contact.)

20. Where a basis for social categorization exists, that is, in group relations, some degree of prejudice-hostility always appears when there is the combination of *visibility* and *competition*. (It does not necessarily follow that the degree of hostility bears a linear relation to the other variables. For example, it has been suggested that hostility is especially likely when a competing group is just noticeably different.)

Economic factors, if they are to have any effect upon group prejudice, must presuppose the existence of the psychologically prior division into an in-and-out group. It is not because of their economic competition that Jews and Japanese excite hostility, but it is because they are Jews or Japanese that their competition is [regarded as] unfair, or underhand, or an offense to those who are neither Jews nor Japanese.²¹

Group antagonisms seem to be inevitable when two peoples in contact with each other may be distinguished by differentiating characteristics, either inborn or cultural and are actual or potential competitors.

Only by eliminating the outward evidences of distinction, such as color, dress or language, or by removing the competitive factor, may racial antagonisms be destroyed.²²

The tension level of any social grouping is in part a function of the relative emphasis in that group's culture upon *participation in common values* as over against individual or group *acquisition of scarce "goods."*

²¹ MacCrone, I. D. *Op cit.*, p. 254.

²² Young, Donald. *American Minority Peoples*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932, p. 586.

In every social system people act in orientation to certain values which can be shared by everyone, and which are not scarce in the sense that one individual's sharing will reduce others' enjoyment of the value. The most ready and conspicuous examples are religious salvation, and group (e.g., national) prestige. All adherents to a religious faith can participate in its values—all, for example, can have salvation—without any member's "success" detracting from that of any other member. Similarly, in this respect, all Americans are presumed to share in any increase or decrease in the prestige of the nation considered as a collectivity. National prestige as such is "participated in" rather than "divided up." On the other hand, in every social system people also act in orientation to scarce, divisible, and divisive values. This is, of course, true even of those who share a common culture in such other respects as language, religion, family mores, political ideology, and so on. The main classes of scarce, divisible values are: wealth, power, and prestige within a given group or culture. In any given state of the economy, the more economic goods held or consumed by one individual, the less there are for others. Power consists of control over others; hence it is inherently scarce and distributive. Prestige status is meaningful only in terms of relative ranking within a system: for one individual or group to be "high" requires that others be ranked "lower."

Thus every society has to work out some equilibrium of relative emphasis upon these two broad classes of action orientation. It seems to be generally agreed among serious students of American society that our culture places a rather extraordinary stress upon competition for distributive values. The "competitive" motif is not merely a matter of such competition being permitted; rather, the striving for "success" is positively

enjoined to such an extent that in many areas and classes it approaches the status of a culturally obligatory pattern. At the same time, American society—at least in comparison with many older, more stable, more homogeneous societies—appears historically to have a relatively low development of the shared, nondivisible values. These two aspects seem clearly inter-related. Thus insofar as emphasis upon religious, otherworldly values has declined, this must in itself reinforce tendencies for “worldly” competition, other things being at all equal.

The competition which is significant for the analysis of group hostility is not just any kind of competition but that which revolves around basic security in subsistence and status. In this connection the importance of status-mobility in the United States is difficult to overstress. Rising and falling on the status-prestige scale is nominally free, and in actuality has been very widespread, i.e., the dominant institutional pattern has been that of achieved rather than ascribed status. In fact, “intensive competition” and “emphasis upon achieved status” are merely two formulations of the same situation. As Charles Horton Cooley pointed out, there are only two polar systems for ranking individuals in the social order: either inherited status or some form of competition.

Note

In the following propositions the condition “all other things being equal” should be understood in each case. Since “other conditions” are rarely “equal,” this is a rigorous limitation on concrete generalizations.

21. The greater the differentiation of groups and of individual social roles in a society, the greater the probabilities of group conflict.

We are living in a more complex and developed culture than any before, and the possibilities of confusion and conflict are correspondingly the greatest.²³

In complex civilization, therefore, group antagonism necessarily increases because every differentiation (division of labor, heterogeneity) brings about particularistic interests.²⁴

22. Intergroup conflict is the more likely the more rapid and far-reaching the social changes to which individuals have to adjust.

Theorem 1: A people forced to make readjustments are likely to display increased energies of hostilities in some direction, even when their “objective” situation is more favorable than in the status quo ante period. This prediction is particularly indicated when the people have been deprived of habitual outlets for aggression.²⁵

23. Open conflict is the more likely the more *direct* the intergroup competition for the distributive rewards of wealth, power, prestige, or other scarce values, and the more *successful* the competition of vulnerable groups.

When there is an actual threat to the dominance of the in-group, socially legitimated hostilities may appear.²⁶

24. Intergroup hostility and conflict are the more likely the greater the general level of tension in the society as a result of economic depression, prior cultural conflict, or various types of social disorganization.

...the most important source of virulent anti-Semitism is probably the projection on the Jew, as a symbol, of free-floating aggression, springing from insecurities and social disorganization.²⁷

²³ Pettee, George S. *The Process of Revolution*, Vol. 5. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938, p. xii.

²⁴ Alexander, Franz. A Discussion of “Hostility and Fear in Social Life,” by John Dollard, *Social Forces*, 17:27-29 (1938), p. 28.

²⁵ Kluckhohn, Clyde. “Group Tensions: Analysis of a Case History,” *op. cit.*, p. 226.

²⁶ Dollard, John. “Hostility and Fear in Social Life,” *op. cit.*, p. 19-20.

²⁷ Parsons, Talcott. “The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism,” in Graeber and Britt, *Jews in a Gentile World*. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1942, p. 121.

Throughout the history of the United States there seems to have been a direct correlation between the peaks of nativist spirit and the valleys of exceptional economic difficulty.²⁸

25. Disruption of stable expectations of interpersonal conduct tends to be productive of intergroup conflict. Insofar as institutional patterning of behavior breaks down in important life-areas, predictability is lowered, with a consequent increase in anxiety and in various types of frustration. Free-floating aggression thus produced easily becomes focused on ethnic, racial, or religious groups.

26. The intensity of intergroup hostility varies inversely with the number and adequacy of "harmless" outlets for aggression within a society. (What are "harmless outlets" is a matter of valuation from other points of view. One possible definition is: those avenues for discharge of aggressive impulses which do not violate major norms necessary for the structural continuity of the social system. These in our society might include competitive sports, swearing, some forms of aggressive interpersonal joking, certain uses of alcohol, drama and pageantry, etc.)

27. Migration of a visibly different group into a given area increases the likelihood of conflict; the probability of conflict is the greater (a) the larger the ratio of the incoming minority to the resident population, and (b) the more rapid the influx.

28. Conflict is especially likely in periods of rapid change in levels of living. The probability of conflict is increased insofar as the changes have a differential impact on various groups.

29. Hostilities and conflicts among ethnic or racial groups are to an appreciable extent interchangeable with "class" conflicts. (This hypothesis states

that ethnic conflicts may prevent focalization of class conflicts, e.g., labor vs. employers, and that interclass struggle may direct a given "charge" of hostility away from ethnic targets.)

30. Given a social group which is "a going concern," a sensed outside threat *to the group as a whole* will result in heightened internal cohesion and an increased centralization of control within the group.

This appears to be one of the most important general principles of group dynamics. It is applicable to a large number of concrete events, ranging from nations at war to the behavior of neighborhood factions, and it is supported by a wealth of observation. However, it holds true only under very specific conditions: (a) The group must be a "going concern," i.e., there must be a minimal consensus among the constituent individuals that the aggregate is a group, and that its preservation as an entity is worth while. The case of France in 1940 may be taken, in part, as illustrative of the consequence of inadequate collective consensus. (b) There must be recognition of an outside threat which is thought to menace the group as a whole, not just some parts of it. An objective threat is not causal, in this respect, unless recognized. On the other hand, external groups may be defined as threatening in the absence of objective danger.

31. The probability of internal group conflict is lowered by the presence of an outside threat which endangers all groups. Hatred of a common enemy is the most powerful known agency for producing group unity.²⁹

Groups which arise out of conflict tend to disintegrate when opposition ceases.³⁰

The best safeguard against internal disruption

²⁸ Young, Donald. *Research Memorandum on Minority Peoples in the Depression*. Social Science Research Council Bulletin 31. New York, 1937.

²⁹ Edwards, L. P. *The Natural History of Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927, p. 55.

³⁰ Hiller, E. T. *The Strike*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928, p. 30.

tive antagonisms seems to be the presence of an external enemy which gives the hostile impulses an external target.³¹

To find a common dislike is apparently one of the most frequent and gratifying experiences in creating a bond between individuals. It is as though uncomfortable latent hostilities between the two parties are removed by deflection to a third, outside object.

32. Focalization of hostility upon a given group is probably inhibited by a multiplicity of vulnerable minorities in the society; a society riven by many minor cleavages is in less danger of open mass conflict than a society with only one or a few cleavages. (However, there is a possibility that a socially incapacitating chaos of group antagonisms may generate a demand for unification which will involve focusing hostility upon a selected minority.)

In the most extreme case of mass violence:

An essential step in the development of revolution is the gradual concentration of public dissatisfaction upon some one institution and the persons representing it.... In the earlier stages...the dissatisfaction is diffused and dissipated.³²

33. Among the members of any dominant group the greatest incidence of open conflict behavior toward a given minority will be found among those classes which are most vulnerable to competition from the minority. It is a legitimate guess from the scattered evidence at hand that group conflict is not so much a correlate of *differences* in status as it is of *changes* in status and in the highly visible symbols thereof.

Aggressive responses are apparently powerfully excited by fear.³³

34. Group conflict arises in part because it satisfies certain individual or

³¹ Alexander, Franz. *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

³² Edwards, L. P. *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

³³ Dollard, John, "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," *op. cit.*, p. 18.

group needs. Unless these needs can be eliminated or greatly diminished or satisfied through other means, there will remain a possibility of conflict, no matter how skillfully formal techniques of diversion and control are applied.

What seems to be required first is an analysis of the prejudiced individual to find out not where he acquired the prejudice but *why he needs it*.³⁴

35. Maintenance of the "American Creed" in intergroup matters is usually strongest among small groups of professional and upper class persons, and emphasis upon its universal values circulates downward in the social stratification pyramid. In general, only persons in "upper" groups have sufficient security to work actively for innovations in the direction of greater privileges for minorities. Although behavior in nondiscriminatory labor unions and certain related organizations may appear to contradict this hypothesis, it may be argued that even in such cases the impetus toward nondiscrimination tends in the main to come from the top organizational levels. (Suggested by Charles Dollard.)

36. Historically viewed, American lower class groups have always had successive groups of recent immigrants which provided both a basis for compensatory feelings of superiority and a target for release of structurally determined frustrations. Each level in the class structure could thus control and subdue those still lower by displacing its aggression on lower groups as a means of maintaining its own sense of status.

The cessation of large-scale immigration has thus removed an important element of flexibility in the balancing system for controlling intergroup hostilities.

37. In American society psychological insecurity concerning position on the scale of social stratification is most in-

³⁴ Watson, Goodwin. "The Problem of Evaluation," *The Annals*, 244:177-182 (1946), p. 181.

tense in the lower middle class. This class may, therefore, be expected to exhibit a maximum of free-floating hostility.

38. An important element of the American value-system is the belief that individuals have an obligation to accept the results of fair competition i.e., to be a "good loser." Hence competition tends to turn into conflict whenever doubts are raised concerning the fairness of the competition or the validity of the rules of the game.

Experience seems to show that American groups do not easily accept the results of competition or other processes which appear to them to be responsible for catastrophic declines in their social position.

39. Conflict between persons of different identifiable groups is the more likely when there is no clear definition of the situation, especially with regard to patterns of "appropriate" personal behavior.

...the intensity of intergroup antagonism varies with the frequency of contacts between minority and majority individuals not in accord with customary practice under an accepted social definition of status relationship.³⁵

40. Mass violence (e.g., race riots) is most likely under the following conditions: (a) prolonged frustration, leading to a high tension level; (b) presence of population elements with a propensity to violence (especially lower class, adolescent males in socially disorganized areas); (c) a highly visible and rapid change in intergroup relations; (d) a precipitating incident of intergroup conflict.

IV. REACTIONS OF MINORITY GROUPS

41. Marked self-consciousness and sensitivity is characteristic of those minority group members occupying ambiguous social positions in modern America.

³⁵ Young, Donald. *Op. cit.*, p. 65-66.

42. Militancy, except for sporadic and short-lived uprisings, is not characteristic of the most deprived and oppressed groups, but rather of those who have gained considerable rights so that they are able realistically to hope for more.

The consciousness of repression leads to discontent only when it is felt unnecessary. This is the reason why a rising class, which is actually becoming constantly better off objectively, generally rebels most readily, and why the most severe repression has so often failed to cause a revolution.³⁶

43. A militant reaction from a minority group is most likely when (a) the group's position is rapidly improving, or (b) when it is rapidly deteriorating, especially if this follows a period of improvement.

The whole argument about distress and expansive ambition as causes of revolution [conflict] may be resolved if one remembers that a shoe may pinch, either because the foot has grown, or because the shoe has shrunk.³⁷

44. Prejudice against Negroes and certain other minorities is likely to be especially vigorous and vocal among ethnic groups which have been only recently "Americanized" and which are attempting to move up in the class hierarchy. (This tendency is intensified by any discrepancy between the ideology of upward social mobility and actual rigidities in the social structure.)

45. Mutual hostilities sometimes arise between minority groups which are themselves the object of aggression by the dominant majority, e.g., anti-Semitism among Negroes. In other instances minorities combine in mutual support against prejudice and discrimination on the part of the majority groups. The conditions determining these opposite types of behavior are not well understood.

³⁶ Pettee, George S. *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

The Nature of Pressure Groups

The Temporary National Economic Committee prepared this now classic report. This monograph (No. 26) is one of a series ordered by Congress to describe in detail the economic forces at work in the United States and their impact upon politics. This selection from the monograph deals almost exclusively with economic pressure groups. But this analysis of the nature of pressure groups, their methods and the characteristics of the struggle between them and government, could as well be applied to nonbusiness groups. Much of what government does is done in a kind of vacuum, in the absence of the knowledge and direct interest of the general public. Whether one regards this as good or bad, normal or dangerous, one should at least understand why it happens.

Economic power is rather widely diffused, although its control is concentrated, as pointed out above. In the struggle for dominance, it is exerted largely through pressure groups—groups organized for the purpose of applying political and economic pressure to secure their own ends. It is these pressure groups with which this study is largely concerned. By far the largest and most important of these groups is to be found in "business," which in this study means the business community, as dominated by the 200 largest nonfinancial and the 50 largest financial corporations, and the employer and trade associations into which it and its satellites are organized. These 250 corporations represent a concentration of economic power in the fields of manufacturing, transportation, electric and gas utilities and mining, and, to a lesser extent, merchandising, the service industries, and even agriculture.

Another large segment of pressure groups includes the patriotic and service organizations, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Navy League, etc.

A third segment includes the reform groups—the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the National Civil Service Reform League, the League of Women Voters, etc.

The farm groups include the National Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the Farmers' Educational and Co-operative Union, along with minor groups like the Tenants' and Sharecroppers' Union.

There are numerous labor groups, the most powerful being the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the various railway brotherhoods. Their function as pressure groups is secondary to that of collective bargaining agents but has come increasingly to the fore during the past quarter century.

Peace groups like the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Council for the Prevention of War, the Keep America Out of War Committee, etc., might well be included with the patriotic and service groups, except that there is a clear demarcation between the activities of the two which makes a separate classification desirable.

This enumeration by no means includes all the pressure groups. Some of them spring up for immediate purposes, and when those purposes are achieved disappear. Some of them are organized for purposes other than the wielding of political and economic power and adopt that function only temporarily. The American Association of University Women is such an organization, which is politically active only on sporadic occasions.

A number of groups organized for the preservation of civil rights, the advancement of democracy, or for purely humanitarian motives, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the various committees for the aid of refugees, or for Spain or China, the Red Cross, etc., should also be classified separately. They are normally active only for their own purposes, and do not lend themselves readily to alliances with other groups, except to the extent to which their membership is active politically.

There is another contestant in the struggle for power which cannot be ignored, although it is customarily treated by the pressure groups more as an instrument for securing and maintaining their own control than as a rival in the contest. This is the general public. The public is an amorphous mass, largely directionless, often easily swayed, gullible, and easily misled. Nevertheless, it possesses a tremendous potential strength and an enormous determination when it finds a channel for its energies. It would be a mistake to underrate mass opinion, however futile it may seem at any particular moment to try to goad it into effective action in its own behalf.

Mass opinion sets the stage for political action at any particular moment in this country, to a large degree. Gullible as it is, it cannot in ordinary times be pushed beyond a certain point. It is utterly impossible to return to the political condi-

tions of 1800, or 1910, or even 1930, partly because economic conditions have changed and partly because it is impossible to set back the clock of public opinion. The gradual extension of suffrage, unionization, popular control of legislation, extension of social services—all of these things are now in the realm of public policy and cannot be removed except by a violent revolution and the use of unexampled force. Even then, most of them would be retained.

Pressure groups attempt to mold public opinion to accomplish their own aims, and at any given moment it seems that government is the result of a compromise between conflicting pressure groups. Historically, however, the march of events in this country has been in the direction of public betterment. It has been hindered, obstructed, and at times apparently completely stopped by pressure groups and selfish interests, but it has been impossible to stop it permanently.

That does not mean, however, that the struggle can be ignored. Events are moving faster and faster, and it is becoming more and more dangerous to permit a lag between the events themselves and the public perception of their significance. Often a generation elapses between an occurrence and the generalization of its import. Pressure groups have been able to play upon this lag in achieving their own purposes and have often managed to prolong it.

But as technology piles up its disruptive effects, and as its benefits are distributed too sparingly to the public as a whole, as the problem of distribution of goods becomes more and more serious, so it becomes more important that the public should understand its problems and use its power to solve them. It is no longer possible, if, indeed, it ever was, to trust in the eventual working out of the struggle.

Among the noteworthy characteristics

of the struggle for power between government and business are:

- (1) The invisibility of most of the action.
- (2) The continuity of the struggle.
- (3) Its varying intensity.
- (4) Its constantly shifting battleground.

Although any legislation under consideration in Congress is spotlighted in the daily news, although the President's activities and the administrative decisions of the various Government agencies are frequently headlined in press and radio, and although court decisions are a matter of widespread public interest, still it is true that a large, and extremely important, part of the governmental process is hidden from the public.

It is a commonplace that the work of Congress is done not in the Senate and House chambers, where the spectators come to watch, but in the committee rooms of the congressional committees. Even this, however, is but a faint indication of the extent to which governmental activity is carried on behind the scenes. The factors which influence legislators are only rarely the opinions of their colleagues, uttered in formal debate in Congress. They are the legislator's own political convictions, his mail from his district or State, the lobbyists who approach him in his office or in the halls of the Capitol, or the witnesses who appear before him in committee. None of these activities is carried on with the publicity devoted to formal congressional action. The callers at the White House rarely are even listed in the papers, although one or two Washington papers make a habit of printing the day's appointments. Still less are callers upon department administrators listed. The trade journal of a certain industry group may mention that its members went to Washington on a mission of benefit to the industry, but the news does not get into the general press.

Letters, telegrams, telephone calls, personal visits, and the other contacts between contestants are rarely of enough immediate dramatic content to secure public attention, even if it were not usually made a point to conduct such activities without publicity.

Another strong reason for this invisibility is to be found in the geographical basis of legislative and judicial representation. This organization of government obscures the economic or functional basis for legislative decisions, which are frequently far more compelling than a geographical accident. The political process is invisible also because citizen groups, the most energetic and purposeful of the working forces of government, are completely unprovided for by the written Constitution. Only in the living Constitution are they recognized as having significance along with the formal Government agencies. They function in and through the Government structure, without, however, as a rule suffering from the white light of publicity which surrounds it.

In addition to being invisible, the political process, the struggle for *de facto* dominance, is continuous. From the first days of the Republic to the present, the contest has never ceased. The constant increase and centralization of economic power have been accompanied by an increase (although not a corresponding one) in governmental power. There have been periods which seemed relatively peaceful, but for the most part the peace was on the surface and indicated temporary gains on the part of business when it controlled the Government and was not forced to resort to secondary weapons to accomplish its will.

Because business controls the instruments of propaganda, the periods when the control struggle favors business seem relatively quiet; when business seems to be losing ground, the struggle becomes

more vociferous. In the 1920's Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were sympathetic to the viewpoint of business, and Congress and the courts were generally Republican. There was relatively little surface indication of conflict, beyond the "red" scares and the activities of the farm bloc. The Bryan campaigns, however, Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign, the election of 1920, and the period of the 1930's all mark times when the contest was not only bitter on both sides, but extremely vocal.

The struggle has constantly intensified over the past 50 years. The rise of modern technology has been a powerful indirect stimulus to increasing governmental oversight of activities once regarded as private. If this trend continues, and it shows no sign of slackening, the Government must continue to extend its activities, and to attempt to match the concentration of economic power in the hands of those not politically responsible to the electorate.

The intensity of the struggle for dominance depends on a number of factors. While the struggle is continuous over a long period of time, there are nevertheless lapses, or breathing spells. The strength and bitterness of the conflict are usually determined primarily by the philosophy of the temporary leaders of government. (Two, four, eight, or even twelve years, constitute temporary leadership as compared to the continuity of business management and philosophy.) Their interpretation of events, their political debts, their view of the future—all these things and many more determine the intensity of their participation. The philosophy of business is not subject to change to nearly the same extent. Business wants government to leave it alone, and also wants to be able to use governmental authority in its own internecine competitions. This is a pervasive, single-minded philosophy, adhered to by businessmen generally, and providing a real rallying

point for their energies. As a result, the combat between the two is most active when political leaders are unsympathetic with, or critical of, business. President Roosevelt's case leaps to mind, but the same thing was true of Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Cleveland.

At what point the brunt of the battle is borne depends on a number of factors at any particular time. It depends, among other things, on the nature and number of current issues, upon the personnel of the government agencies, Congress, or the Supreme Court, or upon the trend of dominant public opinion.

The first battle of the conflict occurs in the choice of legislators. The second takes place in the legislature itself. If business loses that, it resorts to the administrative agencies charged with the enforcement of the law; if it loses there, or sometimes while it is fighting there, it has recourse to the courts; and if it loses again, the struggle reverts to the legislature, taking the form of an attempt to amend or repeal the law. The forces of propaganda are, of course, in constant use. Business, for instance, first sought to defeat the National Labor Relations Act in Congress. Failing that, a number of trade journals, the publications of the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce recommended that the act be ignored until it was tested in the courts. (At that time, it seemed likely that a favorable court decision could be secured.) When the act was finally declared constitutional, however, the focus of the attack shifted first to the approaching congressional elections, in the hope of amending the act, and then to Congress itself.

Although by no means always favorable, the circumstances determining the site of the struggle usually favor business. Business is less restricted than government in choosing the place to fight. It can fight

or not, secure in its conviction that "sixty billion dollars can't be wrong." If it feels compelled to fight, it can accept the challenge, at the same time starting a backfire elsewhere.

In this connection the business orientation of the newspaper press is a valuable asset. In the nature of the things, public opinion is usually well disposed toward business. This is a natural consequence of the popular belief in the virtues of the American system, as understood by the business community. Business is more or less unconsciously assumed to be right. Government is the "prosecutor." But, in addition, newspapers have it in their power materially to influence public opinion on particular issues. When it comes to measuring particular situations of fact against general principles and presenting the comparison as news, newspapers are shapers of opinion as well as purveyors of fact. Editors are aware of this, of course, and many take special precautions to avoid it. With others, editorializing is practiced as a matter of course. And even where editors and publishers are men of the highest integrity, they are owners and managers of big business enterprises, and their papers inevitably reflect, at least to some extent, their economic interest. When organized business deliberately propagandizes the country, using newspaper advertising as one medium, the press is a direct means of channeling business views into the public mind.

Slogans and clichés have a special importance in rendering favorable the circumstances in which business chooses to stand against government. "Inalienable rights," "individual initiative and effort," "private ownership and control" are typical of those used by the National Association of Manufacturers. They are among the essential features of the "American System." They constitute the description of the economy which business prefers, but they seem to hark back to the days

before the emergence of the modern corporation as a dominant institution. It stretches the imagination almost to the breaking point, for instance, to regard the operations of Standard Oil of New Jersey as those of an individual in the usually accepted sense of that word.

But the legal profession, at the bidding of business, has been equal to the task. By getting the courts to accept the contention that the corporate possesses a personality separate from those of the individuals acting for it and by getting them also to extend the operation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to these corporate personalities, lawyers have remade constitutional guarantees in the image of business.

This feat is the best example we have of business control of government. Language used by Thomas Jefferson to state the relationship between citizens and government necessary for the development of the individual personality has been used by business to attract public support in its effort to avoid regulation. The law, the newspaper press, and the advertising profession have all helped business by spreading this changed conception of the Jeffersonian idea.

The forces engaged in the struggle for the control of power were classified as government, pressure groups, and the general public, with government and those pressure groups allied with business as the major contestants.

Theoretically, pressure groups compete with each other on equal terms, have equal bargaining power, with none enjoying an advantage over another. This assumes that the right of petition guaranteed by the Constitution is exercised by "free and equal" men. The most it assumes, under a broader interpretation, is that citizens, when they have grievances against their government, lend weight to their pleas by mobilizing their strength and directing it by organization to Congress. But it is

assumed that such organization is temporary, and furthermore that the group wields no more economic power than that growing out of the aggregate resources of the individuals composing it.

Actually, the situation has changed radically. Relying on the individual's right of petition, lawyers today lobby for business, for labor, for farmers, just as they have done for decades. But beyond this surface similarity there is little resemblance to the situation of Washington's day. The membership organization, employing the lobbyist, directed by paid executives, exerts a degree of strength, cohesion, and mobility differing essentially from the fluctuating pressures of an earlier day. As for business, the corporations whose right as persons to petition the government is exercised by lawyer-lobbyists have behind them so much wealth, such concentrated control, and such a degree of impersonality as to challenge their right to function, under democratic theory, as individuals. In addition, corporations have marshaled behind them the bulk of the scientific brains of the country, a resource which labor, farmers, and government itself cannot equal. In the contest for government control, applied science is so weighty that it tips the scales in favor of business.

Theoretically, government participates in the struggle not as a contestant but as an umpire. If business long ago had not borrowed public power, government might still be able to function solely in the umpire's role. But with the attempt by Congress to balance the tremendous power which business has gained, government appears not only as an umpire but as a contestant as well. To every group aggrieved by government, Washington appears as more than a contestant; it seems to be an antagonist. And, since business has gained so large a share of public power, it is not surprising that business more than any other group

regards the government as an antagonist.

It is difficult to enumerate the organizations which, together, are the antagonists in the struggle for power. A classification by function, on the basis of government, pressure groups, and the general public, apparently neglects the divergent interests making up the various groups, so that in many cases wider variations in aim, methods, and effectiveness are found within a single group than exists between any of the three groups. The abyss that separates the United States Chamber of Commerce from the Municipal Ownership League, for instance, is far wider and deeper than the separation between the Republicans and the conservative Democrats.

It is probably true that the ranks of the pressure groups shelter some who would prefer to live under a government in which their sole voice was that of individual citizens; and that government agencies and legislative bodies are honeycombed with men and women who feel that business is far better able to wield political control than the politicians. Still it is impossible to classify the interacting forces on a completely adequate basis, and the division here set up has the advantage of emphasizing the energetic, directional approach of pressure groups as against either government or the general public.

Government, of course, includes town, county, and State legislative bodies and administrative agencies, as well as the local courts. The Federal Government's scope of action is so different from the lower levels of government that it must be classified separately, although its general position in the contest is at least partly the same. One of the chief techniques by which pressure groups get and maintain their power is by insisting that a certain function legally belongs to the States, even though it is clear that the State cannot handle it adequately. By

insisting that it belongs to the States, they manage to preclude the possibility of any effective action.

Among the pressure groups, business can be divided into two categories—principals and satellites. In the former are included the groups representing business and industry generally and those representing distinctive parts of American business. In the latter are the professional associations which revolve around business, largely dependent upon it for support.

Chief among the organized groups representing business generally is the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. The outstanding employers' group is the National Association of Manufacturers. It acts not only on its own account, but has also, through the National Industrial Council, been instrumental in co-ordinating the activities of State industrial associations, local industrial relations organizations and manufacturing trade associations. Twelve of the country's top-notch corporations keep informed of each other's activities in the industrial relations field through a special conference committee.

In the electric power industry, the Edison Electric Institute, successor to the National Electric Light Association, operates a well-known lobby. Legislative activities of the country's life insurance industry are under the direction of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents. On governmental matters the Association of American Railroads speaks for the railway industry. Iron and steel, petroleum, lumber, coal, copper are represented by the American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, the National Lumber Manufacturers' Association, the National Coal Association, and the Copper Institute, respectively. Of special importance, because of the national defense considerations involved in national policy regarding merchant ship-

ping and air transport, are the American Merchant Marine Institute (formerly the American Steamship Owners Association) and the Air Transport Association.

Among industry's satellites, commercial banking presents a united front to government through the American Bankers Association, while the Investment Bankers Association of America functions in the same capacity for investment banking. Although it includes by no means all the country's lawyers, the American Bar Association is the part of the legal profession most closely allied in thought with American business. Through the American Newspaper Publishers Association the country's daily newspapers join their strength for business and against government. National groups in the accounting, engineering, auditing, and advertising professions share the general philosophy of business and shape their public activities accordingly.

The organizations through which laborers, farmers, distributors, and consumers direct their efforts in forming public policy are well-known, although they vary considerably in effectiveness. The great bulk of the labor unions are organized into the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the railway brotherhoods, although the independent unions are not necessarily inactive in politics. Among the important farm groups are the National Grange, which has been active in politics for 70 years, and the American Farm Bureau Federation and Farmers Educational and Co-operative Union, which have emerged as potent factors in lobbying since the World War. Farmers' membership co-operatives are active politically, working through the American Co-operative Council. Numerous farm commodity producers are organized on a national scale and engage in both National and State politics. The American National Livestock Growers Asso-

ciation is typical of this group. It is particularly difficult to distinguish between such producers' organizations and the pressure groups comprising "business." Their members are, in a sense, farmers, but they have far more in common with the business community than with agricultural groups.

Effective organization of retail distributors on a national basis was late in developing, the National Retail Federation dating only from 1935. Effectiveness of organized consumers is very limited, the only Nation-wide group claiming to

represent consumers being the National Consumers League. However, organizations such as the American Association of University Women and the National League of Women Voters are becoming increasingly consumer-conscious and also increasingly active in endeavoring to shape public policy where it affects consumers.

This list of contestants contains only a few of the Nation's politically important pressure groups. However, it includes most of the strongest in the struggle for power.

The Unorganized Majority vs. the Organized Minority

Harvey Fergusson has for twenty years been a successful creative writer and journalist. Recently he has turned to the serious study of contemporary society. His first work of this kind was *Modern Man: His Belief and Behavior* (1936). Observers have been amazed at the success of small groups in laying hold of government help for the realization of their objectives. Mr. Fergusson has put his finger on the real reason for this: organization. The nature of modern society is such that power depends on organization. Yet some people are not organized or are not represented by any organization, therefore they have no power—either to protect themselves against those who do or to achieve their own interests. Mr. Fergusson makes the further point that organized economic pressures are the natural by-products of a complex industrial system which itself depends on specialization and organization of skills. The political danger may lie not so much in the existence of organized groups but in the fact that such groups do not under present circumstances counter-balance one another. Most groups demand, and receive, special rights and privileges from the government; each time this happens someone else's rights and privileges are modified accordingly. Here is the opportunity for exploitation about which Mr. Fergusson is concerned. It would be well to remember, however, in reading this essay that our society is not as rigidly grouped as the author suggests. A union member is also a consumer. White collar workers are consumers. Within organized labor there is competition and conflict. The greater organization he suggests might only tend to split the individual's interests several ways instead of mobilizing, focusing, and protecting them.

The "pressure groups" did not become established and widely known figures under that name in the American political drama until the early years of World War II, although they had existed and grown steadily in size and power for generations. Formerly their representatives in Washington and in the state capitals were known only as lobbyists and the lobbyist was a vaguely sinister figure

for many years. He was considered, in fact, only about one degree removed from criminality and a great deal of romantic folklore clung to his coat-tails. He was popularly supposed to operate upon the tribunes of the people with the help of high-powered blondes, champagne and banquets at which legislators found thousand-dollar bills under their dinner plates.

From *People and Power* by Harvey Fergusson, copyright 1947 by Harvey Fergusson, by permission of William Morrow and Company, Inc.

There is a wide difference between the half-mythical lobbyist of a generation ago and the modern pressure group, which is typically a highly organized bureau, with a corps of press agents, contact men, and stenographers, representing a highly organized group of national extent and operating upon the Congress, the public, and the executive departments by a complicated system of personal appeal, propaganda, and electioneering. But the pressure groups are still generally considered, as the lobbyist always was, to be somehow a subversion or a perversion of the principles of a Democratic society. They have been investigated by the Senate and denounced as an invisible government, although they are highly visible to anyone who looks, and still more audible to anyone who listens. Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, who led an investigation of them in 1935, expressed the traditional and accepted view of their activities when he described them as a "menace to Democracy."

The pressure groups may well be in need of regulation. They are in some sense governing bodies without any form of public responsibility. How they could be made more responsible is a difficult legal question. But they are assuredly not a violation of the principles upon which a Democratic society rests. On the contrary they are an expression of the right of assembly, which is the most important of all the Democratic rights embodied in the Constitution. It is essentially the right of any group of citizens to form an organization for the promotion of its own interests by any kind of argument, private or public, short of fomenting armed rebellion. It is the first right that all dictatorships destroy, and the rights of free speech and a free press are largely accessory to it. At least they would be useless without it.

It is true that the action of Congress and of all the state legislatures is largely

determined by the pressure of organized groups, and that pressure groups representing the minority which owns the means of production have generally dominated the Congress, and have often dominated the state legislatures even more successfully. But it is also true that every law and institution making for necessary adjustment to a changing world is dependent upon organized support, both for its creation and for its effectiveness after it is created. And "organized support" is what you call a pressure group when it is pressing the way you want to go. The "menace to Democracy" is the fellow who disagrees with you and does something effective about it. That something effective always takes the form of organization, for there is no other form of power.

All power is organization and all organization is power. For this reason there is no escape from the pressure of organized power in any society which no longer has a frontier to serve as a place of refuge. Everyone in such a society is either a beneficiary or a victim of organized power. This might be regarded as a statement of the obvious if there were not so many notions woven into the American tradition which contravene and obscure it. Nearly all of these notions are associated with the single word "independent," which is one of the great honorific words of the American language, tracing its power clear back to the Declaration of Independence. Independence of any kind and of anything is always considered a condition of virtue in America. The independent politician and the independent voter especially have been praised for generations. But of what precisely are these honored gentlemen independent? They are certainly not independent of organization. All political power derives from and depends upon organization. Every politician is an agent

and product of organized forces primarily. One who tries to stand alone, as Wendell Willkie did, may be a great intellectual influence but he always finds that he has no share in political power. In the same way, the citizen who belongs to no occupational organization may be a man of personal and intellectual influence. He may vote regularly and for the best man. But the so-called independent voters, as a political body, do not determine political results. When these are analyzed they are always seen to be the result of a conflict among very specific organized forces.

A man who has no share in any form of organized power is not independent of organized power. He is at the mercy of it, and not in one way but in a hundred. Almost every element in his daily life, from the motion pictures he is allowed to see to the income tax he has to pay, is determined by organized pressures. He has some genuine control over his political and economic destiny only if he has some share in organized power.

The belief in the power and independence of the separate individual is not merely an American notion. As Bertrand Russell points out in his *History of Western Philosophy*, it derives largely from the thought of John Locke, which lies at the root of so much of the Democratic dogma. It was perhaps always in part a mythical notion, but it certainly has no reality in a world such as ours. Individual liberty, as personal autonomy and growth, is a genuine and permanent value, but individual self-sufficiency, either economic or political, is an illusion in a world where all power is owned by organizations and all vital conflicts are between organizations. In such a world the typical citizen who stands alone is a pigmy in a battle of giants so tall that often he cannot even see what they are doing.

The second principle to be noted is

that the more highly a society is unified by its technology, the more highly organized it necessarily becomes. It is doubtless in this respect that our world differs most from the one in which John Locke did his thinking. If a modern industrial state is not organized in one way, it must and will be organized in another. And there are only two modes of organization visible in modern industrial society. One of them is the complete domination of the society by a single organization. The other is an equilibrium, however imperfect, resulting from a complex conflict among a great number and variety of organizations. Only the latter leaves any room for the growth of individual liberty.

A third principle—and for the purposes of this effort the most important of all—is that the condition of an industrial society depends upon the relations among the various forms of organized power it contains and, even more, upon the relation between organized powers and the unorganized mass. If all the evils of organized power are not due to the existence of an unorganized mass, at least it is evident that the unorganized mass is the material out of which every form of tyranny forges its instrument, and it is also the thing which every form of organized power exploits. The chief evil of organized economic power in our own society is that it tends always to restrict production for its own benefit, and any artificial restriction of production is quite simply a sacrifice of the unorganized mass to the organized powers, and also a means of subordinating it to them. In times of depression, when millions are denied adequate subsistence, this becomes literally a consumption of the unorganized mass by the organized powers, so that our economy sometimes resembles an animal trying to keep alive by devouring its own body.

In a democratic society, nothing can

prevent this process except the organization of every interest for its own defense. The only possible cure for the evils of organized pressure is more organization, and especially more various and complete organization of the whole society by all of its occupational interests. This too might be called obvious, but it is surely not obvious to the typical American citizen who often goes in for a kind of personal isolationism while priding himself upon his independence. The evils of organized pressure derive largely from the fact that about seventy-five per cent of American industrial workers are still unorganized at this writing, as are seventy per cent of American farmers, and a still larger proportion of white-collar workers, while consumer co-operation is just beginning and organization is praised but not practiced by most intellectuals.

We will have at least the possibility of a balanced society when we are a nation of contending pressure groups and not before.

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The interaction of all the forces that play upon a political machine is so complex as to defy analysis, but no analysis can discover any point at which power is separable from organization of some kind, or any political result which is not a compromise among the organized forces involved.

In this complex struggle, the "independent vote" is the mysterious factor, and also the chief subject of illusion, not only on the part of the typical citizen but also of many more sophisticated observers. The independent voter is presumably not merely one who switches his vote from one party to the other, according to which candidate he likes the best. He is also one whose vote is not determined by his allegiance to any form of organization, either political, economic, or religious. A large part of the American public is still made up of voters who

are independent in that sense. Theoretically the independent voter is exercising the high prerogative of a perfectly independent judgment. Often the independent vote is said to hold a "balance of power" and to determine the result of an election and especially of a presidential election. But it is very hard to discover how this huge conglomerate mass truly determines any political result. For concerning the independent vote only two things can be said with certainty. One is that a variable but always large part of it does not get to the polls at all. A heavy rain is enough to keep much of it at home. The second is that it is always variously divided and no one can determine exactly how. Even if a president or a legislator felt that he owed his election to the independent vote, he would be at a loss how to serve it, for it is truly both dumb and divided, while the organized forces that press upon him once he is in office are both unified and highly articulate.

The respective roles of organized power and the unorganized mass in American politics were revealed, about as clearly as they ever are revealed to the spectator, by the struggle for the vice-presidential nomination which took place in the Democratic National Convention in 1944.

The Roosevelt Administration had always been sustained in power by three singularly diverse organized forces—the Democratic machines of the great industrial cities, the state and county machines of the Southern states, and organized labor, which the Administration had steadily built up as a political force. By 1944, organized labor had become something of a political machine on its own account, and one of a kind new in this country, in that it represented a fairly unified economic interest. That is, it was not only a pressure group in Washington, but also a precinct by precinct organiza-

tion of voters, who supported that pressure group.

Nothing could better illustrate the curious and subtle interactions of organized power in a democracy than the fact that these three strange fellows—the solid South, organized labor, and the great city machines—were found in the same political bed. That such leaders as Sidney Hillman of the Needle Trades, Harry Byrd of the Virginia Byrds, and Boss Kelly of Chicago should have been united at least in their support of Roosevelt as a candidate for president is striking evidence at once of the power of organized forces and of their ability to achieve balance by compromise when they must. These three had nothing in common except that their own power depended upon the triumph of the Democratic ticket. The Southern machines, dominated by reactionary organizations, had fought almost all of the President's policies. The great city machines were more friendly to labor, simply because labor was more powerful in their jurisdictions, but they did not love the New Deal for its own sake any more than the Southern reactionaries did. Only organized labor truly supported most of the Administration's domestic reforms.

On the presidential nomination these three forces were united in exactly the same way that three shipwrecked mariners clinging to the same life-preserver are united. But on the vice-presidential nomination they were sharply divided, labor supporting Wallace, who was practically its personal representative in the government, and both the other organized groups wanting a man more amenable to their pressure. Public opinion polls revealed the purely incidental fact that about 65 per cent of the Democratic voters favored Wallace, the other 35 per cent being divided in their preferences among half a dozen other candidates.

At the height of his power in the con-

vention, Wallace commanded just a little over a third of the total vote. In a word, the vote was divided, with almost mathematical precision, according to the proportional strength of the organized forces involved. The "people's choice," as usual, got nothing but applause and sympathy.

The reaction of editorial writers to this triumph of organized power was revealing of that mixture of delusion and pretense which infects our whole political life. It was described as a triumph for machine politics, a flouting of the popular will, a proof that the Democratic party has no unity, and a travesty upon the spirit of Democracy. All of these things in a sense it was. But every political triumph is a machine triumph, the people as a whole has no will because it has no unity, both of the major parties have long been composed of a great variety of conflicting interests, and every political result is the issue of a conflict among organized forces. In a word, our political system worked in this instance just as it always has worked, only more visibly. Our genuine Democracy consists in the fact that if all of the various forces in the population which favored Wallace had been even half as well organized as those which opposed him, he could have been nominated. And nothing stands between that majority and the power it might have except its delusions and its political inertia.

The tradition and theory of democracy, as these are taught in the schools and expounded from the stump, have very little to do with democracy as an emergent form of human society. Tradition and theory contain a great deal of delusion and pretense which are used by designing leaders for their own ends. The solid reality of Democracy is the slow growth everywhere in industrial society of the proportion of the population which is sufficiently articulate and aware to

claim some share of control over its own destiny. That claim can only be made effective by the creation of organizations which represent the genuine will and power of men to co-operate with each other in the service of the needs they share. Such organizations may be crude and imperfect, they may contain an element of compulsion and many other abuses, but so long as they represent the genuine needs and interests of their members, they are genuine self-government and popular power. Moreover, they are the only possible form of popular power, for all power over anything is a process of organization. All the power of man over nature is achieved by organizing natural forces to serve human ends. Un-

organized force exists in a society in about the same sense that inorganic force exists in nature. That is, it is merely potential. A river is force but it does not become power until you pour it through a turbine. A mob is force but it lasts only until it becomes an organization or collides with one, and in the latter case it always disintegrates. Any unorganized movement in a society is like a mob in both these respects, and also in the respect that it is likely to be captured and organized by interested men for their own purposes rather than for the benefit of its members. "Public opinion" is itself an unorganized force and it is always exploited by those who control organized power.

The Vulnerability of Government to Special Pleas

J. H. Spigelman is a writer and consultant for numerous government agencies. He had years of practical experience in Washington observing the phenomena of which he writes. The value of Mr. Spigelman's essay consists of the analysis he makes of the reasons why groups have come to be so dependent on government. A basic dilemma of political behavior is presented. If government is required to listen to the diverse demands made upon it, it ought to have the responsibility of weighing the results of those demands in terms of what is socially desirable. What Mr. Spigelman is saying is that government in the United States cannot act in this way, that it must either respond willy-nilly or find new means of resisting at least some of the pressures. The author presents a challenging diagnosis whether one agrees with him or not. As a basis of this diagnosis there are set forth the reasons why special pleas—group pressures—have become so difficult to resist. How can government protect society from the consequences of its having to listen and respond?

A great many influences, particularly those arising from the war, have conspired to increase both our dependence on gov-

ernment and government's sensitivity to pressures prompted by this dependence. For one thing, as the power and responsi-

From "The Protection of Society," by J. H. Spigelman, *Harper's Magazine*, September, 1946.

bilities of democratic government grow, so, unavoidably, does its responsiveness to those over whom its authority extends. Thus, the fact that it intervenes in wage disputes inevitably makes it more sensitive to pressures for the maintenance of the wage rates it helped determine, and therefore too for the maintenance of prices that would enable the employer to pay those rates. The fact that it is committed to a "full employment" policy sensitizes it to business demands for favors and concessions as the price for co-operation with that policy. The fact that it regulates agriculture has rendered it incapable of resisting the importunities of farm interests.

In general, the actions it was compelled to take to meet the necessities of war and of postwar readjustment have created obligations from which it will not be able to extricate itself once the present boom plays itself out and people again turn to government in ever growing numbers for protection and support. The same power that kept prices and wages down during the war can also, it will be argued, keep them up. The same power that created new industries and made flourishing communities arise in the wilderness can also preserve these industries and communities. The same power that could generate a superabundance of jobs for destructive purposes can also—or so many will contend—generate plenty of productive employment.

It will be extremely bad politics for government to abandon those who are able to attribute their distress, if only in part, to government action, and who can point to ways in which government could assist them. Especially so, when government can no longer plead the nation's peril to extenuate its insensitivity to private need. Still less will it be able to plead its impotence before inexorable "natural law." Rightly or wrongly, we no longer believe that we are prisoners of any such law. Obviously,

its domain has shrunk as that of government has grown. And it will continue to shrink. We have had too many examples of the successful circumvention of natural law to be persuaded by arguments about what the government cannot do. An administration that pleads its powerlessness during the difficult times that lie ahead will simply be replaced, as were the various weak democracies of Europe and our own Hoover administration, by one with more power and fewer inhibitions about using it.

The social conscience of the American people, its sense of justice and humanity, finds it intolerable that income and position should depend on the ability of people to adjust themselves to new situations, rather than on the rights that society delights to honor and the needs it chooses to respect. It finds it unthinkable that small businessmen or honest workers, that whole communities, that—above all—veterans and their dependents, should suffer hardships merely because government, out of consideration for some abstract "rule of law," fails to act effectively to relieve their hardships. To permit such distress, to be unresponsive to righteous need in time of crisis, is to justify and invite revolution.

Government may therefore be relied upon to do all it can to meet these needs. Too much will seem to depend on its doing so. The cost in distress and insecurity and the consequent political unrest will, in a great many instances—particularly if those concerned are veterans able to act through their organizations—appear greater than the abstract benefits of tariff reductions, or of withdrawal of subsidies and price and wage guarantees, or, in general, of permitting the situation to work itself out in its own way. The concentrated pressure for special privileges and immunities that interested groups can exert on government will almost always carry more weight than the principled

negativism of the proponents of "sound liberal" policy.

"Liberal" advocacy of detached, unresponsive government insisting austere on the "rule of law" will remain pointless so long as government is defenseless against interest groups dependent on it; so long as it is unable to resist their importunities and to overcome their resistance to measures that the government deems necessary; so long as there exists no adequate basis on which government can act responsibly, that is, with full regard to the consequences of policy.

There is no such basis today. The Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, once served to insulate government and to discourage impulsive responses to pressure and opinion. But its inadequacy was revealed during the 'thirties, when the Constitution was interpreted as prohibiting action designed to meet the crisis, while providing no answer to the problems that pressed so urgently for solution. The Supreme Court won a symbolic victory in the rejection by Congress of President Roosevelt's court reorganization plan. But subsequent changes in the court's membership and basic orientation seem to assure that—with the sole exception of measures affecting civil liberties—it will no longer seriously interfere with any action the Administration may want to take in meeting the problems, and placating the pressures, with which it may be confronted.

In any event, nothing in the Constitution nor in the way the Supreme Court has interpreted it affords a reliable means of assuring responsibility in government. Since the Supreme Court is concerned primarily with the form rather than the substance of government, and since its rôle, even with respect to form, is purely negative, its rejection of improper form by no means assures proper content. Who can doubt that, given a certain amount of circumspection, government can frame

measures that might lead to economic chaos or to a new world war, without arousing a murmur of official protest from the Supreme Court?

Not unaware of the manifest weakness of constitutional defenses against irresponsible response to pressure, the executive and legislative branches of government have sought to erect their own defenses. Thus, many an administrative official has tried to insulate himself from random public opinion, and particularly from the various interest groups and their representatives in Congress, in order to do his job without interference. The complexity and variability of government's present concerns have favored such attempts. Since it is impossible today for Congress to legislate in specific detail all the powers that the several administrative agencies are to exercise, the resulting wide margins of administrative discretion have made it relatively easy for administrators situated in some inaccessible cranny of the bureaucracy, and relatively immune, therefore, to the scrutiny of Congress or the attentions of the lobbyist, to make policy decisions that may vitally affect the whole country.

But obviously this method of achieving responsibility is no more to be relied upon than that provided by the Supreme Court. For one thing, there is no assurance that the insulated specialist or official will be any more responsible, merely because he is unresponsive, than the legislator who is hypersensitive to every influence, every current of opinion. Besides, the better organized pressures have means of penetrating even into his fastnesses and, if need be, of drawing the attention of his superiors and of Congress to his high-handedness.

What matters most, however, is the growing reaction against administrative discretion. People are more and more resentful of what they regard as the arrogance of appointed officials. Congress, too,

has become annoyed at what it considers the improper appropriation by administrators of its policy-making prerogatives. Since the present Administration is more responsive than responsible, since it is extremely solicitous about the pride and pleasure of Congress, administrative discretion has passed its peak, at least for the time being. The more independent officials are being replaced by those who enjoy the pleasure of Congress and know how to get along with it. And disinterested people, mindful of the new temper, are quitting public service to make way for party hacks who can be relied upon to subordinate their own convictions, if they have any, to the needs of placating Congress and of winning the next election.

But Congress itself is not altogether unaware of the dangers of obstructionism and irresponsibility. Many of its members have been interested in plans, originating both in and out of Congress, designed to make it less haphazardly responsive and more responsible. There is no need here to describe in detail the proposals of Thomas K. Finletter, Henry Hazlitt, or the House and Senate committees, for reforming Congress. These proposals have all been pigeonholed. But even if they, or similar ones, were adopted, they would by no means protect Congress nor assure its responsibility. Just as no administration can, in the long run, be much more responsible than Congress, so also the leaders and co-ordinating committees of Congress cannot be much more responsible than the ordinary member. So long as organized groups demand special advantages and immunities, so long as they can manipulate public opinion, one or the other of the major political parties and the opportunists in both parties will make political capital of the insensitivity of the more disinterested members of Congress. If responsible congressmen are to hold their own in the unceasing struggle for the confidence and support of their constituents, they too will

be compelled to make concessions to expediency, or lose that support and with it their seats in Congress. A Congress continuously exposed to irresponsible pressures will inevitably take their complexion and, in the main, do their bidding, no matter how it may be reorganized.

Reorganization may make the path of the petty lobbyist and the small and poorly organized interest group more difficult, may make it impossible for them ever to get their interests attended to; but, for that very reason, it would strengthen the hands of the most powerful and best managed group, which, unlike the private citizen or the small-time lobbyist, need not bother with "button-holing" particular congressmen or with pleading their causes before some obscure committee. They can carry their influence directly to whatever new co-ordinating committee, or legislative cabinet, or economic council, may be established, and to the President himself. And there is no convincing indication that the wisdom of the Congress, or of the President and his advisers, no matter how collected and co-ordinated, is adequate to the task of dealing properly with these interests. Even if government collectively knew how the nation's essential needs can best be served, there is nothing it can do to protect itself from pressures at variance with these needs. All its efforts at self-protection are as foredoomed to futility as those of the individual.

The main effect of current attempts to co-ordinate and protect government can only be to stabilize its commitment to whatever course, no matter how ill-conceived, it may happen to embark upon. Today, particular errors tend, at least in part, to neutralize each other. An unconsidered measure of Congress may be vetoed by the President; an impulsive act of the President or his subordinates may be reviewed, and then modified or rejected, by Congress; the recommendations of partic-

ular congressional committees may be ignored by the whole House; concessions made to one interest may be nullified by those nonchalantly made to others. In short, the traditional system of checks and balances, the customary looseness and haphazardness of our government—though ill-suited to the urgencies of our time—still operate to a degree to protect it from too firm a commitment, too profound an involvement in mistaken policies. But to the extent that the committees of Congress are co-ordinated, the policies of President and Congress harmonized, and the responses to pressure made a solemn and considered undertaking of the whole government rather than a random and reversible action of some committee, to that extent will government find it more difficult to extricate itself from its errors and their repercussions.

There are already disquieting indications that this tendency is gaining ground, even without the proposed reforms. The increasing resort to government proprietary corporations, such as the RFC, the TVA, and the projected atomic energy authority, which take many important matters "out of politics" (though of course not out of government), tends in this direction. No less significant is the considerable progress, during and since the war, toward interparty unity on various important issues: not only the much applauded harmony on foreign policy, but also (despite the destructionism of the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition) as regards most of the favors, concessions, and special protections demanded by the dominant farm, business, and labor groups. Each of these agreements on policy starts government going along a road on which there is no turning back.

This tendency cannot, under present circumstances, be avoided. Once a particular pattern of government spending and control takes root, a tremendous complex of interests inevitably grows up around it.

It little matters whether or not the persons benefiting from, let us say, a subsidy or price guarantee are Democrats or Republicans; whether or not they initially approved the assistance on which, willy-nilly, they have become dependent. After a while, as the structure of the economy is modified by government intervention, the opposition party must learn to respect this dependence or incur the hostility of such persons. The longer this dependence lasts, the more unquestioningly must it be respected.

It is not without significance that each succeeding Republican presidential candidate moved closer to the New Deal program than his predecessor. Mr. Landon felt it necessary to endorse only a small part of that program; Mr. Willkie, most of it; and Mr. Dewey, despite his personal conservatism, almost all of it. For all the notorious looseness of campaign promises, there can be little doubt that, had any of these men been elected, he would have found it extremely inexpedient to make radical departures from the essentials of New Dealism.

The fact is that the profound involvement of government in the American economy, and its entanglement in the toils of public opinion, has given it an inertia so great as almost to preclude major deflection from its present course. Those who fondly imagine that we can return to an old-style Republicanism, sublimely indifferent to the needs of those unable to protect themselves against their exploiters and against the manifold hazards of modern life, simply do not reckon with a public opinion which today is fully aware both of government's obligations to those who have come to depend upon it and of its potential effectiveness in discharging these obligations. They do not reckon with government's unprotectedness against that opinion.

Without a strength and independence that no mere change of administration or

internal reorganization can give it, government must still be buffeted about by every influence strong enough to penetrate its defenses, and be led astray by any notion that happens to strike the fancy of enough people. The British cabinet system, the admitted model of most of our would-be reformers of government, did not preserve Britain from policies that nourished Hitler's power and brought Britain close to defeat; nor is it likely to save it from a muddling and painful advance toward statism, from the disintegration of its empire and the deterioration of its position in the world, or from the possibility of policies that may again lead to war. There is no reason to think that some approximation or elegant variation of that model would preserve America from perils just as great.

It was once possible to limit the consequences of government's mismanagement. Before the advent of the "welfare state," government could liquidate its errors at the expense of hapless individuals who had to bear insecurity and hardship, economic annihilation itself, uncared for by a government which was—or pretended to be—unable to help them. Occasionally, a desperate people would rise against a weak or tyrannical government and destroy it for its sins. But whether particular individuals or governments paid the reckoning, the nation's survival was not threatened.

But neither alternative is available today. Government must shield its citizens, as best it can, from the consequences of its errors, no matter at what future cost to the whole nation. It must continuously broaden and intensify its intervention in the nation's affairs in order to head off or alleviate the effects of its own bungling. Only in the Soviet Union are great masses of people still willing to accept the consequences of miscarriages of plan, still willing to permit government to liquidate its errors, whatever the cost, and to start afresh. Hence the tremendous dynamism

of the Soviet system, as of any system that is willing to pay the price of its achievements.

But in all other countries, willingness to suffer the effects of government's mismanagement or impotence has virtually ceased to exist. Government must underwrite its errors until they generate consequences that it can no longer deal with effectively. And when that time comes, not only certain individuals, not only government, but the whole of society is involved in disaster. Napoleon's adventures ruined only Napoleon and his armies; Hitler's adventures involved all of Germany in a ruin so profound that nothing remained around which the life of the German people could be reconstituted. The gross incompetence and irresponsibility of a Grant, or even of a Harding, led to little more than national scandals; President Truman's fumbling, as new crises develop at home and abroad, might well lead to irreparable catastrophe. The time when we could afford to learn by error is gone.

The consequences of fumbling may not be immediately evident. We may do quite well for a time, no matter what is done or left undone. The shortages and the savings accumulated during the war, and what still remains and what our loans may still add to the "reservoirs of good will" abroad, may take care of that. If need be, matters can be patched up for a while. Indeed, government's ability to effect makeshift solutions of pressing problems and thus to postpone a reckoning is the main advantage it derives from its enhanced role.

But government cannot, in the long run, transcend its own inherent limitations. No doubt it can circumvent the old individualistic ruthlessness; it can mitigate personal insecurity and distress; it can plan for more adequate social services and more continuous employment. But it can hardly prevent the consequences

of the abuse of its own powers, nor of the miscarriage of its own plans—the sort of thing that has cost the Soviet Union so dear, free though it be of depressions, unemployment and insecurity as we know them. It cannot protect the nation from the depression that may result from its efforts to forestall depression—if, say, its spending takes forms which deter private spending or if its controls operate to hamstring private enterprise. Nor can it protect the nation from the war that may result from its very efforts to prevent war—if, say, it becomes committed to the preservation of empires already in irreversible decline, or if it blindly attempts to prevent the rise and expansion of new powers with as yet unexhausted potentialities for growth.

Clearly, the development of government's power, the illimitable extension of its concerns—despite all its would-be limiters—poses quite as many problems as it solves. And it poses then more acutely than ever before; for, in a horribly real sense, the future of the nation, and even of the whole of civilization, depends on how these problems are dealt with.

With so much at stake, improvisations will no longer do. Society may not be able

to endure much longer the “trial and error,” “hit or miss” kind of government we have had thus far; nor will the proposed contrivances for government's self-protection and self-correction suffice. If the American way of life is to survive, we must devise more effective and more discriminating ways than have yet been suggested of lessening the dangerous immediacy of interdependence of government, the various interest groups, and public opinion; of breaking the circuit of pressure and mechanical response to pressure.

Not until we have such protection will government be able to act as boldly and decisively as today it must; but without jeopardy to the nation. Not until then can we begin to remedy the anxieties and indecisions, the reluctance to act, the “failure of nerve” so characteristic of our time, without going to the other extreme of blind aggression and destructiveness. Not until then can we hope to steer our way between a policy of drift and one of mad adventure, or to do what has to be done to assure our progress in safety to a better world.

To find such a means of protection is the most urgent need of our time.

What Is a Nation?

Harold Stannard entered journalism after a distinguished academic career in Great Britain. Scholar, writer, and world traveler, he had a wide knowledge of human affairs. The late Mr. Stannard was long associated with the *London Times*. This selection emphasizes that one of the most important—many feel it is *the* most important—forces in international politics is a form of group feeling, namely loyalty to a social grouping we term the nation. Equally significant are the consequences of this feeling. He suggests that this particular type of grouping is being subjected to questioning by men in various parts of the globe. The question is raised whether the functions served by the nation are bought at too high a price or bring with them other results which are not desirable. But the author is really stressing another point too: national sentiment is the expression of a social impulse; the national grouping represents the embodiment of an idea. What idea? Is the idea still valid?

... The age in which we live finds man in one of his more restless moods. For nearly five centuries the civilized world has tended to regard the nation as the ideal unit of society, and it is in so far as they are organized on a self-conscious national basis that communities can nowadays exert an influence beyond their borders and play a part in what are appropriately called international affairs. It is taken almost as a matter of course that patriotism, which is the emotional expression of a sense of nationality, should be the strongest of collective emotions and that a man should be more ready to die for his country than for his religion, his social order, his racial group, or his home. Creed, blood, class, and family are, indeed, all elements in the idea of nationality, but all are gathered up in and transcended by it. Never in history has the compelling power of the national idea been more manifest than in the two great wars of the present century, but by one of those

paradoxes through which the human mind is wont to advance, these wars have in themselves reacted upon the temper which made them possible. It would even seem that nation-making is more satisfactory while still in progress than when finally achieved, in that when nations are fully made they fall upon one another. The national idea begins by offering a more comprehensive unity than that given by any tribal or feudal tie, but ends by imposing limits upon itself and by regarding elements outside them first as alien and then as hostile.

... The nineteenth century saw the greatest triumphs of the idea of nationality because the French Revolution had made that idea democratic. In Europe, where the idea of nationality was born, the Revolution enabled it to reach its most effective development by accomplishing the unity of Italy and of Germany, the two regions whose unsettled condition had kept the Continent in tur-

From "What Is a Nation?" by Harold Stannard, *Looking Forward* series. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945.

moil for four hundred years. Searching for reasons for the dramatic swiftness with which both Italian and German unity were attained, inquiring minds reached a conclusion which the generation after 1870 accepted as final. It was that the unstable condition of both Germany and Italy had been due to the intrusion of foreign influences, in the one case French, and in the other Austrian; and that the united action which alone had availed to expel the foreigner would, if perpetuated in forms of government, in itself be strong enough to prevent his return. Independence thus came to be regarded as the guarantee both of freedom and of security, and the consolidation of central and western Europe into a series of national States gave conclusive force to the example set by the American colonies a century earlier.

Today the pendulum of thought has swung almost to the other extreme. It appears that the nation-State does not give the assurance either of freedom within its frontiers or of security against attack from beyond them. On the contrary, a nation in its first illusive enthusiasm for safety develops internal antagonisms which become irreconcilable. This new truth has held of great and small nations alike. The rise of dictatorship in Germany and Italy was directly due to the chaos which party struggles were creating in both countries, and the swift collapse of France was but the reflection of those profound dissensions which the Third Republic proved unable to appease. Similarly, the German conquest of the Low Countries within a week was immediately due to the overwhelming power of a highly developed industrialism converted to war purposes; but it might never have been attempted had not Germany's aggressive projects, themselves the morbid issue of a nationalism gone frantic, been nourished by the growing dissension between Fleming and Walloon

in Belgium and the deadlock between parties which had paralyzed government in Holland during the spring and summer of 1939.

There is something suicidal about nationalism in its latest phase. It grows more exclusive as it becomes more intense with the consequence that it ends by disrupting regions which are geographically one. The growth of Irish nationalism has transformed the Ulster frontier, originally a chain of customs houses, into an ideological barrier of the most formidable kind, and the growth of Indian nationalism threatens to substitute for the unity created by the British Raj a Moslem North perpetually at variance with a Hindu South.

... Any contemporary study of national feeling must address itself boldly to this paradox—that nationalism is far and away the most powerful social impulse at present operative and that it is almost universally discredited as the ultimate form of social organization. . . .

The ancient world knew nothing of national feeling. Its empires were despotisms in which a master race under a king endowed with divine attributes ruled over conquered and subjected peoples. . . . Greek thought, Roman practice, and feudal sentiment have all left their traces on national feeling. But the parents of nationalism in the meaning that the word has gradually acquired in more than four hundred years were the Reformation and the Renaissance. The first of these movements destroyed the religious unity of Europe. . . . The outstanding characteristic of the Renaissance as a mode of thought was that it drew men's eyes away from heaven and down to earth, made them feel that life here and now was supremely worth living, and proclaimed that every individual had his own specific reaction to the world about him which he could impress upon the minds of his fellows. Out of all the crosscur-

rents of thought and emotion produced by the interaction of the Reformation and the Renaissance the national idea was born.

... It is on the whole fair to say that the sentiment which formed the core of nationality was dynastic, though in the earlier phase of nationalism it was felt that unity in worship was as essential as unity in secular government and in the latter phase it was discovered that when once firmly established the sentiment of unity did not need to find its symbol in a crown. ...

... Nationalism is an expression of the social impulse shaped by the particular circumstances of Europe toward the close of the fifteenth century. All impulses need some external point on which they can fasten if they are to attain effective expression, and in the opening phase of nationalism it appears that this external home for an inward impulse is best provided by an individual—a Henry VIII, a Louis XIV, or a Washington. Once so located, the idea of nationality can best be maintained by a dynasty, a truth of which the British Commonwealth is the outstanding illustration. On the other hand, the case of the United States is a sufficient proof that when once national sentiment has attained sufficient strength to be self-conscious it can shift its attachment from a person to a statement of principles.

... national sentiment developed at a time when the center of gravity of the social order was in process of shifting from religion to politics. But because the shift was still incomplete, community of religious belief was at first felt to be one of the essential attributes of a nation. For this reason the earliest national wars took the shape of religious wars. The terrible Thirty Years' War which ruined Germany in the first half of the seventeenth century was in form a conflict between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, but in substance it became, as Hitler has realized, a struggle to strengthen French unity and to weaken German unity. ...

... when the smoke of battle began to clear in Europe after 1650 it was manifest that the long wars had confirmed and strengthened the dynastic principle, so that in its next phase militant nationalism ceases to fight over creeds but battles for sovereignty. ... But ... before dynastic motives had ceased to be potent, economic issues were beginning to emerge. The seventeenth century struggle between England and Holland was marked by the passage of the Navigation Acts, and colonies with their wealth of raw material were the prizes of the great eighteenth-century wars with France. In more modern times ... the desire to bring deposits of coal and iron under the same flag was responsible, if not for the war of 1870, at any rate for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the victorious Germans; and though final judgment cannot yet be pronounced on the causes of the two great wars of the present century, contemporary opinion has given a good deal of support to Lenin's argument that the wars of capitalist States are always fought for markets and are therefore imperialistic.

... as the dynastic and economic motives of national wars became clearer to men's minds and as the tide of democratic thought swept onwards, the average man was bound to ask himself why he should be killed for the sake of either kings or capitalists. Once that question is fairly posed, national sentiment in its traditional expressions becomes a target for criticism. Only ideas are really worth dying for, and ideas endure because they have their place in a kingdom of real values independent of time and circumstance. ... To this extent nationalism traces a circle in human thought. With ideas it began and with ideas it is ending.

... The circumstances of our day suggest that... the national idea becomes less tolerant as it becomes more definite. A stage is reached when it ceases to be capable of expansion, when it can no longer assimilate but only exclude. That stage has been reached now and our own century has shown how swiftly exclusion hardens into hostility, with the result that nationalism, taking one side or the other in the eternal seesaw between liberty and order, has made war more universal and more intense. This is the situation which statesmanship must now seek to remedy. There are those who, considering

the historical development of nationalism, maintain that it can be cleansed of its poison either by the substitution of republics for monarchies or by the abolition of the economic class war... But is it not possible that both look too much to the past and evade the special ideological difficulties of the present? What the world needs is a new synthesis which shall somehow transcend nationalism.

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International Conflict as Group Conflict

John Thomson MacCurdy was a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and Lecturer in Psychopathology at the University. The late Dr. MacCurdy analyzed the way in which national groups may develop irrational thoughts about one another and therefore pave the way for war. Here he does not say that *all* international suspicions are grounded in what the psychologist would call "warped" thinking but only that *some* are; however, these may constitute the very factor which turns ordinary political and economic rivalry into something more vicious. The reader has an excellent opportunity to apply Dr. MacCurdy's thesis to the present tension between the United States and Russia. To what extent does our thinking about Russia tend to be "paranoid" and vice versa? It is not an easy question to answer, but unless an attempt is made to answer it, we run the risk of being snared into self-destruction aided by delusions of our own making. Dr. MacCurdy offers a tool of analysis. It is only one of many. It is not a full-blown theory or blueprint. It is a way of probing political behavior to see what and why it is.

In describing the features peculiar to any social group and correlating them so as to build up a unitary picture the layman is prone to use the analogy of *personality*, a tendency exhibited in the habit of personifying our own and other nations. The

individual is compounded of physical characteristics, of various intellectual capacities, of—possibly conflicting—hopes, fears, loyalties, antipathies, aspirations, and moral discriminations. As character is formed these are gradually welded to-

From "Paranoid Thinking in Politics," by J. T. MacCurdy, *The Fortnightly*, June, 1946.

gether into a combination peculiar to that individual but one that is not a static constellation. Although constantly being modified under the influence of maturation and the impact of experience, it gains a consistency, a unity which we call the personality, which strives to maintain its individuality. To what extent is it useful, and therefore legitimate, to use the analogy of personality in a scientific study of societies? The question will be capable of an answer only when sociology is a completed science. In the meantime it may be safe to say that to apply a formula applicable to individual psychology arbitrarily to the psychology of the group is to indulge in pure magic. But it may nevertheless be legitimate for the expert in one field to use his concepts as tentative hypotheses in exploring the other. When we can not merely see a dual applicability of a formula but demonstrate that it is applicable because a similar conjunction of factors is in operation, then we may both endorse the method and indulge the hope that it may eventually lead to the formulation of fundamental psychological laws.

In individual psychology much has been learned about personality from the study of its disintegration in what is called mental disease. With our personalizing tendency we often say: "Germany has gone mad," or, "The Germans are all mad." We shall see that the latter statement is scientifically indefensible but that the former may, with proper qualifications, be accepted. Communal thinking may follow the pattern of individual mental aberrations known as paranoid states, which are a commonplace of psychiatric practice.

The essential characteristic of a paranoid psychosis is the development of what are known as "delusions" of reference: the patient projects on another individual—or group of individuals—ideas as to the other's attitude which are always of hos-

tility. The imagined enemy is plotting against the happiness, home, health, fortune, or actual life of the patient. No argument is likely to dislodge these delusions because they are built into a logically buttressed system. . . .

... To speak of Germans being mad because they individually believed their country was encircled by enemies waiting to devour them is wrong because each German was holding a belief currently accepted in his community. Further, it is scientifically improper to speak of the country as a whole being deluded because there exists no world society capable of forming and expressing a judgment as to the probability of the belief being true. On the other hand a group can, *qua* group, go through all the stages of paranoid thinking with terrifying facility. In this sense a country, or any other closely integrated group, can be mad. Indeed the objective observer sees it happening on both sides in the rivalry between political parties and in the competition between labor and employers as well as in international relationships. . . . [emerging] from the interaction of many minds to produce ideas belonging to the group as a whole, these in turn coercing the thought of each member. All that is needed to start the process is conflict of interest and the mutual suspicion which such conflict engenders.

We have seen that in judging the significance of an individual's act, the motive which lay behind it is assigned at least as great an importance as the nature of the act itself. Scientifically the judgment about what the motive may be can be rated only as a guess and practically the "true" motive is what is accepted with unanimity in the community. It follows that, if group A and group B have conflicting interests, and if an action is taken by B which could be construed as hostile to A, the members of A will tend to think that B has intended to

injure them. If the action is mean and of a nature designated criminal when performed by a private citizen, then the judgment will come into conflict with whatever reputation for decency the people of B may have. If the members of the two groups are socially mingled, so that it is obvious to the majority of individuals in A that the majority of the individuals in B are not criminals, then the "delusion" as to B's motive will have little currency. On the other hand if such contact is lacking, and particularly if A gets its news only through censored channels, the only factors tending to prevent the deepening of the paranoid conviction will be timidity or indifference. It thus becomes evident that isolation is essential to the building up of sturdy communal "delusions." The Swiss, for instance, to whom foreigners are a commonplace, would find it difficult in the absence of compelling evidence to form strong opinions as to the behavior of other countries. In contrast it would be surprising if the Soviet peoples—in so far as they are interested at all—did not regard all foreigners as ogres: historically foreigners have been invaders or the friends and tools of Russian tyrants and only a minute number of the Russian hordes have had any opportunity through personal contacts of correcting the lesson of history. For our part, unfortunately, although we have a free press and wireless, Russian secrecy prevents our knowing much about what Russians and their institutions are like. The Kremlin has provided our Russophobes with a good wicket. In contrast to international rivalries, party politics are played in a different setting. Right and Left do not live thousands of miles apart; they see each other daily. So the imputations of treason, graft, or lunacy that are prone to appear during election campaigns are laughed away by the bulk of the electorate at the time and abandoned even by

partisans when the election fervor has died away....

As already noted, motives in individuals are nearly always mixed, and this is bound to be true as well of groups because the predilections of the members vary. And, if the competitor sees (because he fears) the selfish component while recognizing only his own altruism, analogous influences work within the group to foment suspicion and encourage self-righteousness. Propagandists see to it that the rival group is made responsible for what friction there is, while the press is sedulously engaged in flattering the virtue of its public. The group conscience is uncritical and powerful enough to make the individual who tries to be objective into a pariah. The dice are loaded against the development of individual paranoia (hence its relative rarity) but are heavily in favor of the group as a whole indulging in thinking of a delusional type.

Actions taken in defense of life and livelihood are morally blameless or at least excusable. But what are life and livelihood? ...

... In modern times the nation is the group which has the predominant influence in deciding what is morally right or wrong and what is to be regarded as "real." It is easy for a nation to extend its definition of its "life" to include not only the means of subsistence for its members, their right to a higher standard of living, but also its power, prestige, and right to extend its ideas of government throughout the world. Thus aggression can come to be regarded sincerely as a matter of self-defense. Naturally the country that does not wish to be thus "civilized" sooner or later takes steps, both material and moral, to defend itself. These are prone to include the detection of sinister motives as the sole factors actuating the other country's policy. So hostility is cumulatively engendered until there comes into operation the Iron Rule:

"Do unto others as they would do to you, but do it first." By this time the myth of encirclement has produced real encirclement; what was a delusion has validated itself in actuality.

Many examples could be given to illustrate the principles here briefly sketched....

...there is Semitism and anti-Semitism, a conflict as old as our era. A people (was there any reason?) were so discriminated against for centuries that their continued existence depended actually on illegal practices and, as an alternative to death, developed a trading code involving sharp practice. This served as a rationalization for further persecution, confirming sharp practice as the preferred form of adaptation. Old traditions die slowly and we can never deliberately pick for maintenance those we judge most virtuous and comely. ... Inevitably a sufficient number of them persist in behavior that is at once stigmatized as "Jewish" in order to rationalize what anti-Semitism there may be in the community. Further, we see the principle of isolationism operating as an aggravating factor. Where there are enough of them, and where they clannishly segregate themselves, they give each other moral support: "A Jew is never prosecuted but only persecuted," and so a cumulative hostility is built up.

Another obvious example of paranoid thinking—and a still more terrifying one—is in the mutual distrust of the U.S.S.R. and the "Capitalist Democracies." The experience and the isolation of Imperial Russia favored distrust of foreigners. The present government springs from revolutionaries who lived a precarious underground existence for generations. Its ideology is a direct challenge to the political economy of most of the rest of the world. It would have been a psychological miracle if a mutual paranoid attitude between the Soviet Union

and the "plutocracies" had not arisen. Who does not remember the "Red Menace" of the early 1920's—more virulent in America than here? Who is now not appalled by the extent of Russia's need for "security"? Few of us, however, probably realize how sincere the Kremlin may be in believing its methods are justified morally. In a country where politics and economics are obverse and reverse of the same coin, it must be difficult to believe that the operations of private financiers are not really promoted by a government that is manipulated in turn by the "plutocrats." So it is "obvious" that foreign investments are the means for securing control of the foreign country and enslaving its people. This, to the communist, is a more dishonest kind of imperial conquest than is the fomenting of rebellion in a foreign state, particularly when the latter is going to give emancipation to the hordes that are now enslaved. Provable facts are of little importance: what matters is the animus that lies behind overt actions and this is "known" by intuition, the accuracy of which is demonstrated by the consistency with which the same interpretation can be made to fit every event as it occurs.

An instructive—although rather disheartening—exercise is to scrutinize the speeches and articles of group protagonists (in any field) for examples of alleged motives being cited as unquestionable facts and without such qualifications as, "It seems as if..." or, "One seems justified in assuming..." This gives a rough index as to the extent with which paranoid reasoning is being substituted for an objective evaluation of events. The degree to which rationality has departed may be gauged by the frequency with which the ostensibly friendly or compromise gesture is brushed aside as mere camouflage which is being used to disguise a sinister policy.

This is a gloomy theme. Can the psychiatrist who makes his diagnosis with assurance offer treatment with similar confidence? Alas, no! Knowledge is not wisdom but only the beginning thereof. Man who has brought so much of the rest of nature into his service is as ignorant of how to control his own group behaviour as is a savage who has discovered fire and plays with his toy in a petrol refinery. He could conduct his games with relative safety if he had an efficient fire extinguisher. But, failing that, a knowledge of what substances were inflammable would prevent many a conflagration. If by some miracle of education the general public could be trained to note whenever an inference was treated as a fact in the course of argument, and, having noted it, to laugh at the speaker, then a large measure of our social, political, and international problems would be on the way to solution. But our present system of education seems unlikely to make a reality of this Utopia. Our savants seem often to be as guilty as the proletariat of this kind of unreason when they stray outside the narrow fields of their specialities to enter the world of "affairs."

... every imputation of false motives [in communal delusions] should be vig-

orously challenged when first made; there should be no temporizing "diplomacy." At the same time "our side" ought to be prepared to face a scrutiny of its rationalizations. . . . The saying "It takes two to make a quarrel" does not cover unprovoked attack but it does cover the incubation of mutual hostility. One may fear the violence of a lunatic and take precautionary measures, but one does not take his utterances so seriously as to retort in kind. No more should those of us who speak for our groups be tempted to reply to suspicion with countersuspicion. Accusations should be subjected to patient examination, refuted with firmness where that is possible and the substance of truth that is detectable admitted. Agreed differences of opinion and attitude can be dealt with, whereas agreement about airy generalities serves merely to camouflage (clumsily) unadmitted hostility. Even if only one side to a quarrel acts thus, its heat is bound to be reduced. It may not bring peace but it can prevent a skirmish from becoming the war of annihilation that alone can give satisfaction to such hate as is engendered when communal delusions in opposing groups mutually validate each other.

6

THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF POLITICS

I

"No other factor—not even that of peace or war—is so tremendously fatal for the long-time destinies of democracy as the factor of population." Thus does Gunnar Myrdal, great Swedish social scientist and statesman, call our attention to one of the world's most perplexing problems. Perhaps not since the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus issued his denial of the inevitability of human progress have political leaders and scientists been so concerned with the problems arising out of population trends, whether these indicate growth, decline, or variations in age composition. Moreover, the problem is one calling for analysis and understanding and should not serve as a backdrop for the sensational claims of racialists seeking to cloak their aims in pseudoscientific assertions of extreme eugenicists. Nor should population differentials be taken as the sole determinant of national power and thus lead to blanket approval of so-called defense measures.

In three hundred years the world's total population has practically quadrupled, from an estimated 545 millions to about 2,171 millions. And there is no indication that the peak of world population growth has been reached. In fact, according to Kingsley Davis, should the present population continue to increase at the rate of growth which characterized the period from 1900 to 1940, there would be in the year 2240 some 21 billion humans trying to exist on the earth's resources! It is no wonder that many students would like to reverse Rousseau's standard for evaluating a "good" government and argue that a declining population constituted a better test.

What has produced this tremendous increase in population? The answer is uncertain, but it is obviously related to the ratio between the birth and death rates. There seems to be no evidence to support belief that human fertility has increased. In fact, all research seems to point to the conclusion that birth rates have declined. Therefore demographers conclude that the vast expansion in population is due to a fairly persistent decline in mortality rates. This factor

is revealed in the steady lengthening of life expectancy in most modern industrial nations. For example, in Sweden males at birth had a life expectancy of 33.2 years in 1755, which increased to 50.9 by 1900 and to 63.2, in 1935. In the United States it is estimated that at the time of the American Revolution the average length of life was about 35.5 years. By 1900 this had been extended to 48.2 years and by 1942 to 63.6 years. In contrast we may note that life expectancy at birth in China or India is about 27 years! This change may be said to be a by-product of the Industrial Revolution, with its improved techniques in transportation, in production of goods, and in sanitary conditions. It reflects the development of science, public health, and preventive medicine. Changing from an agrarian to an urban industrialized society forced men to face and solve problems which were not new but which had been compounded by concentration of population. The first result of industrialization was to make possible a tremendous increase in the number of people who could live in a given area. Eventually, of course, all industrial countries have revealed the same population pattern, a gradual leveling off to a stable ratio of births and deaths, with ultimate decline in the offing. This has been true of northwestern and central European countries, e.g., Sweden, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, which give evidence of following this same evolution. This is, of course, one of the reasons for today's concern with population trends, because the Soviet Union, eastern Europe generally, and certain of the Latin-American and North African nations are still experiencing great population growth. (A British Royal Commission recently declared that if present trends continue, "the effect on British social and economic life, on migration to the Dominions, and on Britain's position among the nations, will be far-reaching. And behind all these considerations lies the ultimate threat of a gradual fading out of the British people. This threat, though remote at present, is real, and it overshadows the whole problem.") To the extent that a large population constitutes a factor in the measurement of military potential, it enters into the power calculations of statesmen. Furthermore, most of Asia has still to experience its peak rate of population growth, although the pressure of people on resources in this area already constitutes one of the explosively tense situations in world politics. Although today India is one of the major industrial countries of the world, in terms of its needs and potential capacity the process of industrialization has barely gotten under way. In China, of course, there has been almost no beginning made, and under the Nationalist government there is little reason to believe that the necessary widespread development of industry, transportation, scientific agriculture, and public health measures will be initiated rapidly enough to stave off disaster. This lag perpetuates and intensifies the tense situation, for in the long run there is every reason to believe that industrialization will not only provide the means for supporting the population, but it will ultimately reproduce the pattern of gradual decline experienced by western nations.

II

Why are political leaders of almost every country so concerned over the problems involved in population changes? Is there any important relationship between the size of a nation's population and the welfare of its people? Concern with these matters is revealed in Great Britain where a royal commission on population is conducting elaborate surveys, in France where the government has sought to replace some 800,000 men lost in the war by importing labor from Algiers, Italy, and Germany, and in Sweden where elaborate programs have been developed to encourage parents to have large families. In all these countries the birth rate has been steadily declining, and it is a source of grave concern to statesmen that historically no nation has ever been able to reverse this trend once it developed.

In the domestic realm it is the implication involved in a changing age composition of the population, rather than in over-all numbers, which produces immediate concern. For example, all countries accept the necessity for maintaining full employment for their people, but this is complicated by an aging population. Modern industry demands speed, accuracy, and stamina with the result that older men find increasing difficulty in maintaining the pace set by the production line. This may mean a greater burden on society for the support of individuals prematurely retired from active work, through an extension of social insurance coverage. It is also to be expected that an older population will be less mobile, both occupationally, and geographically. While public agencies may be able to provide re-training facilities to equip men for other productive jobs, the older worker is more likely to have his roots down in a community and be hesitant about moving to centers where there may be a labor shortage. There may well be a decline in per capita productivity, as England has already experienced with her coal miners, but this can be offset to a considerable degree by the introduction of labor-saving techniques and tools.

There will also be an increased need for developing recreation facilities and adult education centers designed to meet the requirements of an older population. Although it is extremely difficult to measure, there may even be a modification in the kinds of consumer goods which a more adult population will demand of private industry.

It is also possible that the whole political tone of these societies may be changed by the more conservative outlook of older people. There may be a tendency to resist change, to retard innovations, to be less flexible in meeting crises. And in turn youth may become apathetic, cynical, or discouraged because of the closing off of opportunities.

An older population obviously means less military manpower, fewer in the age group 15-34. An example of the impact of this fact on the thinking of a country may be seen in France, with the prewar development of the "Maginot complex." However, it is generally fair to suggest that this factor is less important than the level of industrial development in a country, because it

can be offset to some extent by the substitution of material, e.g., munitions, tanks, planes, for manpower. Nonetheless, it enters into the calculations of statesmen because large, youthful populations frequently are found in areas which are undergoing tremendous industrial progress—Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and India. And, in addition, Japan's struggle in China suggests that even material resources may not serve to overcome the sheer weight of numbers.

In the United States it is to be expected that future population trends will be similar to those experienced in Europe, even though the period of decline is some years away. "The prospect is that the population of the United States will have reached relative stability or actual decline before the end of this century." At any rate there are already arising certain problems related to the location and composition of our population which demand the attention of students of politics. One example is revealed in the fact that the population reservoirs in this country, those areas which more than reproduce their number and thus have an exportable surplus, are also the sections where all indices of cultural level are lowest. That is, where school facilities and trained teachers are inadequate, where libraries and public services of all kinds are virtually nonexistent. It is all too obvious that this results in a general lowering of standards in other sections of the country as these people migrate. It is at least in partial recognition of these conditions that there has been recent demand for federal grants to aid the development of opportunities for people in these sections.

The war intensified the amount of internal migration as workers from all sections of the United States poured into war production centers, usually large urban centers. Although there is some expectation that there will be a few ghost towns as a result of inability to convert war industries to peacetime production, it is unlikely that there will be any wholesale reversal of the population movements which have occurred since 1940. The result of this movement has been to intensify housing shortages, disturb labor relations, produce tensions between groups which have in some instances led to race riots, and generally to compound problems for local and state governments.

The growth of an urban population has in the United States, as in other nations, produced problems which are neither fully comprehended nor adequately solved as yet. One result has certainly been to diminish the rate of population growth, since urban life characteristically seems to discourage the growth of large families. At the same time there has been an increase in the number of consumer units, especially in the lower income brackets, which may explain part of the present intensive pressure on the supply of housing and consumer goods of all kinds. The result for political leaders is apparent in the demand for government action in the housing field and for control over inflation. There are also profound implications for American politics and the American ideology in the fact that urban dwellers typically are wage and salary earners rather than owners of productive property. Much early democratic theorizing in this country assumed the persistence of a population solidly based upon small holdings of productive land.

The moral for all countries which have reached or are approaching population stability or decline seems to be the same. They must make an intensive effort to develop the full potential of their people by education, provision of health facilities for children and adults, industrial re-training programs, appropriate recreational opportunities for older people, and complete social security coverage. It also requires that countries make maximum use of resources, capital equipment, and technological skill.

III

The fact that the United Nations has established an office for population research is one indication of a general awareness that the problem is world-wide and probably beyond the capacity of any single nation to solve. Although aggressive national leaders have much abused the concept of "overpopulation," it is not unreasonable to suppose that inequalities in economic resources and opportunities are a potential and continuing source of friction between national states. Nations have persistently assumed that it was only a matter of national concern when they established quotas or closed the door completely to immigration. With world population increasing at the rate of some 20,000,000 annually, and with all frontiers closed to further expansion, unilateral action no longer represents either an adequate or a safe course to follow.

What constitutes overpopulation? Is overpopulation a valid excuse for expansion? Japan, Germany, and Italy made full use of this conception to justify their aggressive designs against other peoples. However, it is a term which can be understood only within the context of a particular culture: there may be overpopulation in terms of the particular social and economic structure existing. Certainly figures of population density, i.e., the number of people per square mile, provide no adequate measure. In prewar Europe nonaggressive countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—had the greatest density of population, followed by Germany and Italy. In a primarily agrarian society, density figures would bear a more direct relationship to standard of living. But in a varied economy, with highly developed manufacturing and commerce, it is possible to sustain a much greater population at higher standards of living. Had the leaders of Germany and Italy been anxious to solve their national problems by peaceful means, they might have devoted every effort to increasing industrial efficiency and to extending commercial relations with other nations. Furthermore, they would scarcely have devoted time, money, and energy to devising means for increasing population!

Assuming that in certain countries there will be a persistent imbalance between the available resources and the population, what is the solution? For practical purposes migration may be ruled out, both because all countries have raised barriers and because the available space would soon be overrun with no significant improvement in the total picture. However, the development of bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions may contribute to the lessen-

ing of friction and ill will arising out of migration problems. For example, the 1938 agreement between Argentina and the Netherlands facilitated the movement of qualified settlers from the Netherlands to agricultural areas in Argentina. Territorial conquest, the acquisition of colonies, has never provided a significant outlet for surplus population even for those countries—Japan, Italy, Germany—which justified colonial ventures on this basis.

Through the United Nations every effort should be made to encourage the rapid industrialization of those areas where population pressure is most acute. This will mean at first an intensified growth in total numbers, but all statistical evidence supports the belief that over a period of time an industrialized India, or China, or Eastern Europe will experience the same pattern of gradual stabilization and ultimate decline. As Kingsley Davis emphasizes, "to think that the Asiatics can borrow and utilize successfully the instrumentalities of the West without also borrowing its other features is to commit a sociological error." It would also suggest that the more expansion there can be of commerce between nations and regions the less danger there will be of explosive tensions building up. The export of goods and services may take the place of exporting surplus population.

It would seem to follow that statesmen in the United States and Great Britain should attempt to support these regimes in other countries which are capable of introducing domestic reforms which will lead to maximum use of resources. In China, for example, widespread land reform, development of river valleys, the application of technology to food production, and a broadly based educational program are urgent. United States policy must be directed to supporting elements in Chinese society which see the need for these reforms and are capable of implementing them.

As the United Nations' organizations spread technical and health information, they must encourage the widespread dissemination of family limitation methods among all segments of the population. That this may be done despite obstacles of religious belief is illustrated by experience in Puerto Rico.

One final point is worth emphasizing: in a world in which more than fifty per cent of the population lives at bare subsistence levels, with inadequate food, primitive health conditions, and no real hope for the future, it is sound policy for more fortunate peoples to avoid the gratuitous insults too frequently involved in passing arbitrary legislation. (The "national origins plan" incorporated in the Immigration Act of 1924 is an expression of race prejudice, rather than an objective means of selecting desirable immigrants.) Instead, every effort should be made to develop a broad international approach through the United Nations, in recognition of the crucial nature of the problems at stake and an awareness that only creative participation by all nations can avert catastrophe.

Population Trends in the United States

W. S. Woytinsky, economic consultant for the Social Security Administration, suggests some of the uses which may be made of population statistics. Both public and private agencies need to consider size, distribution, and character of population in planning for future expansion or contraction of services. The analysis of interstate migration suggests political and social problems which may stem from this phenomenon, e.g., congestion in urban districts with resulting pressure on housing, schools, and transportation systems. Can individual states and metropolitan areas handle these problems, or must there be an over-all national policy?

Population trends will play a large part in determining future needs and resources. They will determine the structure of the domestic market—the number and type of consumers and consumer units, their geographic distribution and social characteristics, all of which are important in measuring basic requirements for food, clothing, shelter, and services. The same trends will influence the size of the labor force, the development of our cities, means of transportation, and school systems. A survey of needs and resources in 1950 and 1960 must be concerned, therefore, with an analysis of the probable size, distribution, and character of population of the United States in those years. In order to estimate postwar population it is necessary to examine the factors that have determined population growth and changes in its geographic distribution and other characteristics in the past.

I. GROWTH OF THE POPULATION

The history of the United States between the middle of the nineteenth century and the close of the 1920's was

marked by a rapidly growing population. This resulted from a substantial surplus of births over deaths and a heavy inflow of immigrants. (See Table 5 and Figure 3.)

Our population more than trebled during the 60 years from 1870 to 1930, and almost doubled during the last four decades of that period. Increases ranged from 10 to 17 million in each decade; immigration contributed from a fifth to a half of these gains. After the first world war, immigration fell off considerably but population growth was well maintained.

The end of the 1920's, however, brought a marked change in both of these trends. With the depression of the 1930's came a sharp drop in the rate of population growth to about half what it was in the preceding decade. The birth rate dropped below the point needed to maintain the population, while there were actually more emigrants than immigrants in the decade as a whole.

a. Trends in Birth and Death Rates.

After 1915 the number of births per thousand of the population steadily de-

TABLE 5
GROWTH OF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1940

Census Year	Population as Reported by Census	Increase Over Preceding Census	Immigration in Preceding Decade ^a	Immigration as Per Cent of Population Increase	Number of Immigrants Arriving After 1840 and Their Descendants ^b
	(In Millions)				(In Millions)
1850	23.2	6.1	1.7	27.9	1.9
1860	31.4	8.3	2.6	31.3	4.9
1870	39.8 ^c	8.4	2.3	27.4	7.8
1880	50.2	10.3	2.8	27.2	12.2
1890	62.9	12.8	5.2	40.6	20.0
1900	76.0	13.0	3.7	28.5	28.0
1910	92.0	16.0	8.8	55.0	41.0
1920	105.7	13.7	3.7	27.0	53.0
1930	122.8	17.1	3.2	18.7	64.0
1940	131.7 ^d	8.9	-0.04	-0.4	67.0

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1946, pp. 4, 107.

^a Up to 1867, passengers arriving; 1868-1903, immigrants arriving; 1904-1906, aliens admitted; 1907-1910, immigrant aliens admitted; since 1910, net immigration. Only net immigration shows the actual contribution of immigration to population increase; unfortunately no statistics of net immigration are available for the period before 1910.

^b Rough estimates.

^c Revised figure.

^d Without correction for underenumeration (cf. Tables 9 and 10).

Note: Slight discrepancies between the first and second columns are due to rounding.

clined, but this trend was partially offset by the declining mortality rate. Even in the 1930's, we had a visible surplus of births over deaths, so that the population continued to increase. This actual surplus, however, was due to the abnormal age composition of our population and concealed the fact that the birth rate had dropped to such a point that, if long continued, it could not maintain even a stationary population. (See Table 6.)

Progressive urbanization and the spread of birth control were probably chiefly responsible for the gradual fall in the birth rate to 18.9 per 1,000 by the end of the 1920's. The further decline in the birth rate was apparently due to the depression—the 1933 rate of 16.6 was probably lower than what might be considered “normal” for that year. The recovery in

the late 1930's brought a slow and uncertain upturn in the birth rate, but with the outbreak of World War II the birth rate soon climbed to the levels of the 1920's.

History shows that wars have a pronounced influence on the birth rate. World War I brought a drop in 1919, reflecting the absence of our troops abroad during the previous year, and an upswing in 1920 and 1921. Similar movements in the birth rate occurred in other countries; and it may be regarded as characteristic that the number of marriages and births tends to increase in the period when war is expected and in its early phase, to drop in its more advanced phase, and to rise sharply soon as it did after the end of the First World War.

Recent changes in the birth rate during




FIG. 3. Population growth and immigration, 1850-1960. Sources: Tables 5 and 9. Solid line ends at less than zero.

and immediately after the war follow somewhat the same pattern. Over the long run, however, the critical factor determining the trend of births will be the attitude of the American family toward rearing children. If the nation returns to mass unemployment as in the 1930's, the birth rate may fall below the depression levels. But it may remain at a comparatively high level if we succeed in ensuring a satisfactory level of employment, living standards and security.

b. Trends in the Marriage Rate.

The fact that the birth rate tends to

follow the marriage rate of the preceding year and that the latter is more directly affected by wars and depressions is clear from a comparison of the first two columns of Table 6. During World War I and immediately thereafter, the rate of marriages dropped sharply in 1918, skyrocketed in 1920 and declined again to a low point in 1922. The birth rate reflected all these variations a year later. After dropping sharply during the 1921-1922 depression from the postwar peak, the marriage rate recovered in 1923 and fluctuated within a narrow range during the rest of the decade. The annual num-

ber of marriages during this period was about 1.2 million, or around one per cent of the population.

TABLE 6

MARRIAGE, BIRTH AND DEATH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-1943

Year	Marriages Number Per 1,000 Women Aged 17-29	Births Number Per 1,000 of Population	Deaths Number Per 1,000 of Population
1910	84.8	a	14.7
1911	84.7	a	13.9
1912	88.2	a	13.6
1913	88.9	a	13.8
1914	88.5	a	13.3
1915	86.2	25.0	13.2
1916	91.3	24.9	13.8
1917	96.3	24.5	14.0
1918	83.4	24.7	18.1
1919	95.2	22.4	12.9
1920	104.2	23.7	13.0
1921	93.8	24.2	11.5
1922	90.1	22.3	11.7
1923	96.3	22.1	12.1
1924	91.5	22.2	11.6
1925	90.5	21.3	11.7
1926	90.4	20.5	12.1
1927	89.0	20.5	11.3
1928	86.5	19.7	12.0
1929	89.0	18.8	11.9
1930	80.4	18.9	11.3
1931	75.0	18.0	11.1
1932	68.8	17.4	10.9
1933	76.2	16.6	10.7
1934	89.6	17.2	11.1
1935	90.5	16.9	10.9
1936	92.5	16.7	11.6
1937	96.4	17.1	11.3
1938	87.6	17.6	10.6
1939	90.6	17.3	10.6
1940	102.2	17.9	10.8
1941	108.7	18.9	10.5
1942	a	21.0	10.4
1943	a	21.5	10.9

a Not available.

Under the impact of the depression of the 1930's, the marriage rate—followed by the birth rate—fell sharply, from 89 per thousand women aged 17 to 29 to a low of less than 69 in 1932. Thereafter, the marriage rate soon recovered to the levels of the 1920's, but the birth rate remained close to the depression low point. The aggregate deficit in marriages between 1930 and 1933, based on comparison with the 1929 rate, has been estimated at approximately 800,000. This may help to account for the slow advance in the number of births after the business upturn in the last half of the 1930 decade.

Under the impact of World War II, the number of marriages began to rise long before Pearl Harbor. In 1940 it was about 200,000 higher than might be expected in accordance with the 1929 rates. In 1941 the excess of actual over the expected number of marriages was 300,000. The number of marriages in 1942 and 1943 was estimated by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company at 1,800,000 and 1,725,000 respectively, or approximately 410,000 and 325,000 more than the number theoretically expected, at the 1929 rate. By the end of 1943, the aggregate surplus of war marriages (1940-1943) was far above 1.2 million, or about one and a half times the aggregate deficit through the early phase of the depression.

In spite of the decline in the number of marriages in 1944, the cumulative surplus through the five-year period from 1940 through 1944 was close to 1.5 million. Moreover, the "marriage boom" continued after the end of the war. Thus, the number of recently married couples in 1950 will be appreciably larger than in 1930 or 1940. In fact it will be larger than at any time in the history of the United States. This development will probably affect not only the number of births in the years immediately after the end of the war, but also the reproduction rate in the nation over the 1950 decade.

TABLE 7

NET REPRODUCTION RATES OF URBAN AND RURAL WHITE POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1905-1910 AND 1935-1940

Region	Rural			Rural		
	Urban	Nonfarm	Farm	Urban	Nonfarm	Farm
	1905-1910			1935-1940		
Northeastern States	1,933	1,426	1,439	715	1,035	1,406
North Central States	963	1,451	1,834	753	1,146	1,452
South	764	1,591	2,199	712	1,211	1,812
West	807	1,459	1,848	726	1,174	1,559

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Special Reports*, November 11, 1943 (Series P-43, No. 5).

c. Trends in Reproduction Rate.

The net reproduction rate (which, by measuring the net balance of births and deaths at different age levels, shows the expected increase or decrease of the population over a generation) declined steeply during the three decades before the war. Following are the net reproduction rates computed by the Census for 1935-1940, compared with 1930-1935 and 1905-1910.

	1905- 1910	1930- 1935	1935- 1940
Total population	1,336	984	978
Urban population	937	747	726
Rural nonfarm population	1,499	1,150	1,150
Farm population	2,022	1,632	1,661

The same trend occurred in all geographic regions, as shown in Table 7. However, the recent upswing in marriage and birth rates suggests that the birth figures for 1935-1940, which underlie the reproduction rate of this period, were influenced to some extent by the depression and do not reflect the long-range trend. In fact, given the present age distribution and mortality rates, the population ought to reproduce itself with an average birth rate of about 18 per 1,000. The natality rates in 1941-1944 were appreciably above this mark and correspond to a net reproduction rate of 1,200 or more.

d. Trends in Immigration.

Fluctuations in the flow of immigrants into the United States depend partly on economic conditions in this country and abroad, but chiefly on our immigration policy. Immigration was generally unrestricted up to World War I, reflecting the accepted policy of providing our expanding industries with a growing labor force by promoting immigration from the Old World. The all-time peak of immigration came in the decade immediately before World War I, when the number of immigrants, mainly from Austro-Hungary, Russia, and Italy, averaged almost a million annually.

After the war, the United States adopted a policy of rigorous control over the volume of immigration, its composition by nationality, and the occupational and economic status of immigrants. In 1921 Congress limited the number of immigrants to 360,000 per year. This total was allocated among emigration countries in proportion to the distribution by national origin of the foreign-born population of the United States in 1910. The basis of allocation was changed and the permitted total reduced to 165,000 in 1924, and in 1929 the general ceiling was set at 150,000 immigrants per year, where it remains at present.

TABLE 8
IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION AND ADMISSIONS AND DEPARTURES
OF OTHER PERSONS,^a 1931-1944
(In Thousands)

Year	Admissions			Departures			Excess of Admissions Over Departures ^b
	Total	Immigrants	Others	Total	Emigrants	Others	
1931	281	97	184	291	62	229	-10
1932	175	36	139	287	103	184	-113
1933	151	23	128	244	80	164	-93
1934	163	29	134	177	40	137	-13
1935	180	35	145	189	39	150	-9
1936	191	36	155	193	36	157	-2
1937	232	50	182	225	27	198	7
1938	253	68	185	222	25	197	30
1939	268	83	185	202	27	175	67
1940	209	71	138	166	21	145	43
1941	152	52	100	88	17	71	63
1942	111	29	82	75	7	67	37
1943	105	24	81	59	5	54	46
1944	142	29	114	84	6	79	58

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1942, p. 122.

^a Citizens and aliens other than immigrants and emigrants.

^b Discrepancies in subtraction are due to rounding.

During the depression, immigration fell far below this theoretical ceiling. Some foreign countries, such as Great Britain, did not send to the United States as many emigrants as we were willing to accept. Quotas from other countries were not filled because applicants for visas could not meet requirements of economic status and the like. The flow of immigrants was also partially offset—and in the early depression years, more than offset—by the departure of foreigners, as shown in Table 8.

The inflow of immigrants will probably not approach the 150,000 maximum now that the war is over. The policy of this country will probably be against mass immigration from Asia, East Europe and the defeated Axis countries, the very regions that would be most likely to send

a large number of emigrants abroad. On the other hand, emigration from Great Britain is likely to flow to the British dominions rather than to the United States. The United States will probably remain the Promised Land for emigrants from countries of northwestern Europe, but this flow of immigrants may be partly offset by the increasing demand for American workers in overseas possessions of the United States. On the whole, it seems unlikely that immigration will be an important factor in our population growth during the next decade.

2. ESTIMATES OF FUTURE POPULATION

Estimates of future population in the United States have been developed by

Thompson and Whelpton. Their estimates are based on varying assumptions as to birth and death rates and international migration, with no allowance for military losses. A choice is offered among nine patterns of development. The four extreme projections—for high and low fertility and mortality—suggest that the main source of uncertainty is in future fertility of the population rather than in future mortality.

Under the least favorable conditions for growth, the 1950 population would be only 2 million smaller than under the most favorable, but the maximum difference for 1960 would be 8.8 million. Variations in fertility assumptions account for 1.5 million, and in mortality assumptions for only 500,000, of the difference between the highest and lowest estimates for 1950. For 1960, fertility assumptions account for 6.7 million, and mortality assumptions for only 2.1 million, of the difference between the extreme estimates. The birth rate is clearly the great unknown in estimating future population.

Of all the possible combinations of projections, those assuming medium fertility, medium mortality, and no net immigration (with a correction for the number of children underenumerated by the 1940 Census) may seem most suitable for long-range projections. However, they do not suit the purpose of the present study, which is focused on the 1950-1960 decade. The number of children in this period will be affected by the unusually high birth rates in the early 1940's, and the composition of the population will probably be closer to the Thompson-Whelpton projections that assume high fertility and medium mortality. Their high fertility projections assume, in part, an average annual birth rate of approximately 18 per 1,000 population in 1940-1960, which is approximately the same as in 1940, somewhat lower than in 1941 and considerably lower than from 1942 to 1945. This as-

sumption may be optimistic for projections looking as far ahead as the year 2000, but it is not too high for the next decade or so, especially if this period is an era of prosperity with a high level of economic activity and employment.

The mortality assumption has little bearing on the size and distribution of the population in 1950, but it is more important for the 1960 figures. The medium mortality assumption has been used here simply because it is neither unduly optimistic nor pessimistic.

Projections that make no allowance for the influx of immigrants are preferable for the purpose of the present study because substantial net immigration before 1950 and in the early part of the following decade is improbable. If they turn out to be on the conservative side, this bias will tend to offset any upward bias that results from the fact that no allowance is made in the estimates for war losses.

Under the selected assumptions, future population will be 144.7 million in 1950 and 155.1 million in 1960. These compare with 132.5 million for 1940 (which is the original Census figure of 131.7 million corrected for underenumeration of children). If these assumptions prove reasonable, the population will increase between 1940 and 1950 by more than 12 million, or at a rate of over 9 per cent; and by more than 10 million, or over 7 per cent, from 1950 to 1960. This is substantially below the average of more than 15 million during the first three decades of the century, when net immigration largely contributed to population growth. However, it compares favorably with the increase of less than 9 million, or about 7 per cent, that occurred between 1930 and 1940.

a. Sex and Age Distribution of Future Population.

According to the projections of Thompson-Whelpton (high fertility and medium

TABLE 9
ESTIMATED AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION, 1940-1960

Age Class	1940		1950		1960	
	(In Thousands)	(Per Cent)	(In Thousands)	(Per Cent)	(In Thousands)	(Per Cent)
Total	132,532 ^a	100.0	144,706	100.0	155,108	100.0
0-14	33,835	25.5	37,336	25.8	38,857	25.1
15-29	35,018	26.4	34,244	23.7	34,311	22.1
30-44	28,575	21.6	31,885	22.0	34,063	22.0
45-59	21,356	16.1	24,327	16.8	27,522	17.7
60-74	11,105	8.4	13,526	9.3	16,286	10.5
75 and over	2,643	2.0	3,388	2.3	4,069	2.6

Source: Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, *Estimates of Future Population of the United States, 1940-2000*, National Resources Planning Board, 1943, p. 48.

^a Corrected for underenumeration of children.

mortality) the sex distribution of future population will be as follows (in millions):

	1940	1950	1960
Total	132.5	144.7	155.1
Male	66.6	72.2	77.2
Female	65.9	72.5	77.9

The proportion of women in the population would increase slightly—from 49.7 per cent in 1940 to 50.1 in 1950, and to 50.2 in 1960. Thus, for the first time in our history we shall be faced with a "surplus" of women. Actually, the proportion of women will be slightly higher than shown, because of war casualties.

The age composition of the population will also undergo significant, though not spectacular, changes in the postwar years. The proportion of persons over 60 years of age will continue to increase—from less than 14 million, or 10 per cent of the population, in 1940 to more than 20 million, or over 13 per cent of the total, in 1960. Because of the declining birth rate through the late 1920's into the 1930's, there will be a declining proportion in the 15- to 29-year age classes; but with a higher birth rate after 1940, the proportion of children under 14 years of age will hold fairly steady. Likewise, those in early

middle age (from 30 to 44) will remain stable at about 22 per cent of the total; but the proportion of 45- to 59-year-olds will increase moderately. (See Table 9.)

b. Trends in Families and Consumer Units.

Examination of past trends in light of recent developments in marriage and birth rates supports the conclusion that the average family size will decline further, while the number of families and consumer units will increase more rapidly than the population as a whole.

Family size. Although the Census provides no strictly comparable data on family size over the past half century, an idea of the long-term trend can be gained by comparing the growth of population with the increase in the number of families. (See Table 10.)

The number of families increased by 175 per cent between 1890 and 1940, while the population as a whole gained only 110 per cent. Although these figures and the ratio of population to families are not entirely comparable from decade to decade, the changes are so large as to reflect a definite trend toward smaller families.

TABLE 10

POPULATION, NUMBER OF FAMILIES AND
RATIO OF POPULATION TO FAMILIES,
1890-1940

Year	Total Population	Families ^a	Population Per Family ^b
<i>(In Thousands)</i>			
1890	62,948	12,690	4.9
1900	75,995	15,964	4.8
1910	91,972	20,256	4.5
1920	105,711	24,352	4.3
1930	122,775	29,905	4.1
1940	132,532 ^c	34,949	3.8

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1943, pp. 2, 46.

^a Statistics for 1900, 1930 and 1940 represent private families (or private households) only; those for 1890, 1910 and 1920 include the small number in hotels, institutions and other quasi households.

^b Obtained by dividing total population by number of families; hence not strictly average size of private families, because total population includes an appreciable number of persons who are members of quasi households. The trend from one census year to another, however, is practically the same as that for average size of private families.

^c Corrected for underenumeration of children.

More precise data on family size for 1930 and 1940 (shown in Table 11) support the evidence of this general trend. Families with not more than three members increased from 52 per cent of the total number in 1930 to nearly 58 per cent in 1940. While the proportion of four-person families held steady, families with five or more persons fell from 31 per cent of the total in 1930 to 25 per cent in 1940. As for the largest families, there was not only a great decline in the proportion, but also a substantial fall in the actual number.

The average family size (excluding boarders, servants, guests, etc., and institutional population) dropped from 3.82 persons in 1930 to 3.52 in 1940. The recent improvement in birth rates will naturally slow down this trend somewhat, but it is an open question whether it will bring it to a standstill.

Consumer units. The probable distribution of consumer units in 1950 and 1960 was estimated by the Bureau of the Census, on the assumption that the proportion of heads of families in each age and sex group of the population will change from 1940 to 1950 and from 1950 to 1960 in the same way as it changed in the 1930-1940 decade. The future population of the United States was estimated in this computation, in accordance with the projections of Thompson and Whelpton, using their assumptions of medium fertility, medium mortality, and net immigration of 50,000 per year in 1940-1949 and of 100,000 per year in 1950-1959. The assumption regarding fertility affects the

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY SIZE,
1930 AND 1940

Family Size	Number of Families		Percentage Distribution	
	1930	1940	1930	1940
<i>(In Thousands)</i>				
All families ^a	29,905	35,089	100.0	100.0
Families comprising ^b				
1 person	2,357	3,547	7.9	10.1
2 persons	6,983	9,009	23.4	25.7
3 persons	6,227	7,701	20.8	21.9
4 persons	5,235	6,154	17.5	17.5
5 persons	3,574	3,733	12.0	10.6
6 persons	2,273	2,168	7.6	6.2
7 persons	1,393	1,235	4.7	3.5
8 persons	843	701	2.8	2.0
9 persons or more	1,019	842	3.4	2.4

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Population and Housing, Families, General Characteristics*, 1940, p. 24.

^a Discrepancies in additions are due to rounding. Number of families in 1940 is based on sample and differs slightly from total in complete census.

^b Only related persons, excluding lodgers and boarders, resident servants, guests, and foster children or wards.

TABLE 12
ESTIMATED POPULATION AND CONSUMER UNITS, 1930-1960
(In Millions)

	1930	1940	1950	1960
Population, Total	122.8	132.5	144.7	155.1
In institutions, including armed forces	2.1	1.7	3.5	3.4
Others	120.7	130.8	141.2	151.7
In hotels, lodging houses, etc.	0.9	1.5	2.0	1.5
Lodgers and servants with private families	5.0	5.5	6.0	4.5
Members of family households	114.8	123.8	133.2	145.7
Consumer Units, Total	35.8	41.9	47.9	50.3
Private families ^a	29.9	34.9	39.9	44.3
Families of 2 or more	27.5	31.3	35.4	39.0
One-person households	2.4	3.6	4.5	5.3
Lodgers in hotels etc. and with private families	5.9	7.0	8.0	6.0

^a For 1930 and 1940, as recorded by the Census; for 1950 and 1960, as estimated by the Census under the assumptions discussed above, adjusted to April 1st of the respective years, without allowance for war losses.

Note: 1940 population corrected for underenumeration of children.

results very little, since only a negligible number of persons born in 1940 or later would be family heads by 1960. The assumption regarding net immigration tends to increase the population aged 20 years and over, in comparison with the projections used in the present study. On the other hand, the method of projecting into the future the variation in the proportion of family heads in each age and sex group fails to take into account the probability of an appreciable increase in the number of families resulting from the increased number of marriages. The two sources of error (if they are sources of error) to some extent offset each other. The figures obtained in this way by the Bureau of the Census are as good as any other projection.

According to the Bureau of the Census, the number of families in the United States on the basis of the assumptions described above, will total 39,757,000 on January 1, 1950, and 44,235,000 on January 1, 1960, without allowance for war losses. The figures for April 1 of these

respective years, comparable to the Census data for April 1, 1940, would approximate 39.9 million in 1950 and 44.3 million in 1960.

For an estimate of the probable number of consumer units (private families, i.e., individual households, plus lodgers living in hotels and with families) in 1950 and 1960, the following trends must be taken into account. The war has increased the civilian institutional population. It may be expected that about 2 million men will be in the armed forces in 1950 and 1960, compared with less than half a million in 1940. Thus, the growth of civilian non-institutional population will fall slightly behind the advance in the total population. On the other hand, because of the lag in building construction, the number of lodgers and persons in hotels and lodging houses in 1950 will probably be higher than in 1940 but is likely to diminish as housing conditions improve after 1950. Estimates for 1950 and 1960, compared with 1930 and 1940, are shown in Table 12.

TABLE 13
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION GROWTH, 1920-1940

	1920	1930	1940 ^a	1920	1930	1940
	<i>(In Thousands)</i>			<i>(Per Cent)</i>		
Total population ^b	105,711	122,775	132,500	100.0	100.0	100.0
Urban	54,305	68,955	74,800	51.3	56.2	56.5
Rural farm	31,359	30,158	30,400	29.7	24.6	22.9
Rural nonfarm	20,047	23,662	27,200	19.0	19.3	20.6

^a Corrected for underenumeration of children.

^b Discrepancies in additions are due to rounding.

3. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

The United States has always had a dynamic population, characterized over the past century by a steady westward movement and trend away from farms and rural communities to the great urban centers. These trends have been accelerated—though to some extent distorted—by World War II.

a. Urban and Rural Areas.

The proportion of our population living in rural areas showed a marked decline from decade to decade between 1890 and 1930. In 1890 it was about 65 per cent of the population; in 1900, 60 per cent; in 1910, 54 per cent; in 1920, 49 per cent; and in 1930, 44 per cent. The negligible change between 1930 and 1940—from 43.8 to 43.5 per cent—marked a distinct slowing down in the rate of urbanization.

In estimating the trend in distribution of population between urban and rural communities, a distinction must be drawn between the farm and nonfarm population in rural areas. The size of the farm population is controlled by changes in the volume, technique and organization of agricultural production, while the size of the rural nonfarm population depends to a large extent upon the development of industrial activities in villages and the

degree to which industrial population flows over the borderlines of metropolitan areas into rural areas.

The rural farm population in the United States has declined since 1920, not only in relation to the total population but also, slightly, in absolute size. The rural non-farm population, on the contrary, actually increased during the same period—and at a higher rate than the urban population. (See Table 13.)

An outstanding development in the early phase of the war was the depopulation of farms. According to the Department of Agriculture, the farm population decreased from 30,269,000 in January 1940 to 25,521,000 in January 1944. The loss was the net result of three movements: induction into the armed forces of 1,650,000 men who were living on farms; net loss of 4,660,000 persons of both sexes and all ages who moved away from farms; and an excess of births over deaths in farm population amounting to 1,562,000. Even if farm men in the armed forces were included, the farm population at the end of the war would still have been several hundred thousand less than the level that would have been reached had the depression not interrupted the downward trend that prevailed in the 1920's.

Now that the war is over, even if the movement away from farms is reversed

and farm men in the armed forces go back to farming, it seems unlikely that the farm population will return to the 1940 level. The downward trend of farm population may be slowed by a large foreign and domestic demand for agricultural products, improved financial status of farmers, and the shift to farming of industrial workers in such states as California, Oregon and Washington. But these factors will probably not offset the effects of wartime migration. Because of the abandonment of submarginal farms and the decline in the average size of farm families, the farm population may fall by a million between 1940 and 1950. A further decline of a million during the subsequent decade also seems probable.

On the other hand, the growth of rural nonfarm population will probably continue. It will be stimulated by such factors as the development of suburban residential areas; improved transportation facilities (especially in development of suburban airlines); the increasing proportion of aged persons retired from gainful work and living outside the cities; an increasing interest in outdoor sports, and development of rural recreational areas; expansion of national parks with all kinds of service enterprises clustered around them; and the development of rural industries and handicrafts.

Under the impact of these factors, the rural nonfarm population could readily increase from 1940 to 1960 by about the same amount as in the two preceding decades—around 3.5 million per decade. This would result in the following distribution of the population (in millions):

	1940	1950	1960
Total population	132.5	144.7	155.1
Urban	74.8	84.6	92.5
Rural farm	30.4	29.4	28.4
Rural nonfarm	27.2	30.7	34.2

This would mean a decline in the proportion of farm population from 23 per

cent of the total population in 1940 to 20 per cent in 1950, and to slightly over 18 per cent in 1960. The proportion of rural (farm and nonfarm) population would decline from 43.5 per cent in 1940 to 41.5 per cent in 1950, and to 40.4 per cent in 1960. However, the distinction between urban and rural communities may well become less striking, if the tendency toward the extension of residential suburbs into surrounding rural areas continues.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER UNITS BY
TYPE OF COMMUNITY, 1940-1960
(In Millions)

Type of Community and of Consumer Unit	1940	1950	1960
Urban			
Total	25.4	30.0	32.4
Private families of 2 persons or more	18.3	21.8	24.8
One-person families	2.3	2.9	3.5
Lodgers ^a	4.8	5.3	4.1
Rural Farm			
Total	8.2	7.9	7.0
Private families of 2 persons or more	6.7	6.1	5.6
One-person families	0.4	0.5	0.5
Lodgers ^a	1.1	1.3	0.9
Rural Nonfarm			
Total	8.3	10.0	10.9
Private families of 2 persons or more	6.4	7.6	8.7
One-person families	0.8	1.0	1.2
Lodgers ^a	1.1	1.4	1.0

^a Lodgers (including servants or hired hands) with private families as well as in large lodging houses, hotels for transients, boats, camps, and the like. These figures do not include armed forces and institutional population in prisons, reformatories, jails, workhouses, mental institutions, homes for aged and infirm, and the like.

The probable number of urban, rural nonfarm and farm private families in 1950 and 1960 may be estimated in ac-

TABLE 15
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TYPE AND SIZE OF
COMMUNITY, 1900-1940

Type and Size of Community	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940
	(Per Cent)				
Total population	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Urban communities	40.0	45.8	51.4	56.2	56.5
1,000,000 or more persons	8.5	9.2	9.6	12.3	12.1
500,000-1,000,000	2.2	3.3	5.9	4.7	4.9
250,000- 500,000	3.8	4.3	4.3	6.5	5.9
100,000- 250,000	4.3	5.3	6.2	6.1	5.9
50,000- 100,000	3.6	4.5	5.0	5.3	5.6
25,000- 50,000	3.7	4.4	4.8	5.2	5.6
10,000- 25,000	5.7	6.0	6.6	7.4	7.6
5,000- 10,000	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.8	5.1
2,500- 5,000	4.1	4.2	4.3	3.8	3.8
Rural Communities	60.0	54.2	48.6	43.8	43.5

Source: Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1939 and 1941.

cordance with the preceding projections as follows (in millions):

	1940	1950	1960
Total*	34.9	39.9	44.3
Urban	20.6	24.7	28.3
Rural farm	7.1	6.6	6.1
Rural nonfarm	7.2	8.6	9.9

* See Table 12.

Assuming a gradual increase in the proportion of one-person households in all three types of communities, the number of consumer units in urban and rural areas is likely to shift, with an increase over 1940 in urban and rural nonfarm consumer units and a decrease in farm consumer units, both in 1950 and 1960. (See Table 14.)

How the future urban population will be distributed among communities of various size is not very clear. Growth of the population has generally been accompanied by increasing urbanization and by progressive concentration in large communities. But developments in the last decade before the war did not follow this

pattern. The urban trend slowed down markedly, and the population shifted somewhat toward middle-sized and small cities—of 5,000 to 100,000 population. (See Table 15.)

The largest cities—over 100,000 population—increased their share of the country's total population from less than 19 per cent in 1900 to nearly 30 per cent in 1930, but their proportion dropped to 28.8 per cent in 1940. The middle-sized cities (from 5,000 to 100,000 population), on the other hand, showed a smaller relative growth from 1900 to 1930—from about 17 per cent of the total to 22.7 per cent—but made a further gain to 23.9 per cent in 1940. This change in trend might be accounted for by the depression, which was particularly severe in large cities and caused migration of their population to rural areas. But the recent expansion of residential and middle-sized communities bordering on larger urban communities also helps to explain this development. With further progress in transportation, this tendency is likely to

gain momentum and may act as a brake on the concentration of the population in the largest centers.

b. Long-range Trend in Internal Migration.

The gradual movement in the past of the center of population from east to west resulted partly from the continuous flow of immigrants into the country, their settlement along the coastline and the consequent wave of colonization toward the western frontier. In spite of the cessation of immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere in the 1930's, the general trend of interstate migration from the densely populated East to the thinly populated West continued. To some extent the West remains our open frontier, and large-scale migration westward in the future seems fairly probable. Between 1930 and 1940, interstate migration was manifested by uneven population increases in different geographic divisions that could not be explained by local differences in birth rates: population in the New England states increased 3.3 per cent; in the Middle Atlantic states 4.9 per cent; in the Pacific states 18.8 per cent.

The economic expansion of the Pacific Northwest and the development of naval and military bases along the Pacific Coast will probably stimulate the internal migration westward. Probable increases in the number of tourists and progress in transportation also point to a growing proportion of the population in the Pacific states.

4. GEOGRAPHICAL SHIFTS DURING WORLD WAR II

Extensive migration of the population took place as a result of the war. Apart from the millions entering the armed forces, many civilian workers changed their state of residence. Some of these

were defense workers; some were encouraged to move by new work opportunities in civilian goods industries whose labor supply had been depleted; and others were former retired workers returning to the labor market. Because of the absorption of single men by the army, the proportion of married men in the migrating workers was comparatively high.

From April 1940 to November 1943, the civilian population decreased by 4.2 million, or about 3.2 per cent, although the excess of births over deaths would account for a net growth of the total population of 5.3 million. The loss of the civilian population reflects, of course, the fact that men were taken into the armed forces at a faster rate than the population increased.

a. Regional Variations.

However, the shrinkage of civilian population during this three-and-a-half-year period was far from uniform over the nation as a whole. Its change in each state may be ascertained by comparison of the results of registration for sugar ration books in October-November 1943 with the adjusted census data for April 1, 1940. By allowing for the natural increase of population (i.e., the balance of births over deaths) and the net loss to the armed forces, the Census has computed figures showing the net balance of interstate civilian migration for each state and geographic division. In 12 states—Connecticut, Michigan, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, Florida, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon and California—the civilian population increased appreciably from 1940 to 1943; in 7 states its decrease, accounted for by losses to armed forces, was to some extent offset by in-migration from other states; and in 30 states losses of civilian population were larger than the excess over births of deaths plus losses to the armed forces. (See Table 16.)

TABLE 16

INTERSTATE MIGRATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION, APRIL 1, 1940—NOVEMBER 1, 1943

Division and state	Estimated Civilian Population		Net Increase (+) or Decrease (—)	Surplus of Births Over Deaths From April 1, 1940 to No- vember 1, 1943	Loss to Armed Forces	Net Gain (+) or Loss (—) Through Civil- ian Migration
	April 1, 1940	November 1, 1943				
UNITED STATES	131,401,985	127,228,683	— 4,173,302	5,261,568	9,740,000	+ 305,112
New England	8,423,319	8,084,568	— 338,751	214,516	673,402	+ 120,135
Maine	845,181	782,205	— 62,976	25,763	58,344	— 30,395
New Hampshire	490,638	453,136	— 37,502	11,356	36,863	— 11,995
Vermont	358,856	316,019	— 42,837	10,452	21,882	— 31,407
Massachusetts	4,313,838	4,092,195	— 221,643	94,652	353,327	+ 37,032
Rhode Island	707,920	694,112	— 13,808	18,105	61,391	+ 29,478
Connecticut	1,706,886	1,746,901	+ 40,015	54,188	141,595	+ 127,422
Middle Atlantic	27,515,220	25,783,752	— 1,731,468	681,594	2,262,592	— 150,470
New York	13,462,641	12,440,005	— 1,022,636	288,196	1,087,862	— 222,970
New Jersey	4,156,642	4,077,434	— 79,208	101,337	365,427	+ 184,882
Pennsylvania	9,895,937	9,266,313	— 629,624	292,061	809,303	— 112,382
East North Central	26,609,924	26,078,548	— 531,376	897,660	1,985,499	+ 556,463
Ohio	6,905,092	6,822,031	— 83,061	218,857	532,884	+ 230,966
Indiana	3,427,394	3,379,052	— 48,342	114,785	242,104	+ 78,977
Illinois	7,887,327	7,559,576	— 327,751	218,807	615,120	+ 68,562
Michigan	5,252,922	5,373,718	+ 120,796	232,425	392,441	+ 280,812
Wisconsin	3,137,189	2,944,171	— 193,018	112,786	202,950	— 102,854
West North Central	13,509,282	12,254,437	— 1,254,845	463,776	877,181	— 841,440
Minnesota	2,791,933	2,523,681	— 268,252	111,738	188,026	— 191,964
Iowa	2,537,605	2,275,086	— 262,519	85,717	155,652	— 192,584
Missouri	3,783,760	3,522,109	— 261,651	112,101	256,836	— 116,916
North Dakota	641,875	536,229	— 105,646	31,927	37,143	— 100,430
South Dakota	642,866	544,493	— 98,373	26,486	35,746	— 89,113
Nebraska	1,314,255	1,175,336	— 138,919	40,907	83,532	— 96,294
Kansas	1,796,988	1,677,503	— 119,485	54,900	120,246	— 54,139
South Atlantic	17,728,306	17,690,024	— 38,282	1,041,705	1,210,257	+ 130,270
Delaware	266,128	273,370	+ 7,242	8,142	20,283	+ 19,383
Maryland	1,813,132	1,981,664	+ 168,532	70,498	137,345	+ 235,379
Dist. of Columbia	654,513	816,982	+ 162,469	22,011	64,793	+ 205,251
Virginia	2,649,949	2,767,921	+ 117,972	145,534	182,261	+ 154,699
West Virginia	1,901,919	1,731,171	— 170,748	116,783	147,899	— 139,632
North Carolina	3,566,206	3,344,348	— 221,858	252,087	211,112	— 262,833
South Carolina	1,886,013	1,788,337	— 97,676	150,496	110,244	— 137,928
Georgia	3,099,527	2,974,868	— 124,659	196,198	190,064	— 130,793
Florida	1,890,919	2,011,363	+ 120,444	79,956	146,256	+ 186,744
East South Central	10,761,536	10,074,226	— 687,310	658,174	701,405	— 644,079
Kentucky	2,840,944	2,546,941	— 294,003	153,014	184,341	— 262,676
Tennessee	2,915,536	2,816,399	— 99,137	173,825	202,119	— 70,843
Alabama	2,821,651	2,715,919	— 105,732	187,598	176,964	— 116,366
Mississippi	2,183,405	1,994,967	— 188,438	143,737	137,981	— 194,194

TABLE 16 (continued)

Division and state	Estimated Civilian Population		Net Increase (+) or Decrease (-)	Surplus of Births Over Deaths From April 1, 1940 to November 1, 1943	Loss to Armed Forces	Net Gain (+) or Loss (-) Through Civilian Migration
	April 1, 1940	November 1, 1943				
West South Central	13,030,003	12,292,611	- 737,392	764,298	938,043	- 563,647
Arkansas	1,948,054	1,734,440	- 213,614	132,398	120,640	- 225,372
Louisiana	2,359,410	2,314,941	- 44,469	145,666	171,102	- 19,033
Oklahoma	2,332,849	1,987,539	- 345,310	120,381	162,149	- 303,542
Texas	6,389,690	6,255,691	- 133,999	365,853	484,152	- 15,700
Mountain	4,145,515	4,018,073	- 127,442	224,264	297,926	- 53,780
Montana	559,381	469,916	- 89,465	22,579	43,032	- 69,012
Idaho	524,873	472,925	- 51,948	27,932	34,991	- 44,889
Wyoming	249,873	235,684	- 14,189	12,875	18,376	- 8,688
Colorado	1,121,534	1,066,418	- 55,116	44,841	77,198	- 22,759
New Mexico	531,785	489,863	- 41,922	40,826	38,386	- 44,362
Arizona	497,883	569,150	+ 71,267	32,012	37,396	+ 76,651
Utah	550,062	583,560	+ 33,498	39,085	37,984	+ 32,397
Nevada	110,124	130,557	+ 20,433	4,114	10,563	+ 26,882
Pacific	9,678,880	10,952,444	+ 1,273,564	315,599	793,695	+ 1,751,660
Washington	1,732,365	1,903,649	+ 171,284	57,736	131,383	+ 244,931
Oregon	1,088,476	1,171,801	+ 83,325	33,477	88,310	+ 138,158
California	6,858,039	7,876,994	+ 1,018,955	224,386	574,002	+ 1,368,571

Source: Bureau of the Census, Special Reports, *Population*, August 28, 1944 (Series P-44, No. 17), pp. 3-4.

These changes generally reflect the migration of population from rural states and from some of the older industrial districts to the newer war-industry centers. Wide variations occurred among individual states. New York, for example, lost more than a million of her 1940 civilian population, while California, with roughly half of New York's population, gained a million. Agricultural states had the largest percentage losses, but the industrial East also had substantial losses. North Dakota and Montana lost about 16 per cent of their population, with South Dakota and Oklahoma not far behind with a 15 per cent loss. At the other extreme, the District of Columbia gained almost 25 per cent, and Nevada more than 18 per cent, while Arizona and California showed gains of 14 to 15 per cent. Gains were especially pronounced in the

Southwest and Pacific Coast, while the heaviest losses were suffered by the middle western farm states.

In order to visualize the probable effect of wartime interstate migration on the distribution of population in postwar America, it is worth while to compare it with population shifts during the two decades before the war. (See Table 17). It appears that of 19 states that gained population through interstate migration in 1940-1943, 12 had gains in 1930-1940 and 16 had gains in 1920-1930. Of 30 states with net losses in population in 1940-1943, 21 had similar losses in the preceding decade and 28 had losses in the decade of 1920-1930. In brief, the direction of interstate migration in 1940-1943 was more similar to the pattern of the 1920's than to that of the 1930's.

The similarity of wartime migration

TABLE 17

ESTIMATED NET BALANCE OF INTERSTATE CIVILIAN MIGRATION IN 1940-1943
AS COMPARED WITH 1930-1940 AND 1920-1930

State ^a	Net Gain (+) or Loss (-) Through Migration		
	Civilians		Total Population
	April 1940- November 1943 ^b	1930-1940 ^c	
California	+1,368,600	+1,052,200	+1,738,000
Michigan	+280,800	-5,400	+595,000
Washington	+244,900	+106,600	+82,000
Maryland	+235,400	+110,600	+13,000
Ohio	+231,000	-71,300	+282,000
District of Columbia	+205,300	+144,100	
Florida	+186,700	+335,000	+349,000
New Jersey	+184,900	-47,200	+477,000
Virginia	+154,700	+13,900	-231,000
Oregon	+138,200	+101,200	+96,000
Connecticut	+127,400	+31,000	+84,000
Indiana	+79,000	+12,200	+35,000
Arizona	+76,700	+25,800	+27,000
Illinois	+68,600	-78,300	+488,000
Massachusetts	+37,000	-106,200	+49,000
Utah	+32,400	-38,500	-30,000
Rhode Island	+29,500	-5,500	+18,000
Nevada	+26,900	+16,600	+5,000
Delaware	+19,400	+17,100	-18,000
Wyoming	-8,700	+100	-1,000
New Hampshire	-12,000	+8,900	-7,000
Texas	-15,700	+28,800	+288,000
Louisiana	-19,000	+48,700	-22,000
Colorado	-22,800	+21,500	-15,000
Maine	-30,400	-1,800	-35,000
Vermont	-31,400	-19,800	-19,000
New Mexico	-44,400	+36,900	-20,000
Idaho	-44,900	+23,800	-51,000
Kansas	-54,100	-206,500	-95,000
Montana	-69,000	-24,300	-71,000
Tennessee	-70,800	+56,300	-117,000
South Dakota	-89,100	-122,000	-42,000
Nebraska	-96,300	-183,400	-81,000
North Dakota	-100,400	-125,700	-72,000
Wisconsin	-102,900	-45,200	-7,000
Pennsylvania	-112,400	-355,500	-69,000
Alabama	-116,400	-158,400	-150,000
Missouri	-116,900	-12,600	-60,000
Georgia	-130,800	-94,900	-416,000

TABLE 17 (continued)

State ^a	Net Gain (+) or Loss (—) Through Migration		
	Civilians	Total Population	
	April 1940— November 1943 ^b	1930–1940 ^c	1920–1930 ^d
South Carolina	—137,900	—54,200	—258,000
West Virginia	—139,600	—63,600	—53,000
Minnesota	—192,000	+2,400	—113,000
Iowa	—192,600	—105,100	—168,000
Mississippi	—194,200	—101,200	—103,000
New York	—223,000	—20,000	+1,229,000
Arkansas	—225,400	—113,900	—214,000
Kentucky	—262,700	—71,200	—203,000
North Carolina	—262,800	—62,400	—8,000
Oklahoma	—303,500	—301,900	—49,000

^a States arrayed by declining net gain and increasing net loss through internal migration in 1940 to 1943.

^b Estimated by Bureau of the Census (Series P-44, No. 17, released August 28, 1944). Census figures are rounded here to the next hundred.

^c Estimated by a method similar to that used by Bureau of the Census for the period from 1940 to 1943 (W. S. Woytinsky, *Internal Migration During the War*, Social Security Board, released November 27, 1944). For the estimate of the net change in population from 1930 to 1940, the state figures of the 1930 Census were inflated by 0.638 of one per cent. This correction brings the total for 1930 close to the difference between the 1940 total and the surplus of births over deaths in the decade between the two enumerations.

^d Estimated by C. Warren Thornthwaite, *Internal Migration in the United States*, Study of Population Redistribution, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1934, Chart VII-D opposite p. 22. These figures do not include children under 10 years in 1930.

^e Data not available.

to the pattern of the 1920's is particularly striking when we examine those states in which the trend in 1940-1943 and in 1920-1930 differed from that in 1930-1940. The list, as seen in Table 17, includes 14 states. Of these, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio and Illinois had net gains through interstate migration aggregating 1,909,000 from 1920 to 1930 and 831,000 in 1940-1943, while their 1930-1940 loss totaled 313,900.

The remaining eight states—New Hampshire, Tennessee, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado and New Mexico—lost an aggregate of 346,000 population from 1920 to 1930, gained 198,600 in 1930-1940 and suffered an

aggregate wartime loss of 414,600 from 1940 to 1943. The first group consists of industrial states that were growing during the prosperous 1920's, lost population through migration during the depression and resumed their growth under the impact of the war boom. The second group of states lost population to the industrial centers during both periods of expansion but gained population in the depressed 1930's because of the return of workers laid off in the industrial states.

Only in five states did the direction of interstate migration during the war differ from the 1920-1930 pattern. New York gained population in the 1920's because of immigration from abroad, lost population in the 1930's and also from

1940 to 1943. Texas had a considerable population gain in the 1920's, due to the oil boom, minor gains in the 1930's and a slight loss during the war years. Virginia lost population in the 1920's, but gained in the 1930's and again in 1940-1943 because of the growth of the metropolitan area near the national capital. Delaware experienced a population loss in the 1920's, but gains in the 1930's and in the war period. Utah lost population in both the 1920's and 1930's but had a war-induced gain in 1940-1943 due to the construction of new munitions plants.

To sum up, in 44 states the net balance of 1940-1943 migration corresponded either to a long-range trend that remained steady through all three periods, or to the trend that prevailed in the 1920's and was temporarily obscured by the depression in the 1930's. In only three states—New York, Texas and Virginia—did it deviate from this pattern—because of definite historical factors. And only in two cases—Utah and Delaware—was its deviation from the old pattern caused directly by war pressures.

This analysis provides no definite answer to the question whether and to what extent wartime migrations of civilian population will now be followed by shifts in the opposite direction. Only the economic development of postwar America will answer this question. If a major depression and mass unemployment develop, wartime migrations will appear as dislocations and will make more difficult the task of adjusting the economic system to a low level of activity. If, on the other hand, we enter an era of prosperity, expansion of our economic system will be facilitated by wartime population shifts toward those areas which led in production of arms during the war, were leading in production of machinery and other capital goods in the 1920's, and should now be ready to resume this role.

b. Metropolitan Districts.

This analysis of population shifts by geographic divisions and states obscures the nature of population movements within densely populated metropolitan areas. An examination of 137 "metropolitan counties" shows that these urban centers, as a whole, gained population during the war at a rate exceeding their losses to military service. In fact, while that part of the total civilian population living outside these metropolitan areas showed a wartime decline of 5.9 per cent, the population within these areas increased by 2.2 per cent—from 66.8 million in April 1940 to 68.3 million in November 1943. Of the 137 metropolitan districts, 83 showed a gain in civilian population and only 54 a loss. The changes for individual districts varied from a gain of 61 per cent in the Mobile metropolitan county to a loss of 21 per cent in the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre metropolitan counties. Population increases were more pronounced and more frequent among metropolitan areas in the South and West than in the North.

Are these wartime shifts in population permanent or transient, and will they be offset by reverse movements now that the war has ended? An attempt at an answer has been made by relating wartime population growth to the growth occurring during the decades immediately preceding the war. This analysis indicates that most of the booming centers of war industries have a fair chance of retaining permanently at least a part of their immigrants, while some communities that expanded on the basis of temporary conditions are likely to return to the prewar status now that these conditions have ceased to exist. There will probably be a number of ghost towns around abandoned aircraft factories.

Repercussions of war migration for individual communities will depend, to some extent, upon their policies. The

tendency to get rid of in-migrants as soon as their services were no longer needed prevailed in many congested communities in the early phase of the war. The assumption that many in-migrants would settle in the community was characteristic of later plans for postwar expansion—especially in such communities as Portland, Seattle and Los Angeles.

Inquiries made among war workers indicated that a large proportion intended to remain after the war at the site of their war work or to look for jobs in the neighborhood, rather than to return to their native states and communities. However, these intentions may change if a major depression develops.

All in all, the prospects for individual communities depend upon the same general conditions as those for individual states: the higher the general level of economic activity, the less will be the postwar migration away from the metropolitan areas that boomed during the war.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS

Population changes of long-range importance come gradually, for, as the Census says, "the size and composition of a population at any given time are the composite effect of almost a century of births and deaths." The long-time downward trend in the rate of population growth, which had been in progress for several decades before the war, was exaggerated by the abnormally low marriage and birth rates of the depression. The percentage increase of population during the 1930-1940 decade was less than half that of any earlier decade. Immigration almost ceased and the population gained only 9 million, compared with a gain of 17 million in the preceding decade. But this sharp decline in the rate of growth was broken by a sharp rise in the marriage and birth rates just before and during

the early part of the war. (See Tables 5 and 6.) With the birth rate now above the level of the mid-1920's, it is fair to assume that it will not remain at its recent high levels—nor is it likely to return to the depression low point.

Dwindling immigration. Immigration has in the past been a substantial factor in our population growth; the virtual cessation of immigration in the 1930's was to a considerable extent responsible for the small population gain in that decade. Future immigration policy cannot be predicted, but it seems unlikely that popular sentiment will permit a large volume of immigration during the next decade or so. Indeed, it is quite possible that the number of immigrants, even under conditions of prosperity at home, will be at or below the levels of the 1930's.

With immigration continuing at low levels—no more than enough to offset war losses—and with the birth rate dropping back to the 1940 level, our population growth during the present decade will still amount to more than 12 million, and during the next decade, to over 10 million. These are smaller rates of growth than those in the first three decades of the present century, but they compare favorably with the gain of less than 9 million during the 1930's.

Moreover, the number of families and consumer units promises to increase in the future, as in the past, at a more rapid rate than the population, reflecting the trend toward smaller families. During the past half century, population little more than doubled, but the number of families nearly trebled. (See Table 10.) By 1960 our population will be 17 per cent above the 1940 level, while there will be 20 per cent more consumer units. (See Table 12.) The numerical gain in the number of households will compare favorably with increases in previous periods. This is a trend of considerable significance

when it is remembered that the number of consumer units, rather than the number of persons, is the important determinant of the market for many types of goods.

Whatever the likelihood that the long-term downward trend in the rate of population growth will result in ultimate stabilization of the population and of the number of households, these prospects will apparently be of little consequence during the next decade and a half. In the long run, however, the downward trend in the rate of population growth carries certain implications for public and private policy. Plans for many types of public improvements and for the extension of railways and highway systems depend in large measure on how many of us there will be in the future. Since continued growth at the same rate as in the past cannot be counted on, we shall have to be more cautious in our city-planning programs and in the construction of facilities, such as schools and public utilities.

Aging population. Changes in the rate of growth and in the size of the population are of no greater significance than accompanying changes in the age composition. Our population has been "growing older" for several decades, which means that the proportion of children and younger people has been shrinking while the proportion of aged has been increasing. These trends will continue for the next decade or so, though at a moderate rate. Indeed, the proportion of children under 14 years of age—which was falling—will apparently be stabilized as a result of the recent increase in the birth rate, although the proportion of 15- to 29-year-olds will continue to decline. The most striking change will be in the proportion of aged people. Those over 60 years old will increase from less than 14 million, or 10.4 per cent of the total, in 1940 to more than 20 million, or 13.1

per cent of the total, in 1960. (See Table 9.)

But this does not mean that "we are rapidly becoming a nation in wheel chairs dependent for support on a vanishing company of productive workers." In fact, the proportion of the total population in the productive age classes of 20-64 years will apparently be greater throughout the twentieth century than during the nineteenth. Although we may expect continued increase in the population at the most productive ages, the number of workers between 45 and 65 will show a larger proportionate increase and will give rise to problems affecting the employment of older workers, such as the need for retraining and increasing the adaptability of individual workers. The changing age distribution will have other obvious effects on productive enterprise. Changes in amusement and recreational preferences will occur, demand for medical services will increase, and increasing demands will be made on our old-age-security system.

Geographic trends during the next decade or so appear likely to follow those of the past. The general westward movement of the population, which was accentuated by the war, is likely to continue in the future. The farm population has apparently passed a peak in absolute numbers and will hereafter constitute a smaller proportion of the total. Although we may expect relative expansion of urban centers and rural nonfarm communities, there is some indication that our largest cities will not grow as fast as they have in the past. But urban tastes and standards are likely to dominate the future, even more than they dominated the past.

Greater homogeneity. One of the outstanding characteristics of our population in the past has been extreme heterogeneity, but the restriction of immigration and many other influences are now

working in the direction of greater homogeneity. About 10 per cent of our 1930 population had arrived in the country during the preceding 20 to 25 years, and in many states and cities whites of native parentage constituted less than 50 per cent of the total population. The situation will be very different in 1950. As a result of the cessation of mass immigration after 1929, the number of persons in the country for only 20 years will drop by 1950 to less than one per cent. The number and proportion of native born of foreign or mixed parentage will also decline.

Public health programs and extensive educational campaigns have raised our general standard of health. Although we lack satisfactory statistical information on the health and physical well-being of the people, we do have fragments of evidence which reveal important trends. During the past half century we have conquered such epidemics as cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, and typhoid and have thus added many years to expectancy of life at birth. Many communicable diseases have shown steady decreases which reflect the successful efforts of the public health movement. In the beginning of this movement, emphasis was placed on sanitation and provision of pure water supplies. Now we have come to recognize the importance of diet and nutrition to the health and vitality of the people, and dissemination of information in these fields has brought advances in physical development and health. Selective Service statistics show that we are taller and more broad-shouldered today than during World War I, though there is some doubt about whether this necessarily means better general health. Any general picture of improvement in health, moreover, conceals important variations among areas and economic groups which indicate that there is still plenty of room for improvement.

One of the major causes of the general trend toward homogeneity has been the extension of educational opportunity to larger and larger numbers. This is illustrated by the number of young people continuing their education beyond the elementary grades. The proportion of children 14 to 17 years of age attending high school almost doubled between 1920 and 1936. This growth in secondary school attendance will naturally have an important effect in raising the general educational level of the population.

The radio and movies are probably the most powerful influences in standardizing the attitudes, tastes, and consumer demands of the bulk of our population. Both of these instruments of mass communication exert their influence over greater numbers of the population than any other means of "education." The primary aim of the companies producing movies and radio programs is to reach as large an audience as possible. They have undoubtedly succeeded in reaching a large and steadily growing proportion of the population and have gone a long way toward erasing many of the elements of heterogeneity that have characterized our population in the past.

Although population trends will not determine the future economic and social evolution of the United States, they point to a definite pattern of development. On the side of demand, the growth of the population and, more specifically, the increasing number of households will ensure growing outlets for goods and services. On the side of resources, the expected change in the size and distribution of the population is likely to contribute to the growth, improvement of quality, and greater homogeneity of the labor force. Not only will the supply of labor increase, but workers will have a better educational background and will possess more technical skills, experience and knowledge.

Population and Power in Postwar Europe

Frank W. Notestein is one of the world's outstanding demographers and author of numerous standard works on population trends. He has recently organized for the United Nations a demographic studies office, and he is director of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University. In this article he warns against stressing manpower as the only measurement of national strength, while suggesting the importance of changes in the age composition of a population. Although it is extremely difficult to predict what the population of a given area will be at a certain future date, estimates accurate enough to be useful may be projected. Dr. Notestein finds, for example, that population in Northwestern and Central Europe will reach its peak from 1950-70 and will then gradually decline. In Southern and Eastern Europe the peak of population growth has not yet been reached. What are the implications for the development of economic policy in Eastern European countries? How are these estimates related to questions of Germany's postwar development? How does Soviet Russia's population pyramid support the conclusion that it is the major power in Europe today?

The population of the world is changing rapidly, and the spread of modern technology is giving these changes new political meaning. Yet in the present welter of ingenious political formulations one finds scant recognition of the fact that many of the terms in which international problems are posed have changed since 1918 and will continue to change in the future. There appears to be no general awareness that the postwar settlement, to be just and durable, should take account of the shifting demographic and technological setting.

Of course, these are the views of a demographer riding his hobby. He is not one, however, who thinks that "population change is the cause of war," or that manpower is the only factor in political

strength. Let us agree that position, resources, technical skills, economic and political organization, the psychological characteristics of the people, national aims, leadership, and doubtless many other factors in addition to the size of population are components of political power and national influence. Let us agree also that numbers do not always count in the same direction—that Alaska would be stronger with more people but that India and Java might be stronger with half their present populations.

It remains true that at relatively equal levels of economic development sheer numbers count heavily in political strength. They should count even more heavily in the appraisal of future strength because the rapid spread of modern tech-

nology will bring power to populations now comparatively impotent. The success with which the Soviet Union has brought to bear the manpower of a population that was relatively ineffective twenty years ago demonstrates that fact. Moreover, in general, technological developments and population change are not independent terms in the equation. They are both dependent variables of the same broad processes of social change that are rapidly altering the world's balance of power. Political formulations that fail to take these changes into account are worse than futile. The world's changing people and power cannot be locked in the vise of the past, nor long contained in the framework of the present. Surely realistic planning can be undertaken only on the basis of as much information concerning the changing terms of the problem as the exigencies of an uncertain world make possible.

The writer thinks that such useful forecasting of relevant changes is possible in a number of fields. He undertakes, in what follows, to validate that opinion in the field of population, drawing heavily, in the process, on a study of the prospects for population change in Europe and the Soviet Union recently made by his colleagues and himself.¹

CAN POPULATION CHANGES BE FORESEEN?

Obviously no one can say how many people will be living in any specified area at any specified date. War losses, forced and free migrations, change in political boundaries and a host of other factors make attempts at such prediction foolish. But in spite of the impossibility of obtaining final answers, forecasting is far from

futile. The components of future change range from those that are wholly unpredictable to those that are as predictable as the passage of time. Therefore, we need to simplify the terms of the problem by introducing artificial assumptions that eliminate the less predictable factors. Having established a frame of reference, we can reinstate the uncertain factors with such accuracy as the circumstances permit.

We shall ask, then, not what the populations in the area under consideration will be, but what they would be: (1) if there were no migration across the national boundaries of 1937; and (2) if the trends of fertility and mortality which prevailed during the interwar period developed in an orderly manner during and after this war. Obviously both assumptions are false. Migration has occurred and will continue, and the war's impact on both fertility and mortality has been far from orderly. However, the assumptions have the advantage of making the problem manageable; of showing the population changes implicit in the underlying demographic situation; and of encompassing the variables that, in spite of war and movement, have been in the past the major determinants of population change.

Even on these simplified terms the problem is difficult, but perhaps not so difficult as it appears at first glance. One fact helps greatly. Whatever the future brings, population change must start from existing age distributions. The old people of the years between now and 1970, the older workers, and most of the younger workers and potential parents, are already born. Their respective numbers will greatly affect the number of births and deaths just as the amount of money in the bank affects the size of interest payments. Moreover, we start from existing levels of fertility and mortality, which in the 'thirties ranged from those that would ultimately yield declines of 25 per cent

¹ Notestein, Taeuber, Kirk, Coale, and Kiser: "The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union." Geneva, League of Nations (Columbia University Press, Agent), 1944.

per generation to those that would result in increases of more than 60 per cent.

Of course neither mortality nor fertility will remain fixed at their levels during the 'thirties. Peacetime mortality rates have been declining for a long time and will probably continue to decline. In Europe they are lowest in the North and West and in general become progressively higher as one moves to the South and East. In general, they were declining most where they were highest.

Fertility, too, has declined throughout the area under consideration since before the turn of the century. It has dropped largely as a result of the growing rational control that characterized populations becoming increasingly industrialized, urbanized, and educated. The trend has followed that of mortality, spreading in lagging fashion with the current of modernization from the highly developed regions of the North and West toward the South and East. In general, it too has been dropping most where it was highest, but even where it is very low there is no indication of a fundamental reversal of trend. Some increases have come since the middle of the 'thirties. However, there is every indication that they were, for the most part, the result of economic revival and war. To marriages and births postponed from the depression have been added those advanced by the anticipation of war. Thus far they reflect no fundamental change in family size. Greater Germany was an exception. There energetic governmental policies favoring births, assisted by the large-scale reemployment of the armament boom, brought Germany's reproduction from levels that would yield declines of 30 per cent per generation in 1933 to levels that would maintain a stationary population in 1940. However, in the absence of a very strong governmental policy there is every reason to believe that fertility will continue to decline.

These qualitative predictions concern-

ing the trends of fertility and mortality can be given explicit form. The technical details need not detain us. It is sufficient to note that the procedures incorporate generalizations drawn from past European experience in a manner to make them systematically applicable to the situation of each country considered. In accordance with past experience they provide that both fertility and mortality will decline rapidly where they are high and gradually where they are low, and that the decline will become progressively slower as time goes on. Existing populations can be systematically depleted by the appropriate mortality and recruited by the appropriate fertility to yield projected populations for any selected dates. The writer and his colleagues have constructed a series of such projections for the U.S.S.R. and each country of the Europe of 1937, covering the years 1940 to 1970.² These projected populations are not the ones that will exist, but those that would exist if the basic assumptions were valid. The actual populations will differ because of migration, war losses, and any new factors of peacetime that modify the orderly development of the vital trends of the interwar decades. Nevertheless, because they show the population changes implicit in the underlying demographic situation, they afford a valuable frame of reference with which to analyze the prospects for future change.

PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN TOTAL POPULATIONS

In Figure 1 the actual total populations for the demographic regions of Europe³

² Notestein and others, *op. cit.*

³ The following classification of countries into regions is used: 1. Northwestern and Central Europe: United Kingdom and Ireland (England and Wales, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland); West-Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Switzerland); Northern Europe (Denmark, Es-




FIG. 1. Population trends of regions, 1900-1970. This regional classification (defined in footnote 3) is demographic rather than political. A logarithmic vertical scale is used to permit the comparison of proportional instead of absolute changes in population. The broken lines used in two cases have no significance other than to facilitate their identification. *Office of Population Research, Princeton University.*

as they were from 1900 to 1940 are shown by heavy lines. The populations as projected to 1970 are shown by the lighter extensions of those lines. It will be seen that (without making any allowance for war losses or migration) the total for Europe and the Soviet Union increases by about 96 million between 1940 and 1970. However, only 18 million of that increase occurs west of the 1937 Soviet boundary—an amount less than the total population deficits caused in that area by the last war. Moreover (without allowance for war loss), the maximum population is reached by 1960.

The small change projected for Europe west of the Soviet Union (as existing in 1937) is the resultant of widely divergent trends within that area. The population of Northwestern and Central Europe increases only 3 million to its maximum by 1950, and thereafter declines. Moreover, every country of this region reaches its maximum before 1970, and most of them prior to 1960. By 1970, France has a population about 4 million smaller than in 1940. So does England and Wales. The German total is about the same as in 1940. War losses, in terms of direct casualties, excess civilian mortality, and birth deficits will speed these declines. It is apparent that this region's period of population growth is coming to an end, and that progressive decline can be forestalled only by heavy immigration or a sharp reversal in the past trend of fertility.

The projected population of Southern and Eastern Europe increases by about 27 million between 1940 and 1970. However, even here there is evidence of slowing growth quite apart from war losses. Two-thirds of the projected increase comes between 1940 and 1955. By 1970 the populations grow rather slowly. War losses

will check the growth sharply, but they would have to be extremely heavy to eliminate it. In the absence of heavy emigration a considerable growth may be expected, particularly in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union is now in a demographic position somewhat analogous to that of Western Europe during the latter part of the nineteenth century.⁴ Death rates are high and birth rates higher, and the age structure favors rapid growth. Although the projections are based on the assumption that such rates will decline sharply, they yield very rapid increases. Between 1940 and 1970 the population increases by 77 million to attain a total of 251 million. The increase alone exceeds the total present or prospective population of Germany. Between 1900 and 1940 the population grew by 55 per cent despite war and revolution. The projected growth of about 44 per cent between 1940 and 1970 is not unreasonable (war losses being disregarded).

Such differences in rates of growth sharply modify the distribution of Europe's people. As may be seen from Figure 2, the population of the Northwestern and Central region in 1900 was more than half again as large as that of either Southern and Eastern Europe or the 1937 territory of the Soviet Union. By 1940 the differences were much reduced. By 1970, if the projections were to be realized, the population of the Soviet Union would be the largest of the three, and that of Southern and Eastern Europe only about 15 per cent less than that of Northwestern and Central Europe. In 1900 the latter region contained 45 per cent of the total population; by 1970 it would have just over one-third. Differences in war losses may considerably modify these trends, as may migration.

⁴ The material for the Soviet Union was largely prepared by Dr. Frank Lorimer of the Office of Population Research, and has been published in his "The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects." Geneva, League of Nations (Columbia University Press, Agent), 1946.

tonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Sweden). 2. Southern and Eastern Europe: Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain); Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania). 3. U.S.S.R.




FIG. 2. Absolute and per cent distribution by region, at intervals from 1900 to 1970. *Office of Population Research, Princeton University.*

However, they are not likely to nullify them. The balance of Europe's population will almost inevitably shift sharply eastward in the coming decades.

CHANGES IN AGE COMPOSITION

Changes in the age composition of population are more important, from many points of view, than those in total numbers. They also come more rapidly than those in total numbers. These changes are illustrated in Figure 3 by a series of pyramids. In these diagrams each bar represents a five-year age group with the males to the left and the females to the right. The group aged 0-4 years is at the bottom, that 5-9 years next above, and so on to the top bar, which represents the persons who have survived 85 years or more. The three pyramids at the left represent populations of the demographic regions in 1940; those at the right, the corresponding populations as projected to 1970.

Some common elements stand out in

the 1940 structures. Each shows a relatively small number of males aged 40-55 in 1940 because that group bore the brunt of the casualties of the last war. Each has a gash at age 20-24, as the result of the birth deficits of 1914-1918. The differences in shape are characteristic of the different stages of demographic evolution.

Thus the pyramid for Northwestern and Central Europe is relatively large at the top, reflecting both the low death rates and relatively slow growth of past years. The erosion of the base shows that births had been declining progressively for many years. The concentration of population in the childbearing ages, which has recently supported growth, is clear. No less clear is the fact that only time is required to make that same concentration foster decline.

The pyramid for Southern and Eastern Europe has the profile characteristic of regions with a history of high mortality and still higher fertility. The number of babies has become progressively larger with passing time. The pyramid is rela-




FIG. 3. Age and sex distribution of the population of the major demographic regions in 1940 and projected to 1970. Each bar represents a five-year age group. The pyramids at the left portray the populations of 1940, those at the right the corresponding populations as projected to 1970. *Office of Population Research, Princeton University.*

tively narrow at the top because persons in the older age groups are the survivors of the small birth cohorts of earlier years whose ranks have been sharply depleted by high mortality from birth onward. The age structure favors growth because parental stocks will increase for some time without equal gains in the ages of high mortality. It also foreshadows an eventual end of growth. The oblong base shows that fertility declines of the past fifteen years have begun to check the increase of births, a development that occurred about twenty years earlier in Northwestern and Central Europe.

The pyramid for the Soviet Union shows even higher fertility and mortality, and greater potentialities for future growth. It also records catastrophes. The war and revolution, and the hardships of the early 'thirties, plus policies toward abortion in that period, are evident in the recurrent notches. However, as yet there is no suggestion of a check to the increase of births.

In the pyramids for 1970 all age groups have been moved up thirty years (6 bars) from their position in 1940, after making allowance for deaths in the interval. New groups have been substituted for the ages under thirty on the basis of the assumptions concerning fertility and mortality.

The heavy erosion of the 1970 pyramid for Northwestern and Central Europe might give the impression that sharp declines in fertility have been assumed. Actually, since fertility is already low, the declines projected were the most gradual of all. The heavier undercutting of this pyramid is due less to the assumptions concerning what will happen in that region than to what has already happened to fertility and to the contingents of potential parents.

The 1970 pyramid for Southern and Eastern Europe shows a population nearing the end of its growth. The undercutting of the base has gone a little beyond

that of Northwestern and Central Europe in 1940.

In 1970, the Soviet Union still has rapid growth ahead. In spite of the largest of all assumed declines in fertility, undercutting does not appear here because of the counterbalancing increase in the parental group. The oblong base begins to show about twenty years later than it does in the case of Southern and Eastern Europe. In general terms, then, the populations of the major demographic regions under consideration are in growth stages separated by somewhat less than a generation.

Changes in the component age groups of the population have an important bearing on nearly every phase of social, economic and political life. For present purposes, the matter may be sufficiently illustrated by confining attention to the males aged 15-64, the group that corresponds rather closely to the male labor force. In some respects the coming changes in this group are less speculative, in other respects more speculative, than those in the population as a whole. Until 1960 these ages include only persons born prior to 1945. Postwar changes that might reverse the trend of fertility therefore cannot become effective until after 1960. On the other hand, this is the group that suffers the most casualties and supplies the most migrants. On the whole, it appears likely that the projections represent maximum numbers.

In Northwestern and Central Europe, the projections show rather small changes in the number of males aged 15-64. By 1970 the number exceeds the 1940 number by about 2 million, although the total population declines by about 9 million. The region can therefore withstand sharp war losses without impairing its present ratio of productive males to total population. It can do so, however, only on terms of the effective use of older workers; for within the productive group the shifts are

rapid. The projected young workers (15-34) decline by 7 million, or nearly as much as the total population; the middle group (35-44) remains relatively unchanged; while the group 45-64 increases by nearly 9 million. This latter gain is much too large to be wiped out by war losses. The economic prospects of the region will turn heavily on the effective use of this group.

In Southern and Eastern Europe between 1940 and 1970 the increase in males of working ages exceeds by 3 million the increase in the total male population. The gain is particularly rapid in the Eastern region, where it amounts to 11 million, or an increase over 1940 of 41 per cent. War losses and probably some emigration will cut heavily into the gains, but they are unlikely to eliminate them. In spite of such losses there is every prospect that males of productive age will become a growing part of the population. The increases, however, will be almost entirely confined to the ages over 35.

The projected increase of males of working age in the Soviet Union, like that in the total population, is most spectacular of all. The number rises from 49 million in 1940 to 84 million in 1970, an increase exceeding that in all Europe west of the 1937 boundaries of the U.S.S.R. For 1970, the projections show males of working ages to be substantially more numerous than in either region to the west. Moreover, increases characterize each age segment within the group. Russian losses from the last war and revolution probably exceeded those of all Europe west of her boundaries. Losses from the present conflict would have to be much heavier to wipe out the projected increase. It is difficult to imagine conditions under which a spectacular growth in the Russian male population of working age will not take place during the next decades.

Changes in the number of males 15-34 years of age are particularly important.

On this group depends much of the flexibility of productive skills, and from it come the new military recruits and the cream of the fighting forces. Changes in the projected values from 1940 to 1970 for the major countries and regions are strikingly apparent in Figure 4. In Northwestern and Central Europe the number declines by nearly 7 million to give a total in 1970 little above that of the Soviet Union in 1940. Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the combination of all other countries each decline by amounts ranging from one to a little more than two million. These declines probably are a minimum, for it is somewhat unlikely that the losses of the war will be more than counterbalanced by immigration and increases in births prior to 1955.




FIG. 4. Number of males 15-34 years of age, by region and specified country, 1940, and projected to 1970. Office of Population Research, Princeton University.

The trends in Southern and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are quite different. The projected increases of males

15-34 in the South and East are small and largely confined to the Balkans. War losses and emigration may more than cancel them. However, by 1970 the number in the region will not be far short of the total in Northwestern and Central Europe.

The projected increase in the Soviet Union is very large, rising from 30 million in 1940 to 43 million in 1970. This increase alone exceeds the total present or prospective number of that age group in Germany within her 1937 boundaries. If the projections were to be realized, the Soviet Union by 1970 would have within her 1937 boundaries more men of prime military age than the total of Northwestern and Central Europe, or than that of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Rumania together (these being the seven next largest countries of Europe). Obviously the war will heavily reduce the projected values in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. If the U.S.S.R. should sustain heavier losses than at the present writing seem likely, she might have only 37 million in this group by 1970, or an increase of only 7 million over the number of 1940. Even so, she would have more men of prime military age than the projections show for the four next largest countries (without allowing for their war losses).

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE

The demographic changes described above are more important than their numerical magnitude suggests because they are not isolated events. They are only one phase of broader processes of social evolution; of the eastward sweep of technology, education and wider popular aspirations. The whole chain of events means growing power as well as population. The broader implications of these trends can be only briefly suggested here.

The Soviet Union is clearly the major power of the Eurasian continent. Its people

are still poor and they have suffered beyond belief from wars, foreign and civil, since 1914. Nevertheless, Russia has great demographic and economic resiliency. Numerically, her population probably will recover its war losses before 1950, even inside the old boundaries, and go on to rapid growth. This growth should bring no serious internal strain, for her resources are ample and industrial skills are being rapidly proliferated. She has achieved political unity and solved serious problems of cultural heterogeneity. Her people have developed a vision of better things to come and will have a confidence bred of victory. Clearly she will play an active rôle in the world's affairs and will not be thwarted easily. However, the problems of recovery and the opportunities for vast development at home should serve to direct her major attention to internal problems.

In Southern and Eastern Europe the basic demographic situation is favorable to economic development. Falling growth potentials already indicate that rapid increases in population will end before the carrying capacity of the region is seriously strained. Moreover, the same changes are generating age structures progressively favorable to the maintenance of high ratios of producers to dependents in the population, and this in turn makes possible rising levels of living.

Whether conditions actually improve in Southern and Eastern Europe is, of course, another matter. Thus far the region has not made effective use of its human resources. The situation is particularly acute in the Eastern region. There, the pressure of population on a predominantly agricultural economy is heavy and rising. Obsolete agricultural techniques, fragmented land holdings, archaic property systems and a plethora of workers on the land have all combined to produce mass underemployment and poverty. Under such circumstances a growing labor force will not yield a growing product. Yet the labor

force will increase rapidly. The projections show the number of persons 15-64 years of age increasing by about one-quarter between 1940 and 1955 and by more than one-third between 1940 and 1970—an additional 13 million by 1955 and over 19 million by 1970. Of course, war losses will reduce this increase but probably without changing the essentials of the problem. Smaller increases will be met with smaller resources. The whole problem is vastly complicated by the fact that the region is a tangle of linguistic, religious and political cleavages. Poor populations, increasingly aware of the advantages they do not share, and fired by hatreds ancient and modern, are not the material from which durable peace is easily made.

There is no strictly agrarian solution. Agrarian reform of a sweeping character is needed, but this will not be enough. Indeed, one prerequisite of agrarian reform is the reduction of the number of workers on the land to perhaps two-thirds of those before the war. Emigration from the region may help to some extent. However, as pointed out above, it is not the young and mobile groups that will be increasing rapidly, but the groups over 35 years of age. Under this circumstance, the governments concerned are not likely to favor mass emigration of their youngest workers. The efficient use of the region's growing labor supply can only be obtained by industrialization and urbanization to the limit of the area's potentialities. These potentialities are not large and are not spread evenly. They cannot be realized within a political framework that blocks the movement of men, capital and goods within the region. Problems of this scope are not to be solved by minor border revisions or by ethnic reshuffling. Broader views, integrated planning and the assistance of outside capital and skills will be required for the rapid changes that the situation demands. Such changes could give the people a new hope with which to

sublimate their older hatreds. To that goal a world interested in peace should turn its attention.

In Northwestern and Central Europe the demographic problems will be largely those of adaptation to absence of the growth and youth that characterized the region in the centuries of its rising power. On the economic side, rapid aging and the trend toward decline will complicate somewhat the already difficult problems of maintaining a fully functioning economy. However, if the major problems of economic dynamics are solved, and effective use is made of the rising group of older workers, there is no demographic reason why high and rising levels of living should not be attained in times of peace.

Nevertheless, there will be great and growing concern over the threat of depopulation. Probably immigration will not be encouraged as the major solution, for the countries concerned already are worried by cultural inundations. Rather, strenuous efforts will be made to lift the birth rates, probably with some measure of success. However, such developments can bring no substantial change in the projected economic or military manpower before 1960 or 1965.

It does not seem likely that any nation of Northwestern and Central Europe will challenge the world again. Germany, like her western neighbors, has passed the period in which she could become a dominant world power, owing to the diffusion of technological civilization to peoples that are growing more rapidly. Those who view the prevention of a new German attempt at conquest as the major problem of the peace seem to the writer to be looking backward than ahead. The power and interests of the Soviet Union are an adequate guarantee against that contingency. Nevertheless, important issues turn on the nature of the treatment meted out to the German people in the peace settlement. Germans will continue to form the largest

ethnic group west of the Slavs. On their continued productive efficiency will depend much of the economic welfare of Europe. It is important that, whatever the political safeguards adopted, this productive efficiency be maintained. Otherwise, a train of poverty and disillusionment

spreading throughout the Continent might soon bring a new political upheaval. The realities of the changing demographic and technological situation suggest that the danger of economic frustration in Europe may be greater than that of renewed attempts at military conquest.

Toward a National Population Policy

Frank Lorimer is director of the Population Association of America, professor of population studies in the American University Graduate School, and consultant to the National Resources Committee. In this selection from his book, *Foundations of American Population Policy*, Professor Lorimer stresses the necessity for developing a national policy soundly based upon a consideration of the dynamics of population trends. As the population begins to level off and even to decline, it becomes even more important to improve it qualitatively by health and education programs designed to give us maximum efficiency.

In view of the demographic changes underway within the United States and their social and economic implications, it is appropriate that increased attention be given to both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of population trends. As a nation we can no longer afford to leave such problems to the consideration of a few technicians but must begin to formulate general population policies which are in accord with changing conditions. Moreover, the continued decline in the birth rate may be expected increasingly to attract public attention so that such formulation will become more and more pressing.

The real alternatives in the long-range prospects for the total population of the United States are not rapid population increase or stabilization but rather stabil-

ization or decrease. In fact, a period of population decrease beginning a few decades hence seems almost inevitable. By that time, if present trends continue, the intrinsic reproductivity may be only three-fourths or two-thirds of that required for permanent population replacement. Associated with such long-range trends is the possibility of the approximate equalization of fertility rates between rural and urban areas with a consequent improvement of economic conditions in areas where population presses heavily on natural resources.

To forecast the economic consequences of rapid population decrease in a modern nation is difficult. The disadvantageous aspects of a stationary population as contrasted with an increasing population would be intensified without the com-

pensating advantages of a stable population base. Furthermore, a decreasing population would contain an abnormally high proportion of aged persons. A shift from a declining to a stationary population would then place a double strain upon the relatively small number of young adults because of increased numbers of children as well as large numbers of aged to support. Such considerations increase the alarm that many people feel at the prospect of population decrease.

From the national viewpoint the problem of population trends is related to questions of military power and security. But, within broad limits, the trend of total population is a relatively minor factor in actual or potential military power under the conditions of modern warfare. Natural resources, geographical situation, economic organization, morale, and military organization and equipment are more decisive factors. Thus, while continued population decrease in the United States over a long period of time might have serious consequences in terms of national defense, its importance is easily exaggerated.

More intangible considerations, including intuitive and traditional attitudes, exercise greater influence on popular reactions to the prospect of population decrease, especially if such a trend is pictured as continuing indefinitely. Most Americans probably hope that their descendants may continue indefinitely to share in human experience and to contribute to the unfolding of human destiny. The more thoughtful add the wish that our institutions may be so developed that future generations of Americans may make an increasing contribution to the evolution of civilization and to the spiritual progress of mankind. This ideal does not involve any necessary preference for indefinite population increase, but it does involve an emotional interest in the maintenance of the nation and the en-

richment of the national culture. With the technological resources of the modern era it seems possible, if sufficient social intelligence is exercised, to conserve natural resources effectively and to maintain a stationary population at a constantly rising level of living.

In the light of the foregoing analysis and of contemporary American ideals, the following tentative statement of American population policy with respect to the trend of the total national population may be formulated:

The approaching cessation of population growth in the United States will have advantages that may in the long run equal or outweigh its disadvantages. Positive measures are needed, however, for the adaptation of the American economy to this change in population trend. Economic stability and continued economic progress are now peculiarly dependent on measures for relating production more effectively to the interests of people as consumers of goods and services. At the same time, serious attention should be given to the development of positive measures, consistent with other social interests, for offsetting the present trend toward population decrease so as to assure population maintenance at a relatively high level.

While it is difficult, if not impossible, to set up comprehensive qualitative criteria for a population policy, certain general lines of development are clearly indicated. Health, intelligence, and culture are matters of supreme importance in connection with quality of population. Material conditions affecting such factors as nutrition and medical services, education, communication, travel, reading, and art contribute to the development of personal qualities; and they, in turn, are important factors in material achievement and national security. But personal qualities are only partially determined by material conditions. They are also powerfully affected by biological factors, social institutions, and traditions.

Conditions affecting health are in large

part directly subject to social control, although the effects of genetic variations on health and disease require far more intensive study than they have yet received. The greater importance of environmental than hereditary factors in health from the standpoint of immediate public policy follows from several critical considerations:

(1) Present knowledge makes possible large-scale improvement in environmental conditions affecting health, whereas the application of present knowledge about hereditary physical defects would affect only a very small proportion of the population.

(2) There is no evidence that large racial or social groups differ significantly in vitality, i.e., hereditary capacity for longevity and health, although various racial groups probably do differ in susceptibility to specific diseases and in the frequency of some specific hereditary handicaps.

(3) Natural selection still operates, though with modified force, to increase the mortality and reduce the fertility of individuals who suffer from serious physical handicaps. There is no reason to suppose that the conditions of modern society favor the reproductivity of families with an unfavorable outlook for health, except where such an unfavorable outlook is a function of poverty, poor education, or other social and cultural factors.

Study of the relation of population trends to health lends added significance to the economic aspects of a national health program. Medical care is least adequate in low-income rural areas which are characteristically areas of maximum reproductivity and in which malnutrition and certain deficiency diseases are most prevalent. There is also evidence that in the cities sickness rates are higher in low-income families than among middle and high-income families. Provisions for more adequate medical services for low-income groups will therefore directly benefit the families which are at present making the largest proportional contribution to the future population of the nation. At

the same time, if the distribution of well-trained doctors and nurses among different population groups appreciably affects the spread of contraceptive information, adequate provision for general medical services may be an important first step in the equalization of information regarding the most effective and acceptable means of family limitation.

Population analysis also indicates the importance of increased attention to organic impairment and various chronic diseases in view of the increasing proportion of the population that will be included in the age classes most subject to these afflictions. Recognition of the fact that a large proportion of the population must eventually succumb to chronic diseases, which often involve prolonged helplessness and suffering, leads to greater emphasis on measures for increasing the comfort of the infirm in contrast to the present preoccupation of the medical profession with the mere prolongation of life under any and all conditions.

Also, the problem of mental disease is tremendous and baffling. Fortunately, this problem is now receiving increased attention by research workers, and it is a reasonable hope that in the near future it will be possible to proceed with much more adequate knowledge of the causal factors in different types of mental disease. Institutional care of patients, the conservative application of provisions for sterilization in certain cases where permanent institutional care is not indicated, and efforts directed toward the promotion of mental hygiene through community institutions are practical procedures. More specific programs are dependent upon the results of further research and experimentation.

Turning from considerations of physical and mental health to the consideration of mental ability in connection with quality of population, it is expedient to differentiate between mental deficiency

and variations in "normal" mentality, although no such sharp distinction exists in nature. The mentally deficient are individuals who are distinguished from other individuals in the same environment and often in the same family by such incapacity that they require special attention. There is need for adequate institutional care of the feeble-minded, supplemented by sterilization with consent of the individual or his guardian of those who, apart from risks of parenthood, are capable of greater freedom. Such procedure is recommended by the American Neurological Association's Committee for the Investigation of Eugenical Sterilization. Sterilization laws have been passed by a majority of the states and upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Up to January 1, 1937, more than 11,000 eugenic sterilizations had been performed in state institutions in California, more than 2,500 in Virginia, and more than 1,500 in both Kansas and Michigan; and the practice is being gradually extended in these and other states. A conservative sterilization program, however, cannot be expected to have great influence on population trends because it is properly directed only toward persons handicapped by extreme deficiency, and such persons are generally not highly reproductive.

The large borderline group with intelligence quotients ranging from about 70 to 80 under normal environmental conditions presents a more serious problem. Those who comprise this group may be recognized as dull in school and sometimes as occupationally incompetent, but they are not sharply differentiated socially from better endowed individuals in similar environmental circumstances. There is some indication that this group is unusually reproductive, and it cannot be affected by any acceptable sterilization program. There is doubt, moreover, as to whether mere provision of freer access to contraceptive facilities would cause re-

duction of the fertility of the group to, or below, the average level in the community, though such provision is certainly indicated as a first step. Positive encouragement of family limitation by medical and social workers in dealing with families whose situation makes the control of reproduction especially imperative is likely to become increasingly important.

Unusually gifted individuals comprise a group that may be contrasted with that described in the preceding paragraph. Such superiority may find expression in qualities of leadership or special intellectual interests without involving any shift in social affiliations. In a highly mobile society, however, such individuals are likely to change their occupational status and to seek new social affiliations. In so doing they tend to adopt the social patterns of the group toward which they are advancing, including its patterns of family limitation. In their case restriction of births is enforced by prolonged education and occupational investments, which often entail heavy debts. It is desirable that positions of unusual responsibility be open to all classes, but it is also socially desirable that selection and training for these positions be provided in such a way that ambitious individuals of superior capacities in moderate circumstances will not be restrained from early marriage and parenthood.

There is evidence that environmental factors predominate in producing the observed differences in the average intelligence ratings of various racial and social groups. Differences in the apparent characteristics of groups living under very different environmental conditions may have absolutely no eugenic significance. For example, in comparisons between Kentucky mountaineers and typical urban populations extreme divergencies in average intelligence ratings may appear where there is no evidence and no reasonable

presumption of any important variation in hereditary capacities.

Assuming that variations in developed intellectual traits among large groups are chiefly due to environmental factors, their social significance is, nevertheless, a matter of profound importance. Along with the recognition of the great importance of environmental conditions in mental development comes recognition of the special importance of early home conditioning and of the subtle persistence of culture traits through successive generations. The nutrition, schooling, economic incentives and frustrations, and the general cultural environment which affect children growing up in different parts of the United States today will not only influence their intelligence and character but will also affect the lives of their children and their children's children.

Unfortunately, the highest rates of natural increase today are often found in the areas of the most meager educational advantages, economic opportunity, and cultural stimulus, although in some sections high fertility is associated with vigorous social institutions and good schools. Those who remain permanently in depressed rural areas, and those who move out to areas where they must compete with others who have enjoyed greater initial advantages, are alike subject to serious handicaps. The cumulative effects of depressing environments on successive generations, intensified and extended through differential natural increase, weaken the foundations of American democracy.

Variations in reproduction rates among social classes in cities are usually much smaller than interregional variations. But here, too, the relationship between reproductivity and economic, social, and educational status or intelligence rating, though subject to many exceptions, is generally negative. These conditions are interrelated, however, and it cannot be

assumed that the relationship between reproductivity and any one of these factors would necessarily be negative if the others were held constant. Evidence on the relation of reproductivity to intelligence is meager, but several investigations in England and in this country on intelligence ratings of school children in relation to the number of their brothers and sisters suggest that the brighter children are tending to come from the smaller families. A consideration of the factors which now influence childbearing in contemporary American society leads one to expect such a result.

The extension of voluntary parenthood is a primary requirement of population policy from the qualitative standpoint. This implies, first of all, adequate provision for making scientific information about contraception equally available in all areas and to all classes. Beyond this the factors that influence attitudes toward childbearing among those who have already accepted the idea of family limitation and who have access to more or less effective means of controlling fertility are many and complex. The cost of childbearing and child nurture at accepted standards of living is certainly a critical consideration. But many other traditional, social, aesthetic, affectional, religious, and scientific considerations enter the picture. The character of community institutions as they affect family life is undoubtedly a matter of great significance in this connection. A more accurate knowledge of these conditions is important for the development of population policy.

The personal characteristics of the American people are being constantly changed by environmental conditions and institutions, including health provisions, schools, organizations that channel and redirect culture in more informal ways, and economic organization. These conditions not only influence the individuals directly affected but have far-reaching

effects in shaping the life of the nation. These considerations must be taken into account in exploring the possible objectives of a national population policy. On the basis of already existing knowledge concerning factors that affect the quality of population, therefore, the following policies are tentatively suggested:

The development of special measures conducive to population replacement at a high qualitative level is needed. As reproduction becomes more and more definitely a voluntary matter, it is important that conditions affecting attitudes toward childbearing be such that the most capable and well-adjusted persons will tend to prefer families that are, on the average, as large or larger than those of less advantaged individuals. The specific measures most appropriate to this end must be gradually worked out through public controversy, scientific research, and active experimentation.

Adequate provisions for health, education, and the development of community institutions should be assured to groups characterized by high reproductivity. At the same time, it is important that all facilities for the voluntary control of parenthood that are available to groups with superior opportunities for physical and intellectual development be made equally available to less privileged groups.

Many phases of population policy must be developed on a national basis. On the other hand, the particular demographic conditions in different parts of the nation, the cultural diversity and varied character of social institutions, and the political structure of the United States make regional, state, and local measures for implementing population policy both necessary and practical. Thus, the development and application of population policy in this country must proceed partly on a national and partly on a regional and state basis.

Questions relating to problem areas call for special action and the cooperation of Federal and local agencies. The importance from the demographic standpoint of taking variations in living conditions

among rural areas into account is shown by data on fertility for agricultural problem areas. In 1930, the number of children under 5 years of age per 1,000 rural-farm women aged 20-44 years of age in non-problem areas was 719. The corresponding number in problem areas where it is recommended that some, but less than 20 per cent of all farms be transferred from agriculture to other uses was 754, and in areas where it is recommended that 60 per cent or more of the farms should be so transferred, the number was 909.

Depressed rural areas exhibit a vicious circle: poverty causes poor schooling, poor medical facilities, poor nutrition, and the weakening of personal incentives; these institutional and cultural conditions perpetuate high reproductivity; this high reproductivity further intensifies poverty, by either of two alternative courses. If excessive natural increase is balanced by out-migration, the community must bear the cost of the nurture and education of the migrants who move away before they are in a position to make economic returns or contribute to the maintenance of social institutions; if natural increase is not offset by out-migration, there must be further subdivision of meager property holdings and increased pressure of population on resources.

Although skepticism about any attempt to solve the basic economic problems of agriculture without other fundamental and far-reaching economic changes is justified, it is possible to make a direct attack on the circle of social forces described above at the institutional level, especially as regards educational and health services. The generous subsidizing of such services is essential along with efforts toward improving the quality of the service rendered, such as special facilities for training teachers and nurses and the maintenance of demonstration centers. A vigorous national effort di-

rected toward these ends will contribute effectively to raising standards of living and provide more adequate backgrounds both for migrants who must adjust to new situations and for those who remain to carry on the local economy and community institutions.

Measures for the rehabilitation of impoverished farm families have both a temporary and a long-range significance. Much can be done to mitigate the situation of families who must rely on sources of meager subsistence in rural areas as an alternative to insecurity, unemployment, and dependence on relief in industrial and commercial centers. In many areas the program of rural rehabilitation has large and permanent values. There is a strong conviction among students of American rural life that farmers in this country have overemphasized cash crops and land speculation to the neglect of other sources of real income, increased security, and community progress. Aids toward greater diversification of production, the cultivation of products for local consumption, the raising of standards of family living, and the improvement of community institutions—solutions that families can go a long way toward effecting through their own efforts—will result in a greater enrichment of the content of rural living, along with adjustments that will increase the real income of farm families. Progress toward family limitation in low-income areas and toward facilitation of migration from areas where there is excessive pressure of population on limited economic resources, as new opportunities can be developed in other areas, can accompany and in fact would be enhanced by such

measures designed to improve the quality of living in those areas.

Attempts to force the redistribution of population in accordance with any theoretical pattern have usually proved to be futile. Areas of great potential opportunity can absorb large numbers of new recruits only as these potentialities are realized through the general expansion of economic activity. Granted such expansion, population will “flow” to areas of opportunity; but such movement is impeded by the inadequate education, extreme poverty, and isolation of people in areas of meager opportunity. To an increasing extent, the nation is one community, and the destiny of the whole is dependent upon the health and well-being of all of its constituent groups. . . .

Equality of opportunity implies that individuals may move freely from one area to another without experiencing great differences in plane of living, opportunity, or security. It implies the equalization of opportunity for educational progress. It also implies equalization of opportunity for adequate nutrition, medical care, and physical development and for recreational activities. At the present time the various regions of the United States are characterized by wide differences in real income and opportunity, and these differences in economic opportunity are associated with diverse population trends in such a way as to constitute a serious menace to national welfare.

Provision for equality of opportunity in different parts of the United States is a fundamental consideration in the determination of a national population policy.

7

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

I

In popular American mythology there has been a tendency to assume that economics and property relationships are areas of human interest and activity quite distinct, and properly so, from the political and governmental spheres. The fact that the myth has had little if any relation to historic conditions even in the United States has not shaken the faith of many that such an artificial line may be drawn.

The founding fathers of the United States clearly understood the relationship between politics and economics. From the beginning of their discussions concerning a governmental system they demonstrated an awareness that "every system of government sustains a corresponding system of property relations." And there is certainly much evidence to support the conclusion that debates over the Constitution were far more concerned with concrete economic problems than with such abstract political issues as state's rights and federal power. The division over adoption or rejection of the instrument largely formed around a split between commercial-financial and agrarian interests. This economic interest was expressed by Fisher Ames in 1789, when he said: "I conceive, sir, that the present Constitution was dictated by commercial necessity more than any other cause. The want of an efficient government to secure the manufacturing interests and to advance our commerce, was long seen by men of judgment and pointed out by patriots solicitous to promote our general welfare."

This division between the rival economic interests has been symbolized by the contrast between the policies of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton, generally favoring a concentration of power, both political and economic, advocated governmental policies designed to bind commercial-financial groups to the government with ties of privilege. Hence he advocated protective tariffs, subsidies, and bounties of various kinds to encourage the development of the American economy. In contrast, Jefferson believed in a diffusion of power, both economic and political, and he was convinced that this would be best achieved by encouraging the independent, small farmers. He feared that a democratic society would be impossible to maintain if industry

provided the economic foundation. For, in his view, the dependence of the wage earner "begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition." Thus much of Jefferson's hostility toward the Federalist administration stemmed from his belief that it was being used as a tool for advancing commercial and financial interests to the detriment of those of the agrarians. Nevertheless, that Jefferson was by no means doctrinaire in his support of limited government is revealed in his first message to Congress: "Agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation, the four pillars of our prosperity, are the most thriving when left free to individual enterprise. Protection from casual embarrassments, however, may sometimes be seasonably interposed. If in the course of your observations or inquiries, they should appear to need any aid within the limits of our constitutional powers, your sense of their importance is a sufficient assurance they will occupy your attention."

Certainly it would be difficult to find a more precise statement of the economic basis of politics than that expressed by James Madison in Federalist paper number X. "The most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.... The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation...."

It is difficult to imagine that the men who founded the United States had any intention of establishing *laissez faire* as a universal principle. They sought rather to create a national government which was capable of promoting conditions favorable to individual enterprise and, thereby, to the creation of a healthy, viable society—even if that meant direct interference with a great many things which individuals and states had been in the habit of doing.

II

How is it possible then that the United States, more than any other modern nation, came to epitomize limited government and *laissez faire*? In a brief essay it is impossible to review historical developments, matters relating to our security from foreign threats, the tremendous wealth of natural resources, and a traditional hostility to government which have contributed to this conception of a divorce between politics and economics. All that can be done here is to suggest some of the contributions of John Locke, Adam Smith, John Taylor, Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, and others who have helped shape the American tradition. The extreme individualism of Locke plus his negative conception of the state as primarily a device for the preservation of private property had a profound influence in forming American opinion. His conception of an individual as merely a mental substance provided no basis for the formation of a society, for developing relations between men making up a society. The contrast between Locke's atomizing philosophy and that of the

Greeks may be seen by recalling that Plato and Aristotle conceived of society and political organization as a result of the very nature of man, and not as something voluntarily and artificially created. With Locke the state becomes merely a conventional arrangement, at best a necessary evil, and one to be supported only so long as it preserves private property. It is this conception of the state's function which makes it extremely difficult to justify social encroachments on individual property rights and helps to explain the bitter resistance shown to legislation designed to prevent wastage of resources, or to the income tax, or to social security measures.

Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* was published in 1776. Its emphasis upon a natural order, individualism, and *laissez faire*, as well as its humanitarian insistence that the purpose of an economic order was to further the well-being of consumers should have assured it a cordial reception in a country which had just announced a Declaration of Independence. Actually only a portion of Smith's doctrine was deemed by the Federalists to be valid for the United States. They were sympathetic to the emphasis upon individualism, while they continued to advocate a great many of the mercantilist doctrines which *The Wealth of Nations* had been written to destroy. Alexander Hamilton was a critic of Adam Smith, for while he believed in private property and individual enterprise, he was convinced that government should provide positive assistance to business and commercial groups. His policies actually were not put into practice in any general way until the period following the War of 1812, when Henry Clay, nominally a Jeffersonian, popularized them as the "American System." However, it is certainly clear that Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures* had little in common with the tenets of the Scotch philosopher.

In general it may be suggested that the Jeffersonian agrarians tended to be more sympathetic to the economic doctrines of Smith than did the commercial and financial interests. In reaction against the Hamiltonian policies Jefferson's followers subscribed to a Physiocratic emphasis upon economic freedom for the small farmer. Their doctrines are given most detailed expression in the writings of John Taylor. Accepting a Lockean view of the origin of property, Taylor insisted that it was a natural right which no government could properly interfere with. The great danger was that commercial and financial interests might use political influence to gain property rights. He insisted that wealth gained by speculation or privilege, e.g., tariffs, subsidies, corporate charters, was basically different from that property acquired by craftsman or farmer when he mixed his labor and skill with natural resources. He therefore attacked Chief Justice John Marshall's emphasis upon the sanctity of contracts, in cases where the public interest and such a "sacred" contract with an individual might conflict.

Although the Jeffersonian-Jackson concept of an economy of small property owners continued to exert influence in American political and economic development down to the Civil War, its governmental policies were never clear cut and decisive. In fact they were probably doomed to failure in any case in a

continent so rich in unexploited resources where the rewards for exploitation and speculation appeared to be unlimited.

In practice, then, classical economic doctrines—with American modifications—had a greater vogue among financial-commercial interests in the United States after the Civil War than in the earlier period. The capitalists, tremendously strengthened by governmental policies designed to win that war and with a political party at their disposal, quickly came to appreciate the agrarian emphasis upon limited government and individual economic freedom. Economic liberalism favored limiting state power, giving it only a negative role for the most part, while permitting the rapid growth of an economic oligarchy. Instead of recalling Smith's warning that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices," Americans placed their reliance upon a natural order in which competition in a free market would automatically prevent abuse.

John Dewey has suggested that America has been inclined to follow the negative, individualistic economic liberalism of Locke and Smith because it never experienced the impact of a Jeremy Bentham, with his contrary emphasis upon positive political action for the welfare of society. Not only was there no Benthamite following in this country, but in the period following the Civil War Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner nourished a hard core of rugged individualism and antigovernment dogma.

Darwin's *The Origin of Species* appeared in 1859, but, although it was adequately reviewed in the United States in 1860, the preoccupation with war delayed its impact. Social Darwinism was given its great impetus in the United States by the influence of Herbert Spencer, English philosopher. In a score of books and articles Spencer sought to apply a general law of evolution to society. Taking the latest contributions of physics and biology he attempted to elaborate a structure of social laws. Accordingly the "survival of the fittest" provided justification for ruthless economic competition. Calling for a return to natural rights, with every man free to do as he pleased so long as the rights of others were not infringed, Spencer naturally advocated a negative role for the state. He was opposed to all governmental assistance to the poor, for "the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such . . . and make room for better." Similarly he opposed government-supported education, postal systems, housing laws, sanitary regulations, as well as tariffs and state banking. Since Spencer believed that the social organism was governed by the same laws as the animal organism, he insisted that conscious control of social development was impossible. It therefore became the function of the social sciences to teach men gracefully to submit to the dynamic forces of progress in society. Brilliantly attuned to the needs of an industrializing America, Spencer's philosophy was tremendously popular with influential people, educators, publishers, and business men. It is likely that no other philosopher has ever received so warm a response; more than 368,755 copies of his books were sold in the United States from the 1860's

to 1900, and his disciples spread the gospel with books and in such magazines as Edward Youmans' *Popular Science Monthly*. Andrew Carnegie, an early convert, found in Darwin and Spencer the guiding principles with which to justify his life work.

At Yale University in 1868 William Graham Sumner, professor of political economy, hung a picture of Darwin over his desk and, accepting the major outlines of Spencer's theory, proceeded to instruct a generation of students in social Darwinism and laissez-faire principles. Perhaps no professor at that institution ever has had such a following, despite criticism from Republican alumni who objected to his attacks on protective tariffs. An experience as member of a board investigating Louisiana election frauds in the disputed presidential election of 1876 convinced Sumner that political institutions could not be used to control society. Furthermore, since society is the product of gradual evolution, it cannot be reformed by legislation. He saw society as a persistent struggle for existence, a process expedited by the accumulation of capital which made civilization possible. Hereditary wealth is vital for the well-being of society, and therefore it should not be infringed by governmental action. After all, wealthy men are products of natural selection which automatically selects the ablest, wisest, and best. However, Sumner was completely consistent in his advocacy of laissez-faire principles, with the result that he bitterly attacked protective tariffs and the imperialism which he saw in the Spanish-American War. There was no more effective opponent of government regulation in this period than Sumner. Since society was bound by laws of nature like those which controlled the physical order, men must not tamper with their operation. He therefore vigorously opposed the Sherman Act and the Interstate Commerce Act because they interfered with the operation of natural laws. "The proposition to adopt a policy of organization can never do anything but disturb the harmony of the societal system which is its greatest advantage." There was no need to fear monopoly, and "there is no evil or danger in trusts which is nearly so menacing to society as the measures which are proposed for destroying trusts."

III

What are the institutions and assumptions of the economic doctrine which had finally triumphed in the United States? Classical economics, or capitalism, was founded upon certain basic institutions and fundamental assumptions concerning both the operation of those institutions and the nature of man. It started from the premise that there must be widespread private property in the means of production and distribution, that individuals ought to be protected in their right to own mines or forests, factories, and stores. Of course there were certain necessary limitations on this right, in fact there has been a steady progression in the range and variety of limitations which were found to be necessary for the maintenance of society, e.g., eminent domain, zoning ordinances, and income and inheritance taxation. But it was generally believed

that only through the possession of private property could men be given a basis for freedom and independence. Secondly, it emphasized freedom of enterprise, the right of anyone to enter any occupation. Again there have been limitations placed upon this right, as when the government prohibits the manufacture or sale of certain goods deemed to be socially undesirable. Probably most restrictions have been imposed by private organizations in establishing "guild rules" to control entrance into certain trades and professions, e.g., lawyers, certified public accountants, plumbers, electricians. Thirdly, the primary stimulus for the operation of the whole economy was the profit motive. The promised reward of profit would stimulate men to employ the various means of production in a fashion sufficiently efficient to maximize individual returns. Fourthly, competition was considered as being a guarantee that consumers and society would be protected against excessive profits, inefficiency in the utilization of resources, or poor quality goods. Finally, the price mechanism operating in a free market automatically made decisions concerning the fullest utilization of available capital, labor, and materials. It should be emphasized that laissez-faire economists were not advocates of anarchy. They simply argued that a man in seeking his own interest would unwittingly benefit all society, that he would be, in the words of Adam Smith, "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention."

Obviously this doctrine rests upon a number of basic assumptions. For instance, it takes for granted an "economic man" who is primarily motivated by self-interest and who always knows what his economic interest is. It is also clear that the classical economic theory evolved in an age which was impressed by discovery of laws controlling natural phenomena and which projected this concept of a natural order into the relations between men in the economic sphere. Therefore, because of this natural order *laissez faire* was the best policy. William Graham Sumner clearly expressed a warning against human tampering with a beneficent order: "The truth is that the social order is fixed by laws of nature precisely analogous to those of the physical order. The most that man can do is by his ignorance and conceit to mar the operation of the social laws." There are a considerable number of secondary assumptions which may only be suggested here: the existence of a free individual operating in a free society; substantial equality in economic and political power between competing individuals; the production of inevitably socially desirable results through competition; the reasonably free mobility of capital and labor; and the belief that society can afford the periodic readjustments, the "boom and bust" cycle, as a means of eliminating the inefficient.

To what extent does this theory and its assumptions have validity in modern urban, industrialized United States? Does small property characterize the modern economy? Are decisions concerning production and price automatically determined in a free market? To what extent is capital and labor mobile in a highly developed technology? Is there freedom of enterprise in the classical sense? (In the steel industry? aluminum? automobile?) Is the profit motive a

sufficiently effective device for stimulating the production of needed goods and services? These and scores of similar questions have been persistently asked by thoughtful Americans as our modern economy has developed since 1865. That answers have been given which add up to a loss of faith in a beneficial, automatically functioning "natural order" may be measured by the steady progression of regulatory devices which government has had to develop in response to public demand. For if decisions are not made automatically and mechanically, they must be made by human beings. If that be so, it then becomes a matter of grave concern to society to know what decisions are made, who is making them, and to what ends these decisions are being formulated. Unless this problem is comprehended it becomes impossible to understand the steady progression of governmental controls which has characterized American life from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the present.

IV

This is in truth an "age of corporacy" in which major segments of the economy are completely dominated by a few large corporations. Concentration, no matter how measured, is certainly characteristic of the American economy. Despite this fact a majority of our citizens are probably inclined to think that the corner grocer, the local druggist, or the independent hardware dealer typify "free private enterprise." Unfortunate as it may be for our myths, these are no longer the significant units in the economic pattern. Rather it is the handful of gigantic corporations which profoundly influence the lives of all Americans. Two hundred and fifty of the largest corporations hold two-thirds of the nation's usable manufacturing facilities. In fact, as of 1944, these firms either owned or were in a position to control industrial facilities equivalent to *all* American manufacturing corporations as of 1939. In 1944 two per cent of the manufacturing corporations employed 62 per cent of all industrial workers. And this same general pattern applies to financial institutions and, to a lesser extent, even to retail establishments.

In the readings included below Berle and Means and Stephen Raushenbush suggest the revolutionary nature of the corporate structure. With the separation of ownership and control, new problems, different in kind as well as in degree, were presented to the democratic state. Senator James E. Murray, chairman of a special Senate committee to study small business, pointed out that "the great corporations which dominate every major industry in this country are usually economic states, exercising power over people, over wealth and income, over social performances of individuals and groups, as great, if not greater, than some of our sovereign states. Yet their more intimate operations are almost wholly concealed from public view, and little subject to public review." It is this aspect which needs careful analysis, for democratic society must recognize that power must be made responsible to society. "Large business units, more than any feature of our economic arrangements," according to Professor Sumner

Slichter, "create the problem of the relationship between industry and the state. Today, the development of huge business enterprises has made this relationship between industry and the state the political issue of the age."

We have assumed that power in democratic society would always be kept diffused, that neither the government nor any group would be able to obtain power beyond the ability of others to challenge its exertion. Robert Lynd's essay below suggests that democracy has a tendency to fear power, rather than to see its necessity and use it. The result has been that by clinging to a belief in the efficacy and significance of "small, independent business" we have ignored the danger to democracy represented by concentrated economic power. We have, according to Lynd, tried to maintain the separation of power between political and economic institutions with the result that, relative to government, economic power has become a highly concentrated challenge to democratic procedures.

Competition between relatively equal firms and individuals has been relied upon to check undue encroachment by any single organization. This is no longer adequate for a variety of reasons. The Senate Small Business Committee observed that "as the economy becomes more concentrated the inevitable result is to stifle competition by one or another means, usually by means reprehensible before the law." As *Fortune* expressed it, "the fact is that in many industries a man must be a success—i.e., big—before he can even enter into the competitive struggle." It is significant that in recent years it has been political action which has enabled private individuals to break into fields dominated by a few industrial giants, e.g., Reynolds Aluminum Company, Henry Kaiser enterprises, Preston Tucker in automobiles. Perhaps the most impressive example of government action to expand the opportunities for private enterprise is to be seen in the work of the Tennessee Valley Authority. "Indicative of TVA's contribution to industrial development in the area is the fact that in the 122 Tennessee Valley counties forming the territorial area of the river basin proper, there was a gain of 53.5 per cent in the number of factories from 1933 to 1939." The problem facing the small enterpriser is compounded by the high mortality rate among small businesses. Even apart from the war, when 500,000 independent small firms (i.e., those employing fewer than 500 workers) were eliminated, the life span of small business has been short. A study of retail establishments in Poughkeepsie, New York, revealed that 29.6 per cent survived less than a year. Manufacturing concerns seem to be slightly more durable, for in the same city only 24.0 per cent were liquidated in the first year.

The tremendous war production program, largely financed by government, further stimulated the concentration of economic power. In the granting of contracts from June 1940 through September 1944, 67 per cent went to 100 gigantic corporations out of a total of 18,539 corporations receiving such contracts. Although smaller concerns received subcontracts under these awards, the result was to tie them into the larger firms with some consequent loss of independence. In all the major industries, the largest producers came out of

the war with a greater share of the industry's capacity. Two examples may be cited from the Senate report on the "Future of Independent Business": in iron and steel "three financial interest groups and one other corporation control 8 of the 10 largest steel producers representing in terms of ingot capacity 77.7 per cent of the Nation's capacity." In copper, "the four largest copper producers controlled 76 per cent of the copper mining output in 1880, only 39 per cent in 1920, but 82 per cent at the present time." Thus Senator Murray concludes that "economic concentration will probably be higher in the postwar years than before the war as a result of: the production improvements and scientific research which big business gained during the war; the increase in the liquid funds and general financial strength of big business; the ability of big business to keep its name and trademarks before the public eye during the war; and finally the fact that big business will probably acquire a greater share of the war-built facilities which it operated than will small business, regardless of whether economic conditions are prosperous or depressed."

Therefore, it would seem to be perfectly apparent that negative government is not only no longer adequate, it cannot be tolerated if democratic institutions are to survive. If diffusion of power is a myth, as Robert Lynd suggests, it is an extremely dangerous one to apply only to political life when all tendencies in the economic sphere point to a greater, more far reaching concentration of power. No longer can the economic and political spheres of social life be kept separate and distinct. In actuality, of course, they have never been separate, but today the perpetuation of this misconception can inhibit the development of a realistic public policy. A primary question today is who is to control the forces of modern technology and to what ends. As Charles Beard suggests, the development of a socially desirable policy is further complicated by the alliance between big business and the military. This close association is not necessarily a reflection of mere power-seeking on the part of either, but a natural by-product in a society facing an intensive and prolonged international crisis. In any event it can hardly be mere coincidence that key governmental posts are today held by men who have risen to power through financial or military organizations. In this society those are two of the dominant power sources; an alliance is dictated by mutual dependence.

The problems to be faced in reconciling politics and economics are not susceptible to solution by dogmatic and doctrinaire assertions. They can only be hopefully approached by pragmatic, empirical efforts to create a social order which is conducive to the perpetuation of human freedom and political democracy. As a people we need to ask what it is that we want of our economic system, how that system is operating to provide for these wants, and how it may be controlled to produce the desired ends.

Economic and Political Realities

Charles A. Beard, author, editor, and American historian, exerted much influence over the teaching and writing of American history. His *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* caused considerable consternation when it was first published in 1913, but it is now accepted as providing significant insight into the creation of that document. In this selection from his *The Economic Basis of Politics* the late Dr. Beard offers a restatement of this thesis. He shows that it has been a reciprocal relation, that economic changes have affected governments and that changes in government have affected economic institutions. He suggests that since 1933 politics has gained in power over economics; that there is a growing correlation between economic interests of voters and their party affiliations, presumably as a result of the increase in the number of voters directly concerned with governmental economic action; and he calls attention to the impact of the "military man" with his close ties with the industrialists.

In the United States during the past twenty-five years modifications in interests and ideas pertinent to the economic basis of politics and additions to knowledge of the subject warrant a review and restatement of the theory. The forms and relationships of economic and political realities have been altered in many fundamental respects. Economists of the institutional school and statisticians have furnished more minute descriptions of economic practices, processes, and tendencies. Careful studies of voting habits and of contributions to campaign funds for use in elections have revealed in descriptive and mathematical terms various connections and correlations between economic interests and party affiliations.

By general agreement it had been early recognized that the great manufacturing and financial interests in the country were, in the main, on the Republican side of the political alignment. There were

exceptions, of course, especially among manufacturers and financiers whose fortunes depended largely on export and import business and in the South where political attachments were nominally Democratic for special reasons. But on the whole the major manufacturing and financial interests were Republican, with all that signified in terms of protective tariffs, taxation, banking, government promotion of private enterprise, nonintervention in "the natural distribution of wealth," and laissez-faire in many forms. And despite concessions to progressive and radical factions, the Republicans hewed rather close to the party line from 1921 to 1929, which was the period of so-called Republican prosperity.

At all events, during that period (1921-1929) manufacturing and financial interests enjoyed a high degree of prosperity. There was some unemployment among industrial workers but the amount

was not large enough to produce wholesale disaffection in their ranks. Only among farmers was there widespread economic distress. Although that distress made itself felt in politics, it was not strong enough to bring about a political overturn. Thus, Republican politics had a fairly secure economic basis during those years, while Democrats wandered in the political desert. Had their economic basis continued to be firm, Republicans might well have enjoyed an indefinite tenure of power. The election returns for 1928 certainly pointed in that direction.

In 1929, however, "prosperity" went to pieces. How far that crash was due to Republican policies, whether it could have been avoided by Democratic politicians had they been in power, and similar questions of "causation" are issues which simply cannot be resolved by any kind of analysis, economic, political, or historical. But according to the scapegoat axiom of politics, the Republicans, who had claimed credit for the prosperity, were discredited by the depression, poverty, and unemployment which followed the crack of 1929, and in the election of 1932 they were swept out of office in an avalanche of votes.

This is not to argue that the voters in 1932 were convinced that the Democrats could or would restore "prosperity," or provide a degree of economic well-being sufficient to allay the political unrest which sprang from the depression. Nor is there warrant for claiming that in the campaign of 1932 the Democrats presented a clear outline of just what they intended to do in the way of "restoring," "recovering," or "creating" prosperity. In fact, apart from introducing various measures of regulation and social security long overdue, the Democrats, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership, failed to overcome the depression by the policies they put into effect in his first administration. In 1938 the number of

unemployed workers was at least three times the number recorded during the peak months of "prosperity" under President Calvin Coolidge. It was not until the boom created by preparations for war and the still greater boom created by the war itself that Democratic politics achieved a temporary "prosperity" almost nation-wide in its range.

In the meantime, while the Democrats at the national capital were wrestling with the dislocations in economy and trying to get it into a higher speed of production, politics was gaining in power over economics. In part this gain represented a continuation of old tendencies, but in a larger part it was marked by so much novelty that it could be characterized, with some justification, as revolutionary in upshot if not in purpose. In any case drastic shifts were effected in the methods of politics and in the economic basis of politics. Of these shifts only a few can be listed here, as illustrative.

At the head of the list belong the adoption and execution of the policy of *large-scale taxing, borrowing, and spending for many purposes under government, or political, auspices.*

Among the purposes were: to stimulate and promote private enterprise in industry and agriculture; to increase the amount of employment; to provide economic security for millions of dependent persons; to make preparations for war; and to wage war, after 1941.

It is true that for some of these operations there were precedents. When the panic broke in 1929, President Herbert Hoover urged the expansion of federal spending for public works and called upon the states to follow the federal example; and in other ways federal money and credit were used during the Hoover administration in aid of private enterprise and home loan institutions. But the degree of federal taxing, borrowing, and spending after 1933 reached such a height as to

constitute an economic overturn, far-reaching in its consequences.

By numerous and complicated measures, sometimes connected with the policy of taxing and spending and sometimes standing alone, *manufacturing, commercial, financial, and agricultural interests, once treated as primarily private and as forming the chief economic basis of politics, were made dependent upon politics to an extent which in this respect signaled a breach with the past.*

To describe the new network of relationships would require a monumental treatise. Whole segments of industry, business, and agriculture now rely heavily upon government spending, for civilian and war purposes, as a main source of the popular buying power that keeps economy in motion and prosperity. Having lost their gold coins and bullion to the Federal Government and having filled their vaults with federal bonds and other paper, bankers have become in a large measure mere agents of the Government in Washington. No longer do these powerful interests stand, so to speak, "outside the Government" and in a position to control or dictate to it; all of them are closely linked in their fortunes to the fortunes of politics.

This must not be taken to imply, of course, that the powerful industrial and financial interests of the United States have been expropriated according to the formula of Marxian, as distinguished from American, Communists or that they have become the mere servants of "political men." Far from it. The saying, current in 1933, that the New Deal had saved frightened capitalists from a destructive revolution expressed a conviction then and still held by many Democrats high in the councils of the party. Furthermore, since 1933 numerous friends and patrons of the New Deal have complained that great capitalists have been all along entrenched in the strategic centers of the Roosevelt

administrations. The controversy in 1945 over the selection of certain assistants as aides to the Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, himself a former associate of the powerful Morgan interests, turned in part on this very point. So did the dispute about the ousting of Jesse Jones from the direction of federal lending agencies and the appointment of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce.

With regard to the alleged power of big capitalists in the Roosevelt administrations two other facts have pertinence. The long list of capitalist contributors to the Republican campaign funds for the elections of 1936, 1940, and 1944 indicates that the amount of power exercised by capitalists in the Federal Government was not sufficient to meet their own conceptions of their interests in innumerable cases. Still more significant in this relation is the fact that capitalism, free enterprise, and "trust-busting" somewhat in the economic style of William Jennings Bryan in 1896 were supported by the very left-wing of the New Dealers headed by Henry Wallace, endorsed by leaders in the Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and approved, temporarily at least, by American Communists of the Stalin school. The expropriation of capitalists in favor of "political men" formed no part of the New Deal program as of 1945. Nevertheless, in that year industrial and financial interests did not have any such independent power in politics as they had exercised in 1928 or 1916 or 1900.

During the evolution of the New Deal, another large interest, formerly regarded as essentially private, has assumed a semi-political and semiofficial character. *Fourteen or fifteen million industrial and white collar workers organized in trades and general unions have acquired a special position in law and have thus attached their fortunes to the fortunes of politics.*

To consolidate and fortify this attachment one of the national federations of labor—the Congress of Industrial Organizations—established the Committee for Political Action in 1944 and, with no little reason, claimed to have assured the re-election of President Roosevelt in that year.

Nominally as yet, organized labor possesses a high degree of independence. But some of its privileges have been won by political instead of economic action; and it has entrusted the supervision of important elections and decisions in union affairs to federal agencies, thus regularly invoking the intervention and protection of the Government directly in behalf of its interests. To this extent it has become entangled in the vicissitudes of politics and the state. Although organized labor had participated in campaigns and elections in limited ways for more than half a century, the degree and nature of its participation in 1944 indicated that it had reached a new stage in its relations to government and politics, and had made a deeper plunge into the opposition of interests that provides dynamics for politics, especially where freedom of opinion and elections is practiced.

To carry out New Deal policies in general and particular, *an enormous body of public officials and employees, Federal and state, has been added to the older and relatively small bureaucracy.* In other words, while the number of private citizens and concerns enjoying direct benefits from government expenditures increased, the apparatus of government, central and local, reached proportions never before attained in the United States. Now the political party in power has a huge army of office-holders dependent upon it for jobs, emoluments, promotion, and prestige, and hence by interest inclined to keep it indefinitely in all places of political authority.

Late in 1944 the United States Bureau

of the Census reported that the Federal Government had 3,335,000 civil employees, and that state and local governments had 3,168,000, making a total of 6,503,000 public functionaries. Estimating the number of inhabitants at 138,100,875, the Census Bureau reckoned the number of place-holders at nearly one in twenty of the population. Since each place-holder usually has one or more family relatives, frequently dependents, it becomes evident that this class, whose fortunes are directly attached to those of government, is in a position to wield immense power in politics and society. It is true that in 1944 about two million of the civil employees were in government places connected with the war and that in time many of them may or will be returned to private life. But even so, the number of place-holders will remain large enough to exercise a decisive influence in close elections under the rule of political equality—"one person, one vote." Hence it must be recorded that a new kind of class has appeared in America: a large and permanent bureaucracy composed of political men and women whose economic support is derived mainly if not wholly from politics.

Under the policies of taxing, spending, regulating, and promoting, politicians have put a special sort of floor under their operating machine. Millions of farmers, industrialists, industrial workers, and government employees are made directly dependent upon government actions, that is, politics, for part or all of their profits, wages or other income. Millions of aged and dependent persons are henceforward to obtain all or a substantial portion of their economic support from government, central or local or both in co-operation. Until the war boom demand for labor exceeded the supply, millions of unemployed persons turned to the Federal Government in search of employment or relief; but the boom is admittedly tem-

porary. An end to such prosperity is inevitable.

The political party phase of the economic shifts is patent. In former times party organizations had been maintained principally by contributions from private economic interests desirous of government favors. With funds derived from such sources, party managers carried on campaigns and employed many devices in influencing voters. But under the new regime Democratic politicians, while continuing old ways of collecting party funds, merely have to remind a multitude of voters that they depend directly and immediately upon politics for innumerable tangible benefits received. Indeed it is likely that few of these voters need to be reminded of anything so daily obvious to them. Once Republican politicians had overtly called the attention of manufacturers to the benefit derived from Republican tariff policies; but the number of voters immediately represented by such interests was relatively small. Now the number of voters receiving economic returns from politics mounts upwards into the tens of millions.

Despite all the changes which have taken place in economics and politics during the past quarter of a century, the democratic theory of free and equal heads still rules in American politics, for the most part. . . . Tax and other qualifications on the suffrage in general and special discriminations against Negroes in many states offer contradictions, but the proportion of the adult population that can and does vote is very large. And in practice party divisions show a high degree of correlation with division into income groups. By numerous polls taken during election campaigns, notably since 1936, evidence has been furnished to the effect that *the major portion of the Democratic voters belong to the lower income-groups and that the major portion of the voters in the upper income-groups are to be*

found in the Republican column. Thus modern research and polling methods have developed statistical support for the theory of the economic basis of politics formulated by James Madison in 1787.

While "the political man" has been gaining in authority over "the economic man," American foreign policies and wars since 1898 have rendered necessary the enlargement of military interests in economy and politics. The significance of this development must be appreciated in any effort to understand the tendencies of our times; for it leads to the expectation that *"the military man" and "military force" will play an increasing role in the public affairs of the United States* as well as in the affairs of other countries.

This outcome of recent war experiences was not wholly unforeseen. For many years advocates of internationalism have insisted that "nationalism" and "isolationism," as well as "imperialism," require a huge military and naval establishment—"militarism," in short; and that only by a system of collective security on a world scale can this menace to civilian life and civilian government, including the burdensome cost, be avoided.

Arguments of the kind were prominent in the debate over the League of Nations at the close of the first World War and provisions were made in the Versailles treaty for a reduction of armaments. Although the United States took part in the general conference on that subject, no agreement on reductions could be reached by the great Powers. Again, before and after the United States became involved in the second World War, similar arguments respecting the dangers of militarism were advanced in favor of American participation in the war and in a permanent union of nations to prevent militarism.

However, early in 1945, after victory over Germany and Japan seemed assured and American membership in an organiza-

tion of nations for collective security appeared almost certain, a demand arose in the United States for an extensive program of armaments, including universal military service, to be put into effect after the war as a permanent national system. In his message to Congress on January 6, 1945, President Roosevelt declared himself in favor of making universal training a regular feature of American military policy after peace was restored. It is true that he insisted on the creation of an international organization for collective security, but he evidently did not deem the achievement of that design a sufficient guarantee for the protection of the United States against foreign dangers.

If the new policy is adopted, then the United States will have a gigantic military and naval establishment, modelled more or less on similar institutions long maintained by the great Powers of the world. That will be followed by an immense growth in the number of persons, especially officers, devoted entirely to the occupations of the armed services. This is not to contend that military men are more warlike than civilians; often they are in fact less warlike. But military men have, necessarily, a set of values which differ in many respects from civilian values; and the military interests, enlarged by universal conscription, will constitute a powerful influence in American affairs, with all that may involve amid the domestic and foreign contingencies of coming ages.

In reconsidering an idea as deeply entangled in powerful interests as the idea of the economic basis of politics, no person can hope to be wholly "disinterested," wholly detached and Olympian. He may strive to follow the example of Descartes and put preconceptions out of his mind, but he is almost certain to find them returning, perhaps by the "back-door," as Descartes did. We are not under obligations to accept the associational psy-

chology of John Locke as the whole truth; yet we are all, in some measure, victims of ideas derived from our experiences and associations.

There are few, if any, ideas relative to human affairs which all men and women of every class, clime, race, nation, and age can look upon coldly and agree upon as readily as they can upon the proposition that the circumference of a circle is equal to 3.1416 times its diameter, approximately. Certainly the proposition that "in the absence of military force, political power naturally and necessarily goes into the hands which hold the property" is not a statement likely to be viewed with chill detachment and universally accepted, defended, or criticized without emotion.

Even so, this does not imply that we may not with some success seek the utmost truth about particular aspects of human affairs in detail and in general. Indeed by an informed awareness of relevant preconceptions—sectarian, partisan, and factional, including our own—we may to some extent rise above them or shake off their tyranny. At all events, the theory of the economic basis of politics may be more effectively reconsidered if these admonitions are kept in mind.

Although this theory is ancient in origin, the modern statement of it was formulated in particular circumstances and on the basis of assumptions connected with those circumstances. It was in England and the United States that the thesis was earliest promulgated in comprehensive form and applied to practical politics. And in England civilian supremacy over the monarchy and army was attained by the end of the seventeenth century; in the United States civilian supremacy over all armed forces was guaranteed by the Constitution which went into effect in 1789.

The geographical position of these two countries, given the state of war technology, made unnecessary the maintenance of huge armies for purposes of offense or

defense. While high standing was accorded to the military man in both nations, military virtues were subordinated to civilian virtues—in economic terms, industrial, commercial, and agricultural virtues. In England and the United States, from the latter part of the eighteenth century onward, constitutional government, with emphasis on civil liberties, generally prevailed; thus conditions favored the easy expression of economic interests in politics, and the exercise of power by such interests in affairs of state. Upon the assumption that these conditions would continue indefinitely, politics was extensively treated as if the theory of the economic basis of politics supplied the criteria for “explaining” politics always and everywhere.

It should also be remembered that Karl Marx, who reduced all history to class struggles and formulated the theory of materialist determinism near the middle of the nineteenth century, conducted his major economic studies in England and used English capitalism as the classical example. It is true that Marx and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels, gave some attention to war as a social phenomenon; but neither of them substantially qualified his “economic man” by reference to the role of the military man in universal history. In fact Marx built his system largely on Manchester economics and then evolved his own theory of social dynamics, known as dialectical materialism. It may be truly said that in some ways he was a victim of capitalistic theories then in vogue and of Hegelian metaphysics.

The general conception of Manchesterism as applied to universal history was, up to a certain point, almost identical with that of Marxism. Capitalism was bound to spread throughout the world, reaching at length the most remote and backward places. Old military societies were to be transformed into industrial societies. “The economic man” would

completely subdue “the military man,” the state would shrink, and the administration of things for human welfare would take the place of government by force. Manchesterism saw this occurring as the area of capitalist *laissez faire* was extended and as free trade among nations was progressively realized; and Marx introduced a proletarian revolution as a prelude to universal liberty and well-being. But both systems of historical interpretation looked forward to world peace, economic prosperity, and the decline, if not the disappearance, of “the military man” and the state. Even Marx himself thought that the socialist transformation might be effected in England and the United States by constitutional as distinguished from violent methods.

Nevertheless, the prophecies of Manchesterism and Marxism have not been realized. The whole world has not been fully industrialized or turned to the peaceful pursuits of economic production. In recent years the area of the earth occupied by constitutional and democratic governments has diminished rather than increased. The multitude of people living under the sword of empires and under dictatorial states maintained by military force outnumbers by far the multitude living under systems of government which allow a high degree of economic and political liberty. “The political man” and “the military man” have gained at the expense of “the economic man.” The state has not withered away, as communists once confidently predicted, even under communism as enforced in Russia. Calculations respecting the future of both economic and political forces must still be balanced by calculations as to the possible weight of sheer power and the sword in the years ahead.

Yet amid recent changes one thing remains certain. Politics, including military aspects, must have an economic basis or perish. People must have food, clothing,

and shelter before and while they engage in politics and fighting. Whatever the formulas for the ownership and use of property, the state—despotic or democratic—must secure for itself an economic underwriting sufficient to sustain it or it will in fact wither away, as many states and empires have in the past. "The man of war," with his insatiable demand for materials, is even more than ever dependent upon economic production and, if he strives for political sovereignty, he must make sure that an adequate economic underpinning is provided or he will be destroyed by his own works. It is in these circumstances and subject to such qualifications that the economic basis of politics needs re-examination; for it is a fundamental consideration in statecraft everywhere, all the time.

With economics left out of account, political science cannot rise much above the level of astrology. But when the forms and ownership of property, the productive methods, the economic institutions, and the economic groups and ideas of a given society have been described with the utmost accuracy and when long term trends in the past have been plotted, pure analysis and representative thought have about reached the limits of their procedure. The findings and trends thus disclosed do not constitute an exact science which permits sure predictions as to the definite political consequences that will inexorably flow from the total economic situation or the trends.

Here then we confront the problem of great history, in which all economic, political, military, and other events take place. Inevitably, we also face the central problem of historiography and philosophy: the origin, nature, dynamics, and capacities of human beings in relation to one another and their environment.

But the human mind cannot actually lay hold of things alleged to be "original causes," or things called "causes" in the

subsequent flow of personalities and events, and see them functioning independently in particular ways at particular times with inescapable effects discernible to the eye. We cannot picture realistically in the mind economic events or forces operating against "politics" and producing political "effects," as we can, for instance, picture a locomotive coming up behind a train of cars and pushing it ahead to a given destination. Such physical or mechanical images correspond to none of the realities associated with economic interests and activities in conjunction with political interests and political activities.

We may, of course, adopt some such formula as "economics comes first and determines politics." But this is an arbitrary act of will, and the formula is untenable in view of relevant historical knowledge. Human beings had to eat in order to live and they began eating before they established great societies and states; but human beings were more than mere eating-animals even in the most primitive times of which we have knowledge. At an early stage in social evolution, economics and government, such as they were, became inextricably entangled, and their influences upon each other were reciprocal. Not since the beginning of recorded history has this involved relationship been broken: economic changes have affected governments and changes in governments have affected economic institutions and interests. But the problem of which precedes which or what comes first has not been solved by any process of learning or thinking.

Unless we are to remain indefinitely in indecisive meditation upon an unanswerable question, the knot which cannot be unravelled by philosophy or historical inquiry and speculation must be cut by considering the economic basis of politics in terms of action. At bottom, the problem of comprehending, using, and testing

the theory or fiction thus becomes one in active statecraft for all reflective persons concerned with living and operating in relation to public affairs. Immediately the theory, which is in itself mere idea, is attached to inner images and impulses and to visible circumstances. Having resolved to act, such persons will clarify their purposes as to economic or political ends, will make use of systematic knowledge and thought relative to economic and political interests, will strive to discern what is inescapable in the given conjuncture of events, and will at length come to a judgment on the general situation with reference to the time and form of proposed actions and their probable consequences.

Stated in another way, the political science of pure thought as an end in itself can ignore the economic basis of politics, but the political science of action cannot—unless forsooth it is wholly irrational and hence doomed to self-destruction. If rational, it will employ systematic knowledge of economic institutions, interests, and forces in all their forms, make conjectures or forecasts derived from this knowledge, reach informed judgments respecting the general situation and its details, make decisions so instructed, take appropriate actions, and submit the outcome to the test of human experience.

But here the absolutist who is sure that he *knows* precisely what will happen in every contingency, real or imagined, will file objections. He will declare that the above conclusion discloses no indefeasible or mathematical laws governing human affairs which will permit certainty in predictions and hence make perfectly plain the right thing to do or say at the right moment in order to accomplish a given end or ends. Besides, he will complain, it introduces the factor of human judgment, which is fallible and belongs to intuition, not knowledge and cer-

tainty; it is therefore "mystical" and "unscientific."

To such objections answers are possible. If human affairs are in fact determined under indefeasible or mathematical law, human beings are creatures of fate and have no choices, good or bad, as to the right thing to do or say at any time. They are mere automata in history. With reference to the factor of judgment or intuition, it also appears in the process of formulating theories of physical science, which may or may not be later subjected to the tests of action. At all events, human beings conduct their affairs as if they possess the power of insight, judgment, and choice.

In his volume *The Domain of Natural Science*, one of the most thoughtful and penetrating works on the subject, E. W. Hobson says (p. 460) that there are two kinds of scientific knowledge: the systematic scheme and the unsystematic synthesis (from which elements of the former may not be absent). "But besides these kinds of knowledge, there exists a kind of apprehension which is more immediate and direct, although it is often inextricably combined with knowledge of the other kinds. This knowledge is given by direct intuition, in which the object in the subject-object relation is apparently apprehended all at once, as a whole, and not by a conscious synthesis of all its parts and their relations. . . . An exceptional power of obtaining an intuitional grasp of a complex as a whole is an essential element in the mental outfit of a man of science of the highest order."

The exercise of "intuitional and imaginative apprehension" is prominent in the history of all the great statecraft that has steered nations through the storms of war and revolution and through years of advancing civilization in times of peace. An example of such statecraft on a large scale is to be found in the proceedings of the men who framed the Constitution of

the United States in 1787. These men had at their command knowledge, both systematic and unsystematic; they were familiar with the history of government, tyranny, violence, and liberty; they were intimately acquainted with the political and economic interests involved directly and indirectly in their own undertaking. But, given the nature of their resolve to act, they also had to deal with imponderables, immeasurables, and unpredictable; to make calculations respecting the possibilities and probabilities of the occasion; to pass judgment on the general situation; and finally, without being certain as to the outcome, to make a decision on the forms of actions to be risked, in the hope of attaining the ends of union, government, and liberty, projected in the paper draft of the Constitution submitted to ratifying bodies and to validation by events.

By way of summary, the theory of the economic basis of politics may be restated in the following formulas:

Revolutions and wars on a world-shaking scale have been accompanied by accelerated alterations in the forms and functions of economies and governments.

If historical experience is any guide, drastic changes in economy will find expressions in politics; and, on the other hand, changes in the functions of government will be followed by repercussions in economy.

In every civilized society, whatever the nature, ownership, and law of property, a diversity of economic interests appears and "the most common and durable source" of clashing interests in politics is the various and unequal distribution of property or income. . . .

The practice of democracy as government by the will of majorities or pluralities, under the theory of free and equal heads, does not eliminate economic interests, prevent collisions among them, or

guarantee a pacific conduct of government or an efficient solution of contradictions. . . .

In the absence of military force, economic interests will come to expression in political power.

If private economic interests, having achieved political power, cannot provide an efficient economic underpinning of society in the long run, they will lose their sovereignty to politics or military force.

If by force or stratagem politics achieves sovereignty over all private economic interests, it will have to maintain an efficient economic basis of its own or perish for want of life-giving support.

If military force triumphs over both economics and politics, it must assure an economic basis of its own or collapse amid the ruins of sterile power.

If there are no individual or group economic interests possessing a high degree of independence as against the state, despotism will supplant constitutional government and then run its own historic course.

In the absence of military force, under constitutional government, that is, limited government, against which a high degree of freedom is provided by the supreme law, the statecraft loyal to such government is under obligation to recognize the nature and existence of economic interests, promote certain interests in particular times and circumstances, restrain specific interests in particular times and places, and in general facilitate voluntary and compulsory adjustments of conflicting interests within the framework of some common civil policy.

The principal alternative to such constitutional government and practice of statecraft is the pursuit of specific interests to the bitter end—to the test of sheer power to the uttermost. This will culminate in a resort to arms by one or more of the conflicting interests and may

eventuate in the triumph of one among them (or a coalition); or, if long historical experience is conclusive, will result in the destruction of all factions in the ordeal of violence.

The realities to which the above formulas refer come within the sweep of total history in time. They are not self-contained and independent "tracts of matter and force." They are enmeshed in other human characteristics and events—biological, mental, moral, artistic, and religious—that also appear in total history. The origins of total history, like that of the physical universe, are shrouded

in the darkness of prehistory, and the law or laws of total history, if there be any, have not been discovered. Given the fragmentary evidences available, these origins and law or laws cannot be discovered by the human mind. Hence the above formulas of economics and politics are not "laws of history" but are in the nature of conditioned and conditional axioms respecting probabilities of high degree, subject to modifications by the acquisition of new knowledge and by the experiences of a future that cannot be forecast with any mathematical or descriptive certainty worthy of the name.

The Old Economy

Gardiner C. Means and Caroline F. Ware

have had distinguished careers in research, writing and teaching. Dr. Means is co-author with A. A. Berle of *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, one of the most significant studies of the implications of the corporate form. He was economic adviser to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. Mr. Means' wife, Dr. Caroline F. Ware, has taught at Sarah Lawrence College and American University, and she is the author of numerous studies in social history and economics. In this brief essay the authors outline the characteristics of the economy visualized by Adam Smith and, to a considerable extent, by the American founding fathers. The laissez-faire policy was advocated on the assumption that all decisions affecting the distribution of economic resources would be made automatically without human intervention by the mechanism of the free market. Inasmuch as the classical assumptions no longer correspond to existing facts, it is essential to examine the actual functioning of our economic institutions. If decisions affecting the lives of millions are to be made by men, rather than by forces operating through an impersonal market mechanism, it is imperative that we know who makes decisions and to what ends.

When the "man in the street" is asked to name the corner stones of American economic life, his ready answer is, "Private

property, individual initiative, free competition, private profit." Traditionally, a man's business is his own, to do with as

From *The Modern Economy in Action* by Caroline F. Ware and Gardiner C. Means, copyright, 1936, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

he pleases. He is acclaimed for his ability to make profits through the exercise of his initiative, and schoolboys are taught to want to be like him. Traditionally, opportunity is open to everybody, competition is unrestricted, and the best man wins the crown of success.

We all know this tradition. It is so familiar and so imbedded in our thinking that we continue to accept it even when our daily observation shows us plenty of situations where it is not applicable. We see that the door of opportunity is not always open; that the exercise of initiative may lead, not to success, but to the loss of a job; that a business may be so involved in public interests that to regard it as "private" is to accept the idea that people as well as things can belong to private individuals. Yet familiarity often makes the tradition more convincing to us than observed facts. It is hard for us to view it critically and to test it by the factual conditions of American industry today.

This tradition was developed in the early part of the nineteenth century when conditions more nearly fitted the theory. Most property was privately owned, tangible and visible in form. A man's farm, his house, his ship, his tools, his slaves were all his to do with much as he chose. Most people depended upon their own initiative for the living which they made as farmers, merchants, fishermen, ship-owners, or artisans. Although many a farmer's prosperity depended partly upon the quantity and quality of the land which his father left him, it depended mostly upon whether he farmed the land carelessly or well. This gave a basis for the current belief that a man's property was evidence of his fitness to own. Competition on the whole was free and active. There was little to prevent a man from setting up a rival establishment for making shoes or nails, or for selling merchandise and taking business away from an

older shop or store. So long as there was free land to the west and the sea to the east, the door of opportunity was, or at least appeared to be, always open.

The economic principles which are still generally accepted in America were thus formulated at a time when the characteristic business unit was the small workshop, store, farm, or ship; when each shoemaker, merchant, farmer, or ship captain was independent, self-directing, and in competition with all the many other farmers or ship captains in the vicinity. The presence of a few hired hands or apprentices did not introduce a sufficient amount of organization to impair the fundamentally atomistic character of that economy.

The mere mention of the economic activity typical of the first fifty years of America's national life brings vividly to mind the contrasts between much of industry then and now. Although some activity, especially farming, still follows the old pattern, the economy as a whole has become radically altered from the economic system which shaped our economic traditions.

The economic system of any time is the combination of principles and practices according to which the daily activities of individuals are brought into relation with one another to provide for daily needs. These principles and practices determine how the work of the world will get done, how goods will be produced and distributed, and how the labor of each person, applied to available resources, will be exchanged for the goods and services produced by others. An understanding of the system as a whole is as necessary to those who would understand and deal with the economy, or with any part of the economy, as is a knowledge of the relations among parts of an automobile to the automobile mechanic.

The old economy of small, individually owned, highly competitive business units

depended for its motive power upon the quest for individual profits, and for its interrelationships and adjustments upon flexible and sensitive prices. The central machinery of this economy was the market mechanism; the relationship between individuals involved a bargain, not a command; individual competitors and individual buyers and sellers were fairly equal in strength and no one had power over others or dominant power over the terms of the bargain. The science of economics, as built up by Adam Smith and his followers on the basis of this type of economy and incorporated into the business tradition in America, was essentially a science of trading.

According to this traditional picture of the old economy, the market mechanism worked automatically if only it were let alone. Hence the doctrine of *laissez faire*. If each individual were unhampered in his effort to make the maximum profit, he could be counted upon to exert himself with unsparing energy to produce the things that people wanted most. If competition between each and every producer and each and every buyer were free and equal, the pressure to offer a better product at a lower price could be depended upon to promote ingenuity and technical progress and to lead to a constantly rising standard of living. If prices were flexible, reflecting sensitively the balance between what producers were willing to sell and buyers were willing to buy, the right amount of the right products would be made and sold, and human labor and material resources would be used in the fullest and most efficient fashion.

The three major assumptions upon which the traditional analysis rests are: (1) that individuals act on the profit motive, (2) that they are more or less equal in their competitive and bargaining strength, so that no one has economic power over others, and (3) that prices respond automatically, without the inter-

vention of any human judgment, to variations in supply and demand in order to bring about a balance between the two. These assumptions led to the conclusion that there could be neither overproduction nor unemployment, for prices would adjust until everything offered was sold and until all people who wanted to work and all resources available for use were employed.

Traditional economics well recognized that an economy is a delicate mechanism which calls for a constant process of adjustment in order to mesh the separate activities of millions of people each of whom is producing things that others are to use and is dependent upon the efforts of others. The production and distribution of bread is one of the simpler processes, yet it involves the questions of how much wheat farmers will raise, how much bread is needed by people in city and country, how much income the farmer will get from his wheat, what he will buy with it, and the amount that the city person can afford to pay for bread. Consider, for instance, the somewhat more complex problem of how much of each of more than a thousand kinds of ordinary cotton cloth is to be produced, which mills will produce which, whether women are going to wear cotton or rayon underwear, and how the prices of cotton and rayon cloth and the income of the cotton farmer are interwoven!

In the old economy, these myriad adjustments were made through the mechanism of market price. Each producer decided what to make according to the price that he expected to get. Each buyer decided what he would buy by comparing prices and values. If producers were offering more shoes or cabbages than buyers were willing to buy at the prices that producers were asking, prices dropped. New buyers, who would not purchase shoes at five dollars or cabbages at ten cents, took the shoes off the market at

three dollars and the cabbages at eight cents. Price, moving up and down, acted as a regulator by means of which supply and demand were equated. When too much was offered, or demand fell off, prices went down; when too little, they went up. Lower prices drove the extra producers out of business and into more profitable lines or brought in additional purchasers. Higher prices attracted new producers or drove out some of the buyers. The result, in any case, was a balance. When the balance was upset, it was restored by automatic adjustments in price. If any price got out of line, automatic pressures immediately developed to bring it back. If any resource, whether labor or material, was being poorly used, prices readjusted themselves until it was put to a better use. If labor could be more fruitfully employed making cloth than making shoes, wages would rise in the former industry or drop in the latter until enough workers had shifted from shoemaking to weaving to equalize the productivity of the two types of workers. Correspondingly, if corn should become more valuable for making alcohol than for fattening hogs, the alcohol makers would offer a higher price for it than hog raisers and would divert the supply to themselves until additional supplies of corn would be worth no more to them than the hog raisers. The millions of detailed interrelationships thus took care of themselves without anybody's direction, and the complex economy was kept in running order by the automatic operation of the sensitive market mechanism.

The continued presence of economic activity carried on by individual initiative has kept alive this economic tradition, with its assumption that economic adjustments work themselves out automatically. Thousands of little sawmills scattered all over the country operate when the price of lumber is high enough to make it worth their while and shut down when the price

drops. The amount of petroleum on the market includes the product of individually owned Pennsylvania oil wells that pump or stop pumping as the price goes up or down. Farming, most conspicuously, is still carried on by the same type of unit which was typical of the early nineteenth century—subject during the past three years to a measure of control introduced by the AAA and its successor. The individual farmer produces wheat or not, depending upon what he expects the price of wheat to be, and offers his produce for what it will bring in the market. The market price of wheat varies from day to day, and even from hour to hour, in accordance with changes in the amount offered for sale or in estimates of the amount that will be offered. The individual farmer has no control over either the total amount of wheat produced or the market price of wheat, for his contribution to the total supply of wheat is insignificant. Activities such as these have presented a picture of the traditional free market and have furnished examples to which to point whenever the validity of traditional theory has been called in question.

The tradition of the old economy has been especially tenacious in America, moreover, because the most articulate and politically influential groups in the community have been the ones to typify it. Professional people, merchants, farmers, small business men continue to observe and to practice individual initiative and to believe in it even while they suffer from its disappearance in other parts of the economy. The inarticulate mass of factory workers, who are in a position to see a very different picture, can rarely voice their observations. The "white-collar" groups are diverted by devices such as individual sales records or bonuses from observing how limited the scope for their self-direction has become.

The picture of the old economy has

been further sustained by the practice of treating as a "special case" every situation which does not correspond to the old pattern. Economists, business men, and the general public have known well that "free competition" in the telephone or aluminum industry is a myth. They have known that the prices of cigarettes and automobiles are not flexible and determined in free markets like the price of wheat. They have been conscious of the multitude of industrial, clerical, technical, and administrative workers regimented under the direction of the initiating few. They have often dealt with monopoly or public utilities as special fields of study. But when they have pictured the *economy as a whole* and have discussed its functioning, they have left out of consideration the influence of these nonflexible, noncompetitive parts.

Likewise, when the force of government has been applied to the problems of

the economy it has usually been directed toward the effort to restore free competitive conditions and to break up large and powerful units by means of antitrust laws. Where the government has accepted limited competition, as in the railroads, or monopoly, as in public utilities, its concern has been with the "fairness" of rates, not their effect on the functioning of the economy as a whole.

The task which confronts us here is to detach ourselves from the hold of this tradition and to examine the reality of modern industry for significant contrasts between it and the old economy. In the effort to understand the economy as a whole, our attention will center on those developments which have made our modern economy essentially different from that described by the earlier economists and which may impair the mechanisms upon which the old system has relied in its theory and essential practices.

The Economic Setting

David Lynch, in his *The Concentration of Economic Power*, has made a useful analysis and summary of the thirty-one volumes of hearings and the forty-three monographs which were written for the Temporary National Economic Committee. The increasing reliance by Congress upon the device of investigation by special committees is an example of the way in which techniques essential to effective government have developed, despite the absence of a specific authorization in the Constitution. The TNEC was perhaps the most thorough of all the investigations conducted by Congress into the actual structure and functioning of the American economy. The summary of the hearings before this committee presented below constitutes an effective analysis of the nature of our economic system.

Shortly before the death of ex-President Coolidge he made a most provocative statement. His apparent bewilderment

characterized a people and an age unable to achieve orientation in the swift current of change induced by the technological

revolution. His statement revealed the temper of a people rushing from an epoch of unstable prosperity into a period of depression, with consequent disorganization and despair. The former President said, "We are in a new era to which I do not belong. When I read of the new-fangled things that are popular now, I realize that my time in public affairs is past. I wouldn't know how to handle them if I were called upon to do so." We are in a new age. We are called upon to cope with the problems of that age. Great technological changes have been effected, requiring momentous social and institutional adjustments.

Cultural anthropologists speak of a problem—the social lag—which arises when the institutional and functional aspects of the social pattern get out of kilter with regard to the mechanical and the technical. Modern techniques of production are calling forth new schemes of social organization. It would seem, nevertheless, that the patterns of thought which guided statesmen of the nineteenth century have become more deeply entrenched in the thinking of the twentieth. Leon Henderson described the more salient of these habit patterns as the basic assumptions underlying the organization of our economic society:¹ (1) reliance in the ability of individuals, in free association, to design affirmatively the main forms and directions of life; (2) faith in the efficacy of private property and freedom of contract; (3) the assumption of equality of bargaining power; (4) belief that the pursuit of self-interest will serve the community interest; (5) belief in holding the rules of the game to a minimum; and (6) faith in the function of price and the market place to bring about the best combination and allocation of productive resources.

However much these assumptions may

or may not have been satisfactorily adapted to their day, there is no gainsaying the fact that technologically the twentieth century has departed radically from that of the nineteenth. In the place of the handicraft system has come mass-method machine production; in the place of the individualistic entrepreneur of the Adam Smith type has come the joint stock company, thence the giant corporation and the ultracomplex holding company. In the place of a predominantly agrarian economy has come a highly industrialized society. In the place of relatively simple mechanical devices, such as spinning jennies, power looms, and cotton gins, have appeared giant rotary presses, flying fortresses, giant power projects, and blast furnaces. Everywhere the setting, from which was born the economic ideology and methodology of the nineteenth century, has undergone far-reaching and fundamental changes. Despite these great industrial changes, the habits of mind, the thought patterns, of the past century project themselves into the modern age. The illusion of the nineteenth century perpetuates itself.

The illusion takes several forms. First, it is sometimes assumed that there was a period in the past when a freely competitive, laissez-faire system existed which functioned quite satisfactorily in the allocation of resources. Secondly, it is assumed that a set of rules or principles adapted to one epoch of social and industrial evolution is satisfactorily adjusted to a later and more advanced stage. Third, the facile and escapist legerdemain is sometimes adopted of interpreting the complex pattern of social institutions of the day in terms of the simple economy of yesterday. Writers and men in public offices often assume the existence of an automatic self-adjusting economy and in so doing assume the non-existence of important problems.

This flight from the reality of a com-

¹ *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee*, Part 1, pp. 157-183.

plex modern economy finds a counterpart in a fetish relating to economic organization. The fetish is competition. It is a sort of emotional, cultlike, uncritical acceptance and repetition of the notion that competition is characteristic, feasible, and desirable. Even the monopolists who appeared before the TNEC seriously spoke and thought in terms of a competitive pattern, apparently unable to grasp the reality and the extent of monopoly control in the modern scheme of organization. Then, there is the unchallenged premise, so often expressed, that competition is feasible—feasible in a world of the heavy industry and mass production techniques so characteristic of the twentieth century. There is the belief that competition is not only feasible but also desirable. Throughout the TNEC inquiry no one appeared to subject these basic questions to searching analysis. Hearings and testimony proceeded with established preconceptions as to the role competition should play. The illusion of the nineteenth century was a point of departure for the problem-solvers of the twentieth.

Certain portions of the TNEC hearings serve to emphasize how different the modern economy is from the simple, automatic, self-correcting, laissez-faire concept which still grips the minds of many economists, statesmen, and business men. In the place of an individualistic economy we find an age of corporacy characterized by great masses of property intricately organized around a legal fiction—the corporation. In the place of free association among men we find great combinations of trade associations conspiring together in ways undreamed of by Adam Smith. In the place of a simple, relatively stable economy of shopkeepers and craftsmen we find a dynamic technology swept along by a swiftly moving stream of inventions, innovations, and discoveries guided by a small army of technicians who are giving us a new “planned economy,” at least on

the mechanical side. Instead of a world of relatively free competition we find one which pays lip service to that ideal, but readily embraces anticompetitive practices.

AN AGE OF CORPORACY

Little can be done in this section except to emphasize what the reader already knows. Corporations are so familiar that we take them for granted, and having done so we proceed to think of them in terms of natural individuals and neglect the social implications of these great creatures of the law. The age of individualism, if one ever existed, has given way to an age of corporacy. As individualism was submerged in the tribal commune, in the labor gangs who built the pyramids, on the medieval manor, and in socialistic experiments such as Sunnybrook Farm and Soviet Russia, so it is set aside in this day of corporacy. Men work in great co-operative enterprises, not as free competitive producers, but as wage earners, frequently of a great combination created under a charter granted by the state.

The corporation is characteristic of the modern economy. The old individualistic producer remains, however, as a remnant of the Smithite economy; in fact, the individual is numerically more in evidence than the corporation. There are about 6,000,000 farmers in America—mostly individual enterprisers. In mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, and the service industries there are about 2,000,000 firms;² most of them are individuals or partnerships in business. Corporations number about 500,000. But even numerically, the corporation is becoming more characteristic. Whereas the number of firms, including corporations, increased only 45 per cent between 1910 and 1930, the number of corporations increased by 90 per cent. When one considers the difference in the volume of pro-

² *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. 83–100.

TABLE 1
IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY
(In designated industries, 1937)

Industry	Percentage of Business Done by Corporations in Each Industry
Electric light and power and manufactured gas	100
Communication	100
Mining	96
Manufacturing	92
Transportation	89
Finance	84
Government	58
Trade	58
Contract construction	36
Service	30
Miscellaneous	33
Agriculture	7

Source: *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee*, Part 1, p. 96.

duction and the economic power of the corporation, the comparison becomes even more one-sided.

Numerically small though the corporation may be, it is by no means insignificant. In many of our most important industries the corporation dominates the field; it accounts for 90 per cent or more of production in the electric power, communication, mining, manufacturing, and transportation industries. In finance it accounts for 84 per cent of the business, and in trade, 58 per cent. An estimate of the total volume of business for the entire country indicates that corporations account for nearly 65 per cent. On the basis of production we are indeed in an age of corporacy.

Likewise, from the standpoint of those who employ workers, this is an age of corporacy. Twenty-five per cent of those who employ wage earners employ but one worker; corporations account for virtually none of this group. At the other extreme, 195 employers, or about one-hundredth of 1 per cent of the total, employ more than 10,000 employees each and account

for more than 12 per cent of all employees; corporations account for substantially all of this group. In other words, 25 per cent of the employers employ 1 per cent of the employees, 50 per cent employ 4 per cent of the employees, and 76 per cent of the employers employ 11 per cent. Still another contrast: 50 per cent of the employers (the smallest) employ only 4 per cent of the workers, whereas nine-tenths of 1 per cent of the employers (the largest) employ 50 per cent of the workers. The age of corporate employment is here and with it a materially different world from that envisioned by the physiocrats.

The corporation is an artificial creature of the state, created to perform an essential social function. It has no power other than that granted to it. Created as a fictitious person, clothed with some of the privileges of natural persons, by court action and lenient legislation it has gradually gathered more and more privileges. The assets of some corporations are greater than the total wealth of the states in which they are privileged to do business.

Many have grants of power which no state would have sanctioned fifty years ago. Some have entered into "treaties," cartels, and other arrangements with foreign countries and foreign corporations which constitute acts beyond the legal power even of the states which awarded them their charters.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRADE ASSOCIATION

Obviously to speak of this as an age of corporacy is to give an incomplete characterization. Long ago corporations grouped themselves together in combinations for co-operative, monopolistic, or predatory purposes—ofttimes for the latter. Pools, trusts, holding companies, and other types of combination have had their day, but quietly and quite unobtrusively there has risen a new type of association, less obvious in its control and less ruthless in its elimination of competition, whose influence and mastery of industry remains unrecognized. The trade association functions in an atmosphere of co-operation and congeniality and renders a number of useful services, with the result that its less desirable activities often pass unnoticed.

A trade association has been defined as a voluntary, nonprofit organization of enterprises engaged in a particular type of business. Such enterprises may be individuals, partnerships, or corporations, and in nearly all associations are competitors.³ Trade associations may or may not be incorporated. Since they are composed of competing or erstwhile competing enterprises, the associations, themselves, produce and sell no goods and make no profits; trade associations are service organizations operated for the benefit of their members. Ordinarily they are financed by dues paid by the members,

usually in proportion to sales, output, capital, payroll, or some similar standard. They are administered by governing boards chosen by the members and usually employ staffs of varying size.

Probably the most significant development toward cartels in America during the present century has been the rise of trade associations. They developed during the latter part of the nineteenth century, but at that time tended principally to be social gatherings or clandestine arrangements. The enunciation of the "rule of reason" by the Supreme Court in 1911 and the publication of the book *The New Competition*,⁴ recommending the development of price reporting organizations, gave momentum to the trade association movement. It is estimated that in 1938 there were about 7,800 trade associations in the United States;⁵ nearly 6,000 of these were local organizations, whereas about 2,000 were national in scope.

In its ascent to power the trade association is indebted to government sponsorship and aid. During the administrations of Presidents Coolidge and Hoover trade associations were encouraged; the latter, first as Secretary of Commerce and later as Executive, championed the associations and put the services of his department at their disposal. This was the period which one historian called that of "government alliance with the great trade associations," or, as Mr. Hoover characterized it, "passing from a period of extreme individualistic action into a period of associated activities." The second period of government sponsorship occurred during the days of the NRA, when the associations took the initiative in drafting and presenting the codes. Old associations took on new life, and new ones rose to power and affluence. Most of the codes were administered by the associations, and often the code

³ Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 18, p. 1.

⁴ *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee*, Part 25, p. 13312.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Part 1, p. 139.

authority was an association executive.⁶ Eventually the NRA was struck down by the Supreme Court, but many of the cartels thus created continued to operate.

The functions of trade associations might be grouped in two categories: the ostensible, or obvious, and the collusive, or clandestine. In other words, trade association activities might be classed as those making social contributions and those of a monopolistic and predatory nature. The former functions are often publicized, whereas the latter are less tangible and are seldom admitted. The purpose of this section is to set forth the constructive and co-operative role of trade associations, but at the same time to emphasize that organizations capable of achieving these objectives are fraught with the potentialities of social abuses. These co-operative activities have included simplification and standardization of procedures and products, industrial research, interchange of patent rights, joint advertising, trade promotion, traffic information, codes of business ethics, settlement of disputes, co-operative insurance, joint representation before government bodies, labor relations activities, interchange of credit information, and collection and distribution of statistical information.

The TNEC hearings bear witness to the far-reaching influence and the broad ramifications of trade association activities. This is illustrated by their role before the Federal Trade Commission and their presentations to the TNEC. The Federal Trade Commission is charged by the Congress with the enforcement of the rules of fair competition. During the decade ended in 1938 the trade association was the frequent, if not the most common, instrument employed by those with monopolistic intent to "deprive individual sellers of their freedom to determine their output or prices at which they might sell, or to exclude others from the industry." The

chairman of the FTC testified that most of the unlawful restraint cases which came to the Commission involved trade associations in one way or another.⁷ A list of the industries wherein the associations were thus involved reads like a catalogue of the major industries of America.⁸

Likewise, the TNEC hearings themselves bear testimony to the influence of the trade associations. Each hearing and each volume appears to involve these organizations, and their role is more often dominant than secondary. In the patent hearings an important witness was a representative of the Automotive Parts and Equipment Manufacturers Association, which spoke for 375 member firms.⁹

Two trade associations represented the life insurance companies in the hearings relating to that industry: the Group Association and the Association of Life Insurance Presidents. The stated objective of the first was to "promote sound underwriting practices and to prevent abuses cropping up in business." The "abuses" it feared appear to be almost any type of competition; the testimony indicates that this organization endeavored quite successfully to establish uniform rates, uniform contracts, and simultaneous rate increases.¹⁰ The other organization was the Association of Life Insurance Presidents. This powerful association, representing some of the greatest financial institutions in the world, succeeded in combining them for co-operative projects. With an annual budget of nearly half a million dollars it carried on a number of activities of questionable social serviceability.¹¹ It lobbied successfully against savings bank insurance laws in Missouri, Pennsylvania,

⁷ *Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee*, p. 305.

⁸ *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee*, Part 25, p. 13318; see also Exhibit 2173 for a list of trade associations involved, p. 13560.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Part 3, p. 1046.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Part 10, pp. 4153-4279.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4345-4447.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Part 25, pp. 13319-13321.

Rhode Island, New York, and elsewhere. It compiled a "card index" of the members of the Florida legislature while undertaking to defeat certain tax measures in that state, and its ultimate control of the Georgia legislature by entertainment, campaign contributions, efforts to get elected men who "owe us something instead of our owing them," and "seeing that their wives and daughters were looked after properly" is reminiscent of the days of Credit Mobilier and the tactics of the railroads following the epoch of the Granger laws.

Trade associations were very active in the hearings relating to the liquor industry. The Distilled Spirits Institute¹² was organized under the aegis of the NRA; when the latter was overthrown by the Court, it was survived by the trade association. The institute's annual income approximated a quarter of a million dollars. It engaged in extensive publicity and lobby activities and contributed to the system of maintained prices characteristic of the whiskey industry.

The hearings devoted to the construction industry revealed the operations of several such organizations. Here we even find a trade association of trade associations: the National Small Homes Demonstration Committee, backed by the powerful United States Lumber Manufacturers Association and the National Lumber Retailers Association. In one instance a locally organized association of retailers of building materials¹³ imposed uniform prices, required licenses of all retailers (as though it were a public regulatory body), and generally controlled the trade. It appears that trade association activity had about reached its zenith in the construction industry.¹⁴ There were three such organizations for general contractors, with about 2,500 members; there

were eleven associations for subcontractors, with 15,000 members, and thirty-eight associations of distributors, with 45,000 members; in the building materials industry there were 133 associations.

Nowhere did the role of the trade associations show up more prominently than it did in the petroleum hearings which were initiated at the behest of one of them. As the chairman said, "The facts and opinions now presented have been selected not by the Committee or any of the agencies represented on the Committee, but by spokesmen of the oil industry... the American Petroleum Institute."¹⁵ Here, as so often when business wishes to speak or act, it chose to function through a trade association. The Petroleum Institute described itself as the largest and most inclusive trade association of the petroleum industry; independent operators however, described it as "dominated and controlled by major oil companies."¹⁶ But this trade association was not the only one to be heard. When the independent petroleum dealers presented the problems they faced in a commercial world dominated by the majors, it was a trade association which spoke for them, the National Oil Marketers Association,¹⁷ representing 250 independent concerns. Their story was strengthened by the testimony of 350 independent wholesale merchants (serving 2,200 retail outlets), who were represented by their organization, the Motor Equipment Wholesalers' Association,¹⁸ and of similar groups, such as the Maryland Association of Petroleum Retailers¹⁹ and the Petroleum Retailers Association.²⁰

How the economy is intricately woven into a network of trade associations is illustrated by the testimony of Wilmer R. Schuh, a retail oil dealer. "I am a member

¹² *Ibid.*, Part 6, pp. 2629-2654.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Part 11, pp. 5007-5012.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5227-5228.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Part 14, p. 7097.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7272.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Part 16, p. 8837

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8921.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8934.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9023.

of the Retail Gasoline Dealers Association of Milwaukee, which is a member of the Retail Gasoline Dealers Association of Wisconsin. This association is, in turn, a member of the National Association of Petroleum Retailers."²¹ The latter association claimed to represent 10,000 dealers. How this particular association became a tool of the major oil companies, how it controlled price competition among its members and resorted to ruthless methods to fix prices, is one of the high lights of the findings of the TNEC.²²

We are even confronted by a trade association in the powerful and highly concentrated steel industry, where a few great corporations dominate the field. A common method by which the steel companies maintain prices is the basing-point system. This system was implemented and administered by the Iron and Steel Institute. During the days of the NRA the code authority and the board of directors of the Steel Institute were one and the same. As part of its code of fair competition the steel industry endorsed and enforced the basing-point system. Long after the demise of the NRA the trade association continued to be the focus around which these price-fixing activities were continued.

It was aptly demonstrated in the cartel hearings that the trade association is the American counterpart of the German cartel. Although trade associations cropped up frequently in the other hearings as representatives of organized business, in the cartel hearings they themselves were the subject of study. Under the NRA these organizations reached their heyday and succeeded in the compulsory cartelization of industry, with the associations as the legally constituted agencies of control.²³ The legal basis for this control disappeared when the NRA was declared

unconstitutional, but the cartels remained with little loss of vitality.

Even the investment bankers had their trade association. Its president testified, "I am president of the Investment Bankers Association of America, a voluntary association composed of 723 dealers in securities, having 1,410 offices located in 210 cities and in 40 States."²⁴ This highly organized group effected a harmony so complete that the underwriting field was divided among them by arrangements which stood unchallenged for years. They arrived at an unformulated code whereby competition was eliminated and "proprietary" interests became "frozen."

Nowhere, it seems, could the story of the American economy be told without involving trade associations. In the studies of interstate trade barriers it was the National Cottonseed Products Association²⁵ and the National Association of Margarine Manufacturers²⁶ who told of discriminations against oleomargarine. It was the National Association of Direct Selling Companies, with 225 members, who described the barriers against house-to-house distribution.²⁷ The American Trucking Association,²⁸ a federation of fifty-one different trade associations, the National Council of Private Motor Truck Owners, Inc.,²⁹ and the National Association of Motor Bus Operators, representing 600 member firms and numerous state associations, all joined forces to present an illuminating description of the numerous barriers erected against motor transport.³⁰ While trade associations were thus making public complaints against barriers which have damaged their economic interests, other associations were quietly working and lobbying to perpetuate these barriers

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Part 23, p. 11887.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Part 29, p. 15824.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15842.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15965.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16031.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16059, 16065.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16065.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Part 17, p. 9430.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 9435-9466.

²³ *Ibid.*, Part 25, pp. 13311-13325.

and to erect others to assure themselves of the benefits such impediments create.

The trade association has performed a multiple role in the national economy; it is a research organization, a lobby, a statistical agency, a trade promotion unit, and a device of monopoly. But whatever rôle or rôles it may choose to play, it is an element of tremendous influence in American economic life. It represents a scheme of collective bargaining, uniting corporations great and small; it creates an economic superstructure far removed from the system of craftsmen, shopkeepers, and individual enterprisers so essential to the thinking of the Manchester School.

A DYNAMIC ECONOMY

A third important characteristic of the American economy is its dynamic pace. Even the rapid changes one usually associates with the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century scarcely compare with the far-reaching innovations of the twentieth. Those of the nineteenth were noticeable because they were disruptive and catastrophic, whereas those of the present age come into a world accustomed to change. Throughout the reading of the TNEC hearings one is impressed again and again by this fact. Invention is the key to our times. When inventions were novel and unusual, they were disruptive and noteworthy; today they are commonplace and expected. The most significant innovation of the nineteenth century, according to Dr. Alfred North Whitehead,³¹ was the "invention of the art of invention." Hitherto such contributions had ordinarily come from chance discoveries or from the brilliant observations of "cranks" and those who "tinkered." More recently there has evolved a new type of invention—that by analysis, research, and experimentation—a cold-blooded, calculated process guided by fixed rules and

procedures. "It is this technique of scientific blue printing by means of involved chemical and mathematical formulas which has made the industrial research laboratory the creator of new processes and new products."³²

Since the nineteenth century inventions have appeared with increasing crescendo.³³ Lewis Mumford characterizes the century between 1830 and 1930 as a period of change from an eotechnic to a neotechnic age, with a paleotechnic age between.³⁴ In the eotechnic age, 1830–1840, power was derived principally from wind and water, and wood was the basic material of construction. The world and distances were large, measured by land and sea travel speed of about ten miles per hour. Then came the use of coal, iron, limestone, and mechanical devices, and with them, the paleotechnic era. The world shrank because of a new and terrific land speed of sixty-five miles per hour and an ocean speed of thirty-five miles. But electric power, radio, biochemistry, and chemical interaction created a new order. With it came a more rapid pace, and the world again shrank in size because of the new travel distances on land and regular air speeds of two hundred miles per hour.

A few examples will illustrate how almost every aspect of the economy is undergoing constant change as a result of new techniques and new processes. Some of our most prominent industries are entirely engaged in the production of articles recently unknown. In its annual report for 1937 the Du Pont Company showed that 40 percent of its products were unheard of eight years earlier; these included Duco finisher, enamels, synthetic camphor, ponsol dyes, synthetic methanol, urea, viscose rayon, and cellophane.³⁵ The revolutionary nylon had not yet appeared, of

³² *Ibid.*, p. 16213.

³³ See the list of the most significant inventions since the tenth century, *ibid.*, pp. 16212, 17269 ff.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 16259–16260.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16241.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Part 30, p. 16212.

course. The representative of a great business-machine manufacturer described a new automatic typewriter, capable of turning out twenty copies at a time. Textile producers told of new weaving processes enabling twelve workers to tend the same number of machines which had required forty-six attendants ten years previously, thereby increasing the output per worker by nearly three times in a decade.³⁶ Electric light utilities described how they had reduced coal consumption 40 percent per kilowatt-hour generated.³⁷

Modern technology and invention have revolutionized labor productivity. A study by Carl Snyder shows that the productivity per worker in manufacturing was more than doubled between 1870 and 1930.³⁸ Another study, by Dr. Spurgeon Bell, indicates that in the twenty years preceding 1938 the productivity of labor increased more than 44 per cent in manufacturing, 44 per cent in railroads, 99 per cent in mineral industries, 116 per cent in electric light and power, 40 per cent in the automobile industry, 51 per cent in the steel industry, 55 per cent in paper manufacturing, 38 per cent in cotton textiles, and 153 per cent in the tobacco industry.³⁹

Another investigation by the National Conference Board reveals that between 1923 and 1938 the man-hours required per ton of steel had declined 36 per cent.⁴⁰ In the railroad industry more traffic is moving constantly with less labor. In the short period between 1933 and 1937 freight ton-miles and passenger miles increased about 50 per cent, but the number of employees increased only 25 per cent. These figures are hardly representative, because of the peculiar phase of the business cycle to which they apply; the trend, however, is illustrated by the fact that

freight and passenger traffic declined 25 per cent between the boom year 1929 and 1930, whereas employment dropped more than 40 per cent.

A similar pattern with respect to labor productivity was revealed by the National Research Project of the WPA: "In terms of traffic units, the average output per work-hour increased from 109 in 1923 (on a 1920 basis) to 128 in 1929, to 140 in 1933, and to 175 in 1936."⁴¹ These conclusions are borne out by the studies of the Bureau of Labor Statistics referred to below. Representatives of labor in the electrical manufacturing industry asserted that in 1939, as compared with ten years previously, the same work could be done with 24 percent fewer workers in producing electrical machinery and 50 per cent fewer workers in making radios.⁴² Dr. Frederick C. Mills, of the National Bureau of Economic Research, found that between 1899 and 1929 man-hour productivity had increased 125 per cent in manufacturing, an average increase of about 24 per cent each decade; in the decade ended in 1929, however, the rate had increased to 46 per cent.⁴³ Still another study was that by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics; Dr. Witt Bowden of that agency said, "Productivity in terms of average output per man-hour worked in 1936 was 32.8 per cent greater than in 1926, and 80.9 per cent greater than in 1916."⁴⁴ According to the Bureau, the output per man-hour in manufacturing increased from an index of 60 in 1909 to 140 in 1936, an increase of 130 per cent in 27 years. In the coal industry output increased from an index of 69 to 122, and in railroads from 75 to 143 in a shorter period of 23 years.⁴⁵

These are tremendous changes. No one would claim, however, that the economic

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16882.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17188.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16223.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16220.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16483.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16904.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 16730.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 17129.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16904.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 58-59.

TABLE 2
OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR
(1923-25 average = 100)

Year	Manufacturing	Bituminous Coal Mining	Anthracite Mining	Steam Railroads
1909	62	67	85	
1914	72	75	90	75
1923	94	99	104	96
1929	120	107	100	114
1932	125	110	119	112
1936	140	119	149	140
1937	137	122	158	143

Source: *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee*, Part 1, p. 223.

system had made full utilization of existing plant and technology. Despite this underemployment of knowledge and constructed capacity, these great advances have been achieved. Perhaps it is confusing the issue to speak of it as an increase in labor productivity, since in another sense it represents an increase of capital productivity. But inasmuch as the economy is run by men and presumably for men, it is realistic to talk of it as an increase of labor productivity. This suggests a new and basic problem which confronts this generation as it has confronted no age before it—what is to be done about the increased manpower productivity? It suggests that the number one problem of this age is that of devising ways to increase consumption by the average man commensurate with the increased productivity.

INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH

Since 1920 a good deal has been said about the desirability of a planned economy. In a technological sense we are rapidly approaching such an economy. Our institutional economy—by which is meant the manner in which we organize the material forces of production—is still

primarily a process of trial and error, the heritage of political and social evolution. But rapidly on the technological side the economy has become the product of thoroughgoing planning, study, and research.

As human labor in its crudest form was the principal force shaping production among our more primitive ancestors, the efforts of the research laboratory dictate the processes of this generation. Dr. Davis, Director of Science Service, described science and research as follows: "The investigators engaged in scientific research are the remakers of civilization and the true molders of history. They may be called the catalysts of civilization. . . . They are in our universities, in our Government laboratories, and in our industrial research laboratories."⁴⁶ Research, which essentially is the discovery of new knowledge by means of systematic examination, may be classified under three categories:⁴⁷ pure basic research, applied research, and research for control of a product. Much of the pure basic research is carried on in the universities and other academic institutions, but the contributions of industry to this field are by no means insignificant. The other two

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Part 30, p. 16270.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Part 3, pp. 872-873.

types are largely the product of organized industry.

Scientific research is a salient characteristic of our age. It is estimated that an army of 100,000 individuals is thus engaged in the United States; probably an equal number could be found similarly employed throughout the rest of the world. It is estimated that the annual budget to finance industrial research projects in the United States totals more than \$200,000,000.⁴⁸ In addition to 2,000 major corporations sponsoring such investigations, more than 200 colleges and universities, 40 trade associations, and 250 commercial laboratories are also thus engaged. To this may be added the work of the Federal Government with its great staff and numerous laboratories; the annual Federal budget for research is said to be \$35,000,000. It is significant, nevertheless, that the great majority of industrial enterprises maintain no research departments,⁴⁹ a fact which indicates that research and the cost of financing research laboratories is another important factor leading to industrial concentration in the United States. Few but the mighty maintain great research laboratories, and these projects help the mighty to become mightier.

It will be helpful at this point to describe the research facilities of a few great industrial concerns; this will serve to characterize modern productive methods. The first industrial laboratory in the United States was organized in 1901 by the General Electric Company; it was started by Dr. Whitney of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, together with Elihu Thompson and Dr. Steinmetz. Today this laboratory has developed into what has been called the General Electric House of Magic.⁵⁰ It has an annual budget of more than \$1,000,000 a year

and employs 300 workers. This by no means represents the total research work of this great corporation, which maintains at least fifteen other important laboratories. These are engaged in the more practical work of developing and testing materials, whereas the main laboratory is devoted principally to fundamental research work.

The largest, and possibly the greatest, research laboratory in the world is the Bell Telephone Laboratory. The telephone industry had outgrown its ability to develop adequately by depending upon random unplanned invention. Moreover, it had outgrown a "second stage in which inventive ability and genius was teamed up with engineering skills, skills of the trained engineer, and had reached a stage in which it was clear that some other kind of attack on many problems had to be made."⁵¹ So a great research laboratory was born; it grew from four employees in 1903 to an establishment with many thousands in 1939. From its ceaseless investigations have flowed many benefits to the corporation and to the world. The General Motors Corporation spends annually nearly \$2,000,000 for pure research devoted principally to the development of new products and new devices. Additional sums are spent for engineering research involving the more immediate problems of production; between 1925 and 1938 the corporation spent more than \$170,000,000 in these lines.⁵²

The plastic industry represents an interesting contribution of industrial research. Here a completely new line of products has emerged from the research laboratory and threatens to revolutionize many industrial processes. In 1938 the Bakelite Corporation alone was supplying thirty-five different industries with its product for more than 15,000 different

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Part 30, p. 16271.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17227.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Part 3, pp. 911-918.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 951.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Part 9, pp. 3655-3656.

articles ranging from radio tube bases to safety razor handles. This corporation maintains its own research laboratory, which employs 250 men; its annual research budget usually exceeds one-half million dollars.⁵³

This list of illustrations could be multiplied again and again, but they are sufficient to indicate the trend. More and more productive skill is being transferred from the individual worker to the research laboratory; more and more frequently the products of industry come from planned co-operative scientific investigations; more and more often new processes are born in the laboratory rather than from the inspiration, insight, and intuition of an independent genius.

Obviously these great scientific efforts are not sterile; neither are they designed solely to ascertain academic knowledge or to search for fundamental principles. Industry has a realistic and practical bent; laboratory expenditures must pay for themselves on the balance sheet. They must more than pay for themselves. This purpose is aptly described in the following words of a corporation executive:

Oh, yes; we supply them with the equipment, we pay them to do the work, we direct what work they are to do. We can't permit our research men to work on their own. They might go into very interesting fields which would be of no use to us, not commercial. We do not run an academic laboratory. We are in business, and although we do some molecule chasing and let a few men have their heads in work along lines in which they might feel inclined to do something, a greater part of our research work is directly applied to the needs of the business, and much of the research work is dictated by our customers or by prospective customers.⁵⁴

Comment already has been made relative to the 15,000 products of the Bakelite laboratories and to the fact that in 1937 40 per cent of the products of the Du Pont Corporation were unknown in

1929. Ours is an economy in which product revolution and innovation is so commonplace that it passes quite unnoticed. Yet they merit emphasis—these fruits of the "laboratory revolution." A few illustrations should suffice. From the General Electric "House of Magic" have come many improvements; probably chief among these has been the improvement of the electric light bulb. "The United States public paid about \$90,000,000 for the lamps it bought in 1938. If it had to buy the carbon lamps of 1900 to produce the same amount of light, its lamp bill would have been increased by \$600,000,000 for that one year, \$2,000,000 per working day."⁵⁵ This, however, was not the only saving; the same amount of light has required less current, so much so that had the lamps of 1900 been used it would have cost \$3,000,000,000 additional for power, or \$10,000,000 per working day. Moreover, the increased consumption of power made possible by these lowered costs has itself contributed to a reduction of power rates.

From the Bell Telephone Laboratory has come another product, a vacuum tube—used principally in the telephone service, but adaptable to radio—which has produced an unseen revolution. Its life is about fifty times that of the tube it replaced, and its power consumption is materially less. In reduced power consumption and replacement cost, it has saved the telephone industry \$10,000,000 annually.⁵⁶ So it goes; the television industry has developed a tube which will record the light of a candle ten miles distant,⁵⁷ and the glass industry reports many improvements and savings coming from its laboratories.

But nothing will be gained by multiplying these illustrations. The point has been made: the fruits of modern research

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Part 3, pp. 1077-1091.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1089.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 917.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 953-960.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 986.

are enormous, and this bids well to becoming the age of the "laboratory revolution." Probably we are on the threshold of this revolution rather than in the midst of it. Those best qualified to form a judgment have testified that research laboratories will continue to increase in number and to increase their contributions. Furthermore, there are great unexplored fields still waiting scientific investigation.⁵⁸

The research laboratory is an example of the highly co-operative character of modern economic life. Much as we may talk of the role of the rugged individualist or of the importance of private enterprise, there is no evading the fact that modern research is essentially an associative activity wherein many technicians work jointly on a common project. The laboratory, not the individual, develops the process or creates the device. Frequently the individual receives only nominal title or recognition for the invention, if, indeed, it is traceable to any individual. The laboratory, the organization, the facilities, the project, and the motive are largely provided by the corporation. The efficiency of the individual flows from them; it is a co-operative enterprise. The whole complex creates an economy quite different from the individualistic enterprise system of which textbooks still speak; it is becoming a planned economy—at least on the technical side.

THE ECLIPSE OF COMPETITION

...This brief section will emphasize the fact that there is a broad breach between the degree of competition which by many is presumed to exist in American industrial life and the degree which actually does exist. We talk of competition, we rationalize the economy in terms of competition, we have formed a habit of interpreting it in these terms, and, of

course, those who have a vested interest or a concealed purpose for doing so emphasize the competitive aspects of their industry in preference to collusive and noncompetitive behavior.

"Competition" is a term which men have learned to employ with quite the same animistic and emotional content as certain mystical catch phrases used by the benighted sign worshipers of less civilized ages. The concept of competition has become a fetish, and the word a shibboleth. Competition would seem to be something inherently or mystically good and desirable in or of itself. Both its desirability and its very existence often pass quite unchallenged, as were the gnomes and the elves of former centuries. Its *anting-anting* and *tabu* are ostentatiously and overtly observed, though often quite ritualistically circumvented. The belief in free and unrestricted competition has become part of the folklore of the twentieth century, a heritage of the nineteenth. Scarcely anyone who testified before the TNEC cared to challenge the assumption that competition is the proper basis of economic behavior. Members of the Committee, especially the chairman and vice chairman, appeared to have faith that in some way a return to free competition would supply the ultimate solution to the problems of modern times. This "old oaken bucket" complex seemed to represent a desire to escape to the simple life which obtained before the problems of modern corporacy, mass production, and modern industrialism appeared.

The great industrialists who appeared before the Committee proclaimed their loyalty to and belief in the competitive system. Apparently sincere and oblivious of the fact that the industry they represent constitutes a striking example of monopoly control, representatives of the steel industry constantly asserted, "competition is very keen in the steel indus-

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Part 30, pp. 16273-16291.

try,"⁵⁹ "you have to be competitive and you meet that competition,"⁶⁰ "in our processes there is that of meeting the competitive situation,"⁶¹ "our general policy as to prices is to be competitive,"⁶² "I still believe, Mr. O'Connell, in the fundamental law of competition in business, yes, I thoroughly believe in that,"⁶³ and "well, it is pretty hard for me to visualize in the steel industry how there could be more competition on price without ruining the industry."⁶⁴

The last citation is an unintentional but eloquent affirmation of the statement by Walter Lippmann that "competition is something of which producers have only as much as they cannot eliminate,"⁶⁵ which is pretty close to the basic theory of many in industry—that unrestricted

competition should be required of everyone except "us," that monopolies should be rigorously checked in every industry except this particular one, in which "we" are merely "eliminating the abuses of competition," and that the fostering arm of the law should never be extended except in this peculiar case, in which "we" happen to be the beneficiaries. Note the sincerity of this attitude in the following remark to the Committee: "Senator, in theory, I do not believe in participation of the Government in private business. In this particular type of problem I don't know any other answer."⁶⁶

Nothing in the above discussion is intended either as approval or disapproval of the belief in the efficacy of a freely competitive system. What is intended is to show the strength with which the doctrine is held, the uncritical attitude with which the problem is usually approached, and the prevalence of the idea that free competition is characteristic of the economy.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Part 9, p. 3959.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Part 19, p. 10525; see also pp. 10553, 10555, 10561.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10563.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10587.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 10601.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 10608; see also p. 10625.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10662; see also p. 10751.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Part 25, p. 13085.

The Modern Corporation: Separation of Ownership and Control

Adolph A. Berle, a lawyer, former ambassador to Brazil, and assistant secretary of state, in 1935 published with economist Gardiner C. Means (see page 334) *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. This book was immediately recognized as a major contribution to our understanding of American institutions. In these selections from that book the authors make clear that the corporation is far more than a legal device: it is a means of organizing the economic life of the nation. Although we are now living in a "corporate system," it has not reached its fullest development. The result is, say Berle and Means, that the key to understanding the American economy is no longer to be found in individual enterprises or small partnerships. The most significant aspect of this development has been the separation of ownership and control, with the resultant growth of a "managerial" group. One implication of this development is a change in the function of profits, which go to stockholders—the owners—but no longer serve as a stimulus to efficient use of resources. Since the corporate form has made possible a tremendous concentration of power, it has also led to demands that the government be used to counter-balance this power. The question remains to be faced: Is corporate power to be exercised solely for the benefit of owners and managers, or are interests of the community to be given first consideration?

Corporations have ceased to be merely legal devices through which the private business transactions of individuals may be carried on. Though still much used for this purpose, the corporate form has acquired a larger significance. The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a "corporate system"—as there was once a feudal system—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a degree of prominence en-

titling it to be dealt with as a major social institution.

We are examining this institution probably before it has attained its zenith. Spectacular as its rise has been, every indication seems to be that the system will move forward to proportions which would stagger imagination today; just as the corporate system of today was beyond the imagination of most statesmen and business men at the opening of the present century. Only by remembering that men still living can recall a time when the present situation was hardly dreamed of, can we enforce the conclusion that

From Berle and Means: *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. Copyright, 1932, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

the new order may easily become completely dominant during the lifetime of our children. For that reason, if for no other, it is desirable to examine this system, bearing in mind that its impact on the life of the country and of every individual is certain to be great; it may even determine a large part of the behavior of most men living under it.

Organization of property has played a constant part in the balance of powers which go to make up the life of any era. We need not resolve the controversy as to whether property interests are invariably controlling. The cynical view of many historians insists that property interests have at all times, visible or invisible, been dominant. Following this grim analysis, one commentator on the rise of corporations observed that they had become the "master instruments of civilization." Another expressed his depression at the fact that the system had at length reached a point definitely committing civilization to the rule of a plutocracy. Still others have seen in the system a transition phase towards ultimate socialism or communism. Acceptance of any of these beliefs may be delayed; but the underlying thought expressed in them all is that the corporate system has become the principal factor in economic organization through its mobilization of property interests.

In its new aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction. The power attendant upon such concentration has brought forth princes of industry, whose position in the community is yet to be defined. The surrender of control over their wealth by investors has effectively broken the old property relationships and has raised the problem of defining these relationships anew. The direction of industry

by persons other than those who have ventured their wealth has raised the question of the motive force back of such direction and the effective distribution of the returns from business enterprise.

These corporations have arisen in field after field as the myriad independent and competing units of private business have given way to the few large groupings of the modern quasi-public corporation. The typical business unit of the nineteenth century was owned by individuals or small groups, was managed by them or their appointees, and was, in the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into a single producing organization under unified control and management. Such a unit is the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, perhaps the most advanced development of the corporate system. With assets of almost five billions of dollars, with 454,000 employees, and stockholders to the number of 567,694, this company may indeed be called an economic empire—an empire bounded by no geographical limits, but held together by centralized control. One hundred companies of this size would control the whole of American wealth; would employ all of the gainfully employed; and if there were no duplication of stockholders, would be owned by practically every family in the country.

Such an organization of economic activity rests upon two developments, each of which has made possible an extension of the area under unified control. The factory system, the basis of the industrial revolution, brought an increasingly large

number of workers directly under a single management. Then, the modern corporation, equally revolutionary in its effect, placed the wealth of innumerable individuals under the same central control. By each of these changes the power of those in control was immensely enlarged and the status of those involved, worker or property owner, was radically changed. The independent worker who entered the factory became a wage laborer surrendering the direction of his labor to his industrial master. The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may become merely recipient of the wages of capital.

In and of itself, the corporate device does not necessarily bring about this change. It has long been possible for an individual to incorporate his business even though it still represents his own investment, his own activities, and his own business transactions; he has in fact merely created a legal *alter ego* by setting up a corporation as the nominal vehicle. If the corporate form had done nothing more than this, we should have only an interesting custom according to which business would be carried on by individuals adopting for that purpose certain legal clothing. It would involve no radical shift in property tenure or in the organization of economic activity; it would inaugurate no "system" comparable to the institutions of feudalism.

The corporate system appears only when this type of private or "close" corporation has given way to an essentially different form, the quasi-public corporation: a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of owners.

Such separation may exist in varying degrees. Where the men ultimately re-

sponsible for running a corporation own a majority of the voting stock while the remainder is widely diffused, control and part ownership are in their hands. Only for the remaining owners is there separation from control. Frequently, however, ownership is so widely scattered that working control can be maintained with but a minority interest. The Rockefeller family, for example, is reported to have retained direct or indirect minority interests in many of the Standard Oil Companies; and in the case of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, this interest, amounting to only 14.5 per cent combined with the strategic position of its holders, has proved sufficient for the control of the corporation. In such a case the greater bulk of ownership is virtually without control. Separation of ownership and control becomes almost complete when not even a substantial minority interest exists, as in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company whose largest holder is reported to own less than one per cent of the company's stock. Under such conditions control may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding. In each of these types, majority control, minority control, and management control, the separation of ownership from control has become effective—a large body of security holders has been created who exercise virtually no control over the wealth which they or their predecessors in interest have contributed to the enterprise. In the case of management control, the ownership interest held by the controlling group amounts to but a very small fraction of the total ownership. Corporations where this separation has become an important factor may be classed as quasi-public in character in contradistinction to the private, or closely held corporation

in which no important separation of ownership and control has taken place.

Growing out of this separation are two characteristics, almost as typical of the quasi-public corporation as the separation itself—mere size and the public market for its securities. It is precisely this separation of control from ownership which makes possible tremendous aggregations of property. The Fords and the Mellons, whose personal wealth is sufficient to finance great enterprises, are so few, that they only emphasize the dependence of the large enterprise on the wealth of more than the individual or group of individuals who may be in control. The quasi-public corporation commands its supply of capital from a group of investors frequently described as the "investing public." It draws these savings to itself either directly, as individuals purchase stocks or bonds, or indirectly, as insurance companies, banks, and investment trusts receive these savings and invest them in corporate securities. To secure these funds it must commonly avail itself of an open market in its securities—usually by listing shares on a stock exchange, or, less importantly, by maintaining a private or "unlisted" market. So essential, in fact, is the open market to the quasi-public corporation that it may be considered almost as characteristic of that type of corporation as the separation of ownership from control and the great aggregation of wealth.

These characteristics are not invariable. The private corporation may be, and in a few instances is, exceedingly large; witness the Ford Motor Company, still owned and directed by Mr. Ford and his immediate associates. Private or "close" corporations may and occasionally do avail themselves of a public market for their shares; the Aluminum Company of America, though most of its stock is closely held, has its shares listed on the New York Curb Exchange, and a small

fraction of its stock is traded in there. But these instances are so exceptional as to prove the rule. In the overwhelming bulk of cases, corporations fall into the quasi-public class when they represent large aggregations of wealth and their securities are available in the open market; for in such corporations part or most of the owners have almost invariably surrendered control.

Though the American law makes no distinction between the private corporation and the quasi-public, the economics of the two are essentially different. The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner, and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear. Size alone tends to give these giant corporations a social significance not attached to the smaller units of private enterprise. By the use of the open market for securities, each of these corporations assumes obligations toward the investing public which transform it from a legal method clothing the rule of a few individuals into an institution at least nominally serving investors who have embarked their funds in its enterprise. New responsibilities toward the owners, the workers, the consumers, and the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control. In creating these new relationships, the quasi-public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution. It has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property—has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it. Thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit-seeking enterprise. This revolution forms the subject of the present study.

Examination of the changes produced can properly commence with the new relationships between the owners on the one hand and control on the other, and

it is these relationships with which this book will deal. This involves the area roughly termed "corporation finance"—the relations between the corporation as managed by the group in control, and those who hold participations in it—its stockholders, bondholders, and, to some extent, its other creditors. The change in internal organization—the relation of the corporation to its workers, its plant organization and its technical problem of production—we cannot consider at this time. Nor can we here deal with its external relationships, on the one hand with its customers—the terms on which it furnishes to them its products or its services—and on the other hand, with the political state—the government by which it may be in some degree controlled, or over which it may have a measure of dominance. Here we are concerned only with a fundamental change in the form of property, and in the economic relationships which rest upon it.

Outwardly the change is simple enough. Men are less likely to own the physical instruments of production. They are more likely to own pieces of paper, loosely known as stocks, bonds, and other securities, which have become mobile through the machinery of the public markets. Beneath this, however, lies a more fundamental shift. Physical control over the instruments of production has been surrendered in ever growing degree to centralized groups who manage property in bulk, supposedly, but by no means necessarily, for the benefit of the security holders. Power over industrial property has been cut off from the beneficial ownership of this property—or, in less technical language, from the legal right to enjoy its fruits. Control of physical assets has passed from the individual owner to those who direct the quasi-public institutions, while the owner retains an interest in their product and increase. We see, in fact, the surrender

and regrouping of the incidence of ownership, which formerly bracketed full power of manual disposition with complete right to enjoy the use, the fruits, and the proceeds of physical assets. There has resulted the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership.

This dissolution of the atom of property destroys the very foundation on which the economic order of the past three centuries has rested. Private enterprise, which has molded economic life since the close of the middle ages, has been rooted in the institution of private property. Under the feudal system, its predecessor, economic organization grew out of mutual obligations and privileges derived by various individuals from their relation to property which no one of them owned. Private enterprise, on the other hand, has assumed an owner of the instruments of production with complete property rights over those instruments. Whereas the organization of feudal economic life rested upon an elaborate system of binding customs, the organization under the system of private enterprise has rested upon the self-interest of the property owner—a self-interest held in check only by competition and the conditions of supply and demand. Such self-interest has long been regarded as the best guarantee of economic efficiency. It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may possess.

In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds. As we have seen, it is no longer the individual himself who uses his wealth. Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a position to secure industrial efficiency

and produce profits, are no longer, as owners, entitled to the bulk of such profits. Those who control the destinies of the typical modern corporation own so insignificant a fraction of the company's stock that the returns from running the corporation profitably accrue to them in only a very minor degree. The stockholders, on the other hand, to whom the profits of the corporation go, cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient use of the property, since they have surrendered all disposition of it to those in control of the enterprise. The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use. It consequently challenges the fundamental economic principle of individual initiative in industrial enterprise. It raises for re-examination the question of the motive force back of industry, and the ends for which the modern corporation can be or will be run.

The corporate system further commands attention because its development is progressive, as its features become more marked and as new areas come one by one under its sway. Economic power, in terms of control over physical assets, is apparently responding to a centripetal force, tending more and more to concentrate in the hands of a few corporate managements. At the same time, beneficial ownership is centrifugal, tending to divide and subdivide, to split into ever smaller units and to pass freely from hand to hand. In other words, ownership continually becomes more dispersed; the power formerly joined to it becomes increasingly concentrated; and the corporate system is thereby more securely established.

This system bids fair to be as all-embracing as was the feudal system in its time. It demands that we examine both its conditions and its trends, for an un-

derstanding of the structure upon which will rest the economic order of the future.

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We must conclude, then, that parallel with the growth in the size of the industrial unit has come a dispersion in its ownership such that an important part of the wealth of individuals consists of interests in great enterprises of which no one individual owns a major part. A rapidly increasing proportion of wealth appears to be taking this form and there is much to indicate that the increase will continue. More and more, our thinking must be in terms of this type of wealth. Here again the change is such as to require a re-examination of basic concepts.

(1) Most fundamental of all, the position of ownership has changed from that of an active to that of a passive agent. In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights and expectations with respect to an enterprise. But over the enterprise and over the physical property—the instruments of production—in which he has an interest, the owner has little control. At the same time he bears no responsibility with respect to the enterprise or its physical property. It has often been said that the owner of a horse is responsible. If the horse lives, he must feed it. If the horse dies, he must bury it. No such responsibility attaches to a share of stock. The owner is practically powerless through his own efforts to affect the underlying property.

(2) The spiritual values that formerly went with ownership have been separated from it. Physical property capable of being shaped by its owner could bring to him direct satisfaction apart from the income it yielded in more concrete form. It represented an extension of his own

personality. With the corporate revolution, this quality has been lost to the property owner much as it has been lost to the worker through the industrial revolution.

(3) The value of an individual's wealth is coming to depend on forces entirely outside himself and his own efforts. Instead, its value is determined on the one hand by the actions of the individuals in command of the enterprise—individuals over whom the typical owner has no control, and on the other hand, by the actions of others in a sensitive and often capricious market. The value is thus subject to the vagaries and manipulations characteristic of the market place. It is further subject to the great swings in society's appraisal of its own immediate future as reflected in the general level of values in the organized markets.

(4) The value of the individual's wealth not only fluctuates constantly—the same may be said of most wealth—but it is subject to a constant appraisal. The individual can see the change in the appraised value of his estate from moment to moment, a fact which may markedly affect both the expenditure of his income and his enjoyment of that income.

(5) Individual wealth has become extremely liquid through the organized markets. The individual owner can convert it into other forms of wealth at a moment's notice and, provided the market machinery is in working order, he may do so without serious loss due to forced sale.

(6) Wealth is less and less in a form which can be employed directly by its owner. When wealth is in the form of land, for instance, it is capable of being used by the owner even though the value of land in the market is negligible. The physical quality of such wealth makes possible a subjective value to the owner

quite apart from any market value it may have. The newer form of wealth is quite incapable of this direct use. Only through sale in the market can the owner obtain its direct use. He is thus tied to the market as never before.

(7) Finally, in the corporate system, the "owner" of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility, and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control.

In examining the breakup of the old concept that was property and the old unity that was private enterprise, it is therefore evident that we are dealing not only with distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the other—a control which tends to move further and further away from ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a management capable of perpetuating its own position. The concentration of economic power separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered these empires into the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating "owners" to the position of those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercise their power.

The recognition that industry has come to be dominated by these economic autocrats must bring with it a realization of the hollowness of the familiar statement that economic enterprise in America is a matter of individual initiative. To the dozen or so men in control, there is room for such initiative. For the tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and of owners in a single enterprise, individual initiative no longer exists. Their activity is group activity on a scale so large that the individual, except he be in a position of control, has dropped into relative insignificance. At the same time the problems

of control have become problems in economic government.

Most fundamental to the new picture of economic life must be a new concept of business enterprise as concentrated in the corporate organization. In some measure a concept is already emerging. Over a decade ago, Walter Rathenau wrote concerning the German counterpart of our great corporation:

No one is a permanent owner. The composition of the thousandfold complex which functions as lord of the undertaking is in a state of flux.... This condition of things signifies that ownership has been depersonalized.... The depersonalization of ownership simultaneously implies the objectification of the thing owned. The claims to ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it belonged to one; it takes an objective existence, such as in earlier days was embodied only in state and church, in a municipal corporation, in the life of a guild or a religious order.... The depersonalization of ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor, leads to a point where the enterprise becomes transformed into an institution which resembles the state in character.

The institution here envisaged calls for analysis, not in terms of business enterprise but in terms of social organization. On the one hand, it involves a concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of religious power in the medieval church or of political power in the national state. On the other hand, it involves the interrelation of a wide diversity of economic interests—those of the "owners" who supply capital, those of the workers who "create," those of the consumers who give value to the products of enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield power.

Such a great concentration of power and such a diversity of interest raise the long-fought issue of power and its regulation—of interest and its protection. A

constant warfare has existed between the individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the subjects of that power. Just as there is a continuous desire for power, so also there is a continuous desire to make that power the servant of the bulk of the individuals it affects. The long struggles for the reform of the Catholic Church and for the development of constitutional law in the states are phases of this phenomenon. Absolute power is useful in building the organization. More slow, but equally sure is the development of social pressure demanding that the power shall be used for the benefit of all concerned. This pressure, constant in ecclesiastical and political history, is already making its appearance in many guises in the economic field.

Observable throughout the world, and in varying degrees of intensity, is this insistence that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise located. In its most extreme aspect this is exhibited in the communist movement, which in its purest form is an insistence that *all* of the powers and privileges of property, shall be used only in the common interest. In less extreme forms of socialist dogma, transfer of economic powers to the state for public service is demanded. In the strictly capitalist countries, and particularly in time of depression, demands are constantly put forward that the men controlling the great economic organisms be made to accept responsibility for the well-being of those who are subject to the organization, whether workers, investors, or consumers. In a sense the difference in all of these demands lies only in degree. In proportion as an economic organism grows in strength and its power is concentrated in a few hands, the possessor of power is more easily located, and the demand for responsible power becomes increasingly direct.

How will this demand be made effective? To answer this question would be to foresee the history of the next century. We can here only consider and appraise certain of the more important lines of possible development.

By tradition, a corporation "belongs" to its shareholders, or, in a wider sense, to its security holders, and theirs is the only interest to be recognized as the object of corporate activity. Following this tradition, and without regard for the changed character of ownership, it would be possible to apply in the interests of the *passive* property owner the doctrine of strict property rights, the analysis of which has been presented above in the chapter on Corporate powers as Powers in Trust. By the application of this doctrine, the group in control of a corporation would be placed in a position of trusteeship in which it would be called on to operate or arrange for the operation of the corporation for the sole benefit of the security owners despite the fact that the latter have ceased to have power over or to accept responsibility for the *active* property in which they have an interest. Were this course followed, the bulk of American industry might soon be operated by trustees for the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security owners.

In direct opposition to the above doctrine of strict property rights is the view, apparently held by the great corporation lawyers and by certain students of the field, that corporate development has created a new set of relationships, giving to the groups in control powers which are absolute and not limited by any implied obligation with respect to their use. This logic leads to drastic conclusions. For instance, if, by reason of these new relationships, the men in control of a corporation can operate it in their own interests, and can divert a portion of the asset fund of income stream to their own uses, such is their privilege. Under this

view, since the new powers have been acquired on a quasi-contractual basis, the security holders have agreed in advance to any losses which they may suffer by reason of such use. The result is, briefly, that the existence of the legal and economic relationships giving rise to these powers must be frankly recognized as a modification of the principle of private property.

If these were the only alternatives, the former would appear to be the lesser of two evils. Changed corporate relationships have unquestionably involved an essential alteration in the character of property. But such modifications have hitherto been brought about largely on the principle that might makes right. Choice between strengthening the rights of passive property owners, or leaving a set of uncurbed powers in the hands of control therefore resolves itself into a purely realistic evaluation of different results. We might elect the relative certainty and safety of a trust relationship in favor of a particular group within the corporation, accompanied by a possible diminution of enterprise. Or we may grant the controlling group free rein, with the corresponding danger of a corporate oligarchy coupled with the probability of an era of corporate plundering.

A third possibility exists, however. On the one hand, the owners of passive property, by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest,—they have released the community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights. At the same time, the controlling groups, by means of the extension of corporate powers, have in their own interest broken the bars of tradition which require that the corporation be operated solely for the benefit of the owners of passive property. Eliminating the sole interest of the passive owner,

however, does not necessarily lay a basis for the alternative claim that the new powers should be used in the interest of the controlling groups. The latter have not presented, in acts or words any acceptable defense of the proposition that these powers should be so used. No tradition supports that proposition. The control groups have, rather, cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the control. They have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society.

This third alternative offers a wholly new concept of corporate activity. Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community. The present claims of both contending parties now in the field have been weakened by the developments described in this book. It remains only for the claims of the community to be put forward with clarity and force. Rigid enforcement of property rights as a temporary protection against plundering by control would not stand in the way of the modification of these rights in the interest of other groups. When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger interests of society. Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits from the owners of passive property, and should the community generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners would have to give way. Courts would almost of necessity be forced to recognize the result, justifying it by whatever of the many

legal theories they might choose. It is conceivable—indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive—that the “control” of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.

In still larger view, the modern corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant institution of the modern world. In every age, the major concentration of power has been based upon the dominant interest of that age. The strong man has, in his time, striven to be cardinal or pope, prince or cabinet minister, bank president or partner in the House of Morgan. During the Middle Ages, the Church, exercising spiritual power, dominated Europe and gave to it a unity at a time when both political and economic power were diffused. With the rise of the modern state, political power, concentrated into a few large units, challenged the spiritual interest as the strongest bond of human society. Out of the long struggle between church and state which followed, the state emerged victorious; nationalist politics superseded religion as the basis of the major unifying organization of the western world. Economic power still remained diffused.

The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state—economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation, while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The future may see the economic

organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might

well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.

The Corporation: An Institutional Factor in Modern History

Stephen Raushenbush draws upon a broad background of practical experience in discussing the significance of the corporate form in American society. He has served as chief investigator for two legislative commissions in Pennsylvania; for three years he was director of industrial relations for Pennsylvania; and he has held managerial positions in the clothing and oil industries. He is author of the *March of Fascism*, a provocative analysis of the social and economic conditions which gave rise to fascism. In the article included here Mr. Raushenbush indicates some of the changes in business mores, economic relationships, and social conditions which have been stimulated by the growth of the corporation. It is particularly important that students should ponder the impact of the corporation on the state. Are the decisions of corporate managers purely "economic" decisions? Can the modern state ignore decisions involving investment policies, wage and price levels, or even location of plants?

Within the past eighty years the corporation has become one of the most important institutions in the United States. It represents a concentration of economic power which few of its early sponsors foresaw. Because of that unification of power, it has played a major part in the transformation of this country from a semiagrarian to an industrialized metropolitan community. It has been powerful enough to prevent or frustrate many of the attempts to bring it under the control of the political state. The very fact of its concentrated power has in recent years apparently increased the tempo of our depressions. When a large corporation

shuts up shop, more people go down with it, more economic effort is halted, than would be the case in a realm of many small enterprises.

The rise of an institution to new importance can be measured in terms of the displacement and replacement effects on the older institutions in existence at the beginning of that rise. We have seen the progress of many institutions: monarchy, commercial colonizing companies, the church, the family, the army, town meetings, slavery, the modern political state itself. Each of them has focused or created loyalties, influenced attitudes, habits, customs, developed and expressed

power in political and other cultural forms. Their vitality at any time can be measured, in a dynamic society, by the extent to which they become receiving stations for attitudes and emotions previously centered around other, older institutions. An institution does not grow in a desert. It grows by shoving other institutions aside to make way for itself, or by absorbing them.

The rise of the one-party, all-absorbing totalitarian state in modern Europe is the one vivid example of the process before us; it became vivid to us because of the speed of the process quite as much as by its completeness. Church, corporation, labor unions, democratic institutions, were all rendered impotent, or absorbed, in an attempt to prevent the very competition, among institutions, for loyalty and power which all other rising institutions in our experience have had to undergo, and which has delayed their growth. Like any competent study of any other institution, a study of the growth of Fascism, Nazism, or Communism must be partly in terms of the inadequacy of the older institutions to hold their own against the newcomer.

In the United States the corporation, the economic organization of much of our modern society, has come to maturity more slowly. It has ridden the tide of popular belief in progress, of American belief in efficiency, of that long period when all wanted the natural resources of the nation to be used rapidly, and the rapid use could most easily be secured by those who had unified the financial resources of others in corporation form.

Now, we are told, some few hundred corporations and some few score individuals control over half of our industrial power. Yet little scholarly attention has hitherto been directed toward a development which the historians of the future may consider to be as important to our era as the swing of political power from

the South to the West and North was to the era of a hundred years ago.

The growth of the corporation has brought a change in business mores and in economic relationships. The multitude of economic activities carried on within the corporation are organized by administrative direction rather than by market forces. Sheer size, and the reduction in the number of independent enterprises in fields where corporate production predominates, have placed the corporation in a position to make decisions which have significant impact on the economy.

Corporate growth, too, has brought major social changes. The great migration into the cities has meant a change in the way of life of many people and the growth of many new problems. The character of the liberty that people formerly possessed to become and remain independent in the process of earning a living has been changed. In terms of democratic theory, the growth of the corporation has meant, for many people, a termination of participation in important decisions affecting their lives. By diminishing the independent opportunities for small men in trade and manufacture and forcing them into the more dependent service occupations, it has changed the character and status of the middle class. By the tempo of its technological improvements it has contributed to the problem of unemployment. Industrial discipline has imposed a regimentation and dependence on authority in the lives of the working people which has no parallel elsewhere in our society outside of the military services. In each instance the problems created by the growth of the corporation are left for solution largely to the political state.

The corporation is an institution which still has a great future before it. Like every other vital institution, it is still reaching out for power, for without continually increasing power it cannot assure

its future against the vicissitudes and uncertainties of competition from other corporations or other institutions, such as the political state.

Already there are a whole series of points of frictional contact with the state, which shift with the changing impingements of the corporation and the state alike on the life of the people. Already there is an attempt on the part of some of the spokesmen for the younger institution to capture the patriotic sanction from the government, which represents the state in the minds of the people. When the authoritarian parties in Italy and Germany were able to do that, their importance in the social complex increased enormously. Those who know the one-company steel or coal town recognize the battle cry: "What is best for the corporation is best for the community." On the national scale it reads, "What is good for business is good for America." What is happening here is that the institution is measuring the nation in terms of its own welfare. It is one, or perhaps two, steps from combating everything which conflicts with the institutional interest as "unpatriotic," to fighting it out with the state for the right to exclusive possession of that sanction.

The relations between the modern corporation and the state should lend themselves to profitable study. The first institution has in its later days been able to throw most of its depression burdens upon the latter, with the result of weakening the political state and of making its continued life and health difficult. In its earlier days, it thrived on the gifts of the state's resources. There seems, however, at the moment to be no Hamiltonian bargain that the former wants to keep the latter strong for purposes of support. On the contrary, the spokesmen of the modern corporation want the state kept weak. In that weakness, they believe with the eighteenth-century liberals, lies

the only guarantee of liberty and action for themselves.

In his paper, "The Corporation and the Rise of National Socialism," which Dr. Gerhard Colm presented at the 1939 meeting of the American Historical Association, he dealt with the German experience of the corporation and the weak state:

Business leaders tried to extract from the republic whatever advantage they could but decried all attempts at an active economic policy as "cold socialization." Business made concessions, it is true. It agreed to agricultural tariffs, but only to get the political support of the landed aristocracy. It agreed to social security legislation, since something had to be given to labor. It made concessions to all kinds of pressure groups, but no concessions to the government as such. When a prominent representative of business took charge of the government (Stresemann), the majority of business turned violently against him. They fought with all the means at their disposal whenever the government tried embarking on a constructive program which would have taken care as well of those classes of the population which were less organized as, for instance, the small farmers, shopkeepers, small-sized businesses, and the unemployed. In a world of restricted competition, of international tension and of powerful domestic pressure groups, business still preached a laissez-faire attitude. *Laissez faire* under such conditions means mainly *laissez faire* for the various pressure groups.

In this period of modern industrial organization no government can avoid some sort of business regulation. The question is only how much regulation is necessary, who should direct the regulation and in whose interest it should be invoked. Business apparently wanted to agree to regulation if its own representatives would direct regulation for their own benefit. The short and unsuccessful episode of the Papen government proved the impracticability of such an attempt.

If we wish to find out what the real relationship is between corporate business in Germany, on the one hand, and the victory of National Socialism, on the other, then the an-

swer is that corporate business too shortsightedly believed that it could exert greater influence on a weak government, and did not recognize that the legal order, on which all business activities are based, depends on a strong government determined to pursue a farsighted policy of adjusting the economy to present technological and organizational conditions. The German case proves that in our age of industrial organization a weak government with a *laissez-faire* attitude cannot survive; but a democratic government need not be a weak government.

The significance of this disastrous experiment with a weak state by those who expressed corporation power in Germany has been little appreciated in the United States. Here, as there, before Hitler, the spokesmen for the younger institution have an abounding confidence in their ability to survive in a weak state. They have not accepted the evidence that a weak state tends to be superseded, rather rapidly in modern industrial society, by a strong state. They see only the evidence that a strong state, in our time, does not tolerate economic decisions which are beyond its control and yet vitally affect its destinies.

The growth of the corporation as an institution has to be evaluated, at any one moment of time, by the relative contemporary importance of its decisions with the decisions of the institutions upon which it impinges. In the 1940's the corporation decides when to operate its plants and when to close them. The importance of these decisions is not restricted to its own employees, but extends to the other industries whose products these employees purchase. It decides how much money to invest in new plant and new technological processes. These decisions again extend beyond the immediate environment. It decides price policy, sometimes in cooperation with competitors, with effects upon the whole economy. It decides to move the field of its operations from one

town to another, with huge local after-effects. It decides, with or without effective consultation with the employees, what wages to pay. It decides, with or without effective consultation with the stockholders, what part of earnings to distribute in the form of profits, and what form of political activity its officials should engage in. In times of national crisis, when the nation needs the corporation's resources, the latter is in a position largely to determine the terms upon which its resources will be made available. All these enormously important decisions are taken outside the democratic system, and are powers exercised separately (except, in some instances, for price and wage policy) by each corporation. They have never consciously united in their decisions, with the result of creating a constantly increasing growth of employment and purchasing power. Until they do that, the political state will presumably be called upon to bear the burdens in relief expenditures of various kinds for the failure of the corporation decisions to produce a functioning economy, and will be drained and weakened by the expense, derided for its failure to do something it had not been created to do—guarantee the functioning of the economy—and fought for its attempts to do so.

In the United States the institution upon which the corporation is impinging most at present is no longer the small independent enterprise, but the political state. The latter has for over a hundred years yielded powers to the corporation, without imposing any responsibility upon its creature. In recent years the state has attempted to influence a few of the minor activities of the corporation (safety, minimum wages, maximum hours, compensation for idleness), but has, on the whole, kept out of the major decisions. Yet the state has a series of powers, which it has slowly and only recently been allowed by the courts to exercise, which

are probably adequate today for control of the major economic decisions of the corporation in times of peace almost as thoroughly as they are in times of war, when the safety of the modern state automatically involves control of all the major corporation decisions. In other words, while the recent rise of the corporation in the United States has been accompanied by an actual weakening in the ability of the state to carry continued or new burdens of depression there has, at the same

time, been a theoretical strengthening of the power of the state to control the decisions which result in these burdens of depression.

The student of modern history may expect to find himself observing more and more clearly the simultaneous development of the two institutions in terms of conflict over control of the major decisions of the corporation, which, at one remove, create the major decisions of the modern political state.

The Myth of Diffused Power

Robert S. Lynd, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, is one of the more stimulating writers and teachers of social science. With his wife, Helen, he made a detailed analysis of Muncie, Indiana, the results of which were published in *Middletown* and *Middletown in Transition*. His book *Knowledge for What?* is a most searching examination of American social sciences. In this essay, an introduction to Robert Brady's *Business as a System of Power*, Dr. Lynd suggests some of the implications of the growth of economic power. Because democracy tends to fear power, in the United States, save for intermittent struggles on specific issues, it has chosen to ignore the challenge to democracy of concentrated economic power. He points out that business could not tolerate the separation of political and economic power; it resisted attempts at governmental checks on its activities and sought to win over government as a positive ally. The result has been for the state and business to become intermeshed, a trend intensified by two world wars. Is there a conflict here with Beard's conclusion that the function of constitutional government is to "facilitate voluntary and compulsory adjustments of conflicting interests within the framework of some common civil policy"? Lynd asserts that it is no longer possible to "perpetuate the economic wastes and frictions and the social anarchy entailed in the operation of state power and economic power as rivals."

Men have always experienced difficulty in perceiving the thrust of deeper tendencies beneath the surface phenomena of their

day. Particularly when long-established institutional systems have been breaking up under them have they tended to mis-

take symptom for cause and to greet predictions of major change with incredulity and aversion. In the main, they wrestle with obvious immediacies in familiar terms; for the rest, the deeper tendencies, they prefer to wait and see. If such a policy has seemed to be not without some justification in more leisurely eras of change, it is today nothing less than disastrous. For we are living through one of the great climactic eras of history, a major faulting of the institutional crust. A symptom of the extent of current change is the extreme ideological confusion. Fascist monopoly capitalism adopts "National Socialism"; organized industry opposes organized labor in the name of "democracy"; and ideological opposites fight side by side for goals that sound alike only because they are left vague. In such a time, when men and their most cherished concerns are being dragged headlong at the heels of confused events, the one chance for constructive recovery of control lies in the diagnosis of underlying causes.

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The characteristic thing about democracy is its diffusion of power among the people. That men have recurrently had to have recourse to revolutions in order to assert such a pattern of power attests the inveterate presence within society of a contrary tendency. Power is no less "political" for being labeled "economic" power; for politics is but the science of "who gets what, when, and how." Alexander Hamilton advocated and Jefferson opposed the effort of clotted economic power to substitute concentrated minority class power for diffused power. Lincoln referred to this same tendency when he wrote in 1860, "Soberly, it is now no child's play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation"; and he went on to speak of "the miners and sappers of returning despotism" engaged in undercut-

ting democracy. The preponderant weight of economic power in the Constitutional Convention, while conceding the outward forms of political democracy, went on at once to curb the exercise of the very power it had just granted; it crippled the force of democratic power at the source by parceling up this power by a marvelously dexterous system of barriers to its expression. Thus political equality under the ballot was granted on the unstated but factually double-locked assumption that the people must refrain from seeking the extension of that equality to the economic sphere. In short, the attempted harmonious marriage of democracy to capitalism doomed genuinely popular control from the start. And all down through our national life the continuance of the union has depended upon the unstated condition that the dominant member, capital, continue to provide returns to all elements in democratic society sufficient to disguise the underlying conflict in interests. A crisis within the economic relations of capitalism was bound to precipitate a crisis in the democratic political system.

Democracy in the era of economic liberalism has viewed power as a thing to be feared, rather than used; and this disposition, coupled with the checks on democratic action written into the Constitution, has prompted American democracy to state the problem of power negatively. It has been casual, to the point of recklessness, about the positive development of its own authority. Formally, democracy has held all the aces. But actually, as Laski has pointed out, "The disproportion in America between the actual economic control and the formal political power is almost fantastic." Despite intermittent guerilla warfare between state power and private economic power through all our national life, democracy has slurred over the challenge to its very existence inherent in growing economic power. This has been due to a

number of factors. (1) The fact that the issue between the two types of power has been so heavily cloaked under the sectional issue between the agrarian and the Eastern industrial states has diverted attention from the fact that capitalist economic power constitutes a direct, continuous, and fundamental threat to the whole structure of democratic authority everywhere and always. (2) The appearance of the Industrial Revolution simultaneously with political democracy distracted men's attention from the perennially unfinished task of building democracy. Equipped with a new and marvelously growing technology and with a raw continent beckoning to be exploited, Americans turned their attention all down through the nineteenth century to the grand adventure of getting rich. Democracy was taken for granted as substantially achieved, or at most requiring only to be defended. And a naïve and dangerous popular faith has grown, notably since the Civil War, that democracy and capitalist enterprise are two aspects of the same thing, so that the progress manifestly occurring in industry must also be happening in the democratic political system. Since democracy itself thus failed to throw constantly new goals ahead to catch the imagination and to evoke the energy of its citizens, men thus deprived of anything bigger to work for have in the main vindicated the cynical view that they are motivated only by selfish personal interests. Under such a distorted view of democracy, in which the state and society are nothing and the individual everything, democracy has become increasingly identified with the protection of one's personal affairs; and this has steadily sapped its vitality. (3) Because this "American way" has worked so seemingly opulently, and because of man's need in the rough and tumble of an increasingly insecure world to feel immutable security somehow back of him, American citizens, preoccu-

pied with everything but the affairs of democracy, have increasingly imputed to the Constitution, the central symbol of American democracy, an extravagant finality. If this great and mysterious *It* were but defended, democracy remained unchallenged.

In such an environment, democracy has been largely tolerant of the businessman, for the most part encouraging him with a lavish hand; for upon his restless enterprise the public welfare was conceived to rest. The "trust busting" of the turn of the century was a protest against what seemed to be excesses in an otherwise normal system, not a protest against the system itself. Even in recent decades, as business has grown in power until it has become a jostling giant, democracy has largely failed to recognize its political significance. The world was large and its wealth seemingly unlimited, and if business was growing bigger and more noisily insistent, this was viewed as but a surface manifestation of rugged growth. Down to the First World War abroad, and until 1929 in the United States, what businessmen did was regarded as primarily their own business. Since the fruit of their activities slopped over in taxes, wages, and dividends, it was manifestly contributing to general welfare.

But this nominal division of powers could not be maintained within the structure of capitalist nationalism. As industrialization has spread over the world and competition has increased, the reciprocal relation between state power and economic power has become more apparent. The fundamental import of what has been happening at a quickening tempo since the Russian Revolution of 1917 is the abandonment of the liberal fiction of the separateness of these two kinds of power. Organized business enterprise is less and less willing to tolerate checks on its activities by the state; more and more it needs the state as active ally; and the national

state, in turn, having delivered itself over by accepting the definition of its welfare as synonymous with the welfare of its business system, needs increasingly the utmost of aggressive efficiency from its businessmen. Business is in politics and the state is in business. The state political apparatus can tolerate only the most efficient management of the economic system, since it depends directly upon the latter for national power in foreign relations; whereas the economy must have the political power to extend control, as the Nazis have demonstrated, to the regulation of the social sphere, "not to gratify lower-class maudlinness or rapacity but to secure national concord and efficiency" as an essential aid to foreign economic competition. The result is an unmistakable trend toward the monolithic power structure of the totalitarian state.

And the public does not know what to do about this merging of powers up aloft over its head. As business has organized and has begun to state cogently and lavishly the case for its version of such an "ordered society," the popular challenge expressed earlier in the campaign to curb bigness by governmental action has become confused and blunted. Big business has carefully disseminated to the little man at the grass roots enthusiasm and pride as an American in the superefficiency of the marvelous assembly lines and other paraphernalia of giant technology that produces his automobiles and other daily conveniences. The little man is puzzled, hypnotized into inaction: if he is not to oppose *bigness* itself, the bigness of Henry Ford, Du Pont, and the other great corporations that make these characteristically American things possible, what *is* he to oppose about big business? The technique of dazzling, confusing, and dividing the opposition, used by Hitler, has been skillfully practiced by the propagandists for big business.

The rapidly spreading web of interin-

dustry organization of this business power is the immediate... [problem]. We live in an era in which only organization counts; values and causes with unorganized or only vaguely organized backing were never so impotent. The rapidity of current change creates the need for quick decisions, which puts the organized minority that knows what it wants at a thumping advantage over the scattered and wistful majority. In fact, it is able, as the Nazis have demonstrated, to exploit majority confusions ruthlessly in the name of majority values to minority ends.

One of the most striking conclusions... concerns the similarity in type and function of the organization of business interests from nation to nation, despite seemingly widely dissimilar national backgrounds. This is due primarily to the inner common tendencies within capitalist-controlled technology wherever it operates. But it is also due in part to the fact that men operating across the world from each other learn organizational and other tricks of their trade as rapidly as these appear. Major changes in the way men live and work together under industrial conditions no longer happen in one industry or one country and then spread at a pace to be measured in decades or generations. Inventions have shrunk physical space and organization has diminished social space. World competition sees to it that a profitable technical or organizational device runs around the world of organized interest before common folk of the country of origin are generally aware that it has been developed.

Social organization around functional concerns is normal to human beings. Western liberalism, imputing freedom and rationality to the individual, washed its hands of the problem of securing positive organization; it proceeded on the assumption that, wherever organization was socially desirable, men would recognize the need and forthwith organize them-

selves. Such a theory not only misread human nature but it failed to take account of the momentum developed within such a cultural complex as machine technology owned and exploited within a legally buttressed system of private property rights. Liberal democracy has never dared face the fact that industrial capitalism is an intensely coercive form of organization of society that cumulatively constrains men and all of their institutions to work the will of the minority who hold and wield economic power; and that this relentless warping of men's lives and forms of association becomes less and less the result of voluntary decisions by "bad" and "good" men and more and more an impersonal web of coercions dictated by the need to keep "the system" running. These coercions cumulate themselves to ends that even the organizing leaders of big business may fail to foresee, as step by step they grapple with the next immediate issue, and the next, and the next. Fantastic as it may sound, this course may end by the business leaders of the United States coming to feel, in the welter of their hurrying perplexities, that survival depends on precisely the kind of thing Germany's big business... [wanted:] the liquidation of labor and other popular dissent at home, and a "peace" more vindictive than the Versailles Treaty, that would seek to stabilize an Anglo-American feudal monopoly control over the entire world.

Liberal democracy likewise never solved the problem of bigness; but it alternately fought and condoned it in a confusion of inconsistent policies. A cultural system drenched with the artisan spirit of small enterprise found difficulty in accepting the facts that modern machinery demands integration and that productive enterprise, released from making a pair of shoes for a known local customer, and set to making standard goods for an impersonal and theoretically unlimited "market," likewise demands organization. Hence the recur-

rent efforts to curb bigness. But both bigness and monopoly are normal antecedents to the stage of planned provision for the needs of society which we are now entering, and there is no longer any point in attacking either. The only relevant questions today are: Who controls these productive facilities, and to what ends? and, How effectively are they organized to achieve these ends? or, stated in another way: Will democratic political power absorb and use economic resources, bigness and all, to serve its ends, or will big economic power finally take over state power?

The modern phase of business as a system of organized power began with the spread of the corporate organization of industry after the 1860's. The world of 1870 did not speculate much about the grip which corporate business was to have on the lives of all of us a half-century later. Corporate organization, like the monopolies it made possible, was viewed as the exception, unadapted to general business. The precise significance... is that... this same organizational tendency within industrial society—now become the rule rather than the exception and moved along to its contemporary stage of organized intermonopoly control—... shows us where the logic of such a centrally organized system of power is carrying us. For synchronized monopoly directed by a peak all-industry strategy board is but corporate business come of age. The difference between the early and the mature stages is that, whereas corporate organization completed the taking of the instruments of production out of the hands of the laborer and strengthened economic power in its challenge to democratic political power, the mature stage... is moving on to wrest even the formal political means of curbing economic power from the hands of the citizens of democracy. Corporate organization pocketed production; its giant offspring is pocket-

ing the nation, including the entire lives of its citizens. And organized business is extending this antidemocratic web of power in the name of the people's own values, with billboards proclaiming "What's Good for Industry Is Good for Your Family," and deftly selling itself to a harassed people as "trustees," "guardians," "the people's managers" of the public interest.

The large identities in problem and in organizational form to meet these problems in nation after nation suggest with startling emphasis that we in the United States are caught in the same major coercions that industrial capitalist nations everywhere face. We, too, have no choice as to whether economic and state power shall be merged; for there will be no survival for nations that seek to perpetuate the economic wastes and frictions and the social anarchy entailed in the operation of state power and economic power as rivals. The sheer fact of the emergence of the phenomenon of effectively planned nations has, because of the logic of organization inherent in modern technology, outmoded at a stroke the old system under which all our American national life has been lived. In the United States the present stage of organized, centralized business power, already reaching out in control of schools, media of communication, public opinion, and government itself, provides more than a broad hint of the direction events will take, if present tendencies remain unchecked. In England, longer in the war than ourselves and closer to the choice that must be made, the same power tendencies are at work, despite optimistic reports of surface democratic manifestations. As this is written, the London *New Statesman and Nation* for August 15, 1942, carries a review of a book by an English businessman, N. E. H. Davenport. "He shows, in effect," says the review, "that what has happened is that the vested interests of monopoly capitalism have, for

all practical purposes, taken over the government of the country. Behind the façade of political democracy they are preparing the economic foundations of the corporate State; and, to no small extent, they are being aided and abetted in this task by the powerful trade unions. . . . [Mr. Davenport] has made it clear beyond discussion that unless we are able very soon to persuade or compel the Prime Minister to swift and profound changes in his economic policy, we shall defeat Hitler only to be delivered into the hands of the same type of men for whom a Hitler is a necessary instrument."

In this really desperate predicament, American democracy is unprepared fully to assert itself. . . . We speak vaguely of "the Four Freedoms," and yet we do not go on to give these war aims, at home and abroad, the full-blooded, realistic content so essential if men are really to be quickened to fight for democracy. Such muting of democratic objectives creates the blurred confusion which can provide the perfect setting for the strong men who know what they want. Born as a nation coincidentally with the upsurge of the Industrial Revolution, situated in a rich continent which we have built up with the bodies of cheap foreign labor, protected by the accident of location during the years of our fumbling growth, we have through all our national life been borne forward by a favoring tail wind. This past we view, quite characteristically, not as a stroke of luck but as the vindication of the superior rightness of "the American way"; and this makes for complacency. Growing out of this is our blindness to any way of conceiving our national future other than in terms of the simple extension of our expansive past. Our national naïveté about organization is disastrous in the present crisis. We are called a "nation of joiners," but the individual still holds the focus of our national imagination. With all the flotsam and jetsam of our

"joining," we have little popular belief in or experience of the hard-bitten type of relentless organization for power ends; and where we see it, for instance, in the Tammany type of politics, we deplore it even as we condone it as a special case and a somehow necessary evil. Of all the Western industrial nations, we are the least class-stratified psychologically and the only one without an active labor party or its equivalent in our national political life. And, again, this is not because "the American way" is fundamentally different, but primarily because the American ideology as regards capitalism is less sophisticated than is that of any other Western nation.

Thus our traditions conspire to make us unable to read the meanings behind the organization... [of business]. We are opaque to the political import of this massing of business power, and we still insist on regarding it as primarily a concern only of the businessmen. Meanwhile, the lawyers with their convenient conception of the role of the law, the public-relations men, the press, and all the other pliant agents of organized business go busily about on cat feet as they spread the net and tighten the noose for those so abundantly able to make it "worth their while." Burnham's plausible thesis of the "managerial revolution" has been seized upon by business, and a powerful medium like *Fortune* proclaims itself in its new editorial policy as the organ "for the managers of America." But behind the fiction of the "manager class" so conveniently sterilized from the taint of special interest stands the same old power. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."

If the American rank and file—the upwards of four-fifths of the nation who are working-class and small-business folk—are thus illiterate in the language of

contemporary power, the case is almost as bad with those experts, the professional social scientists, whom society supports because they profess to know about men's institutions. It is no accident that... a world of scientists who comb their fields for important problems for research have left the problem of the power organization and politics of big business so largely unexplored. For the most part, contemporary social scientists still exhibit toward the changing business world the encouraging moral optimism of Alfred Marshall. Nor are we helped by the fact that the crucial science of economics derives its data within the assumptions and concepts of a system conceived not in terms of such things as "power" but of blander processes such as the automatic balancing of the market.

American public opinion tends to reject out of hand any answer to the question "Where are we going?" that is not couched in the familiar optimistic terms. As we... [fought the] war, involving an unparalleled tangle of ideological inconsistencies, the popular mood encouraged by government and sedulously sponsored by business [was] to ignore controversial questions and to concentrate on winning the war. But the First World War gave interindustry co-ordination of big business rapid acceleration; postwar conditions gave it its opportunity and successful foreign precedents; and the management of the [Second World War] [was] taken over by representatives of big business. And this time they may be in Washington for keeps... Both during the war and after, the issue [was] identical: Who controls, and to what ends?...

One stout weapon remains in the hands of the little people at the grass roots of democracy: no one dares to challenge in frontal attack the basic democratic thesis.

Economic Power: "Who Controls, and to What End?"

Robert Brady, Professor of Economics at the University of California, is author of a study of Nazi Germany, as well as *Business as a System of Power* from which this selection is taken. Indicating that the trend toward business unification is inevitable simply because of administrative and technological demands, Mr. Brady concludes that control of this unification may move in one of two directions. One way, the elimination of popular, democratic controls, was followed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The alternative could be the widening of opportunity for public participation in the formulation of economic policies. The crucial question for Americans: can political and economic controls be developed which will permit the survival of democratic institutions and procedures?

Attempts to unify business on an ever more comprehensive basis are inevitable. For how else is it possible to cope with the administrative and managerial problems of an industrial technology which has for decades past been moving toward such a policy?

Intuitively, the most unsophisticated know this part of the story. The break-fast table draws its supplies from the most distant lands. The factory soaks up materials from a continent and sets the finished products flowing along well-grooved channels to the ends of the earth. Finely meshed networks of transportation, communication, and energy bind the whole more closely and rigorously together with each passing day. Within these spreading networks, industrial technology, in an infinity of small ways—hither and yon, endlessly, restlessly, ceaselessly—weaves tighter and more exactly the multifarious interdependencies which engineers, step by step, wring from the master patterns of the unfolding nat-

ural science "web of reason." Integration, coordination, planning, these are the very root and marrow, the essence and the spirit of the industrial system as it is being developed in our times. In these respects changes are unidirectional, additive, cumulative. From them there is no turning back. And, as the bitterly fought issues of the Second World War—a "total war" which pits entire economic systems against each other—have made abundantly plain, the end is not yet.

Moving with this trend, however consciously or intuitively, businessmen all over the world are engaged in weaving parallel webs of control. As the separate strands are extended, a point is reached at which, willy-nilly, a choice of direction is forced upon the businessman. One way leads to the shaking off of all popular restraints on such cumulative powers and to shaping the contours and determining the content of economic policies pregnant with far-reaching political, social, and cultural implications. This is the totali-

tarian road. Organized business in Germany, Italy, Japan, and France has chosen to move in this direction, and has already found that the choice once made is both irrevocable and fraught with dangerous consequences. For it seems that, for better or for worse, what businessmen have taken for the agent of social catharsis is no less than a modernized version of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, whose self-appointed monarchs have learned from the inspired pages of *The Prince* only a *Realpolitik* of survival; a *Realpolitik* which may as readily demolish as resurrect any given structure of pre-existing special-interest controls, including—through the precarious fortunes of subsequent wars, revolutions, or internal paralysis—those of the business interests which fathered, with money, ideas, and leaders, the original *coup d'état*.

The contrasting choice is to force the growth of a sense of responsibility to democratic institutions, not by transmuting arbitrary controls into series of patriarchal relationships, however mellowed and benevolently postured, but by steadily widening the latitude for direct public participation in the formulation of economic policies affecting the public interests. How, is not for us to say. But clearly this is the alternative which faces highly organized business in England, the United States, and other scattered countries still moving within the orbit of the liberal-capitalistic system. Here, just as in the totalitarian countries before the fateful decisions were made, business must choose. If it hesitates, choice will be thrust upon it. On the record no further compromise is possible except a compromise moving definitely in one direction or the other. For sovereign power is indivisible, and a house cannot long remain divided against itself.

Considered solely from the point of view of vested interests, this choice is not an easy one for organized business to

make. It is difficult not only because one route has thus far led to successive and politically dangerous disasters while the alternative entails a democratization reaching to the very roots of the ideology and the institutional sanctions upon which the business system rests as a whole, but also because organized business, however widely it may have cast its webs of influence and however swiftly its leaders may be centralizing authority through machinery of their own or others' devising, still has great difficulty in finding its collective mind. Some businesses are big; some little. Some are interested in contraction, others in expansion; some in local markets, others in national and international markets. Commodities, businesses, trades compete with each other long after conditions of partial or complete monopoly have been effected in restricted areas. For widely varying reasons some favor dictatorships, while others—particularly small businesses—can survive only in a democratic world. Within this newer business world, as often as elsewhere, what is one man's meat may well be another man's poison.

Thus even when organized business may have found some traces of collective mind, it faces the greatest difficulty in expressing a collective will, in focusing effort on the articulation of an internally coherent business program, in giving membership a sense of direction through promotion of a common social-psychological outlook, and in formulating for the doubtful a common set of simple and realizable goals. Yet, faced with the larger decisions which the trend of national and world affairs have placed before it, without these things business will everywhere be reduced to programmatic futility, and its centralized direction may well find itself without the wit at the critical moment to make even those half-hearted compromises urged upon it—as a condition to survival on any workable version

of the time-honored principles of "muddling through"—by its own more vocal bellwether prophets such as Rathenau and Filene.

This is what happened in France, where organized business, unable to reconcile itself to further extension of democratic controls, sold its birthright for a condition of permanent vassalage to a foe sworn to destroy not business, but France.

In the struggle for control over business power, small business is everywhere losing out. Amongst the giants, whoever will not play according to the transformed rules will, upon becoming truly recalcitrant, be expelled by methods which partake more and more of the spirit of the purge. If we can draw any certain lesson from events of the recent past it is surely this, that organized business in one national system will show no mercy to organized business in another national system, once conflicts of interest have forced matters to the arbitraments of war.

The underlying principles are not new. They are clearly in keeping with those long familiar to students of "trust and combination" *Realpolitik* in the domestic arena, and to those who have followed the clash of economic imperialism throughout the period leading up to the two World Wars on the larger field of action. The principal differences which contrast the contemporary with the past are found only in the size and compactness of current organization and in the scale on which the issues are now drawn. There is no difference in the issues themselves.

Thus a comparative study of attempts to expand business controls within the several capitalistic systems becomes a prime necessity for both business and the public. At the outset of such an effort, one is struck by four extremely interest-

ing facts. First, the transformations undergone by business organization in those countries which have revamped their national systems along totalitarian lines are fully consonant with, and may be considered the logical outgrowths of, previous trends in structure, policies, and controls within the business world itself. Second, along every significant line the parallelisms in the evolution of business centralization within the several national systems, including those within countries still functioning on a liberal-capitalistic basis, are so close as to make them appear the common product of a single plan. Third, all business policies have been increasingly discussed and formulated in the face of widespread—in many respects very highly organized and always potentially threatening—popular opposition, whose interests have been coming into conflict with those of organized business in a way which more and more challenges the traditional business view of the proper objectives and the responsibilities of economic leadership as such. And finally, the implications of power in such widespread business controls, together with the popular challenge to business leaders, cause all economic issues to take on a political meaning, and thereby cause the role of the government to grow in importance in a sort of geometric ratio.

It does not follow from the first of these facts that "totalitarianism" was the inevitable result of previous trends in business organization within the Axis states, but only that it was inescapable, because those trends were unmodified when circumstances of an eventually revolutionary character forced quick decision within strategically placed business circles committed to no further compromises with democratic government. It does not follow from the second fact that there was actually such a plan. The reverse is true. But it does follow that there were common sets of forces operating

through greatly varying historical environments, with many factors (such as the level of industrial development and the nature of business organization at the time of rapid adoption of industrial and business methods) differently timed, blended, juxtaposed, or set in conflict, which shaped and posed the issues in similar ways. And from the third and fourth, only this follows, that the issues everywhere come to rest not on whether the government was or is to be the co-ordinator, for that is now truly inescapable, but on whether the government will be able to co-ordinate and plan economic activities toward popular ends, responsible directly therein to democratic institutions, or toward the specialized interests of self-assertive and authoritarian minority groups.

From these considerations the special question necessarily arises, does capitalist civilization anywhere show any signs of being able or willing to plan means and unify ends on a national scale according to a workable formula that is still consonant with democratic institutions? We well know what happened in the totalitarian countries where organized business underwrote the antidemocratic reaction. Can different results be expected elsewhere? Everyone concerned with the present dramatic crisis in world history would like to see this question resolved. Opinions, in reply, already differ as deeply and fundamentally as the status and social philosophies of those who give

answer. This much is certain, the attempt—sometimes made consciously, but more often in groping fashion—to cope with the problem in some manner or other is being made in every major capitalist country in the world. Business is becoming aware of the range of larger issues, is organizing to meet and resolve them, and its collective efforts to these ends are widening out on an ever more comprehensive scale.

And as it gathers together its forces, it comes everywhere to think politically, begins to come to grips at a thousand and one points with the "social question" in all its bewildering manifestations. So proceeding, organized business has more and more found itself compelled at least to make the attempt to evolve new "social philosophies," which will meet the more fundamental challenges dividing its own members in the preferred reaches of the social pyramid and at the same time meet those other challenges thrown at it by the leaders of the vast popular ranks becoming increasingly conscious of their own specific and often opposing interests.

In accomplishing this aim, can business still hope to retain its control over the inner sancta where the fundamental economic decisions are made? And if it succeeds in any marked degree in so holding on, will the political and social controls evolved be reconcilable with continuation of a democratic way of life? These are the fundamental, the critical questions of our times.

Concentrated Private Interest vs. Diffused Public Interest

Walton Hamilton, professor at the Yale Law School and economic analyst, presents in this piece a vivid illustration of the way in which the democratic process is shortcircuited. Though discussing the problem in its wartime setting, he recognizes that we are here faced with trends which have been developing at least since the 1870's. A government designed to fulfill a negative role is incapable of meeting the demand for control in the public interest. With Congress forced to delegate regulation, the courts poorly equipped for the task of supervision, and the Executive swamped in detail and with inadequate means of control over the spawning agencies, how is responsibility imposed? "As the state changes in character, it occupies an area where the older safeguards do not operate." How is democratic government to meet this challenge?

We re-elect FDR—and the opposition is installed within the government. The cause which failed to persuade the voters scores an easy victory in Washington. The democratic process operates, yet it is by-passed. Somehow a wedge has been driven between the exercise of power and its popular source. A constitutional crisis impends which makes insistent the question, Whose government?

...the war has done little more than accelerate trends which were long in the making. For our political order is undergoing revolution. The three-in-one system—executive, legislature, judiciary—was never so neat as we liked to believe. It still operates in a crisscross sort of way, but its authority wanes. And a new order, almost unknown to political theory, arises in an area hitherto little occupied. For economic law did not live up to its Newtonian promise; *laissez faire* got a bad name; the newly felt necessities of the people came to be of political concern.

So the government was called upon to prod, regulate, underwrite, complement, supplant free enterprise. And a host of agencies sprang into being—to put an increasing strain upon the separation of state and economy.

As the barriers fell, the government had to be made over. A state accustomed to letting business alone was not ideally adapted to public control. The need was for a continuous oversight of interests, industries, activities which were unlike and refused to stay put. To this demand for specifics, Congress could respond only with general statutes. It could not act promptly and concretely every time novelty in a situation signaled for a change in remedy. The legislature was most useful in a crisis, when some affair left to itself had broken down and something had to be done about it. On such an occasion it might choose values and point direction; but even then it could do little more than pass an enabling act.

From "The Smoldering Constitutional Crisis," by Walton Hamilton, *The New Republic*, January 18, 1943.

It had to delegate actual regulation to some authority which could apply general provisions to particular cases and changing conditions. Only after experience had shown legislation to be inadequate or out-of-date did it have to return to the particular job. It still inquires; it retains a seriously compromised power over the purse. But its power to shape policy is in decline. Its great days are over.

If Congress has moved backstage, the judiciary has been pushed to the side lines. In the days when *laissez faire* was rampant and respectable, free enterprise was quite able to take care of itself. As the trend toward control made headway, the judiciary came out of the cloister and put up a furious fight in its behalf. But against the current of the times its pretensions had hard going. In a glorious twilight the Supreme Court made a gallant last stand against the President's "unpacking plan"—and then, in a self-denying ordinance, quietly surrendered judicial supremacy. The result was inevitable; for as an agency of industrial government the court was poorly equipped for the task of continuous oversight. The way of litigation is too expensive and cumbersome for everyday use. The interests at stake cannot all be crowded into the rigid forms of a case in controversy. Its tempo is too slow for a world in a hurry; its channels, too narrow for the heavy traffic of the business system. In the lament of a distinguished jurist, that an official attempt to stop hot oil has outrun the decorous—and interminable—processes of justice, a useful institution is caught off its beat. It may now and then barge in to vex and to harass; for the form of myopia called legalism is an occupational disease to which judges are peculiarly susceptible. But no longer can the judiciary direct policy.

An instrument of control, simpler, speedier, more flexible than court or Con-

gress became essential. It was the market which had broken down or flunked its social task. It was to correct the market that the state was called to action. A shipper cannot bargain with the railroad over the price of the haul—the Interstate Commerce Commission comes into being. The investor lacks the skills with which to judge stocks and bonds—the Securities and Exchange Commission is the answer. The law of supply and demand fails to adjust the acreage of staple crops to market demand—the Agricultural Adjustment Administration is sent to the rescue. The private sources of capital, especially in a depression, shrink from risk—the Reconstruction Finance Corporation underwrites a hesitant free enterprise. The individual wage earner is no longer a match for the corporate employer—the National Labor Relations Board is called upon to ensure "that equality in bargaining power in which freedom of contract begins." The impact blurs—and even erases—frontiers between the separate provinces.

State and economy are alike changed by the contact. The business unit becomes the corporate estate. Price, output, capacity are put under managerial control; company policy becomes an aspect of the politics of industry. The government adopts the mechanisms of business and widely employs the corporate device to organize its activities. A few years ago the National Recovery Administration put on a dress rehearsal of business as a political institution. As the war approached, the President made corporate entities our accredited agents in the mobilization of material resources. He seems to have taken it for granted that they were powerful and selfish and would enlist their domains in the war effort only upon their own terms. So today the War Production Board, a kind of House of Delegates for large-scale enterprise, decrees capacity, regulates output, appor-

tions materials, gears the economy to the military struggle. The state takes over where the economy cannot perform; the economy does delegated duty for the state.

It has all come about without goal or plan. An event, a social shift, a new awareness creates an unexpected situation. The need or breakdown is recorded in an improvised control. As creatures of occasions many of these agencies are amorphous, uncertain of their tasks, unsure of their places. No art has deftly shaped them to the different sorts of work they have to do. Their number is so large that alphabetical combinations must be invoked to name them. Among them is every form of organization, association, corporation known to man. Whether an agency meets the world as bureau, division, authority, or corporate subsidiary is not important. Nor does it matter greatly whether it reports to another agency, to a cabinet member, to Congress, or to the President. Even controls which overlap and get tangled are nothing to worry about. They are everyday matters in a society whose affairs are interlocked. A government which does not keep ahead of any blueprint has lost its vitality. The real concern is that the whole establishment is drifting away from responsible government.

If there is need for political reform, it is to impress office and order upon this motley host. The older channels for the public will not have been extended to the newer establishment. The three great powers of government are no longer separate and two of them are no longer great. The judiciary, aloof from popular currents of feeling, cannot do the work of the administrative agencies. Nor can it effectively police their activities. A group with everyday experience in what-it-is-about has it all over a bench of judges who must be jacks of all trades. As against the research facilities available to any commission, the fact-finding of the

courts is primitive. And remote control, however wise, is no substitute for judgment on the spot. The Congress can create an agency, abate its authority, fit it out with new weapons. It can, through public hearings, expose sloth, muddling, incompetence. But it is impotent to conduct the demands of the people through the whole political order. And it can more easily sterilize than it can give life. The Executive has risen to supremacy; he lords it, so far as anyone does, over this vast and recently occupied territory.

The Executive has been exalted; yet his enlarged authority has grown up in a domain unknown to the Constitution. The establishment is too vast for one man to oversee, too intricate for any man to understand. As a nerve center the White House is poorly connected with outlying departments. And the President has quite different powers over the various agencies. His example, a new appointment, the call to be up-and-doing make for alertness. But persuasion and command, even if uniformly applied, encounter different degrees of resistance. And his term may be spent before the will which swept him into office is carried very far along. As the executive order replaces the Act of Congress, "the King's ear" again becomes a political institution. But access to it, as yet grooved into no due process, goes by chance, proximity, the favor of the secretariat. A question of importance may be resolved upon inadequate information; a decision may reach interested parties by hearsay. Instead of notice, hearing, a channel open to all concerned, it becomes necessary to find someone who is blessed with the proper entree.

At his utmost the President cannot overcome the disposition of agencies to go their separate ways. The spirit of the Interstate Commerce Commission is that of the age of T. R. The Federal Trade Commission is a monument to Woodrow

Wilson's attempt to fix a moral plane for competition. The philosophy of Herbert Hoover lives on in the investment policy of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Securities and Exchange Commission behaves as if these were still the palmy days of the New Deal. The War Production Board is the very incarnation of an attempt to run a war from the business office. And the State Department, in the tradition of an archaic chivalry, insists upon arming the nations we must fight. If each agency were sovereign within its own dominion, we might sport a panorama of all the controls. But any major problem—raw materials, synthetic rubber, transport, manpower, the standard of life—involves a multiplex of authorities. It can usually be resolved only by interdepartmental diplomacy. And in such a resort pressures count, only the exceptional case can go to the White House, and the difference-it-makes fades into the background. In the everlasting clash of persons, interests, agencies, national policy serves many masters.

Its very independence exposes an agency to internal and external dangers. A new office is likely to reflect the vitality of the crusade which brought it into being. As age comes, it hardens, formalizes its action, generates a tradition, takes the sterile way of establishment. It is almost as prone as a large corporation—Alcoa, U. S. Steel, Anaconda, American Tel. and Tel.—to go bureaucratic. Its salvation is a nucleus of live officials who persist in sticking their necks out. And it takes external vigil to protect it against dry rot, ceremonial, loss of function. The agency is peculiarly susceptible to minority influence. Its task is to mediate between some private interest in the commonwealth and its public. The interest is compact, well defined, insistent upon its rights, alert. Its public is scattered, absorbed in its own affairs, inarticulate. All the advantage of power, knowledge,

monies with which to manufacture argument, are with the private group. A close decision turns upon pressure, not in general, but at the point of conflict. Here the interest can mobilize its resources, keep the heat on, wear opposition down; the public concern is usually too dissipated to meet the onslaught. A number of contingencies aid the private cause. The officials of the agency occupy a dual office; the rule of arbiter is likely to overtop that of public guardian. The Civil Service has done much to remove political, but far less to abate corporate, patronage. As yet it has devised no adequate test for vision, devotion to the public interest, guts. The government exhibits no unusual gratitude to faithful servants; the interest can often open careers to "fair-minded" young men. And routine and inertia are enlisted under the banner of do-nothing.

All along the frontier of control a concentrated private interest is pitted against a diffused public interest. The interest is willing to go along if the agency is "co-operative." If it is not, ways can be found to render it impotent. Witness the judicial review which for years paralyzed the work of rate-making bodies; or note the quiet demise of the National Labor Relations Board. The Supreme Court only recently put a stop to the parade of corporate privileges as the rights of man to claim immunity from the law. But if the members of an industry want to string along together, keep others out, divide markets, share the spoils, an agency of control may prove a positive asset. If it can be captured, it may become a branch office within the government. Then it can lend a sanction to acts which otherwise would be illegal. Milk control is a mighty prop to a rigid price structure; patents have also been employed to bless many a monopoly.

If a nation cannot keep its own crea-

tions in line, it must expect trouble from the business concerns through which it acts. Corporations consecrated to the pursuit of gain have a terrific kick-back when employed in the public service. A primary precaution is to condition them for delegated duty. Yet no criteria of fitness have been set up for dollar-a-year men. Those called have come far more largely from the business office than from the production line; among them salesmen far outnumber technicians. There has been regard for "acquaintance with the industry," but the nature of that acquaintance has been little specified. Few are at home with the kind of questions which the current crisis brings to the economy. To Washington they bring the attitudes, habits, goals, and fears of acquisitive enterprise. A public official—his name ought to be given—exhibits his confusion by proclaiming the "indispensability" of persons whose special competence lies in keeping output down and prices up. It is no wonder that corporate-public officials, in reference to the government and the industry, are stumped over the antecedents of the pronouns "we" and "they." Every decision made involves a choice between alternatives and leaves its lasting impression.

It is elementary to the law that "no one shall try his own case." Yet a business executive, in his public capacity, makes decisions which affect his competitors. It is a common practice for him to have a voice in the terms of the contract when he has a stake in the outcome. Officials, with conflicting obligations, as officers of the state are giving shape to things to come. We convert public funds into private capital; make private citizens architects of the political economy; employ our worshipful companies as departments of government. Yet alien structure has not been adapted to government use. And we have not even fumbled

with the problem of imposing responsibility.

Such an institution is a product of volcanic transition. Yet, in their sharp departure from the older pattern, the war agencies present a trend everywhere in evidence. A score of forces move to separate the operating government from the popular sources of power. Divisions, bureaus, commissions are concerned with technical problems. It is not easy to translate their decisions into language which the layman can understand. Usually they move case by case; a policy may be set before its direction becomes generally apparent. Officials are prone to enlarge their authority and sanctions are sought to hide their discretion from critical scrutiny. There is a domain—though not a large one—where "military" or some like necessity may caution secrecy. But the excuse easily becomes a mask for irresponsibility; and the advantage it obtains is small compared with the utter demoralization it brings to public opinion. The official who presumes to withhold from the people what they ought to know is imitating the enemy he professes to fight. A slant to the news is perhaps unavoidable; but as a mark of artifice it becomes suspect. A great part of our current propaganda is ineffective. It seems to be designed to sell us something rather than to make articulate the aspirations of common men in this crisis. If the stream of intelligence does not flow, the democratic process cannot operate. Yet many things move to close or corrupt it and few to keep it open. The ancient glory of Congress flames most vividly in its power of inquiry. The critical work of the Bone, Murray, and Truman committees has exposed situations badly in need of surgery and brought to the people facts to which they are entitled. But such resources are inadequate. Congress cannot direct and supervise the whole structure of alphabetical agencies. And, as

matters now go, they are even further beyond the reach of the electorate.

In the election of 1942 the dilemma stands sharply out. Administration does not operate as representative government. The will of the people moves in one domain; the real questions of policy lie in another. It was the work of the various agencies about which men were concerned; it was the conduct of Congress which was taken to the polls. The people knew, at least vaguely, of the Knudsen fiasco, the great capital strike, the business deals with the Axis, the muddling of manpower, the trading with the enemy, the union of militancy and appeasement, the bungling in respect to oil, steel, aluminum, synthetic rubber. Yet they could not express resentment against the men who had blundered or betrayed; they could only blindly turn out Senators and Representatives who had little to do with it. The anomaly of a people's President, operating through key persons, between whom and himself there was mutual distrust, was made to order for the opposition. They were entrenched in power; yet, since responsibility lay with the Executive, they had a perfect alibi at the polls for all their mistakes. It has been said again and again that the election marks a swing to the right. *Fortune* magazine seems nearer the mark in holding it to be a rebuke to the President because he would not—or could not—purge. Should the people not be consulted about the men and measures which shape their destinies? And how else could they protest against being ruled by a group

whom they had rejected with their ballots?

The government moves into a new orbit; yet order and office have not followed. There is no easy way of getting real questions of policy—enlarging personal opportunity, ensuring the economy against breakdown, advancing the standard of life, laying the foundations of a durable peace—raised. And adequate answers can emerge only from an almost miraculous conjunction of unlike wills. In our order of society, agencies of control must be informed, considerate of interests involved, responsive to the public will. As the state changes in character, it occupies an area where the older safeguards do not operate. Our friends to the right, sensitive to the trend, have not been idle. They have attempted to move “independent agencies” under judicial, and away from popular, authority. And, as judicial review runs into difficulties, they set out to capture—or to sabotage—the new controls. The counter task, at which our liberals have made far less headway, is to contrive ways and means for subduing these agencies to the democratic process. A clash of President and Congress is a gallant sideshow; the breach which threatens disaster is between a popular executive and an operative government which the voters cannot reach. Unless “we the people” can make the industrial system the instrument of the general welfare, the dominant interests will take over the government. For the separation of state and economy is now gone.

Economic Position and Political Behavior

Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson

combine the disciplines of political science and economics. Mr. Anderson was executive secretary of the Temporary National Economic Committee and author of two monographs for that Committee, while Mr. Davidson served the TNEC as an economic consultant. Although demonstrating that no neat pattern of political conduct can be predicted on the basis of economic interest alone, the authors do demonstrate that "economic interest must be set down as one of the most powerful elements in political motivation." This selection from *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle* provides an important insight into another aspect of the relation between economics and politics, that of the relation of economic status to political action.

Interest in voting increases with recognition of a stake in government and the material circumstances of voters, as Harris found in a study of San Francisco registrants. Three distinct groups were examined. In the downtown lodginghouse district, made up almost entirely of poor people, single men, and foreign-born, only 56 out of every 100 eligible to vote were registered. Apparently almost half of these citizens were so little interested, or so unaware of their stake in government, that they failed to qualify to vote. In a middle-class residential district 72 per cent registered; while in a wealthy district 79 per cent of those eligible registered. The middle-class district registered about the same proportion of its eligible citizens as did the city as a whole, the wealthy district being somewhat above the average. But it cannot be held that the possession of varying degrees of wealth, or differing economic circumstances alone, were accountable for the different interest in government shown by these three groups, for had the inves-

tigation gone further it would undoubtedly have revealed differences in occupation, education, and culture also at work to contribute their share to the results obtained.

Perhaps an examination of retired persons will give a more precise measure of the relation of income received and political behavior. For them the imperative force of occupation has subsided, if not disappeared, and they are seldom among the most active leaders in public affairs. They are usually living out the twilight of their life span and are concerned primarily, so far as politics go, to prevent their savings and investments from being impaired by government action. In the electorate being studied intensively in this book, 3 per cent of all voters were retired persons. While 57 per cent of the entire electorate belonged to the conservative Republican party, 70 per cent of all retired persons were members of that party, showing influences connected with their status as retired persons accounting for 12 per cent more conserva-

From *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle*, by Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson. Copyright, 1943, by Stanford University Press.

tism than that of the general electorate in this relatively conservative community. Or, putting it another way, these retired persons exhibited registration in the Republican party 20 per cent above a chance relationship, less than half of which increase can be attributed to factors at work in the general electorate determining the party affiliation of all voters and more than half of which can be related directly to their status as retired persons. Economic stake undoubtedly looms large among such factors. Age itself is probably a factor, these old people having been traditionally Republican and refusing to leave the party despite changing economic conditions. But they are not so inflexible as their age might presume them to be; for as many or more of them shifted from the Republican to the Democratic party, or vice versa, between 1932 and 1934 as did active and younger members of the electorate engaged as business proprietors, managers, and officials. But it is the retired widow or spinster of means who shows most conservatism; for 81 per cent were Republicans, 31 per cent above a chance relationship, 24 per cent above the conditions prevailing in the general electorate which is associated with affiliation in the Republican party.

These data do not permit segregation of various economic influences which show the effect of income alone on political behavior, and it may well be that regard for property and what the government may do to it, as well as solicitude for earnings or incomes upon which these retired people live, determines their political behavior.

Political scientists have long been aware of a relationship between income stake and political behavior. Usually this expresses itself in a growing dissatisfaction, a change of party registration, and ultimately a vote which turns the presumably guilty incumbents out and lets the other

political party have a try at the accumulation of economic and social ills. Thus Bean noticed that in the nineteen business recessions since the Civil War the majority party in Congress lost seats 80 per cent of the time; even a 10 per cent decline in the nation's business was sufficient to lose the dominant party that proportion of Congressional places.

Rice concluded, after an exhaustive study of the relationship of the business cycle and voting in New Jersey covering the period 1877 to 1924, that in times of depression there was a drift in that prevailing Democratic state toward the Republican party, despite the powerful Democratic party machine with its entrenched leadership and numerous job holders.

While such studies establish the fact of a close affinity between income received and political behavior, they reveal little, if anything, concerning the way it operates, who is affected by such a belief in the power of government to alter general economic conditions, and who, on the other hand, go to the polls serenely undisturbed by any such ferment astir in the electorate. Nor do they establish the exact responsibility of government for economic cycles of prosperity or depression. In fact, Ayres came to the disturbing conclusion, after measuring business fluctuations back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, that prosperity and depression periods were about equally divided between Republican and Democratic administrations. Nor could distinguishable government policies of the two parties, presumably attacking economic issues from opposing viewpoints, be shown to be determinative of, or to have a causal connection with, the drift toward either depression or prosperity.

It seems reasonable to conclude from the available evidence that particular government policies may and do have direct effects on segments of the econ-

omy, such for example as the bearing of a tariff on the importation of a given commodity or the application of a particular tax to a specific form of wealth. But in the aggregate it appears that government policy has never been clearly of one purpose long enough, or of such economic magnitude, as in itself to account for the oscillations of the business cycle. Somehow the swings of the pendulum from prosperity to depression and back again have been due to economic forces upon which government policy may and does have a noticeable but not a decisive effect.

Surely, changes of administration never create wide enough departures from current practices to enable the voters to discern clearly that one party or the other is responsible for their economic condition.

Nevertheless many citizens believe they are actually determining their economic welfare through the ballot box. For many persons in moderate circumstances—those in the clerical and better-paid manual-labor occupations—the preservation of property, limitation of government spending, a small tax burden, and not too much government interference in economic matters seem desirable. This is also the substance of the economic program of persons in the upper income levels whose property stake in preserving the status quo is large. The affinity between the two is natural. So, in terms of actual economic stake, or presumed identity of purpose, many middle-class and upper-class persons have a common political cause. This is so well understood by both major parties that each makes a strong appeal to such voters and each counts in its leadership numerous persons from these classes of citizens.

Of late years it is true that with the increasing realization of the differences between them there has been an attempt by some Democrats to make the Republicans assume the role of the conservative

party, expressing only the desires of the upper middle class and the rich. But no major party which holds important power can afford, regardless of the cliques which control treasuries and policies, to be divorced from the mass of citizens whose stake in government is definitely not in the preservation of the status quo. Hence the Republican party, in self-defense, must make its contact with sufficient numbers in the electorate to insure a threatening opposition to the Democratic party. Either by an actual liberalization of its party platform or by successfully misleading the voters, it must show a regard for the economic circumstances of the electorate which will appeal to a substantial number among them, not only at the top of the income and property pyramid but down so far into it as to reach large populations of voters. Formerly, in a day dominated by planters, it was the Democrats who faced these necessities; and so the seesaw has gone back and forth between the two parties for generations. So it must continue under the two-party system.

But as economic realism grows, as the electorate becomes aware of its true stake in government, and the possibilities of using government as a positive and direct means of social improvement are realized, both parties must shape their courses more in terms of the realities; for "sound and fury" will avail less and less with voters who know what they want from government. They may be expected to look behind the façade built up to appear like their economic stake in government to ascertain precisely what their economic interest is and how it may be furthered.

Ogburn and Hill have made one of the few studies reported thus far which attempts to get at the relationship of economic status and voting. By using differences in rents, which correlate highly with individual incomes, they attained indirectly a measure of income and vot-

ing. By sampling Chicago, 39 small cities in Illinois, and 70 rural counties—thus attempting to rule out such other influences as those which derive from being foreign-born, from “wet” or “dry” prejudices, and from the Catholic religion—they concluded that the poorer communities voted more for Roosevelt, and the richer ones more for Hoover, because of their “economic status.” Moreover, they observed, this was not simply an expression of a party vote; for these people were not low renters because they were Democrats, but low rent, and hence low income, which it symbolizes, made them Democrats in the belief that their economic stake was best furthered by that party.

But while our studies show conclusively that the center of gravity in the Democratic party is within the manual-labor levels and that of the Republican party somewhere within the white-collar groups, no group is wholly identified with either party or recognizes its economic stake to be in one party exclusively. Forces which determine this economic stake are too diverse for that. There are men of the highest wealth and income in both parties, and conversely men of no wealth and little income in each party. The business interests of some capitalists require free trade; hence it is natural for them to be ardent Democrats. Conversely, some equally rich capitalists are dependent for their business success on high tariffs; and they naturally become Republicans. Both groups may see eye-to-eye in favoring or opposing other items in the agenda of the opposing parties; still their dominant self-interest and their particular economic stake cast them into opposing political camps.

But why people of no wealth and meager income should be arrayed against each other in opposing political parties is not so easily explained. Perhaps it cannot be explained in terms of their economic

stake at all but is the result of other factors—such as the failure of either major party to espouse their cause, subterfuge and chicanery in politics, ignorance of their true economic stake, the party tradition in which they were nurtured, their social surroundings, the influence of party bosses, and others.

However, the majority of people are beginning to grope their way toward a truer knowledge of the sources and relative size of their income, as judged by their choice of parties espousing their particular needs. In 1934, with the Republican party still standing for a return to “normalcy” via the rugged individualistic route proposed by Hoover, it was the Democratic party which undertook a whole series of social measures designed to benefit those receiving little or no income. That this was understood by the voters is shown in the registration for that year as compared with two years earlier—causing a shift in the county being examined here, one which has been predominantly Republican since the turn of the century, from 64 per cent of the electorate registered Republican to 56 per cent, the majority on all manual-labor levels swinging to the Democratic column. Not so the white-collar classes, who still clung to the Republican party as their means of political expression. Here is a cleavage within the electorate of a given community which shows the relationships of politics and presumed economic stake most clearly, for it was the disturbing influence of the depression which loomed largest of all possible factors causing change in party affiliation.

The relationship of real-property holding, party affiliation, and voting was examined in some detail in the investigation made at Santa Clara County. A sample was drawn of 9,936 registrants in 30 precincts from among the 250 whose property owners paid taxes on an assessed valuation of \$6,271,248. The

sample is regarded as representative of the entire electorate and the differing types of precincts in the county.

The 30 precincts were arranged in a descending order according to the median value of property owned and were blocked in three groups of 10 precincts each, distinguished as high-value, moderate-value, and low-value precincts. The high-value group contained precincts whose median property values ranged from \$1,450 to \$4,640. The moderate-value group consisted of precincts with median property values of from \$940 to \$1,425, the low-value group of precincts from \$530 to \$938. It is to be noted that these are assessed valuations, which fall considerably below half of the current market value of the properties in question. The types of property thus ranged upward from very small and cheap homes for those in the lowest group, through moderate acreages or homes in the moderate group, to larger acreages, business properties, or expensive homes in the highest group.

While each group is a third of the precincts, voters in the first ten own 62 per cent of all its property by value, those in the second group 26 per cent, and those in the third group have only 11 per cent. Thus, the three groups may appropriately be said to represent rich, moderate, and poor precincts. What proportion of voters in each of these voting areas own property? Here are the facts, housewives in joint ownership with their husbands or having husbands with property being included:

Precinct	Property Owners		Nonowners of Property	
	No.	% age	No.	% age
Rich (high)	1,699	48.8	1,785	51.2
Moderate	1,240	37.6	2,059	62.4
Poor (low)	934	29.6	2,219	70.4
All precincts	3,873	39.0	6,063	61.0

Aggregate figures on property owning intended to illustrate or prove the voters' stake in government are likely to conceal many important characteristics of that situation. For, while this representative sample of a large electorate reveals 39 per cent of them as real-property taxpayers, 61 per cent had no equities on record. Distinguishable voting areas in the same community show distinctly differing conditions of property ownership. In the precincts of high-median-property values approximately half of the voters own property, in the precincts characterized by more moderate property values slightly more than a third own property, while in the low-property-value precincts less than 30 per cent own property. The property stake of voters in these several precincts is quite unlike. Moreover, the assumption so often made that half or more than half of our people have a real-property stake in government is untrue. This is the condition prevailing in only the upper-class voting areas. Two-thirds of those living in what might be characterized as the "middle class" in the voting population have no real-property stake in government, while in the poor precincts 70 out of a hundred voters have no direct property stake in government.

It is votes which are counted on election day. So far as property stake could be expected to exert an influence, if voters in these representative precincts voted according to their ownership of property, nonowners of property would outvote property owners almost two to one. But the three groups of precincts would behave differently. The richest group of precincts contains 185 more voters than the moderate group, and 331 more than the poor precincts; but there are 459 more property-owning voters in the rich precincts than in the second group, and 765 more than in the third group. Conversely, the rich precincts contain 274 fewer non-owners of property than the moderate

group, and 434 fewer than in the poor precincts.

The method of grouping precincts into blocks of ten conceals certain important differences between individual precincts. Some measure of the extent of difference is shown in a comparison of the precinct having the highest total property value with that having the lowest. The richest precinct contains 379 registered voters, 60 per cent of whom own property assessed at \$580,000, or \$2,593 per owner. The poorest precinct contains 334 registered voters, only 18 per cent of whom own property assessed at \$31,300, in average holdings of \$516. Thus, with only 12 per cent more registrants but with approximately identical total populations the richest precinct has 73 per cent more property owners, who possess 94 per cent more property than those property owners living in the poorest precinct. In between these extremes range the other 28 precincts representative of the entire electorate being examined here. Manifestly, the property stake of voters differs widely in any electorate.

... It suffices for our purposes, in determining the effect of a property stake on voting behavior, to note that ownership of property is definitely linked with membership in the conservative party, regardless of the occupational group to which the voters belong. For all occupational groups from professional at the top down to semi-skilled laborers, despite the violent forces at work in California in the Sinclair upheaval of 1934, more than half who owned any real property, however much or little, remained registered in the Republican party. Only unskilled laborers deviated from this situation; but even among these voters lowest on the occupational, income, and property scale 46 per cent who owned property remained Republican as compared with 36 per cent who had no property stake in government.

There appears to be a substantial cor-

relation between property ownership and party affiliation, as revealed by the following summary:

Precinct	Percentage			
	Property Owners		Nonowners of Property	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Rich (high)	76.5	23.5	64.8	35.2
Moderate	64.7	34.3	50.6	49.4
Poor (low)	61.5	38.5	46.0	54.0
All precincts	69.4	30.6	53.1	46.9

In the 30 precincts 58 per cent were Republican and 40 per cent were Democratic. How property owners and nonowners compared with these percentages may be determined from the table. Thus in all precincts property owners as a group were decidedly more Republican than the electorate and nonowners were less so. Conversely, proportionately fewer property owners and more nonowners are Democratic than for the electorate under scrutiny. But the distinguishable blocks of precincts show varying degrees of party registration. About three-fourths of all property owners in the rich precincts are Republican, two-thirds of the property owners in the moderate precincts belong to that party, and slightly less than two-thirds of the property owners in the poor precincts are Republican.

For nonowners the same descending trend is noticeable; but here the proportion of Republicans drops considerably for all three groups of precincts, two of the three groups being less than the percentage Republican for the entire electorate. Among nonowners in the rich precincts about two-thirds are Republicans, in the moderate precincts half belong to that party, and in the poor precincts nonowners are somewhat less than half Republican.

The range of differences between property holders and nonholders is substantial, being 11.7 per cent for those living in the

rich group of precincts, 14.1 per cent for those in the moderate precincts, and 15.5 for those in the poor precincts. Thus, while residence in rich, moderate, or poor precincts of itself is related to party affiliation regardless of property stake in government, tending toward more Republican party registration for both owners and nonowners as the scale is mounted from poor through moderate to rich precincts, nevertheless, property ownership as such has a distinct influence on, or is clearly related to, whatever forces make for party preferences.

Once again it must be observed that treating the data as groups of precincts conceals the wide range of prevailing conditions. Thus in the poorest of the 30 precincts, with only 18 per cent of the voters owning property, 65 per cent of these owners and 43 per cent of the nonowners are Republican. Compare this situation with the richest precinct, where 60 per cent of the voters own property, 88 per cent of whom were Republican, and 72 per cent of the nonowners were also Republicans. It is obvious that merely owning property, or owning more or less property, does not determine with which party a voter will affiliate; but property ownership is correlated with membership in the Republican party—whether as a cause of such membership or as an associated factor is not indicated.

In the largest city of the county being studied here an election was held in 1934 to provide for the purchase of the city's water system from a private out-of-state corporation. This city is one of the very few large cities in California which does not own its water system. The issue had been agitated for years, and after prolonged debate in the city council, much space being given the matter in the two city dailies, revenue bonds were proposed to provide the funds needed to buy out the private owners. These owners, a New York group, immediately campaigned to

defeat the bond issue and retain their lucrative investment. They found ready allies in a group of citizens banded together in a taxpayers' league whose continued policy it had been to oppose all extensions of government which might in any way increase taxes. Through this local body, provided with ample funds, a vigorous campaign was conducted to oppose the bond issue. The proponents of that measure were private citizens having no large war chest and only a loose political affiliation.

The bond issue was defeated. But who defeated it is of interest here. It should be noted that the bonds were revenue bonds, and could never become a lien upon the city or the general taxpayers, being entirely mortgage bonds on the properties to be purchased. Proponents of the measure tried to make this clear; opponents tried to confuse the voters by saying that to vote bonds would make them liable for losses.

A sample of fourteen precincts in the city was drawn in order to picture adequately how variously circumstanced voters regarded this election. Here is how property owners and nonowners looked at it:

Group	Percentage	
	Registered	Voted
Taxpayers	37.2	47.6
Nontaxpayers	62.8	52.4

It must be remembered that this was a special election, highlighted by a particularly intense struggle. Yet only 52 per cent of all registered voters cast ballots on election day. Among those who did, property owners showed their concern over their property stake in government, either real or presumed; for 66 per cent of them went to the polls, as compared with only 43 per cent of all nonowners. Even so, the election could not

have been won by property owners if there had been a full vote, for they are only slightly more than a third of all voters in this city. It was the nonowners in whose hands the final decision rested, and they chose to vote down the water bonds. But with such a preponderance in voting strength, nontaxpayers do not show up so well in ballots cast. Property owners, although only a third of all qualified voters, cast almost half of all votes in this election.

Here was an election on a strictly economic issue, unencumbered by a vote for political offices. Consequently, it serves well as an example of the interest of variously circumstanced people in the same community. The issue was intended to make a stronger appeal to taxpayers than to nontaxpayers, for the propaganda sought to convince them that any failure of the public utility would increase their property taxes. Yet it cannot be assumed that the 23 per cent excess vote of taxpayers over that of nontaxpayers is entirely the result of their difference in economic stake in government. For, as has already been observed, most of these property owners are residents of the better sections of the community, are engaged in better-paid, more prestigious occupations, and are more sophisticated than most of the nonowners. Hence many factors are probably at work, influencing political behavior. The weight to be given economic stake as such in this particular election may be large, while in other general elections it may be relatively small. Even so, it must be regarded as a very real force in determining the attitude of the electorate.

It is probable that economic stake as such will loom much larger in political decisions as time passes, for the government is being brought much closer to the daily lives of most citizens. For one thing, the government is being called upon to do more things of concern to citizens.

California, for example, legislated into existence only 25 publicly administered functions when she became a state in 1850, and these were all that were required to operate its government during the first ten years of statehood. But by 1935, California exercised 116 state-wide functions. During the first ten years no state functions included business regulation, professional standards, parks, waterways, irrigation, public utilities, or highways. Today, all of these are being made the concern of voters and their elected representatives.

One needs no better proof of the economic stake in government of various groups in the community than the activities of pressure groups in legislative halls, and in administrative departments of city, county, state, and national governments. Here individuals and organizations who know that a single act of government or an administrative decision may make a substantial difference in the conduct of their businesses or their personal fortunes seek to exert pressure in their behalf. In doing so they develop elaborate plans and organizations, conduct year-round programs of pressure costing millions of dollars, and keep paid officials on the job lobbying or building up good public relations in all communities over the country to control public opinion and guide the action of voters. Much of this enormous activity is calculated to preserve the already great gains of particular groups or to increase them still further regardless of their effect upon the true interest of rank-and-file citizens.

In fact, it is probably due in considerable measure to the remarkably successful program of delusion and deception carried on by such political-pressure groups that the electorate is so little able to discern its real economic stake in government and continues either indifferent to or careless of political outcomes or fails to vote with any realistic conception of

what they are voting for. Lack of understanding is the breeding ground of confusion and indifference, making for political decisions on important issues being reached by a relatively small section of the electorate. A city election in Los Angeles in 1941, where the issue was strongly fought between reformers and bosses, was considered successful because it brought out the unusually high vote of about 45 per cent of the electorate. The 1930 state general elections in California were decided by the vote of 64 per cent of all registered voters, while that of 1938 was decided by 75 per cent of the registered voters.

We have just seen from the data on property owners and nonowners that indifference increases as the property stake of voters decreases. So, a recognition of an economic stake in government operates to increase the interest of persons in voting and in the outcome of elections. But it is not only taxpayers who have a direct economic stake in government. The motorist pays license fees to operate his car and is taxed directly for the gasoline he buys; as he speeds along the highway he is aware of the conditions of government-built and maintained roads, bridges, and crossings; he observes traffic signals put there by the government, and keeps a watchful eye on his speedometer for fear of running counter to the law in the shape of a motor cop. The income-taxpayer makes a formal and detailed accounting of his business affairs to the government periodically, and this is being extended to include an ever increasing number of all citizens. Hidden taxes extract sums from the purses of all who live in the country. During a crisis such as national defense, most families are made aware of the draft, of the government's economic program with its many well-paid jobs, the direction or control of production, limitation on civilian supplies, and attempts to control prices. During a period

of prolonged depression, again, many citizens who seldom give a thought to government make every effort to obtain aid for their businesses or themselves.

This growing economic interest in government, in good times or bad, is recognizable as a modern trend, inevitable as the control of the economy becomes centralized. Political realism presupposes that all voters become fully aware of their economic stake in government, to the end that they may influence its course in keeping with their rights as citizens in a democracy.

The picture which emerges from any detailed analysis of ownership of wealth in its various forms and receipt of the income derived from its use shows a favored few in possession of the great bulk of all wealth and receiving the greatest share of its product. There remain some in moderate circumstances who own wealth which gives them substantial returns. Then come the great mass of citizens, more than three-fourths of all, who own little if any wealth and are dependent almost entirely on their own labor for their maintenance.

There is a group in the working population, relatively high-salaried and in exceptionally good circumstances, somewhat less than 5 per cent of the labor force, spread throughout the country in charge of important business enterprise as managers and officials. They own relatively little of the equity in these enterprises but are in varying degrees of command over them, ranging from local managers of rigidly supervised chain retail store outlets on up to the officers of vast industrial empires. Their allegiance to their businesses is usually unswerving; they identify their life purposes with the profit-making success of these enterprises, having as much regard for them as if they really owned them. They are strategically located in one community after another over the land, influencing public opinion and

political action in behalf of the corporations they serve.

There are workers in business employment, below the level of managers and officials, who come into daily contact with their employers or with officials who represent employers. These foremen, clerks, secretaries, department heads, and assistants have only a job interest in the enterprises which employ them. But in a political sense their economic stake appears to them closely aligned with that of the managers and officials for whom they work and the corporations which employ them both. Many white-collar workers tend to reflect the employer's attitudes on political issues, and consider him justified in blaming the government when business is bad. They are sharply aware of this attitude when he declares that if the government doesn't change its policy so that business can pick up he will "just have to let some of his workers go." They are his executive lieutenants in impressing the businessman's viewpoint on their families, neighbors, and friends. Thus it is that so many voters in the white-collar group show a conservatism closely akin to that expressed by business proprietors, managers, and officials, although the incomes, standards of living, and economic stake of the two groups may be far apart.

But white-collar persons are not the only group in the electorate which fails to distinguish between its own and the economic stake of others with whom it has had historical affiliations. While it appears that the economic stake of all but a small group of capitalists, large farmers, and higher business officials is more and more directly affected by government itself, and the economic stake of this small population of well-to-do and wealthy citizens may be best furthered by an absence of more than the rudiments of government, there are many people in poor and moderate circumstances in all

walks of life who mistakenly assume that their lot is common with that of these upper economic levels.

Political belief and party affiliation for any large occupational group, such as farmers, white-collar workers, managers and officials of business, professionals, or manual laborers... is always divided. No group is wholly of one party or takes a single stand on any public issue. Within each group some are found to be right or left of the typical position. The possession and use of wealth is undoubtedly one of the major reasons for typical group-mindedness and for the deviations as well. It becomes more forceful as a political factor when information and experience accumulate to indicate clearly to the members of a group what their particular economic gain or loss from political activity may be.

Thus land ownership is becoming a forlorn hope for many who farm in the South and the Southwest, and is fast becoming so for many in the rich farming areas of the Middle and Pacific states. As these people learn by long experience that they are doomed to tenant or farm-labor status throughout their lifetime, some among them gradually break away from the farmer group-mindedness regarding the farmer's stake in government which focused upon the ownership of land. They begin to organize against farmers and the financial institutions which have secured title to the land they work for shares or wages. Here emerges a cleavage between farm operators and farm hands, in which the latter no longer consider that they have any stake in the soil beyond what work and wages yield them. The process is by no means rapid, but is of such dimensions as to give concern to politicians and officeholders, who see the farm vote breaking up into different and often antagonistic groups to whom no single appeal can be made.

What is happening among farmers is

also at work in every other group of voters. Thus in the professional class many doctors and lawyers, dentists, engineers, and high-grade technicians are no longer able to establish themselves independently, building up a personal clientele, accumulating profits from their efforts, and assuming places of independence in their communities. A hint of what is taking place is shown in the fact that 17 per cent of all physicians beginning practice in 1920 entered the employment of others, while ten years later 27 per cent did so. By 1930 the number of consulting engineers in private practice was less than 5 per cent of all engineers. For this important and expanding profession, working for business firms with the status of hired labor had become almost universal.

This does not mean that these professionals feel more kinship with labor than with management and owners of business. On the contrary, their training, association, higher incomes, and cultural attributes indicate a closer affinity with the upper classes of the business community. But, as unionism becomes respectable and as employed professional people sense the gains in status to be achieved through organization, they seek association with their fellows and establish organizations to wrest from employers favorable conditions of work and wages. Even such individualistic professions as acting and newspaper writing have yielded to this modern trend, resulting in the formation of the Screen Actors Guild and the Newspaper Guild. Here the members' purposes become like those of other workers, and a cleavage develops between professional technicians of all sorts and the managers of business enterprise.

The distinction between the economic stake of managers and owners of business and their white-collar employees is growing. Unions of clerks have sprung up, affiliated with the powerful labor unions of the nation. These and other unions of

the kind have a clearer understanding of the respective interests of each group in business. They are less inclined to serve as lieutenants for business operators in political policies which they feel do not favor their own self-interest. While some aspire to management or ownership of business, and hence demonstrate political attitudes and party affiliations similar to those of businessmen, more and more are becoming aware of the hazards of business and fewer have access to sufficient capital or credit to enter independent enterprise with any reasonable chance of success. The character of their lot is becoming clear to them, and it sets in motion self-examination and appraisals which foster a cleavage between themselves and their employers.

Within the business group itself are appearing distinct sub-groups, formed about the recognition of unlike stakes in government. Little Business and Big Business are distinguishable groups. They share general attitudes toward government, but are in opposing camps respecting many economic and political issues. The disadvantages of smaller enterprises with respect to capital and credit, market terminals, transportation rates and facilities, wholesale buying, advertising, and the pricing of commodities have forced them to turn to government as the means of strengthening their claims. Contrary to long-established habit, they even go so far as to advocate higher taxes, this time on their more powerful competitors, as a means of re-establishing competition. So insistent are their demands, so potent their voting strength, that the Congress has created special committees to aid them. As the concentration of economic power grows rapidly on all business fronts, these smaller businessmen make more urgent appeals for government assistance in their struggle for existence. This new economic division of the business community pits one segment against the other in the po-

litical arena and opens a breach which bids fair to widen until an erstwhile serene likemindedness more or less common to all business enterprises is completely shattered.

The extension of the civil service, which has finally superseded the spoils system in most states and dooms political spoils to eventual extinction, has altered the circumstances of public employees and officials. Under a strong civil service they are no longer the tools of politicians whom they must serve to retain their jobs. From being acutely aware of their economic stake as a government favor, they are now able to assume their places as free citizens, safeguarded by such measures as the Hatch Act. Along with many others who work for their living in jobs paying relatively small salaries, these public servants find it increasingly advantageous to join professional and labor organizations and to establish security of status in their own right. The results are already noticeable. Public servants no longer need change their party affiliation with every change in political administrations. Attempts to throw out holdovers from a previous administration in wholesale fashion are quickly and vigorously condemned by the public generally and opposed by the professional and labor organizations of public employees, whose strength is rapidly increasing.

The manual-labor masses, whose property stake in government ranges from small holdings of income property or a few shares of stock yielding small dividend payments for a very few among them, down to the great mass of relief and near-relief families at the bottom of the labor pyramid who own nothing, are learning that only a few among them succeed in attaining status as owners of property which insures them security and independence. But it is not easy to give up time-honored beliefs so widely fostered concerning the American way of life, whereby honest, diligent effort is always

rewarded by economic success. In the past, each oncoming generation has been forced to learn the fallacy of this belief for itself, and only late in its middle life has come the discouraging conclusion that institutional forces in society make for a degree of insecurity which only a few succeeded in evading. Now, with a better understanding of economic conditions, each generation is acquiring this information earlier, and is organizing to achieve a measure of security and independence from a relentless and impersonal economic system through political means. The manual-labor levels, perhaps more than any other group in the electorate, and more particularly the semiskilled and skilled workers, are daily learning how potent a tool the ballot is in determining their economic well-being.

The stake of a growing number of citizens from many walks of life increases as government ownership of property and management of enterprise increases. The Tennessee Valley Authority project and kindred enterprises mark a sharp departure from the past. Government competition with private business in peacetime focuses attention of many people on the role of public property in the national economy. In wartime the complete rule of government over private enterprise further highlights, if only momentarily, the stake of workers in their government.

It seems fair to conclude that within the better-circumstanced groups in the electorate there is a minority which turns to government for aid, the majority considering too much government a threat to their favored economic and social status. On the other hand, the "little people," as they become increasingly conscious of the growing concentration of economic power in the hands of a few, as they experience frustration in their attempts to achieve independence and security on their own, inevitably turn to the government for aid. To this vast majority of all citizens

the government now assumes the role of economic savior. It alone can place adequate restraints on rapacious economic groups, curbing their monopolistic tendencies, requiring a more equitable division of the product of industry. It alone can provide benefits on a basis of need, can establish social security without favoritism. It alone can adopt those measures which will make such provision for the future that all disadvantaged groups in the population may achieve a decent standard of living and share in the cultural heritage of the nation. Consequently, to all except a relatively few among us, government's economic role has grown enormously and our particular economic interests in government become more clearly recognized.

But there is no neat collection of scientific data on the self-interest of various groups in the electorate, their party affiliation and voting. As was shown in the first chapter of this book, the forces behind the ballots are numerous. At one time one set seems dominant, at

another time another. Usually no single force decides political behavior. It is therefore unlikely except for a few voters, that economic interest is operating as a single isolated and controlling factor, even when that interest is clearly recognized by the voters concerned. Such conditions make it exceedingly difficult to evaluate objectively the force of strictly economic motivation in political life, all the more so when very many voters cannot or do not recognize their particular economic claims upon government and continue to show apathy toward them or actually to vote against them.

Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence is such that, in general, economic interest must be set down as one of the most powerful elements in political motivation. Politics is "not mere sound and fury, a futile game in which the prime consideration is to get the right man and the right slogan. Certainly from the beginning to the end economic realities as substantial as capitalism and agriculture have been behind the party battle."

8

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS

I

It would be difficult to exaggerate the impact of technology on government. Virtually every new technological innovation has resulted in an expanding demand upon government. Each new application of scientific discovery has required some adaptation of institutions, procedures, and practices. The rise of the scientific method and of a technology stemming from it constitutes a dynamic force which produces constant modifications in our society. Technology has modified our institutions, our economics, our politics, our ethics, our religion, and it has compounded our problems of social living.

For example, in the United States transportation technology has had both direct and indirect influence upon government. Steamboat navigation resulted in demands that government agencies inspect steamboats, provide navigation aids, issue pilots' licenses, finance river and harbor construction, and provide a score of similar services. In addition it produced conflict between the Federal and state governments until the Supreme Court gradually clarified the responsibility and jurisdiction of the Federal government for control of commerce and navigation. Every advance in transportation techniques, from the railroad to the airplane, has been accompanied by a corresponding expansion of activity at all levels of government. The expanded scope of government activity has included the construction of transportation facilities; subsidy to private transportation companies in the form of land grants, mail contracts, or tax concessions; and the development of regulatory agencies to determine rates, establish safety requirements, provide against discrimination, and protect citizens dependent upon these commercial facilities.

Not only do these technological changes call for new public controls, but they actually produce new techniques in government. For example, W. F. Ogburn and S. C. Gilfillan have listed the effects of the radio telegraph and telephone and radio broadcasting on government and politics. The government was forced to assume a new regulatory function, as witness the creation of the

Federal Communications Commission. In law a new specialization is required, and legal questions, starting with the right to designated wave lengths, must be resolved. It may alter the relation between executive and legislature if the former is able to bring popular pressure to bear on the legislature through direct radio appeals to the voters. Political campaigns are modified by the ability of candidates to reach larger audiences, and constituencies are kept in closer touch with the work of nominating conventions. It is even possible to develop a public "personality" as government officials make use of radio facilities and appear less distant and more familiar to the voters.

It should be emphasized that the very nature of technology demands organization, which in turn subjects the individual to private controls, frequently more imperative and direct than those of government. It was this aspect that Bertrand Russell had in mind when he remarked that "one regrettable feature of scientific civilization as hitherto developed . . . [is] the diminution in the value and independence of the individual. Great enterprises tend more and more to be collective, and in an industrialized world the interference of the community with the individual must be more intense than it need be in a commercial or agricultural regime." Technology places huge reservoirs of power in private hands. It increases the ability of a few individuals to coerce masses of people, as does the very nature of the industrial system.

Because technology demands huge capital investment, a social invention, the corporation, arose as a device for minimizing individual responsibility while enabling many small amounts of capital to be pooled. The growth of huge impersonal corporations actually came to represent a challenge to the sovereignty of the government. Furthermore, the large concentrations of wealth and capital made possible by the corporate form of business enterprise, and demanded by the nature of the technological process, upset the free market as an automatic regulator of economic affairs and thus destroyed the basis for a policy of nonintervention by government in economic and social matters. With the market mechanism no longer adequate as a basis for continued economic prosperity, citizens commonly turned to government for relief and protection with the result that an Interstate Commerce Commission or a Federal Trade Commission, was created, and antimonopoly laws, pure food and drug laws, or measures to protect investors were enacted by the Federal and state governments.

A fairly persistent shifting of power away from local and state governments to the Federal government has paralleled technological progress. Centralization of political power at higher levels of government has been a natural result of the expansion of gigantic corporations and the obsolescence of previous notions of local self-government and states rights by modern techniques of production and distribution. With technology making possible mass production and, necessarily, mass markets, state lines bear little relation to the facts of modern industrial economy. Indeed, there is general agreement that only the application of technology to transport and to communication has made possible the continued existence of a great continental federal power. Surely it would be difficult

to visualize Pacific coast states being effective members of the Union were it not for the fast train and airplane service and efficient means of communication. No one would suggest today that it was distance alone which made consideration of Hawaii as a participating state impractical. Thus technology has conquered space so effectively that Maine is more intimately bound to California today than was Boston with Philadelphia when the Federal government was established.

Technology has produced countless scores of problems which, in a democratic society, inevitably are reflected in demands upon government. Adam Smith had assumed that consumers would know their economic interests and follow them, but bewildered by a vast array of new goods produced for wide markets the consumer turned gradually to public agencies to protect him against adulteration and harmful products. Furthermore, with the advance of technology has come mass unemployment, periodic depressions, industrial accidents, rapid and wasteful exploitation of resources, and various devices for manipulating patent rights in order to establish monopolistic controls. All of these manifestations have multiplied the demands upon government.

The impact of technology is apparent not only in government but also in all other segments of society. Certainly it is obvious that technology has drastically altered the function of the home, with corresponding implications for the school and church. For example, with the introduction of complex machines and new processes and materials, work required less physical strength, with the result that more women and children left the home to work in factories and additional demands were made upon government to regulate hours of work, enforce safety laws, and establish adequate health and protective measures.

Technology ultimately produces a profound change in the mores of a society, and it may actually effect a revision of ideology. Certainly Jefferson was thinking of democratic procedures as applicable in a society characterized by small independent producers. He had doubted that the democratic ideology would suffice in an industrialized society where organization inevitably meant the loss of individuality and economic independence. On the other hand, conflicts may arise within society just because ideologies and mores do not change rapidly enough to keep up with a dynamic technology. In recent times the *laissez-faire* doctrine has been thoroughly discredited, even as an article of faith, because it obviously provides no adequate philosophy for government in an age characterized by constant technological advance. But it took a severe depression with prolonged unemployment before the glaring inadequacy of the doctrine was commonly recognized. And during the intervening period class antagonisms were intensified, faith in democratic procedures was challenged, and some permanent scars were left in American society.

Possibly the most significant aspect of technological society concerns the increasing doubt expressed by some as to the ability of even the most intelligent, well-educated citizen to participate effectively in decisions involving highly technical, specialized information. Perhaps a democratic society must seek to

develop new procedures and instrumentalities which will reflect popular demands as to ultimate goals, but rely for implementation of policy upon a responsible administration. For the American citizen it suggests a reconsideration of political procedures in an effort to achieve political responsibility on the part of parties and leaders.

II

One of the key problems of our times is the problem of the proper use and control of science. In dramatic fashion the American people have learned what science can do in wartime, but we need to acquire a keener appreciation of its peacetime potential. World War II focused attention upon the intimate and direct relationship between government and science. Until that time basic research in science had received relatively little stimulus from the Federal government, save for special research projects, usually initiated on occasions when a national emergency provided the needed incentive to act.

Science itself is neither good or bad; it is a body of knowledge, a method, and a tool which may be used for socially desirable ends, or to destroy man. How it is used is ultimately a social and political question. We have seen that it may be harnessed to "the sovereign assassin," or, applied as technology in our industrial system without proper controls, it may intensify economic crises and contribute to that modern misery of mass unemployment. "The challenge of science is fundamentally a result of the new opportunity for social progress that is now at hand. Science and technology," according to Kirtley Mather, "have leveled all physical barriers to the good life of universal freedom." From now on, "it is man, not nature, that enslaves." There are no technical barriers to prevent significant democratic social progress.

In partial recognition of this fact there are today in practically every field of natural science research programs being developed by the Federal government or under its auspices. At least sixteen Federal departments, agencies, or commissions are involved in a program which in 1947 required a nine-fold increase in the expenditure of public funds over the 1940 allotment.

What has hitherto been the relation and the concern of government with science? Without attempting to provide a complete statement of the historical relationship, it may be recalled that as early as the 1830's the Federal government employed the Franklin Institute of Pennsylvania to conduct research in the problem of oiler explosions in steam vessels. After that period government departments were inclined to develop their own experimental laboratories. But it was in the field of agriculture that extensive government efforts to apply scientific discoveries were early and most commonly made. In 1862 the Morrill Act was passed establishing funds for land-grant colleges in the states to encourage the development of agricultural and mechanical arts. In 1875 Connecticut opened the first agricultural experiment station, and in 1887 the Hatch Act was enacted by Congress to provide an experiment station in every state that had an operating land-grant college. The importance of government assistance

to these programs was further emphasized in 1862, when the then Bureau of Agriculture was given status as a Department and specifically authorized "to acquire . . . all information concerning agriculture . . . by practical and scientific experiments." Therefore, during the next few years a variety of great bureaus were organized, all occupied with conducting research into problems faced by American agriculture. For example, the Bureau of Animal Husbandry devised techniques for controlling the tick, a parasitic pest which had cost cattlemen millions of dollars in damage to their livestock; the Bureau of Plant Industry imported more than 30,000 new varieties of plants into the United States and developed production techniques which tremendously increased the yield per acre. In 1894 the Carey Act, designed to encourage state projects in arid regions, was passed, only to be supplemented by Federal government action in 1902 as a result of state failure to meet the problem.

Congress also created, in 1863, the National Academy of Sciences which was intended to conduct research and experimentation whenever requested to do so by a Department of the government. A provision was made to provide adequate funds for such research projects, but the Academy never actually received any direct appropriations from Congress, although it did occasionally receive funds from an agency directly concerned with a specific problem.

After the outbreak of World War I Congress created on March 3, 1915, a National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. This body was directed to study the problems involved in flight and to conduct related research in aeronautics. At first it was primarily occupied with military aviation, but in 1925 its program was expanded to include civil aviation. Today, "it is probably the largest single organization in the world devoted entirely to research in problems of flight." It is presently composed of some fifteen members who receive no government compensation, but who represent the Departments of Commerce, Army and Navy, the Weather Bureau, the Smithsonian Institute, the Bureau of Standards, and others who are familiar "with the needs of aeronautical science, either civil or military, or are skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences." This was the first major effort by the Federal government to support research in a nonagricultural field, and according to the President's Scientific Research Board, "there is not an airplane flying today which does not bear the work of NACA research. Cowlings for air-cooled engines, airfoil sections, control surface shapes and sizes, propeller designs—all these and many other devices and designs have been predicated on the research information that has come from the NACA laboratories."

In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson requested the National Academy of Sciences to organize the National Research Council as a means of furthering national defense preparation. This Council proved unsuccessful as a device for bringing the resources of government to the aid of scientific development.

Perhaps illustrating the impact of catastrophe on social innovation, it was World War II that decisively brought positive government action to further scientific research. In June 1940, the National Defense Research Committee

was created. It included such nationally known scientists as Vannevar Bush, James Conant, Karl Compton, Richard Tolman, and Frank Jewett. Becoming the Office of Scientific Research and Development in June 1941, this organization had full responsibility for mobilizing the scientific resources of the nation for defense. Operating directly under the President's supervision, OSRD received funds from Congress for carrying out its directives. It entered into more than 2200 contracts for research projects involving expenditures of over \$500,000,000 for radar, antisubmarine devices, proximity fuses, surgical sponges, antimalarial drugs, and a score of other items essential to a nation at war. The OSRD created no new government laboratories but instead relied upon contracts with universities, nonprofit organizations and, to some extent, industrial laboratories.

In his report to President Truman in July, 1945, Vannevar Bush proposed the formation of a postwar National Science Foundation to provide government funds for the support of basic scientific research in academic and nonprofit institutions. This was a reflection of the fact, recently pointed out by Harrison Brown, that "American science is in grave danger of suffering from stagnation, decay, and eventual death. If those who guide the destinies of our country do not soon learn the 'scientific facts of life' our science will go the way of German science." It is not enough to concentrate on the immediately practical, for we have been too long exploiting our reserve of basic scientific knowledge. Basic or fundamental research is research without any immediate or specific practical result. To an extent not realized by laymen, our wartime exploits in radar, electronics, and atomic energy involved drawing upon a reservoir of fundamental research which had accumulated over a period of years as the result of brilliant contributions by scientists in every country. Because no immediate profit is returned from this basic research it has traditionally been centered in the universities, rather than in industrial laboratories, although industry has sometimes supported it through fellowships and grants to universities. "Industry is generally inhibited," according to Vannevar Bush, "by preconceived goals, by its own clearly defined standards, and by the constant pressure of commercial necessity." The war period, then, was one of intensive exploitation of already acquired basic knowledge. But it was also a period of lag in adding to our store of fundamental knowledge. It is this fact that concerns American scientists and leads them to urge active government assistance and support for a thoroughgoing national program of scientific development.

In recognition of this situation, President Truman recommended to Congress the establishment of a Federal agency to stimulate and co-ordinate scientific research. Recognizing the need for pushing back the frontiers of science and realizing that only nonprofit organizations can devote the required time to basic research, scientists agree that Federal funds must subsidize this work. It is also clearly understood by most scientists that it will require Federal provision of scholarships and fellowships if an adequate force of trained scientists is to be developed in the United States. The result thus far has been the passage

by the Senate, in May, 1948, of the National Science Foundation Act. This body when established will have the responsibility of developing a national research program for basic research, conduct experimental work for national defense, and grant scholarships and fellowships to provide a pool of trained, competent scientific personnel.

In 1947 "expenditures for research and development in the physical and biological sciences by the agencies and departments of the Federal Government amounted to approximately \$625 million." This amount does not include expenditures of the Atomic Energy Commission. Less than one third of this \$625 million was spent in Federal laboratories, although the bulk of nonmilitary research is conducted by the great laboratories of the various Departments. The Army and Navy spent five-sixths of the total expenditure and most of these funds were paid to universities or industrial laboratories.

A major problem today involves provision for the formulation of a general policy so that government may encourage research along definite lines. Many vitally important questions demand attention: What proportion of available resources of material and manpower should be allotted to basic research and to development? What share should be allocated to electronic research, atomic research, medical research, etc.? What should be the patent policy for developments made by men working with public funds? How are we to resolve the problem of security, military control, with the kind of freedom which scientific progress demands? What exactly should be the government's responsibility for encouraging the development and the use of science in the public interest?

In this connection it may be well to ponder the significant omission by Congress of the social sciences, either in the investigation of our scientific research resources, or in the assistance program of the projected National Science Foundation. It has already been noted that the proper utilization of scientific knowledge is fundamentally a social and political problem, to be resolved through political action. Testifying before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Dr. D. W. Brock of the National Research Council commented, "I cannot think of any field of research in physical science which does not ultimately lead, and usually very promptly, to new social problems. . . . It is important, therefore, that competent social scientists should work hand in hand with the natural scientists, so that problems may be solved as they arise, and so that many of them may not arise in the first instance." For example, the social scientist would be concerned with Professor Paul Sears' warning that we have thus far concentrated upon "the kind of science which speeds up the production of things from resources—the elaboration of consumers' goods that can be sold." While at the same time "we have been far less concerned to use science to safeguard the natural resources from which goods must continue to be produced." Studying the implications of such a book as Fairfield Osborn's *Our Plundered Planet*, the social scientist will ask whether individualism and profit seeking provide adequate safeguards for the public interest in our remaining resources. He will ponder Mr. Osborn's observation that "appro-

priations of the Federal Government towards conservation purposes of every nature—soils, forests, wildlife, water control, reclamation projects, and others—are less than 1 per cent of our present annual budget . . . a fraction of what is needed to protect the basic elements of our nation's present and future strength."

What is needed is a science to make use of the knowledge which research has made available. This is a proper function for a social science and until the responsibility is accepted scientific discoveries may result in haphazard exploitation and consequent suffering, rather than in constant improvement of living standards for all peoples.

It is the function of the student of politics to be concerned with the goals of a democratic people, to learn from the scientist whether such goals are feasible and, if they are, how they may be attained. He is concerned with the control of government, the determination of public policy, and its effective implementation. Thus in the realm of science, it is not enough that a broad program be developed to provide direct financial assistance and a coherent, integrated national science policy. There must be an awareness that the expenditure of public funds for research facilities and scholarships presents an obligation. It becomes a responsibility of government to make certain that the science it sponsors is utilized on behalf of the nation. Public policy must be concerned to guarantee that research projects are undertaken which meet the needs of American society, whether in adding to our fund of basic science, improving the health of our people, or in making certain that national resources are used for national ends. A modern democratic government must equip itself with trained personnel devoted to the common welfare and able both to distinguish and defend the public interest.

Therefore, in working with the natural scientist in developing a national program for our scientific growth, the social scientist may recall the finding of the Temporary National Economic Committee's monograph that "... corporations have marshaled behind them the bulk of the scientific brains of the country, a resource which labor, farmers, and government itself cannot equal. In the contest for government control, applied science is so weighty that it tips the scales in favor of business. . . . The control over applied science which business holds is the key to the explanation of its dominant position in the process of government. . . . For the student of politics and government [this] ranks as a primary factor of highest significance. Interested as he is in innovations affecting the ability of government to use effectively the power of the State, he must recognize the invention of the art of invention as a political factor of primary importance." He may want to join Robert Lynd in asking, "Whose government? And which research?"

Technology and Governmental Change

William F. Ogburn, professor of the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, suggests that scientific discovery and mechanical invention interact with social invention to produce social change at a rate unknown to older societies. He indicates here how technology operates through other institutions and forces change on government. What is a social invention? Why is there a lag between the introduction of technological innovations and the social adjustment demanded? What is the role of courts and law in resisting change? How does the introduction of social insurance illustrate the impact of technology?

That social changes are rapidly taking place today is a truism. The daily newspapers carry cartoons proclaiming it. Moving-picture films illustrate it. Why is the social current moving so rapidly; why is the torrent so much disturbed? It was not always this way. Among isolated primitive peoples, the years that come and go are very much the same. A mother knows that her granddaughter will be doing about what her own grandmother did. No doubt such a relatively static condition existed among the Europeans of prehistorical times. But today no mother can predict five generations ahead what her offspring will be doing.

The volume of rapid social change is the outstanding, basic fact of modern times. No field of social life escapes its influence. No social phenomenon can be discussed without considering it.

Why is there so much social change today and so little in ancient times? The most probable answer, the result of quite extensive study, is mechanical invention and scientific discovery. There is no doubt that useful inventions and researches cause social changes. Steam and steel were major forces in developing our extensive urban life. Gunpowder influenced the decline of

feudalism. The discovery of seed-planting destroyed the hunting cultures and brought a radically new form of social life. The automobile is helping to create the metropolitan community. Small inventions, likewise, have far-reaching effects. The coin-in-the-slot device changes the range and nature of salesmanship, radically affects different businesses, and creates unemployment. The effects of the invention of contraceptives on population and social institutions is so vast as to defy human estimation. It is obvious, then, that social changes are caused by inventions.

Not everything new, of course, comes from mechanical invention. There are social inventions, also, as, for instance, proportional representation, social insurance, the holding company, and the League of Nations. Some social changes originate then from social inventions. Social inventions may have been precipitated by mechanical invention, as, for instance, the Interstate Commerce Commission was caused by the railroads. The connection between the social invention and the mechanical is not so close in the case of the juvenile court, which results from changes in the urban family due in

turn to the mechanical forces that produced city life. Some social inventions are so far removed from mechanical invention that any connection is scarcely discernible. Such would be the case with the invention of the parole of prisoners. On the other hand, some social inventions cause mechanical inventions. Thus a sales tax may bring out a new token money. A zoning law, as in New York, may force architectural devices to be used to modify the skyline; or an antinoise campaign may cause the invention of a rubber horseshoe used in connection with milk wagons on early morning deliveries.

Indeed, the more one studies the relationship between mechanical and social invention, the more interrelated they seem. Civilization is a complex of interconnections between social institutions and customs, on the one hand, and technology and science, on the other. The whole interconnected mass is in motion. When each part is in motion and banging up against some other part, the question of origins seems artificial and unrealistic. If one pushes the question to the extreme, origins are lost in a maze of causative factors.

The analysis can be carried further and clarified more, but at a cost of time. Such an effort would be beyond the scope of this paper. It may be said, however, that new contributions in technology and science are more accumulative than new contributions to customs and social institutions. And the bigger the accumulation of technology, the more probably there will be a greater number of new inventions. So in the course of time a great technology has developed, accompanied by an enormous number of inventions which occasion social changes. But it is not necessary to accept completely such an analysis for the purpose of this paper. All that it is necessary to admit is that there are a very large number of inventions and patents every year, and that many of these cause social change.

If an invention causes social change, then the invention must come first. Sometimes the consequent social change may come very quickly, almost immediately. Thus consolidated rural schools followed shortly after the coming of good roads and the automobile. In other cases, the social changes follow very slowly, requiring a century or more. As an illustration, the general property tax, that is adapted to a system of agriculture where property is visible, has persisted for a century after inventions increased greatly the proportion of our property that is tangible and rendered the general property tax unjust and inadequate. One may say, therefore, that technology moves forward and the social institution lags behind in varying degrees.

As to why so much time elapses between a technological development and the social changes it causes, there are a great variety of reasons, only one of which will be mentioned now. It is that the contact of the social institution with the technology is not direct but takes place through a varying number of intermediaries. A change in *A* will not effect a change in *D* directly but must effect a change in *B* first, which then changes *C*, which in turn reaches *D*. Time is required for such a process of change. Thus the invention of the elevator increases the number of homes in apartment houses which leads to increased density of population, which tends to lower the birth rate, which sets free more of a married woman's time, which finally increases the number of women employed outside the home. It takes some time, therefore, for the invention of the elevator to affect the employment of women, or otherwise to spend its force as one social change after another is affected.

A very common pattern is for the technological change to effect first an economic organization which, second, causes a change in some social institution, such

as the family or government, and which finally causes a change in the social philosophy of a people. Thus technology brings the factors which take occupations away from the home, which cause a loss of other functions of the family, such as caring for the old, which cause the government to provide old-age pensions, which in turn tend to weaken the social philosophy of *laissez faire*. It is not claimed that such a process is universal, has been true in all history or prehistory, or that there are not other different social processes. All that is claimed is that observation shows such a process to be fairly common today. Observations of the phenomena of the social change of modern times also reveals that governmental institutions are often the third link in this four-chain sequence, to wit, technology, industry, government, social philosophy. The statement of sequence is an elaboration of the theory of the economic interpretation of history, made by placing a technological factor before the economic factor. The economic interpretation of history really is a technological interpretation of history.

This theory then means that technology through the media of other institutions is forcing changes in government if we may focus our attention on that particular institution. It follows also that changes in government come later than the precipitating technological changes. Our interest may now be turned to the question of how much later do changes in government occur, and is such a delay a serious matter? These questions may best be pursued by considering some illustrations.

That governments are slow to change is shown by a consideration of county government. In the early history of the United States, where the great majority of the population followed farming as an occupation, when cities were rare and villages many, the county was a very significant unit of government. The size

of the county was a convenient one, having been laid out in terms of the horse and buggy and the inferior roads of the time. The distance of chief concern was that to the county seat, where the courthouse was located. The taxation base was largely farm wealth, and since the family of that time performed so many social functions, what the government did was not extensive. The social services were not developed very much at the time, and county government was not expensive.

But the situation became changed because of the factory and because of the transportation inventions. The effect of the factory was to differentiate the sources of wealth and concentrate it in cities, particularly the intangible forms of property. At the same time the factory transferred many governmental functions, formerly exercised by the family, over to various agencies of local government, thus increasing the cost. The county government became unable to meet modern problems, and as a government drifted into a subsidiary position among the various other forms. At the same time the automobile and the steam locomotive were perfected, which made it theoretically possible for a county government to serve a much larger area as readily as it served in earlier days its present area. If the county were, say, ten times its present area, it would have a much wider base for raising revenue, a very important matter. The situation is further illustrated by a comparison with the wards of a city. One would not recommend that each ward of a city have a separate government financed from funds raised only from within the boundaries of the ward. The poorer wards would not be able to supply their own governmental needs. With the changed methods of transportation counties are now somewhat like the wards in the preceding illustrations. The expense of trying to maintain so many county offices in a state of efficiency is a burden on the taxpayer which could

be alleviated by consolidating counties, as was done with rural schools.

Technology thus brings about a condition where fewer and larger counties are needed. But the county government does not change to keep pace with the advancing technology. This delay is quite long and costly. In a severe depression, such as we have just experienced, it is a very serious handicap.

This resistance of a social pattern to change is so common that social scientists have given it a scientific name, "cultural inertia." Boundary lines between counties and states are peculiarly resistant to modification. Boundary lines of cities also are difficult to enlarge, but less so. If the boundary lines of counties are not changed so that a number of them may be consolidated, the governmental functions will tend to leave the county and go to units with a larger tax base, such as the state and the nation.

A governmental pattern that is very inert may persist so long that it loses all its old functions and takes on an entirely new set. Such is the case with the persistence of the Monroe Doctrine, which has a different function from what it had a century ago.

The government of peoples within the present areas of counties will have to make some kind of adjustment to meet the new technological situation. Certainly the technological situation is not going to be changed backward to make an adjustment to an unchanged county. So there will be an adjustment in one way or another. But the question is, How costly will be the delay, how inefficient? The longer the delay, the greater the cost, the more inefficiency there will be the more maladjustment will result.

A somewhat similar illustration, but less obvious, is the selection of representation for legislative assemblies. The basis of selection in this country is geographical, which was quite appropriate at the time

the assemblies were set up, for differences were largely geographical. Distances were great and communication undeveloped. Andrew Jackson fought the Battle of New Orleans three weeks after the War of 1812 was over and the treaty signed. He had not heard the news. The relative isolation of different districts meant that customs, manners, interests, and even dialects developed peculiar to different localities. But transportation, communication, and advertising have greatly changed these differences. The newspapers are surprisingly alike as one travels from Atlantic to Pacific. Towns and cities show the same advertising, and the store windows the same displays.

Meanwhile, other technologies have differentiated society into a vast number of occupation and interest groups: laborers, farmers, bankers, cotton growers, the foreign-born, the professions, etc. Formerly, nearly everyone was a farmer. Society has become more alike horizontally, so to speak, but vertically more differentiated. Yet, the basis of representation is still geographic in this country. The logical step to take, it is thought, would be to give representation to the interest groups. But the governmental patterns stay fixed. We have, then, a changing technology with consequent changes in economic and allied institutions, but a rigid governmental structure. What happens? In this case legislative lobbies, affording some sort of representation to these special interests, grow up outside the formal structure of constitutional government. Indeed, they have been called the third house. They are not recognized officially, as in Italy and in Russia. This sort of roundabout adjustment has led some observers of the governmental process to think that a flexible people with ingenuity can make any governmental structure work. According to this attitude, it doesn't make any difference what kind of a governmental structure we have; the right spirit in the

people will make it click. This conclusion is only grossly true in wide limits. It simply means that the people will have some kind of government. But if we make more refined observations on degrees of adjustment and maladjustment, it would seem to be clear that a more flexible governmental structure would enable a happier adjustment to a rapidly changing technology which goes its own way without having to make adjustments to government.

The slowness of governmental structure to change is quite impressive as one studies the situation, at least so far as the United States is concerned in the course of its brief history. A very simple illustration of quite a minor character was accidentally observed recently in noting the comparisons of characteristics of rapidly growing cities and with those of cities with declining populations. The number of police per unit of population was quite consistently less for the rapidly growing cities and greater for the cities with a declining population. Why does a rapidly growing city have fewer police than a declining one of the same size? Quite probably, when the budget is made up for the coming year, the estimates are based on the known past rather than on a problematical increase (or decline) of population. Furthermore, policies in regard to tenure of office may be against the practice of dismissals, and possibly of increases of staff. But no matter what the reason, the government does not change quickly enough in increasing or decreasing the numbers of police to adjust to population changes. Again it may be noted that population increases or decreases of cities are due largely to economic changes, as has often been shown; and these in turn rest on technology.

One of the most important sources of extensive changes in government is the decline of the family. Let us consider more fully this relationship, since it is not gen-

erally appreciated by students of political science or by students of sociology. The major changes in the family organization are due to technology. The steam engine as a source of power was too large for the dwelling house with its home industries, and the larger buildings that were built over them were called factories. Spinning, weaving, furniture production, soap production, medicine making, canning, baking, tailoring, sewing, laundering, followed the steam engine into the factory. When these economic functions were in the home, the family as an institution regulated and controlled industrial production and the conditions of labor. But with the transfer of production to the factory, industrial conditions were uncontrolled for quite a time by any outside institution, but later the state took over certain regulations, such as those dealing with child labor, accidents, working conditions, and hours of labor, which were formerly handled by the family. Whether government in exercising such regulations has made a satisfactory adjustment to this loss of economic functions by the family will be questioned by many persons who protest the existing order. There are those who argue that the Supreme Court still blocks the proper adaptation, and it may also be argued that the persistence of old boundaries to local governing areas delays a proper adaptation on the part of government to an industry that has sprawled over state lines. But most everyone will agree that the government delayed much too long in shortening the hours of labor of children and in general in preventing the excesses of unregulated industrialism.

With the loss of the economic functions from the family, there was a corresponding loss in other correlated functions. A very good illustration is the protective functions exercised by the family over its members. For instance, the police now afford families a protection once rendered by the adult males of the family with

their sword. So also the family's recognized obligation was to protect their children. Yet in many families under the condition of life in the city's slums, where mothers are wage earners, and where gangs thrive, the protection of children is shifted to governmental agencies, such as juvenile courts, reform schools, playground directors, and day nurseries. So, also, caring for the old was almost exclusively a family function before the modern technological development, except in those accidental cases of badly broken kinship groups among the very poor, when the county poorhouse was provided. But now the transportation system scatters the members of the family groups to the different corners of the nation. The invention of contraceptives means that often there are no children to care for the old. The factory system brings more mobility of labor over longer distances than does household agriculture. Furthermore, the crowding of families in multifamily dwellings puts a premium on living space which makes the adjustment to the care of the aged more difficult, as does also the absence of a vegetable garden in cities. Private insurance companies have not met the problem, so this family function of caring for the old is being taken over by the state through the medium of old-age insurance programs.

Indeed, it may be said that all forms of social insurance are functions taken over by the government from the family, because technology first changed the family which in turn forced a governmental change as new technological developments grew up outside the homestead. This transfer of functions from the family to the state is not appreciated by the laissez-faireists. The family was once the chief regulatory agency over production, but as technology moved production outside, it was more or less unregulated, until it was found that the state had to do what the family once did in regulating working

conditions. So, also, much of the proliferation of the functions of city governments so well described by many political scientists is really the collective handling of functions that were done by the farm families before technology changed the face of society. The breakdown of the family, accomplished by technology, is, then, in a way, the cause of the socialistic and fascistic trends of the state.

From this analysis it follows logically that there must have been a delay in the transfer of functions from family to state. How serious was the maladjustment can only be determined by examining each transfer separately. But the delay was quite seriously prolonged in the case of workmen's compensation, and no doubt in the case of caring for the old and in unemployment insurance, as well as in other services.

Another illustration of technology forcing a change lies in the field of international relations. Here the steamboat, the cable, and radio have meant trade and travel, investment and the flow of short-time securities. Yet Washington's farewell address about entangling alliance is still quoted in support of an isolationist policy. An adequate governmental development to keep pace with the technology that is forcing contacts between nations and nationals would include the ambassadorial and consular service, trade and investment information bureaus, well-thought-out creditor and debtor policies, monetary programs, as well as more than an isolated attack on such an international problem as war. We have in recent years greatly improved the consular service and made much better provision for information about trade. But in most other relations, it is easy to show rather conspicuous inadequacies. In this particular illustration it is quite difficult within the limits of this paper to prove that changes in our governmental machinery dealing with contacts with other nations have not kept

pace with the technology that has increased there. But a brief examination of the situation makes the hypothesis quite probable.

The most convincing illustrations in support of the idea of governmental inertia against the pervasive force of technological change are naturally historical rather than contemporary. From the practical point of view there are many acute situations today apparently owing to the slowness of governments to change, but this causal relationship is difficult to prove. Quite similar to the crisis in county government is the situation in reference to the suburban areas of the very large cities. The problem of government in suburban areas is precipitated by the automobile and rapid rail transportation, both of relatively recent origin. They have dispersed population and factories outward from the metropolitan center, but not yet has the city government been extended outward. Instead there has grown up a multiplicity of local governments, educational boards, sanitary commissions, park committees, health units, town governments, and dock commissions, presenting overlappings as well as interstitial areas. The advantage of a larger central government by consolidation of these smaller local governing units is easily argued. The advantages of consolidation are not difficult to see in dealing with crime, where the narrow boundary lines of city governments are quite inadequate to hold the criminal. He has learned the use of the automobile in making his escape, and his search for hide-outs has taken him into outlying regions where police surveillance is weak or nonexistent. What is happening is the creation by technology of a new population unit—not a city, not a village, not a county. Indeed, there is as yet no name for it. For want of a better designation it is sometimes called a metropolitan area. But while technology has created this new population unit, there has not

yet been created an adequate governing unit for it.

An inquiry into the relations of technology and governmental change should include illustrations of governmental change producing new technologies. Perhaps the best illustration is that of wartime governmental organizations developing military inventions and machines useful in war. Here the governmental change would seem to precede the technology. War, however, is also accompanied by a slowness to import military inventions found in other nations. Military establishments are not always up to date.

There are, of course, many cases where governments take up directly a new invention and make use of it. Such is the case with the airplane. In such instances the reaction of government to technology is somewhat similar to industry. In these cases of direct use by governments of tools, adaptation is quite rapid once the government decides to adopt the new machine. The situation is different, though, in those cases where the influence is less direct, but comes indirectly from the infringement of some other social institution which has felt earlier its direct influence. Thus the government seems to be slow in adjusting to the monopolistic industries that technology is encouraging, and in recognizing the public-utility status in several industries that appear to have reached that status today, again owing largely to technology.

There is one type of governmental activity that very definitely encourages resistance to change. I refer to the courts in their practice of following precedent when interpreting a particular law. Law, itself, is in a peculiar position as regards social change. Common law is the codification of certain old customs on vital matters. Hence the common law crystallized the old and would, of course, be essential in stationary societies. New situations are dealt with by new laws from

legislative bodies. The purpose of new laws, like the old, is to make rules that society is to follow. But naturally, rules, in so far as they are specific, as most legal rules are, are only applicable to situations that are continuing. Thus, lawmakers and law administrators seem to have the functions of laying out grooves for the flow of human behavior and of trying to force human beings to fit into the grooves. Such an assignment is quite in conformity with life as found in a stationary society. But in our changing society, technology is continuously breaking up many of the grooves that law makes and administers. Thus law and technology are opponents as in a battle. So it is natural that the courts should hark back to precedent; and the administrator is under oath to enforce the law, no matter what the changes may bring about. The lawyer loves the orderliness of his pattern of law and does not like to have it disarranged by invention. Meanwhile, in our rapidly changing society, the legislatures have a difficult task with their large membership and their tradition of deliberation, of keeping up with the new and changing conditions brought in by technology.

The courts are thus an extreme case of special resistance to change, but other structures of government have also special forces operating on them to resist change. The Constitution of the United States is thus too revered and hallowed an instrument to tamper with. The utterances of the fathers of our government are to be followed as literally as possible, so great is their halo, although they lived in a comparatively simple household economy, while ours is a quite complicated machine age.

Some governmental structures are thus

an unusual obstacle to change. Meanwhile, technology develops, is let loose on society, sweeping all before it. Time on the clock of technology cannot be turned back. We cannot return to the stone age, nor to the horse and buggy, nor to the plantation days of a rural economy. Technology rolls on like a huge tidal wave, while governmental structures stand like the rock of ages in a world of disorder—an irresistible force meeting an immovable object. If governmental structures won't change and technology can't be stopped, what will happen? The answer is that the impasse may be avoided, after delays long and painful enough, by developing practices not officially recognized as governmental or political. These do the functions which a governmental structure would do if it had changed. Thus the legislative lobby performs, perhaps less well, functions which would be performed by a reorganized legislature with a more adequate basis of representation. The basis of legislative representation does not change, the influence of technology in reclassifying social groups cannot be stopped, hence a new liaison body develops to make the old governmental body work, somehow under the new conditions. Of course, it is not strictly true, either, that governmental structures do not change. The Constitution is amended from time to time, and new administrative bodies do develop and even exercise legislative functions. But the tragedy lies in the delay. In conclusion, then, we may say, technology cracks the whip, but because these extra liaison bodies do not develop rapidly and properly in the effort to make the lethargic governmental structure work, the institutions of society slip out of gear and humanity suffers because of it.

Science and Democratic Government

T. Swann Harding, author of this article, is editor of scientific publications for the Department of Agriculture. He has recently published *Two Blades of Grass* which provides a fascinating record of the successful application of science to agriculture. In the article reprinted here Mr. Harding emphasizes the fact that government is increasingly dependent upon science and upon the expert. Students may usefully read Harold J. Laski's "The Limitations of the Expert" (*Harper's Magazine* 162:101-110) in conjunction with Harding's assertion that "professional experts acting as consultants and in a purely advisory capacity are insufficient." What should be the rôle of the expert in a democracy? How does one decide between experts when they disagree?

As these lines are written two sullen groups of nations view one another across the world with gradually intensifying hostility. Dictatorship has shown that it can use scientific knowledge and the brains of scientists to create disaster. However, in the years before the recent war, those most advanced nations in the sphere of government, the democracies, failed to give science its proper place in government, and in society. Yet the same intelligence which so miraculously perfected an atomic bomb to wipe out an entire city could—had it had incentive—have produced a garden city the like of which the world has never known.

What is the place of science in the government of a democracy? We have had awesome demonstration of the manner in which scientific knowledge can be harnessed by primitive and atavistic governments of ruthless and ignorant men to produce catastrophe. We have had ample display of scientifically contrived calamity and disaster. We have seen what happens when the creators of scientific knowledge renounce responsibility for the use made of the power they unleash. We

have had endless discussion of forms of government. How do scientists fit into our own government?

Much more important than political control of government is recognition, however belated, of the fact that advances in science and technology have revolutionized our governmental requirements. This applies to state governments but is especially true of Federal government. As a specific example, why was it that a distinguished anthropologist only a few years ago pointed out that our policy toward the American Indian had not in the least degree been influenced by the findings of that distinguished scientific institution, the Bureau of American Ethnology?

How could that have been possible, when the bureau had already issued nearly two hundred monographs and bulletins dealing with the American Indian and his culture? Publications of other scientific institutions doubled the number. Yet, with this mine of information at its disposal, our government's policy towards our aborigines, which should have been the most enlightened in the world, was

unaffected by science. The material available was used hardly at all. Our policy toward the Indians was compounded largely of preconceived notions held by nonspecialists and it was implemented by nonexpert personnel.

You may regard that as a minor instance, but it could be duplicated in many fields. Actually the social and economic environment of our government has been revolutionized by steam, electricity, machinery, science, and technology. But government has not caught up to this, and we are on the threshold of atomic energy. Governmental policies based on ethical aspirations and preconceived notions, grounded in beliefs not sustained by facts, are as wholly outmoded as those based on the now anachronistic theories of Marx or Lenin.

But the ideas of the agricultural age preceding the era of machine industry and applied science still tend to prevail in our democratic government. Only World War II produced some awareness that something more was needed. We have clung to instinctive, emotional, rule-of-thumb methods in government. We have neglected scientific method, which is essentially rational and analytical, which dispassionately assembles the pertinent facts, formulates conclusions based upon them, tests these out and modifies them on a basis of new facts as perceived, carries out experiments as required, and executes policies based on the knowledge so created.

In recent years, it is true, large areas of government have necessarily become increasingly technical in character—but this does not hold at the highest levels. The process was inevitable, unless we elected to renounce science and all its derivatives. The daily operations of public administration involved a knowledge of medicine, physics, chemistry, bacteriology, agronomy, higher mathematics, and a whole train of scientific disciplines. For

the ordinary problems faced by government today can no longer be solved by simple exercise of nonexpert intelligence. Power to deal effectively with these problems rests primarily on technical competence.

As Charles A. Beard wrote nearly twenty years ago: "In the presence of an intricate question respecting the hydraulics of river improvement, the physics of hull design and water resistance, or the strength of materials, the most intelligent and highly educated lawyer or editor in America is about as helpless as the most ignorant laborer. Jefferson's plowman and professor stand on the same footing. Hamilton's rich and well-born and his despised mass of the people are in the same boat."

It remains true, of course, that a person of exceptional natural intelligence can more quickly master the intricacies of technology than one not so richly endowed. But life is far too short for anyone at all to master the entire range of specialties and to acquire technical competence in them. Hence the traditional government employee, as well as the statesman, must today heed the advice of specialists who speak tongues they do not fully understand, and who dimly interpret to them the more obscure frontiers of advancing research, science, and technology.

But informed competence rather than unalloyed native intelligence is urgent all up and down the line. Whichever political party is in power, science holds the lead-strings. Dictatorship and democracy alike bow to science.

Often in spite of itself, and against its own better judgment, our Federal Government has had increasingly to employ scientific and technical personnel. If, for instance, you enact a law to control traffic in food, drugs, and cosmetics or to inspect meat, you must have the requisite scientists to perform laboratory

work which will back up regulatory functions in these fields. You must also have researchers developing new facts and methods which can alone make actions stick in court.

Today the Federal Government's roster of scientific specialists runs the gamut of the sciences themselves, and of their highly varied subcategories. The traditionally qualified, classically educated person of broad native intelligence, the nonspecialist, is in constant retreat before the expert.

This thing began when Congress established a compulsory contributory medical service for the care of American merchant seamen in especially constructed marine hospitals. That radical step was taken July 16, 1798, and it meant that the government must hire medical specialists; it ultimately developed into that magnificent research and service institution, the Public Health Service and its National Institute of Health.

Further impetus to the employment of scientific personnel was given by the creation of the Department of Agriculture; President Lincoln signed its organic act May 15, 1862. The second Commissioner of Agriculture—the agency then had a bureau, not a Cabinet, status—the distinguished General Horace Capron, soon found that mere hack politicians and ordinary clerks would not properly staff his Department.

In his annual report to President Grant for 1870, Commissioner Capron remarked that his agency's "work demands a higher order of talent than the routine service of most public business; it requires a knowledge of national economy, social science, natural history, applied chemistry, animal and vegetable physiology, and practical agriculture; and presents so broad a range of facts in each field of investigation as to demand the most active effort and the most persistent industry." Moreover he was being offered far too much

help which was "practically useless for the purpose."

As time passed numerous Federal Government agencies began to require the services of scientifically trained personnel. The armed forces soon had incorporated into them units which performed research. But it was World War II, of course, that made such extensive use of scientific knowledge and the experts; indeed it could not have been waged without them. The Office of Scientific Research and Development was the outstanding example of what efficient deliberate mass homicide demands these modern times.

Today science forms an essential adjunct to and an integral part of all Government operations in the field of agriculture and defense. The following much abridged list merely suggests the many other Federal Government activities which require the employment of scientific personnel, the performance of research, and the application of scientific knowledge:

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hydrographic Office, Naval Observatory, Bureau of Reclamation, Geological Survey, Bureau of Mines, Office of Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey, National Bureau of Standards, Patent Office, Weather Bureau, Food and Drug Administration, Women's Bureau, Children's Bureau, Public Health Service, Public Roads Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Trade Commission, U. S. Tariff Commission, Federal Power Commission, Smithsonian Institution, Tennessee Valley Authority, Veterans Administration, Agricultural Research Administration, Forest Service, Soil Conservation Service, and Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Regulatory agencies must back their actions with scientific facts which often have to be ascertained by research. Industry generally is happy to have government undertake basic or pure research and it-

self, in the main, to pursue applied or development research. That last stronghold of small free enterprise, the agricultural industry, by its very nature requires government to carry on most of its research, both basic and applied. Because of its unique status in our national life the Federal Government is in a very strategic position to procure statistics and other information required in research studies.

Here rises the acute problem of handling scientific personnel by the quasi-traditional procedures originally evolved for quite other purposes. Such questions also arise as: Is a career in a government scientific laboratory a proper objective for a promising young scientist? Is government research of high quality? Can government offer research workers an environment that will provide them freedom and render them fruitful? Or will they be worried to exasperation with red tape and a subtle invisible censorship? How should research be budgeted and administered?

Science has rapidly assumed an increasing place in government. Yet in 1947 government spent only about 55 million dollars on fundamental or background research.¹ Because approximate figures are readily available for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, they will be used as an example. In 1900 it had about 300 employees actively engaged in research; it spent about \$490,000 on this activity, or something like \$1,633 per employee per year. During 1918, the last year of World War I, the respective figures were 3,150 employees, \$5,600,000 appropriation, or \$1,962 per worker.

By 1932 Agriculture had nearly five thousand workers engaged in research, the appropriation for this activity was

\$16,069,000, or \$3,348 per employee. The respective figures were 6,250 employees, an appropriation of \$21,412,000, or \$3,426 per employee the year of Pearl Harbor. The latest figures, those for 1946, show 6,150 scientific workers, an expenditure of \$4,026 on each and a total appropriation of \$24,762,000 for research during the fiscal year.² The returns on such investment in research are enormous, often 500, not infrequently 10,000 per cent; for detail see my book, *Two Blades of Grass*.

This same volume also demonstrates that research and findings of the very highest type have resulted, many of which changed the entire course of science progress. It is obvious that government can provide sufficient latitude for gifted research workers to do a superior job. Naturally it does not invariably offer an environment in which first-quality research can be performed. Many gifted scientists who entered government service during World War II and served under nonexpert officers of the armed forces complained bitterly and declared they would never work for government at peace.

But the government can enable its workers to do top-flight work. The disdain with which many scientists outside government affect to regard government scientific work is not wholly warranted by any means. Indeed this disdain is rather curious. It forms part and parcel of the American's tendency to denigrate anything his government does, while resorting to it for assistance and protection in all great national emergencies. Moreover scientists who are employed by universities, private foundations, or private industry, and who fervently thank God they do not have to work for government, run into just about the same sort of difficulties

¹ All-told the Federal government expenditure for 1947 will be about 625 millions, most of it for applied and developmental research. Of this 80 per cent will be spent by the armed forces, the remainder by civilian government agencies.

² Department of Agriculture expenditures for research will total about \$31,328,000 for fiscal year 1947.

that they assume to be the government scientific worker's unique portion.

For there is a sort of invisible censorship in every laboratory. Research is directed and channeled by someone. Projects can be discontinued as surely because some director of an industry is hostile to them as because powerful groups cause politicians to deny them funds. It is true that some powerful interest may prevent the performance of research and the dissemination of its results in some state university, but benefactors may quite ignorantly stipulate that funds shall not be used for wise purposes in private research institutes.

Again, freedom of publication may be impaired because some powerful interest would find the results inimical to its presumed welfare, or because those up above decide that the results must remain secret for defense purposes. Many scientists who worked for government during World War II especially resented the latter. But no scientific worker at all always has absolute freedom of publication. It is true that a research worker may not widely publish results favorable to margarine in a state with a big dairy industry, but just as certainly all industrial concerns closely scrutinize and censor papers their staff members deliver or publish, to prevent giving away what they naïvely regard as industrial secrets.

There is nothing about government employment that is irrevocably hostile to the performance of high-quality research by top-flight investigators. Salaries in the lower grades are fully adequate. They are inadequate in the higher grades, just as they are in universities and private foundations, for both constantly lose top men to industry. Yet those men must be more attracted usually by their monetary reward than by their scientific work. Men who leave fertile and varied fields of government research to become research directors for soft drink or proprietary

medicine concerns, however capable and competent, are lacking in devotion to science.

Government service also offers ample opportunities for professional advancement and recognition and for in-service training, as well as advanced education. Equipment and supplies are normally available in plenty; there are excellent libraries readily accessible to perform a variety of helpful functions. It is true that government is still penurious about travel funds, on the theory that any sort of trip partakes of the nature of a vacation, and is merely a slightly disguised recreational adventure. Hence government scientists do not have the opportunity they should to attend professional society meetings or to visit distant colleagues to discuss mutual problems.

However, travel funds are often restricted elsewhere than in government. More serious is the traditional government habit of budgeting research on an annual basis, quite like more routine activities. Yet it has had recently to give a two- or three-year guarantee of continuation of a project when contracting with outside laboratories. Any research project worth undertaking is likely to take at least a year merely to get under way. It should be guaranteed in advance sufficient longevity to provide opportunity for full accomplishment. Year-to-year appropriations, with the everpresent possibility of sudden discontinuance, do not conduce to progress.

Again, ordinary Civil Service procedures created for the selection and appointment of clerical personnel are ill-adapted to scientific workers. But improvements are coming slowly. Years ago when the writer entered the service as a chemist he took a two-day written assembled examination covering the entire field of chemistry. Today, of course, chemistry is so divided up into unlike specialties that no one could even pretend to master

the whole field. So nonassembled examinations, interviews, and the filling out of forms as to education and experience, have taken the place of answering written questions in writing.

But successful applicants still appear in lists of eligibles, the unit desiring to make an appointment being required to select one of the top three. This is bad from at least two standpoints, one of which is veteran's preference. A Wave, or a male officer, who sat the war out in a Washington office gets this preference which only combat veterans really merit. It offers sufficient margin to place an incompetent on the list of eligibles or a less competent individual among the top three.

Secondly, practically every scientific research job is unique. Not just any chemist who can manage to stand high on a list of eligibles can fill any job in this field the government may have vacant. Usually a specialist with a peculiar knowledge of just certain things is required. Yet the appointing agency may be compelled to accept an incompetent with noncombatant veteran's preference, or someone unqualified in the special knowledge desired, because they happen to be among the top three.

After he gets his appointment, the scientific worker is still hedged about with Civil Service rules. His promotions depend on his efficiency ratings and, research being the exploratory job it is, it is next to impossible to rate a scientific research worker by rules formulated for clerks and stenographers. The position of science in our government could be improved by changes in methods of examination, selection, and promotion. Separation and retirement policies are already quite good.

Likewise improvements could be made in the budgeting of research programs and projects. There should be divisions, staffed by qualified specialists, in both the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget having the specific func-

tion of attending the personnel and budgetary needs of all Federal research workers and programs.

Quite arbitrary cuts in appropriations for research made by Congress can, of course, not only shatter morale among government scientific workers, but also discourage others from entering the service. Untold damage is done in this way yet, considering the conditions under which it must function on trivial budgetary details, it is remarkable that Congress does as well as it does. The entire procedure of justifying and granting appropriations for research needs renovation.

This brings us to the place of scientists in government. Originally professional workers were almost invariably subordinated to administrators who were untrained in science. But, regardless of how rigorous an intellectual discipline may be, only those trained in science, at least to some extent, can have proper regard for the place of science in modern culture and government.

As early as 1929 there was a British Association of Scientific Workers which got together with seventy members of the House of Commons and formed the nucleus of a Parliamentary Science Committee. Its function was to inform Members of Parliament about the facts germane to scientific problems they had to consider. It also brought to the notice of Parliament what science had done, was doing, and could do, and advised how government could best encourage research and direct the activities of technical personnel.

Today scientific and technical knowledge should largely control the expenditure of public funds. The useless expenditure of public money can better be prevented by scientific study than by any other means. Nearly all problems of administration and development now involve scientific factors. It is anachronistic to leave control too much in the hands

of those who lack first-hand knowledge of science.

When the boll weevil first appeared there were experts who knew what should be done and who advocated doing it, but nonscientists made the decision and the boll weevil became a disastrous pest. The same thing can be said of the many years during which flood control and soil conservation were vociferously advocated by experts who could not gain acceptance of their views by nonexperts who controlled the moneybags. On one occasion a thousand economists signed a manifesto saying just what calamity would follow passage of a certain tariff bill; they were ignored and the calamity occurred quite as the experts predicted.

Scientists must do more today than merely push forward the frontiers of human knowledge. They can no longer rest content to permit others to use the results of their discoveries unguided. They must accept responsibility for control of the forces they have unleashed. As we know from the activities of our associations of atomic scientists, many of them are aroused to their responsibilities. But efficient administration and a high degree of informed statesmanship are now impossible without the active co-operation of science.

Scientific workers must continue to demand their rightful place in policy formulation. By pure inadvertence and as a mere by-product of idle curiosity, science has done more to change the structure of our society during the past 75 years than all the politicians and reformers who ever lived. The contention of political parties for control of government is obsolete now when national policies should be formulated on a basis of scientifically ascertained facts as interpreted by experts.

These experts in both the social and the natural sciences should work in teams, along with the fellows who know how to

make the people not only accept but relish what is best for the nation—the highest type of politicians. Professional experts acting as consultants and in a purely subordinate capacity are insufficient. Their work cannot be wholly advisory. Their position and status, relative to that of administrators, must be improved. This does not mean ruin good scientists to make poor administrators.

But those who administer scientific programs and projects, as well as those who supervise the activities of scientific personnel, must have sufficient first-hand knowledge of science to enable them to act intelligently. They may be far better administrators than the scientists, but they must understand science well enough to evaluate the problems confronting them. The time is past when administrators who lack all knowledge of science should presume to deal with scientific and technical problems which can be understood and properly solved only by scientific means.

Science is peculiarly adapted to work well with government in a democracy. For democracy is a method, a scientifically experimental method, of government, whereas dictatorship, of whatever kind, is a rigid system of government. A democracy at its best also seeks the relevant facts, examines them dispassionately, formulates tentative conclusions based upon them, tries these conclusions in practice, and makes such adjustments in them as the circumstances warrant. That is scientific method.

A democracy uses science in the formulation of policy. Dictatorship uses scientific means of enforcing preconceived opinions, and of acquiring power over others. Science strengthens and broadens democracy; it merely renders dictatorship more arbitrarily ruthless. Scientific personnel must achieve its rightful status within this our own democratic government.

The Atomic Crusade and Its Social Implications

Arthur H. Compton is Chancellor of Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. During the war he was director of the Government's Metallurgical Project, which was responsible for the development of plutonium for use in the atomic bomb. Students of politics will ponder his conclusion that, "above all, the atomic project is an example of the supreme value of a purpose. . . . The lesson one learns is that when people are working with a will to attain an objective, they will strive to learn how to do their part, and will willingly work with others as may be necessary for the desired result." Few Americans fully appreciate the implications of atomic energy for the whole society. This article attempts to outline some of the lessons learned, as well as projecting possible results of the "crusade" which produced a potent weapon.

Much has been said regarding the implications of atomic energy. It is worth calling special attention to the unusual sequence of events that led to making atomic energy useful and which has made a group of scientists become a significant factor in our political and social life. This sequence of events is indeed a social movement, motivated primarily not by considerations of economic and political power, but by social objectives and ideals. For this reason the correct connotations are given by characterizing the movement of which the atomic bomb was an incident as "the atomic crusade."

In considering the social implications of this atomic crusade, it is important to note why it was possible for the movement to develop and succeed in its wartime objectives in the United States, while it was not similarly successful elsewhere. This will lead us into a consideration of its form of organization and of the factors favorable to its strength.

What are the future implications of such features as the highly organized research, the close co-operation of science, industry, and government, and the imposition of secrecy on research that is traditionally free? But perhaps of greatest interest is the way in which the atomic crusade epitomizes certain major social trends, such as growing specialization with its implied co-ordinated co-operation, increasing emphasis on better training and education, and the growing awareness of the need for generally accepted social objectives as co-ordinating principles in setting a pattern for our social and political development.

The dramatic use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was unique with regard both to the startling newness of the weapon and to its decisive effectiveness. Perhaps the bomb merely gave the Japanese a convenient excuse for resigning from a struggle which their leaders already knew was lost. Nevertheless, it

changed literally at a flash the world's attitude toward war. Our enemies had not overlooked the possibility of an atomic bomb. In fact, their progress in this direction was the spur that goaded us into its development. Their own war-time investigations had, however, convinced them that the construction of such a weapon could not actually be accomplished. In our own country the atomic bomb was one of the last major developments of war research to be undertaken. It was conceived as a practical undertaking only after other urgent war tasks had made heavy demands on the Nation's major scientific talent. Thus it was the more remarkable that so complex an undertaking should have been carried to a decisive conclusion so quietly and in so short a time.

FAITH IN THE GOAL

The atomic program was in fact a crusade. This is why it was so effective. It was not necessary to have a highly refined organization to get co-operation. The goal was recognized as so important that personally favored ideas were willingly scrapped when it became clear that better progress could be made by working along other lines. Individual scientists, leaders of the Government, the Army, universities, and great industrial organizations successively caught the vision of great achievement. They could see that success might spell early victory and that to lose the race might well mean defeat. They were glad for a chance to share in what was instinctively recognized as one of the great human adventures of all time.

Many have wondered how the secret was so well kept that both our enemies and the American public were taken completely by surprise. Probably some thousands of persons—a per cent or so of the million who worked on the job—

knew, or guessed, that atomic bombs were being prepared. Though very few were acquainted with such essential details as delivery schedules, objectives, and timing, the vigor of the prosecution of the work showed that the use of the bombs in this war was expected. Of course, care was used in selecting those who would have to know the purpose of what they were doing. But the real explanation for the tightness of the secrecy was that when by accident someone learned what was going on, he was awed by its significance. A simple suggestion was enough to make him understand that "here is something I must not tell. The safety of the world may depend on the tightness of my lips." He had himself become a part of the crusade.

As in the case of a holy war, so also the atomic crusade was the expression of a widespread faith that had developed over many years. Among the scientists this was a faith in the reliability of their methods of prediction, a confidence in their ability to accomplish a task that theory showed was possible, combined with a conviction that the release of atomic energy would eventually become one of the greatest gifts that science could ever provide to man. Generations of experience with the growing applications of science gave the representatives of government and industry a faith in the considered judgment of scientists. Other marvels as great as this had appeared. All those in responsible positions were determined to avoid any chance of losing the fight for freedom. If for no other reason than that they might be right, the predictions of the scientists must be listened to. Faith, expressed in complete support, was called for.

ATOMIC POWER IN PEACE

It would be a mistake to suppose that either the scientists or the Government

set out initially to build an atomic bomb. This was indeed the central military objective of the great atomic war effort. The bomb was, however, only the war-time aspect of a much greater vision. This vision began to take shape with the discovery fifty years ago that within the atom lies a storehouse filled with energy vaster by far than that which shows itself in such chemical processes as the burning of coal. Many a physicist in his heart of hearts hoped that he might have a share in presenting this wealth of energy in useful form as a Promethean gift to mankind. Perhaps nothing that physics could ever do would be of so great practical importance. Dreams were dreamed of a more abundant life, of greater knowledge to control disease, of greater freedom to build a better world. When uranium fission was discovered, it seemed that these dreams might be made real. Atomic power to drive the wheels of industry? Yes, and to propel ships over the seas and supply heat in the arctic wilds, making more of the planet available to man.

But uranium fission came at a time when war, the defense of all that was dear, compelled everyone's attention. The possibility of atomic explosions had been thought of only as terrors to be avoided, disasters that might overcome the bold experimenters who first would start the atomic chain reaction. Could atomic engines win the war? Hardly. By the time they were developed in usable form the war should be over. Nor would the use of such engines be of decisive importance. But the sudden release of atomic energy might make a bomb that would give to its user an enormous advantage. When this advantage was clearly seen, fear lest the enemy might first build such weapons called for a great effort. The atomic war program quickly took shape and into it was thrown all the strength that could be spared from other vital tasks.

To those who had been working with

atoms for years, however, even the winning of the war was only one step in the use of the new-found strength. Victory was necessary so that people should be free to work for a better world. Among the essential features of that better world stands prominently the freedom from fear of war. The atomists knew that from here on, war would be so destructive that its waging would be madness. The world must see that this is true and be compelled to find a way whereby war can be prevented. With this as a greater objective, the years they spent at making atomic bombs prepared those who were making them to burst into a vast missionary call for peace as soon as the war was won. The little group of atomic physicists had now grown to a crusading army, with the strength of the many thousands of humanity-minded men and women who had shared their intense war effort.

Nor is peace itself the final goal. Many have been the frustrations of science. Improved methods of supplying food and shelter and other essentials to needy humanity have failed to achieve their promise because of the failure of society to use them for the common welfare. Here in atomic energy is a new, great opportunity to enrich life. Those who have brought this new child of science into being are determined that they shall not be frustrated again. It is not the rich, not the clever or the powerful, not the United States, Canada, or Britain alone that shall prosper from this new gift. The whole world shall have peace and, as far as the new advances of science and technology can bring it, prosperity and a more complete life. It is this great goal that the atomists hold before them. Atomic energy gives perhaps the greatest opportunity they will ever have to work effectively toward that goal. This opportunity must be used to the utmost. Such is the spirit of the atomic crusade.

MOBILIZATION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB PROJECT

In his official report on the use of atomic energy in war Professor H. D. Smyth has given an authentic account of the way in which the atomic program was organized. For the purpose of this article it will be useful for me only to call attention to certain distinctive features of that organization.

It was the civilian scientists actually engaged on studies of atomic fission who first called attention to its potential importance in war. Previous to the discovery of the fission of uranium, the hopes for releasing atomic energy were so vague that no one considered seriously the possibility of making it useful in a practical way except after long-continued fundamental research. Such research was indeed progressing, but without any of the urgency associated with war or even with imminent peacetime applications. With the discovery of the fission of uranium, however, physicists throughout the world looked for rapid developments. When in the spring of 1939 reports from Europe and America showed that this fission was accompanied by the emission of more than one neutron per disintegrating atom, the physics world was aware that an atomic chain reaction was possible. How it could best be achieved and how it could most effectively be used had yet to be explored.

Atomic power, radioactivity in abundance, and bombs were thought of and discussed in all quarters of the globe. Those whose interests lay solely in pure physics thought of atomic fission as just one more property of matter that needed exploration. But those who were alert to war developments took quick action. In Germany the resources of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute at Berlin were turned to isotope separation with an eye alert to possible use for a chain reaction. In

the United States the Government was persuaded to give modest support to the enterprise while its objectives were as yet vague. But until 1941 the primary initiative in this country continued to come from civilian scientists and the universities. To the physicists of Columbia University, Princeton, and the University of California goes the chief credit during these early years for proceeding with this vital program as far as limited support made possible, while a study was being made as to what military applications of the energy might be developed.

These early explorations were conducted almost wholly by civilians, under the cover of a secrecy initiated and imposed by the scientists themselves. Their work showed that U^{235} might be concentrated by gaseous diffusion, that plutonium could be made which would be similar in properties to U^{235} , and that with a suitable combination of uranium and graphite it might be possible to make an atomic chain reaction. Until the summer of 1941 no serious attempt had been made in this country to see how such a chain reaction might be made effective in the war, and lacking such an objective, government interest in the program was casual.

The Government Sponsors Research.

Then came the report from England that her physicists had calculated that a bomb of enormous destructive power could be made from a surprisingly small amount of U^{235} . Our data supported theirs, and indicated further that the U^{235} could be separated by any one of several processes that looked industrially feasible. A reviewing committee, appointed by the President of the National Academy of Sciences at the request of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, reported favorably on the feasibility of making atomic bombs of U^{235} that might be decisive in the war,

and gave a rough but reliable estimate of the time and the cost required to make the bombs. It was on the basis of this report and of a similar recommendation from the British that President Roosevelt authorized Vannevar Bush, as director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, to proceed with full vigor with what experiments were needed to see whether the proposed atomic program was indeed practicable. This order, which became effective just before Pearl Harbor, was the start of the atomic development as an active war project.

Vannevar Bush asked James Conant to see that the program was organized and carried through. Conant appointed an executive committee of six persons, of whom three were assigned responsibility for carrying through major divisions of the bomb development task. Of these three, Harold Urey at Columbia University centered his work on the diffusion process for separating U^{235} . Ernest Lawrence at the University of California at Berkeley undertook to try the magnetic separation of the isotopes. I had the joint task of designing the bomb and developing a method for making plutonium. This work was organized at the University of Chicago.

A major handicap faced by the atomic program was the fact that other tasks were already in hand which had scoured the country for competent research men. The radar and electronics studies, anti-submarine research, and the ordnance laboratories had taken the first choice of men with the needed qualifications. The atomic program was fortunate, however, in two ways. First, a considerable nucleus of the leaders in atomic research had not left the field, and rallied to the newly established centers. And second, the previous laboratories had drawn chiefly from the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and had not exhausted the extensive research talent from the middle of the country.

Industry as well as science had to be recruited. With evidence of government interest, this industrial support was gratifying. Consider for example the case of Company "A," which was uniquely qualified to carry through a new and difficult process that had been developed in the laboratory. Speed was of the essence. The task would demand a considerable part of the company's total strength at a time when it was already heavily loaded with important jobs. One morning the need was described to the head of the company. That afternoon the engineers started with the work. The day after the delivery of the first order was completed, well ahead of schedule, the contract was signed determining the price and other details. Company "A" had become a part of the crusade.

After six months of intensive effort, the scientists had gained further confidence in the feasibility of a bomb using either U^{235} or plutonium. Hopeful progress had been made toward separating U^{235} . The evidence was convincing that a pile of uranium and graphite could be built that would give a chain reaction and supply a source of plutonium.

When President Roosevelt was presented with these findings by Vannevar Bush, he set aside the needed funds and instructed the War Department to do whatever was necessary to build atomic bombs. To General Leslie Groves and Colonel (now General) K. D. Nichols of the Corps of Engineers was assigned the responsibility for putting the President's order into effect.

Army, Industry, Universities Co-operate.

It was necessary for General Groves to determine which of the various methods for producing U^{235} or plutonium should be put on a production basis, the scale of the production program, how this production should be carried out, and under what conditions the bombs should be

built. He made these decisions with advice from a series of reviewing committees composed of highly qualified scientists and engineers who in turn discussed the problems with the research men who were engaged in the development of the processes. His major decisions were in turn reviewed by a Military Policy Committee (Bush, Conant, General Styer, and Admiral Purnell). Messrs. James Conant, R. C. Tolman, W. K. Lewis, and C. A. Thomas acted as frequent consultants to him on technical aspects of these problems, though a large part of his advice came directly from the leaders of the various development projects.

Because of the short time available, the policy adopted was that of proceeding immediately with the building of production plants which, if all went as hoped for, would make available at the earliest possible moment enough atomic weapons to be of decisive military value. For the sake of speed and sureness, three methods of separating U^{235} were carried through to production. While only one method of producing plutonium was completed, alternative methods were under development until the chosen process looked certain of success. Placing the bomb production unit in a completely isolated area, under the direction of a theoretical physicist who in spite of his evident competence was untried in such a major administrative task, was one of General Groves' many major decisions which, if wrong, might have meant the failure of the enterprise.

In order to secure the full co-operation of industry, General Groves chose the du Pont Company as a leader, and requested this organization to undertake the construction and operation of the plant for producing plutonium. Representatives of the company were given full opportunity to study the state of development of all aspects of the bomb program.

After two months of such study, in a meeting at Wilmington, a vice president

of the company officially told General Groves that if the Army insisted, the du Pont Company would proceed with constructing and operating the plutonium plant, but that he must state that in the judgment of the company the chance was not greater than one in one hundred that useful results would come from the work during World War II. The vice president explained that as yet (November 1942) no laboratory demonstration of a chain reaction had been made, and no laboratory process for separation of plutonium had been developed. To assume the establishment of such unknown processes on a production basis before the war would be over seemed quite unrealistic. Fortunately, within two weeks the chain reaction was operating in the laboratory, the reviewing committee brought in a favorable report, and the du Pont Company, at the Army's urgent request, undertook the contract, devoting to it the best talent in its organization.

Other major industrial organizations were similarly brought into the enterprise. Sometimes parts of the task looked almost hopelessly difficult. Occasionally one of the operating companies or one of the leaders of the scientific program would become discouraged about an essential part of the work. General Groves and Colonel Nichols, however, never faltered in their determination to carry through.

From the beginning of the task, the universities had been taking an active part. Now they were asked to undertake new burdens. Especially at Chicago, California, and Columbia the undertaking assumed proportions comparable with or greater than all the rest of the universities' activities. It was not obvious that the type of work to be done was appropriate to a university. Nevertheless, here were corporations that were prepared to operate the new mushroom research organizations. In the emergency the heads of these institutions felt that they must help if they

were needed. As one spokesman said, "We will turn our university inside out if necessary for winning this war."

Thus the army, American industry, and the universities joined the atomic crusade.

Decision on Use of Bomb.

As the time approached when the bombs would be complete, fateful decisions were necessary. Though the atomic program was initially stimulated by fear of Germany, the European war was now drawing to a close. In planning for the use of the bombs against Japan, President Truman acted on the advice of a civilian committee of highest level. Originally the program of developing and building the bombs had been authorized by President Roosevelt, in consultation with Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Stimson, Chief of Staff General Marshall, Vannevar Bush, and James Conant. As the work proceeded and large expenditures were required, members of the Military Affairs Committee and a few others were informed as to plans, progress, and intentions.

Shortly after the death of President Roosevelt, President Truman appointed a civilian Interim Committee to advise him regarding the atomic program. The Secretary of War was chairman of this committee, with George L. Harrison as his alternative. Other members were James F. Byrnes, now Secretary of State; Ralph A. Bard, former Under Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, and Karl T. Compton. Advisers to this committee were General Marshall, General Groves, and a "Scientific Panel" consisting of Ernest Lawrence, Enrico Fermi, Robert Oppenheimer, and Arthur Compton. The use of the bombs by the Army was ordered by President Truman, closely in accord with the recommendations of this Interim Committee.

The Committee likewise outlined the broad policies for the further development of the possibilities of atomic energy. Their policies continued to serve as the Government's guide until Congress enacted new legislation.

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

The atomic program is an excellent example of the usefulness of both free and organized research. That the possibility of releasing atomic energy was discovered is a triumph of free research. That this possibility was so quickly applied is a phenomenal achievement of organized research.

The Nazis introduced the distinction between "German" and "Jewish" science. "German" science was that which was distinctly capable of advancing the relative strength of the German Nation. "Jewish" science was that which was of value only for general understanding, or of general human benefit. Science of the former type was practical; of the latter, theoretical or broadly basic in its interest. It was partly because of Nazi scorn of such basic science that many students of science left Germany for countries such as Britain and America where they might pursue their studies with freedom.

Nuclear physics, whose growth has made atomic power available, is a combination of the studies of atomic structure, the theory of relativity, and the quantum theory. None of these was considered by the Nazis to be "German" science. Uranium fission was discovered in a German laboratory, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, which was almost unique in continuing the support of fundamental science. In the United States, however, scientists remained free to work in whatever fields seemed to them of greatest value. Our universities, in fact, encouraged whatever studies might aid in the

understanding of the physical world. Because of the high value that they place on freedom of thought, our scientists, especially those of foreign origin, were doubly eager to work with their full strength for the survival of our Nation. It is thus fair to say that the strength that comes because of freedom was a vital factor in enabling the United States to initiate and carry through its atomic crusade. At the same time, co-operation in research was called for to an unprecedented extent. How was such co-operation possible in a country where freedom of effort was so highly valued?

A part of the answer is to be found in the spontaneous growth of our voluntarily organized research programs. The centers where the atomic research program developed most productively were those such as at Berkeley and Chicago where there already existed strong nuclei of scientists who had come together voluntarily because by co-operative effort they could work more effectively on their chosen tasks of nuclear physics or cosmic rays. The atomic laboratories were merely greatly expanded organizations of the type which had already become a pattern for modern science—voluntary research teams, the members of each team following willingly the plan set by its captain.

It is important to note that these war research teams were also composed of volunteers. They came together not because of orders, but because they saw that only by such co-operative effort could they do the job that they felt was so urgent. While this might have resulted in weakness because of poor co-ordination of effort, it turned out to be a source of strength.

General Groves once complained that these scientists were undisciplined: "They do not know how to take orders or give orders." It was explained to him that they had instead a different kind of discipline. The scientist is essentially an initiator. It

is his function to find out for himself what needs to be done and to exert the self-discipline required to do it without instructions from anyone.

The technique of directing the activities of such a group of self-starters so that their work will be effectively co-ordinated toward a single goal is very different from that of commanding an army or bossing a crew of laborers. Instead of telling a man what his job is and how he should do it, the research man needs first of all to know what the objective of his task is, why it is important, and what the interests and abilities of his collaborators are. Then he can intelligently choose for himself where he can best contribute to the program. It takes more effort thus to keep a program oriented; but having chosen his task, the scientist assumes a responsibility and an enthusiasm for its accomplishment which are not to be found among those who work merely under orders.

An important but rarely mentioned feature of the war research organizations was the frequent staff discussions of technical and policy problems. When the plutonium project was at its height, such meetings were held regularly twice a month, usually at Chicago, but occasionally at Oak Ridge or elsewhere. A hundred or more persons would attend with representatives from the scores of widely distributed centers at which collaborative work was going on. Papers were read, some dealing with the progress on important problems, and some with technical or scientific information that had been found. At the policy meetings, with attendance limited to some thirty heads of laboratories or divisions, the state of the atomic program was regularly reviewed and plans for the future were discussed. While at all of these meetings representatives of the Army were present, the notable fact was the freedom and thoroughness with which all the relevant problems were considered. Perhaps more

than any other aspect of the organization, it was these regularly scheduled general discussions, combined with frequent group discussions at each major center, that kept the work progressing on the direct road to success.

Difficulties under Army Control.

When the atomic program was transferred to the Army's shoulders, there were many discussions as to the advisability of inducting many or all of those engaged in it into the Army, so that they might work under military directives. Such action would, I believe, have made it enormously more difficult to maintain the freedom necessary for effective progress. Even without such direct militarization, the evident need for concentration on the direct line of attack to solve the problems promptly led to much more regimentation than would ordinarily have been acceptable over so long a time to research men. By keeping the top direction in the hands of men who were themselves familiar with research, however, it was possible to maintain a highly co-ordinated program without coercion and with persistently high morale.

The difficulty of organizing such a research program within the Army's accustomed secrecy rules, however, amounted practically to an impossibility. Prominent among the military principles of secrecy is that of compartmentalization. No one must know anything that is not necessary for performing his own task. If, however, one is to choose his task and take the responsibility for performing it so as to give the results needed by others, one's view of the over-all effort must extend well beyond his own immediate compartment. On the other hand, the sense of responsibility that goes with understanding the significance of one's work gives unusual earnestness in avoiding leaks of information to those outside the project. The result was that within the research

groups knowledge of what was going on was inevitably much more widespread than the security officers desired. Yet if any leak of significant information was traceable to the workers in the research laboratories, it was never mentioned by the security officers.

On the other hand, it would be unfair to say that secrecy as imposed by the Army had any appreciable retarding effect on completing the atomic bombs. In the early stages, before atomic energy was of interest to the Army, it is probable that secrecy regarding the work on designing chain reacting piles and the withholding, even from official reviewing committees, of information regarding explosive chain reactions may have delayed the development of the program by many months. This early secrecy was, however, self-imposed by the scientists engaged in fission studies and those charged with promoting the research. After the summer of 1942, when the Army was placed in control, I know of no time when the program of producing the materials and building the bombs was appreciably delayed by lack of scientific or technical information. Military secrecy made necessary a greater scientific effort, and it occasionally caused some close approaches to serious errors; but it cannot fairly be charged with retarding the final preparation of the bomb.

Gap between Research and Application.

One of the unprecedented features of the atomic program was the large-scale co-operation of academic scientists, industrialists, and military men. The original ideas and their reduction to laboratory practice were primarily the contribution of men from the universities. The huge production program called for the strength of our best-organized industries. The undertaking of transferring the academic knowledge to industrial production and military use could in wartime be co-ordinated only through the military.

The obstacles in the way of smooth co-operation were many. Many of the scientists, as is usually true of inventors, wanted to retain control of the design, the construction, and even the operation of the production plants. The ideas were theirs. None but them knew how to build and operate the new devices. Not only had they earned the right to control the first use of their inventions, but also they were confident that they could bring faster production results than could others who would have to learn the processes from the beginning. The industrial men started with little faith in the practical competence of the scientists; but that little faith grew to full reliance as the two groups worked together. The concern of the scientists with the objectives, the progress, and the consequences of their work was a worry to the Army men, who could not understand why a simple order was not an adequate basis for the scientists' action.

American education has never solved the problem of preparing men for research on the new developments required by industry. The traditional training received by an engineer has been in familiarizing himself with the accepted methods of performing important industrial processes. He is rarely introduced to the search for new methods of doing the old tasks, much less for methods of doing tasks such as have not been done before. The research scientist, on the other hand, has traditionally been led to consider fundamental science only as worthy of his attention, and the practical arts as of concern only to those in a lower stratum of intellectual society. He has been taught how to find all kinds of new facts and methods, but has not learned the value of concerning himself with the things of practical use.

The enforced wartime association of scientists and engineers has had at least some effect in giving each of these professions a greater appreciation of the task the other is performing. What is more,

hundreds of young men have learned by practical experience the art of engineering research. It remains to be seen whether our universities and technical schools will be able to develop a postwar education that will supply the new men so urgently needed for solving the new technical problems of industry.

LASTING EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC CRUSADE

The great human significance of the atomic crusade is its dramatic emphasis on the vital necessity of co-operation versus antagonism, of intelligent versus emotional or unconsidered living, and of great, commonly accepted objectives. These needs have become increasingly evident with every advance of science and technology. They are, in fact, essential to civilization. But the atomic bomb has written them before us in blazing letters.

The atomic bomb has made any future war between nations armed with such weapons so disastrous to both parties as to be irrational. The only way to avoid such disaster is that of international co-operation, intelligently planned to prevent any nation from initiating a war. Only by progressive elimination of antagonisms and inculcation of a desire for co-operation can we hope to attain the great objective of a long-enduring peace with freedom.

Science and technology have brought with them increasing specialization. Management and labor, the various trades and professions, government with its many branches, business and agriculture, school and church, each is developing toward doing a better job in a narrower field. This system greatly increases our strength and richness of life as long as we work effectively together. When antagonisms develop, however, as in a nation-wide strike or an unwillingness to give justice to a minority group, the complex modern

society becomes weakened so that all of us suffer.

The Value of Co-operation.

In this regard the atomic project is itself a notable example of the effectiveness of co-operation. Mention has already been made of the way in which the scientists, the industrialists, and the Army worked together. It should be noted that this co-operation was not based on any special friendship or understanding. It occurred rather because each group recognized that full co-operation with the others was necessary in order to perform its own task. Accordingly, each gave to the other the best help within its power. As a result of close working together over the years, there developed a much improved understanding of each other's attitudes and problems, an increased respect, and many friendships.

Within these three major groups, also, the differences were striking. Under the officers of the Regular Army were Reserve officers, enlisted men and women with and without technical training, many civilians in various capacities, and even hundreds of naval personnel. The industries employed not only engineers, but specialists of all varieties, tough construction crews, skilled and unskilled labor of all kinds. It was remarkable to see thousands of newly recruited men and women learn to do new and unheard-of jobs as operators with skill equal to or better than that of their scientist teachers. Among the scientists were voluntary and compulsory exiles from Europe who brought a large share of the theoretical knowledge and earnest enthusiasm that made of the project a crusade. Noteworthy also were the dozen Negro scientists who worked in complete equality with their white colleagues. The men from all corners of the country, from England, and from other countries, worked together with no thought of differing interests.

To all concerned it was evident that this task called for more education and training than was usual for preparing our technical men. The physics and chemistry were of a highly advanced research type, which was understood at first only by those of the most extensive training. The organizational task performed by the Army was one requiring an acquaintance with the Nation's industrial possibilities and a familiarity with Washington politics and with labor problems far beyond the ken of most engineers. Likewise, the engineering required to build a complex new plant, with not even a pilot plant as a pattern to follow, with small tolerances and details such as had never previously been heard of, called for the best skill the Nation had available. The importance of the extra knowledge and skill in making sure that the right moves would be made was thus impressed upon all who shared the enterprise. Only by intelligent planning could such a task have a chance of success.

Need for National Goal.

Above all, the atomic project is an example of the supreme value of a purpose. The war goal of the atomists was to build bombs that would bring victory and lasting peace. This was a part of the greater goal of defense and victory. The lesson one learns is that when people are working with a will to attain an objective, they will strive to learn how to do their part, and will willingly work with others as may be necessary for the desired result. With a goal established, training has a meaning and the will to co-operate is taken for granted. Here is the secret of co-ordinating the efforts of a free and democratic people.

In the success of the atomic bomb project the United States has perhaps caught a new view of its titanic strength. It is a strength that comes when a compelling objective draws the co-ordinated

effort of trained and educated citizens. Those who have shared in the atomic crusade are now insisting that this titanic strength be turned toward ensuring the world's peace and toward giving the

world's people a chance to share more fully in making their lives of value. Toward this great task the mobilization of atomic strength of the Nation was but a step.

Law and Atomic Energy

E. Blythe Stason is Professor of Law and Dean of the University of Michigan Law School and a specialist in administrative law. He has written this article to illustrate some of the implications of modern science for law and to suggest the impact of atomic fission on the legal system itself. Convinced that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is one of the most important pieces of legislation of our time, Mr. Stason focuses his attention on that Act. What is the challenge of modern science to our institutions? What is involved as we move "away from rule by law and toward rule by public administration"?

Among its other contributions to society, the legal system furnishes, as well it may, the necessary rules, principles, and standards to guide and regulate the activities of mankind, to the end that people may live together in relative peace and harmony, and may carry on their everyday activities without unduly impinging on the rights and privileges of others. However, the technological developments of these recent science-dominated years have created severe stresses in the legal system by increasing enormously the interdependence of mankind, thereby requiring infinitely more complicated legal controls to keep in good order the progressively more complex social and economic system. And then by way of climax, the year of our Lord 1945 projected into an already complex society atomic chain fission, and, as time goes on, this, together with the possibilities of the atomic bomb, will further increase the stresses in the legal system. It is not too much to say that no one yet

knows whether a democratic legal system can survive these stresses. We earnestly hope it can.

My purpose in this article is to report upon some of the legal implications of modern science, and, since atomic fission not only illustrates the effect of modern science on law as a social institution, but has the further advantage of being dramatic and timely, I shall use its impact on the legal system as the concrete example to buttress the general conclusions I wish to establish.

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ASPECTS

How to wrap the legal system around a technological monster possessing the potentialities of atomic energy, taking account not only of its known values but also of its extravagant possibilities for the future, is an affair of no small dimensions. The problem resolves itself into two

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phases—one international and the other domestic.

President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee of England and Mackenzie King of Canada have announced their approval and support of ultimate control of all nonpeaceful aspects of atomic energy by the United Nations. On November 15, 1945, these three representatives of their respective nations met in Washington and issued a Declaration on Atomic Energy, stating at the outset their willingness to proceed with the exchange of fundamental scientific information and the interchange of scientists and scientific literature, all for peaceful ends, with any nation that will fully reciprocate, just as soon as effective and enforceable safeguards against use for destructive purposes can be devised.

The international aspect of the matter is now in the hands of the United Nations. At its London meeting, the United Nations set up a Commission on Atomic Energy. President Truman has named Bernard M. Baruch to be the United States representative on the Commission.

Consideration of the international arrangements is now in progress, although at the present moment there is a substantial dispute between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the character of international safeguards to be adopted. Eventually the international arrangements will become law by being written into a treaty and submitted to Congress for approval.

In the meantime, we must set our domestic household in order. Up to the present time, all of the two billion dollars' worth of wartime development of atomic fission has been conducted by and under the complete control of the War Department, where it was very properly placed in 1942 by the President of the United States, acting under his war powers. Now that the war is at an end, the burden falls on Congress to devise a permanent, peacetime program inducting atomic energy as

well as may be into our conventional legal system.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

After nearly a year of hearings and study, Congress on July 26 adopted the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, thus writing into law its best judgment concerning proper peacetime controls for the world's most dynamic technological discovery. It is among the most, if not the most, important legislation of our time. In pursuit of some conclusions on the legal implications of modern science, I am going to describe this Atomic Energy Act in some detail, and thereafter I shall lay before you certain generalizations, both concerning the act itself, and also concerning the interrelations of law, administration, and technology.

The act is bulky, consisting of about fifty pages of printed matter. Its objectives are readily understood, but their achievement is exceedingly difficult. The regulatory powers of government in dealing with atomic energy override four separate processes: first, fundamental research in atomic theory; second, mining or acquisition of source materials, that is, the raw elements from which the fissionable material is extracted; third, development of processes and devices by which fissionable material is extracted from source materials; and fourth, utilization of fissionable material in the generation of useful energy.

The law undertakes to control, operate, regulate, or prohibit all of these technological processes as the public interests may require. Thus stated, the legal problem seems simple and not too different, let us say, from the perfectly familiar regulation of the electric power industry, the communication business, or any other public utility. However, because of certain unique potentialities of atomic energy, the simplicity of theory changes

into extreme complexity in application.

The act contains 21 Sections. Eleven of them deserve special elaboration.

Declaration of Policy.

Section 1 states:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that subject at all times to the paramount objective assuring the common defence and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace.

It is the purpose of this act to effectuate the policies . . . by providing among others for the following major programs relating to atomic energy.

(1) A program of assisting and fostering private research and development to encourage maximum scientific progress.

(2) A program for the control of scientific and technical information which will permit the dissemination of such information to encourage scientific progress and for the sharing, on a reciprocal basis, of information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy as soon as effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised.

(3) A program of federally conducted research and development to assure the government of adequate scientific and technical accomplishment.

(4) A program for government control of the production, ownership and use of fissionable material to assure the common defence and security, and to insure the broadest possible exploitation of the field.

(5) A program of administration which will be consistent with the foregoing policies and with international arrangements made by the United States, and which will enable the Congress to be currently informed so as to take further legislative action as may hereafter be appropriate.

Organization.

Section 2 imposes responsibility for achieving the desired objectives upon an

Atomic Energy Commission which is the principal administrative agency created by the act. The Commission is composed of five full-time civilian members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Originally the House Military Affairs Committee (Hon. Andrew May of Kentucky, chairman) recommended a commission of nine members and would not have required that they be placed on a full-time basis. In other words, under the original House version the President could have appointed officers in the armed forces of the United States, and thus the door was left open to military domination of the future development of atomic energy. This aroused violent and quite justifiable opposition, and the act as finally adopted, on the insistence of the Senate, and with the support of the President, prescribes a full-time and hence a civilian Commission membership. A salary of \$17,500 per annum is prescribed for the Chairman, and \$15,000 for the other Commissioners. The Commissioners hold office for terms of five years each.

Within the Commission and subordinate to it, there is a general manager, also appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and four division heads appointed by the Commission. The divisions specified are: Division of Research, Division of Production, Division of Engineering, and Division of Military Applications. The head of the last-named division may be a military officer. Then there is a General Advisory Committee, a board of advisers appointed by the President from civilian life. This Advisory Committee is to meet at least four times each calendar year to advise the Commission on scientific and technical matters relating to research and development of atomic energy.

Finally, there is a Military Liaison Committee consisting of representatives of the War and Navy Departments, de-

tailed without additional compensation by the Secretaries of War and Navy. The Atomic Energy Commission is commanded to advise and consult with this Liaison Committee on all matters which the Committee deems to relate to military applications of atomic energy.

Research.

Congress has recognized that only by continued progress in science can the high purposes of the act be achieved. In Section 3 the Commission is authorized both to conduct its own research programs and to assist research in private and public institutions by making supporting arrangements through contracts, agreements, and loans in aid of research activities.

Especial care has been taken in various parts of the act to avoid imposing restrictions on private research. Indeed, the power of the Commission over such research is confined to the bare minimum necessary to protect national security and to prevent hazards to the public safety and health.

Production of Fissionable Material.

Congress early became convinced that an absolute government monopoly of the function of producing fissionable materials is indispensable to effective protection of the public interests in atomic energy. A number of reasons point unmistakably to this conclusion, even though it may seem superficially inconsistent with our general reluctance to authorize government to embark upon business enterprises. Most important of all the reasons is the fact that fissionable material is the principal ingredient of atomic bombs, and to permit private manufacture of such weapons would be to turn loose in the world enormous destructive potentialities. Accordingly, Section 4 of the act provides that the Commission shall be the exclusive owner of all facilities for the

production of fissionable material. An exception is made of research facilities, and facilities having a potential production rate inadequate to enable the operator to produce atomic weapons. Conversely, it is made unlawful for any private person to own such facilities.

If it so desires, the Commission may itself operate its facilities for the production of fissionable materials. However, the act has endeavored to some extent to reconcile government monopoly with our traditional free enterprise system, and accordingly the Commission is authorized to enter into management contracts with private persons or corporations for the operation of government-owned plants, thus seeking to gain the full advantage of the skill and experience of American industry and measurably to preserve private enterprise in the production of fissionable materials.

Control of Materials.

The act identifies and defines two kinds of materials, fissionable materials and source materials. The term "fissionable materials" means all those materials capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction. Specifically mentioned are uranium enriched in the isotope 235 and plutonium (seemingly the only materials now deemed effective), but the Commission may, by regulation, add any other materials which it determines from time to time to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through chain reaction.

Consistently with the purposes underlying the provisions of Section 4, prescribing government ownership of all facilities for the production of fissionable materials, Section 5 declares that the ownership of all the fissionable materials themselves is vested in the Commission, and private ownership thereof is forbidden. The Commission is, nevertheless, authorized to distribute fissionable mate-

rials, with or without charge, as an aid to the conduct of research and development activities, for use in medical therapy, or for use in industrial applications, pursuant to licenses hereinafter referred to.

Government ownership of fissionable materials is not, however, extended to what the act calls source materials, that is, to uranium and thorium and ores containing uranium and thorium in useful proportions, but private owners may not transfer or export such source materials without first obtaining from the Commission a license to do so. Although the Commission is not made the owner of all source materials, it is empowered to acquire, in return for just compensation, necessary supplies of source materials wherever found, or interests in real property containing such materials. Source materials on public lands are reserved as property of the Commission.

Military Applications of Atomic Energy.

I have now called attention to the fact that the Commission is given absolute ownership and monopoly of the facilities for production of fissionable materials, and absolute ownership of the materials themselves. The Commission is also made a manufacturer of atomic weapons, subject to the control of the President, who must give specific assent to such manufacture. The Senate would have insisted that the Commission be the sole manufacturer of such weapons. The House, however, disagreed, and in the final draft of the act the President is authorized in Section 6 to permit the armed forces also to manufacture such weapons if he deems it desirable for them to do so.

Utilization of Atomic Energy.

One of the vital objectives is, of course, to promote the use of atomic energy in all feasible peacetime activities. Testimony before the committees of Congress has revealed the possibilities of numerous and

even startling benefits to mankind in medicine, in public health, and in the production for industry of heat, light, and power. The ultimate utilization of atomic energy promises to bring vast changes in the economic order. At the same time, Congress recognizes that great industrial installations representing nation-wide investment and employing many thousands of workers may be rendered obsolete. Congress feels, therefore, that it should retain the opportunity of passing upon and giving the green light to specific atomic energy uses. Section 7 therefore provides:

1. That atomic energy utilization devices (except for research or medical purposes) can neither be manufactured nor used without a license issued by the Commission.

2. That whenever the Commission feels that any nonmilitary use of atomic energy has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value, it shall make a report to Congress stating all the facts with respect to such use, together with its estimate of the social, political, economic, and international effects of such use, and its recommendations with respect thereto, and

3. That no license for manufacture of utilization devices or for use of atomic energy may be issued by the Commission until after this report has been filed with Congress for a period of 90 days during which Congress has been in session (thus affording an opportunity for Congressional veto).

4. That, thereafter, the Commission may in its discretion issue licenses to individuals for the approved industrial purposes. Such licenses are to be "on a non-exclusive basis" and the Commission may "supply to the extent available appropriate quantities of fissionable material to licensees whose proposed activities will serve some useful purpose proportional to the quantity of fissionable material to be consumed," and who comply with

certain other conditions. Licenses are to be issued for specified periods of not less than one year each, and they are revocable at any time by the Commission, in accordance with such procedures as the Commission may establish. These provisions grant to the Commission most important authority over future industrial utilization of atomic energy.

International Arrangements.

Congress recognizes, as does everyone else who thinks seriously on the subject, that the future of civilization is absolutely dependent upon the adoption of effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic weapons. Binding international treaties are sure to come, and, accordingly, Section 8 of the act provides that the Atomic Energy Act and any action of the Commission thereunder shall be subject to the provisions of any arrangement made for the international regulation of atomic energy. If inspections by international authority or other essential international protective arrangements are agreed upon, they must become the law of the land.

Property of the Commission.

Under Section 9, the Commission takes over all of the resources now owned by the United States devoted to atomic energy development, i.e.: all source materials, all fissionable materials, all atomic weapons, all property of the Manhattan District, and all patents, plants, contracts, and information relating to atomic energy. The Commission thus becomes a very heavy property owner—one of the world's largest.

Control of Information.

Then follows the all-important provision of Section 10 concerning the control of information relative to atomic energy. The problems here are delicate indeed. Common defense and security of the Na-

tion require the retention of the atomic bomb secret until other nations who might conceivably build such weapons have entered into effective international agreements safeguarding this possibility. At the same time, sufficient freedom of interchange of knowledge must be afforded to permit continued scientific progress. How shall the law draw the line? The act provides that:

1. No so-called restricted data shall be communicated in any manner whatsoever, and restricted data is defined to include all data concerning production and use of fissionable material except that which the Commission finds that it can release without adversely affecting the common defense and security. Severe penalties are attached to the unlawful communication of restricted data.

2. Information with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes shall not be shared with other nations unless and until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of such energy for destructive purposes have been established, and

3. Subject to the foregoing limitations, the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy shall be permitted and encouraged so as to provide the free interchange of ideas and criticisms essential to scientific progress.

This section is going to be exceedingly difficult to administer; the lines between restricted and nonrestricted information will not be easy to draw.

Patents and Inventions.

Section 11 has been a battleground in all committee hearings. The act prohibits private patents in the area of government monopoly, that is, in connection with the production and ownership of fissionable materials and the manufacture of atomic weapons. Any person who makes an invention or discovery useful for such

purposes is required to report the same to the Commission.

On the other hand, patents may be issued in normal course for inventions or discoveries appertaining to nonmilitary utilization of atomic energy. In all such cases, however, the Atomic Energy Commission is given authority to exert a unique control over the patents issued—a control not encountered elsewhere in our legal system. The control is this: The Commission may declare the patents to be "affected with the public interest" if it determines that the free licensing of such inventions is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act. In the event a patent is declared to be affected with the public interest, the Commission is itself authorized to make any desired use of the invention, and any person to whom a license is issued under Section 7 of the act to engage in the utilization of atomic energy may likewise be licensed to use the patented article or process. The owner of the patent, however, is entitled to receive reasonable royalty fees, which may be agreed to between the owner and the licensee, or, in the absence of such agreement, shall be determined by the Atomic Energy Commission.

It is obvious that these provisions make marked changes in our previous concepts of private patent rights and patent monopolies. Undoubtedly a wise decision was reached when it was concluded that no patents could be tolerated in the area of government monopoly, that is, in the production of fissionable materials and manufacture of atomic weapons. However, the requirement of "compulsory licensing" in connection with devices for the peacetime utilization of fissionable materials presents a more debatable aspect. Whatever objections there may be to patent rights, it is certainly arguable that without such rights so-called "risk capital" will not readily

flow into an area of developmental activity, even though royalties as prescribed by Commission action must be paid.

William H. Davis, former chairman of the War Labor Board, and one of the outstanding patent authorities of the country, testified before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Senate on this very point, asserting that if the patent rights to utilization devices were subjected to compulsory licensing, it would become necessary eventually for the Government to supply the risk capital, simply because private persons or corporations could not or would not supply it without the expectation of the economic advantage of the patent rights. However, Congress decided to take the chance, and the compulsory licensing feature for utilization of patents was written into the act. This is a distinct innovation in patent law. Only the future can tell whether or not it will tend to slow down the developmental process.

PRINCIPAL JURISTIC FEATURES OF THE ACT

The foregoing are the bare bones of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Considering the difficulties inherent in the subject matter, it is a magnificent example of lawmaking and certainly one of vast importance to every man, woman, and child in the country. The President's signature of the bill on August 1 and his appointment of the Commission brought the bare bones to life.

Backing away, for a moment, from the technical details of the legislation just described, what can we say concerning the jurisprudence involved in it? Without seriously straining the imagination, we can draw from it some significant conclusions concerning the impact of atomic fission on our legal system. Let us confine ourselves to two such observations.

Powers Delegated to Atomic Commission.

We should first notice the broad sweep of discretionary powers given to the Commission—powers to be exercised without effective guiding standards set forth in the law. Although the history of recent years reveals many instances of somewhat similar but less sweeping delegation of discretionary regulatory powers, no other peacetime enactment even approaching in importance the Atomic Energy Act has conferred anything like as much uncanalized power upon an administrative agency—not even the late lamented National Industrial Recovery Act which was felled by the ax of the pre-New Deal Supreme Court. In this regard the Atomic Energy Act occupies a unique place in jurisprudence. It is a juristic innovation rendered necessary by the impact of one phase of modern science on the economic and social order.

Let me illustrate by taking a few examples from the act. The Commission is directed (in Section 3) to aid the research efforts of private or public institutions and in connection therewith "to make arrangements, including contracts, agreements, and loans for the conduct of research." No attempt is made (and perhaps none could be made) to prescribe in the law the standards to be followed by the Commission in aiding research and making the "arrangements" therefor. What institutions shall be helped? How much help shall they receive? What conditions shall be attached to the aid extended? These and other questions must be decided by the Commission without the aid of law and simply in the exercise of its own judgment. In very large measure, the immediate future of research in atomic energy is dependent upon the wisdom of five men acting outside the range of legal rules, principles, or standards.

Again, the Commission (in Section 4)

is authorized and directed "to produce or to provide for the production of fissionable materials in its own facilities." The Commission will run a tremendous government business without statutory standards to guide its activities. Or the production of fissionable materials may be achieved by contract with private enterprise obligating the contracting party to produce fissionable material in facilities owned by the Commission, and this may be done under the act without the necessity of resorting to competitive bidding usually required for government contracts. Who gets the contracts? and for how much? and on what conditions? Reliance is placed entirely on the wisdom and judgment of five men acting outside the range of legal rules, principles, or standards.

Again, the Commission (in Section 5) is given authority to distribute fissionable material owned by it, with or without charge, to applicants requesting such material "for the conduct of research, for use in medical therapy, or for use under industrial utilization licenses." With some minor exceptions concerning public health and safety, no standards guide the discretion of the Commission to help determine who will get the materials, and how much, and on what conditions. A great responsibility rests upon five men.

The act provides further (in Section 7) that the Commission may license the "manufacture, production, export or use" of devices for the utilization of fissionable material, "subject to such conditions as the Commission may by regulation establish to effectuate the provisions of this act." The Commission's power to determine conditions is virtually unrestricted.

Thus the act confers on the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission the most sweeping discretionary powers ever conferred on an administrative

agency—powers that in very large measure will condition and determine the development and utilization of atomic energy during the generation to come. Wise, competent, and fair administration will be of incalculable value to the country. Maladministration or inefficient administration will be immeasurably devastating.

There is indeed no escape from conferring such powers—from relying largely upon the wisdom of the men who are chosen for these important posts. It is simply not possible, at this stage of the atomic energy game, to write in careful detail the applicable rules of law. Congress therefore has adopted the only alternative and relied upon the judgment of men rather than upon the rule of law. Congress knew what it was doing, but it simply could not do differently.

Secretary of War Patterson, when questioned on the subject by a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs, said: "The hazards in the way of peace alone are so considerable, the dangers from abuse of it are so tremendous, that you have to have strict control by an administrative body."

Government Monopoly.

As a second major feature of juristic policy in the Atomic Energy Act, we notice the important provisions for government ownership and monopoly and the exclusion of private enterprise from a large segment of atomic affairs. This too has been made necessary by the especially heavy impact of atomic fission on the ordinary affairs of mankind.

As I have hitherto written, the utilization of atomic energy involves four stages: first, fundamental research; second, the production of the raw ores; third, the production of fissionable material and the devices for utilizing it; and fourth, utilization of the fissionable material in war or in peace. Of these

four functions, the third is by law made exclusively a government-owned monopoly. The first and second are left to private enterprise, the second, however, being very strictly controlled by licensing procedures. The fourth is, of course, reserved exclusively to government monopoly as far as it relates to military uses, and it is strictly controlled by licensing procedures as far as it relates to peacetime industrial uses. Government-owned monopoly bites deeply into atomic energy—far more deeply than into any other activity of comparable industrial possibilities. Private enterprise, for the present at least, is very largely excluded.

When we consider the possibilities of the future—the development of fissionable materials out of other elements as yet unexplored; the production of atomic energy by the *fusion* as compared with the *fission* of atomic elements; the utilization of atomic energy for the peacetime benefit of mankind; the utilization of by-products such as manufactured radioactive materials—we cannot but be impressed with the extent to which the regulatory features of our legal system concerning atomic energy are likely to affect our civilization. And then, when we reflect that these vast potentialities are of necessity being reserved for government monopoly, or, if left to private enterprise at all, are subject to strict control by an administrative agency acting not in accordance with legal rules but in response to the judgment and discretion of its members, we cannot but be impressed with the thought that so-called free enterprise will not be particularly free in participating in the atomic future, and that the so-called rule of law will be largely replaced over a considerable segment of human activity by control through the judgment of public administrators.

Just to get the problem in proper

focus, suppose for a moment that some of our other great natural resources were subjected to like governmental authority; for example, petroleum products or electric power or the manufacture of more conventional varieties of explosives. The Office of Price Administration and the War Labor Board would pale into insignificance. Because of the dangerous potentialities of atomic energy in an unstable international situation, there is absolutely no alternative to the extent of government monopoly and control now written into the law, but we need not be blind to the probable future effect on the economic affairs of the Nation. At the same time, we are entitled to hope that the wisdom of the future will provide for the reduction of government controls by use of discretionary administrative power as the safety of the Nation and the world makes such reduction consistent with the welfare and security of humanity.

SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Since I have dealt largely with the question of atomic energy and the law, I can only briefly touch upon the social (in this case the legal) implications of modern science. Modern science, not only in the development of nuclear physics but generally in its development of manufacturing, communications, transportation, and other branches of industry, has brought a train of economic and social frictions. Modern science brings us airplanes, radio, penicillin, clothing made out of sodium acetate, and now atomic fission. But it also brings us as its indirect contribution large industry with its labor problems, monopoly with financial and business problems, and unemployment with social problems. These things flow more or less directly from modern science as the necessary concomitants of the complex, stream-

lined, interdependent mankind that has come to depend so heavily on the contributions of modern science.

Now we come to the real point of the paper. Most of the problems that arise as a result of modern scientific and technological development are simply too complex to be solved by writing the rules of the game in precise and definitive form and enforcing them through the judicial system as codes of legal rules and principles. They can seemingly be solved only by increasingly potent and intensive governmental administrative intervention, or, in some instances, even by government ownership; although, except for the Tennessee Valley Authority and now atomic fission, government ownership has not loomed very large in our picture.

These governmental operations necessarily substitute administrative agencies with broad discretionary powers for the conventional processes of the law and the judicial system. They necessarily govern our actions by substituting the judgment and discretion of government officials for the rules, principles, and standards of the legal system. This process of substitution has been growing progressively more pronounced as technology has heaped more and more complex living upon us. The march of time and modern science has carried us away from rule by law and toward rule by public administration.

We have been, are, and wish to remain a democracy. So long as a democratic community can prescribe by law the rules to guide the activities of its people, including its public officials, it can preserve its democratic ideals and methods. However, the experience of history has not yet shown how to preserve democracy when law is completely or even largely replaced by the judgment of administrators, by dictatorial fiat. There have been some tragic recent examples to give us

pause, but there must be some way of assuring that administration, even though it is given very great discretionary powers, can be held responsive to popular will. Modern science forces us to find

that way. That is the challenge of modern science to the legal system. That is the principal implication of modern science so far as it concerns the system of law under which we live.

Science and American Power

Max Lerner has here attempted to suggest both the strength and weakness of the American approach to science. Why is it that science is not given an opportunity to develop its full potential? How is it possible for the most advanced ideas in technology to "exist side by side with primitive and animistic taboos in the realm of social thought and action"? Mr. Lerner has been a college teacher at Sarah Lawrence and Williams, editor of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, *The Nation*, and author of *It's Later Than You Think*, *Ideas for the Ice Age*, *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes*, and a new edition of Thorstein Veblen's writings.

The big paradox about science in America is that with all its vaunted use it is not given full sway; that while it is worshiped it is also feared; that while its strength is linked with the atmosphere of freedom in which it has developed, it has not released the social imagination nor fortified the social will; that the finest flowering of scientific genius in the realm of technology somehow manages to exist side by side with primitive and animistic taboos in the realm of social thought and action.

We live today in the shadow of a scientific triumph whose immensity will give its name to an entire world epoch to come—the release of atomic energy. The discovery was the result of world knowledge, levying upon contributions from scientists of many nations. But it was America that took over the knowledge, organized it, fitted it together, underwrote the engineering work required, and got out in front with every indication that it means

to stay in front. How have the Americans achieved this position? Why should it have been exactly they who were destined to wield to the fullest the power of science and wear most jauntily the greenest bays of its glory?

For the beginning of an answer we must look to the growth of American civilization. America was born at the beginning of the great age of science. When we think of the major inventions of the modern world, we think naturally of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the full flowering of technology. But back of this flowering were the long centuries when the seed grew in the earth. The *saeculum mirabile* of European science was, by the common suffrage of its historians, the seventeenth. The same expansive forces that produced the scientific discoveries of that century produced the American settlements as well. Europe was pent-up. It reached out intellectually, as it reached out physically,

for new frontiers. In England the history of the Royal Society paralleled that of the plantation companies, and men were tinkering with test tubes in laboratories throughout the 17th and 18th centuries while other men were fighting out the battles of dogma and religious freedom, mercantilism and economic freedom. When we remember that the whole atmosphere surrounding the settlement and peopling of America was an atmosphere of scientific beginnings, it becomes more congruous to think of America itself as an experiment on the vast laboratory of a continent. Except in a climate of innovation America would have been impossible, and in the innovating social climate of America, inventions were bound to flourish.

They did not, of course, until the primary needs of physical and political survival had been met. Until after the Revolutionary War, Benjamin Franklin and Benjamin Rush were the only American scientists of account. Science, the heir of centuries of intellectual development, could not flourish in a wilderness. It needed universities, laboratories, leisure. Nor could the Americans move into the realm of scientific experiment with all their lusty strength until they first had a sense of that strength: which did not come until the Revolution had been fought and the Constitution consolidated. But once launched on its career American science had everything in its favor for a rapid sweep across the world horizons.

For one thing, it was close enough to the European intellectual heritage to be able to tap its accumulated knowledge; yet it had also the freedom of distance—the extra margin of freedom from the accustomed grooves of thinking which often hemmed a European scientist in. One of the clearest examples of this double-truth may be found in Benjamin Franklin's career as a scientist. (Cf. I. Bernard Cohen's introduction to his edi-

tion of *Benjamin Franklin's Experiments and Observations on Electricity*, Harvard, 1941.)

Franklin is one of the great names in electricity, with his "single fluid theory" of electricity, his coining of new terms for the science, his theory of the Leyden jar, and his conclusions about the relation of lightning and electricity. He started his puttering about with the theory of electricity when an English friend sent him some rudimentary equipment with a few hints on how to use it. Without the European scientific tradition he would have been helpless: but from that point on, being far from Europe, he was on his own, with a joyous sense of excitement in his discoveries, and working in an atmosphere of intense popular interest. So much was he on his own that often when he wrote his friends in Europe about his experiments, he didn't know whether terms already existed for what he observed, or whether his own newly-coined terms were the first. With the growth of his fame as a scientist, his European friends sent him the literature containing the orthodox vocabulary and the traditional ideas on electricity. As Cohen observes in his introduction, "As he learned from books, rather than his own investigations, he ceased to have a free unfettered mind. As he became more and more familiar with the literature of electricity, he made fewer and fewer discoveries until finally he made no more."

Franklin's career had some other things in it that Cohen recounts and that are symbolic of the career of American science. He was the subject of a grotesque incident in England: his lightning rod was discussed in the Royal Society, which when asked to protect a powder magazine from the effects of lightning, recommended the Franklin lightning rod, with pointed conductors below the surface of moist earth. An English member of the committee, Benjamin Wilson, dissented on

the matter of "points" and insisted on blunt conductors or "knobs" instead. He continued to attack Franklin and split the Society on the matter, without success—until the Revolutionary War. Here George III intervened, ordered "blunt" conductors for the royal palace, and when the President of the Royal Society refused to reverse the committee's recommendation on the Franklin rod, the King forced his resignation.

One may take this delightful story as a symbol of the European institutional hindrances from which American science was free. It could pursue the laws of Nature without troubling about the laws of monarchies; it could work in an atmosphere in which (except for the period of the New England theocracy) it did not have to cope with a codified body of religious taboos nor with a church rooted in state power; it did not have to reckon with either priestly or aristocratic castes. It was free to open and develop the resources of a Continent.

But these were negative freedoms. The positive strength that American science had lay in the fact that the resources of the Continent were there to develop, and that the whole impulse of America was to do exactly that. In that impulse were tied together the main threads of the American mind—its Puritan emphasis on work and works, its drive to capitalist exploitation, its sense of newness and curiosity, its confidence in itself, its feeling of illimitable horizons and a staggering destiny. Even the economic ruling class, which emerged in the Industrial Revolution after Franklin's death, was anything but hostile to the science which underlay the technological changes that had created it. In Europe the class of economic rulers had to give primacy and prestige to the political rulers and the social aristocracy; in America its sway was undisputed. Its great hope lay exactly in science. For only science could conquer

the needed domain for these rulers, strip the forests, open the land, build the railroads, pick the cotton, thresh the wheat, harness the energy. The rich prize of the Continent lay open and inviting; the best skilled labor and technical brains had been drawn to it; the floodgates were down.

But let me state clearly in what sense America has excelled in science. Not so much in "pure" science or scientific theory. It was partly that America came too late to take part in the greatest scientific discoveries: mathematics came to birth in Egypt and Babylonia, geometry in Greece, astronomy in the Renaissance; chemistry rose to importance in the 18th century. America has developed no Pythagoras, no Aristotle, no Euclid or Archimedes, no Copernicus or Galileo, no Newton, no Lavoisier, no Darwin or Mendel, no Planck or Mach or Einstein. There was still room for American pure scientists of the stature of Willard Biggs or Simon Newcomb; and in the present generation so much of the talent of European science that was not killed off by fascism has sought refuge in America, and so much research money has been made available for "pure" research by the corporations and the armed services who have had proof in the past that pure science pays off in the end, that from now on the American record in scientific theory may come to occupy the place that Greece, England, and Germany have had in the past.

But up to now the great American achievement has been less in theory than in its application, less in the discovery of laws than in the fashioning of "inventions," less in "science" itself than in technology and engineering. To be sure, Americans have taken their share of the burden of lonely scientific thinking; they have assumed more than their share of the organization of scientific research; their laboratories are the greatest and best equipped in the world, and the experimental scientific habit of thought has entered

the American consciousness as deeply as the consciousness of any people in history. But where America has gone farthest ahead has been in applied science. Wherever in the world and whenever in history men have made strides in the understanding of how nature works, it is almost invariably the Americans who have carried farthest the application of that understanding.

One of the flaming symbols of this fact is the atom bomb. Atomic theory was hot on the trail of nuclear fission in every great country in the world, but it remained for the Americans to carry to completion the task of releasing the atom's explosive and destructive force. To the theory itself scientists from every great country in the world contributed, including the enemy countries of Germany and Austria and Italy. The achievement of the Americans was an engineering achievement; the division of the necessary research into thousands of parts and its distribution among all the research centers of the country; the fitting of the findings together into an intricate pattern; the construction of plants, machinery, machine tools; the combination of wealth and economic power with inexhaustible research and precision.

The Russians may someday be capable of similar feats, perhaps even of greater. But for the present the Americans rule the field in the application of science to technology. Again we must ask: why?

The Greek civilization made greater individual contributions to scientific theory than the American has. It moved from myth to science. But somehow the Greeks never crossed the threshold from science to technology. Centuries before the Christian era, three men of Miletus on the coast of Asia Minor—Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes—pierced to the beginnings of science; in Sicily three others—Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Empedocles—laid the foundations for theories on which men

have been building for centuries; in the little town of Abdera in Thrace, two men—Leucippus and Democritus—first evolved the atomic theory of the constitution of matter. At the height of Greek achievement, a Macedonian called Aristotle synthesized everything that the Greeks knew of nature and its workings in systems more staggeringly comprehensive than any man before or after him was capable of. Yet Greek science stopped with these world views. It did not run machines, relieve labor of its burdens, pile up wealth and power. Why?

The effort to account for the failure of Greek technology may in turn shed light on my query about the success of American technology. Democritus, who first formulated the atomic theory, will no doubt remain a greater name in the history of science than Oppenheimer, who supervised the scientific work on nuclear fission and the atom bomb. But Oppenheimer lives in a social atmosphere wholly different from that of Democritus, or even of Aristotle centuries later.

As Max Beer, J. L. Hammond, and Benjamin Farrington have pointed out, what kept the Greeks from using their science was their institution of slavery at the base of their social system. The thinking was done by free men and citizens; the work was done by slaves. Where there is a contempt for labor, there is a separation from the sources of experience with nature, an incapacity for induction and verification, a blindness as to the practical imperatives that shape innovation. The American scientist, no matter how rich or famous, has never cut himself off thus from these sources of experience. While he has been less a creator of world views than the Greek scientists or even the modern European, he has been persistently the discoverer of new ways of getting old and new things done. Greek science developed greatly in the context of Greek political and moral individualism, but in the con-

text of slavery and the aristocratic attitude toward work it could go no further than science, and was truncated before it could reach technology. American technology developed also in the context of individualism, but there were no taboos of the ruling class to truncate it.

If the South had triumphed in the Civil War and had gone on to spread over the whole American civilization the social implications of the "peculiar institution," the same fate might have befallen American science as befell Greek. The Civil War was thus more than a moral or a constitutional struggle. Exactly because it was fought over moral and constitutional issues it was also a crisis in technology. Calhoun dreamt of a Greek Republic in the South, and the ruling class in a South-dominated system of slavery might, like the Greek, have lived more graciously than the capitalist class that emerged the victor from the Civil War. It might even have produced a finer flowering of literature and philosophy. But the ruling class that did emerge created a social psychology and an ethos in which, whatever else might be said of it, science was at a premium and technology was cherished.

It was a ruling class which, having triumphed over a rival system of economic organization, went on to the even greater triumphs of the conquest of a Continent and the economic empire of the world. It lavished its gifts on science because science in turn opened a cornucopia of profits. It whipped technology on because, with every new discovery, new areas of investment were opened and new heights of productivity were reached. If it be said that in the process of overcoming the Southern system of feudal slavery the capitalist ruling class created a new industrial helotry, in which men are tied not to the land but to the machine, the answer is yes. But where the Greek ruling class used its helots to keep the technological status quo, the American rulers use theirs

to increase their profits, and to do that they need always to raise the level of technology and productivity. The level of American technology will cease to rise just as soon as the American economic rulers grow so blind in their pursuit of particular profits and power that they allow the economy as a whole to collapse; and just as soon as the "pathos of distance" between the corporate rulers and the industrial helots becomes too great to be bridged by the dignity of work and the passion for technology.

I turn now to another facet of the inquiry. If we say that American strength is the result of American science and technology, it would be equally true to say the character of American science and technology shed some light on the inner nature of that strength. The question about a civilization is not whether it uses science, but what sciences it uses, and what use it makes of them.

The characteristic Greek sciences were botany, zoology, biology, and mathematics, as befitted a people who were interested in the individual and the category and their relations. The characteristic sciences of American technology turned out to be chemistry and physics, electronics and radiation, as befits a people who are interested in energy and speed, communication and power. Thus the American sciences are a key to the crucial traits of the American civilization. They are the sciences of power.

Spengler had at least a half-truth by the tail when he wrote (in his famous chapter on *Faustian and Apollinian Nature-knowledge*): "Force is the mechanical Nature-picture of western man.... The primary ideas of this physics stood firm long before the first physicist was born." While this theory that the science-type in any civilization exists long before the science does is mainly pretty good poetry, it is provocative enough not to be ignored. Veblen came perhaps closer

to the same problem when he linked the American "technology of physics and chemistry" (a quarter-century ago radiation and electronics had not yet emerged) with the "absentee ownership" by and of corporations. And if you push absentee ownership and corporate power still farther back, you get the "natural rights" of property.

Here I think we reach a significant relationship. The American conceptions of science were hand in hand with the American conceptions of nature: the Declaration of Independence, with its theory of the natural rights of the individual, necessarily was the forerunner of the great inventions of the nineteenth century. The *Federalist Papers* are in themselves a microcosm of the forces in the American mind that were to shape the uses of science: on the one hand, an equilibrium-politics, and on the other hand a deep drive to establish the principle of a central authority with the power to govern. The two may seem inconsistent to the critical student of today, and their inconsistency has been shown in the creaking of the American governmental machine: yet the important fact is that they were both part of the 18th century American mind, and the sense of natural law in the equilibrium principle coexisted with the power-sense in the principle of central authority.

These two—the sense of natural law and the power-sense—have been the formative forces in American science and tech-

nology, as they have been in American political science and economics. The "reception" that the Americans gave the principles of John Locke, as Walton Hamilton has analyzed it and Merle Curti has traced it, is another instance of the transforming drive in the American civilization: for the Locke that came out of American thought was very different from the Locke that came into it from the English. It is in the nature of a civilization's "genius" that whatever material it devours it transforms in the image of its own stereotype. When John Locke came out of the American transforming machine, his name was Andrew Carnegie or Henry Ford. The Declaration of Independence became the "due process" decisions of the Supreme Court. Tom Paine's flaming pamphlet on natural law became the comfortable doctrines that bolstered property-exploitation. The American's conception of Nature became corporate absentee ownership, and its servant and handmaiden was the technology of chemistry and physics.

The congruity between American science and the driving spirit of American political and economic development was the congruity of élan and force. The geography and resources of America invited a physics of force, and the role of Nature in American political thinking reflected it and prepared the ground for it. Out of the sciences of force came American technology and the machine-process; and they in turn cast their spell upon science.

9

REGIONS, REGIONALISM, AND POLITICS

I

In the readings in this chapter we shall be concerned primarily with certain aspects of a relationship between area (space) and politics. There are several rather obvious implications to be drawn from this relationship. One is that political power is always exercised within boundary lines or legal frontiers whether they be national, state, county, township, or city boundaries. Such jurisdictional divisions of the earth's surface differ from one another geographically as well as politically. Thus factors of geography influence British foreign policy, American military power, the control of Montana politics by the copper interests, or the impact of the fruit growers on California politics. Another implication is that as a general rule legal boundaries change slowly while their significance may change rapidly. The social relations which require political regulation have tended increasingly to spread beyond the particular jurisdictions wherein power resides. The atomic bomb, guided missiles, and germ warfare know no political frontiers; yet, any power to control the use of these weapons can—at this stage of international development—only be exercised within national boundaries. A more mundane example is that technology has done something to the county as a political unit. Land was once the chief productive resource, the chief basis of wealth, and therefore was a proper support for taxes. Now most counties are poor because the population has tended to segregate in cities and because land is no longer so important in tax yield. County lines remain a tribute to a bygone era, unchanged by conditions which invalidate their original function.

II

Regions seldom have exact boundaries in the sense employed above: the region is an in-between unit—somewhere between states and the federal government in the United States, and between national states and the United Nations system. Most people are aware of the *Western Hemisphere*, the *South*, the *Mid-*

west or *New England*. But the existence of different types of regions, various theories of regional planning, regionalism as a cultural and political force, and the effect of regional differences on local and national politics have all been subjects primarily for the attention of specialists and practicing politicians.

We have suggested that within any society there are several layers of political jurisdiction ranging upward from the local community, and we have also suggested that people dwelling in one geographic area are likely to have some interests peculiar to them which differentiate them from the people of other areas. These phenomena are not just *reflections* of underlying factors, they are *in themselves* factors which influence political life and practices. Moreover some intricate problems of government per se are involved; the question of how men are to administer their political activities plunges one directly into the matter of area. Area is one of the criteria for administrative organization in the modern nation.

Another line of thought which emerges from a consideration of area and politics concerns the progressive enlargement of political units. Some observers point to a development from the primary unit, the family, to the tribe, to feudal units, and finally to the nation-state. The implication is that the nation-state has become obsolete for some purposes and is in process of being succeeded by some larger, more inclusive political entity. There is an element of factual truth buried in this hypothesis, but as a generalization it is too broad; the evolution of political institutions is more complex. For one thing, political units larger than the state have been known to flourish only to die. The decline and fall of the Roman and British Empires would seem to indicate that mere enlargement of political jurisdiction is no test of effectiveness or durability. There is evidence that continued political centralization is not always desirable; recently there has been a tendency—notably in the United States—to decentralize, to vest some functions in smaller areas of administration. Size alone is not the decisive factor; bigness is not good or bad in itself, and steady increase in political area is not necessarily proof that smaller units are outmoded. Function must be considered along with size. The real problem is, what political functions are best performed in spatial units of what size?

Nevertheless, mankind today either lives in, or is affected directly by, larger units of government than has been true in the past. A lengthy inquiry would be required to explain this change, but a brief reminder of the impact of sheer size on present day politics is in order. The larger the jurisdictional boundaries of government have become—and consequently the further away from the individual they have grown—the more impersonal government has become. Parallel to the two *social* worlds (the personal and the impersonal) noted in a previous chapter are two *political* worlds, the local and the national. For the most part, the great political decisions are made in the external or national political world. Large area plus technology equals big government—meaning centralization of regulatory and policy-making functions. Big government, though necessary, has undoubtedly helped foster public apathy and lack of

participation. Yet, by the same token, the people tend to look to the national or central authority for decisions, with the result that interest in local politics has also visibly declined.

As units of government have increased in size democracy has, of course, become more and more indirect. It is probably true in principle that direct democracy thrives best in small units where face to face relationships are common. Students of government and politics have professed to see a great hope for the future of democracy in a revival of local political responsibility or participation. This is a recognition that large area and large populations induce indirect rule and that an effective laboratory for practical democratic experience can only be found where the area covered by political jurisdiction is relatively small. This idea contains the seeds of a lesson: geographic area (size) will exert a strong influence on the nature of political institutions. One basic reason for the variations between British and American political practices lies in the difference in the number of square miles administered under each system; diversity increases proportionately with area and American political methods must take great diversity into account. The trend toward larger political units for some functions (including the so-called trend toward world government) is compelling a revaluation of techniques. It is not enough to say that where the area is larger representative democracy must replace direct democracy. A new problem is created by greater size, namely, how is it possible to overcome the handicaps to rule-by-the-people when the latter live widely separated and when it is difficult to implant in the minds of individuals an awareness of being one among many living under somewhat different conditions?

III

What is a region? Obviously it comprises an *area*, a clearly definable geographic unit. If one says such and such a territory constitutes a certain kind of region, he is employing a spatial concept. Yet, as Odum and Moore (*American Regionalism*, p. 1) have pointed out, "... the region differs from the mere locality or pure geographic area in that it is characterized not so much by boundary lines and actual limits as it is by flexibility of limits, by extension from a center and by fringe or border margins which separate one area from another." Another aspect of the region is a "homogeneity" of selected features: a political region like the Midwest is a region because there are some behavior traits or environmental influences which the whole area shares and which distinguish it from other political regions in the United States. Organically, a region consists of land and people "culturally conditioned through time and spatial relations"—a miniature "society within a society" having peculiar structural or functional characteristics but nonetheless integrated with a larger whole. In sum, there is a regional quality to national culture, behavior, and institutions.

A distinction is necessary between "region" and "regionalism." Supposedly,

a region—as defined—is an objective fact. Regionalism is a collection of phenomena resulting from the existence of regions—for example, the ways in which the existence of national or international regions effect government and politics. A further distinction is required. Both regions and regionalism can be used for two different purposes: as a method of observing politics, of tracing the historical development of institutions or of explaining current events, and, as an instrumentality—to administer government, to criticize institutions and policies, and to meet the social needs of the population. The first is illustrated by saying that the 20-year protection given the slave trade in the Constitution as drawn in 1787 was due to regional pressures. The second is illustrated by saying that there ought to be a conservation and power project in the Missouri River Valley region because this is the best method of conquering the drought problem.

It is not surprising therefore to discover that there are many varieties of regions and regionalism. There are administrative regions and planning regions. The urban sociologist will see a country divided into metropolitan regions. Literary regionalism identifies Irving, Cooper, and Bryant as Northeastern figures, with Edna Ferber representing the Western, and Steinbeck the Southwestern regions. Anthropologists will conceive regions as based upon the distribution of aboriginal antecedents of various sections of the population. Geographers draw their regional map based upon similarities of physical climate, soil, vegetation, and so on. Demographers focus their attention upon population density and rate of growth. Economic regions embrace the relationship between the natural landscape on the one hand and patterns of production, distribution and transport on the other. All approaches to the definition of regions and concepts of regionalism have one thing in common: they are concerned with phenomena or conditions relating to space.

IV

The theory and practice of regions and regionalism is of the utmost importance in international politics. The Inter-American System (presented below), the Arab League, the Russian Orbit, the Caribbean and South Pacific Commissions, the new Western European bloc solidified under the protection and aid of the European Recovery Program (passed by Congress in the Spring of 1948) all testify to the importance of this factor. International regions differ widely too. Western Europe seems to be emerging momentarily as more of an economic and military than political grouping. The Caribbean Commission exemplifies a modest economic and social planning, while the Arab League is political and military in nature. The Inter-American System has several kinds of bonds, however flimsy they may appear at times; recently the emphasis has been on the co-operation of the independent states of the Hemisphere in the face of a non-Hemisphere threat to their common security. Russia's forging of regional ties in Eastern Europe, though it bears superficial resemblances to the Pan-

American bloc, is in reality more overtly military than the latter and there is no corresponding insistence upon the independence and self-determination of the members.

Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter contains the following recognition of such developments:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. . . . The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement under its authority. . . . The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies. . . .

International regionalism as theory is important too. The foremost writer advocating a system of world regional organization is Mr. Walter Lippmann, foreign affairs analyst for the New York *Herald Tribune*. In two well-known books, *War Aims* and *U. S. Foreign Policy*, he argues that Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, Latin America, Scandinavia, Western Europe, Spain, and West Africa together constitute a natural strategic defense region which he calls the Atlantic Community. This community ought to be formally recognized and strengthened. Beyond the Atlantic Community Mr. Lippmann sees the Russian Orbit and the Chinese Orbit. Events in 1948 seemed to give promise that his thesis might be justified.

For several years Winston Churchill has been a colorful advocate, first (in 1946) of a genuine political federation of Great Britain and Western Europe and later of a federated Europe. Writing in the Paris weekly *Carrefour* in May, 1948, Mr. Churchill put the choice before European nations as "union or catastrophe." "The hour of choice has come. And that choice is simple. If the populations of Europe decide to unite and work together for their mutual good . . . they may yet . . . regain the sweet rising tide of liberty, happiness, and abundance. But it is their last chance." He wrote further, "We shall accept without question the supremacy of the United Nations which provides for regional organizations. The European union will be one, the United States with dependencies, the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth will be the others of the four pillars of the modern temple of peace."

V

What are some of the connecting links between political behavior and the phenomena of regions and regionalism? If there are many types of regionalism and regions, what, precisely, is the kind in which the political scientist is interested?

Significant portions of American political history can be explained in terms of the growth of the United States on a regional basis. In his classic analysis,

The Frontier in American History (1920), the late Frederick Jackson Turner states: "Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the Colonization of the Great West. . . . Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life." Again, "This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive, furnish the forces dominating American character."

Regional influences can be seen at work in Congress. Mining and lumber interests tend to center their demands on Congressmen from the West and Northwest. The "Silver bloc" which appears every now and then in the Senate represents Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Wyoming, and Montana where important silver and copper enterprises are located; there is some truth in the remark that in this sparsely populated region, interests rather than voters are represented. The South offers many examples of regional pressures on policy-making, particularly the continuous opposition by the representatives of the ten Southern states to antilynching legislation and the Civil Liberties Program proposed by President Truman in 1948. The West coast (California, Washington, and Oregon) has traditionally been opposed to the unlimited immigration of Chinese and Japanese; during World War II, the relocation of enemy aliens was partly the result of a regional concern over a racial situation. For many years the Midwest seemed to be the center of what is termed "isolationist" sentiment—a feeling of reluctance to have the United States intervene in world affairs. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

It would be well to keep in mind that political representation in the United States is fundamentally geographical. When it is also considered that economic activity has largely spilled over state lines, it becomes clearer why regional, as distinct from local, state or national, views manifest themselves in politics.

"Sectionalism" is a synonym for a certain kind of regional political pressure on national legislation, but since we have suggested that regions and regionalism are of various sizes and types it is better to keep the two terms separate. For instance, the Civil War was a "sectional" struggle between the North and South. In a sense it was an interregional conflict (which, incidentally, still has overtones today); however, while it is proper to speak of the South as a fairly well defined region politically, it would be difficult to characterize something called the North in the same way; the North has been divided between the Midwest and the Northeast (or New England) and Middle Atlantic states. The region and the section may coincide, but not necessarily. There is a further difference: Sectionalism—as a spirit, as a movement and as a political rallying

point—tends to emphasize rivalry, provincialism, isolation, and self-sufficiency. The new regionalism (as set forth by Lilienthal, Mumford, Odum, and others)—also a spirit, a movement, and a political device—emphasizes the recognition of diversity of land and culture, the idea of integration and balance: integration of region with the whole nation, and balance of region with region.

Another aspect of the regional basis of politics is that groups of states have tended to vote consistently Republican or Democratic or to swing back and forth. The most obvious expression of this is the "Solid South" which, except for the presidential election of 1928, has supported the Democratic Party. Regional solidarity in voting has been slowly undergoing a change and there is evidence that the pattern of national voting is becoming less regional in nature. Nonetheless, it is probably still accurate to say that if a candidate cannot poll a strong vote in the presidential primary in a key midwestern state like Wisconsin he does not stand much chance of nomination in the Republican party. And it is probably true too that the nucleus of a victorious electoral college plurality must be comprised of a combination of two of the following blocs: Northeast, Midwest, and South; this will not be enough in itself, but a candidate cannot be elected without it.

Many of our political problems are regional, and regions have become an administrative device. The individual states of our federal union alone, or even in conjunction with the federal government, are not always in a position to take effective political action in some matters. One direct relationship between area and politics is this: political controls must embrace all the important factors in a given situation if they are to be effective; one reason for the ever-increasing territorial scope of government is that technology and nature do not respect political boundaries. A project like the TVA—looking at it as a conservation measure and as a source of power for the whole Tennessee River Valley—could only have been accomplished on a regional level. The river itself and the needs of the people were *interstate* and not *intrastate*. The TVA represents one of a hundred different types of regional approaches to administration in the United States.

Taking a somewhat larger problem, some of the South's economic difficulties require that this region be considered as a counterpart of the whole nation. The economic unbalance and distress in the South are regional conditions. There is some truth in the statement that the South has gradually drifted into a semicolonial status. It is below the national average in per capita income; it has had its skilled labor force reduced by the migration of important age groups; it contains one-half of all the eroded soil in the United States; and it has less competitive strength economically than any other region. A recent Supreme Court decision underlines this latter point. On May 12, 1947, the Supreme Court upheld an Interstate Commerce Commission order reducing classification freight rates by 10% in the South and West and increasing them by 10% in the North and East. Before this decision the charge per 100-weight shipment from Atlanta, Georgia, to Hopkinsville, Kentucky, (362 miles) was \$1.06

whereas from Chicago to Hopkinsville (396 miles) it was only \$.84 per 100-weight.

New Deal policies and industrial stimulation during World War II have given the West an unprecedented prosperity and paved the way for developments which will eventually change the structure of the national economy. Bernard DeVoto, who knows and loves the West and who above all perceives the psychological and cultural factors which may stand in the way of the realization of the Western "dream," recently wrote:

The West has always suppressed domestic criticism, while cringing before criticism from outside, and has treated nonconformity of idea and innovation of any kind, especially in business, as dire social evils. Forever in rebellion against exterior exploitation, it has nevertheless always co-operated with the exploiters against itself when the chips were down. Worst of all, its own interior exploitation has always worked to the same end. No destruction by absentee-owned corporations of the West's natural resources—all it has—has ever been forestalled, because anything that could forestall it would also forestall the West's own destruction of those same resources. At this moment there is intended an assault on the public resources of the West which is altogether Western and so open that it cannot possibly be called a conspiracy. It is an assault which in a single generation could destroy the West and return it to the processes of geology. That such an intent publicly flourishes and may succeed—at the very moment when the West is undertaking, with some possibility of success, to emancipate itself and establish an advanced industrial economy—is plain proof of schizophrenia.*

It is apparent from the foregoing and from the materials presented below that there are regional problems which are beyond the reach of any existing governmental agencies, except the federal courts or regulatory bodies. Furthermore, there are forces at work within the great regions which prevent them from undertaking a conscious, unified approach to their own difficulties. Thus the South is caught in a kind of vicious circle. Industrialization and social reforms which would strengthen the South are retarded because government and politics in this region are not very responsive to these needs. And until there are far-reaching economic and social changes, government is likely to remain subservient to the dominant pressures.

Finally, it remains to point out that politics within regions must be partly explained as the result of indigenous factors. Why is voting more independent in the West than in the South? How do the respective "myths" of the South and Midwest differ and what is the effect of this on their respective politics? What forces, social or otherwise, weaken the South and Midwest vis-à-vis other regions? Of what does the political significance of the Midwest consist? What is the effect of the different economic make-up of the various regions of the United States? The readings presented below cover some of the major aspects or regional factors in American politics and should be thought about in connection with these questions.

* Bernard De Voto, "The Anxious West," *Harper's Magazine*, December, 1946, pp. 490-1.

Regionalism and Politics

Lewis Mumford is a philosopher, essayist, and social critic. He has written many books on phases of contemporary civilization. In this selection, Mr. Mumford is concerned with planning and with regional development as an antidote to certain disadvantages of modern living. He is not so much concerned with *what is* as much as he is concerned with *what might be*. In other words, he is analyzing regionalism as an instrument of social policy. The political implications of such a point of view are obvious. Attention is particularly called to Mr. Mumford's point that social requirements are seldom met within the usual type of political boundaries.

The reanimation and the rebuilding of regions, as deliberate works of collective art, is the grand task of politics for the opening generation. It raises anew, in a form that now has fuller human significance, the fundamental questions of human interrelationship across the ethnic, ideological, and cultural boundaries that have been carried over from the past. And as the new tasks of region-building imply shifts in the population, migration into more favored areas, and the building up or reconstruction of a multitude of new urban complexes, the politics of regional development become of critical importance. Not merely must we define and express the region: we must work out, by deliberate experiment, the areas for interregional co-operation and for super-regional authority. In displacing the functions of the power-state by those of the service-state we must also transform the structure of the existing organizations. The task calls for imaginative audacity and moral vision: how much so, one may discover by considering the methods of political co-ordination that grew up in our recent past.

The process of political unification has

taken place, throughout the world, in fairly generous disregard of geographic and economic realities. And the result is that political areas, economic areas, and cultural areas do not exist in concentric relationship: overlappings, duplications, conflicts, and blank spaces characterize our territorial relationships. Though the sovereignty of the state is supposed to polarize all these relationships it actually adds to the confusion, since it often attempts to displace in the interests of "unity" more natural allegiances. In general, political unification has meant de-regionalization: this is equally true in federal states, like the United States, and in unitary states like France. As the powers of the central government have waxed and its territory increased, the powers of the local regions and cities have waned: earliest perhaps in France, latest in Germany. Finally, each state has tended to reach the pathological condition wittily described by the French critic: apoplexy at the center and paralysis at the extremities.

In creating the semblance of political unity between diverse regions and communities, the idea of the nation has been

an important one: a term inherently so vague and so contradictory that it must always be taken in a mystic sense, as meaning whatever the ruling classes hold it convenient to mean at the moment. Sometimes language is the key to nationhood: sometimes a common political territory: sometimes common institutions: sometimes all of these together. But a common language does not make the English and the Americans a single nation, and a common territory does not make the Germans and the Czechs in Czechoslovakia a single nation: so in any scientific sense the concept is worthless. Viewed realistically, however, "nationalism" is an attempt to make the laws and customs and beliefs of a single region or city do duty for the varied expressions of a multitude of other regions. To the extent that such a unity does not grow out of spontaneous allegiances and natural affiliations it must constantly be held together by deliberate effort: indoctrination in the school, propaganda in the press, restrictive laws, extirpation of rival dialects and languages, either by mockery or mandate, suppression of the customs and privileges of minorities.

The national state, fortunately, never achieves anything like the omnicompetence and omnipotence it aspires to. Only in times of war, when frontiers are closed, when the movement of men and goods and ideas across "national" boundaries can be clocked, when a pervading sense of fear sanctions the extirpation of differences, does the national state conform to its ideal pattern. All the great national states, and the empires formed around a national core, are at bottom war-states: their politics is war-politics; and the all-absorbing preoccupation of its governing classes lies in collective preparation for armored assault. The final caricature of this tendency is National Socialist Germany today, with its fatuous racial mythology (taken over from the descen-

dants of Abraham), its operative religion, and its cult of brutality: all focused on war.

In the so-called national state there is only an accidental correspondence between the outlines of the state and the departments of state administration on one hand, and the nature of the component regions on the other. Rival forces, rival authorities, rival centers of culture are suppressed under a centralized system of government: witness the fate of the provincial centers of France between 1600 and 1900, and observe what is happening in Germany, the ancient home of municipal freedom, today. The suppression of regional characteristics, in the interests of national unity, is systematically carried on by the modern state; and in this effort the political agents are powerfully abetted by the financial forces of the metropolis, seeking to impose uniform standards in order to guarantee their own control of the "national market."

But at the very moment, in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the repressive forces of nationalism seemed about to achieve an unqualified victory, they met a fresh challenge. It was in 1854 that the *Félibrigistes* first met in order to restore the language and the autonomous cultural life of Provence: that marked the conscious beginning of a regionalist movement that has grown slowly but steadily ever since. The Bretons and Provençals in France, the Czechs and Slovaks in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Irish, Welsh, and Scotch in Great Britain, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium—these and similar groups have asserted their claims to an autonomous regional life. If the movement took no hold on Germany during this period, it was only because that country, before the advent of the Nazis, was the outstanding example of an historic federalism which

roughly satisfied the needs of regional and cultural autonomy: it needed only a political re-definition of the constituent regions, including a division of Prussia, to make Germany a world example of economic and cultural regionalism.

The rise of regional groups raised the specter of national disunity: a fatal image to states immersed in war or preparation for war. National systems of education have therefore attempted to break down whatever regional consciousness has survived: history is national history, and the focus of events is always the national capital, not the local city. Even more, metropolitan fashions and metropolitan propaganda, spread through magazines and newspapers, have sought to make the whole movement for regional autonomy seem, if not actually traitorous, a little ridiculous. Since the rulers of the state have refused to give regionalism a status in the existing structure of the political community, they have to some extent forced the movement toward autonomy to assume a recalcitrant and backward-looking air. Regionalism has been identified with sectionalism or separatism; and even the regionalists themselves have often laid too great stress upon the formation of fractional sovereign states, as if the evils of over-centralization and the superstitions of Austrian sovereignty were to be diminished by multiplying the opportunities for petty despotism.

At the very beginning of the regionalist movement, intelligent observers like Auguste Comte and still later, Le Play, not merely observed that it was bound to take place, because it satisfied the ultimate conditions of political existence: but Comte indeed predicted that within a century or so there would be a hundred and sixty such regional entities in Europe. Though that prediction has not been completely fulfilled, the fact is that there are now a greater number of states than

there were in the middle of the nineteenth century; and what is more important, perhaps, a greater number of national languages are now in existence than were on the tongues of men a century ago. Political consolidation, in indifference to regional realities, has met with unexpected obstacles: under the even whitewash of "national unity" the colors of the underlying geographic, economic, and cultural realities are beginning to show through. Not the least important sign of this new regime is the recognition accorded under Lenin in Soviet Russia to the principle of cultural autonomy.

The fact is that real communities and real regions do not fit into the frontiers and the ideological pattern of the national state. The state is usually too big to define a single region, with its political, economic, and social elements in symmetrical relationships, and it is too small to include a whole society, like that of Western Europe or the North American Continent, which must ultimately become the sphere of a larger system of co-operative administration. The limits of functional authority, such as is involved in the organization of a continental railroad system or the steel industry, cannot rest effectively within the fortuitous boundaries of the state: the larger relationships need a larger framework of authority, and the more intimate relationships require a narrower field of effort. This is no less true of art and science and religion, which are by nature part of the common stock, not of a region, a province, or a state, but of a whole society. There is no way short of tyrannical repression in which the interests of a scholar, a man of letters, or a member of the Catholic Church can be kept within the boundaries of the national state. Real interests, real functions, real intercourse flow across such frontiers: while the effective organs of concentration are not the national states (which means in practice the exclusive

pre-eminence of the national capital) but the regional city and the region. The local polarization of loyalties, for all sane political uses, does not involve the building of cultural Maginot lines.

"One of the main reasons for getting rid of power politics," an eminent political theorist of Oxford has said, "is to enable the world to get back to natural political groupings; and natural groupings mean smaller areas and smaller groups." Branford and Geddes, in *Our Social Inheritance*, have summarized the situation with equal perspicuity: "Does it not rather seem," they say, "as if something were wrong with this whole theory and practice of modern organization into great centralized states with their megalopolitan rivalry? Must we not seek some better mode of adjusting our human lives, if we would plough in peace and reap in safety? If uni-centralization be obviously intolerable, and septem-centralization [in the seven great national capitals] be so unstable and thus impractical, must we not look . . . to the decentralization of these, as the true road to European peace and re-unity?"

At no point have the realities of social existence coincided with the claims, the demands, and the pretenses of the power-state: its politics can be successfully driven home, momentarily, only at the point of a bayonet. If this fact was true at the beginning of the baroque attempt to centralize power, it is even more massively true today, when world-wide transportation, travel, and communication, a world-wide system of intercourse through printed books and phonograph records and moving pictures, have given to the most important activities of society a frame of reference that no longer can be restricted to the so-called national territories.

On one hand the state, as at present organized, tends to obliterate the intimacy of primary communities, organized

on a basis of active daily association and face to face intercourse. And on the other hand, it often viciously obstructs the organization and control of activities on a continental and finally a world-wide scale. This applies to the allocation of limited resources, the passage of goods and people, the migration of individuals and families, and the exploitation of unsettled or extranational territories. Power politics, as practiced in the past by Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, and as threatened even more menacingly today by Italy, Germany, and Japan, works merely to add to the area of un-building and de-civilization.

Yet our inability to devise at once the appropriate structure for our civilization should be no cause for permanent discouragement. Most of the forces that work benignly toward the co-operation and communion of peoples are young; most of the forces that work against such intercourse are old, and are deeply ingrained in institutional habits and in organizations. Our failure even to contrive a breathing space in bellicose effort—if one makes the very partial and dubious exception of the nineteenth century—is partly due to the inertia of historic burdens.

Too hastily we have attempted to achieve a more beneficent alignment in culture, while retaining those power states whose existence perpetuates the habits of territorial conquest and class exploitation. One might as well turn over to a band of inveterate thieves the unsupervised guardianship of a public fund. The territorial extent of control, as implied in the original outline of the Society of Nations, could not counterbalance the inherent antagonism, on the part of its member-states, to any form of co-operation that implied a diminution of their prestige and power. Such an attempt was plainly foredoomed to failure; and as long ago as 1919 intelligent observers pointed

out these grounds for believing that failure must ensue. What has taken place since has merely confirmed the realism of that elementary analysis.

But in the reorganization of the political community, as in the remoralization of modern society, which must go along with it, a generation is a small span of time: too short to hope for effective changes. Our present discouragement at the results of the last generation's effort is premature by at least a century or two. In the meanwhile, it is highly important to recognize the basic regional and economic realities that have been ignored by the mythology of the national state, with its egoistic schemes of conquest, dominion, and belligerent assertion.

No effort to improve the structure of communities and cities will be effective without re-defining the areas of territorial association in consonance with the objective geographic, economic, and social facts. And meanwhile, too, no effective change can be worked in the regional unit on the basis of past historic situations: what one seeks is not the ancient structure, but the emerging one: a structure that will include not only the geographic constants but the social variables, as these are redefined and projected from generation to generation. What we have to conceive and work out is a federal system of government which shall be based upon a progressive integration of region with region, of province with province, of continent with continent: each part loose enough and flexible enough to adjust to the continuing changes in local and transregional life. Once such a structure has been outlined, it will tend to make effective that concentric regrouping of political, economic, and cultural functions, whose absence is today a severe handicap to co-operative effort.

For the false stability of the national state, purchased by tyranny and suppres-

sion or sheer obliviousness to local characteristics, we must substitute the dynamic stability of a body politic in a state of tension and readjustment, in which no issues need ever pile up to the point where they will cause a morbid mobilization of violence and ill will. Such a federal system must be conceived in the spirit of Blake's great dictum: One law for the lion and the ox is oppression.

Still another important principle must be embodied in the reconstitution of regions: that of social relativity. Here politics has still to recognize and express the deep change that has taken place in our entire world picture. In the Middle Ages, man naïvely regarded himself as the center of the universe; and Europeans regarded themselves as occupying a conspicuously central and favored position among the civilizations of the world—of which they were pathetically ignorant. This general view expressed itself politically in the hierarchical organization of society: a social pyramid of classes, whose apex was the pope or king: later a pyramid of communities whose apex and central point was the capital city. The baroque sense of time and space altered this picture in certain details; but it carried out completely, within the boundaries of the rising states, the hierarchic organization of medieval theory. And by turns one state or another succeeded to a central position within the European polity: while within that state the capital city concentrated the power and culture of the whole country.

In the light of our new world picture, these views are obsolete and the maintenance of such a system of relationships is absurd. From the standpoint of relativity, no one state can claim pre-eminence, and no one position within the community is central. Every unit and every activity, no matter how small, no matter how apparently insignificant, has a fundamental importance for itself, and ulti-

mately for the whole body politic. Thanks to our system of instantaneous communication, any center may become, for a particular purpose or function, the center of the region: any particular region may become the center of the world. For certain types of surgical operation one must go, not to great New York, but to little Rochester, Minnesota; just as for a certain quality of intellectual culture one must still go to the Universities of Oxford or Poitiers, not London or Paris.

Authority under the emerging regime of political relativity is a matter of functional competence, not a matter of mere bulk or spatial advantage: neither size, position, nor physical power—nor a monopoly of all these qualities—by itself determines the importance of a city or a community. For cultural individualities are incommensurable: proportionately,

the smaller countries, like Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, have contributed far more to the development of modern life than colossi like England and Germany. This fact was recognized, very wisely, in the original constitution of the United States, which allotted as many senators to tiny Rhode Island as to the vast state of Pennsylvania; and it is capable of further application. In the days of Goethe, Weimar exercised more cultural authority than centralized Berlin; and with the redistribution of physical energy, political power, and cultural interest that is now incipient, the principle of social relativity will be incorporated in both the regional and the urban pattern. No longer will a single center monopolize advantage, or substitute its activities for those of the whole.

Regionalism in Action

David Lilienthal was identified in Chapter 1. Another selection from the same book is printed below. The one-time federal administrator for the Tennessee Valley Authority discusses it below as a project set up and operated on a regional basis. Actually, the writer throws additional light on regionalism in general and argues for an extension of its benefits. In particular Mr. Lilienthal sees regional administration as a means of hitting three targets with the same shot: a desirable decentralization of federal functions, the preservation of regional differences, and the accomplishment of good for the states involved, for the region and for the nation as a whole.

You cannot, of course, decentralize the functions of the federal government if the whole nation is the operating unit for the carrying out of national powers. Obviously some smaller area than the whole country must be used. In the case of the TVA, Congress and the President deter-

mined that in the development of resources that smaller unit should be based upon the natural region; this region is described in the language of the 1933 enactment as "the Tennessee River drainage basin and... such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected

From *TVA: Democracy on the March* by David E. Lilienthal. Copyright, 1944, by David E. Lilienthal. Harper & Brothers, publishers.

by the development consequent to this Act...."

The use of the region as an autonomous unit of development was a deliberate "experiment." The results of this departure in national policy were to be reported to the nation and become the object of study as to its effectiveness. It was anticipated at the time that if the experiment commended itself by its results the method might be followed or adapted to other regions. The idea that the Tennessee Valley region was set up as a kind of testing ground for the nation has been often expressed, and appears in the President's original message: "If we are successful here," he said, "we can march on, step by step, in a like development of other great natural territorial units within our borders."

The application of TVA's results in decentralized regional development to other parts of the country has become a question of some practical consequence, since from time to time bills providing for regional developments have been introduced in Congress. These proposals, some now pending, are often described or are promoted as measures that provide a "TVA" for this or that area of the country.

That the letters TVA should be thus used as a kind of symbol for resource development is pleasing to us, naturally. But references to TVA in connection with such proposals are inaccurate and misleading unless they do in fact adopt the TVA idea in its essentials,

- a federal autonomous agency, with authority to make its decisions in the region
- responsibility to deal with resources, as a unified whole, clearly fixed in the regional agency, not divided among several centralized federal agencies
- a policy, fixed by law, that the federal regional agency work co-operatively with and through local and state agencies.

The entire TVA experiment, as I interpret it, makes it clear that no proposal for regional resource development may be described as a kind of "TVA" unless it embodies these fundamentals, which are clearly written into the TVA Act and have been the very heart and spirit of ten years of transforming that law into action.

My concern here is not whether in future legislation Congress decides to follow or to abandon these principles embodied in the TVA; this book has a deeper purpose than merely to serve as a polemic urging more regional authorities along TVA principles. But I have a responsibility to point out that, in the discussions of future resource policy, merely adopting the nomenclature "regional authority" or "regional administration" is not in itself an adoption of the TVA idea.

What constitutes a region? How large should it be for most effective development? I have no confidence in the elaborate rituals by which some technicians think they can determine what constitutes a region. No one can work out a formula for what is in reality a judgment that does not lend itself to such precise measurement. On this issue of what constitutes a region and upon the general philosophy of regionalism there is a substantial literature to which those who wish to pursue the subject are referred.

There is, however, one generalization which our specific experience in the TVA does support: the regions should not be so large that they are not, in a management sense, of "workable" size. The full potentialities of the unified approach to resources, and the opportunity to be close to the people and their problems, may be fatally impaired if the region itself is a vast one.

In my judgment the present TVA region ought not to be substantially enlarged. This "region"—the watershed plus the area of electric service that extends outside the drainage basin substantially as

that area is now constituted—is about as large as it ever should be. The proposal now pending in Congress (once approved by the Senate) to add to the TVA's responsibility the development of the Cumberland River will probably be adopted after the war. This is sound. That river lies within the region and adjoins the drainage line, emptying into the Ohio two or three miles from the mouth of the Tennessee. The people of the Cumberland Valley are already participating in parts of the enterprise, and they understand it. But, with that exception and some extension of electricity beyond the area presently served, I feel strongly that substantial additions to the territorial scope of the TVA would impair its effectiveness and threaten the onset of the evils of remoteness we seek to remedy.

Those who come to have confidence in the TVA idea and seek to have it put into effect in their own regions should be warned that the task is one of adaptation and not of copying or imitation. Indeed, it is the strength of the regional idea that it tends to nourish regional differences in traditions, culture, and ways of living, without sacrifice of national unity on other fundamentals. National unity, but unity through diversity, is the essential meaning of the nation's motto, *E Pluribus Unum*.

I would be rendering a disservice if I left the impression that the TVA's methods offer a ready-made pattern to be copied literally, in all manner of situations, or that genuine decentralization in the administration of every and any kind of national function is feasible. Many functions of the federal government present entirely different problems from the development and improvement of land, water, forests, minerals. Resources have a fixed *situs* and can only be dealt with adequately at that *situs*. TVA's methods can be readily adapted to such problems. But whether regional decentralization in

the genuine sense is feasible for many other functions is not a subject for generalization. While different devices must be invented, TVA's methods and experience may be of considerable aid in that process.

All through the public service and in business able men are concerning themselves with such inventions, often with notable results. The practices of decentralized administration have made considerable headway; the tendency, however, continues the other way. Lip service is paid to decentralization by legislators and administrators; they then proceed to draw to Washington the very elements of discretion and the power to decide which impose centralization in its worst forms. Members of Congress will inveigh against the evils of "concentrating power in Washington," and then almost in the same breath (unwittingly, without a doubt) will speed up that very process by passing legislation that sets up additional managerial controls in a central Washington bureau. An able Member of Congress, sincerely interested in the necessity of federal decentralization, recently introduced a comprehensive resolution proposing a broad study of the means of achieving decentralization in the government; but only a few months later the same Member introduced another measure to combine all federally owned power operations in a central "power administration" in Washington!

The issue of regional decentralization is further clouded by simple naïveté. The mere moving of personnel out of Washington to some other city as a result of wartime congestion is regarded by many as "decentralization." This may simply be a rather expensive form of centralization. And then there is a tendency to obscure the issue and distract attention from the heart of the problem by arguments about quite irrelevant or relatively unimportant details. Thus there is sometimes a great

to-do about whether a regional agency should be headed by a board of three members or by a single administrator. This of course has nothing whatever to do with the region as a unit of decentralization.

There is another and more subtle way of avoiding the real issue in regionalism: to paint a glowing detailed picture of the opportunities for regional development and the virtues of regionalism, and then to fail to discuss *how* these happy results are to be secured. This blandly ignores the fact that the particularized benefits so persuasively portrayed have, as a matter of historical fact, never been achieved by any of the traditional methods of resource development. If this manner of presentation does not show lack of candor it displays a failure to understand the essential relation that means bear to results. The public is entitled to a realistic and candid discussion of precisely what is involved in regional decentralization. If a particular goal is described specifically, the method for reaching it should be disclosed with equal particularity; it cannot be ignored as an "administrative detail."

There are some opponents of decentralization and regionalism who face the issue squarely. I shall not, of course, attempt to state or to answer any but the principal of their objections, some of which are put in the highly technical jargon of *expertise*. Behind the multiplicity of words there is often concealed some bureau's or department's "vested right" in centralized government. In this the public is little interested. It does not interest me either, for I fail to see the relevance of such an objection.

The objection that regionalism will "Balkanize" the country is a familiar and candid one usually sincerely raised. The argument is that regionalism is a kind of provincialism that divides rather than unites the country, underlining sectional

animosities and obstructing a really national outlook. But such a position shows a lack of understanding of our history and of the nature of regionalism. It assumes first of all that regions, rather than the individual states, have not always been the units of important national policy development, as scholars such as Turner have made clear and as public men understand so well. In the Congressional Record we read of "the Gentleman from Indiana" or New York or Texas. The newspapers however are more realistic. They report the plans, meetings, and votes of the "Senators from the Corn Belt," or the "cotton bloc," or the "New England delegation in Congress."

For the practical purposes of federal legislation, this is a country of regions, not states.

The growth and development of our national policies is not the result of conflicts between states; it represents an attempted reconciliation between the interests of the various natural regions. Debates on such subjects as the tariff, inland waterway improvements, or measures relating to agriculture almost always foreshadowed votes cast for the most part on a sectional basis. It was not a war between separate states which settled one great economic and political conflict in this country. It was strife between sections. And, although only once in its history has this country resorted to arms to settle regional differences, our national policies have always been arrived at through compromises—often very costly ones to the nation's interest—between the points of view of different sections of the country. Each region has fought for its own interests, usually with little regard to the effect on the country as a whole. This is sectionalism. We avoid the word today, hoping perhaps that the evils of disunity and local selfishness will vanish if the syllables are forgotten. But it is not so easily exorcised.

Modern regionalism, by contrast, rests squarely upon the supremacy of the *national* interest. It admits that there are problems and resources common to areas larger than any single state—a river basin, for example. It recognizes that certain points of view develop in some portions of the country and are not shared by the nation as a whole. It affirms and insists, however, that the solution of regional problems and the development of regional resources are *matters of concern to the whole country*. It proposes to harmonize regional advancement with the national welfare. That concern for and supremacy of the national interest distinguishes “regionalism” from “sectionalism.” Under the banner of sectionalism, states throughout history have combined to support or to oppose federal action. Under the modern concept of regionalism, the federal government acts to meet regional needs to the end that the entire nation may profit.

The organization of the Tennessee Valley Authority is an example of this modern idea of regionalism. To create it seven states did not unite to demand special privileges to distinguish them from the country as a whole, regardless of the ensuing consequences to the national welfare. The federal legislature itself created an independent regional agency whose basic objective was to conserve the natural resources lying in the valley of the Tennessee and to develop those resources *in conformity with broad national objectives and policies*. This is the very opposite—indeed it is the antidote—of “Balkanization.”

The idea of regionalism embodied in the TVA—a federal agency decentralized in fact—offers a rational way of harmonizing regional interests with the national interest. For the first time a federal implement is at hand for that task, to take the place of the usual method of political bargaining, so often wholly crude and

without a basis in facts, policy, or principle.

An interesting illustration of how TVA functions in this balancing of regional and national concerns is afforded by the process by which the TVA Act was amended in 1940, to increase the payments in lieu of taxes on TVA’s property which it is authorized to make to local and state agencies of the valley. The issue presented a sharp conflict between regional and national interests. Since, of course, federal property may not be taxed by the states, the Tennessee Valley region wanted Congress to consent to the largest possible tax payments from the federal government’s TVA. The national government’s interest, on the other hand, was in having returned to its treasury the maximum amount of TVA’s surplus power revenues, and that meant consent to only a minimum tax payment to the valley. An analogous conflict has been before the national Congress on many occasions. In one case the bitter controversy reached a climax when Oklahoma’s Governor called out state troops, the state by this show of force displaying its dissent to federal policy.

But in adjusting this kind of region-nation conflict in the Tennessee Valley, for the first time Congress could determine the issue on a record of facts and with a consideration of principle. For it was TVA’s duty to prepare itself to make a balanced presentation. Hence consideration of the problem was not on the level of a mere show of voting strength, or log-rolling, or some haphazard and casual solution. To be successful in the discharge of this function it was necessary that TVA have the confidence of the region, and yet prove to Congress that it was putting national interests first.

TVA made an exhaustive analysis of the facts respecting local tax problems as a result of TVA property purchases, the prospects for the future, the benefits

received by the region from federal funds. The details of the varying tax laws of several different states were analyzed closely. Then TVA representatives conferred with the governors and fiscal officers of all the states, of many counties with peculiarly difficult problems, with tax consultants, and with federal tax officials. As a result a measure was drafted which embodied principles that TVA as a national agency could recommend. And, although far short of the original claims of local tax bodies, its fairness led all the states to concur. After exhaustive Congressional committee hearings, the bill as recommended by the TVA and agreed to by the states was passed. Under this law TVA has paid, to the end of the fiscal year 1943, out of its power revenues, a total of \$5,320,000 in tax payments to states and counties of the valley; in the single fiscal year ended June 30, 1943, the total of these payments was about two million dollars.

There are many other instances of the way a federal regional agency, though understanding and sympathizing with regional concerns, can *further the national interest in a cohesion of all regions*; this is in contrast with the evils of sectionalism, for it adds to national strength. Early in its history, for example, the TVA took a firm stand against any policy of inducing existing industry located in other regions to move to the Tennessee Valley. Important as industrial development in this region seemed, it was clear that our national obligation would be violated by such a practice of pirating industry. It is significant that this policy, initially viewed here with disapproval, now has nearly universal support from the valley itself, long become accustomed to such raiding practices by some private agencies. The practices of inducing industry to change location by offering tax exemptions, free land and buildings, and the lure of "cheap and docile labor," practices

that stir up interregional animosities and distrust, are today definitely under a cloud of disapproval by the business interests in this valley.

In quite a different way the TVA, by relating the interests of this region to the national interest, has been able to promote national strength. An illustration is afforded by the development of a blast furnace to convert the phosphate ores of the Far West into fertilizer materials. The starting point was, of course, the need of the Tennessee Valley region. The high-grade phosphate ores of Tennessee are too limited in extent to continue to support the land needs of so large a part of the United States as they are being called upon to serve. In the Far West on the public domain there existed almost limitless supplies. The TVA electric furnace, newly designed, would have been ideal for the processing of these far western deposits for use as fertilizer on farms of the Middle West. The electric furnace, however, was not practical for these western ores, because essential low-cost electric power was not near enough at hand. A new blast furnace, which could use readily available western fuels, was the TVA chemical engineers' answer. The *national* interest in building the land of the Midwest was furthered by a *regional* interest in preventing the premature exhaustion of the mineral resources of the Southeast.

It is worth while to contrast the performance of a regional national agency under such circumstances with the unhappy record of state embargoes and other trade barriers that have been resorted to in the past, in a local or sectional spirit, in analogous and sometimes parallel situations.

Regionalism can try out and demonstrate on a limited scale methods of development and of administration that are then open to use for the whole nation. The origin of the TVA itself illustrates the point. Franklin D. Roosevelt in New

York State and George W. Norris in Nebraska saw the importance and value of regional planning of resources. They urged the setting up of a national experiment, in a southern region, which would be available for appraisal by every region. Experimentation and demonstration of the value of complete river planning, reliance upon reservoirs for flood control, multiple-purpose dams instead of limited-purpose structures—once these have been tried out on a drainage-basin scale in this valley region, they can and are being applied elsewhere. Similarly with new methods of administration: some of the specific steps toward regional decentralization, among other federal agencies, are directly attributable to public knowledge and approval of the successful experience in this one valley.

Regionalism is strengthening, not dividing, the nation. TVA was launched in such a setting of national interest; as President-elect Roosevelt said in January, 1933, in an informal speech in the South, it was

more today than a mere opportunity for the Federal Government to do a kind turn for the people in one small section of a couple of States . . . [It was an] opportunity to accomplish a great purpose for the people of many States and, indeed for the whole Union. Because there we have an opportunity of setting an example of planning, not just for ourselves but for the generations to come, tying in industry and agriculture and forestry and flood prevention, tying them all into a unified whole over a distance of a thousand miles so that we can afford better opportunities and better places for living for millions of yet unborn in the days to come.

In many matters of detail the TVA demonstrates the contrast between selfish sectionalism and national regionalism. TVA's personnel by a deliberate policy is selected from every part of the United States, whereas a narrow, sectional interest would follow the provincial practice in

many cities and states of confining public employment to local citizens. The way in which the TVA has "loaned" its technical personnel to many other government agencies points in the same direction; the Bonneville Administration in the Northwest, the Santee-Cooper development in South Carolina, the Colorado River Authority in Texas are examples. In one degree or another these and other agencies have shared the lessons of the Tennessee Valley's experience and methods, even in such details of management as land purchasing, electric rate schedules, personnel management, accounting. Because the TVA has thus been called upon for aid in problems in other parts of the country (and more recently in foreign countries) the danger that this regional agency might fall into a narrow provincialism, the very antithesis of a national outlook, has been kept to a minimum.

"If there were a number of regional authorities like the TVA how could they possibly be co-ordinated?" This question is usually asked as if there could be but one answer, and that one a complete refutation of regionalism. It is sometimes coupled with the assertion, intended to show friendliness to the regional idea: "TVA has proved to be effective; but that is because there is only one TVA."

These critics offer the spectacle of a nation in which regional authorities would each be going its separate way, resulting in chaos or requiring elaborate administrative "co-ordination" in Washington. These fears call for some comment, based upon TVA's experience.

Surely it is not fear of conflicts on *policy* on which these concerns center. The policies that a regional authority must pursue are, of course, national policies. The broad structure of these policies must be determined by Congress. It is, of course, the highest function of Congress and the President to resolve just such conflicts in policy affecting the whole

nation. The regional authority provides an instrument for assisting in reasoned settlement of such differing policies. Provided the legislation creating the regional pillars of decentralization is so drawn that Congress passes upon and defines fundamental policies, there would seem to be little basis for fears in this direction.

If not policy co-ordination, just what, then, is the nature of these apprehensions of conflicts between regional authorities, this fear of "lack of co-ordination"? The real issue is not lack of co-ordination in policies, but the fact that the decentralized administration of federal functions will not result in *operating uniformity*. The actual concern is that in one region problems will be administered in a different way from what they are in another.

It is important to examine this apprehension. And it clarifies the nature of the objection to observe that almost without exception the fears are held by those who do not believe in decentralization as a policy of administration.

Decentralization frankly seeks to promote diversity; centralization requires uniformity and standardization.

It follows quite simply that if your idea of "co-ordination" is *national uniformity in administration*, regionalism will create insuperable problems of "co-ordination." If you cannot conceive of a well-governed country that in every region is not standardized, identical, and uniform, then you do not want decentralization, and of course you would be opposed to regional authorities. If, on the other hand, diversity under broad national policies rather than uniformity in administration, adaptation to regional differences, and discretion and flexibility through the broad reaches of this greatly varied country are what appeal to you as sound, humane, and desirable, then the problems of co-ordination that cause the centralizers such concern become relatively simple and manageable.

It is difficult to exaggerate the lengths to which some men with administrative responsibility feel it is necessary to go in order to secure what they call co-ordination. This extends to matters of managerial detail. What such men would mean by the "co-ordination" of methods of federal land-buying—I use this only by way of a wholly hypothetical illustration—would be to erase differences as to the methods that might exist between federal land buyers dealing with small upland farms in east Tennessee and those applied in the flat sectioned reaches of northern Indiana. To them a regulation respecting personnel management is not a good regulation if it does not apply uniformly throughout this whole country.

Now if your mind operates that way you would be opposed to regionalism. For only a centralized government can pour the country into such a single mold. If differences in how a public program is administered in the Tennessee Valley and in the Arkansas Valley, in Illinois and in New Mexico, disturb you, if those differences appear to be a "conflict," then you are right in assuming that regional decentralization will promote conflict.

This is not to say that under regionalism there will not be conflicts between regions. The major ones of these conflicts must be decided by Congress, as they have been since the very establishment of our central government. Other major conflicts involving the Executive Department would have to be decided by the President, as they always have been under centralized government administration.

So long as we harbor the administrative obsession that uniformity in administration is essential, the amount of co-ordination of this kind with which Congress and the President must deal and must continue to deal will be very great. Nor will regionalism eliminate all or most of these conflicts. But I do venture the assertion that it will considerably lessen them. This is

true because the best place to co-ordinate is *close to the point where the conflict arises*, and not in the top levels and central offices. Industrial managers know this and practice it daily. The same thing proves true in government.

And so, looking at the whole picture, it can be said with confidence that in the national interest the difficulties of co-ordination are certainly not increased, and I think upon consideration it will be seen that they are actually diminished, by regionalism. Let the reader reflect upon the way in which the TVA has brought into the task of resource development a great host of local communities and state agencies. The problems of co-ordinating these efforts have not proved to be insuperable because TVA is a decentralized federal agency operating in the Tennessee Valley region with power to make its decisions in the field. The serious conflicts in administration are the ones which, unresolved in the local communities, find their way into the remote and often unreal atmosphere where men are dealing in "jurisdiction" and, as I have said, are preoccupied with their own institutions.

Co-ordination between a regional agency and other federal regional agencies or centralized departments is not, of course, automatic. The TVA has, from the outset, developed a comprehensive scheme of active co-operation with every other federal agency, either in Washington or in field offices, that has a responsibility or a

function which could be helpful in the building of this region. In an earlier chapter I have alluded to the extent to which the changes in this valley have been due to these other federal activities; I wish to repeat and emphasize that here. The TVA has entered into hundreds of contracts with more than a score of other federal departments and bureaus. These inter-federal agency contracts and the relations carried on under them have from time to time developed serious differences on matters of importance. The task of reaching agreement has not always been an easy one. Yet there has never been any difference that could not be worked out, usually between the staffs of the agencies. In ten years no conflict between the TVA and these many federal departments and bureaus has made necessary a single conference with the President. In fact, the TVA Board has on only two occasions found it necessary to confer with the President on Authority problems in the almost five years since the fall of France and the ensuing conversion of TVA to war needs.

The subject of regionalism has the widest ramifications, since it touches fundamental issues; a complete discussion is beyond the scope of this book. But our experience indicates clearly that the asserted danger of conflicts and the difficulties of co-ordination arising from regional decentralization are exaggerated and largely unreal.

International Regionalism: The Inter-American System

Charter of the Organization of American

States, adopted at Bogotá, Colombia, in April, 1948, represents the latest step in the development of Western Hemisphere unity and co-operation which began modestly in 1889. However, there is always a political reality behind regional agreements of this kind. The casual observer is likely to fall into one of two pitfalls: the tendency to read too much into an international convention, to take the words literally; or the tendency to be completely cynical and to say the words mean nothing. As is generally the case, the truth lies somewhere in between. Coming as it did after two years of strained relations between East and West, between Russia and America, the Bogotá Agreement reflects a world situation in which the regional security interests of the Americas are focused on such matters as the extension of communist influence. The Articles should be studied with the following questions in mind: what are the common principles underlying the system? how is hemisphere policy declared? what is the significance of the various organs: the Conference, the Council, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Pan American Union and so on? What, if any, sanctions are provided for the enforcement of the obligations of the Inter-American system? Thus far, an external threat has been the best means of cementing existing ties. Walter Lippmann has recently raised the question of whether the Western Hemisphere constitutes a truly strategic or security region.

IN THE NAME OF THEIR
PEOPLES,

THE STATES
REPRESENTED AT THE
NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF AMERICAN STATES,

Convinced that the historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations;

Conscious that that mission has already inspired numerous agreements, whose

essential value lies in their desire to live together in peace, and, through their mutual understanding and respect for the sovereignty of each one, to provide for the betterment of all in independence, in equality, and under law;

Confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man;

Persuaded that their welfare, and their contribution to the progress and the civi-

lization of the world, will increasingly require intensive continental co-operation;

Resolved to persevere in the noble undertaking that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles and purposes they solemnly reaffirm;

Convinced that juridical organization is a necessary condition for a security and peace founded on moral order and on justice; and

In accordance with resolution IX of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Mexico City, Have agreed upon the following

CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Part One

CHAPTER I

Nature and Purposes

Article 1

The American States establish in this Charter the international organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence. The Organization of American States is a regional agency within the United Nations.

Article 2

All American States that ratify the present Charter are members of the Organization.

Article 3

Any new political entity that arises from the union of several member states and that, as such, ratifies this Charter, shall become a member of the Organiza-

tion. The entry of the new political entity into the Organization shall result in the loss of membership of each one of the states which constitute it.

Article 4

The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, establishes the following essential aims:

(A) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;

(B) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that arise among the member states;

(C) To organize solidary action on the part of those states in the event of aggression;

(D) To seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that arise among them; and

(E) To promote by co-operative action their economic, social and cultural development.

CHAPTER II

Principles

Article 5

The American states reaffirm the following principles:

(A) International law is the standard of conduct of states in their reciprocal relations.

(B) International order essentially consists of respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of states, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law.

(C) Good faith should govern the relations between states.

(D) The solidarity of the American states and the high aims which are sought

through it require the political organization of those states on the basis of effective exercise of representative democracy.

(E) The American states condemn war of aggression; victory does not give rights.

(F) Aggression against one American state is aggression against all the other American states.

(G) Controversies of an international character arising between two or more American states should be settled by peaceful procedures.

(H) Social justice and social security are the bases of lasting peace.

(I) Economic co-operation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the continent.

(J) The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex.

(K) The spiritual unity of the continent is based on respect for the cultural values of the American countries and demands their close co-operation for the high purposes of civilization.

(L) The education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom, and peace.

CHAPTER III

Fundamental Rights and Duties of States

Article 6

States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise these rights, and have equal duties. The rights of each state depends not upon its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international law.

Article 7

Every American state has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by other states in accordance with International Law.

Article 8

The fundamental rights of states may not be impaired in any manner whatsoever.

Article 9

The political existence of a state is independent of its recognition by other states. Even before being recognized, the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently, to organize itself as it thinks best, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of the rights of other states in accordance with international law.

Article 10

Recognition implies that the state granting it accepts the personality of the new state with all the rights and duties that international law provides for the two states.

Article 11

The right of each state to protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another state.

Article 12

The jurisdiction of states within the limits of their national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens.

Article 13

Each state has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the state shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.

Article 14

Respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitute a standard for the development of peaceful relations among states. International treaties and agreements should be public.

Article 15

No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

Article 16

No state may use or encourage the use of enforcement measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

Article 17

The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

Article 18

The American states bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, save in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties, or in fulfillment thereof.

Article 19

Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a viola-

tion of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.

CHAPTER IV*Pacific Settlement of Disputes***Article 20**

All international disputes that arise among the American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article 21

The following are peaceful procedures: Direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial procedure, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time.

Article 22

In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American States which, in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties should agree on any other peaceful procedure that will enable them to reach a solution.

Article 23

A special treaty will establish the proper means of settling disputes and will determine the procedures appropriate for each of the peaceful means, in such a manner that it will not be possible for a dispute among American States to fail of definitive settlement within a reasonable period.

CHAPTER V*Collective Security***Article 24**

Every act of aggression on the part of a State against the territorial integrity of

inviolability or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States.

Article 25

If the territorial inviolability or integrity or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State is affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American states, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.

CHAPTER VI

Economic Standards

Article 26

The member states agree to co-operate with one another, as far as their resources may permit and their laws provide, in the broadest spirit of good neighborliness, in order to strengthen their economic structure, develop their agriculture and mining, promote their industry, and increase their trade.

Article 27

If the economy of an American state is affected by serious conditions that cannot be satisfactorily remedied by its sole unaided effort, such state may place its economic problems before the inter-American Economic and Social Council, to seek, through consultation, the most appropriate solution for such problems.

CHAPTER VII

Social Standards

Article 28

The member states agree to co-operate with one another to achieve just and decent living conditions for their entire populations.

Article 29

The member states agree upon the desirability of developing their social legislation on the following bases:

(A) All human beings, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, creed, or social condition, have the right to attain material well-being and spiritual growth under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity and economic security.

(B) Work is a right and a social duty; it shall not be considered as an article of commerce; it demands respect for freedom of association and for the dignity of the worker; and it is to be performed under conditions that ensure life, health, and a decent standard of living, both during the working years and during old age, or when any circumstances deprives the individual of the possibility of working.

CHAPTER VIII

Cultural Standards

Article 30

The member states agree to further the exercise of the right to education, in accordance with their constitutional provisions and their material resources, on the following bases:

(A) Elementary education shall be compulsory, and, when provided by the state, shall be without cost.

(B) Higher education shall be recognized as available to all, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, language, creed, or social condition.

Article 31

With due consideration for the personality of each, the member states undertake to facilitate free cultural interchange by every medium of expression.

Part Two

CHAPTER IX

The Organs

Article 32

The Organization of American States accomplishes its aims by means of:

- (A) The Inter-American Conference;
- (B) The meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
- (C) The Council;
- (D) The Pan American Union;
- (E) The specialized conferences; and
- (F) The specialized organizations.

CHAPTER X

The Inter-American Conference

Article 33

The Inter-American Conference is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States. It decides the general action and policy of the Organization; determines the structure and functions of its organs, and has the authority to consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States. These functions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Charter and of other inter-American treaties.

Article 34

All member States have the right to be represented at the Inter-American Conference. Each state has the right to one vote.

Article 35

The Conference shall convene every five years at the time fixed by the Council of the Organization, after consultation with the government of the country where the conference is to be held.

Article 36

In special circumstances and with the approval of two-thirds of the American Governments, a special Inter-American Conference may be held, or the date of the next regular conference may be changed.

Article 37

Each Inter-American Conference shall fix the place of meeting of the next conference. If for any unforeseen reason the conference cannot be held at the place fixed, it shall be the duty of the Council of the Organization to designate a new place.

Article 38

The program and regulations of the Inter-American Conference shall be prepared by the Council of the Organization and submitted to the member Governments for consideration.

CHAPTER XI

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Article 39

The meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as organ of consultation.

Article 40

Any member state may request that a meeting of consultation be called. The request should be addressed to the Coun-

cil of the Organization, which shall decide by an absolute majority whether a meeting should be held.

Article 41

The program and regulations of the meeting of consultation shall be prepared by the Council of the Organization and submitted to the member governments for consideration.

Article 42

If a Minister of Foreign Affairs, for exceptional reasons, is unable to attend the meeting, he shall be represented by a special delegate.

Article 43

In case of an armed attack within the territory of an American State or within the region of security delimited by treaties in force, a meeting of consultation shall be held without delay. Such meeting shall be called immediately by the chairman of the Council of the Organization, who shall, at the same time, call a meeting of the Council itself.

Article 44

An Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the organs of consultation on problems of military co-operation that arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on the subject of collective security.

Article 45

The Advisory Defense Committee shall be composed of the highest military authorities of the American States participating in the meeting of consultation. Under exceptional circumstances the Government may appoint substitutes. Each state shall be entitled to one vote.

Article 46

The Advisory Defense Committee shall be convoked under the same conditions as the organ of consultation, when the

latter has to deal with matters relating to defense against aggression.

Article 47

The committee shall also meet when the conference or the meeting of consultation or the governments, by a two-thirds majority of the member states, assign to it technical studies or reports on specific subjects.

CHAPTER XII

The Council

Article 48

The Council of the Organization of American States is composed of one representative for each member state of the Organization, especially appointed by the respective government, with the rank of ambassador. The appointment may be given to the diplomatic representative accredited to the Government of the country in which the Council has its seat. During the absence of the titular representative, the Government may appoint an interim representative.

Article 49

The Council shall elect a chairman and vice chairman, who shall serve for one year and shall not be eligible for re-election to either of those positions for the term immediately following.

Article 50

The Council takes cognizance—within the limits of the present Charter and of inter-American treaties and agreements—of any matter referred to it by the Inter-American Conference or the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Article 51

The Council shall be responsible for the proper performance of the duties assigned to the Pan American Union.

Article 52

The Council shall serve provisionally as an organ of consultation when the circumstances provided for in Article 43 of this Charter arise.

Article 53

It is also the duty of the Council:

(A) To draft and submit to the Governments and to the Inter-American Conference proposals for the creation of new specialized organizations or for the combination, adaptation, or elimination of existing ones, including matters relating to the financing and support thereof;

(B) To draft recommendations to the Governments, the Inter-American Conference, the specialized conferences, or the specialized organizations, for the co-ordination of the activities and programs of such organizations, after consultation with them;

(C) To conclude agreements with the inter-American specialized organizations to determine the relations that should exist between the respective agency and the organization;

(D) To conclude agreements or special arrangements for co-operation with other American organizations of recognized international standing;

(E) To promote and facilitate collaboration between the Organization of American States and the United Nations, as well as between inter-American specialized organizations and similar international ones.

(F) To adopt resolutions that will enable the Secretary General to perform the duties envisaged in Article 84.

(G) To perform any other duties assigned to it by the present Charter.

Article 54

The Council establishes the bases for fixing the quota that each Government is to contribute to the maintenance of the

Pan American Union, taking into account the ability to pay of the respective countries and their willingness to contribute a fair share. The budget, approved by the Council, shall be transmitted to the Governments at least six months before the first day of the fiscal year, with a list containing the annual quota of each country. Decisions on budgetary matters require the approval of two-thirds of the members of the Council.

Article 55

The Council drafts its own regulations.

Article 56

The Council functions at the seat of the Pan American Union.

Article 57

The following are organs of the Council of the Organization of American States:

(A) The Inter-American Economic and Social Council;

(B) The Inter-American Council of Jurists; and

(C) The Inter-American Cultural Council.

Article 58

The organs referred to in the preceding article have technical autonomy within the limits of this Charter; but their decisions may not encroach upon the sphere of action that corresponds to the Council of the Organization.

Article 59

The organs of the Council of the Organization are composed of representatives of all the member States of the Organization.

Article 60

The organs of the Council of the Organization shall, as far as lies within

their power, render to the Governments such technical services as the latter request; and they shall advise the Council of the Organization in matters within their jurisdiction.

Article 61

The organs of the Council of the Organization shall, in agreement with the Council, establish co-operative relations with the corresponding organs of the United Nations and with such national or international agencies as function within their respective spheres of action.

Article 62

The Council of the Organization, with the advice of the appropriate bodies and after consultation with the Governments, shall draft the statutes of such of its organs as are in process of formation, within the provisions of this Charter. These organs shall issue their own regulation.

A. Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Article 63

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council has for its principal purpose the promotion of the economic and social welfare of the American nations through effective co-operation among them for utilizing their natural resources to the best advantage, developing their agriculture and industry, and raising the standard of living of their peoples.

Article 64

To accomplish this purpose the Council shall:

(A) Propose the means by which the American nations may give each other technical assistance to make studies and formulate and execute plans in order to carry out the purposes referred to in

Article 26 and to develop and improve their social services;

(B) Act as co-ordinating agency for all official inter-American activities of an economic and social nature;

(C) Undertake studies on its own initiative, or at the request of any member State;

(D) Assemble and prepare reports on economic and social matters for the use of the member States;

(E) Suggest to the Council of the Organization the advisability of holding specialized conferences on economic and social matters;

(F) Carry on such other activities as may be assigned to it by the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or the Council of the Organization.

Article 65

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, composed of whatever specialist delegates each member State appoints, holds its meetings on its own initiative or on that of the Council of the Organization.

Article 66

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council functions at the seat of the Pan American Union, but it may hold meetings at any city in the American countries by a majority decision of the member States.

B. Inter-American Council of Jurists

Article 67

The purpose of the Inter-American Council of Jurists is to serve as an advisory body in juridical matters; to promote the development and codification of public and private international law, and to study the possibility of making uniform the laws of the various American countries in so far as it appears desirable.

Article 68

The Inter-American Juridical Committee of Rio de Janeiro is the permanent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists.

Article 69

The Juridical Committee is composed of jurists of the nine countries selected by the Inter-American Conference. The election of the jurists shall be made by the Inter-American Council of Jurists from a panel submitted by each country chosen by the conference. The members of the Juridical Committee represent all member states of the Organization. The Council of the Organization is empowered to fill any vacancies that occur during the intervals between Inter-American Conferences and between meetings of the Inter-American Council of Jurists.

Article 70

The Juridical Committee shall undertake such studies and preparatory work as are assigned to it by the Inter-American Council of Jurists, the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or the Council of the Organization. It may also undertake those studies and projects which, on its own initiative, it considers advisable.

Article 71

The Inter-American Council of Jurists and the Juridical Committee should seek to obtain the co-operation of national committees for the codification of international law, institutes of international and comparative law and other specialized agencies.

Article 72

The Inter-American Council of Jurists shall meet when convened by the Council of the Organization, at the place determined by the Council of Jurists at its previous meeting.

C. Inter-American Cultural Council**Article 73**

The purpose of the Inter-American Cultural Council is to promote friendly relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples, in order to strengthen the peaceful sentiments that have characterized the evolution of America, through the promotion of educational, scientific and cultural exchange.

Article 74

To this end the principal functions of the Council shall be:

(A) To sponsor inter-American cultural activities;

(B) To collect and supply information on cultural activities carried on in and among the American States by private and official agencies both national and international in character;

(C) To promote the adoption of basic educational programs adapted to the needs of all population groups in the American countries;

(D) To promote, in addition, the adoption of special programs of training, education, and culture for the indigenous groups of the American countries;

(E) To co-operate in the protection, preservation, and increase of the cultural heritage of the continent;

(F) To promote co-operation among the American nations in the fields of education, science and culture, by means of the exchange of materials for research and study, as well as of teachers, students, specialists, and, in general, such other persons and materials as are useful for the realization of these ends;

(G) To encourage the education of the peoples for harmonious international relations;

(H) To carry on such other activities as may be assigned to it by the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of the consultation of Ministers of Foreign

Affairs, or the Council of the Organization.

Article 75

The Inter-American Cultural Council specifies the place of its next meeting and is convened by the Council of the Organization on the date chosen by the latter in agreement with the Government of the country selected as the seat of the meeting.

Article 76

There shall be a Committee for Cultural Action of which five states, chosen at each Inter-American Conference, shall be members. The respective members of the Committee for Cultural Action shall be selected by the Inter-American Cultural Council from a panel submitted by each country chosen by the conference; these members shall be specialists in education or cultural matters. When the Inter-American Cultural Council and the Inter-American Conferences are not in session, the Council of the Organization may fill vacancies that arise and replace those countries that find it necessary to discontinue their co-operation.

Article 77

The Committee for Cultural Action shall function as a permanent committee of the Inter-American Cultural Council, for the purpose of preparing any studies that the latter assigns to it and concerning which the Council shall have the final decision.

CHAPTER XIII

The Pan American Union

Article 78

The Pan American Union is the central permanent organ of the Organization of American States and the General Secretariat of the Organization. It shall perform the duties assigned to it in this

Charter and such other duties as are assigned to it in other Inter-American treaties and agreements.

Article 79

There shall be a Secretary General of the Organization, elected by the Council for a ten-year term, who may not be re-elected or succeeded by a person of the same nationality. In the event of a vacancy in the position of Secretary General, the Council shall within the next ninety days elect a successor to fill such position for the remainder of the term, and he may be re-elected if the vacancy occurs during the second half of the term.

Article 80

The Secretary General directs the Pan American Union and is the legal representative thereof.

Article 81

The Secretary General participates with voice, but without vote, in the deliberations of the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the specialized conferences, and the Council and its organs.

Article 82

The Pan American Union, through its technical and information offices, shall, under the direction of the Council, promote economic, social, juridical, and cultural relations among all the member states of the organization.

Article 83

The Pan American Union also performs the following functions:

(A) Transmits ex officio to member states the convocation to the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the specialized conferences;

(B) Advises the Council and its organs in the preparation of programs and regu-

lations of the Inter-American Conference, the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the specialized conferences;

(C) Places at the disposal of the Government of a country where a conference is held whatever technical aid and personnel it can, when such government so requests;

(D) Is custodian of the documents and archives of Inter-American Conferences, meetings of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and, insofar as possible, specialized conferences;

(E) Serves as a depository of the instruments of ratification of inter-American agreements;

(F) Performs the functions entrusted to it by the Inter-American Conference, and the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

(G) Submits to the Council an annual report on the activities of the Organization;

(H) Submits to each Inter-American conference a report on the work accomplished by inter-American organs since the previous conference.

Article 84

It is the duty of the Secretary General:

(A) To establish, with the approval of the Council, such technical and administrative offices of the Pan American Union as are necessary to accomplish its aims;

(B) To determine the number of department chiefs, officers and employees of the Pan American Union; to appoint them, regulate their powers and duties, and fix their compensation, in accordance with general standards set up by the Council.

Article 85

There shall be an Assistant Secretary General, elected by the Council for a term of ten years and eligible for re-election. In

the event of a vacancy in the position of Assistant Secretary General, the Council shall, within the next ninety days, elect a successor to fill such position for the remainder of the term.

Article 86

The Assistant Secretary General is the secretary of the Council. He performs the duties of the Secretary General during the latter's temporary absence or disability, or during the ninety-day vacancy contemplated in Article 79. Furthermore, he serves as advisory officer to the Secretary General, with the power to act as his delegate in all matters that the Secretary General entrusts to him.

Article 87

The Council, by a two-thirds vote of its members, may remove the Secretary General or the Assistant Secretary General, whenever the proper functioning of the organization so demands.

Article 88

The chiefs of the respective departments of the Pan American Union appointed by the Secretary General are executive secretaries of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Council of Jurists and the Cultural Council.

Article 89

In the performance of their duties the staff members shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority outside the Pan American Union. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect upon their position as international officials responsible only to the union.

Article 90

Every member of the Organization of American States pledges itself to respect

the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

Article 91

In selecting its personnel the Pan American Union shall give first consideration to efficiency, competence, and probity; but, at the same time, importance shall be given to the necessity of recruiting personnel on as broad a geographical basis as possible.

Article 92

The seat of the Pan American Union is the city of Washington.

CHAPTER XIV

Specialized Conferences

Article 93

The specialized conferences meet to deal with special technical matters or to develop specific aspects of inter-American co-operation, when it is so decided by the Inter-American Conference or the meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; when inter-American agreements so provide; or when the Council of the Organization considers it necessary, either on its own initiative or at the request of one of its organs or of one of the specialized organizations.

Article 94

The program and regulations of the specialized conferences shall be prepared by the organs of the Council of the Organization or by the specialized organizations concerned; they shall be submitted to the member Governments for consideration, and transmitted to the Council for its information.

CHAPTER XV

The Specialized Organizations

Article 95

For the purposes of this Charter, the inter-American specialized organizations are the intergovernmental organizations established by multilateral agreements and having specific functions with respect to technical matters of common interest to the American states.

Article 96

The Council shall maintain a register of the organizations that fulfill the conditions set forth in the foregoing article and for the purposes stated in Article 53.

Article 97

The specialized organizations enjoy the fullest technical autonomy and shall take into account the recommendations of the Council in conformity with the provisions of the present Charter.

Article 98

The specialized organizations shall submit to the Council periodic reports on the progress of their work and on their annual budgets and expenses.

Article 99

Agreements between the Council and the specialized organizations provided for in Paragraph (C) of Article 53 may provide that such organizations transmit their budgets to the Council for approval.

Arrangements may also be made for the Pan American Union to receive the quotas of the contributing countries and distribute them in accordance with pertinent agreements.

Article 100

The specialized organizations should establish co-operative relations with world agencies of the same character in order

to co-ordinate their activities. In concluding agreements with international agencies of a world-wide character, the Inter-American specialized organizations should preserve their identity and status as integral parts of the Organization of American States, even when they perform regional functions of international agencies.

Article 101

In determining the geographic location of the specialized organizations, the interests of all the American States shall be taken into account.

Part Three

CHAPTER XVI

United Nations

Article 102

None of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the member states under the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER XVII

Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 103

The Organization of American States shall enjoy, in the territory of each member, such legal capacity, privileges, and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions and the accomplishment of its purposes.

Article 104

The representatives of the Governments on the Council of the Organization, the representatives on the organs of the Council, the personnel of the representations, and also the Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General of the Organization shall enjoy the privileges and immunities

necessary for the independent performance of their duties.

Article 105

The juridical status of the inter-American specialized organizations and the privileges and immunities that should be granted to them and to their personnel, as well as to the officials of the Pan American Union, shall be determined in each case through agreements between the respective organizations and the Governments concerned.

Article 106

Correspondence of the Organization of American States, including printed matter and parcels, when bearing the frank thereof, shall be carried post free in the mails of the member states.

Article 107

The Organization of American States does not recognize any restriction on the eligibility of men and women to participate in the activities of and hold positions in the various organs.

CHAPTER XVIII

Ratification and Entry into Force

Article 108

The present Charter remains open for signature by the American States and shall be ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The original instrument, the Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments for purposes of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall notify the signatory states of such deposit.

Article 109

The present Charter shall enter into force among the ratifying States when two-thirds have deposited their ratifications. It shall enter into force with respect to the remaining States in the order in which they deposit their ratifications.

Article 110

The present Charter shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Pan American Union.

Article 111

Amendments to the present Charter may be adopted only at an Inter-American Conference convened for that purpose. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the terms and the procedure set forth in Article 109.

Article 112

This Charter shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced by any member State upon written notification to the Pan American Union, which shall communicate to all the others each notice of denunciation received. After two years from the date on which the Pan American Union receives a notice of denunciation, the present Charter shall cease to be in force with respect to the denouncing State, which shall cease to belong to the Organization after it has fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, whose full powers have been presented and found to be in good and due form, sign the present Charter at the City of Bogotá, Colombia, on the dates that appear with their respective signatures.

The Mind of the Middle West

John Gunther is an internationally known novelist, journalist, traveler, and student of human affairs. He is the author, among other books, of *Inside Europe* and *Inside Latin America*. The depth of Mr. Gunther's perception is belied by his interesting style. Here the author discusses the Middle West, so important in American politics. Why does this region have such a direct impact on national politics? What are the reasons for a special regional point of view on some issues in this section? What characteristics differentiate the Middle West from other regions? From Mr. Gunther's account is it possible to decide whether regional considerations are becoming more or less important politically? Two points emerge from this selection: a strong tradition may be a source of political weakness as well as strength; and, there is a duality in the "Middle Western Mind" which reflects a larger, country-wide duality. One aspect of this is seen in the contrast between the "melting pot" basis of the population on the one hand and a distrust of everything foreign on the other.

To define the Middle West is comparatively easy; it is the upper basin of the Mississippi and its tributaries. The region cannot, however, be precisely bounded by state lines, though commonly it is assumed to consist of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. But the eastern fringes of the Great Plains states—the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Kansas—also belong to the Middle West by most standards. Conversely part of Minnesota (which calls itself the "Northwest" or "Upper Midwest" incidentally) hardly seems middle western at all, and Missouri has, as we shall see, pronounced characteristics of the South. Ohio is in a category mostly its own. Most Ohioans, at least in the rural areas, think of themselves as Middle Westerners, but towns like Akron and Cleveland belong much more to the orbit of the industrial East, and Cincinnati is southerly as well as

eastern. One remark I heard is that Toledo is "where the Middle West ends." All this being true, we shall abide by those authorities who consider the Middle West to be the eight great states named above.

There are other criteria, of course, aside from the Mississippi basin. It might be said that the Middle West is that part of the nation where moist black soil of great depth and richness is to be found, in contrast to the red soil of the South, the mongrel stone and sand of New England, and the red, yellow, or dry sparse soil of the West. But there is plenty of middle western soil, like some in Minnesota and the marginal southern areas of Indiana and Missouri, not black at all. Another definition might be that it is that part of the country mostly laid out in townships six miles square; it is where the farmer owns his own quarter-section (160 acres) and works it himself. But

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there are plenty of middle western farmers with more or less than 160 acres, to say nothing of the fact that the whole region is pre-eminently one of great cities too. Another simple definition might be that the Midwest is the broad flat area blocked off by the Rockies and the Alleghenies at each end, where people tend to look inward rather than outward, where few ever see the sea. Similarly a narrow delimitation might be that it is an area coterminous with the circulation belt of the Chicago *Tribune*.

At any rate one thing is corelike and indisputable. This great block of states is the central pivot and umbilicus of the nation.

THREE BRIEF OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE MIDDLE WEST

(1) More than any other American region, except possibly New England, it represents the full flowering of the "gadget mind." Most American boys, and in particular those from midwest farms, are born mechanics; they can do anything with their hands. Out of this and much else has come what Detroit, let us say, symbolizes better than any other American city—the assembly line and mass production.

Perhaps the "mechanical approach" is the curse of modern America. It has put a sharp metallic edge on events and phenomena in many fields, and it serves to make utility, practicalness, the dominant American measuring stick in almost everything. What really runs this country, one might say, is the spirit that wants to know what makes an automobile go. What really distinguishes the Middle West is the combination it affords of black soil *and* the tractor; it is where corn *and* the jeep work together.

Details in this field are innumerable. The skyscraper was invented in Chicago. Henry Ford once made the nation laugh,

witlessly, by talking about the synthetic cow. The scientific work that most interested Charles A. Lindbergh was on an artificial heart.

(2) The most interesting single thing about the Middle West is probably its actual middleness, not only in geography or in the sense of moderation, but in its averageness, its typicalness. This is America uncontaminated. Here sounds the most spontaneous natural note in the nation. Any good politician knows that, if he can't carry the Middle West, he can't carry anything. The region has, as a result, a profound veto power over the rest of the country. Another aspect of this "middleness" is that, since the midwest is like a governor controlling the oscillations of a wheel, it is the part of the nation that most strongly resists change. One might also say that, for the Japanese to have assumed that an attack on Pearl Harbor could win a war or for the Germans ever to have had any idea of beating the United States at all, proves that they knew nothing of the Middle West whatsoever.

This middleness can be expressed in another dimension. The Mississippi Basin was filled by the pushing out of the first thirteen states, and therefore it became a kind of bridge between New England, Virginia, and the migrations later. The influence of the South is often ignored, but it is considerable, particularly in Ohio, Missouri, and southern Illinois and Indiana. The father of the Middle West was, as Graham Hutton points out, none other than Thomas Jefferson, and Patrick Henry (believe it or not!) was the first governor of Illinois.

New England, however, outranks the South as a progenitor. In a way the Midwest is exactly what one would expect from a marriage between New England puritanism and *rich* soil.

Middleness in still another direction is expressed by the suggestive fact that the

area is, all at once, a producer, processor, distributor, and consumer. Two-thirds of the entire retail market of the nation, Hutton calculates, is in the middle states. The West is as we know primarily a producer; the East is primarily a consumer; the Middle West is both, and also the link between them.

(3) It would be absurd to call the Melting Pot specifically a Midwest phenomenon; it exists conspicuously in New England and all the industrial cities of the East; from this point on until we reach the South many chapters hence, the foreign-born and the sons of foreign-born will never be far absent from these pages. But the challenge of opening up and settling a continent was first met in the Middle West. Some of the earlier strains, like those of the French and Dutch, are recessive nowadays. But think of the Scots, Germans, Irish, Italians, Canadians, Russians, Scandinavians, Bohemians, Poles, that came later!

Except for a few Indian full-bloods, *all* Americans are, of course, the product of foreign immigration—Puritan, Cavalier, Chinese, Greek, Negro, Montenegrin, or what you will. This point, though astonishing to some outsiders, need not be labored. "The United States," a British historian wrote once, "is the greatest single achievement of European civilization."

A phrase every middle western boy hears a thousand times is "the old country," uttered by his elders usually in a tone of nostalgic affection plus relief that it is far away plus a desire to return for a visit someday but not to stay. The United States is a country unique in the world because it was populated not merely by people who live in it by the accident of birth, but by those who willed to come here.

How well the melting pot has melted is a question not the province of this chapter. "The temperature at which

fusion takes place," as André Siegfried wrote once, varies according to locality and the nature of the stock. But surely, of all American achievements in the past century and the early years of this, the successful absorption of millions upon millions of immigrants is the most notable. Free primary education was, of course, a major factor in this. What is the more remarkable is that this ponderous influx was assimilated without a declension in the national standard of living; indeed, the standard actually went up. As recently as 1927, Siegfried thought that the problem of assimilation was still the most onerous that America had to face. In 1945, all that he would have had to do was glance at the crew of almost any B-29.

There are, however, some striking examples in the Middle West today of foreign-born and foreign-descended groups still tightly cohesive. If the reader happens to be a Chicagoan, he will know what an American city is like when it contains a Greek city, a Lithuanian city, a Sicilian city, a Slovak city, a Hungarian city, and a Negro city. Chicago is the biggest Italian community in the world after Milan, and the biggest Polish community after Warsaw. According to Hutton, two-fifths of *all* Chicagoans, even today, do not customarily speak English at home. Or take the massive and extremely American state of Michigan, where more than *half* the entire population is foreign-born or had parents foreign-born. Michigan has one community that, in a literal sense, is unique: Hamtramck. This has a population of roughly 50,000, almost exclusively Polish. Hamtramck is entirely surrounded by Detroit geographically—it is impossible to get in or out of it without going through Detroit—but it is a quite separate and independent community, no part of Detroit politically. It has its own city council, laws, and mayor.

MIDWEST MISCELLANY

Years ago in *Inside Europe*, writing about that baffling country England, I listed some forces and things heard and seen in British public and private life. One might do likewise for the Middle West:

Church suppers.

County and state fairs—particularly on Governor's Day as in Iowa.

The ole swimmin' hole, the red brick schoolhouse, and the ritual of "working one's way" through college.

Juke boxes.

Cartoons like that by John McCutcheon of the *Chicago Tribune* about Indian Summer, football teams like the Green Bay Packers, and social phenomena like wrong-side-of-the-trackism in regard to where a person is born.

Canals and the memory of portages.

The tradition of great independent newspaper editors, living and dead, like Charles H. Dennis and Henry Justin Smith of the *Chicago Daily News*, H. E. Newbranch of the *Omaha World Herald*, William T. Evjue of the *Madison (Wisconsin) Capital Times*, W. W. Waymack of the *Des Moines Register and Tribune*, and Oliver K. Bovard of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*.

Small lakes in northern Indiana like saucupans full of limp bathing suits; the lawns, six inches deep with autumn leaves, before frame houses with big porches in middle-sized Wisconsin towns; the rows of pumpkins outside the filling stations in Ohio villages.

Country (as distinct from city) clubs.

The recreation and travel industry, which produces an income of 300 million dollars a year in Michigan alone.

The great state universities, their athletics and their alumni.

Bulletin boards in the local post offices, with their wide variety of reading matter—reports on migratory birds, advices

on criminals by the FBI, and civil service jobs open at \$1,140.25 per year.

Automobiles with wooden bumpers in the winter of 1946-47—as strange a sight as an eagle wearing gloves.

Splendid teachers (to name only a few from a single university) like Robert Morss Lovett, Frederick Starr, the late James Weber Linn, Charles E. Merriam, Ferdinand Schevill, Edith Foster Flint, and Anton J. Carlson.

Nuggets of political conversation like "Don't know if he can vote his own wife, but he carries a lot of punch," "When we're in a war I'm for the president as long as it lasts," "There's a pretty high brand of government in this here state," (how many times did I hear that!) "He's the best rough-and-tumble swivel-chair lawyer in the country," and "The guy is so honest that there's nothing he'd steal but an election."

Utterly nauseous conditions in the state insane asylums.

The use of the "visit" as a synonym for the verb "see."

Public worship of vitamins, golf, and Frank Sinatra.

The signs in hotel lobbies, made of small white letters set into black felt, like MAX BERKOVITC BRKL KNIT SWEATERS CHIC TOGS BLOUSES 590, and those in hotel restaurants, like LUNCHEON GUESTS WITH A 75¢ MINIMUM ARE INVITED TO PLAY CARDS FROM 2 TO 4:30 P.M.

The fact that the most conservative vote is not, contrary to general opinion, that of the farmers but of businessmen in small towns.

Middle western (and American) awe of a really good department store, like Marshall Field's in Chicago.

The elevator boy in Indianapolis who said of his car, "This jitney o' mine is a piece o' junk."

Painters like Grant Wood, John Stuart Curry, and Thomas Hart Benton.

The stupendous effect of women on

adult education, in that it is generally women who promote lecture tours by visiting celebrities and the like.

The look on the GI's face when the MP poured his bottle of bourbon down the toilet in a Pullman washroom between Elkhart and Toledo.

The crushing social pressure exerted on youngsters by the corner drugstore.

Place names like What Cheer, Iowa, and Peculiar, Missouri.

Night schools—especially their courses in law.

Motels and tourist camps, which, what with hypocrisy, puritanism, and the housing shortage, have become the chief haunts of the amorous.

The hired man who comes to work at 7:50 A.M. or 8:02 instead of 8 sharp, to "avoid regimentation" and demonstrate his independence and equality.

Slovenly cemeteries in remote Indiana villages; Iowa streets absolutely silent after 7:30 P.M.; bank nights in an Ohio hamlet (population 2,172) with a pot of \$635.55; weddings performed in Missouri on an open truck.

Fishing.

The fact that the United States is the country where most luxuries are cheap.

A great instinct for horseplay and a terrific gambling impulse in most Americans.

The gap between a basic good will in citizens and a lack of concrete know-how; the gap between sound and generous social ideals and inadequate performance; the gap between what most people believe in as regards political and civic affairs, and what they actually do.

NOTE ON POLITICS

Considering the Middle West to be twelve states instead of merely eight, with the Great Plains thus included, it will control about a third of the delegates to the next party conventions. It is not

without interest that, in January, 1947, the Republican chairmen in these states met and adopted in Chicago a resolution to the effect that their nominee should be "one who is symbolic of the ideals and heritage of the Middle West." In fact as of the moment of writing all serious contenders for the Republican nomination, except Warren of California, are Midwesterners by birth if not residence; Vandenberg, Taft, Stassen, Bricker, and Dewey who was born in Michigan.

Also, the political leverage exerted by the Midwest was shown sharply by the chairmanships assigned to congressional committees after the 1946 elections. The position of Taft and Vandenberg in the Senate is well known. In the House, Charles A. Halleck of Indiana (a Dewey man) won the majority leadership after a contest with another Middle Westerner, Clarence J. Brown, the Ohio favorite. Leo E. Allen (Illinois) became chairman of the powerful Rules Committee, and Leslie C. Arends (Illinois) the party whip. All told New York got two chairmanships out of nineteen, New Jersey four, Massachusetts one, the Pacific coast one, and the Midwest all the rest—eleven. Five went to Michigan alone. Of course seniority was the prime reason for all this. Of the eleven Midwest chairmen, two at least are vehemently narrow and intractable isolationists, Clare E. Hoffman of Michigan and Harold Knutson of Minnesota.

MIDDLE WEST AND ISOLATION

With foreign policy as such this book does not deal; there must, however, be a word about isolationism. That the Middle West is the most isolationist area in the country is usually taken for granted; whether this is really so is not certain. Actually, whether you like it or not, isolationism to some degree exists wherever America exists. Polls carefully made

by the Gallup and Roper organizations do not indicate that the Mississippi Basin states are much more decisively isolationist than other areas, except perhaps the South and Texas which are of course interventionist in the extreme. Questionnaires in Iowa do not have results much different from those in, say, upper New York state, or Oregon. Consider too the personal item that three of the most outspoken and ardent internationalists of our time—Willkie, Wallace, Stassen—were or are all Middle Westerners.

Let us say a word first about the tenacious grip that isolationism can indubitably exert. It is old stuff to most of us; it may not be such old stuff to the man in Zanzibar. For instance during the whole of World War I the United States was never an "ally" of Great Britain and France, but only an "associated power." Until just before Pearl Harbor, 32 per cent of the American people thought it was more important to stay out of war than to beat Hitler. Some small personal items seem, nowadays, almost too singular for belief. No American distinguished himself more for friendship to Britain during World War II, or more endeared himself to the British public, than Herbert Agar, once editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*. But before the war Mr. Agar—I mean no reproach—had been a convinced and quite vocal isolationist. No paper has a more broadly generous record of public service than the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, but even this newspaper attacked with ferocity, as late as 1941, the arrangement whereby we "gave" Britain fifty overage destroyers. Thousands of Americans of every stamp and category, in the prehistoric days before 1939, failed to realize that the Atlantic Ocean, in the false sense of security it gave, was one of the worst enemies the United States ever had.

To an extraordinary extent classifications became mixed. It is a tribute to

the depth and width of the issue that before Pearl Harbor, Colonel McCormick, Norman Thomas, the Communist party, distinguished folk like Charles A. Beard and Stuart Chase, the La Follettes, Oswald Garrison Villard, and William Randolph Hearst, were all in the same camp. In the interventionist camp, be it noted, was an equally odd assortment—J. P. Morgan & Co., the liberal weeklies, almost all non-Communist radicals, Yankees to whom the word "radical" connoted a touch of hell, the cotton millionaires, most Jews, William Allen White, and southern senators full of frounce.

Shrill isolationist notes may still be heard. Consider the following bleat from a Missouri congressman named Dewey Short:

I am against it (the UNRRA appropriation) with all my heart and soul. I talk as I vote and vote as I talk. So long as I know they have crown jewels of the King and the Czar—and I have seen them—they are brilliant and would bring a neat sum on any market today, enough to run any government for quite a while—as long as they wear ermine and emeralds in London and Moscow, as long as foreign assets are hidden in nearly every country of the world, I am not going to vote for \$1 to take butter and bacon, cornpone and sowbelly out of the mouths of my poor people.

The leading forces behind isolationism, with particular reference to the immediate pre-Pearl Harbor period in the Middle West, might be listed as follows:

First, and above all, the simple factor of geography. The Midwest is, as Hutton puts it, "surrounded, shielded, insulated," by the rest of the country. Probably not one per cent of the people of the eight central states have ever seen New York or San Francisco. There were no submarine nets in Lake Michigan, or bombs in Calumet, and the idea that the United States could be in any physical danger

seemed (and still seems to some) preposterous.

Second—so I heard it put once—the Middle West was so rich that “it could afford not to care.”

Third, powerful religious influences, both Protestant and Catholic. Innumerable preachers told their flocks that it was morally wrong to fight and taught the evilness of war. Probably this had as much to do with the growth of American pacifism, which in many instances became identical with isolationism, as any single factor between 1919 and 1941. In addition many Catholics had strong appeasement tendencies, and appeasement in Europe was what most isolationists wanted or tended to defend.

Fourth, racial background. This country is largely populated by people (and their descendants) who left Europe to find a new life; hence, they resisted vividly anything that brought them back to Europe. Also formidable numbers of Middle Westerners are of German background, and many of these had German sympathies. Again, the region is full of Scandinavians, who were traditionally isolationist even in Europe itself. One should not, however, draw too sweeping conclusions about this. Nebraska is a strongly German state, and Kansas has scarcely any Germans at all; yet Kansas was much more isolationist than Nebraska. Usually, in a community where isolationism was abnormally acute, several factors were at work in combination. Milwaukee for instance is a town even more markedly Polish than German; also the Catholics are powerful there and so is the Chicago *Tribune*.

Fifth, a curious lack of self-confidence among Americans generally as far as things international are concerned, an innate provincialism. I have heard people say, “We don’t really know what we are ourselves, and so how can we throw our weight around in the rest of the world?”

Sixth, the paradox alluded to early in this book to the effect that so many American Westerners, particularly liberals who might have been expected to be strongly internationalist, were on the contrary powerful conservative influences in the field of foreign affairs, because they hated the eastern banking interests and the big cities of the East. Also, absorbed to the hilt in the field of domestic reform, they had no energy left for other matters. Mr. Willkie’s “one world” idea simply did not exist; rather, there *was* only one world, and it was the United States.

Seventh, ignorance, fed by ill-educated leadership. Think back to some of the moonshine prophecies made before the war, and what a burlesque atmosphere they led to. Father Coughlin said (January 15, 1942), “We lack the guns, tanks, ammunition, without which an army can be slaughtered like sheep. We have not the ships to transport a mass army.” Herbert Hoover said (June 29, 1941): “Does any sane person believe that by military means we can defeat two-thirds of the military power of the whole world in even years and years?” Charles A. Lindbergh said (April 19, 1941): “This war is lost. . . . It is not within our power today to win the war for England, even though we throw the entire resources of our nation into the conflict.” Former Governor La Follette of Wisconsin said (June 6, 1941): “Nothing that Britain can do now can pull the chestnuts out of the fire. It matters nothing to America which group controls Europe, be it England or Germany.”

Eighth, in contrast to the feeling that England was bound to be defeated, a widespread hands-off sentiment existed on the ground that Britain was bound to win in the end anyway and so why worry.

Ninth, the United States, in so far as it faces anywhere, has during all its

history faced the Pacific. Europe is what is behind it. This may have contributed to the phenomenon whereby almost all isolationists turned into fervent admirers of General MacArthur, and urged more and more support to him even if this meant weakening American forces in Europe. Once the war was under way, most isolationists thought that it was much more important to beat Japan than Germany. (On the other hand, the late General Patton was also a hero to most isolationists, maybe because they felt that he too hated Europe, or perhaps because they are so often apt to be hypnotized by flamboyant military figures, no matter whom.)

Tenth, domestic political considerations. People hated Roosevelt; therefore they hated "his" war.

Eleventh, international considerations. A few isolationists, at least, foresaw that Stalin was going to reap the chief rewards from the war, and hence the great number of folk who hate and fear Russia on a wide variety of grounds opposed American intervention, on the ground that this would ultimately serve to further a "Russian" victory.

A fascinating turnabout has come in this realm. The professional Russia-haters, who were once ardent isolationists for the most part, and many of whom were pro-German, are now equally ardent interventionists, since they want to beat the Soviet Union down, and think that the United States should do so.

Equally, former interventionists who favored Russia generally are now, after World War II, under considerable compulsion to face around and become isolationists, because anything that serves to diminish American influence in Europe will serve to strengthen the Russian position there.

Twelfth, the McCormick dialectic and the influence of papers like the *Chicago Tribune*.

Beyond all this is still something else, zealous anti-Britishness of so many mid-west Americans. Many people who are classified as isolationists are not so at all. They are merely anti-British.

Not one American in ten thousand ever looks at the *Congressional Record*, and so most citizens are dulcetly unaware of some of the concrete shapes Anglo-phobia may take.

Fred Bradley, Congressman from Michigan, said during the debate on the British Loan (July 13, 1946): "Britain still owes us from the first World War \$6,500,000,000 in principal and interest that she has not made one single move to repay...but she has unmined gold reserves worth at least \$15,000,000,000 and \$8,000,000,000 in diamond reserves." Gerald W. Landis (Indiana, July 12, 1946), said: "Why should we make this loan to Britain? The British are by no means strapped.... They own 1,500,000 shares in United States industries: General Motors, 434,000 shares; Radio Corporation, 177,000 shares; Amerada Petroleum, 133,000 shares; Chrysler Corporation, 36,000 shares; Standard Oil of New Jersey, 198,000 shares; Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 130,000 shares; Standard Oil of Indiana, 315,000 shares; American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 70,000 shares; U.S. Steel Preferred, 21,000 shares."

Time and time again, during this debate, midwest senators and congressmen submitted lists showing what the loan would "cost" each county in their constituency. The figures were ingeniously worked out, down to the last alleged cent. Representative Karl Stefan of Nebraska (July 2, 1946) put it this way:

Mr. Speaker, calculated upon the basis of 1940 census figures, and utilizing the accepted figures of \$2,000 for the share of each individual in the Nation in the Nation's debt and \$28 for each individual in the Nation as his share in what will be taken from the Nation by the proposed British loan, Nebraskans must

assume \$2,631,668,000 as their share of the national debt and \$36,843,352 as their share of the loss to this country through the British loan.

Broken down into counties, this means:

COUNTY	SHARE OF NATIONAL DEBT	SHARE OF BRITISH LOAN
Adams	\$49,152,000	\$687,128
Antelope	26,578,000	371,092
Arthur	2,090,000	29,260

Mr. Stefan's list of counties then fills a solid column. Marion T. Bennett of Missouri proceeds further and presents a similar list subdivided by cities:

The share of each community in my district can be computed in the same way. The present estimated population of Springfield, Missouri, my home town, is 76,450. Springfield's share of the British loan would therefore be \$2,140,000.

I do not mention these details to give circulation to the financial views of these congressmen, or to rebut their premises which would be easy enough. Foreign policy—good foreign policy anyway—cannot be measured in dollars and cents. I do mention them to demonstrate on what a specific and particularized intimate local level midwest politicians are apt to consider any matter having to do with (a) international co-operation and (b) world peace.

We return to slightly broader vistas. Nobody, it would seem, can easily be an isolationist in an era when you can cross the Atlantic between lunch and dinner and when the atomic bomb can make mincemeat of any ideology. Chicago is as near Moscow by air as New York. Foreign policy is, or should be, as much a matter of survival to the Middle West as the price of corn. Many points may, in fact, be adduced to show an internationalist trend everywhere in the nation, the Midwest included. Not only were Wheeler, La Follette, Shipstead, and Nye beaten

recently, as we know; so, among other isolationists, were Danaher, Gillette, Holman, Davis of Pennsylvania, Clark of Idaho, Clark of Missouri, Walsh of Massachusetts, and Ham Fish. Of the thirty-one senators who voted against Lend Lease in 1941, only thirteen are still in the Senate, and of these several are much less intransigently isolationist than they once were.

As a counterbalance to the congressional views quoted above I am tempted to mention, though it does not have any official status, a remarkable pamphlet called *Crossroads Middletown*. It begins with the sentence, "This booklet is the story of the awakening of the people of Middletown, Ohio, to the realization that they are today at the crossroads between peace and war." It describes then, with vivid impact, the various steps Middletown took to inform itself of the nature of the crisis, its education of local opinion toward effective international collaboration, the town meetings it held and the "quota force plan" it suggests for establishing an "effective world authority" with the United States participating. And hundreds of middle western communities feel exactly as does Middletown, though not all have expressed themselves so effectively. Two polls taken recently by the Roper organization should be noted:

1945

Which one of these comes closest to expressing what you would like to have the United States do after the war?

	PER CENT
a. Enter into no alliances and have as little as possible to do with other countries	9.7
b. Depend only on separate alliances with certain countries	4.8
c. Take an active part in an international organization	71.8
d. Don't know	13.7

1946

If every other country in the world would elect representatives to a World Congress and let all problems between countries be decided by this Congress with a strict provision that all countries have to abide by the decisions whether they like them or not, would you be willing to have the United States go along on this?

	PER CENT
Yes	62.4
No	19.8
Don't know	17.8

But to conclude. Is isolationism finally, actually, and completely dead in the Middle West? Of course not. It is, however, much tempered and diluted. Perhaps the fundamental emotional bias has not changed. But there has been a distinct change in practical attitudes. A man who has had a succession of bad colds will carry an umbrella the next time he goes out into the rain. This is a rough approximation of the way the Middle West is feeling. The UN may not be a very good umbrella. But at the moment it is the only thing it has.

The South as a Political Region

Gunnar Myrdal, the author of the distinguished book from which the following excerpt is taken, is a brilliant social economist. He was formerly Minister of Commerce in the Swedish Cabinet and professor of economics at the University of Stockholm. *An American Dilemma* is the most comprehensive study of the Negro in the United States ever made. But it is more than this; it contains data and insights relevant to American politics in general. It is especially suggestive on the South as a political region; certainly some of the popular "myths" about the South ought to be partially exploded by a careful reading of the following selection. What are the factors which produce the peculiar pattern of Southern politics? What is the effect of the bi-cultural social structure of the South? What is the influence of the South on national politics? What makes possible the inordinate power of the so-called Southern bloc in Congress? "Split personality" is again evident in a region. Here it is characterized by a mixture of some liberalism and extensive conservatism, of individualism and paternal rule, of political indolence and militancy, of richness in resources and economic poverty. Why?

THE "SOLID SOUTH"

Except for the Reconstruction period and for the period after Restoration culminating in the Populist movement (1890's), the South has consistently disfranchised the Negroes and has had to cling to the

Democratic party to do so. This suppression of normal bi-partisan politics has given the region the appellation "Solid South." The South had a two-party system before 1830, and it was lost in the consolidation of forces against the North just before and during the Civil War. As

From *An American Dilemma* by Gunnar Myrdal. Copyright, 1944, by Harper & Brothers.

we noted in the previous chapter, it was lost again at the close of Reconstruction. But already by the end of the 'seventies and increasingly up to the first half of the 'nineties, the Populist movement divided the agrarian middle and lower class from the Democratic party, which was led by the plantation owners, industrialists, merchants and bankers. The rise to political importance of the agrarian radicals resulted in the fulfillment of the prediction that all precautions taken to keep the Negroes disfranchised would crumble if a split occurred in the ranks of the whites. Both factions appealed to the Negro voters. The regular Democrats, who were most familiar with the administrative machinery and who included most of the owners of plantations where Negroes were employed in large numbers, are said to have been most successful. But the agrarians were just as eager to get help where they could find it. In 1896 in North Carolina they joined the Republicans, and as a consequence more Negroes were appointed to offices in that state than ever before. For more than half a decade, the Democratic party was virtually disrupted in most states of the South.

But the reaction soon got under way. A new movement to disfranchise the Negroes by more effective legal means—starting with the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 and continuing with the adoption of new constitutions in seven other states between 1895 and 1910—drew its main arguments from the danger of a break in white solidarity, demonstrated by the agrarian revolt. When Populism declined, and it did so rapidly after 1896, and the unity between the Populists and the Democrats became restored, the main dish at the love feasts was the disfranchisement of the Negro.

After this crisis, the Democratic one-party rule has persisted practically unbroken until now, with the minor exception of the 1928 presidential campaign.

In spite of a formidable armor of constitutional and statutory provisions for disfranchising the Negro and an extra-legal social pressure to complement the statutes, the main regions of the white South still do not dare to have any political division, lest the white factions be tempted to seek Negro support. The irony of the situation is that the disfranchisement of the Negro had been argued as the only means of preventing corruption at the polls and of allowing the whites to divide along natural political lines. The second goal is obviously not reached, as the one-party system is still retained; since it is the only guarantee against Negro franchise, the elimination of the one-party system would be the basis for freedom of the whites to split. And to prevent corruption under a one-party system in a region with the unfortunate traditions of the South—when it is so difficult everywhere in America even when an opposition party is present—is practically impossible. In this vicious circle Southern politics is caught.

The one-party system in the South; its supporting election machine with its restrictions, intricacies, and manipulations; its vast allowances for arbitrary administration; and the low political participation of even the white people favor a *de facto* oligarchic regime, broken here and there, now and then, by demagogues from Tom Watson to Huey Long, who appeal to the lower classes among whites. The oligarchy consists of the big landowners, the industrialists, the bankers, and the merchants. Northern corporate business with big investments in the region has been sharing in the political control by this oligarchy.

There is an amazing avoidance of issues in Southern politics. "The South votes for Men—Democratic men—but rarely ever for issues, unless the issue is defined in black and white." We have to remember that in a measure this is a characteris-

tic of all American politics. But in the South, it is driven to its extreme. The chief direct reason for this is, of course, the one-party system which normally keeps politics within a single political machine and restricts the scope of political struggle to personalities and offices. The great Southern orator of the post-Restoration period, Henry W. Grady, gave the best rationalization of this situation as it is even today argued by the majority of the ruling class of the region. The reason is the Negro.

The whites understand that the slightest division on their part will revive those desperate days (of Reconstruction). . . . So that the whites have agreed everywhere to sink their differences on moral and economic issues, and present solid and unbroken ranks to this alien and dangerous element. This once done, the rest is easy. Banded intelligence and responsibility will win everywhere and all the time. Against it numbers cannot prevail.

It is not the Negro himself who is feared but "the baseness of white politicians" who might be tempted to use the Negro vote for "nefarious purposes":

It may be asked, then: "Why do the Southern whites fear the political domination of the blacks?" They do not fear that directly. But the blacks are ignorant, and therefore easily deluded; strong of race instinct, and therefore clannish; without information, and therefore without strong political convictions; passionate, and therefore easily excited; poor, irresponsible, and with no idea of the integrity of the suffrage, and therefore easily bought. The fear is that this vast swarm of ignorant, purchasable, and credulous voters will be compacted and controlled by desperate and unscrupulous white men, and made to hold the balance of power wherever the whites are divided. This fear has kept and will keep, the whites "solid." It would keep the intelligence and responsibility of any community, North or South, solid.

But there is a higher principle invoked to explain why "the whites shall have clear and unmistakable control of public

affairs" and why a solid front must be preserved:

They own the property. They have the intelligence. Theirs is the responsibility. For these reasons they are entitled to control. Beyond these reasons is a racial one. They are the superior race, and will not and can not submit to the domination of an inferior race.

Against these arguments the Southern liberals hammer away. They point out that the one-party system fosters mediocrity, demagoguery, political apathy and irrationality. They point out that fear of the Negro shadows every political discussion and prevents the whites from doing anything to improve themselves. The conservative whites counter that the Southern system does allow for political division—in the primaries, though not in the general elections. This, however, is a myth which Southerners have carefully fostered: in 1940 only 36 of the 78 Democratic primaries—less than half—were contested in the eight poll tax states. Thus, even in the primaries there is little opportunity for political division.

But undoubtedly there are sometimes real divisions even in the South on interests and issues: poor people against rich, the hill country against the plantation lands, the coast against the inland. But the fact that the issues have to be fought out under cover of personalities and within a one-party machine must, particularly in a region of inadequate political education, confuse those issues. It has, indeed, been the tradition and the spirit of the "Solid South" to have such confusion, as the party machine is always sensing, and capitalizing upon, the danger of a serious political division. The newspapers usually respect this tradition. They publish the generalities contained in the various candidates' platforms and speeches but usually abstain from giving information on the real issues which might sometimes be involved.

Even admitting, therefore, that the

one-party system allows for a certain number of issues and divisions, it must be maintained that, in a considerable degree, the one-party rule of the South obliterates healthy democratic politics, both in national and in local affairs. There is a considerable amount of truth in W. E. DuBois' bitter characterization:

The white primary system in the South is simply a system which compels the white man to disenfranchise himself in order to take the vote away from the Negro. . . . The mass of people in the South today have no knowledge as to how they are governed or by whom. Elections have nothing to do with broad policies and social development, but are matters of selection of friends to lucrative offices and punishment of personal enemies. Local administration is a purposely disguised system of intrigue which not even an expert could unravel.

SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM

Democratically organized people's movements, giving voice to the needs of the simple citizen and a power basis for his full participation in the control of society, do not thrive in this political atmosphere. To an extent the lack of organized mass participation in government is a general American characteristic. The South shows even less popular political interest than the rest of the country. Except for the Ku Klux Klan, which lacked positive political goals, the Prohibition movement, which was based more on emotion than on reason, and the Populist movement, which, in the South as all over the country, was loose in organization and confused in aims and which achieved little, the South has never experienced organized mass movements of a political character.

There have been few spontaneous movements to improve the well-being of the masses of people, such as trade unions or adult education. Even the farmers' co-operative movement has been lagging in

the South, and what has come in has been due mainly to the efforts of the federal government. The Southern masses do not generally organize either for advancing their ideals or for protecting their group interests. The immediate reason most often given by Southern liberals is the resistance from the political oligarchy which wants to keep the masses inarticulate. This has also been the initial situation in most other regions and countries, but in these others eventually the organized and self-disciplined mass movements have come to form the very basis for a revitalized democracy. The deeper reasons are again the low level of political culture in the South, which has become solidified partly in the region's steadfast struggle to keep the Negro from participation.

All modern reform movements which have penetrated the rest of the country and gradually changed American society—woman suffrage and economic equality, collective bargaining, labor legislation, progressive education, child welfare, civil service reform, police and court reform, prison reform—have, until recently, hardly touched the greater part of the South except in so far as the federal government has imposed them from the outside. In particular, there has been no active participation of the masses. Recently they have become the interest of the upper class liberals around the universities and other cultural centers. Southern liberalism—which will be discussed in further detail below—is beautiful and dignified. It preserves much of the philosophical grace of the mythical old aristocratic South. But until the New Deal came, it had no source of power. Even yet it does not have contact with, or support by, the masses. Social reform is now coming rapidly to the South, but it is coming mainly from Washington. For a hundred years this region, which played such an important and distinguished role in the American Revolution and in the early history of the

Republic, has not contributed to the nation anything approaching its fair share of fresh political thinking and forward-looking political initiative in national issues. It has, on the whole, served as a reactionary drug against the forces of change and progress.

This political conservatism is directly tied up with the Negro problem in several ways. The devices inaugurated to disfranchise Negroes, the one-party system, the low political participation on the part of the white masses, and other peculiarities of Southern politics, all tend to give a disproportionate power to classes, groups and individuals who feel their interest tied up with conservatism in social issues. But there is also a more direct connection between Southern conservatism and the Negro problem. For constitutional and other reasons, social reform measures will have to include Negroes, and this is resented. The conservative opponents of reform proposals can usually discredit them by pointing out that they will improve the status of the Negroes, and that they prepare for "social equality." This argument has been raised in the South against labor unions, child labor legislation, and practically every other proposal for reform.

It has been argued to the white workers that the Wages and Hours Law was an attempt to legislate equality between the races by raising the wage level of Negro workers to that of the whites. The South has never been seriously interested in instituting tenancy legislation to protect the tenants' rights and at the same time to improve agriculture, and the argument has again been that the Negro share-cropper should not be helped against the white man. I have met this same argument everywhere in the South when discussing economic and social reforms: "We don't want our Negroes to..." The poor white Southerners are apparently still pre-

pared to pay the price of their own distress in order to keep the Negro still lower.

Liberals commonly describe this argument as a "red herring," intentionally used by the reactionaries to distract and deceive the ignorant public and to discredit reforms. But this argument is not merely deceptive. It most certainly has a kernel of truth in it. Of necessity, social reforms involve changes which are general and social co-operation, to be effective, cannot remain confined exclusively to whites. All social reforms involve an element of economic and social equalization which, by the very logic of things, cannot wholly set the Negroes apart. In addition to technical factors and the constitutional barriers against making social legislation openly discriminatory, there is also the sense of rationality and fairness in the minds of the white Southerners themselves. "Social equality," in a sense, *will* be promoted in a society remade by social reforms; the caste order *was* more easily upheld in a conservative laissez-faire society. In spite of much discrimination, this has been the experience of the South during the New Deal. There is, therefore—and this should not be concealed—a measure of logic in the political correlation between the anti-Negro attitude and the traditional conservatism of the South generally. As the South is now gradually accepting social reform, it will also have to give up a considerable part of discrimination against the Negroes both in principle and in practice.

If social reforms have been lacking in the South, certain other changes have been going strong. The Prohibition movement, for example, has had widespread political support. William Archer, when he toured the South in the first decade of the twentieth century, could report that "the most remarkable phenomenon in the recent history of the South is the 'wave of prohibition' which has passed, and is passing, over the country. There are 20,000,000 people

in the fourteen Southern States, 17,000,-000 of whom are under prohibitory law in some form." Even today, nearly a decade after the abolition of the Eighteenth Amendment, two Southern states—Mississippi and Oklahoma (and one Northern state—Kansas)—have laws prohibiting the sale of hard liquor. Even those states which do not have prohibition laws have strong prohibitionist sentiments. For example: in 1938 the Virginia legislature ordered the burning of a study of the physiological effects of liquor after they had paid to have this study made, simply because it observed that liquor in small quantities was not harmful. These demonstrations against liquor are apparently not meant to affect white people; in most Southern states they are directed solely against the Negro. Archer remarked that: "The presence of the Negro in the South is a tower of strength to the prohibitionist."

The South is also strongly religious. Not only is the nonchurch member comparatively rare, but the denominations tend to be more fundamentalist and evangelical than in the North. Although it would have to be checked by carefully collected quantitative data, my impression is that the sermons stress the Other World more often than this one and rely for a text more often on the Old Testament than on the New Testament. It would seem that the Southern white man, especially in the lower classes, goes to church more to get an emotional thrill than to get an intellectual framework into which to put his daily problems. These things are true in the North, too, but to a much smaller extent. In spite of his otherworldliness in church, the Southern preacher is often interested in power. Until recently he was often quite important in local politics; during the 1920's clergymen may almost be said to have dominated the South. They were a potent force be-

hind the resuscitation of the Ku Klux Klan. They backed the "Blue Laws." They dominated many universities. The Dayton trial, which was fought over the question of teaching evolution in Tennessee, was only the most spectacular manifestation of the general power of the fundamentalist clergy.

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THE CHANGING SOUTH

The South is changing rapidly. During the 'thirties the changes went into high speed. Those changes cover the whole field of social relations and are being analyzed in other chapters of this inquiry. At this point only a few summary hints are needed to stress their paramount importance for Southern politics.

It is easy to give the false impression that the South is static. The preceding pages of this chapter—taken by themselves—might also have fallen into this error. There are two main causes of this illusion. One is the extremely low starting points, in all respects—general education, political culture, economic standards—of the South at the end of the Civil War. The outside observer, today, who does not himself share in the breath-taking drama of the Southern people, will easily observe that the South is far behind the rest of the nation but might overlook the great changes that have occurred since the Civil War. To guard against this we have tried to be explicit about the humble beginnings.

The second cause is a curious tendency of most Southerners, a tendency related to their conservatism, to stress in conversation and literature that customs are strong and that there is much resistance to change. Reality is actually dynamic in the South, but people's ideas about reality are usually astonishingly static. The average Southerner does not seem to believe in the changes which are going on right

before his own eyes. The pessimistic and conservative idea about the "mores" and the "folkways"—which supposedly cannot be changed by the "stateways"—is not only a particularly cherished notion among Southern social scientists, but is something of a regional religion for a large proportion of the literate people. The South is intensely conscious of its history, and there is a high level of historical knowledge among the educated classes. But history is not used, as in the North, to show how society is continuously changing, but, rather, on the contrary, to justify the *status quo* and to emphasize society's inertia.

It is true that the presence of this bent of mind itself hampers social change. But the material and spiritual changes under way are so momentous that they cut through these barriers. Southerners are apt to say that "the poll tax will not be abolished in the South, for the courthouse gangs will not allow it," or that "Negroes will never vote in the South, for white people will not stand for it," or that "there are never going to be any labor unions down here, for public opinion is against it." The Truth is, of course, that the poll tax is abolished in three states (North Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida) already, and that it is likely to be abolished in the others as time passes. The trend is clear and uni-directional: when the poll tax is once abolished in a state it is unlikely that it will be reintroduced there, while in the other states the discussion will continue about its abolition. The courthouse gangs and the local politicians might be against the reform, but there is a general upheaval of social and economic conditions in the South which is changing their basis of power. Likewise, Negroes are voting in some places in the South, and white people are tolerating it. In the new annual A.A.A. elections for the crop restriction program they are even voting right in the cotton counties of the Black

Belt in perhaps even greater proportion than whites.

Industrialization and urbanization are proceeding at a greater speed in the South than in other parts of the country. Agriculture in the South is facing a more thoroughgoing adjustment to world market conditions than elsewhere, and this structural change means more to the South because its economy is based on agriculture to a greater extent. Because of the coming economic changes and because of the high birth rate, migration may be expected to become more important than it now is, and migration always has far-reaching social effects. Unionization has proceeded in spite of all impediments. The national labor movement in America cannot indefinitely be expected to overlook the fact that the present conservative power constellation in the South is antagonistic to its interests. Indeed, it is something of a riddle that organized labor throughout the country has, for such a long time, acquiesced in the Southern situation.

The economic depression and the following prolonged stagnation during the 'thirties meant distress everywhere and particularly in the poor, backward, harassed South. The liberal New Deal which followed in the wake of the economic pressure was sponsored by the same national party which locally has meant the "Solid South," cultural traditionalism and political reaction. But apart from the fact of party allegiance, the South was actually too poor to scorn systematically the gifts of national charity, even if the price to be paid was the acceptance of social legislation and organized social reform. Not overlooking the considerable discrimination against Negroes in the local administration of New Deal measures in the South, we must see that the New Deal has made a lasting break in Southern racial practices. It has been said that the South was once bought by the Northern

capitalists, who did not care much for the Negroes and allowed the Southerners almost complete freedom in the pursuit of any kind of racial discrimination. *Now Washington is the main "buyer" of the South.* And Washington usually seeks to extend its assistance regardless of race.

Washington is not consistent in its racial policy, it is true. The New Deal, whatever its leadership and its aspirations, is bridled by shrewd politicians who must be just as reluctant to break openly with Southern conservatism as with the corrupt city machines in the North. But at the same time these politicians have to look out for the labor vote and for the Negro vote in the North, which again strengthens the forces working for nondiscrimination in the New Deal. There is, in the game, plenty of room for skillful log-rolling; the Southern conservatives in Congress and at home will often succeed in blocking rules and policies drawn up by the New Dealers to protect the Negroes' right to their equal share. The fight goes on under cover. But sometimes it flares into the open, as when Southern reactionary congressmen utilize their strategic committee positions to defeat or restrict some proposal of the New Deal. This blocking of social reform by Southern congressmen and the more general condition—which existed long before the New Deal—for Southern congressmen to exert a disproportionate influence on legislation because of their longer tenure and the consequent importance of their committee assignments and prestige, *is one of the main reasons why the Negro problem is a national one and not merely a sectional one.* Northern politicians are becoming aware of this fact before the Northern public.

If, in the main, the New Deal has to deal tactfully with Southern congressmen, the latter cannot afford to break off entirely from the New Deal either. The Democratic party is their means of reach-

ing out into national politics. And, besides, they have to watch their home front, where the New Deal is getting popular with the masses. The race issue, in these New Deal measures, is never an isolated element which can be cut off; it is always involved in the bigger issue of whether poor people shall be helped or not. The fundamental fact is that the South is poor and in clear need of social assistance and economic reform. To this must be added a personal factor of considerable weight. Roosevelt is not just another Democratic President. He has succeeded in becoming truly popular among the common people in the South, and he has taught them to demand more out of life in terms of security and freedom from want. He has acquired such prestige that the epithet "nigger lover" simply cannot be applied to him. Even the most conservative Southerner will scarcely dare to come out against him personally in the same way as do Republican conservatives in the North.

In this way Southern political conservatism as a whole, and even on the race point, has to retreat and compromise. Meanwhile, the entire South is experiencing the benefits of the various federal policies. A general trend of centralization of governmental functions—from local governments to state governments, and from state governments to federal governments—is helping to give the South a new kind of administration. Even more in the South than in the rest of the country the New Deal takes on the form of a popular movement. Partly under the stimulation of the New Deal, the people of the South are coming to organize themselves for a wide variety of purposes: in county planning and other agricultural groups, in 4-H clubs, in credit associations and co-operatives, in religious reform groups, discussion forums, fact-finding committees, parent-teacher associations, interracial commissions, professional organiza-

tions and civic betterment leagues. Some of these organizations are much older than the New Deal, but the whole trend has certainly gained momentum during recent years. The relation to the political New Deal of these variegated civic activities is apparent. The people behind it are the same as those working for the New Deal. Often those organizations are initiated and financed by the N.Y.A., the W.P.A., and the F.S.A. or some of the other government agencies.

Small numbers of Southerners, even in the lower classes, are thus gradually becoming accustomed to meeting together for orderly discussion of their problems. We have already observed the lack, in the South even more than in the North, of self-generating peoples' movements. The activity which we are now considering is certainly not a spontaneous outflow from the intelligent demands of problem-conscious masses. It is spoon-fed from above. But we must be careful not to underestimate its potentialities. The building up of a social democracy does not, perhaps, follow exactly the same pattern everywhere. It may be that as small groups from the masses are in this way reached by modern political thought, they will, in their turn, act as catalysts bringing political intelligence and organizational solidarity to the vast dormant masses of white and black people in the South.

The New Deal—particularly in the South—does not rate highly when judged by norms of administrative efficiency. There has been lack of careful planning, co-ordination, and persistency, and there has also been waste of personnel and money. But the New Deal has spirit—particularly in the South. And it has done what many of the more efficient national welfare policies in other countries have rather neglected: it has strongly emphasized the education of the people. Such agencies as, for instance, the Farm Security Administration, have perhaps their

most outstanding accomplishment in the education of the masses for a fuller and more efficient life. By actually changing the people, and not only assisting them economically, the New Deal becomes the more potent as a dynamic factor undermining the *status quo* in the South.

The docility of the people on the plantations and in the textile mills—so different from the common stereotype of the independent, upright American—is, of course, the very thing to be educated away. But in the initial effort at change, this docility gives the public agencies the opportunity to use an element of patriarchal compulsion in the right direction, which speeds up the educational process. The poorest farmer in the Scandinavian countries or in England—or in the Middle West, for that matter—would not take benevolent orders so meekly as Negro and white sharecroppers do in the South. But if use is made of dependence and paternalism, the aim is independence and self-reliance. It has to be remembered that these people have lived in still greater dependence before, and that their close supervision by federal agencies is to be regarded as a weaning process.

If we note further that the long-run trend in the South toward a higher level of general education and cultural participation of both Negroes and whites is steadily proceeding, we have accounted for the main dynamic factors in the Southern political situation. They all accumulate to bring Southern conservatism into a process of gradual disintegration. In this period of accelerated change, the Second World War has come to America. Some of the specific New Deal policies are being discontinued. Undoubtedly this War will have some of the usual effects of all wars in the direction of cultural and political reaction. It is reported that the Ku Klux Klan is preparing for a new and glorious comeback after this War is over. But, more fundamentally, the War will

probably work toward a still greater speeding up of most of the changes under way. And the War is fought for democracy, for the "American way of life"—which is certainly not Southern traditionalism.

In these changes, the various areas of the South are proceeding at different levels. The Deep South lags somewhat behind the Upper South, the Southwest, and the Border states, just as these are not as advanced as the Northern and Western regions of the country. These regional differences give us a sort of observational check in our analysis of the changes in time; they are especially useful in foreseeing the future of the Deep South.

No Yankee will be tactless enough to mention it, in so many words, and no Southerner can afford to admit it, but *the main thing happening to the South is that it is gradually becoming Americanized.*

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THE SOUTHERN POLITICAL SCENE

The future might belong to liberalism, but the South of today is mainly ruled by its conservatives. Though the South, as part of the United States, has, in the main, the same political forms as the North, the activity which goes on within these forms is strikingly different. The difference not only makes internal politics in the South distinctive, but it influences the activities of the federal government. Although there are local and occasional variations which will be considered presently, the South exhibits the following major political divergences from the rest of the nation:

(1) For all practical purposes, the South has only one political party. In the 1940 election, for example, 76 per cent of all votes were cast for the Democratic candidate for President. In the extreme cases of Mississippi and South Carolina,

98 per cent of the votes went to the Democratic candidate. This causes the primary to be far more important than the general election. In fact, the general election—most important in the North and West—is usually a formal ritual to satisfy the demand of the Federal Constitution. While there is often a real contest in the primaries, on the whole the struggle is one between personalities rather than issues. Although the Democratic party holds unchallenged power over most of the South, this party is not a highly organized political unity. Politics is decentralized.

(2) A much smaller proportion of the population participates in the elections in the South than in the North. In 1940, only 28 per cent of the adult population voted in 12 Southern states, as compared to 53 per cent in the North and West. In the extreme case of South Carolina, only 10 per cent voted. Most of this voting is carried on with a corruption and disrespect for law that is found in only a few areas of the North and West.

(3) For all practical purposes, Negroes are disfranchised in the South. Out of a total Negro adult population of 3,651,256 in the 8 Deep Southern states (excluding Oklahoma) of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, South Carolina, and Arkansas, Bunche estimates that only 80,000 to 90,000 Negroes voted in the general election of 1940. Practically none voted in the primary.

These three major political facts about the South are really part of one single problem, and—as we shall find—this problem is the Negro problem. Because a Republican administration was at the helm in Washington during the Civil War and Reconstruction, the white South affiliated itself with the Democratic party. It has remained Democratic and has kept the Democratic party in the South a white man's party to prevent Negroes

from having any voice in government. A white Republican is generally considered a "nigger lover" but at the same time he is allowed to vote in the Democratic "white primary" in many sections of the South. Every attempt to build up a two-party system is still regarded as a threat of "black domination." As a result, the political issues in the South cannot be fought at the general elections (and not often in the primaries either). No political organization can be built around an issue (except for prohibition). The candidates at a Democratic primary may represent, as we have pointed out, different interests and different points of view, but once the primary has selected the Democratic candidate, usually all opposition to him must cease until he is up for renomination several years later (the "gentleman's agreement"). The necessity of the one-party system as a means of excluding Negroes from suffrage and the danger of "black domination" are kept to the fore of people's attention. In most regions of the South an appeal to white solidarity is a great campaign asset for a candidate; in some regions in the Deep South "nigger baiting" still get votes. All over the South it is dangerous for a candidate to be accused of friendliness to the Negro. As we have observed earlier, political campaigning and election have in the South ceremonial and symbolic significance, and oratorical ability is a first necessity for a Southern politician.

In keeping Negroes from the polls by such devices as the poll tax, white men have been disfranchised. In preventing a two-party system from arising—which might let in the Negro vote—white men have been kept politically apathetic. White Southerners stay away from the polls for the most part. Another large proportion comes to the polls solely because they are given a dollar or two apiece for their vote by the local political ma-

chine. As participation in elections is kept low, relatively little money can often control elections in the South. And investigations show that corruption and illegal practices at the polls are the rule—not the exception. The election machinery is in most parts of the region far behind that in the North and in the other democratic countries of the world. For example, the secret, printed, uniform ballot (the so-called "Australian ballot") is not used over large areas of the South, and election officials and hangers-on at the polls know how everyone votes.

At the same time there is a myth in the South that politics is clean, that it became clean when the new state constitution—inaugurated between 1890 and 1910—completed the process of disfranchising the Negro. Many a story is passed around describing the terrible times before 1890 when Negroes were fed liquor and herded to the polls, first by the Republicans and later by the Democrats and Populists when they split and appealed to the Negro vote.

As a prerequisite for understanding the Negro's role in Southern politics, it is necessary to consider two further aspects of the political scene: the influence of the South in national politics and the position there of the Republican party.

The difference between politics in the South and in the rest of the nation is so great that it visibly affects the personality of Southern members of Congress: they act and think differently in Washington from what they do in their home states. So do Northerners, of course; but the shift undergone by the Southerners is much more drastic. The typical Southern members of Congress are, however, basically so far away from national norms that, in spite of all accommodations, they remain a distinctive force in Washington. This fact becomes all the more important as, for a variety of reasons, they have

a disproportionate influence in national politics.

Seats in the House of Representatives are apportioned according to population, and the nine million Negroes in the South give the South a good share of its seats, although so few Negroes are permitted to vote. The large amount of nonvoting among Southern whites similarly makes each vote count more. The small electorate, the one-party system, well-organized local machines, as well as other factors already referred to, create a near permanency of tenure for the average Southern member of Congress which is seldom paralleled in the North. With seniority as a basis for holding important committee posts in Congress, and with acquaintance as an almost necessary means for participating effectively in congressional activities, the Southerner's permanency of tenure gives him a decided advantage in Washington. This is especially true when—as now—the Democratic party is in power: it controls the most important positions in Congress, and it relies heavily on its disproportionate representation from the South.

There are two important limitations, though, to the South's influence on the Democratic party and thereby on the nation. First, it can practically never hope to control the Presidency, since the Democratic candidate for President is almost sure of the South but must be especially attractive to the North. Second, the Democratic party is solicitous of the Northern Negro and has been successfully weaning his vote away from the Republican party.

To the national Republican party, the South has for a long time been a place from which practically no support could be expected, and Southern Republicans were for the most part persons whose votes for nomination had to be bought up at the national conventions. To the Southern Republicans, the national Re-

publican party has been a source of federal patronage. To Negro Republicans it has also been a traditional but failing hope. A major exception to total weakness of the Republican party in the South, of course, was the 1928 presidential election when Texas, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia bolted the Democratic candidate, Smith, because he was a Catholic and anti-Prohibitionist. Several Republican areas may be found in the Border states of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Delaware, and West Virginia, and also in Tennessee and Oklahoma. The Deep South, too, has its few Republicans: cities always harbor nonconformists, and even a rural area—such as Winston County, Alabama—may be overwhelmingly Republican. In recent years, the small proportion of migrants from the North has occasionally brought its Republican affiliation along and a few native businessmen have considered that their sentiments were with the national Republican party. But these are all exceptions: in most places and at most times in the South, white persons consider it a disgrace to vote Republican. White Republicans have traditionally been labeled "scalawags" and "nigger lovers"—epithets which express the most extreme form of disfavor and which reveal the heart of the political situation in the South.

When the federal government withdrew the army of occupation in the 1870's, and the Klan was left free to terrorize Negro and white Republicans at the polls, the Republican party in the South was broken. With a few Negro and poor white votes—and sometimes in coalition with the Populists—the Republican party retained some representation throughout the South until the new state constitutions of 1890-1910 disfranchised Negroes even more completely. By 1920, in recognition of its lack of significance in the South, the Republican party practically abandoned primaries and often did

not even put up candidates in the general election. In 1940, the last remaining strength of Southern Republicans was removed: at future national conventions congressional districts with fewer than 1,000 Republican votes in the previous election will be denied delegates. It is estimated that this will affect 75 congressional districts in the South.

At the same time that the Republican party was declining in the South, the whites within it were splitting off from the Negroes to form what has been commonly called "the lily-white movement." The term seems to date back to 1888 when the Negro Republican leader, N. W. Cuney, applied it to white Republicans who tried to drive Negroes out of the state convention of Texas by fomenting riots. The movement was given impetus by Presidents Taft and Hoover. The aim of the lily-white leaders and of these Republican Presidents was to build up a Republican party in the South by dissociating the party from Negroes, and from the epithets "nigger lover" and "scalawag." They sought to do this by purging the party of Negro influence and a Negro share in the spoils of victory and by attracting the new South's businessmen.

In one sense, the movement has been successful in all but a few Border states: There is now but one "regular" Negro national Republican committeeman—Perry Howard of Mississippi, who resides in Washington, D. C. In recent elections it is probable that a majority of the few Negroes who voted in Southern states voted Democratic, although there is no proof of this. Because there has been no Republican President since Hoover, it cannot be determined whether a national Republican victory would give Southern

Negroes a share of the spoils. It should be observed that the lily-white movement is not completely anti-Negro: lily-white leaders want Negro votes but do not want to recognize Negro influence or claims. In some states, as in Louisiana, Negro Republican registrants are needed in order to continue the party's legal recognition and keep its place on the ballot. The rule adopted at the 1940 Convention requiring a congressional district to have 1,000 votes to secure representation may also lead to a courting by the party of Negro Republican votes in the South.

In another sense, the lily-white movement has been a failure: it has led to no mass defection of whites from the Democratic party. The movement is up against the potent myth that, if the whites split, the Negroes will hold the "balance of power" and dominate Southern politics. With the declining proportion of Negroes in the South, and with the recent split in the Negro vote, this myth has even less foundation than formerly. It was a matter of honor for Southern Negroes to be Republican before 1930. Many Negroes in the South feel that the old rump Republican party never did any good for the Negroes but merely gave jobs to a few of their political leaders. They felt hurt by the Republican party's defection when it went lily-white. It cannot, of course, be proved, but it seems likely that there has been a landslide away from the Republican party in the South as well as in the North. Still, many Negroes are shrewd enough to calculate that if the lily-white movement should be successful, there could develop a two-party system in the South, which would give the Negro a chance to become a voter again.

10

IDEOLOGY: THE ROLE OF IDEAS

I

One of the most important lessons to be learned in politics is that what men think and how they think are basic determinants of political behavior. Some of the influences which shape ideas have been analyzed in previous chapters. Once formed, however, ideas become in themselves independent causal factors. Lord Keynes, the noted English economist, whose own ideas and theories have moved men profoundly, expressed it succinctly: "The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. . . . I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. . . ." But what are ideas? How can the influence of an idea be traced? What are the political implications of the very *processes* of thinking? To what kinds of errors is political thought susceptible? Though we have recently become accustomed to the fact that opposing ideas have bitterly divided humanity, such questions indicate that the connection between ideas and politics must be explored with some imagination and care.

A preliminary remark or two on the nature of ideas and types of thinking may be suggestive. The word "idea" has several meanings: intention or design; mental image or impression; conception; belief, opinion, doctrine. Differences in these meanings may be important. A vague impression of the values of democracy is not the same thing as a firm belief in democracy; an intention is not the same as an opinion. Yet they all exist in the mind. The significance of a political discussion or an appeal by a leader may depend on which kinds of ideas are involved.

James Harvey Robinson has noted four types of thinking. Reverie—day-dreaming—is familiar to everyone; it consists of allowing thoughts (or ideas as defined) to come and go at will. Another kind of thinking is making up

one's mind, coming to a decision. A third—important for politics—is rationalization. Rationalization is the process of finding arguments for continuing to believe as we do. Ideas which we defend in this way are usually those absorbed from our over-all environment; having become imperceptibly imbedded in our minds, they are rarely subjected to critical examination—they are accepted as self-evident. So much a part of our egos are they that to question them is to invite some sort of personal defeat. Finally, there is creative thinking, wherein one retains an open mind on various subjects, seeks objective knowledge, and changes his opinions and beliefs as often as it is necessary. As our knowledge is broadened, it ought to change our impressions and conceptions of the things going on about us. Creative thinking means trying to be rational. Being rational means exploring all the alternatives—uncovering all the facts; it means investigating the consequences of all the alternatives; and it means choosing among alternatives on the basis of conscious values and goals. It is doubtlessly impossible to be completely rational. Nevertheless, creative thinking is the maximum effort toward objectivity. Clearly, then, rationalization and being rational are two different things.

An interesting point emerges. When thinking takes the form of rationalization and is dominated by untested ideas absorbed from environment or is dominated by emotion (or by both), men tend to be irrational; in this sense, ideas possess men. When thinking is creative and is characterized by the attempt to be rational, men possess ideas. In the latter case ideas become techniques, servants; in the former they become handicaps, sources of confusion.

The beginnings of political wisdom lie in asking one's self: "Where did my ideas come from?"

II

There are three sources of error which may influence political thinking. Since there are no inborn ideas, as Locke has argued, the individual may receive incomplete or inaccurate data about the universe and its inhabitants from those who provide his instruction from birth onward. Or the individual may cling to ideas which are *appropriate* to his position and function in society. Again, ideas may be *safe* or *convenient*. People generally feel better about ideas to which they are accustomed. Most lack the courage to resist the pressure society exerts against new or unsafe ideas. From Socrates down through John Locke to Henry Wallace men have been abused and pilloried because their ideas did not conform to an acceptable pattern. The real difficulty here is that some ideas tend to be believed because of their ancient vintage or because they are customary, not because of their intrinsic validity.

The third source of error is a more serious one. A single individual cannot so sufficiently grasp the nature of the complex universe as to be sure that his thinking has a sound foundation. It is therefore necessary to rely on the creative thinking of others. A high degree of "co-operative thinking" is required. Unfortunately there are obstacles. Philosophers and political scientists disagree.

Political scientists disagree among themselves. The irony is that destructive disagreement seems pleasurable to some of the antagonists. Obviously there are bound to be differences of opinion about human political affairs, but somehow the pooling of knowledge in the social sciences has not quite kept pace with that in the natural sciences. Scientists stand on one another's shoulders. Yet, there are large areas of political behavior which remain little explored as a result of a failure of experts in politics to do the same. The general public has suffered by not having an adequate basis for its consideration of political issues.

What is the significance of the foregoing discussion for the main theme of this volume? One ought to be able to test the thinking of others and to evaluate his own ideas. Furthermore, one ought to be able to understand why some men—demagogues and dictators or their imitators—have such a frightening hold on the thoughts of masses of people. Censorship is not the only form of thought control. Skilled manipulators capitalize on the fact that deep in our thinking are certain ideas we accept as "true." We in the United States live in a form of political society in which participation by the public in policy-making is necessary and desirable. The really crucial problems facing us will have to be met with constructive political action. Constructive political action requires rational, creative thinking. This kind of thinking in a complex world must rest in part upon co-operative thinking. Have our desire, training and capacity for such thinking kept pace with our problems?

III

Although it is sometimes difficult to realize it, the political conditions under which we all live have been influenced by certain outstanding figures who have so effectively marshaled their thoughts and recommendations on politics that their teachings have lived after them. In this group would be mentioned, among others, Aristotle, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, John Locke, Hegel, Hobbes, and Karl Marx.

How can the influence of political ideas be traced? Why do some ideas survive and others die? Max Lerner argues that the meaning of ideas is to be found in the thinker, in the intellectual tradition into which his ideas were advanced, his contemporary social background and the historical consequences of his theories.

Thomas Jefferson's ideas have had a considerable impact upon political developments in the United States. The man and his biography throw some light on why he had the ideas he did. Among many other things, Jefferson was a farmer; he lived in a tranquil Virginia county with other farmers, most of whom he knew face to face. It was natural that he should believe in joint consultation among trustworthy, self-reliant landowners and farmers as a fundamentally sound political process. Jefferson's democracy was an agrarian democracy. To take another example, Woodrow Wilson's strong Presbyterian upbringing partially explains his rather rigid adherence to principle. This same

kind of life-history factor should be applied to anyone whose writings have attained influential status—in more detail, of course, than it has been possible to suggest here.

The intellectual tradition of which ideas are a part is important. Usually a political theory (or a body of thought on political matters) will reflect certain general patterns of thinking characteristic of the period when it is first advanced or given more precise formulation. Nor does the interrelationship end here; effectiveness of ideas will be enhanced if they are given the subtle support of being in keeping with current fashion. John Locke, for example, based a good deal of his political thought on the assumption that man is fundamentally a creature of reason. It is more than coincidence that Locke was writing during the Age of Reason—in the late eighteenth century—during an era in which men believed in their capacity to solve their political and social problems by the application of rational thinking. A shift in intellectual tradition brought a reaction to the Age of Reason. Later writers, like Rousseau, tended to stress emotion rather than reason.

Another line of inquiry which may throw light on the nature and influence of ideas must be directed to the "Age and Its Biography." A social setting will go far toward explaining the prevalence of an idea or theory. As has been pointed out, a predominantly agrarian economy of small, individual property owners living in a nonurban environment shaped the theories of Thomas Jefferson. The fact that a sizeable portion of American society was ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clothed in the early 1930's did more than dictate the late Franklin D. Roosevelt's political strategy; it influenced his thinking on the respective rôles of political and economic power, on the relationship between general welfare and individual liberty. What are the major social forces at work in the mid-twentieth century which account for the political ideas in circulation?

Finally, the endurance of ideas is important. So are the people who use ideas after their formulation and the people to whom they are later addressed. Some of the concepts in Washington's famous Farewell Address persisted in discussions of American foreign policy down to 1939. Interpretations of what Washington said about foreign entanglements were repeated to successive audiences until they became almost sanctified. The fact that Washington originally spoke to a particular situation and the fact that most people never read what Washington really said mattered little. The German philosopher Nietzsche has been quoted in favor of nationalism which he actually opposed. Adam Smith never uttered a word specifically in defense of business enterprise as such. Yet he is still quoted by those who would free monopolies from government regulation. Darwin's scientific investigations were invoked to justify a social theory of struggle for survival and "survival of the fittest" which was nowhere expressed in his writings. Karl Marx had several interpreters. Therefore it is perhaps more correct to speak of the writings of Marx on the one hand and Marxism, or what has been done with his writings, on the other. This distinction is applicable to most great thinkers.

Ideas endure—even when their original version is, deliberately or otherwise, distorted and even when conditions change radically. Why? It is not easy to answer briefly. Several reasons may be suggested. Ideas are used to rationalize the continuance of policies or practices which some individuals and groups find profitable. Ideas become banners in causes, in battles for social change: “the rights of man” is a more attractive slogan than “freedom to do business” in a certain way. The ideas of respected leaders have a persistence all their own. Some ideas merge with age into a kind of folklore, unchanging because no attempt is ever made to compare them with the actual conditions of changing societies and societal concepts.

In terms of this analysis, it should be inquired: What political ideas struggle for ascendancy at the moment? Who evolved them originally? Why did he (or they) think that way? Out of what kind of social setting did these ideas emerge? What intellectual patterns prevailed? Who has taken up the ideas since and for what purpose? Do the original assumptions behind the ideas still hold true? How have actual political practices been modified or affected?

IV

We live at a time when ideas are weapons. Ideas clash as military forces clash. What men think politically will provide the motivation for casting a specific vote, favoring a policy, seeking power or using it. Ideas may thus determine the line-up of political support and the outcome of issues. It is also clear from what has been said above that ideas may take shape from two kinds of thinking: the rational, in which the intelligence is subject to control, and the emotional (irrational) in which reason is blurred and ideas actually undermine the intelligence. The same individual may engage in both, and this duality is of immense significance in politics. Propaganda is a political weapon. Propaganda is the discovery and exploitation of the irrational in man. Clever leaders have mobilized great political power by equipping their followers with ideas instead of, or in addition to, armaments. Part of the responsibility for the success of totalitarian idealism—inculcated by an appeal to the emotions—must be placed upon intelligent people everywhere who have refused to recognize that men can and do think irrationally. Many a monstrous idea has recently been enthroned as a working political principle—for example the racial superiority theory of the Nazis—long after reasoning people had dismissed it as too fantastic to take seriously.

Aggressive groups have been most successful with dangerous emotional appeals. The result of this has been to spread a general distrust of *any* attempts to recognize irrational thought processes. While dictators have glorified the irrational side of man and used it for selfish or antisocial purposes, it does not follow that such glorification is necessary or that it need always be put to some unworthy purpose. If we say it is expecting the impossible for men to be wholly rational and if we also say that freedom of ideas is essential to democracy, then

we must learn to use, evaluate, and develop ideas, even ideas with an irrational basis, to the end that they serve rather than dominate mankind.

In 1948 the United Nations Educational and Scientific Commission began to study the world-wide social disorders which cause war. The Director, Julian Huxley—outstanding English scientist—stated that the commission was proceeding on the basic assumption that the ultimate answer to the problem of war and peace lay in the minds of men. Here is acknowledgment that what men think, no matter how wrong they are, constitutes much of political reality.

V

A relatively new word in the vocabulary of politics is "ideology." The term has acquired a distinctly bad taint because of the use of systems of beliefs and values by the totalitarian states and because of the cavalier way in which various phases of totalitarian ideologies have been altered for reasons of political expediency. Miss Dorothy Thompson spoke in 1941 of ideologies having "all proved to be unmitigated buncombe." At the same time she was urging a great "propaganda campaign" to inform the world of the nature of an American peace—a move she apparently did not regard as ideological.

Although ideological conflict has plainly marked domestic and international politics during the past 16 years, the meanings attached to "ideology" vary widely. Samples of usage will demonstrate that the conflict of ideologies cannot be dismissed as "buncombe." The CIO is said to be embarrassed by "the ideological division of the liberal forces of the country." "Starvation renders a people an uneasy prey to any ideology however evil. . . ." People who enlist in the Communist cause "have little ideological knowledge of what Communism is." Thomas Hamilton, at one time chief United Nations reporter for the *New York Times*, wrote, "I think that the American people will do themselves and the world a disservice if they allow their dealings with Russia to be controlled by ideological considerations, if they put it on the basis that we're a democracy and Russia totalitarian. Ideologies are brought in afterwards to support views taken because of national interests." An earlier commentator, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, called idealistic rationalizations of selfish interests "fig leaves of the mind."

A definition of ideology is required—one which will be at once inclusive and neutral. *An ideology is a cluster of ideas, about life, society, or government, which originate in most cases as consciously advocated or dogmatically asserted social, political, or religious slogans or battle cries and which through continuous usage and preachment gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party, or nationality.* Hence it is proper to speak of good or bad ideologies in so far as effects are concerned, or in terms of democratic or liberal or communistic or American or Russian ideology.

To this definition must be added a descriptive factor mentioned in a previous chapter. When a social group—a nation—develops common ways of behaving

and providing their mutual needs, they will also slowly build up a set of assumptions about life. Men are products of a culture—the particular culture in which they live. Ideology then is intimately related to culture. Possibly we have paid too much attention to the “bibles” of various ideologies—the *Declaration of Independence* and Marx’s *Communist Manifesto*, to take two examples. One must search deeper for the roots of the beliefs professed by those who follow the two ideologies represented by these documents.

Moreover, contradictions are inherent in any ideology. A culture fulfills two functions among others: the socialization of the individual, disciplining him to group ends, and the provision of opportunities for the individual to express and cultivate his own personality. The two functions may conflict. In the case of the American ideology, it will be noticed that a reverence for the Rule of Law—rights and duties prescribed by impartial authority and enforced by the state—runs counter to an obvious disrespect for specific laws and a kind of gleeful game of “beating the law” in general. Prejudice and necessity will also lead to practices which violate the group ideology. Racial discrimination in the United States directly subverts the American creed of equality. The Soviet constitution of 1936 speaks eloquently of individual freedom, but the present Russian regime is admittedly repressive of certain human liberties. The point is that ideologies are not just mystical pronouncements of a few leaders, pronouncements which constitute political window dressing. On the contrary, the beliefs and values which a people develop or accept will reflect the character of their society. The tension produced by the clash between what the society accepts as a norm of conduct and what it permits individuals to do actually is a causal factor of no small consequence in both national and international politics.

Ideologies are uniquely illustrative of the tendency in mankind to seek justification for conduct. Methods and values which have actually or apparently served a society well become sanctified. The spread of these abroad is not an act of aggression, not enslavement, but liberation—an enhancement of the well-being of the people embraced. It is seldom realized that the tendency to universalize the values of a particular culture are conducive to unnecessary conflict. Values and beliefs appropriate to one segment of human society are not *ipso facto* appropriate to another. The conflict of ideologies suggests that one of our gravest problems is to make the world safe for differences of all sorts.

VI

How does ideology become a vital factor in international politics? In the first place, ideologies are excellent weapons. Ideological appeals may be directed toward positive and specific objectives. Germany, Italy, Japan, and the USSR, which have in late years all employed ideology as a servant of foreign policy, have been explicit about their claims and ambitions—usually implying, or leading to, a change in the *status quo*. A more general focus of ideological

tactics would be the building of maximum good will abroad—a characteristic of the foreign policies of passive, reasonably satisfied nations. It may be said that one of the most important results sought by an active national ideology is to mobilize the nation against the outside world. Social psychologists and sociologists are agreed that the most effective way to curb dissent within a group and to provide a target for transferred aggression is to set up in the minds of the group a clear external threat; there is no better way to do this than to insist that another nation desires, or is inexorably driven to, the destruction of their basic values and institutions. However, ideological mobilization may also be undertaken *after* an external threat manifests itself. Dictators have freely and skillfully sought the former result, while the United States became more consciously preoccupied with the ideological side of its foreign policy after Pearl Harbor.

Another purpose of an ideological foreign policy is the creation of discontent and division among enemies along with the mobilization of support among friends abroad. An attractive or effective ideology is a means of improving a nation's power position, for any weakening of a potential opponent is a relative gain. Making war in a complex society requires a high degree of co-operation and morale, a solid agreement that the group's beliefs and ways of doing things are worth dying for if necessary. An ideological fifth column—highly organized local minorities who respond favorably to beliefs propounded by a government other than the one under which they dwell—is an efficient dissolver of morale. Perhaps the best recent example of the successful divisive influence of ideological appeals is the splitting of French opinion by the Nazis before, during, and after the Fall of France in 1940; France's demise had other causes, of course, but certainly one basic reason for her weakness and disunity could be attributed to the skill with which Berlin cultivated certain sections of French opinion.

Whether ideologies are used as power techniques or not, their mere existence breeds conflict of arms and distrust of motives. Obviously one aspect of the present explosive impasse between Russia and America consists of a mutual distrust of each other's ideas; neither feels it could live in a world dominated by the other's system of thought. The root difficulty here is that nations dare not—except under extreme circumstances—entrust the protection of their interests to an international political process wholly different from that which has served them well domestically. When a country like Czechoslovakia falls under either Russian or American influence (the degree of influence and the techniques will naturally vary widely in the two cases) it means the extension of the area of operation of one or the other of the two political processes. It is more than a question of military power and security; it is a question of a possible threat to the institutions—government, economy, moral values—each regards as basic to life.

Furthermore, even when the ideological conflict is less direct, it makes peaceful settlement of disputes and international co-operation difficult. Words and

documents tend to be subject to different interpretation. For example, the word "democratic" inserted in several vital Russian-American treaties and agreements means quite different things to each of the parties. There seems to have been no way to avoid such a situation; at least the possibilities remained obscure until agreements like Potsdam (1945) and Moscow (1945) had to be implemented. It is no mere quarrel over terminology; behind the words are different institutions, experiences, and cultures.

Ideology as an element in international politics is complicated by the relationship between a country's national aims and the world-wide spread of its ideology. To put the question more precisely: "Is Russia just trying to preserve her security as a nation-state or does Russia really want to impose her ideas on the rest of the world?" "Which is dominant in Russian foreign policy, the Communist Revolution or Russian national interest?" In some respects this is an important distinction, but it is difficult to analyze it. To reiterate, the spread of an ideology may itself be an objective of foreign policy or it may be a technique for the attainment of other objectives; in reality it is both. As an objective of Soviet policy the spread of communism through the operation of inevitable historical forces is still as important as it ever was but it seems likely that it has become a *long term objective*. *Short term objectives* are those primarily defined by what might be called national interests; in the case of Russia these would number such matters as her interest in the Dardanelles, in Iranian oil, in special ties with her eastern European neighbors. The two sets of objectives are equally significant, the difference between them consisting of timing and emphasis. And the two are interdependent; it is obvious that in the eyes of Russian policy-makers there is no contradiction involved in pursuing both. Security policy preserves the minimum condition for "socialism in one country" and buys the time for the realization of long term objectives. The Russian ideology, on the other hand, provides the framework for defining national interests and also helps determine how Soviet leaders interpret the immediate international political scene. Therefore the answer to the original questions is that Russia is seeking the spread of communism *and* the achievement of specific aims of her immediate national security.

The ideological (international) and national elements are present in the foreign policies of all states. Differences between states depend on the relative weight they give to the two factors. During the past twenty-five years, it is safe to say that ideology was much more prominent in Soviet foreign policy than in American foreign policy.

Reverting to ideology as a technique or instrument in Soviet foreign policy, it is to be noted that the apparent periods of use and disuse are misleading. The communist element has been deliberately played down where necessary or expedient. Observers have often professed confusion when Moscow has supported a central government against a minority communist-inspired uprising. A suggestive interpretation is that this is a well-known tactic in battle: the sacrifice of lesser units for the sake of the larger campaign. When a temporary

repudiation of Russian ideology is necessary for its long term success, it is a mistake to interpret this as an about-face. It is rather a matter of appropriateness to be decided in each individual case.

VII

Ideological conflict is not new among nations. In 1656 Cromwell proclaimed the "natural" enmity of England and Catholic Spain a phase of the Catholic-Protestant clash which marked the late medieval period. The appearance of the Holy Alliance after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 was a manifestation of the opposition of monarchy to rising republicanism in the Western world. Later in the nineteenth century Turkey was barred from the European family of nations on largely religious or ideological grounds.

Why have ideological cleavages become more critical in the twentieth century? How do modern ideological conflicts differ from those in the past? Despite the bitterness of the Reformation struggle the bulk of the population of the world's power centers were at least united by a common ethic-Christianity. Earlier ideological struggles were also primarily between ruling houses, leaders, and governments, not great masses of people. They seem to have been more political than anything else. Today, such struggles energize and directly affect whole populations. Narrow political considerations have been either replaced or supplemented by broader social and economic interests. Current history is being written in terms of collective social forces. The attitude of men toward the social situation in which they find themselves is more important than ever because group organization and mass communication have provided a formal recognition of different economic and social interests; emotional appeals can now be made to real or alleged interests. Complex technology and the uneven distribution of wealth and property have tended to create classes and degrees of social dissatisfaction.

Nationalism is a species of ideology. The emergence of national states after the Feudal Era and the struggles between heads of those states for power and prestige were prominent factors in earlier ideological conflicts. Recently to the emotional factor of nationalism has been added an appeal for social change. Modern totalitarian states have fused nationalist and class ideologies, the appeal to national emotion and class solidarity. As Hans Kohn has pointed out, this merger has introduced an element of religious fervor. It invests emotions and ideas with a new absoluteness. For this reason ideological cleavages are now deeper. One nation is pitted against another not only for all the reasons which set group against group—clashes of interest, diverse personalities, or transferred aggressiveness—but because the peculiar form of economic and social organization of one is a menace to the other. What makes the situation explosive is the fact that the idea of class conflict involves acceptance of inevitable conflict between nations representing so-called decadent classes and those representing their successors. That this division of the world is a gross oversimplification,

and is partly untrue, is once again only poignant testimony to the strength of beliefs and dogma. Ideological conflict under modern conditions may be in process of creating closed societies accompanied by the mutual branding of nonmembers as infidels, unbelievers, and traitors. A glance at any newspaper, Russian or American (less so perhaps in the latter) will indicate that this is not a wholly unwarranted observation. If it is true that the foundations of peace, co-operation and intercultural adjustment must be laid in the minds of men, then the existence of watertight compartments in which minds are sealed against outside influences is a discouraging reality indeed. What can be done to eliminate the causes of, and the reasons for, closed societies?

Mental Images vs. Reality

Walter Lippmann is an editor, political philosopher, and syndicated columnist. In recent years he has emerged as a foremost commentator on foreign affairs. *Public Opinion* was one of his earlier books, and it has become almost a classic in its field. Aside from myths and lies, another kind of distortion of thought is possible. Mr. Lippmann points out that in the process of transferring reality to our minds, each of us may arrive at a somewhat different picture. An additional element of political conflict is, then, due to the fact men differ in what they know about their environment.

The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that event. That is why until we know what others think they know, we cannot truly understand their acts. I have seen a young girl, brought up in a Pennsylvania mining town, plunged suddenly from entire cheerfulness into a paroxysm of grief when a gust of wind cracked the kitchen window-pane. For hours she was inconsolable, and to me incomprehensible. But when she was able to talk, it transpired that if a window-pane broke it meant that a close relative had died. She was, therefore, mourning for her father, who had frightened her into running away from home. The father was, of course, quite

thoroughly alive as a telegraphic inquiry soon proved. But until the telegram came, the cracked glass was an authentic message to that girl. Why it was authentic only a prolonged investigation by a skilled psychiatrist could show. But even the most casual observer could see that the girl, enormously upset by her family troubles, had hallucinated a complete fiction out of one external fact, a remembered superstition, and a turmoil of remorse, and of fear and love for her father.

Abnormality in these instances is only a matter of degree. When an Attorney-General, who has been frightened by a bomb exploded on his doorstep, convinces himself by the reading of revolutionary

literature that a revolution is to happen on the first of May 1920, we recognize that much the same mechanism is at work. The war, of course, furnished many examples of this pattern: the casual fact, the creative imagination, the will to believe, and out of these three elements, a counterfeit of reality to which there was a violent instinctive response. For it is clear enough that under certain conditions men respond as powerfully to fictions as they do to realities, and that in many cases they help to create the very fictions to which they respond. Let him cast the first stone who did not believe in the Russian army that passed through England in August, 1914, did not accept any tale of atrocities without direct proof, and never saw a plot, a traitor, or a spy where there was none. Let him cast a stone who never passed on as the real inside truth what he had heard someone say who knew no more than he did.

In all these instances we must note particularly one common factor. It is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo environment. To that pseudo environment his behavior is a response. But because it *is* behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates. If the behavior is not a practical act, but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may be a long time before there is any noticeable break in the texture of the fictitious world. But when the stimulus of the pseudo fact results in action on things or other people, contradiction soon develops. Then comes the sensation of butting one's head against a stone wall, of learning by experience, and witnessing Herbert Spencer's tragedy of the murder of a Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts, the discomfort in short of a maladjustment. For certainly, at the level of social life, what is called the adjustment of man

to his environment takes place through the medium of fictions.

By fictions I do not mean lies. I mean a representation of the environment which is in lesser or greater degree made by man himself. The range of fiction extends all the way from complete hallucination to the scientists' perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model, or his decision that for his particular problem accuracy beyond a certain number of decimal places is not important. A work of fiction may have almost any degree of fidelity, and so long as the degree of fidelity can be taken into account, fiction is not misleading. In fact, human culture is very largely the selection, the rearrangement, the tracing of patterns upon, and the stylizing of, what William James called "the random irradiations and resettlements of our ideas." The alternative to the use of fictions is direct exposure to the ebb and flow of sensation. That is not a real alternative, for however refreshing it is to see at times with a perfectly innocent eye, innocence itself is not wisdom, though a source and corrective of wisdom.

For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone else's need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia.

At the moment, I should like to think only about the world-wide spectacle of men acting upon their environment, moved by stimuli from their pseudo-environments. For when full allowance has

been made for deliberate fraud, political science has still to account for such facts as two nations attacking one another, each convinced that it is acting in self-defense, or two classes at war each certain that it speaks for the common interest. They live, we are likely to say, in different worlds. More accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in different ones.

It is to these special worlds, it is to these private or group, or class, or provincial, or occupational, or national, or sectarian artifacts, that the political adjustment of mankind in the Great Society takes place. Their variety and complication are impossible to describe. Yet these fictions determine a very great part of men's political behavior. We must think of perhaps fifty sovereign parliaments consisting of at least a hundred legislative bodies. With them belong at least fifty hierarchies of provincial and municipal assemblies, which with their executive, administrative and legislative organs, constitute formal authority on earth. But that does not begin to reveal the complexity of political life. For in each of these innumerable centers of authority there are parties, and these parties are themselves hierarchies with their roots in classes, sections, cliques and clans; and within these are the individual politicians, each the personal center of a web of connection and memory and fear and hope.

Somehow or other, for reasons often necessarily obscure, as the result of domination or compromise or a logroll, there emerge from these political bodies commands, which set armies in motion or make peace, conscript life, tax, exile, imprison, protect property or confiscate it, encourage one kind of enterprise and discourage another, facilitate immigration or obstruct it, improve communication or censor it, establish schools, build navies, proclaim "policies," and "destiny," raise economic barriers, make property or un-

make it, bring one people under the rule of another, or favor one class as against another. For each of these decisions some view of the facts is taken to be conclusive, some view of the circumstances is accepted as the basis of inference and as the stimulus of feeling. What view of the facts, and why that one?

And yet even this does not begin to exhaust the real complexity. The formal political structure exists in a social environment, where there are innumerable large and small corporations and institutions, voluntary and semivoluntary associations, national, provincial, urban and neighborhood groupings, which often as not make the decision that the political body registers. On what are these decisions based?

"Modern society," says Mr. Chesterton, "is intrinsically insecure because it is based on the notion that all men will do the same thing for different reasons. . . . And as within the head of any convict may be the hell of a quite solitary crime, so in the house or under the hat of any suburban clerk may be the limbo of a quite separate philosophy. The first man may be a complete Materialist and feel his own body as a horrible machine manufacturing his own mind. He may listen to his thoughts as to the dull ticking of a clock. The man next door may be a Christian Scientist and regard his own body as somehow rather less substantial than his own shadow. He may come almost to regard his own arms and legs as delusions like moving serpents in the dream of delirium tremens. The third man in the street may not be a Christian Scientist but, on the contrary, a Christian. He may live in a fairy tale as his neighbors would say; a secret but solid fairy tale full of faces and presences of unearthly friends. The fourth man may be a theosophist, and only too probably a vegetarian; and I do not see why I should not gratify myself with the fancy that the fifth man is a

devil worshiper.... Now whether or not this sort of variety is valuable, this sort of unity is shaky. To expect that all men for all time will go on thinking different things, and yet doing the same things, is a doubtful speculation. It is not founding society on a communion, or even on a convention, but rather on a coincidence. Four men may meet under the same lamp post; one to paint it pea green as part of a great municipal reform; one to read his breviary in the light of it; one to embrace it with accidental ardour in a fit of alcoholic enthusiasm; and the last merely because the pea green post is a conspicuous point of rendezvous with his young lady. But to expect this to happen night after night is unwise...." *

For the four men at the lamp post substitute the governments, the parties, the corporations, the societies, the social sets, the trades and professions, universities, sects, and nationalities of the world. Think of the legislator voting a statute that will affect distant peoples, a statesman coming to a decision. Think of the Peace Conference reconstituting the frontiers of Europe, an ambassador in a foreign country trying to discern the intentions of his own government and of the foreign government, a promotor working a concession in a backward country, an editor demanding a war, a clergyman calling on the police to regulate amusement, a club lounging-room making up its mind about a strike, a sewing circle preparing to regulate the schools, nine judges deciding whether a legislature in Oregon may fix the working hours of women, a cabinet meeting to decide on the recognition of a government, a party convention choosing a candidate and writing a platform, twenty-seven million voters casting their ballots, an Irishman in Cork thinking about an Irishman in Belfast, a Third International planning to reconstruct the whole of human society,

a board of directors confronted with a set of their employees' demands, a boy choosing a career, a merchant estimating supply and demand for the coming season, a speculator predicting the course of the market, a banker deciding whether to put credit behind a new enterprise, the advertiser, the reader of advertisements.... Think of the different sorts of Americans thinking about their notions of "The British Empire" or "France" or "Russia" or "Mexico." It is not so different from Mr. Chesterton's four men at the pea green lamp post.

And so before we involve ourselves in the jungle of obscurities about the innate differences of men, we shall do well to fix our attention upon the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world. I do not doubt that there are important biological differences. Since man is an animal it would be strange if there were not. But as rational beings it is worse than shallow to generalize at all about comparative behavior until there is a measurable similarity between the environments to which behavior is a response.

The pragmatic value of this idea is that it introduces a much needed refinement into the ancient controversy about nature and nurture, innate quality and environment. For the pseudo-environment is a hybrid compounded of "human nature" and "conditions." To my mind it shows the uselessness of pontificating about what man is and always will be from what we observe man to be doing, or about what are the necessary conditions of society. For we do not know how men would behave in response to the facts of the Great Society. All that we really know is how they behave in response to what can fairly be called a most inadequate picture of the Great Society. No conclusion about man or the Great Society can honestly be made on evidence like that.

This, then, will be the clue to our in-

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quiry. We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him. If his atlas tells him that the world is flat he will not sail near what he believes to be the edge of our planet for fear of falling off. If his maps include a fountain of eternal youth, a Ponce de León will go in quest of it. If someone digs up yellow dirt that looks like gold, he will for a time act exactly as if he had found gold. The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do. It does not determine what they will achieve. It determines their effort, their feelings, their hopes, not their accomplishments and results. The very men who most loudly proclaim their "materialism" and their contempt for "ideologues," the Marxian communists, place their entire hope on what? On the formation by propaganda of a class-conscious group. But what is propaganda, if not the effort to alter the picture to which men respond, to substitute one social pattern for another? What is class consciousness but a way of realizing the world? National consciousness but another way? And Professor Giddings' consciousness of kind, but a process of believing that we recognize among the multitude certain ones marked as our kind?

Try to explain social life as the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. You will soon be saying that the hedonist begs the question, for even supposing that man does pursue these ends, the crucial problem of why he thinks one course rather than another likely to produce pleasure, is untouched. Does the guidance of man's conscience explain? How then does he happen to have the particular conscience which he has? The theory of economic self-interest? But how do men come to conceive their interest in one way rather than another? The desire for security, or prestige or domination, or what is vaguely

called self-realization? How do men conceive their security, what do they consider prestige, how do they figure out the means of domination, or what is the notion of self which they wish to realize? Pleasure, pain, conscience, acquisition, protection, enhancement, mastery are undoubtedly names for some of the ways people act. There may be instinctive dispositions which work toward such ends. But no statement of the end, or any description of the tendencies to seek it, can explain the behavior which results. The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their pseudo environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining element in thought, feeling, and action. For if the connection between reality and human response were direct and immediate, rather than indirect and inferred, indecision and failure would be unknown, and (if each of us fitted as snugly into the world, as the child in the womb), Mr. Bernard Shaw would not have been able to say that except for the first nine months of its existence no human being ever manages its affairs as well as a plant.

The chief difficulty in adapting the psychoanalytic scheme to political thought arises in this connection. The Freudians are concerned with the maladjustment of distinct individuals to other individuals and to concrete circumstances. They have assumed that if internal derangements could be straightened out, there would be little or no confusion about what is the obviously normal relationship. But public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them. The situations to which public opinions refer are known only as opinions. The psychoanalyst, on the other hand, almost always assumes that the environment is knowable, and if not knowable then at least bearable, to any unclouded intelligence. This assumption of his is the problem of public opinion.

Instead of taking for granted an environment that is readily known, the social analyst is most concerned in studying how the larger political environment is conceived, and how it can be conceived more successfully. The psychoanalyst examines the adjustment to an X, called by him the environment; the social analyst examines the X, called by him the pseudo environment.

He is, of course, permanently and constantly in debt to the new psychology, not only because when rightly applied it so greatly helps people to stand on their own feet, come what may, but because the study of dreams, fantasy and rationalization has thrown light on how the pseudo environment is put together. But he cannot assume as his criterion either what is called a "normal biological career" within the existing social order, or a career "freed from religious suppression and dogmatic conventions" outside. What for a sociologist is a normal social career? Or one freed from suppressions and conventions? Conservative critics do, to be sure, assume the first, and romantic ones the second. But in assuming them they are taking the whole world for granted. They are saying in effect either that society is the sort of thing which corresponds to their idea of what is normal, or the sort of thing which corresponds to their idea of what is free. Both ideas are merely public opinions, and while the psychoanalyst as physician may perhaps assume them, the sociologist may not take the products of existing public

opinion as criteria by which to study public opinion.

The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined. Man is no Aristotelian god contemplating all existence at one glance. He is the creature of an evolution who can just about span a sufficient portion of reality to manage his survival, and snatch what on the scale of time are but a few moments of insight and happiness. Yet this same creature has invented ways of seeing what no naked eye could see, of hearing what no ear could hear, of weighing immense masses and infinitesimal ones, of counting and separating more items than he can individually remember. He is learning to see with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember. Gradually he makes for himself a trustworthy picture inside his head of the world beyond his reach.

Those features of the world outside which have to do with the behavior of other human beings, in so far as that behavior crosses ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly public affairs. The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters.

Ideology as a Means of Social Control

Joseph Roucek is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Hofstra College. His particular specialty is Balkan history and political affairs. He is author of several works on the nature of politics. Starting with the assumption that ideas have sources, forms, purposes, and an independent existence of their own, Professor Roucek points out that ideology may be the very embodiment of unscientific thinking. In an earlier chapter it was argued that science had a limited application to politics because the latter dealt with human relations which cannot be completely controlled as the scientist can control his conditions. But scientific principles can be applied to political thinking. Professor Roucek is also insisting that a vigorous democracy offers the only real basis for the trial and error, dissemination of knowledge, and self-criticism so necessary to the most fruitful application of intelligence to the solution of political problems.

Although we like to think that we live in a "scientific age," the fact remains that the scientific habit of thought has not penetrated our social thinking very far at all. Is there not a perfect proof provided by the effectiveness of the "unscientific" and ideological doctrines of Hitlerism and Communism in influencing the course of human events during the last two decades? In fact, ideological elements force themselves into the whole field of natural and social sciences, particularly the latter. The social scientist, who prides himself on being purely empirical, is simply unable to cut himself away from ideological influences which take the form of philosophical and metaphysical postulates.

Without attempting at all, however, to deal with the problem of social methodology, we may indicate here the fundamental difference in the methods and aims of the ideologist and the scientist.

The general method of science is to collect as much data, as many relative

facts, as possible; then these are studied to see if they present uniformities—scientific laws. A scientific law, the statement of uniformities found in the facts, means that the uniformity it expresses has been manifested up until the present in social life. Tomorrow these new laws may have to be amended to square with newly discovered facts. The essence of scientific approach, therefore, is not in the content of its specific conclusions so much as in the method whereby its conclusions are made and constantly corrected. The true scientist regards his best theories as hypotheses. He is constantly on the alert to analyze his own mental processes and to eliminate his own emotions from coloring his theories.

Pure science is always secular and horizontal in its reference and cannot express the vertical tendencies in culture which refer to the ultimate source of meaning of life. This need is answered by the ideologist who holds his theories, his ideological principles, to be sacred and timeless laws

From "Ideology as a Means of Social Control," by Joseph Roucek, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, April, 1944.

that cannot and must not be contaminated by experiments since his creed seeks to be a smooth and consistent flow of absolutes. If there are any tests at all of an ideology, they can be limited to those of internal consistency, authority, rationalistic thinking, and historical principles. For the ideologist his creed is a set of articles of faith; he habitually confuses his thoughts and effects. That he uses the methods and the phraseology of science can not conceal his true nature; his is the theological temperament applied to politics. His mythical descriptions of reality, although claiming to be "scientific," are inexact in describing detailed and historic facts, but have the virtue of giving men a sense of depth in life. He makes it possible for man to believe in a meaningful existence which makes it possible to preserve moral vitality because the world as it exists is regarded by him as perfect even though meaningful.

That the social sciences differ from one another and from the physical sciences in regard to their techniques, while they all agree as to their logic as sciences, is recognized generally. Now the scientific method tries, on the one hand, to eliminate or minimize the errors or illusions of knowledge; but the ideology, on the other hand, assuming that it is "scientific," utilizes consciously or unconsciously, illusions and even errors. Science constantly questions everything. The ideology takes its illusions for granted; it declines to question them, not seeking even possible contradictions between one factual assumption and another, and refuses to correct the distorting influences of its selected facts. Hence, it sees often what does not exist.

In other words, sciences base their beliefs on the best available evidence; the ideology bases its beliefs on selected facts—frequently on imaginary evidence, on the basis of its philosophical-political principles. The ideology employs only the evi-

dence which certifies the conclusions of the ideological principles.

The ideologist is not interested primarily in a scientific truth, but in his ideal which is given expression in his ideology. Scientific guessing is labelled a guess; but ideological guessing assumes that it is a scientific conclusion. The fact is disregarded that social phenomena are extremely complex and depend on a large number of variables. The ideologist often uses an oversimple a priori hypothesis that all peoples must go through the same series of stages in their history; therefore, as evidenced by Montesquieu, Comte, and Spencer, different peoples may be compared in the stage of development. While logical analysis or deduction can reach true conclusions only if we start with true premises, the ideological analysis reaches also "true conclusions" by starting with preconceived premises.

But, as can be seen in Marxism and other cases, the ideological deduction helps in detecting some questionable assumptions involved, formulating new hypotheses by producing new alternatives to those already tacitly assumed, and freeing one from the habit of regarding the familiar as the only possibility. Herein lies the unquestioned value of the ideology.

From this, it is evident that ideological thinking is one of the forms of political thinking, not of scientific thinking. The politician is not interested in the scientific knowledge of the "truth," but in his political or philosophical "ideal." In his ideology he does not include social realities in their complex and kaleidoscopic unit, but constructs them according to his ideal as a well-prepared picture. Ideologies are therefore a synthesis of facts and assumptions arranged to demonstrate an ideal which differs radically from what might be likened to a photograph of social realities.

The fact remains, nevertheless, that the "scientific" form of ideologies, which is

such a serious obstacle to a positive knowledge of society, is one of the most powerful weapons for influencing our social life. The ideologies most effecting the course of social events have been presented in supposedly "scientific" forms—Liberalism, Democracy, Socialism, racial theories, and what not. One of the most doctrinaire assertions of *laissez faire* can be found in the works of a thinker who prided himself on having achieved a synthesis of contemporary "scientific" thought. Spencer's *Social Statics* and *The Man Versus the State* illustrate the "scientific" form given by ideologies; this appearance of infallible truth is an indispensable characteristic. The ideal which is the real basis of the ideology does not appear in it as an ideal, but as a scientific conclusion from the observed facts. As Merriam truthfully remarks: "Of scientific social studies it might be truthfully declared that not every one who saith 'Lord, Lord,' shall enter into the kingdom." Thus we are confronted today by innumerable varieties of "scientific ideologies"—nationalistic patriotism, socialistic collectivism, the ideologies of Fascism, Communism, Democracy, Liberalism, Guild Socialism, Syndicalism, and so on.

Ours is not the first age which has produced new systems of ideas, and which has been marked by ideological conflicts. But no age, with the exception of the time of the religious wars of the sixteenth century, has seen such a variety of doctrines; without any exception no age has seen the struggle of ideologies run so deeply and in such complex patterns.

Certain major conditions make the present conflict, ever-changing though it is, different from any in the past. Modern psychology and sociology have produced a class of intellectuals conscious of ideologies and of their nature, and able to wage the warfare of ideas on a level never before matched. We have ideologies as others have in the past, but we build them and

attack them on quite a professional level.

The world situation in which ideologies have their present role differs in more respects than merely the advance of psychology and sociology. We are living in the age of the Second World War, after the great increase of population of the nineteenth century, after the first century of the industrial revolution, after the relative close of the great outflow of population and capital to the backward areas of the world, after Einstein has revised Newtonian physics, after medicine and biology have brought new views on the nature of life, and after sociology and anthropology have brought new views about the nature of society.

Only by remembering these major conditions which distinguish this age from others, can we be prepared to avoid too easy parallels and consequently too easy conclusions as to the character of ideologies and of the issues joined. The major ideologies and doctrines of today, Communism, Fascism, Nazism, and Democracy, have their roots in the past as doctrines always have, but the combinations of elements made possible by critical analysis and psychological insight are in many ways new. As in the military phases of war, though the eternal verities of tactics remain unchanged, the use of new weapons and techniques may give a new character to the struggle and make the experts of one day the amateurs of the next.

One of the sharpest differences between the ideologies and conflicts of today and any previous ones is the totalitarian character of the intellectual struggle. In all past situations of doctrinal conflict, the conflict has been carried on against a background of agreed tradition. For instance, the French Revolution did change the calendar and weights and measures, but it did not attack the essential character of the sovereign State, or the gold standard, or capital punishment for crime. Today

one cannot name a single premise of thought or behavior which is not at issue.

Around the great doctrines which wage war literally, Communism, Fascism, and Democracy, is a morass of opinions more various than ever before in the world. The greater size of libraries, the plethora of books, and the more numerous detailed controversies make possible a greater number of permutations of doctrine than ever before. Concurrently, there is an altogether unparalleled use of the weapons of criticism. In contrast with past controversies, there is general use today of all the weapons of criticism to attack opponents at their premises. Not merely the reasoned argument and its conclusions are attacked, but the whole rational character of each doctrine is under attack by its antagonists. It is true that in former centuries the antagonists considered their opponents' side mad or perverted. But never before have so many intellectuals been talking and writing for whom it was a simple technique to attack not only conclusions but premises, not only political doctrines but their whole metaphysical underpinning. Today there is simply no no-man's-land left without the influence of ideological struggles.

One of the most interesting aspects of the modern trend has been the rapidity with which the ideologies and their interpretations have been changing their meaning—just like the proverbial chameleon. The books written upon the ideologies rapidly become out of date in almost all cases. Just notice the number of books (if it is worth adding them all up!) devoted during, let us say, the last five years to the reinterpretations and changing meanings of Democracy. Those which do not become completely obsolete in a few years retain significance only as contributions to the slowly growing body of those ideas about the ideologies which seem to have some stable validity. This is one of the most revealing facts among all the data

of the subject. It could not be true if the ideologies we are concerned with were stable philosophies, clearly and permanently expressed in leading documents and speeches. It could not be true if Mussolini or Hitler or the leading protagonists of Democracy knew exactly what their principles were and to what they led.

This indicates that there have been not only ideologies, but secondary ideologies about ideologies. What we have learned has not been simply what Fascism is, or Communism is, but what a student or writer trained in certain methods of investigation is led to conclude about them. All along we have known many facts, but in addition we have included among our own data certain judgments, such as "Fascism is a means of defending capitalism," which are not known facts but really preliminary conclusions reached at a certain date on the basis of the known facts at that time. It is necessary to distinguish such preliminary conclusions, reached on former occasions, from the data proper. We must learn to study various ideologies not only as seen by the ideological opponents and proponents, but as they are.

There is no question that the use of ideologies as a means of social control will be on the increase. The tremendous increase in communication facilities, related to the utilization of modern educational systems for ideological purposes, will more than ever before help the indoctrination of great masses of people with the ideologies propounded by the groups controlling the State and through it the telegraph, the telephone, the newspaper, the radio, within the framework of modern propaganda techniques.

The impact of the policies of the totalitarian regimes on the democratic ways of life will increasingly decrease our faith in the efficacy of free thought and increase our need to rely on the use of all the devices that a successful ideologist can

muster today. Men of action have always looked upon ideologies as their weapons, but it is only latterly that men of thought have been driven to accept that position after a period in which it was fashionable to regard ideas as epiphenomena, mere ghostly and ineffective adjuncts of material processes, or at best, as more or less dishonest rationalizations of economic compulsions.

We must, however, conclude with words of warning. It is true that many ideas today are mere illusions when we consider them from the point of view of their social basis. The stereotyped application of the concept of ideology to every pattern of thought is, in the last analysis, based on the notion that there is no philosophical truth, in fact no truth at all for humanity, and that all thought is conditional. In its end results it belongs to only a specific stratum of mankind and is valid only for this stratum. A complicated correlation of the ideological reasoning to a social group does not mean at all, however, that such analysis should discourage social science from its aim to point to the future. If anything, we need to adhere to the ideology of continued but hopeful struggles, lest mankind become completely disheartened by the frightful happenings of the present, lest men's belief in a worthwhile, peaceful and happy direction of society perish from the earth.

It may not be amiss to say a few words about democracy as an ideology. Unfortunately, our long familiarity with democracy as a growing concern has bred in many thinkers a very critical cynicism which regards it as something impossible to achieve. But democracy, in spite of its glaring defects and discords, is the only ideology which welcomes many opinions, tolerates many creeds, protects minority interests, governs best by governing least. It is the only creed propounding that the State exists for the Man, not Man for the State, and that the ends of organized society, however important they are, be attained only by democratic means.

If anything is really to be said about the disadvantages of democracy, it is that nondemocratic ideologies have been willing to fight for their beliefs and convictions, while democracies often have been starry-eyed or on the defensive. Democracy in the future must prove to its proponents that it is an ideology which offers long odds on the capacity of the human mind, on the proposition that only the freest exercise of human reason and tolerance cannot be really disproved. Man can be misled by insufficient knowledge or corrupted by non-rational impulses, but Democracy must show that it is the ideology, above all others, providing the most favorable conditions for living the good life by rational and human means.

The Nature of Political Myth

George Woodcock is a poet, biographer, political essayist, and critic. He is editor of the English journal *Now*. Here Mr. Woodcock makes a plea for a rational approach to political problems by demonstrating the fallacies of myths. Political myths are deliberately used, or can be used even by those who do not create them, for selfish, antisocial purposes. Men have been lured to death and chaos by attractive myths which seemed to promise great satisfaction. How many propositions—supposedly taken for granted today—are in reality myths as Mr. Woodcock has defined them? This essay was first published in the United States in *The University Observer* (Chicago, 1947).

The political myth might be described as a projection into the past, or, more often, the future, of a mirage based on the desires of a section of the people, which is used to induce them to follow some political group or embrace some programme, under the illusion that they will attain what they have seen in the mirage. Political myths, like religious myths, have about as much basis in reality as fantasies in general. They are almost always incapable of fulfilment, but they can lead men to act in such a way that actual social changes are precipitated through their agency. Occasionally, they have produced good changes, but in general their influence has been to obscure the political vision of those who succumbed to them, and in this way to open the path to political tactics, based on deliberate deception which aimed at the antisocial acquisition of power.

The political myth began with Plato, whose efforts were comparatively harmless because his ideas were embraced by only a few of his contemporaries. It has been used ever since by all those brilliant political tacticians who have wished to gain a mass following for their own

schemes. One of its most recent manifestations was the series of racial myths by which the Nazis led the German people into the misery of war and defeat.

In examining the myth, we should be careful to distinguish it from the falsifications of historical events which might be called political legends. The differences are relatively clear.

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To show...political...myth, I will quote the Marxist myth of the end of the capitalist state which, again, I use more for its brevity and conciseness than for any other reason. It occurs in *Das Kapital*.

Along with the constantly diminishing number of magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very process of capitalist production itself.

The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has sprung up and flourished along with it and under it. Centralization of the means of pro-

From "The Functions of the Political Myth," *The Writer and Politics*, by George Woodcock, 1948. Used by permission of the author and The Porcupine Press, London.

duction and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist husk. This husk is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

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...whether we justify it or not, historical falsification is plain and open lying. The political myth, on the other hand, presents a much more ambiguous case, as will be seen from the ... quotation. This, clearly, is not a lie about anything that has actually happened, since it concerns the future. Here, immediately, we can perceive two important characteristics of the political myth. It is never laid in the present, but almost always in the future, or, rarely, in a remote and unhistorical past. Because of this, it cannot be checked by reference to any known or provable facts. Therefore, while it cannot be proved to be true, it equally certainly cannot be proved untrue. From these circumstances, it gains two advantages. If it should ever come to be true, its creator, or his heir, can assume the privileges of a successful prophet. And, if it should not come true, it can usually be projected farther into the future—although there are limits beyond which a myth becomes stale and ceases to hold the imagination of the people, and at this point has to be replaced by another myth.

For the main driving force of the myth is the desire of the people. It may be created by some individual to further his own ends, or those of his party, but it will only succeed if it projects the unconscious or partly conscious desires of those who are to be led, and it is kept alive by this popular desire and by the idea that the group who propagate it are in fact providing a means for the attainment of such wishes.

Thus, the Christian myth of the kingdom of God—sometimes on earth, sometimes in heaven—represented the desire of slaves to escape from earthly kingdoms

into realms where, in this life or after death, they would be free from oppression and would stand equal among the saints. For centuries the poor were content to wait in their misery, but eventually they became a little weary. The second coming of Christ, the kingdom of God on earth, seemed indefinitely delayed, and there was a depressing lack of travelers' tales about the realm beyond death. It became reasonably evident that, even if the myth were realizable, the Churches, who have used it for centuries to their own advantage, were unlikely to bring it to fulfillment. So men began to abandon Christianity and search for new myths.

One of these was the already-quoted Marxist myth of the downfall of the capitalist order. A circumstance that made Marx's myth less effective than its Christian forerunners was that he was only half-consciously a myth-maker. He was also a sociologist, concerned with the interpretation of actual social events and developments, and he was foolish enough to link his myth too closely with such events. Consequently, when society began to develop in ways he had never anticipated, when fascism supervened and the great middle class began to absorb whole sections of the former proletariat, when the very places where capitalism appeared to have been overthrown turned out to be the least pleasant for the ordinary freedom-loving man, his myth was somewhat discredited. It no longer corresponded with or represented a means to achieve popular desires, and Marx's followers have since been forced either to repeat their story to a vanishing audience, or to create new myths—which among the Stalinists have reverted to more primitive desires, the desire for motherhood and protection instead of the desire for freedom represented in the original Marxist myth.

From this brief discussion we can discern a number of points concerning the myth, which it may be well to itemize.

(1) It is not concerned with the present and is laid, usually in the future, but always, even if in the past, at some period outside history.

(2) Not being dependent on ascertainable facts, it cannot be proved true or untrue.

(3) If not immediately fulfilled, it can be projected farther into the future. Human hope and patience make the successful myth a long-term asset.

(4) It is rooted in the desires of the people. It may be contrived by an individual, but unless it represents the satisfaction of some popular yearning, it will never make good.

(5) It is subject to decay in time. People will not wait indefinitely for fulfilment, and the discredited myth has to be replaced by something new.

(6) The more nearly related to actual circumstances, the less hardy is a political myth. If linked too closely to events, its achievement may be made impossible by the course of history.

The advantages of myths in governing and in gaining and holding power have long been recognized by political writers. Plato decided to base his ideal society on a myth of the Earthborn, and stoutly maintained the right of the ruler to fabricate such a myth—even if he knew it to be false. In *The Republic* he says, "Then it pertains to the guardians of the city, and to them alone, to tell falsehoods, to deceive either enemies or citizens for the city's welfare." Later he remarks, "Well, then, can we contrive anything in the way of these necessary lies of which we spoke a little while ago, so that by means of one noble falsehood we may convince, preferably the rulers themselves, but in any case the rest of the citizens?" he then goes on to describe the myth of the Earthborn.

Plato's myth failed because it did not correspond with the desires of his contemporaries. He would perhaps have been a more successful politician if he had adapted his myths to the mental currents of his age instead of merely interpreting his own fantasies of an ideal past.

Between Plato and the modern world lies the great revolution of Christianity, which gave a new dynamic to European thought by orienting man's ideas away from the Golden Age in the past to the Kingdom of Heaven in the future. The myth now represented, not a nostalgic wish to rebuild a past which had never existed, but a forward-looking desire for a future which, because it was a future, might fulfil the most extravagant desires. For centuries the great myths of Christianity dominated the whole of society, and even so practiced a politician as Dante saw his ideals in terms of Christian mythology.

It was not, however, until the Renaissance that another thinker came forward with the same magnificent cynicism as Plato to observe the value of myths in the governing of men. This was Niccolò Machiavelli, whose almost disarming candor detected and extolled the uses of religion as an aid to political power. "Those Princes and Commonwealths," he declares, "who would keep their governments entire and incorrupt, are above all things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preserve them in due veneration. . . ."

Following Machiavelli, many of those theorists for whom social action is concerned mainly with the seizure of power have advocated in some manner the use of the myth. During the period of the German romantic philosophers there occurred a deliberate and wholesale creation of myths, racial and nationalistic myths, myths of the state and the people, by such writers as Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling. Of this school, Schopenhauer, a philosopher who was not led and did not lead others into the mists of mythological invention, remarked: "... these so-called philosophers do not attempt to teach, but to bewitch the reader."

Hegel and his fellows did not attempt to portray any ascertainable reality, but

presented a number of unprovable concepts which were myths in every true respect. K. R. Popper, in his excellent attack on historicist philosophies, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, shows how Hegel's myth of "Spirit" was transformed into the Nazi myth of "Blood" and the Marxist myth of "Class," and so became a dynamic element of change in social history. Incidentally, the passages from Hegel given by Mr. Popper present such a clear example of the way in which the myth moves on a plane outside all rational discussion, that they are worth quotation at length.

The National State is Spirit in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality; it is therefore the absolute power on earth. . . . The state is the Spirit of the People itself. The actual State is animated by this spirit, in all its particular affairs, its Wars, and its Institutions. . . . The self-consciousness of one particular nation is the vehicle for the development of the collective spirit; . . . in it, the Spirit of the Time invests its Will. Against this Will, the other national minds have no rights; *that* Nation dominates the World.

If we attempt to analyze these sentences into concrete social terms, they are revealed as empty and meaningless abstractions. Yet the fact remains that such statements make a successful appeal to the desire for identification with a greater whole, for immersion in a victorious collectivity, which is present in many people and is related to their fear of freedom and responsibility. Foolish as they may seem, phrases and myths very similar to those concocted by Hegel played a decisive part in the Nazi assumption of power in Germany and the German campaign of conquest and expansion.

When we pass from Hegel to Marx, we must observe one point concerning the myth—that it need not be consciously fabricated in order to deceive and defraud the people. It is possible for a social thinker to create a theory in which he

honestly believes and which has at the same time all those desire-fulfilling qualities which make it a successful political myth. I consider that Marx was one of those almost unconscious myth-makers and that, despite the petty dishonesties in which he sometimes indulged during his polemics with opposing theorists, he quite sincerely believed that his prophecies of the end of capitalism were destined to be fulfilled. He really believed in the bursting of the husk, and the knell of capitalist private property. But a political myth is no more effective for being sincerely held by its originator. Indeed, it is usually less so, for it is too closely connected with contemporary realities to have that longevity and tenacity which is the characteristic of the successful myth, and which comes from its having the least possible connection with social reality.

This was realized by one of Marx's more unorthodox disciples, Georges Sorel, who became the leading theorist of the political myth. Sorel was an engineer who, in his retirement, became interested in social matters and attached himself to the syndicalist movement which was then arising in France. Sorel affected to despise politicians and intellectuals. Nevertheless, he saw more clearly than any previous social theorist the power of the myth in affecting the social actions of men, and realized its formidable nature as a political weapon. In his book, *Reflections on Violence*, he develops at some length his theory of the political myth, with special application to the general strike, regarded by his fellow syndicalists as a practical method of social struggle, but by Sorel as a potent myth, by which, independently of its achievement, the working classes might be led to action and produce a somewhat mystically conceived social regeneration.

According to Sorel, men engaged in any dynamic social movement "always picture their coming action as a battle

in which their cause is certain to triumph." Such "groups of images" he calls *myths*, and contends that they cannot be analyzed, but "must be taken as a whole, as historical forces, and . . . we should be especially careful not to make any comparison between accomplished fact and the picture people had formed for themselves before action." He then puts his idea of the myth beyond reasoned thought by an admission which is strikingly similar to those of the Nazi and Fascist theorists:

In employing the term myth, I believed myself that I had made a happy choice, because I thus put myself in a position to refuse any discussion whatever with the people who wish to submit the idea of a general strike to a detailed criticism, and who accumulate objections against its practical possibility.

But, despite his expressed distaste for realistic discussion, Sorel has a number of shrewd observations on the nature of myths which are worth our consideration.

In action, according to Sorel, we create "an imaginary world placed ahead of the present world composed of movements which depend entirely on us." Such artificial constructions generally vanish rapidly from our minds, "but when the masses are deeply moved, it then becomes possible to trace the kind of representation which constitutes a social myth." In other words, the myth is a fantasy which happens to offer fulfilment to the desires of many people. Without the existence of myths, according to Sorel, it is useless to expect any widespread action on the part of the workers. He claims that "Utopian" ideas, based on a discussion of practical realities, have no such motive power as myths.

A myth cannot be refuted, since it is, at bottom, identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, unanalyzable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical descriptions.

Later, in his discussion of the specific myth of the general strike, Sorel becomes more explicit in his views on the power of the myth to produce action by the presentation of social issues in a way which will deeply impress the minds of the people.

Oppositions, instead of being glossed over, must be thrown into sharp relief if we desire to obtain a clear idea of Syndicalist movement; the groups which are struggling one against the other must be shown as separate and compact as possible; in short, the movements of the revolted masses must be represented in such a way that the soul of the revolutionaries may receive a deep and lasting impression.

These results could not be produced in any certain manner by the use of ordinary language; use must be made of a body of images which, *by intuition alone*, and before any considered analyses are made, is capable of evoking as an undivided whole the mass of sentiments which corresponds to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society.

From this passage it is again clear that the myth-maker takes his arguments completely out of the realm of reason and objective truth—indeed, that he no longer uses arguments in any real sense, but merely images and generalizations which make an emotional appeal to the irrational elements in the human mind. The lack of any connection with objectivity is made even more clear in later passages, where Sorel denies that there need be any accuracy whatever in the content of the myth. What is important to him is not whether it has any real connection with the future, but its effect on men's actions in the present, which need never achieve or approach what the myth promises. It is sufficient, for Sorel, if the myth makes men eager to act.

The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense. *It is the myth in its*

entirety which is alone important; its parts are only of interest in so far as they bring out the main idea. No useful purpose is served, therefore, in arguing about the incidents which may occur in the course of a social war, and about the decisive conflicts which may give victory to the proletariat; even supposing the revolutionaries to have been wholly and entirely deluded in setting up this imaginary picture of the general strike, this picture may yet have been, in the course of the preparation for the Revolution, a great element of strength, if it has given to the whole body of Revolutionary thought a precision and a rigidity which no other method of thought could have given.

The major weakness of Sorel's position is, of course, that the myth may be used by any clever demagogue for moving the people to action, no matter what his actual objectives may be. Nothing is easier, as has been proved time and again in the history of political struggle, than to lead a people to a given situation by inducing them to struggle for a promise of its opposite. Thus almost all tyrants who have ruled with a mass following have established their government by inducing the people to struggle for freedom. The Bolsheviks gained power by using the potent promises of "Land to the peasants, factories to the workers" and "All Power to the Soviets." When, by such means, they had induced the Russian workers to support them, they proceeded to enact the opposite of their promises, by putting the factories and the land under state control and by making the Soviets into powerless bodies of yes-men.

Sorel may have been sincere in his revolutionary desires. But it was the ruling classes, not the workers, who benefited by his revelations concerning the myth, and put them into practice. The Italian Fascists in particular made free use of his ideas in order to persuade the people into allowing them to take power on promises that would not be kept. Nor

is it likely, in the long run, that any truly revolutionary end will be achieved by the use of the myth.

For, in the last analysis, human life and relationships are not governed by generalized ideas, by all-embracing promises, but by the factual details of production and every-day intercourse. It is on these details that the essential life of the community proceeds, and that real social advances are made. A change in a method of production, a new source of power used rationally, is much more likely to lead to increased freedom and well-being than any political myth.

It is true that myths stir the people to action. They lead them forward in emotional surges which have little reasonableness in them, but which undoubtedly precipitate certain changes. Yet, because the mood of a people led by a myth is essentially irrational, the social changes that occur are moulded and turned to their own account by men who have contrived to retain their powers of calculation. The people die in the streets for an unrealized myth, but the politicians and parties gain power and privilege by the changes that are brought about.

While the myth remains a potent factor in society, there is little chance of men becoming free from the power of the demagogue who is capable of creating myths or adapting them to his own ends. It is only when people can see political realities in a rational manner, and can mold their desires for the future according to practical standards, that they will begin to distinguish between really productive social advancement and the kind of action which results from accepting the impulse of certain images and emotional stimuli presented in the shape of a political myth. Then we may hope to see an end to the era of the demagogue, and the beginning of a society of co-operation between equals.

But we must not for a moment sup-

pose that the power of the political myth will be easy to break. The average man is uneducated in the details of social life, and accepts the promise of a myth-maker because he knows no better, and also because it seems to promise fulfillment for his desires. The myth appeals to emotional impulses which are all the stronger in rationally undeveloped people.

The conquest of myths is a work partly for the psychologist and partly for the teacher. The psychologist has still much work to do in studying the action of such irrational appeals among the masses. He and the teacher (with whom we might include the serious social student) can between them decide how his discoveries can be used to counter the appeals of unreason and induce people to accept the reasoned statement of facts. Education in social details and in rational methods of thinking is equally necessary. (Lenin remarked to Clara Zetkin on one occasion

that the Bolsheviks owed their success largely to the illiteracy of the peasants.) Lastly, the rejection of the myth should not mean the abandonment of planning for the future. Without provisional planning, there would be little guide to reasonable action. But our plans should be concerned, not with abstractions, but with concrete facts, with people and things, with probabilities which can be proved or amended in accordance with experience. And, above all, we should be careful to avoid the deceptive use of symbols and images.

In such a way, the people could be brought into a direct contact with the working of their own society, and, by participating in the details of social activity, could gain an experience in co-operative action which would provide a much more reliable force towards real social revolution than the most formidable and seductive myth.

Beliefs under Stress

Alexander Leighton is equipped by training and experience to write about men and their belief systems. He is a medical doctor, psychiatrist, and anthropologist. Aside from years of actually living with native tribes in one part of the globe or another, during World War II as a Lt. Commander in the Navy he was assigned to the Japanese Relocation Center at Poston, Arizona, to "apply the methods of social science" to that troubled community and to find out in terms of human relationships what was happening and why. This book is the result of that assignment, and it is filled with practical illustrations of how man's mind works. A study of this kind would be interesting in itself, but the implications for the student of politics are more far-reaching. Most nations are today living under tension. Following two wars, the United States has passed through two periods of "red scares" and "witch hunts" which have flared up and died down. Why does a great nation like America become sensitive and somewhat petulant about the ideas of a very small minority? The student can apply Dr. Leighton's conclusions for himself. Is there any connection between a Dies Committee or a Thomas Un-American Activities Committee and the happenings observed by the author at a relocation camp?

The present chapter is concerned with the nature of beliefs and the manner in which they modify how people react to stress and how people mobilize the resources of their personalities. Man acts in terms of what he perceives; and what he perceives must pass not only through his eyes, ears and other special senses to reach his consciousness, but also through the dark and iridescent waters of his beliefs.

Because beliefs commonly contain central ideas with many related, secondary, and dependent ideas and ramifying suppositions, they are described here as "Systems of Belief." Any nation, tribe or community will have many such systems. . . .

Principle 1. All people everywhere have systems of belief which range from the deeply ingrained to the superficial.

The deeply ingrained systems of belief are fundamental assumptions regarding values, man's place in life, the nature of the world and the nature of the supernatural. Although influenced by observation and reason they are profoundly emotional rather than intellectual, are felt with certainty rather than thought through, and are acquired from other people by example and the pressure of general opinion rather than by argument and direct persuasion. Some are so basic that they are never completely expressed in words but are taken for granted, and some have connections running down below the level of consciousness. In systems of belief grow the roots of human motive and security, the sense of protection in the storms of the world, the capacities to do things and create things.

The superficial systems of belief are

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opinions and attitudes which, while anchored to the deeply ingrained beliefs, are more easily modified by immediate experience and by reasoning. Like blades of grass, they blow this way and that in the winds of circumstances, but do not readily let go of their roots.

Between the deeply ingrained systems of belief and those that are superficial are many shades of intensity dealing with many different topics such as right and wrong, law and order, earning a living, preserving health, or the practice of religion.

An important characteristic of belief systems is the fact that a single community, and even one individual, commonly harbors beliefs that are incompatible with each other by standards of reason. Circumstances can create clashes between these systems, either within individuals or within a community, but the remarkable thing is the frequency with which people simply retain their contradictory beliefs without feeling any necessity to bring them into an orderly relationship. Samuel Butler has called the tendency "... This merciful provision of nature, this buffer against collision, this friction which upsets calculations but without which existence would be intolerable, this crowning glory of human invention whereby we can be blind and see at one and the same time, this blessed inconsistency."

Whether blessed or not, this inconsistency exists in all systems of belief, east, west, north, south, civilized and uncivilized, but, like a personal mannerism, it is a thing more easily seen in the stranger than in ourselves. The following are some examples in American culture pointed out by Robert S. Lynd:

Everyone should try to be successful.

But: The kind of person you are is more important than how successful you are.

Life would not be tolerable if we did not believe in progress and know that things are

getting better. We should, therefore, welcome new things.

But: The old, tried fundamentals are best; and it is a mistake for busybodies to try to change things too fast or to upset the fundamentals....

Education is a fine thing.

But: It is the practical men who get things done....

Women are the finest of God's creatures.

But: Women aren't very practical and are usually inferior to men in reasoning power and general ability.

In spite of their alogical qualities, systems of belief do make sense. To be sure, they run out of sight into questions regarding the nature of the mind, the forces of emotions and even the meaning of life—questions concerning which it is not too modest to say our knowledge is incomplete. Nevertheless, many psychiatric and psychological studies have revealed that systems of belief perform definite functions in the process of human living. They enable thousands, even millions, of people to act together in common understanding where otherwise there would only be strife and confusion; they protect the conscious self from devastating doubts and uncertainties and provide compensation for such adverse influences in life as the inevitability of death and the loss sooner or later of all things held dear. The logical relationship that systems of belief may have to each other does not count nearly so much as their capacity to fulfill these functions. In fact, apparent contradictions may represent opposing trends of feeling which are actually in a state of equilibrium with each other and thus, like spokes of a wheel, can point in opposite directions provided they articulate with and keep from the ground the man who is the hub.

Popular reaction to the theory of organic evolution as set forth by Darwin may serve as illustration of the functional nature of belief systems. When the theory appeared, almost a century ago, it was

vehemently attacked; and even today, although it is generally accepted by educated people, there are numbers who still reject it. This was not because the idea was hard to grasp, or because the evidence advanced was insufficient. It was not even because it hurt human pride to recognize the apes as next of kin in the animal world. It was because the theory seemed to strike at the basic systems of belief regarding the nature of God and Man. The standards by which past life had been lived, the moral structure of society and the basis of behavior, spiritual support in frustrations and disappointments, the whole scale of values in future striving, consolation in sorrow and the hope of life after death—all these were felt to be threatened. In actual fact, they were not necessarily destroyed, but extensive modifications were required and people were afraid. Several generations had to die before the concept of organic evolution became incorporated in our systems of belief.

The administrator who grows impatient with beliefs that clash with his own, who feels that the people should forget about their former political systems and accept our democracy quickly, or give over their superstitions and accept modern health measures, would do well to remember that he may be handing them just such a problem as the acceptance of organic evolution presented to our society.

Because systems of belief have deep connections with the springs of man's existence, they are often interdependent in a manner that may not be obvious on the surface. The theory of organic evolution had bearing on morals because both morals and the conception of the origin of species are encompassed by beliefs called the Christian religion. Systems of belief resemble a thick matting of roots under the floor of the forest which if cut may result in the withering of some distant bush or a whole tree. The man who

intrudes into another culture, or way of life, with administrative acts may be like one who cuts bothersome roots without being aware of their functions and interconnections. The people of the other culture, however, like the trees of the forest, even if themselves ignorant of the functional nature of their systems of belief, nevertheless feel it when their roots are cut.

In times of stress, human dependency on belief systems becomes greater and has significance in determining the direction in which events will move. Beliefs influence the degree to which individuals will be sensitive to the forces of stress outlined . . . and have much to do with the form reactions take, whether co-operative, withdrawing, or aggressive . . . and to the utilization of personal resources. . . .

Principle 2. Human groups cannot effectively carry out acts for which they have no underlying systems of belief.

This point has been well expressed by Elton Mayo in regard to the industrial worker:

If an individual cannot work with sufficient understanding of his work situation, then, unlike a machine, he can only work against opposition from himself. This is the essential nature of the human; with all the will in the world to co-operate, he finds it difficult to persist in action for an end he cannot dimly see.

This does not mean that each man must become convinced of the correctness of an aim as a result of careful reasoning, but only that he must be convinced. Conviction may be achieved in many ways that range from the use of reason to acceptance because some esteemed person said that such and such was so. The point is, that a system of belief of whatever source, from science to religion, must underlie action if it is to be effective in the long run. People may act under coercion, or in bewilderment without anything other than notions that are too unstable to be called systems of belief, but

such action will not have permanence or much force.

From the life in the Center, one of the best examples of this principle was the inability of the people to do much with self-government until they began to believe that it was possible.

Principle 3. Some of the outstanding differences between the various classes, tribes, and nations of men arise from different systems of belief and the attitudes derived from them.

This fact is so obvious and so generally experienced that it scarcely requires further comment, but it is perhaps worth noting one of the many ways in which it showed itself in the Center. American belief regarding the nature of leadership as represented by members of the Administration and by the Japanese-Americans emphasized the vigorous individual who, after popular election, assumes personal responsibility for devising plans and getting things done. A Japanese system of belief represented in the Center by most of the older people emphasized community guidance through a council of elders and heads of families who reach mutual agreement regarding policies and who assume responsibility as a group for what is done and avoid dominance by any single individual.

The struggle between these two systems eventuated in a compromise. As early as June 1942, a joint Issei-Nisei group proposed a plan for community government that was in effect such a compromise, but it was set aside by overall War Relocation Authority policy which aimed at making the plan in all Centers uniform and strictly after the American pattern. A community council composed only of American citizens was developed according to a system of popular election and emphasis on the popular leader was encouraged. At the time of the strike, this was eclipsed by the more Japanese form, and then in the period of

readjustment, the compromise took shape and thereafter seemed to work relatively well serving the needs of Isseis and Niseis and the Administration, and did not seem to violate any fundamental principles of democracy.

Although systems of belief may vary greatly from one group of people to another and constitute many of the differences that are commonly thought of as "racial," their functional nature seems much the same in all peoples. In this they resemble languages which may differ profoundly in form and sound, yet all have the function of enabling people to express themselves and evolve ideas and feelings so they can live and work together, care for their families, protect themselves, gain what they need and transmit their aspirations and creations to their fellows.

Principle 4. Systems of belief influence the way people respond to stress.

Systems of belief are like lenses which magnify, reduce, distort, and color that which is perceived through them, and cause different people to react very differently to the same situation, whether it be war, defeat, new government, or rehabilitation measures.

In the Center, the evacuees who believed the Administration was doing the best it could for them and the evacuees who believed it was trying to exploit them reacted differently to the school-building program. Many of the former went to work confident that if they did their share the children would have schools in the coming year, while the latter refused to work and maintained that the buildings would be used as dormitories for government personnel.

Innumerable other illustrations could be given, not only from experience in the Center, but from every place where people of different beliefs have contact. The spark which set off the rebellion of India in 1857 was the coating of the

cartridges used by the soldiers with a grease. To people with British systems of belief it was a matter of indifference, but to men with Moslem systems of belief who took the grease to be pig-fat, it was a source of great agitation.

Tolstoy points out that during Napoleon's attack on Russia, the French believed Moscow was deliberately burned by its Governor in ferocious patriotism while the Russians believed it was barbarously burned by the French. "In reality, however, deserted Moscow had to burn as inevitably as a heap of shavings has to burn on which sparks continually fall for several days. A town built of wood, where scarcely a day passes without conflagrations when the house owners are in residence and a police force is present, cannot help burning when its inhabitants have left it and it is occupied by soldiers who smoke pipes, make camp-fires of the Senate chairs in the Senate Square, and cook themselves meals twice a day."

Principle 5. People under stress are inclined to become more intolerant of belief systems which they perceive to be different from their own.

Principle 6. Related to this intolerance is the common belief system that persons who live by foreign belief systems are cut to one stereotyped pattern and are possessed of traits that are unaccountable, inferior, or repugnant.

These two principles naturally follow if it is true that systems of belief have roots running deeply into man's sense of security and his hopes of achieving his aspirations. He will be intolerant of anything that shakes his orientation, his sense of knowing where he stands, and which offers competition to the guide posts of value upon which he has counted. One method of protecting his belief systems is to evolve further belief systems which deny virtue to foreign systems and their possessors by regarding them as at

the best quaint and, at the worst, stupid and dangerous. This is probably one of the factors important in the persecutions, massacres, and wars that have been carried out in the name of religion.

In the Center there were no massacres, though there were moments during the strike when things might easily have developed in that direction. There were, however, numerous different systems of belief accompanied by intolerances that came between different parts of the Administration, between Administration and evacuees, between older and younger evacuees, between Buddhists and Christians, between city people and country people, between the more Americanized and the less Americanized, between the educated and the uneducated, between the rich and the poor, between the different units that made up the camp, and between the different blocks in a single unit. They varied considerably in degree but their general quality of reciprocal intolerance combined with simple, inaccurate, and prejudiced convictions was the same everywhere.

World-wide prevalence of intolerance and stereotyped beliefs is plainly evident, and everyone is familiar with the way the Germans played it up rather than attempted to mitigate it. The following quotation from a pre-Nazi newspaper indicates the kind of beliefs upon which Hitler was able to build.

The Serbians are professional regicides, the Russians half animals, the French vengeful, vain coxcombs, the British barbarous highwaymen and world pirates in the hypocritical cloak of Christianity, the Italians assassins, the Japanese apes and hyenas, that is, far from being fully human.

However, it is not only in Germany that one finds such belief systems. After the Civil War, the proponents of the "Bloody Shirt" in the Northern States, who did much to prolong economic and social chaos in the South, worked on the

belief that slavery had debased the Southern mind, that nobody who had ever been active in the Confederacy could be trusted and that rebels never changed. Southerners were even referred to as a different "race" and Stevens declared that Congress must treat the Southern States as "conquered provinces and settle them with new men and drive the present rebels as exiles from this country."

In the Detroit riots of June, 1943, participants who attacked Negroes at random made such remarks as, "Those black bastards damn well deserved it." While other citizens were saying, "But Carrie, they're only niggers, and everyone knows that niggers always revert to that cannibal blood in them and always kill, or something."

Beliefs of this sort absolve the person holding them from treating other groups of people by the same standards he applies to the members of his own group. In the words of Mark May, "Conscience thins out and weakens when it crosses international and interracial boundaries."

Of comparable significance with belief systems in regard to the inferiority of other groups are belief systems in regard to the superiority of one's own ideas. Most people of whatever nation believe as a fact that their ways are superior to all others just as they believe as a fact that the ocean is deep, that the sun rises in the east, or that their own religion is the only "true" religion.

For generations European and American explorers in the Arctic died of malnutrition and starvation in the midst of plenty because convinced that they could not subsist on the fare of the Eskimo which embraced raw animal organs now known to be well filled with vitamins.

Not only do most people think that their beliefs are superior, but they expect others of different nations and tribes to recognize this superiority. As a consequence, individuals from different

groups are constantly likely to baffle and anger each other by behavior which seems to be stupidly blind to the superiority of the other's systems of belief and to the deficiencies in their own ways.

In times of stress those intolerances and prejudicial convictions are likely to multiply in numbers and grow in firmness of conviction and add their weight to the vicious circle of increasing stresses and social and psychological deterioration.

Principle 7. In communities undergoing stress it is common for belief systems to:

Become more emotional and less rational,

Increase in number and variety,

Increase in tendency to conflict,

Become plastic and changeable.

Principle 8. The longer and more intense the stress, the more extensive will be the changes in the systems of belief until some new equilibrium is established.

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...It may be said that change in systems of belief is another way in which individuals react to the various types of stress that were outlined...and those alterations follow, among other things, the trends toward co-operation, withdrawal, and aggression....Under the hammer blows of adversity the belief systems break into fragments which the people struggle to change and use as formulas for getting out of their predicament. New religious cults appear and old ones take on new life. Political, social, and military panaceas become rallying grounds for groups, each of which thinks it has the answer to all things. Slogans and symbols representing the various belief systems become common.

It has been mentioned...that one of the reactions to the stresses of the situation in the Center was aggression directed against "dogs." This had as an integral part a system of belief in which informers

were thought to be at work among the evacuees. It is possible that in actual fact there were or had been Japanese in the group who, as alleged, turned in the names of "innocent people" to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to make money or settle grudges, but it is certain that numbers of men were thought to be "dogs" without any reasonable basis. The point about the "dogs" was not so much the detection and punishment of the really guilty as it was the finding of persons who could be regarded as guilty and thus stand for easily understood concrete, obvious, and reachable causes of the personal misery which permeated the Center. Hating and beating these "dogs" gave the people a feeling of doing something, of "making somebody suffer for this," of cleaning out the evil that lay within their own group and of pulling in harmony with each other again. They were unable to control the outside world which had oppressed them but they could have the satisfaction of attacking causes if they believed them to exist in their own midst.

In behaving thus, the evacuees were probably doing much the same as the people of California had done when, suffering the discomforts of war preparation and frightened by events in the Pacific, they uncritically attributed espionage and sabotage to the Japanese-Americans and clamored for their removal without being willing to leave the matter to the Army, Naval, and Federal intelligence offices responsible for security. Bitterly as the evacuees resented the way they had been treated by other Californians and much as they complained of "injustice," they were blind to the fact that their attitudes toward "dogs" displayed the very same kind of prejudicial belief.

The two men whose incarceration started off the strike were also symbols of starkly emotional belief systems which took the men to be innocent without ref-

erence to fact. Later events seemed to indicate that they were innocent, but at the time of the strike very few of the thousands claiming their innocence were in a position to know whether they were or not. These people did not want to examine the evidence objectively. What they wanted was to get the men released and they desired this because many of their feelings and needs were answered by believing them to be fine young heroes martyred through persecution from those same relentless forces which all evacuees felt were harassing them. To save the prisoners was to achieve some measure of self-defense, to retaliate, and, for once, to do something on their own.

These feelings and the beliefs based on them outweighed by far the influence of any rational appraisal of what, in fact, they could accomplish and the serious damage to their future welfare they might do if they antagonized people who were trying to help them, and if, by creating an incident, they gave ammunition to those who were urging more severe and discriminatory treatment for all people of Japanese ancestry living in the United States.

All of these trends have been noted in many different communities in many different cultures and societies by many different observers. If ways and means of curing or compensating for the underlying causes of the stress are not worked out as was the case in the Center, then the drift seems to be toward more and more disorganization with the eventual achievement of a state of chronic apathy and shiftlessness as may be seen in some American Indian groups and in parts of the Orient, or a continuous series of upheavals as in the Balkans or parts of South America.

"When the accustomed ways of life of a group of people are severely hampered by conditions over which as individuals they have no control but which they are

led to believe could be remedied by mass action, the psychological stage is set for an aggressive social movement. . . . If a group tastes the benefits of raid and plunder without experiencing too much punishment, it is likely to shape its internal affairs to a policy of external aggression. It seeks better weapons and more skilled users of them. It invents an ideology (systems of belief) . . . that reinforces its policies; . . . all designed to implement the type of group conduct which has been found to be most profitable."

Principle 9. As systems of belief in a community under stress become more emotional, unstable, and conflicting, the community becomes less able to deal with its stresses.

Principle 10. Out of the confusion of a community under stress there is likely to arise a single radical system of belief which may or may not bring a new stability, but which will bring to a large section of the population a sense of at least temporary relief from stress.

It is in this situation that communities are most susceptible to the social and political quack. Exhausted, confused and frustrated people will snatch at any hope if it has only an outward shell that shines brightly, just as distraught patients respond to the promises of the medical quack. In both cases, the essence of quackery is that the hope is an illusion which brings a temporary feeling of relief, but in the end leaves the people worse off than before.

Principle 11. After a period of stress, there is a drift back toward former systems of belief, but the return is rarely, if ever, complete.

A parallel may be noted here with the trend toward good spirits after an outburst of aggression. Following the strike in the Center, many of the hostile beliefs which people held regarding the Administration, the conviction that the prisoners were innocent, the widespread credence in the

activity of informers, and many other systems of thought which had been to the fore, either disappeared or were greatly reduced in extent. The belief that older people should run the Center receded again and gave place to belief in self-government in which old and young both participated and which gave heed to the needs of both aliens and citizens.

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Principle 13. To be effective, all measures aimed at correcting stresses must be applied in accordance with the belief systems of both administration and the people administered, or else the belief systems must be altered.

This principle follows from what has been previously pointed out regarding the nature of systems of belief and their influence on the way people perceive and respond to stress. As a matter of general practice, the administrator will find it better to work through the systems of belief as they exist among the people and as they change spontaneously rather than attempt to introduce extensive alterations. Aside from the fact that administrative efforts to exert thorough control over what people believe is at variance with the democratic philosophy, it is a task of enormous practical difficulty. The production of even moderate changes in systems of belief is likely to prove a long job and worth the effort only when restricted in scope and when there is plenty of time, clear goals, stable policies and consistent administrative operation.

On the other hand, systems of belief as they exist and as they change of themselves, are often elastic and flexible and offer the administrator a wide field within which to operate. As has been noted, the plasticity and the number of differing systems of belief increase during times of stress, thereby enhancing this opportunity.

However, after the emphasis on the advisability of letting systems of belief alone

whenever possible, it must be recognized that every administration is faced with a number of specific attitudes, both in its own ranks and among the people with whom it has to deal, which are, from the administrator's point of view, unrealistic and obstructionistic. In times of stress there will be systems of belief, such as those involving scapegoats, which are imminently dangerous. In such cases, alteration must be secured.

Principle 14. The things which alter the systems of belief that people hold are:
Observation of fact and reasoned thinking.

Contact with other systems of belief.
All types of stress.

New opportunities for achieving security and satisfying aspirations.

The basis for this principle is partly empirical observation by clinical and advertising psychologists, psychiatrists, and students of public opinion, and partly conclusions drawn from the other principles that have been stated.

The appeal to reason through words and the presentation of facts so that they speak for themselves has its place in any plan to influence beliefs, particularly in dealing with people who are accustomed to having their emotions modified by such means. However, it is a method which is as a rule overestimated and can usually do little by itself if standing in the way of onrushing feeling.

Reason operates most powerfully when it takes the form of actual experience of what works and what does not work, but administrators are usually too timid to let people find out for themselves.

Administrators have an irresistible urge to insist on their wisdom.

The more a group of people is under stress, the less power is reason likely to have. It has been noted in studies of communities and countries suffering social upheaval as a result of stress, that the moderate, intelligent, and far-sighted

leadership which exists at the beginning is likely to give way, if the stress continues unrelieved, to leadership that consists chiefly in an ability to feel and express vividly what the mass of the people feel and to ride up and down on the surgings of their passions, like a cork on waves, with little or no ability to comprehend, foresee, and plan. The administrator who approaches turbulent people with reason is likely to get about as much result as if he were addressing a jungle. Before reason will have force, he must get attention and must develop a feeling toward himself in which there are elements of confidence. This is probably best done by a move that clearly gives the people some of what they want, some answers to their needs, and a hint that more may be forthcoming. After that, it may be possible to move in ways that are well founded on intelligent assessment of the resources of the situation.

In his handling of the strike, the Director of the Center, gave both the leaders and the people a feeling that they could "get somewhere" with him, and when he granted the release of the prisoners the tide turned from opposition to a working with and through him. Having got their attention and confidence, he was able to guide their desires, feelings of needs, and systems of belief so that they were more than immediate emotional outlets and led to relief from some of the basic types of stress.

There can be no doubt that this is an excellent pattern of administrative action whenever it is practicable.

Of very great strength in the modification of systems of belief is contact with a different opinion. The nature of the contact and the kinds of people concerned is of course important; and under some circumstances it can operate to harden convictions rather than dissolve them. However, this is likely to be a transitory stage, and if the contact is maintained it

usually happens that while both groups may change their beliefs to some extent, one or the other will show extensive alteration.

In the case of individuals, the pressure of group opinion is enormous, and the modern trend in psychiatry to treat people in groups ("group psychotherapy") represents in part a harnessing of this social force in the service of medical treatment. A glance at the advertising in almost any magazine will show page after page where through pictures and words the reader is made to feel that everybody who is anybody believes in this toothpaste or that vitamin. It evidently works or business concerns would not continue to spend millions in this manner. In the case of the vitamins, reasoned statements from the medical profession telling people that they have been oversold have little effect. The very man who smiles with condescension at the magic rituals whereby an African weaves a feeling of security, will himself perform the daily ritual of consuming his magic vitamins. Both the African and the civilized man do as they do because they have anxieties and have been exposed to other people who believed that the rituals bring security. If challenged in regard to their beliefs, both African and American will quote endless examples of persons, including themselves, who have been benefited by performing their respective rituals.

Whenever possible, the administrator should channel the force of group opinion to suit his aims, but in so doing he must recognize that people are more susceptible to opinions of persons in groups that resemble their own than they are to beliefs of people who are very different. Thus one segment of a community may strongly influence another, while the opinions of the administrative group, especially if they are of a different nation and language, may have relatively little effect. It is necessary to work through the leaders and

different groups among the people themselves.

Since belief systems can change as a result of stress on the individuals in the community, it is important never to lose sight of this relationship when dealing with events. In the Center, releasing the prisoners stopped the demonstration and strike. If the Military Police had been called in, they also would have stopped the demonstration, though it is unlikely they could have terminated the strike. However, neither releasing the prisoners nor the use of force through Military Police would have been of more than passing value in community management had it not been possible at the same time to improve health facilities, reduce some of the overcrowding in the quarters, help people secure furniture and partitions, and by the whole trend of the negotiations and subsequent administrative acts show the evacuees that some improvements in security and opportunity were available. Out of this came a partial sense of relief from apparent threats to life and health, physical discomforts, separation from family and friends, the feelings of being disliked and rejected by other people, capricious and unreliable authority, and the derived feelings of frustration, dilemma and uncertainty regarding both present and future. Negotiations in terms of the situation had the advantage not only of stopping the strike, but of paving the way for relieving fundamental stress and of building co-operation—none of which simple force would have accomplished. The success achieved in this instance was shown in improved efficiency in work and in community management by the evacuees. The reason it was achieved is illustrated by the fact that six months later, when the people learned that the Director might transfer to other duties, a petition requesting him to stay was presented with many thousands of evacuee names on it. The persons prominent in promoting this

move were among those who had formerly been leaders during the strike.

Opportunities to satisfy needs and aspirations no less than situations of stress cause systems of belief to change. Those evacuees who found new career opportunities as a result of working for the Government not only shifted from hostile to friendly beliefs in regard to the Government, but came to feel that other evacuees were being unreasonable. When the ranchers of the Parker Valley discovered that they needed evacuee help in harvesting their cotton, there was within the space of a few weeks a miraculous shift from beliefs which pictured all evacuees as enemies to thinking of them as hard-working and co-operative Americans of Japanese ancestry. (It must also be added that when the cotton-picking was stopped by military order, the drift of these ranchers back to former attitudes was equally noticeable.)

The world has seen many religious, political, and other types of conversion brought about by opportunities to satisfy desires. Perhaps one of the most familiar of all examples is the radical who turns conservative when he achieves high office and status. Such behavior is often labeled hypocrisy, but it is not true hypocrisy since the individual or the group of people experiencing the shift really hold the new beliefs with as much sincerity as they held the old.

Any belief system is easier to change in some directions than in others and it is wiser to begin by trying to move in an easy direction that approximates the administration's aims than to insist on a difficult direction that exactly fits its purposes. In the Center it proved more workable to incorporate into the self-government program the older people's conception of community management through meetings of elders than to insist on adherence to an ideal plan for democratic government created in Washington

by people who never lived in the Center and who had little knowledge of the systems of belief held by the older evacuees. The ultimate result was no less democratic than the initial plan, but it began with what was familiar to an important segment of the people concerned and then moved in a direction in which they were able to go.

Many other illustrations of this exist. It is easier to teach Navaho Indians the elements of hygiene on the basis of their own belief in contagious magic than to begin with an explanation of germs. The spread of dangerous influences from one object to another by touch, and the need in certain circumstances for sterile techniques are perfectly compatible with Navaho systems of belief but talk about the existence and behavior of bacteria sounds to them at first blush as fantastic as any of their religious beliefs sound to us. It is only after prolonged contact with white culture and considerable education that the average Navaho will begin to take stock in germs.

The actual tools to be employed in exerting influence on systems of belief will depend on the opportunities presented in each concrete situation. In general, all pertinent forms of communication should be utilized to the full. These forms of communication include radio, newspapers, magazines, posters, leaflets, movies, lectures, meetings with leaders for discussion, and mass meetings. In addition, administrative power may be employed to give support to persons and groups of persons who promulgate the belief systems the administration wishes to encourage, while persons advocating opposite trends can be discouraged directly and indirectly. The power of public opinion can be skillfully directed to the point where it will do the most. At all stages, judgment and knowledge of the immediate situation should temper action, and the emphasis should be on guidance of trends in the commu-

nity rather than on insistence and force. Nevertheless, the creation of appropriate laws and regulations and their enforcement are of fundamental importance. While these must, in order to be effective, operate in consonance with the existing belief systems of the people concerned, they may still function to influence change in those belief systems in one direction or another.

The handling of the development of self-government in Poston after the strike is an example of successful administrative treatment of belief systems in pursuit of an ultimate goal. It was greatly handicapped by weak and un-co-ordinated methods of communication, the importance of which was never fully grasped by the project Director and the other administrators.

Ideology and Foreign Policy

William G. Carleton is Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. He has written widely in scholarly journals. His writings are uniformly provocative and informative and are distinguished for facility of expression. In this article the author carries on discussion of a point raised in the introduction, namely, the relation between ideology and power or national security factors in foreign policy. An interesting question arises: The United States and the USSR are engaged in a competitive struggle for influence in those parts of the world deemed of vital security to each country; is it true, however, that the USSR counters U. S. military power with its own military power? Is it true that the United States counters Soviet propaganda power with its own propaganda power? Professor Carleton suggests that ideology is both a power technique and an objective to which power is applied. Each nation employs the power which it is best fitted to employ. Clearly the economic power of the USSR abroad is momentarily negligible while its ideological power is not. At the moment, the reverse seems to be true of the United States. If the future struggle is to be in part one of ideas, is America fully mobilized for such combat? The recent declarations of American foreign policy bear witness to a stronger ideological line. Is this sufficient?

What is the chief element in formulating the foreign policy of a nation? Is it ideology or is it balance of power? Is it both? If both, which weighs the more?

Did Sparta and Athens fight the Peloponnesian War because of the conflict of their social and political systems or be-

cause each feared the collective power of the other? Was Whig Britain at war with Bourbon France because of the rivalry of different institutions or because of the clash of competitive imperialisms? Did Burke's Britain fight Revolutionary France because of Tory fear of the Jaco-

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bins or because Britain feared for the balance of power? Did the United States go to war with Germany in 1917 and again in 1941 because of a conflict of cultures or a conflict of power?

What is this thing called "ideology"? There are, of course, ideologies and ideologies, and the term needs clarification.

Nations differ from each other in cultural and institutional patterns. But institutions inside nations are forever undergoing changes. These changes bring on institutional conflict within nations. Some fear these changes while others favor them. Very often the institutional conflict taking place inside one nation is at the same time also taking place inside other nations. In other words, the struggle for institutional change often cuts across national boundaries.

In one age, the emphasis is on one aspect of cultural or institutional change; in another age, the emphasis is on another aspect. In the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century, the chief institutional conflict inside countries involved religion. In some countries the Protestants won, and in other countries the Catholics won. But inside Protestant countries, there were Catholic minorities, and inside Catholic countries, there were Protestant minorities. Later, the chief institutional conflict was over constitutional and representative government. In some countries constitutional government won, and in other countries absolute monarchy held its own; but in countries where constitutional government won, there were still those who clung to the divinity of kings, and in countries where absolutism won, there were minority groups which favored constitutional and representative government. Still later, the chief institutional conflict was over political democracy. However, in countries where democracy triumphed, there were minority groups which opposed it, and in countries where

democracy made little headway, there were minority groups which championed it. Today, in this middle of the twentieth century, the chief institutional conflict centers around the ownership of productive property. The struggle is one of capitalism versus some form of collectivism. Inside almost every country this struggle is taking place in one way or another. In some countries collectivism is farther advanced than in others. Those in one country who favor collectivism find themselves in sympathy with those in other countries who favor it. Those in one country who oppose collectivism find themselves in sympathy with those in other countries who oppose it.

The decisive institutional conflict of any age has come to be known as the "ideological" conflict. While, in general, that conflict was in the seventeenth century waged over religion, in the eighteenth century over constitutional and representative government, and in the nineteenth century over political democracy, in the present century it is being waged over Socialism.

That the institutional or ideological conflict is waged inside many nations at the same time, that the new institution struggling to be born is farther advanced in some countries than in others, that this conflict cuts across national lines and leaves people and groups within the various countries with ideological sympathies for similar groups in other countries—all of this enormously complicates international relations. International wars often take on the appearance of deep-seated ideological conflict involving not only national interests but future institutional and cultural development. Men who belong to minority groups are often torn between two loyalties—loyalty to ideology and loyalty to nation. Such men may be damned as "Trojan horses" and "fifth columnists" if they follow their ideological impulse; they may be damned as dis-

loyal to their ideology if they follow their national impulse.

What if a situation arises in international politics in which ideology and national interest do not coincide? In that case, which is put first by those who conduct the nation's foreign policy—ideology or national interest?

As we look back on the past, it seems that, when the hour of decision struck, the national urge was generally stronger than the ideological. During the Thirty Years' War, in an age when the chief ideological conflict was religious, Catholic France went to the aid of Sweden and the German Protestants in their conflict with Catholic Austria. To Cardinal Richelieu and other French leaders of the day it was more important for France to check Austria, for the Bourbons to humble the Hapsburgs, than for Catholics to stand together against Protestants. In the late seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, it usually seemed more important to the absolute monarchs of Vienna and Berlin to check the French nation than that Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Bourbons should stand together in ideological alliance to maintain absolutism against the slowly rising tide of constitutionalism. Britain fought Bourbon France, Revolutionary France, and Napoleonic France, for while the ideologies shifted and changed, the national rivalry and imperialist conflict did not. In more recent times, Tsarist Russia has been allied with republican France, democratic Britain with oligarchic Japan, democratic America and democratic Britain with Communist Russia, and Communist Russia with Nazi Germany. National interests make strange bedfellows—in the face of a threat to the balance of power, nations will make alliances with the ideological devil.

Where, in general, the dominant ideology within the nation and the national interest do coincide, in what direction have the ideological minorities usually

gone? In a crisis, what have these minorities done—have they followed their ideologies or their national patriotisms? In the past, the tug of national loyalty has generally won out over ideological persuasion. British Catholics rallied to Elizabeth in her fight with Catholic Spain. Charles James Fox's Whigs rallied to Pitt in the national fight against Napoleon. And in the two global wars of this century the Socialists did what they boasted they would never do—in the main, they rallied to the national standards. A Coriolanus and an Alcibiades, a Vallandigham and a Petigru, a Quisling and an Einstein, a Laval and a Thomas Mann are relatively rare in history. (This is, I know, an incongruous list of saints and sinners, but they have this one thing in common: in one way or another, all sacrificed homeland for ideology.) And should all our hopes of peace collapse and the future see a third world war involving the Soviet Union against the United States, it is still a safe prediction that Eleanor Roosevelt and Colonel Robert McCormick, Max Lerner and Hamilton Fish, Philip Murray and John Bricker, Henry Wallace and Lawrence Dennis would be fighting side by side in the name of national interest and national survival.

However, it would be a mistake to come to the conclusion that because ideology has not played the leading part in historic international relations it has played no part at all. It has played its part, an important part. Where national interests and dominant ideology within the nation coincide, a national war can be made to appear an ideological one, morale can be strengthened, and enthusiasm intensified. If a nation possesses considerable ideological unity, it will be in a stronger position to win a war; if a nation's enemies are ideologically divided, those enemies will be more susceptible to fifth-column tactics. When a country is rising to challenge the old balance of

power, nations thus threatened will make alliances more easily and earlier if they have similar institutions and cultures; alliances will be more difficult and will come later (perhaps too late!) if the nations thus threatened have dissimilar institutions and cultures.

Just as national interests and balance-of-power considerations seem to have been the most important causes of war, so also they seem to have been most affected by war. The results of international wars seem to have been more significant in their national and balance-of-power aspect than in their ideological aspect. The Grand Alliance against Napoleonic France checked France and saved the European balance of power but did not succeed in arresting the spread of revolutionary ideas. The Grand Alliance won the war nationally but in the end lost it ideologically. However, when nations outside of France became more and more influenced by French Revolutionary ideas, those ideas took on the appearance of being their own—they were assimilated into their own national cultures. Again, at the close of the First World War, it appeared that middle-class democracy would triumph in the world, but now we can see that instead, the First World War marked virtually the end of the advance of middle-class democracy in any large areas of the world. However, the First World War did parry the German threat to the balance of power; it did temporarily satisfy the national interests of the victors; the war was won nationally even though it was lost ideologically. Again, the victory of the United Nations in the Second World War saved the world from a second German threat to the balance of power—that much is certain. Perhaps it will also have hastened Socialism, but, in any event, the ideological results are not so clear as the national ones.

It seems, then, that the influence of great wars on the cultural and institution-

al trends of the time is exaggerated. These trends arise out of conditions and forces operating within the nations. Wars affect them. Wars may accelerate these trends or slow them up. Wars hardly create them.

The Marxists would claim that what appears to be the national interest has in fact been primarily the interest of the dominant class in control of the state and that class interest has governed the foreign policy of national states and involved national states in wars for class ends. The great national wars, according to Marxist doctrine, have been wars in the interests of the dominant economic classes in the warring nations—conflicts of rival imperialisms. Where, in the past, ideology has seemed to split the dominant class, such ideological conflict, according to the Marxists, has been superficial or at least secondary to that class's economic interest. When a threat has appeared to the economic interest of the dominant class, these secondary ideological ranks have been closed in the class interest masquerading in the name of the nation. Of course, say the Marxists, the Catholic landlords and business men of Elizabeth's day rallied to the fight against Catholic Spain because their profits were involved. Of course, the Marxists say again, the Charles James Fox Whigs, enamored though they were of many of the principles of the French Revolution, rallied to the war against Revolutionary France because their dividends from the British East India Company and from many another chartered company were at stake. (They fail to recall that the peace party in Britain led by Fox did not actually "rally" to the war until France under Napoleon had threatened to control the Channel and invade Britain.)

To be sure, the great conflict is ideological, say the Marxists—an ideological conflict between the exploiting capitalists and the exploited workers—and when this

ideological conflict comes to the fore and cuts across national states, then the conflict between nations will be seen to be a sham and a swindle, the ideological factor will become stronger than the national factor in international relations, national wars will be converted into civil wars, and the erstwhile dominant economic class, now embattled, will find it more and more difficult to cloak its class interests in the garment of nationalism.

It may be that the Marxists are correct as to the future. It may be that the ideological will supersede the national as the number one factor in international relations. It may be that now the great institutional conflict within nations has come to be directly economic (and not indirectly so, as in the case of many of the ideological conflicts of the past) and the fundamental issue easier for all to see, that more and more will men respond to the class and ideological appeal rather than the national appeal. And if men more and more are learning to think as the Marxists do (the post-war elections in Britain and especially in Continental Europe indicate that they are) then it is quite possible that our century will see international relations conducted in fact and in name more along ideological than national lines. Indeed, the Second World War was in many ways a series of civil wars, with Socialists and Communists in Axis countries praying for an Allied victory and fascists in Allied countries supporting collaboration with the Axis. Ideological minorities were co-operating with the national enemy on a scale never equalled in the days when Protestantism or constitutional government or political democracy was the pivot of ideological conflict—though perhaps some of this co-operation should be credited to the increase and improvement in the means of communication. And today, Henry Wallace speaking to Britain in a way hostile to the views of a majority of his own countrymen or

Winston Churchill speaking to America in a way hostile to the views of millions of Left-wing Britons is another example of how in our time ideology cuts across national boundaries.

At present, the United States and the Soviet Union face each other as the predominant powers of the earth. Each is viewing world politics in a different light from the other.

Our policy-makers are thinking more in the old terms of nationalism, self-determination, and the balance of power. Soviet influence on Leftist parties the world over is looked upon largely as old-fashioned aggression and imperialism. There is widespread fear that Russia as Russia will upset the balance of power in Europe and Asia. Poland and Rumania and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and China are appealed to by our government on the basis of national self-determination. (National self-determination, once a liberal rallying cry, has become also a conservative shibboleth.)

The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, are thinking more and more in terms of ideological conflict, class warfare, social politics. To Soviet policy-makers the contest in the world today is not so much one between the United States and Russia as it is between world fascism and world Communism. And those in other countries who follow the Soviet lead take much the same view. Communists and extreme Leftists the world over are giving their allegiance not so much to nations as to ideology. Russia is merely the instrument to be used in spreading ideology. Moscow influences Communist parties in all countries, and Communist parties everywhere influence Moscow. There is common indoctrination, consultation, co-operation. It is a two-way street, though the pre-eminence of Russia in the movement makes the outgoing counsel from Moscow weightier than the incoming counsel.

If a third world war should come—a

war between the United States and the Soviet Union—for millions of Leftists the world over that war would be viewed almost exclusively as an ideological one. In countries where the extreme Left is in control, national policy would be made less on the balance-of-power idea and more on ideological consideration. In the United States, where Marxist ideas have scarcely penetrated at all, the war would be viewed in the old nationalistic terms. It would be a war to protect our shores from invasion, to uphold the balance of power, to save the world from Russian domination. As has already been said, in a final showdown nearly all of us would stand together. Our Communist fifth column would be smothered by the avalanche of nationalistic sentiment. American psychological warfare abroad would naturally reflect our own view of the situation, and we should probably err on the side of making too much appeal to nationalistic sentiments, which in large areas of the world would be effective only in Rightist circles. Our own failure to take into account the enormous strides the ideological point of view has made among the masses of people in Europe and Asia in recent decades, and particularly since the Second World War, might betray us into making very serious mistakes in the conduct of that war.

Should the Communists eventually win control in important countries outside Russia—in China, in Germany, in France, in Italy—it is quite possible that ideology would triumph over nationalism and a new international state emerge. After all, the nations themselves were built not so much on contract as on class and functional foundations. The feudal states of western Europe were put together into national states by the rising *bourgeoisie* joining hands across the boundaries of feudal provinces and communes. Just as the national state (which sometimes cut across nationality) was made by the

bourgeoisie, so a new international state may be made by the co-operation of Leftist parties joining hands across national boundaries. If an international state should come about in this way, then, of course, the old balance of power as played by national states will be relegated to the historical limbo. The Communists still confidently expect that Communism will lead to such an international state.

Of course, the Communists may be wrong about this. Nationalistic forces may be stronger than Communist intentions. When the Communists come into actual power in a country they inherit the national paraphernalia—the nation's history, culture, aspirations—and concessions have to be made to them. The Russian Communists have made many concessions to nationalism. The Chinese Communists have often pursued a course independent of Moscow, and if they should gain actual power in all China they might have to follow an even more independent course. Thorez, Communist leader in France, says over and again: "Different countries, different methods." And the moderate Socialists, even more than the extreme Socialists or Communists, have, of course, made many more concessions to nationalism and have proclaimed this as a virtue. Moreover, if the United States should use the moderate Left (Socialists) to check the extreme Left (Communists), such a policy might help to prevent a third world war and also help to halt a trend towards a Communist world state with the Soviet Union as its nucleus. Then, too, it is even possible, as Edward Hallett Carr has suggested, that in a state where everybody's work and wages and social security are dependent upon government, where the mass of people will seem to have as direct a stake in the national government as at one time only the *bourgeoisie* enjoyed, the mass of people may feel even more keenly their tie to the national government, and

Socialist states might end by being as nationalistic or even more nationalistic than bourgeois states. If this should turn out to be the case (although the Marxist analysis that private ownership of the productive processes and private profits are the basis of imperialism and international conflict may prove to be sounder), then Socialism, like the Commercial Revolution and the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution and the early stages of the Industrial Revolution before it, will have ended by intensifying nationalism, in spite of the aims and intentions of many of its disciples. And then, should Socialism spread and thus turn out nationalistic, the old historic pattern of the national balance of power would continue the dominant role in international relations, even though Socialist and Communist states remained nominal members of an international organization like the United Nations.

Of one thing, I think, we can be sure: even the creation of an international Communist state would not end the conflict over power. Within the international state would be different social and economic groups with different interests. They would fight for control, just as groups and classes within national states now fight for control. The international state would end the national balance-of-power conflict, but it would not end the ideological conflict inside it. The ideological conflict of the future will be different, but it will continue in some form. Even if the Marxists should achieve one-half of their ideal, the international state, they would not succeed in achieving the other half—the abolition of all its internal group differences. Within the international state would be geographical sections, cultural diversities, a wide gamut of different industries and economic enterprises, and various social classes: commissars, managers, engineers, technicians, skilled workers, unskilled workers, farmers, and

so forth. These various factors and groups would generate conflict over government policies and there would arise struggles for power which even Communist purges could not keep down. These struggles would cut across the old national boundaries.

In short, evidence is already strong that the Marxists may be able to make the ideological conflict rather than the national conflict the pivot of mid-twentieth-century international politics. As a result of this ideological conflict the more extreme Marxists—the Communists—may even be able to establish an international Communist state, but this is far less certain either because they may not win the ultimate international conflict even after succeeding in making the issue an ideological issue, or because the forces of nationalism may be too strong for the Communists once they inherit the various national governments. But even should the Communists win and establish an international Communist state, it is almost certain that new social and economic groups would arise to continue the struggle for power within the international state, peacefully perhaps, but a struggle none the less. If so, then national conflict over the balance of power would disappear, but ideological conflict within the international state would persist.

Should there be a third world war and should the United States, using the old shibboleths of nationalism, win the war, it is doubtful even then if political nationalism and the balance of power would continue as they have done in the past. We are perhaps too close to events of the last thirty years to be able to see just how far the old foundations of nationalism have already been eroded away. In the fifteenth century, participants in the wars of Louis XI and the Wars of the Roses were too close to those events to realize that feudal power was being overthrown before their very eyes and a strong na-

tional power built. So probably with us today. The historians of the twentieth century, more clear-eyed than we, may look back and see that the great international wars of the twentieth century were in fact dissolving nationalism and building internationalism.

For nationalism today is truly beset from all directions. Among the dissolving agents are: the cumulative impact of technology and science resulting in the continued drastic elimination of distance and space, the atomic bomb, the release of atomic energy, and the overwhelming necessity for having to extend international functionalism to control what in the future will probably be the world's most important source of industrial production; the palpable absurdities of fascist nationalism and the revulsion from fascist nationalism even in countries which experienced it; the realistic education given millions of men who participated in the great wars of the twentieth century in areas remote from their homelands; the glaring fact that real national power in the international power conflict is today possessed by only two nations, leaving all other nations as mere outsiders with no important power; the growth of international cartels; the Socialist appeal to the brotherhood of man; the Communist insistence on international action and the actual co-operation of Communist parties from country to country; the Socialist outlook of many of the "nationalistic" leaders of the colonial countries in revolt against imperialism; the body of practical experience in international co-operation gained through the League of Nations and the United Nations. The Communists would put the world together through something like a Communist International; a majority of the people of Britain and the United States would prefer to see

the world put together by the slow functional growth of an organization which originated in contract—the United Nations. (Inside the United Nations, too, there would, of course, be power politics, but as international functionalism grew it would come to be less and less power politics based on nationalism and more and more power politics based on ideology, that is, group and class conflicts cutting across the old national lines.) And there are those, like James Burnham and the oversimplifiers and distorters of Arnold Toynbee, who are so impatient with the slower and wiser methods of bringing an international state that they would have America attempt to build a "universal empire" to end "a time of troubles." Whatever method of putting the world together will ultimately prevail is still anybody's guess, but that the world in our time is in painful process of being put together is more than a guess—it is a hypothesis based upon a growing accumulation of evidence.

Thus anyone called upon to answer the crucial question in international relations today would be, I think, on safe ground in saying that, from the rise of national states and up to about now, the chief element in international relations has been nationalism and the national balance of power. But he should warn the questioner not to be misled by this historic fact or by the superficial aspects of the present diplomatic duel between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially as that duel is generally interpreted in the United States. Because this middle of the twentieth century may be witnessing the epoch-making shift in the foundation of international politics from the nationalistic balance of power to ideology, evidence of which we shall ignore at our peril.

11

THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY

I

One of the most astute foreign observers of American society, Alexis de Tocqueville, set forth the primary function of an ideology: "A government retains its sway over a great number of citizens far less by the voluntary and rational consent of the multitude than by that instinctive, and to a certain extent involuntary, agreement which results from similarity of feelings and resemblances of opinion. . . . Society can exist only when a great number of men consider a great number of things under the same aspect, when they hold the same opinions upon many subjects, and when the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions to their minds." Certainly it is true that the American ideology has provided a common faith and a common meeting ground for a wide variety of peoples. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the political philosophy, or the hierarchy of values, which a society and a government attempts to live by. There have been times in American history when men were tempted to be cynical about the gap between professed ideals and actions. We may still be concerned at the discrepancy, but we have learned from observing nazism and fascism that even imperfect attainment of lofty ideals constitutes some safeguard for men. The mere fact that lipservice must be rendered to our professed ideals constitutes a defense against the ruthless denial of idealism.

We have recently been forced to give more attention to the substance of our ideology because, for the first time in many years, our democratic faith has been challenged before the world, first by fascism and then by communism. Americans have always assumed that their political creed had universal appeal that would, when people learned of it, enable it to sweep the world. We have believed that the American creed was applicable to all men, in all societies and countries. The United States has been conscious of its messianic role in bringing enlightenment to all the world. In the words of Senator Albert J. Beveridge, speaking to the Senate in 1900: "God . . . has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. . . . He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savages and senile peoples."

Now we are uncomfortable, alarmed, and somewhat shocked to discover that there is another nation, the Soviet Union, at least equally imbued with a messianic faith and another ideology which controverts our notions of political democracy and challenges the "power of attraction" of the United States. What will happen to the democratic ideology as a result of this challenge? Will it be strengthened by more conscious devotion to its professed ideals? Will it be revised, broadened, and deepened to meet the needs of a new age? Or will it serve only to blind us to the realities of the existing world? The way in which answers are sought to such questions as these may determine the success of our ideological competition with the Soviet Union. At present we are at a disadvantage in the competition because, in contrast with Soviet leaders, our leaders do not seem to have absolute faith in our doctrines or in their universal applicability. Furthermore, within our society there has developed over a period of years a marked disparity between our prevailing political doctrine and the ideology which seeks to describe our economic institutions. And there is no little doubt in the minds of many Americans as to whether ideology, particularly that of political democracy, is really exportable. For these and other reasons, including the awareness that the American system was seriously challenged by the prolonged economic collapse in the 1930's—and from which we were only extracted by the productive forces released in war—many Americans are deeply concerned over the contemporary ideological competition. "The fact is," as Owen Lattimore has written, "that for most of the people in the world today what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not another, is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice."

II

Although the English colonists who came to this country were not the products of a democratic society, they were imbued with the conviction that they were free men. As a result of their environment and experience in opposing control, whether by Parliament, wealthy land owners, or the directors of joint stock companies, they quickly became convinced of the soundness of democratic procedures. The consent of the governed, majority rule, freedom of assembly, speech, and religion were accepted as basic articles of faith. As practical men dealing primarily with material problems they accepted both the possibility and the desirability of compromise. Aside from religious differences, which were fairly quickly resolved as the result of the wide variety of sects, Americans were not faced with those ideological conflicts which render compromise difficult if not impossible. The very nature of the land seemed to provide a solid basis for assuming the perfectibility of man. There was ample evidence to support the conclusion that environment was the decisive element in shaping human personality. With characteristic optimism Americans became convinced that all men, at least those who were willing to work, are basically the same, that the

majority of people are decent and desire peaceful co-operation. It was natural for Americans to operate on the optimistic assumption that the majority would never exploit to the maximum extent its advantage, and that the minority would not cause a stalemate by inhibiting action.

As a second article in the American version of democratic ideology, limited government came to be widely accepted as "natural" and "right." It reflected the struggle against England, the resentment at efforts to establish class rule within the colonies, and the traditional agrarian attitude that government has little positive good to offer a rural population. The distrust of government contributed to the establishment of a federal system in which the powers of the central government were specifically enumerated and the constituent states retained a high proportion of sovereignty. Within the context of the period it was not unreasonable for eighteenth century Americans to assume that threats to individual liberties originated in government. They therefore demanded the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers in an effort to prevent authoritarian excesses. Believing in the rule of law, that no man should be held responsible for offenses not specifically provided for in statutes, these early Americans subscribed to the myth of "a government of laws and not of men."

A profound conviction that economic individualism and freedom of enterprise provided the greatest opportunity for individual growth and development has characterized American ideology from the start. Although, as suggested in another chapter, Hamilton and the Federalists were more sympathetic to the mercantilistic alliance of politics and economics, popular devotion has been given to the web of myth and reality spun around the concept of economic individualism. Certainly throughout a considerable portion of American history there was a close correlation between the concept and the reality. There was opportunity for the man of initiative and energy to combine his labor with nature and thus to acquire property. Popular leaders, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln were keenly aware of the relationship between widespread small property ownership and the survival of political democracy. Persistent indeed has been the suspicion of monopoly, of "big business," in American thought. From the opposition of Jefferson and Jackson to the Bank of the United States, the Granger movement's attack on railroad monopolies which led to antitrust legislation in the 1880's and 1890's, down through the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson and the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt, Americans have expressed verbal hostility to dominating business concentrations, while reaffirming their faith in an economy of small proprietors. Unfortunately myth and ideology have in this instance served to cloak reality to such an extent that Americans are left with a faith which has become unreal. As Pendleton Herring has noted, "Free enterprise has lost its meaning in many areas of our economy, but the empty phrase has been taken over at times as a symbol for the protection of monopolies."

In contrast with Great Britain, social equality has been a persistent article

of faith in the American credo. We have not always practiced political democracy, but traditionally Americans have demanded social equality, equality before the law, and equality of opportunity. In the early years of this country there was a general equality of condition among the people and, as de Tocqueville observes, this basic fact had a profound effect upon every aspect of American society. It influenced our laws, the formation of our legislatures, our social institutions, and our ways of thinking and acting. Among a wide variety of ramifications we take note of only one indication of this emphasis upon equality. Public men have had to be on guard against seeming to be "uncommon" men: they have had to appear to share the habits and prejudices of the majority. Though birth in a log cabin may no longer constitute a prerequisite for political office, it remains useful to have worked on a farm, acquired honest callouses from industrial labor, or to have sold newspapers. The persistence of the Horatio Alger myths, or the "office-boy-to-president" routine, demonstrates the powerful grip this doctrine of equality has on American emotions. It may have been transmuted by the streamlining involved in radio quiz shows, where the successful contestant receives a truly kingly reward for answering the telephone on time, but that it does persist is revealed in various public opinion polls. And now, when equality of opportunity to acquire and hold productive resources no longer seems real to many, we witness the transformation of the appeal to stress "free enterprise," i.e., the right to enter, or invest in, any business. Even when great differences in wealth became apparent to all, Americans were certain that such inequalities were temporary, that "no one in America can long live on his past, or on the past of his fathers." This is the shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves theory, which is a comforting if not an accurate account of contemporary wealth distribution.

Another facet of American ideology accounts for the strong reformist tradition. In part a product of Protestantism and in part a reflection of our political revolt against Great Britain, this ideology has contained a concept of appeal to a "higher law," a right and a duty to revolt against injustice. Traditionally American people have opposed authority whether religious, governmental, or economic. This hostility has provided a basis for the periodic efforts of Americans to challenge the domination of any particular class or group which seemed to be asserting undue control. It is seen in the Jeffersonian attack upon the Federalists, the resentment which produced Jacksonian democracy, and the innumerable reform movements from the 1870's to the New Deal of 1933-38. None of these typical expressions of resentment have challenged fundamental institutions, either political or economic, but have rather concentrated upon abuses which were felt to constitute denials of equal opportunity. They did not challenge private property, nor did they advocate unlimited expansion of governmental function. Basically American reformism has advocated extension of government action only to the degree necessary to provide a continuing meaning to the conception of equality. As Vernon L. Parrington expressed it, a great barbecue was spread before the people, at least some of the people, and it was

desirable to see that the waiters didn't play favorites in the distribution of the choice morsels!

One other aspect of American ideology is worth commenting on: the suspicion and fear of militarism. This is of special significance today for there are some one hundred and fifty professional military men in key policy-determining posts in civilian government. To take cognizance of this development is in no sense to denigrate the motives of individual officers. Certainly Americans may well take pride that their military tradition and organization is capable of turning up men of the caliber of a George C. Marshall or a Dwight D. Eisenhower. Nevertheless it may be asserted that the present trend toward reliance upon Army and Navy officers in civilian posts contravenes the spirit of the American democratic tradition. It may be emphasized here that militarism is less the attitude of military men toward civilians than it is the attitude of civilians toward the military. For example, when the chairman of a House committee informed his colleagues on the committee that in the future they would remain standing when Army or Navy officers were present to testify until they had been given the command, "At ease," that exemplified militarism! Although we have had periodic bouts of hero worshiping which resulted in placing military men in the presidential office, there has been a persistent current of hostility to military influence in political life. This was formalized in the Constitution by providing for civilian supremacy, e.g., that the Commander-in-Chief of our military forces was to be a civilian official, the President, and by giving control of fiscal policy to the House of Representatives.

It should also be stressed that many of our ablest military men have been antimilitarist in the sense of believing that civilian supremacy must be maintained, and in resenting the efforts to use military men to settle domestic troubles. There seems to be evidence that George Washington was approached by representatives of a group which desired him to subvert democratic procedures and establish a military dictatorship. To his everlasting credit he flatly rejected such overtures, despite his personal bitter experience with the obtuseness to which legislative bodies are occasionally subject. Charles Beard has said that the framers of the Constitution considered their major achievement was the avoidance of a military dictatorship. The most recent statement of the subordination of the military to civilian control is that of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in refusing to be considered as a political candidate. In a letter deserving to rank as a great public document, Eisenhower expressed the conviction "that the necessary and wise subordination of the military to civil power will be best sustained when lifelong professional soldiers in the absence of some obvious and overriding reasons, abstain from seeking high political office."

There are at least two aspects of this problem that citizens may well ponder. Is the reliance upon professional military men at the present time a result of civilian failure to accept responsibility for serving their government? Is this the culmination of the bankruptcy of individualism, that civilians are so preoccupied with the pursuit of their own interests that they are no longer available

for public service? Or is it a reflection of Congressional unwillingness to tolerate anyone of integrity and independence who fails to conform to Congressional prejudice? Has the irresponsible character assassination of a Thomas Committee resulted in depriving the American government of the service of able and honest men?

In the second place, Americans may speculate as to whether this contemporary development constitutes a repudiation of a key doctrine of the democratic ideology. Is this an example of what happens to an ideology in the face of challenge? What is to be the fate of other aspects of the ideology if international tension continues acute?

III

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the American ideology? Does it continue to serve as a force binding together a great nation? Is it an ideology with universal appeal for peoples living in other countries with different historical experience? If so, will it produce the same kind of governmental institutions? To what extent does it prevent us from seeing and comprehending the existing conditions within our society? How may it be modified to strengthen its power of attraction for other peoples?

Perhaps the most common criticism of the American credo is that it has placed far too much emphasis upon the individual and his rights, while displaying too little concern for society. This is not to challenge faith in the inherent worth of each individual, but rather to suggest that the failure to stress duty and a sense of social responsibility produces a doctrine inadequate for meeting the needs of a twentieth-century world. It may have been an adequate philosophy for a relatively simple society operating in a continent so rich in resources that relative equality of opportunity was a fact. But in a world dominated by great conglomerations of power, relying upon a technology which demands collective control, and a world in which millions of peoples in many societies live on the ragged edge of starvation, it cannot offer a universal appeal. A most recent example of this problem is given in the Bogotá Conference of American States in April 1948. The United States delegation sought to persuade the other American states to emphasize the rights of individual investors. But diplomats of the South American countries revealed a fear of economic exploitation which would minimize social responsibility. The problem faced by most of those countries is one calling for a wholesale attack on poverty and malnutrition. They doubt the ability of private individuals, no matter how well-intentioned, to effect the required transformation in the economies of those countries. It may well be that Americans will need to reconsider the implications of our traditional emphasis upon freedom and individualism, if we seek to present a democratic ideology carrying an appeal for peoples living under conditions unlike those which characterized the North American continent. In the American scene, as Parrington noted, "freedom had become individualism, and individualism had become the inalienable right to pre-empt, to exploit, to squan-

der." Even within our own borders it has become impossible to support any longer this luxury. To survive, freedom will have to acquire a positive quality; mere freedom *from* no longer provides a sound basis for democratic society. What is required is a positive action to provide the richest possible opportunity for the creative growth of the human being in a society which makes possible a meaningful life. Freedom is an individual matter, but no longer can freedom be achieved by the individual's working in isolation from his fellows. As Karl Mannheim observed, a theory is inadequate if in a specific situation it uses concepts which prevent men from meeting existing problems.

When we consider ideology from the standpoint of its ability to establish itself in other countries, we are faced with the problem of translating it into governing institutions. Although the ideals of democracy undoubtedly carry tremendous appeal for men everywhere, it is primarily a doctrine emphasizing procedures and attitudes, rather than specific institutions. Furthermore, in its American form there is no adequate theory of the state. A negative role for government was a reasonable assumption in the eighteenth century, but it does not appeal to other peoples who have not only no tradition of hostility to government, but a conviction that government must constitute a positive force in the service of society. The separation of powers in the American Constitution rendered it difficult to govern and practically impossible to develop a concept of political responsibility. Perhaps no other society in the world today could tolerate this approach to the state. If it be true, as Carl Becker asserted, that "government by discussion works best when there is nothing of profound importance to discuss and when there is plenty of time to discuss it," then government by discussion will not long survive.

It is a strange quirk of Americans that, with an ideology so difficult to translate into institutional structures, we should tend to accept the form for the spirit of democratic procedure. We are usually satisfied that a country is democratic if it has a two-house legislature, at least two political parties, and regular and honestly administered elections. It is possible that this tendency to concentrate on formal political institutions leads to neglect of the political rôle played by private and nongovernmental agencies and influences. Frequently we fail to examine the function and activities of an authoritarian church, a powerful military clique, or an organized economic group.

This absence of realistic analysis of the forces operative within other countries characterizes our approach to developments within the United States. There has been a general failure to understand the implications for democratic survival of the fact that a majority of Americans now live under authoritarian conditions. In their economic life, which is far more immediate and vital to most than any other aspect, Americans do not live by the articles of their democratic faith. They are disciplined by a routine made necessary by the impersonal demands of an industrial system. The hours worked, the wages paid, the prices set, and the kinds of goods available for their consumption are, in large part, beyond the individual's control or ability to influence. Successful operation of

a democratic government was assumed to rest upon developing a population capable of thinking, analyzing, and regulating its own existence. It is questionable whether rational thinking is being encouraged by the environment in which a majority of Americans now spend a major portion of their lives. Where political power has been successfully restricted by an institutional arrangement of checks and balances, it was assumed that natural laws would operate in the economic sphere to prevent the abuse of power there.

Thus, in the democratic ideology as evolved in the United States, the rôle of power has been neglected. We have tended to act as though it were a matter of balancing power, of offsetting the privileges of one group by conceding privileges to another. Henry Adams ascribed this method to President McKinley: "He undertook to pool interests in a general trust into which every interest should be taken, more or less at its own evaluation. . . ." While the costs to the country may be high, Adams felt that they were less costly than revolution would prove. In contrast a contemporary student of the problem of power, Robert Lynd, sees power developing not as individual blocks, susceptible to a balancing procedure, but rather as an intricate web of power reacting in dialectical fashion as attempts are made to challenge, or to control it. If this conception be valid, it would seem to imply a fundamental revision of the American concept of the rôle of government, for only government is potentially able to exercise control in the interest of a democratic society. Furthermore, so long as democratic procedures are sustained, the population is able to insure that public power will be exerted in the interests of society rather than on behalf of special interest groups.

Related to this problem of power is the pertinent fact that while we have over a period of years broadened, deepened, and sharpened our concept of political democracy, little progress has been achieved in obtaining effective democratic control of our economic institutions. Those in charge of industrial absolutism have tolerated and accepted the extension of democracy thus far because, within the context of American ideology, it constituted relatively little challenge to economic power. As indicated above, reformism in the United States has never challenged the basic assumptions of the economic system. As related to labor unions and collective bargaining, industry has reluctantly accepted this activity so long as labor conducted itself merely as another pressure group and the debate centered about wages, hours, and working conditions. However, as labor, driven by its own internal dynamic, is forced to take a broader, i.e., more society-oriented, point of view, management may well decide to eliminate it as an effective challenger. Since 1933 it has become apparent that the next steps to be taken by political democracy must inevitably result in an extension of democratic procedure and controls to economic institutions. A modern industrial society must be operated in the interests of the whole, simply because men have become utterly dependent upon its continuous operation at high levels of efficient use of productive resources. No democratic government can permit the mass unemployment and suffering which inevitably

result either from total collapse, or imperfect operation of the economy. This suggests that the problem of power, inadequately treated by democratic ideology, is no longer to be met by a balancing and neutralizing of rival claimants. It is rather a question of who is to control and to what ends. Democratic analysis must become sufficiently sophisticated to provide an explanation of the power problem and a basis for agreement among citizens if it is to serve contemporary needs. So long as it relies upon an ideology which merely obscures and prevents men from comprehending the existing world, it will fail to attract support from other societies and it may contribute to the loss of democratic control in the United States.

For those with faith in the inherent soundness of democracy it is inconceivable that it should be incapable of meeting demands made upon it by the conditions of modern society. In de Tocqueville's words, "Can it be believed that the democracy which has overthrown the feudal system and vanquished kings will retreat before tradesmen and capitalists?"

The Creed of an American

David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, presented this statement of his democratic faith in February, 1947, while testifying before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy. In a petulant outburst, Senator McKellar had apparently sought to impugn the motives and loyalty of this able, career public servant. "The Creed of An American" was Mr. Lilienthal's reply.

My convictions are not so much concerned with what I am against as what I am for; and that excludes a lot of things automatically.

Traditionally, democracy has been an affirmative doctrine rather than merely a negative one.

I believe—and I so conceive the Constitution of the United States to rest upon, as does religion—the fundamental proposition of the integrity of the individual; and that all government and all private institutions must be designed to promote and to protect and to defend the integrity and dignity of the individual; that that is the essential meaning of the Constitution and the Bill of

Rights, as it is essentially the meaning of religion.

Any form of government, therefore, and any other institutions which make men means rather than ends, which exalt the state or any other institutions above the importance of men, which place arbitrary power over men as a fundamental tenet of government, are contrary to that conception, and, therefore, I am deeply opposed to them.

The Communistic philosophy as well as the Communistic form of government fall within this category, for their fundamental tenet is quite to the contrary. The fundamental tenet of Communism is that the state is an end in itself, and that therefore the powers which the state

exercises over the individual are without any ethical standards to limit them.

That I deeply disbelieve.

It is very easy simply to say that one is not a Communist. And, of course, if my record requires me to state that very affirmative, then it is a great disappointment to me.

It is very easy to talk about being against Communism. It is equally important to believe those things which provide a satisfying and effective alternative. Democracy is that satisfying, affirmative alternative.

Its hope in the world is that it is an affirmative belief, rather than being simply a belief against something else and nothing more.

One of the tenets of democracy that grows out of this central core of a belief that the individual comes first, that all men are the children of God and that their personalities are therefore sacred, carries with it a great belief in civil liberties and their protection and a repugnance to anyone who would steal from a human being that which is most precious to him—his good name—either by impugning things to him by innuendo or by insinuation. And it is especially an unhappy circumstance that occasionally that is done in the name of democracy. This, I think, can tear our country apart and destroy it if we carry it further.

I deeply believe in the capacity of democracy to surmount any trials that

may lie ahead, provided only that we practice it in our daily lives.

And among the things we must practice is that while we seek fervently to ferret out the subversive and antidemocratic forces in the country, we do not at the same time, by hysteria, by resort to innuendo and smears, and other unfortunate tactics, besmirch the very cause that we believe in, and cause a separation among our people—cause one group and one individual to hate another, based on mere attacks, mere unsubstantiated attacks upon their loyalty.

I want also to add that part of my conviction is based on my training as an Anglo-American common law lawyer. It is the very basis and the great heritage of the English people to this country, which we have maintained, that we insist on the strictest rules of credibility of witnesses and on the avoidance of hearsay, and that gossip shall be excluded, in the courts of justice. And that, too, is an essential of our democracy.

Whether by administrative agencies acting arbitrarily against business organizations, or whether by investigating activities of legislative branches, whenever these principles—of the protection of an individual and his good name against besmirchment by gossip, hearsay, and the statements of witnesses who are not subject to cross-examination—are violated, then, too, we have failed in carrying forward our ideals in respect to democracy.

That I deeply believe.

American Ideals and the American Conscience

Gunnar Myrdal, brilliant Swedish social scientist, was employed by Carnegie Corporation of New York to direct a comprehensive study of the Negro in the United States. The result was the two volume work, *An American Dilemma*, which ranks with those great studies of American society by Lord Bryce and Alexis de Tocqueville. In this selection, Chapter One, the author has presented a thorough analysis of the American ideology and its impact on every facet of American life. He traces its origins to the European philosophy of Enlightenment, Christianity, and English law, and suggests that these roots explain the conservative devotion to basic principles. Unfortunately this has too often resulted in a devotion to the letter of our Constitution rather than to the spirit of our liberal tradition. This foreign student also notes the conflict produced by our failure to live up to the implications of our ideals.

It is a commonplace to point out the heterogeneity of the American nation and the swift succession of all sorts of changes in all its component parts and, as it often seems, in every conceivable direction. America is truly a shock to the stranger. The bewildering impression it gives of dissimilarity throughout and of chaotic unrest is indicated by the fact that few outside observers—and, indeed, few native Americans—have been able to avoid the intellectual escape of speaking about America as “paradoxical.”

Still there is evidently a strong unity in this nation and a basic homogeneity and stability in its valuations. Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, and colors, have something in common: a social *ethos*, a political creed. It is difficult to avoid the judgment that this “American Creed” is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation.

When the American Creed is once

detected, the cacophony becomes a melody. The further observation then becomes apparent: that America, compared to every other country in Western civilization, large or small, has the most *explicitly expressed* system of general ideals in reference to human interrelations. This body of ideals is more widely understood and appreciated than similar ideals are anywhere else. The American Creed is not merely—as in some other countries—the implicit background of the nation’s political and judicial order as it functions. To be sure, the political creed of America is not very satisfactorily effectuated in actual social life. But as principles which *ought* to rule, the Creed has been made conscious to everyone in American society.

Sometimes one even gets the impression that there is a relation between the intense apprehension of high and uncompromising ideals and the spotty reality. One feels that it is, perhaps, the difficulty of giving

reality to the *ethos* in this young and still somewhat unorganized nation—that it is the prevalence of “wrongs” in America, “wrongs” judged by the high standards of the national Creed—which helps make the ideals stand out so clearly. America is continuously struggling for its soul. These principles of social ethics have been hammered into easily remembered formulas. All means of intellectual communication are utilized to stamp them into everybody’s mind. The schools teach them, the churches preach them. The courts pronounce their judicial decisions in their terms. They permeate editorials with a pattern of idealism so ingrained that the writers could scarcely free themselves from it even if they tried. They have fixed a custom of indulging in high-sounding generalities in all written or spoken addresses to the American public, otherwise so splendidly gifted for the matter-of-fact approach to things and problems. Even the stranger, when he has to appear before an American audience, feels this, if he is sensitive at all, and finds himself espousing the national Creed, as this is the only means by which a speaker can obtain human response from the people to whom he talks.

The Negro people in America are no exception to the national pattern. “It was a revelation to me to hear Negroes sometimes indulge in a glorification of American democracy in the same uncritical way as unsophisticated whites often do,” relates the Dutch observer, Bertram Schrieke. A Negro political scientist, Ralph Bunche, observes:

Every man in the street, white, black, red, or yellow, knows that this is “the land of the free,” the “land of opportunity,” the “cradle of liberty,” the “home of democracy,” that the American flag symbolizes the “equality of all men” and guarantees to us all “the protection of life, liberty and property,” freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and racial tolerance.

The present writer has made the same observation. The American Negroes know that they are a subordinated group experiencing, more than anybody else in the nation, the consequences of the fact that the Creed is not lived up to in America. Yet their faith in the Creed is not simply a means of pleading their unfulfilled rights. They, like the whites, are under the spell of the great national suggestion. With one part of themselves they actually believe, as do the whites, that the Creed is ruling America.

These ideals of the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and a fair opportunity represent to the American people the essential meaning of the nation’s early struggle for independence. In the clarity and intellectual boldness of the Enlightenment period these tenets were written into the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and into the constitutions of the several states. The ideals of the American Creed have thus become the highest law of the land. The Supreme Court pays its reverence to these general principles when it declares what is constitutional and what is not. They have been elaborated upon by all national leaders, thinkers, and statesmen. America has had, throughout its history, a continuous discussion of the principles and implications of democracy, a discussion which, in every epoch, measured by any standard, remained high, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. The flow of learned treatises and popular tracts on the subject has not ebbed, nor is it likely to do so. In all wars, including the present one, the American Creed has been the ideological foundation of national morale.

The American Creed is identified with America’s peculiar brand of nationalism,

and it gives the common American his feeling of the historical mission of America in the world—a fact which just now becomes of global importance but which is also of highest significance for the particular problem studied in this book. The great national historian of the middle nineteenth century, George Bancroft, expressed this national feeling of pride and responsibility:

In the fulness of time a republic rose in the wilderness of America. Thousands of years had passed away before this child of the ages could be born. From whatever there was of good in the systems of the former centuries she drew her nourishment; the wrecks of the past were her warnings. . . . The fame of this only daughter of freedom went out into all the lands of the earth; from her the human race drew hope.

And Frederick J. Turner, who injected the naturalistic explanation into history that American democracy was a native-born product of the Western frontier, early in this century wrote in a similar vein:

Other nations have been rich and prosperous and powerful. But the United States has believed that it had an original contribution to make to the history of society by the production of a self-determining, self-restrained, intelligent democracy.

Wilson's fourteen points and Roosevelt's four freedoms have more recently expressed to the world the boundless idealistic aspirations of this American Creed. For a century and more before the present epoch, when the oceans gave reality to the Monroe Doctrine, America at least applauded heartily every uprising of the people in any corner of the world. This was a tradition from America's own Revolution. The political revolutionaries of foreign countries were approved even by the conservatives in America. And America wanted generously to share its precious ideals and its happiness in enjoying a society ruled by its own people

with all who would come here. James Truslow Adams tells us:

The American dream that has lured tens of millions of all nations to our shores in the past century has not been a dream of merely material plenty, though that has doubtless counted heavily. It has been much more than that. It has been a dream of being able to grow to fullest development as man and woman, unhampered by the barriers which had slowly been erected in older civilizations, unrepressed by social orders which had developed for the benefit of classes rather than for the simple human being of any and every class. And that dream has been realized more fully in actual life here than anywhere else, though very imperfectly even among ourselves.

This is what the Western frontier country could say to the "East." And even the skeptic cannot help feeling that, perhaps, this youthful exuberant America has the destiny to do for the whole Old World what the frontier did to the old colonies. *American nationalism is permeated by the American Creed*, and therefore becomes international in its essence.

It is remarkable that a vast democracy with so many cultural disparities has been able to reach this unanimity of ideals and to elevate them supremely over the threshold of popular perception. Totalitarian fascism and nazism have not in their own countries—at least not in the short range of their present rule—succeeded in accomplishing a similar result, in spite of the fact that those governments, after having subdued the principal precepts most akin to the American Creed, have attempted to coerce the minds of their people by means of a centrally controlled, ruthless, and scientifically contrived apparatus of propaganda and violence.

There are more things to be wondered about. The disparity of national origin, language, religion, and culture, during the long era of mass immigration into the United States, has been closely correlated

with income differences and social class distinctions. Successive vintages of "Old Americans" have owned the country and held the dominant political power; they have often despised and exploited "the foreigners." To this extent conditions in America must be said to have been particularly favorable to the stratification of a rigid class society.

But it has not come to be. On the question of why the trend took the other course, the historians, from Turner on, point to the free land and the boundless resources. The persistent drive from the Western frontier—now and then swelling into great tides as in the Jeffersonian movement around 1800, the Jacksonian movement a generation later, and the successive third-party movements and breaks in the traditional parties—could, however, reach its historical potency only because of the fact that America, from the Revolution onward, had an equalitarian creed as a going national *ethos*. The economic determinants and the force of the ideals can be shown to be inter-related. But the latter should not be relegated to merely a dependent variable. Vernon L. Parrington, the great historian of the development of the American mind, writes thus:

The humanitarian idealism of the Declaration [of Independence] has always echoed as a battle cry in the hearts of those who dream of an America dedicated to democratic ends. It cannot be long ignored or repudiated, for sooner or later it returns to plague the council of practical politics. It is constantly breaking out in fresh revolt. . . . Without its freshening influence our political history would have been much more sordid and materialistic.

Indeed, the new republic began its career with a reaction. Charles Beard, in *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, and a group of modern historians, throwing aside the much cherished national mythology which had blurred the difference in spirit

between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, have shown that the latter was conceived in considerable suspicion against democracy and fear of "the people." It was dominated by property consciousness and designed as a defense against the democratic spirit let loose during the Revolution.

But, admitting all this, the Constitution which actually emerged out of the compromises in the drafting convention provided for the most democratic state structure in existence anywhere in the world at that time. And many of the safeguards so skillfully thought out by the conservatives to protect "the rich, the well-born, and the capable" against majority rule melted when the new order began to function. Other conservative safeguards have fastened themselves into the political pattern. And "in the ceaseless conflict between the man and dollar, between democracy and property"—again to quote Parrington—property has for long periods triumphed and blocked the will of the people. And there are today large geographical regions and fields of human life which, particularly when measured by the high goals of the American Creed, are conspicuously lagging. But taking the broad historical view, the American Creed has triumphed. It has given the main direction to change in this country. America has had gifted conservative statesmen and national leaders, and they have often determined the course of public affairs. But with few exceptions, only the liberals have gone down in history as national heroes. America is, as we shall point out, conservative in fundamental principles, and in much more than that, though hopefully experimentalistic in regard to much of the practical arrangements in society. But the *principles conserved are liberal*, and some, indeed, are radical.

America got this dynamic Creed much as a political convenience and a device of

strategy during the long struggle with the English Crown, the London Parliament and the various British powerholders in the colonies. It served as the rallying center for the growing national unity that was needed. Later it was a necessary device for building up a national morale in order to enlist and sustain the people in the Revolutionary War. In this spirit the famous declarations were resolved, the glorious speeches made, the inciting pamphlets written and spread. "The appeal to arms would seem to have been brought about by a minority of the American people, directed by a small group of skillful leaders, who, like Indian scouts, covered their tracks so cleverly, that only the keenest trailers can now follow their course and understand their strategy."

But the Creed, once set forth and disseminated among the American people, became so strongly entrenched in their hearts, and the circumstances have since then been so relatively favorable, that it has succeeded in keeping itself very much alive for more than a century and a half.

The American Creed is a humanistic liberalism developing out of the epoch of Enlightenment when America received its national consciousness and its political structure. The Revolution did not stop short of anything less than the heroic desire for the "emancipation of human nature." The enticing flavor of the eighteenth century, so dear to every intellectual and rationalist, has not been lost on the long journey up to the present time.

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For practical purposes the main norms of the American Creed as usually pronounced are centered in the belief in equality and in the rights to liberty. In the Declaration of Independence—as in the earlier Virginia Bill of Rights—equality was given the supreme rank and the

rights to liberty are posited as derived from equality. This logic was even more clearly expressed in Jefferson's original formulation of the first of the "self-evident truths": "All men are created equal *and from that equal creation* they derive rights inherent and unalienable, among which are the preservation of life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

Liberty, in a sense, was easiest to reach. It is a vague ideal: everything turns around *whose* liberty is preserved, to *what extent* and *in what direction*. In society liberty for one may mean the suppression of liberty for others. The result of competition will be determined by who got a head start and who is handicapped. In America as everywhere else—and sometimes, perhaps, on the average, a little more ruthlessly—liberty often provided an opportunity for the stronger to rob the weaker. Against this, the equalitarianism in the Creed has been persistently revolting. The struggle is far from ended. The reason why American liberty was not more dangerous to equality was, of course, the open frontier and the free land. When opportunity became bounded in the last generation, the inherent conflict between equality and liberty flared up. Equality is slowly winning. The New Deal during the 'thirties was a landslide.

If the European philosophy of Enlightenment was one of the ideological roots of the American Creed, another equally important one was Christianity, particularly as it took the form in the colonies of various lower class Protestant sects, split off from the Anglican Church. "Democracy was envisaged in religious terms long before it assumed a political terminology."

It is true that modern history has relegated to the category of the pious patriotic myths the popular belief that *all* the colonies had been founded to get religious liberty, which could not be had

in the Old World. Some of the colonies were commercial adventures and the settlers came to them, and even to the religious colonies later, to improve their economic status. It is also true that the churches in the early colonial times did not always exactly represent the idea of democratic government in America but most often a harsher tyranny over people's souls and behavior than either King or Parliament ever cared to wield.

But the myth itself is a social reality with important effects. It was strong already in the period of the Revolution and continued to grow. A small proportion of new immigrants throughout the nineteenth century came for religious reasons, or partly so, and a great many more wanted to rationalize their uprooting and transplantation in such terms. So religion itself in America took on a spirit of fight for liberty. The Bible is full of support for such a spirit. It consists to a large extent of the tales of oppression and redemption from oppression: in the Old Testament of the Jewish people and in the New Testament of the early Christians. The rich and mighty are most often the wrongdoers, while the poor and lowly are the followers of God and Christ.

The basic teaching of Protestant Christianity is democratic. We are all poor sinners and have the same heavenly father. The concept of natural rights in the philosophy of Enlightenment corresponded rather closely with the idea of moral law in the Christian faith:

The doctrine of the free individual, postulating the gradual escape of men from external political control, as they learned to obey the moral law, had its counterpart in the emphasis of evangelicism upon the freedom of the regenerated man from the terrors of the Old Testament code framed for the curbing of unruly and sinful generations. The philosophy of progress was similar to the Utopian hopes of the millennarians. The mission of American democracy to save the world from the oppression of autocrats was a secular ver-

sion of the destiny of Christianity to save the world from the governance of Satan.

But apart from the historical problem of the extent to which church and religion in America actually inspired the American Creed, they became a powerful container and preserver of the Creed when it was once in existence. This was true from the beginning. While in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars the increasing power of the churches everywhere spelled a period of reaction, the great revivals beginning around 1800 in America were a sort of religious continuation of the Revolution.

In this way great numbers whom the more-or-less involved theory of natural rights had escaped came under the leveling influence of a religious doctrine which held that all men were equal in the sight of God. Throughout the Revival period the upper classes looked upon the movement as "a religious distemper" which spread like a contagious disease, and they pointed out that it made its greatest appeal to "those of weak intellect and unstable emotions, women, adolescents, and Negroes." But to the poor farmer who had helped to win the Revolution only to find himself oppressed as much by the American ruling classes as he had ever been by Crown officials, the movement was "the greatest stir of Religion since the day of Pentecost."

Religion is still a potent force in American life. "They are a religious people," observed Lord Bryce about Americans a half a century ago, with great understanding for the importance of this fact for their national ideology. American scientific observers are likely to get their attentions fixed upon the process of progressive secularization to the extent that they do not see this main fact, that America probably is still the most religious country in the Western world. Political leaders are continuously deducing the American Creed out of the Bible. Vice President Henry Wallace, in his historic speech of May 8, 1942, to the Free World Association, where he de-

clared the present war to be "a fight between a slave world and a free world" and declared himself for "a people's peace" to inaugurate "the century of the common man," spoke thus:

The idea of freedom—the freedom that we in the United States know and love so well—is derived from the Bible with its extraordinary emphasis on the dignity of the individual. Democracy is the only true political expression of Christianity.

The prophets of the Old Testament were the first to preach social justice. But that which was sensed by the prophets many centuries before Christ was not given complete and powerful political expression until our Nation was formed as a Federal Union a century and a half ago.

Ministers have often been reactionaries in America. They have often tried to stifle free speech; they have organized persecution of unpopular dissenters and have even, in some regions, been active as the organizers of the Ku Klux Klan and similar "un-American" (in terms of the American Creed) movements. But, on the whole, church and religion in America are a force strengthening the American Creed. The fundamental tenets of Christianity press for expression even in the most bigoted setting. And, again on the whole, American religion is not particularly bigoted, but on the contrary, rather open-minded. The mere fact that there are many denominations, and that there is competition between them, forces American churches to a greater tolerance and ecumenical understanding and to a greater humanism and interest in social problems than the people in the churches would otherwise call for.

I also believe that American churches and their teachings have contributed something essential to the emotional temper of the Creed and, indeed, of the American people. Competent and sympathetic foreign observers have always noted the generosity and helpfulness of

Americans. This and the equally conspicuous formal democracy in human contacts have undoubtedly had much to do with the predominantly lower class origin of the American people, and even more perhaps, with the mobility and the opportunities—what de Tocqueville called the "equality of condition"—in the nation when it was in its formative stage. But I cannot help feeling that the Christian neighborliness of the common American reflects, also, an influence from the churches. Apart from its origin, this temper of the Americans is part and parcel of the American Creed. It shows up in the Americans' readiness to make financial sacrifices for charitable purposes. No country has so many cheerful givers as America. It was not only "rugged individualism," nor a relatively continuous prosperity, that made it possible for America to get along without a publicly organized welfare policy almost up to the Great Depression in the 'thirties but it was also the world's most generous private charity.

The third main ideological influence behind the American Creed is English law. The indebtedness of American civilization to the culture of the mother country is nowhere else as great as in respect to the democratic concept of law and order, which it inherited almost without noticing it. It is the glory of England that, after many generations of hard struggle, it established the principles of justice, equity, and equality before the law even in an age when the rest of Europe (except for the cultural islands of Switzerland, Iceland, and Scandinavia) based personal security on the arbitrary police and on *lettres de cachet*.

This concept of a government "of laws and not of men" contained certain fundamentals of both equality and liberty. It will be a part of our task to study how these elemental demands are not

nearly realized even in present-day America. But in the American Creed they have never been questioned. And it is no exaggeration to state that the philosophical ideas of human equality and the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property, hastily sowed on American ground in a period of revolution when they were opportune—even allowing ever so much credit to the influences from the free life on the Western frontier—would not have struck root as they did if the soil had not already been cultivated by English law.

Law and order represent such a crucial element both in the American Creed and in the spotty American reality that, at a later stage of our argument in this chapter, we shall have to devote some further remarks to this particular set of ideological roots.

These ideological forces—the Christian religion and the English law—also explain why America through all its adventures has so doggedly stuck to its high ideals: why it has been so conservative in keeping to liberalism as a national creed even if not as its actual way of life. This conservatism, in fundamental principles, has, to a great extent, been perverted into a nearly fetishistic cult of the Constitution. This is unfortunate since the 150-year-old Constitution is in many respects impractical and ill-suited for modern conditions and since, furthermore, the drafters of the document made it technically difficult to change even if there were no popular feeling against change.

The worship of the Constitution also is a most flagrant violation of the American Creed which, as far as the technical arrangements for executing the power of the people are concerned, is strongly opposed to stiff formulas. Jefferson actually referred to the American form of government as an experiment. The young

Walt Whitman, among many other liberals before and after him, expressed the spirit of the American Revolution more faithfully when he demanded "continual additions to our great experiment of how much liberty society will bear." Modern historical studies of how the Constitution came to be as it is reveal that the Constitutional Convention was nearly a plot against the common people. Until recently, the Constitution has been used to block the popular will: the Fourteenth Amendment inserted after the Civil War to protect the civil rights of the poor freedmen has, for instance, been used more to protect business corporations against public control.

But when all this is said, it does not give more than one side of the cult of the Constitution. The common American is not informed on the technicalities and has never thought of any great difference in spirit between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. When he worships the Constitution, it is an act of American nationalism, and in this the American Creed is inextricably blended. The liberal Creed, even in its dynamic formulation by Jefferson, is adhered to by every American. The unanimity around, and the explicitness of, this Creed is the great wonder of America. The "Old Americans," all those who have thoroughly come to identify themselves with the nation—which are many more than the Sons and Daughters of the Revolution—adhere to the Creed as the faith of their ancestors. The others—the Negroes, the new immigrants, the Jews, and other disadvantaged and unpopular groups—could not possibly have invented a system of political ideals which better corresponded to their interests. So, by the logic of the unique American history, it has developed that the rich and secure, out of pride and conservatism, and the poor and insecure, out of dire need, have come to profess the identical social ideals.

The reflecting observer comes to feel that this spiritual convergence, more than America's strategic position behind the oceans and its immense material resources, is what makes the nation great and what promises it a still greater future. Behind it all is the historical reality which makes it possible for the President to appeal to all in the nation in this way: "Let us not forget that we are all descendants from revolutionaries and immigrants."

While the Creed is important and is enacted into law, it is not lived up to in practice. To understand this we shall have to examine American attitudes toward law. It is necessary to discuss the legal tradition of America at the outset, since it gives a unique twist to each of the specific problems that we shall take up in ensuing chapters.

Americans are accustomed to inscribe their ideals in laws, ranging from their national Constitution to their local traffic rules. American laws thus often contain, in addition to the actually enforced rules (that is, "laws" in the ordinary technical meaning of the term), other rules which are not valid or operative but merely express the legislators' hopes, desires, advice or dreams. There is nothing in the legal form to distinguish the latter rules from the former ones. Much of the political discussion has to do with the question of strengthening the administration of laws or taking other measures so as to enforce them. Between the completely enforced rules and the unenforceable ones there are many intermediary types which are sometimes, under some conditions, or in some part, only conditionally and incompletely enforced.

To an extent this peculiar cultural trait of America is explainable by the fact that the nation is young and, even more, that it owes its state structure to a revolution—a revolution in the coura-

geously rationalistic age of Enlightenment. Americans have kept to this custom of inscribing their ideals in laws.

The "function," from the legislator's point of view, of legislating national ideals is, of course, a pedagogical one of giving them high publicity and prestige. Legislating ideals has also a "function" of dedicating the nation to the task of gradually approaching them. In a new nation made up of immigrants from all corners of the world and constantly growing by the arrival of other immigrants, carrying with them a greatly diversified cultural heritage, these goals must have stood out as important to statesmen and political thinkers.

Another cultural trait of Americans is a relatively low degree of respect for law and order. This trait, as well as the other one just mentioned, is of paramount importance for the Negro problem as we shall show in some detail in later chapters. There is a relation between these two traits, of high ideals in some laws and low respect for all laws, but this relation is by no means as simple as it appears.

On this point we must observe somewhat more closely the moralistic attitude toward law in America, expressed in the common belief that there is a "higher law" behind and above the specific laws contained in constitutions, statutes and other regulations.

The idea of a "natural law" has long been a part of our common line of legal tradition. When the elected "lawman" in pre-Christian times "spoke the law" to the assembled arm-bearing freemen, he was not assumed to make the law or invent it but to expound something which existed prior to and independent of himself and all others participating in the procedure. The idea of a "higher law," as well as the whole procedure of letting it become a social reality and, indeed, the entire legal system as it functioned and grew in the

northern countries, had deep roots in primitive religion and magic, as is revealed by studies of the contemporary mythology and the peculiar formalistic mechanisms of the creation and operation of law. The distinguishing mark of the particular type of magical thinking in these countries was, however, that out of it developed what we now understand to be the characteristic respect for law of modern democracy.

When representative bodies, among them the English Parliament, emerged as political institutions, they also did not conceive of themselves as "legislatures" in the modern sense, but pretended only to state the law that already "existed." Even when these legislatures began to take on new functions and to make rules to meet new situations, they still kept up the fiction that they only "declared" or "explained" the law as it existed. The modern idea of creating laws by "legislation" is thus a late product in the historical development of Western democracy, and it was never totally freed from the connotation of its subordination to a "higher law" existing independent of all formally fixed rules.

In America the Revolution gave a tremendous spread to this primitive idea of "natural law" as it, in the meantime, had been developed in the philosophies of Enlightenment under the further influences of Greek speculation, Roman law, medieval scholasticism, and free naturalistic speculation since Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Hugo Grotius. American religion supported it strongly. The idea fixed itself upon the entire American state structure. "A peculiarity of American democracy had been from the beginning that it put its faith in a higher law rather than in the changing will of the people." The role given to the Supreme Court and the tradition of this tribunal not to "legislate," which as a court it could

hardly have the right to do, but to refer to the higher principles back of the Constitution strengthened still more the grip of this old idea on the mind of the Americans.

The adherence even in modern times to this idealistic conception of the origin and reality of the judicial order undoubtedly, in one way, raised its moral prestige among the American people as it had done earlier in the history of the Old World. No careful observer of the present American scene should miss seeing, in spite of everything we shall discuss presently, the common American's pride in and devotion to the nation's judicial system and its legal institutions. Government authorities constantly appeal to this idealistic pride and devotion of the citizens in order to enforce the law. In America, there is a continuous endeavor to keep the judicial system orderly, and there is a continuous educational campaign on behalf of this idealism. Undoubtedly *the idealistic concept of American law as an emanation of "natural law" is a force which strengthens the rule of law in America.*

But, in another way, it is at the same time most detrimental to automatic, unreflecting law observance on the part of the citizens. Laws become disputable on moral grounds. Each legislative statute is judged by the common citizen in terms of his conception of the higher "natural law." He decides whether it is "just" or "unjust" and has *the dangerous attitude that, if it is unjust, he may feel free to disobey it.* The strong stress on individual rights and the almost complete silence on the citizen's duties in the American Creed make this reaction the more natural. The Jeffersonian distrust of government—"that government is best which governs least"—soon took the form, particularly on the Western frontier, of a distrust and disrespect for the enacted laws. The doctrine of a higher law fosters an "extra-

legal" disposition toward the state and excuses illegal acts.

But the frontier was not, in this respect, fundamentally different from the old colonies. Without stepping outside the American tradition, Garrison could pronounce even the Constitution to be a "compact with Hell" on the slavery issue. This, by itself, would not have been dangerous to democracy, if he had meant to argue only for a change of the Constitution. But he and many more Northerners of conscientious inclinations found it a moral obligation not to obey the fugitive slave laws. Here the citizen does not stop to criticize the laws and the judicial system and demand a change in them, but he sets his own conception of the "higher law" above the existing laws in society and feels it his right to disobey them. It is against this background also that we shall have to study the amazing disrespect for law and order which even today characterizes the Southern states in America and constitutes such a large part of the Negro problem. This anarchistic tendency founded upon a primitive concept of natural law has never left American political speculation or American popular thought.

This anarchistic tendency in America's legal culture becomes even more dangerous because of the presence of a quite different tendency: *a desire to regulate human behavior tyrannically by means of formal laws*. This last tendency is a heritage from early American puritanism which was sometimes fanatical and dogmatic and always had a strong inclination to mind other people's business. So we find that this American, who is so proud to announce that he will not obey laws other than those which are "good" and "just," as soon as the discussion turns to something which in his opinion is bad and unjust, will emphatically pronounce that "there ought to be a law against..." To demand and legislate all sorts of laws

against this or that is just as much part of American freedom as to disobey the laws when they are enacted. America has become a country where exceedingly much is permitted in practice but at the same time exceedingly much is forbidden in law.

By instituting a national prohibition of the sale of liquor without taking adequate steps for its enforcement, America was nearly drenched in corruption and organized crime until the statute was repealed. The laws against gambling have, on a smaller scale, the same effect at the present time. And many more of those unrespected laws are damaging in so far as they, for example, prevent a rational organization of various public activities, or when they can be used by individuals for blackmailing purposes or by the state or municipal authorities to persecute unpopular individuals or groups. Such practices are conducive to a general disrespect for law in America. Actually today it is a necessity in everyday living for the common good American citizen to decide for himself which laws should be observed and which not.

We shall meet this conflict as a central theme in all angles of the Negro problem. The conflict should not, however, be formulated only in terms of the national ideology. Or, rather, this ideology is not fully explainable in terms of the thoughts and feelings out of which the American Creed was composed.

A low degree of law observance already became habitual and nationally cherished in colonial times when the British Parliament and Crown, increasingly looked upon as a foreign ruler by the Americans, insisted upon passing laws which the Americans considered unwise, impractical or simply unjust. The free life on the frontier also strained legal bonds. There the conflict between puritanical intolerance and untamed desire for individual

freedom clashed more severely than anywhere else. The mass immigration and the cultural heterogeneity were other factors hampering the fixation of a firm legal order in America. The presence of states within the nation with different sets of laws and the high mobility between states and the federal government, the technical and political difficulties in changing the federal Constitution, the consequent great complexity of the American legal system, and the mass of legal fiction and plain trickery also are among the important factors. For example, it cannot be conducive to the highest respect for the legal system that the federal government is forced to carry out important social legislation under the fiction that it is regulating "interstate commerce," or that federal prosecuting agencies punish dangerous gangsters for income tax evasion rather than for the felonies they have committed.

So this idealistic America also became the country of legalistic formalism. Contrary to America's basic ideology of natural law and its strong practical sense, "the letter of the law," as opposed to its "spirit," came to have an excessive importance. The weak bureaucracy became tangled up in "red tape." The clever lawyer came to play a large and unsavory role in politics, in business, and in the everyday life of the citizens. The Americans thus got a judicial order which is in many respects contrary to all their inclinations.

Under the influence of all these and many other factors the common American citizen has acquired a comparatively low degree of personal identification with the state and the legal machinery. An American, when he accidentally comes by the scene of a crime or of an attempt by the police to seize an offender, is, on the average, more inclined to hurry on in order not to get involved in something unpleasant, and less inclined to stop and help the arm of the law, than a Britisher or a

Scandinavian would be under similar circumstances. He is more likely to look on his country's and his community's politics and administration as something to be indulged and tolerated, as outside his own responsibility, and less likely to think and act as a would-be legislator, in a co-operative endeavor to organize a decent social life. He is even inclined to dissociate himself from politics as something unworthy and to take measures to keep the worthy things "out of politics." This is part of what Lord Bryce called "the fatalism of the multitude" in America. This political fatalism and the lack of identification and participation work as a vicious circle, being both cause and effect of corruption and political machine rule.

The authorities, when not relying upon the idealistic appeal, will most often meet the citizen's individualistic inclinations by trying to educate him to obey the law less in terms of collective interest than in terms of self-interest. They try to tell the young that "crime does not pay," which, in some areas, is a statement of doubtful truth.

In the exploitation of the new continent business leaders were not particular about whether or not the means they used corresponded either with the natural law or with the specific laws of the nation or the states. This became of greater importance because of the central position of business in the formation of national aspirations and ideals. When Theodore Roosevelt exclaimed: "Damn the law! I want the canal built," he spoke the language of his contemporary business world and of the ordinary American.

We have to conceive of all the numerous breaches of law, which an American citizen commits or learns about in the course of ordinary living, as psychologically a series of shocks which condition him and the entire society to a low degree of law observance. The American nation has, further, experienced disappointments

in its attempts to legislate social change, which, with few exceptions, have been badly prepared and inefficiently carried out. The almost traumatic effects of these historical disappointments have been enhanced by America's conspicuous success in so many fields other than legislation. One of the traumata was the Reconstruction legislation, which attempted to give Negroes civil rights in the South; another one was the antitrust legislation pressed by the Western farmers and enacted to curb the growth of monopolistic finance capitalism; a third one was the prohibition amendment.

Against this background, and remembering the puritan tendency in America to make all sorts of haphazard laws directed at symptoms and not at causes and without much consideration for social facts and possibilities, it is understandable that the social scientists, particularly the sociologists, in America have developed a defeatist attitude towards the possibility of inducing social change by means of legislation. The political "do-nothing" tendency is strong in present-day social science in America. It is, typically enough, developed as a *general* theory—actually as a scientific translation of the old natural law idea in its negative import. The social scientists simply reflect the general distrust of politics and legislation that is widespread among the educated classes of Americans.

Of particular importance to us is that this view is common even among Negro intellectuals when reflecting on various aspects of the Negro problem. The failure of Reconstruction had especially severe effects on them. Younger Negro intellectuals are disposed to express disbelief in the possibility that much can be won by politics, legislation, and law suits, and have become inclined to set their hopes on what they conceive of as more fundamental changes of the economic structure.

Sometimes they think in terms of an economic revolution. But, whether their thoughts take such a radical direction or stay conservative, a common trait is fatalism in regard to politics and legislation. Fatalism in regard to *res publica* is, however, by no means a Negro characteristic. It is a common American disease of the democratic spirit which is on the way to becoming chronic.

...A few critical remarks on the general theory that "stateways cannot change folkways" need to be made at the start. In this abstract form and as applied to various specific problems, the theory cannot be true, since in other parts of the world similar changes are effectuated by means of legislation. The theory must, therefore, be qualified in the light of specific American conditions. But even in America new legislation, infringing upon old customs and upon individual and local interests, is often made fairly watertight nowadays. The general explanation why some laws have been more successful than others in America is that *they have been better prepared and better administered*.

This means that, among the explanations for the general disrepute and deficiency of law and order in America, there are two other factors: *the habit of passing laws without careful investigation, and the relatively low standard of American administration of law*. To the latter point we shall return in a later chapter, where we shall point also to the new but strong tendency in America toward the building up of an independent and legal administration. On the former point we shall restrict ourselves to quoting a high authority: "For nothing is done with so little of scientific or orderly method as the legislative making of laws."

These two factors are strategic. When the foolish attempts to suppress symptoms of ills while leaving the causes untouched become censored, and when lawmaking

increasingly becomes an important task of scientific social engineering, and when, further, administration becomes independent, legal, impartial, and efficient, better laws will be made, and they will be better enforced even in America. It is a problem to explain why lawmaking and administration have been so backward in a nation where private business and also private agencies for public good are often excellently organized.

The mere possibility of change in these two factors shows the fallacy of the general theory that law cannot change custom. In the face of the tendency in American society toward more careful lawmaking and improved administration the theory appears politically as well as theoretically biased; biased against induced change. In this book we shall meet other dynamic tendencies in American society favoring the same development, the chief among them being, perhaps, the growing cultural homogeneity and the increasing political and social participation of the masses. Many social scientists tend not only to ignore these changes, but to deny them and, in some cases, to oppose them.

If in the course of time Americans are brought to be a law-abiding people, and if they at the same time succeed in keeping alive not only their conservatism in fundamental principles and their pride and devotion to their national political institutions, but also some of their puritan eagerness and courage in attempting to reform themselves and the world—re-directed somewhat from the old Biblical inclination of thinking only in terms of prescriptions and purges—this great nation may become the master builder of a stable but progressive commonwealth.

The conflict in the American concept of law and order is only one side of the "moral overstrain" of the nation. America believes in and aspires to something much

higher than its plane of actual life. The subordinate position of Negroes is perhaps the most glaring conflict in the American conscience and the greatest unsolved task for American democracy. But it is by no means the only one. Donald Young complains:

In our more introspective moments, nearly all of us Americans will admit that our government contains imperfections and anachronisms. We who have been born and brought up under the evils of gang rule, graft, political incompetence, inadequate representation, and some of the other weaknesses of democracy, American plan, have developed mental callouses and are no longer sensitive to them.

The popular explanation of the disparity in America between ideals and actual behavior is that Americans do not have the slightest intention of living up to the ideals which they talk about and put into their Constitution and laws. Many Americans are accustomed to talk loosely and disparagingly about adherence to the American Creed as "lipservice" and even "hypocrisy." Foreigners are even more prone to make such a characterization.

This explanation is too superficial. To begin with, the true hypocrite sins in secret; he conceals his faults. The American, on the contrary, is strongly and sincerely "against sin," even, and not least, his own sins. He investigates his faults, puts them on record, and shouts them from the housetops, adding the most severe recriminations against himself, including the accusation of hypocrisy. If all the world is well informed about the political corruption, organized crime, and faltering system of justice in America, it is primarily not due to its malice but to American publicity about its own imperfections. America's handling of the Negro problem has been criticized most emphatically by white Americans since long before the Revolution, and the criticism has steadily gone on and will not

stop until America has completely reformed itself.

Bryce observed: "They know, and are content that all the world should know, the worst as well as the best of themselves. They have a boundless faith in free inquiry and full discussion. They admit the possibility of any number of temporary errors and delusions." The present author remembers, from his first visit to this country as an inexperienced social scientist at the end of the 'twenties, how confused he often felt when Americans in all walks of life were trustingly asking him to tell them what was "wrong with this country." It is true that this open-mindedness, particularly against the outside world, may have decreased considerably since then on account of the depression, and that the present War might work in the same direction, though this is not certain; and it is true also that the opposite tendency always had its strong representation in America. But, by and large, America has been and will remain, in all probability, a society which is eager to indulge in self-scrutiny and to welcome criticism.

This American eagerness to get on record one's sins and their causes is illustrated in the often quoted letter by Patrick Henry (1772), where he confessed that he had slaves because he was "drawn along by the general inconvenience of living here without them."

I will not, I cannot, justify it. However culpable my conduct, I will so far pay my *devoir* to virtue as to own the excellence and rectitude of her precepts, and lament my want of conformity to them.

American rationalism and moralism spoke through Patrick Henry. America as a nation is like its courageous and eloquent son of the Revolution. It is continuously paying its *devoir* to virtue; it is repeating its allegiance to the full American Creed by lamenting its want of conformity to it. The strength and security of the nation

helped this puritan tradition to continue. No weak nation anxious for its future could ever have done it. Americans believe in their own ability and in progress. They are at bottom moral optimists.

In a great nation there is, of course, division of labor. Some Americans do most of the sinning, but most do some of it. Some specialize in muckraking, preaching, and lamentation; but there is a little of the muckraker and preacher in all Americans. On the other hand, superficially viewed, Americans often appear cynical. Their social science has lately developed along a deterministic track of amoralistic unconcernedness; but this is itself easily seen to be a moralistic reaction. As a matter of fact, this young nation is the least cynical of all nations. It is not hypocritical in the usual sense of the word, but labors persistently with its moral problems. It is taking its Creed very seriously indeed, and this is the reason why the ideals are not only continuously discussed but also represent a social force—why they receive more than "lip-service" in the collective life of the nation. The cultural unity of the nation is this common sharing in both the consciousness of sins and the devotion to high ideals.

Americans accuse themselves, and are accused by others, of being materialists. But they are equally extreme in the other direction. Sometimes an American feels moved to put the matter right, as Josiah Royce did when he explained:

When foreigners accuse us of extraordinary love for gain, and of practical materialism, they fail to see how largely we are a nation of idealists. Yet that we are such a nation is something constantly brought to the attention of those whose calling requires them to observe any of the tendencies prevalent in our recent intellectual life in America.

The American problem to be studied in this book would, indeed, have an entirely different prognosis if this fact were forgotten.

For the study of a national problem which cuts so sharply through the whole body politic as does the Negro problem, no other set of valuations could serve as adequately as the norm for an incisive formulation of our value premises as can the American Creed. No other norm could compete in authority over people's minds. "The American democratic faith is a pattern of ideals providing standards of value with which the accomplishments of realistic democracy may be judged," observes an author surveying the historical trends of American thinking.

And there is no doubt that these ideals are active realities. The student of American history must be professionally near-sighted or blinded by a doctrinal belief in a materialistic determinism if he fails to see the significance of tracing how the Creed is gradually realizing itself. *The American Creed is itself one of the dominant "social trends."* "Call it a dream or call it vision," says John Dewey, "it has been interwoven in a tradition that has had an immense effect upon American life." Or, to quote a distinguished Negro thinker, the late Kelly Miller:

In this country political, social, and economic conditions gravitate toward equality. We may continue to expect thunderstorms in the political firmament so long as there exists inequality of political temperature in the atmosphere of the two regions. Neither Massachusetts nor Mississippi will rest satisfied until there is an equality of political condition in both States. . . . Democratic institutions can no more tolerate a double political status than two standards of ethics or discrepant units of weight and measure.

But apart from trends, the American Creed represents the national conscience. The Negro is a "problem" to the average American partly because of a palpable conflict between the status actually awarded him and those ideals.

The American Creed, just because it is a living reality in a developing democ-

racy, is not a fixed and clear-cut dogma. It is still growing. During the Revolutionary epoch the interests of statesmen and philosophers and of the general public were focused on the more formal aspects of freedom, equality, and justice. After a long period of material expansion but not rapid spiritual growth, the American Creed is in this generation again in a formative stage. It is now discovering its ideals in the social and economic sphere and in the realm of international organization.

While this is going on, there are great disparities in opinions even on fundamentals in these new fields of valuation—as there were during the Revolution concerning the ideals which then became crystalized. Some Americans see in trade unions a denial of the rights to human liberty; others see in the unions an expression of the common man's right to reach for greater equality and freedom. Some Americans want to tax property and nationalize public utilities in order to defend equality of opportunity for the masses of the people and to preserve their liberties; others see in such attempts an assault upon American principles of liberty. In the international field American ideals in recent decades and even today seem divided and rambling in the wide space of the triangle marked by the three points: absolute isolationism, an organized world democracy, and American world imperialism.

These great disparities of opinion would, in any other social problem, considerably increase the technical difficulties of utilizing the Creed as a set of specified and definite value premises for research. When in later chapters we face the task of defining our value premises specifically, we shall find that this is not the case in the Negro problem. The Creed is expressive and definite in practically all respects of importance for the Negro problem. Most of the value premises with which we shall

be concerned have actually been incorporated for a long time in the national Constitution and in the constitutions and laws of the several states.

The deeper reason for the technical simplicity of the value aspect of the Negro problem is this: From the point of view of the American Creed the status accorded the Negro in America represents nothing more and nothing less than a century-long lag of public morals. In principle the Negro problem was settled long ago; in practice the solution is not effectuated. The Negro in America has not yet been given the elemental civil and political rights of formal democracy, including a fair opportunity to earn his living, upon which a general accord was already won when the American Creed was first taking form. And this anachronism constitutes the contemporary "problem" both to Negroes and to whites.

If those rights were respected, many other pressing social problems would, of course, still remain. Many Negroes would, together with many whites, belong to groups which would invoke the old ideals of equality and liberty in demanding more effective protection for their social and economic opportunities. But there would no longer be a *Negro* problem. This does

not mean that the Negro problem is an easy problem to solve. It is a tremendous task for theoretical research to find out why the Negro's status is what it is. In its unsolved form it further intertwines with all other social problems. It is simple only in the technical sense that in America the value premises—if they are conceived to be the ideals of the American Creed—are extraordinarily specific and definite.

Finally, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, it should be explained that we have called this Creed "American" in the sense that it is adhered to by the Americans. This is the only matter which interests us in this book, which is focused upon the Negro problem as part of American life and American politics. But this Creed is, of course, no American monopoly. With minor variations, some of which, however, are not without importance, the American Creed is the common democratic creed. "American ideals" are just humane ideals as they have matured in our common Western civilization upon the foundation of Christianity and pre-Christian legalism and under the influence of the economic, scientific, and political development over a number of centuries. The American Creed is older and wider than America itself.

Who Is Loyal to America?

Henry Steele Commager, Professor of American History at Columbia University, is one of many citizens to be disturbed by the concerted attacks on democratic values. This phenomenon is the more alarming since it has centered in, and, to some extent at least, been stimulated by, the United States Congress and particularly by the Dies and Thomas Un-American Committee. In this article Mr. Commager asks, what is this "new loyalty" that is demanded? Since when have Americans accepted conformity as part of the democratic credo? It is a dangerous error to seek to "equate loyalty with conformity," for democratic society dies without criticism and without the stimulation and challenge of new ideas, new approaches to the solution of its problems. Coercion, terror, and character assassination will not produce loyalty. In the face of challenge by another ideology, what is needed is a reaffirmation and a positive program of action to give reality to the democratic ideology.

On May 6 a Russian-born girl, Mrs. Shura Lewis, gave a talk to the students of the Western High School of Washington, D. C. She talked about Russia—its school system, its public health program, the position of women, of the aged, of the workers, the farmers, and the professional classes—and compared, superficially and uncritically, some American and Russian social institutions. The most careful examination of the speech—happily reprinted for us in the *Congressional Record*—does not disclose a single disparagement of anything American unless it is a quasi-humorous reference to the cost of having a baby and of dental treatment in this country. Mrs. Lewis said nothing that had not been said a thousand times, in speeches, in newspapers, magazines, and books. She said nothing that any normal person could find objectionable.

Her speech, however, created a sensation. A few students walked out on it. Others improvised placards proclaiming

their devotion to Americanism. Indignant mothers telephoned their protests. Newspapers took a strong stand against the outrage. Congress, rarely concerned for the political or economic welfare of the citizens of the capital city, reacted sharply when its intellectual welfare was at stake. Congressmen Rankin and Dirksen thundered and lightnined; the District of Columbia Committee went into a huddle; there were demands for housecleaning in the whole school system, which was obviously shot through and through with Communism.

All this might be ignored, for we have learned not to expect either intelligence or understanding of Americanism from this element in our Congress. More ominous was the reaction of the educators entrusted with the high responsibility of guiding and guarding the intellectual welfare of our boys and girls. Did they stand up for intellectual freedom? Did they insist that high-school children had the

right and the duty to learn about other countries? Did they protest that students were to be trusted to use intelligence and common sense? Did they affirm that the Americanism of their students was staunch enough to resist propaganda? Did they perform even the elementary task, expected of educators above all, of analyzing the much-criticized speech which was given by Mrs. Lewis?

Not at all. The District Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Hobart Corning, hastened to agree with the animadversions of Representatives Rankin and Dirksen. The whole thing was, he confessed, "a very unfortunate occurrence," and had "shocked the whole school system." What Mrs. Lewis said, he added gratuitously, was "repugnant to all who are working with youth in the Washington schools," and "the entire affair contrary to the philosophy of education under which we operate." Mr. Danowsky, the hapless principal of the Western High School, was "the most shocked and regretful of all." The District of Columbia Committee would be happy to know that though he was innocent in the matter, he had been properly reprimanded!

It is the reaction of the educators that makes this episode more than a tempest in a teapot. We expect hysteria from Mr. Rankin and some newspapers: we are shocked when we see educators, timid before criticism and confused about first principles, betray their trust. And we wonder what can be that "philosophy of education" which believes that young people can be trained to the duties of citizenship by wrapping their minds in cotton-wool.

Merely by talking about Russia Mrs. Lewis was thought to be attacking Americanism. It is indicative of the seriousness of the situation that during this same week the House found it necessary to take time out from the discussion of the labor

bill, the tax bill, the International Trade Organization, and the world famine, to meet assaults upon Americanism from a new quarter. This time it was the artists who were undermining the American system, and members of the House spent some hours passing around reproductions of the paintings which the State Department had sent abroad as part of its program for advertising American culture. We need not pause over the exquisite humor which congressmen displayed in their comments on modern art: weary statesmen must have their fun. But we may profitably remark the major criticism which was directed against this unfortunate collection of paintings. What was wrong with these paintings, it shortly appeared, was that they were un-American. "No American drew those crazy pictures," said Mr. Rankin. Perhaps he was right. The copious files of the Committee on Un-American Activities were levied upon to prove that of the forty-five artists represented "no less than twenty were definitely New Deal in various shades of Communism." The damning facts are specified for each of the pernicious twenty; we can content ourselves with the first of them, Ben-Zion. What is the evidence here? "Ben-Zion was one of the signers of a letter sent to President Roosevelt by the United American Artists which urged help to the USSR and Britain after Hitler attacked Russia." He was, in short, a fellow-traveler of Churchill and Roosevelt.

The same day that Mr. Dirksen was denouncing the Washington school authorities for allowing students to hear about Russia ("In Russia equal right is granted to each nationality. There is no discrimination. Nobody says, you are a Negro, you are a Jew") Representative Williams of Mississippi rose to denounce the *Survey-Graphic* magazine and to add further to our understanding of Americanism. The *Survey-Graphic*, he said,

"contained 129 pages of outrageously vile and nauseating anti-Southern, anti-Christian, un-American, and pro-Communist tripe, ostensibly directed toward the elimination of the custom of racial segregation in the South." It was written by "meddling un-American purveyors of hate and indecency."

All in all, a busy week for the House. Yet those who make a practice of reading their *Record* will agree that it was a typical week. For increasingly Congress is concerned with the eradication of disloyalty and the defense of Americanism, and scarcely a day passes that some congressman does not treat us to exhortations and admonitions, impassioned appeals and eloquent declamations, similar to those inspired by Mrs. Lewis, Mr. Ben-Zion, and the editors of the *Survey-Graphic*. And scarcely a day passes that the outlines of the new loyalty and the new Americanism are not etched more sharply in public policy.

And this is what is significant—the emergence of new patterns of Americanism and of loyalty, patterns radically different from those which have long been traditional. It is not only the Congress that is busy designing the new patterns. They are outlined in President Truman's recent disloyalty order; in similar orders formulated by the New York City Council and by state and local authorities throughout the country; in the programs of the D.A.R., the American Legion, and similar patriotic organizations; in the editorials of the Hearst and the McCormick-Patterson papers; and in an elaborate series of advertisements sponsored by large corporations and business organizations. In the making is a revival of the red hysteria of the early 1920's, one of the shabbiest chapters in the history of American democracy; and more than a revival, for the new crusade is designed not merely to frustrate Communism but to formulate

a positive definition of Americanism, and a positive concept of loyalty.

What is the new loyalty? It is, above all, conformity. It is the uncritical and unquestioning acceptance of America as it is—the political institutions, the social relationships, the economic practices. It rejects inquiry into the race question or socialized medicine, or public housing, or into the wisdom or validity of our foreign policy. It regards as particularly heinous any challenge to what is called "the system of private enterprise," identifying that system with Americanism. It abandons evolution, repudiates the once popular concept of progress, and regards America as a finished product, perfect and complete.

It is, it must be added, easily satisfied. For it wants not intellectual conviction nor spiritual conquest, but mere outward conformity. In matters of loyalty it takes the word for the deed, the gesture for the principle. It is content with the flag salute, and does not pause to consider the warning of our Supreme Court that "a person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn." It is satisfied with membership in respectable organizations and, as it assumes that every member of a liberal organization is a Communist, concludes that every member of a conservative one is a true American. It has not yet learned that not everyone who saith Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of Heaven. It is designed neither to discover real disloyalty nor to foster true loyalty.

II

What is wrong with this new concept of loyalty? What, fundamentally, is wrong with the pusillanimous retreat of the Washington educators, the barbarous antics of Washington legislators, the hys-

terical outbursts of the D.A.R., the gross and vulgar appeals of business corporations? It is not merely that these things are offensive. It is rather that they are wrong—morally, socially, and politically.

The concept of loyalty as conformity is a false one. It is narrow and restrictive, denies freedom of thought and of conscience, and is irremediably stained by private and selfish considerations. "Enlightened loyalty," wrote Josiah Royce, who made loyalty the very core of his philosophy,

means harm to no man's loyalty. It is at war only with disloyalty, and its warfare, unless necessity constrains, is only a spiritual warfare. It does not foster class hatreds; it knows nothing reasonable about race prejudices; and it regards all races of men as one in their need of loyalty. It ignores mutual misunderstandings. It loves its own wherever upon earth its own, namely loyalty itself, is to be found.

Justice, charity, wisdom, spirituality, he added, were all definable in terms of loyalty, and we may properly ask which of these qualities our contemporary champions of loyalty display.

Above all, loyalty must be to something larger than oneself, untainted by private purposes or selfish ends. But what are we to say of the attempts by the NAM and by individual corporations to identify loyalty with the system of private enterprise? Is it not as if officeholders should attempt to identify loyalty with their own party, their own political careers? Do not those corporations which pay for full-page advertisements associating Americanism with the competitive system expect, ultimately, to profit from that association? Do not those organizations that deplore, in the name of patriotism, the extension of government operation of hydro-electric power expect to profit from their campaign?

Certainly it is a gross perversion not only of the concept of loyalty but of the concept of Americanism to identify it

with a particular economic system. This precise question, interestingly enough, came before the Supreme Court in the *Schneiderman* case not so long ago—and it was Wendell Willkie who was counsel for *Schneiderman*. Said the Court:

Throughout our history many sincere people whose attachment to the general Constitutional scheme cannot be doubted have, for various and even divergent reasons, urged differing degrees of governmental ownership and control of natural resources, basic means of production, and banks and the media of exchange, either with or without compensation. And something once regarded as a species of private property was abolished without compensating the owners when the institution of slavery was forbidden. Can it be said that the author of the Emancipation Proclamation and the supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment were not attached to the Constitution?

There is, it should be added, a further danger in the willful identification of Americanism with a particular body of economic practices. Many learned economists predict for the near future an economic crash similar to that of 1929. If Americanism is equated with competitive capitalism, what happens to it if competitive capitalism comes a cropper? If loyalty and private enterprise are inextricably associated, what is to preserve loyalty if private enterprise fails? Those who associate Americanism with a particular program of economic practices have a grave responsibility, for if their program should fail, they expose Americanism itself to disrepute.

The effort to equate loyalty with conformity is misguided because it assumes that there is a fixed content to loyalty and that this can be determined and defined. But loyalty is a principle, and eludes definition except in its own terms. It is devotion to the best interests of the commonwealth, and may require hostility to the particular policies which the government pursues, the particular practices which the economy undertakes, the par-

ticular institutions which society maintains. "If there is any fixed star in our Constitutional constellation," said the Supreme Court in the *Barnette* case, "it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception they do not now occur to us."

True loyalty may require, in fact, what appears to the naïve to be disloyalty. It may require hostility to certain provisions of the Constitution itself, and historians have not concluded that those who subscribed to the "Higher Law" were lacking in patriotism. We should not forget that our tradition is one of protest and revolt, and it is stultifying to celebrate the rebels of the past—Jefferson and Paine, Emerson and Thoreau—while we silence the rebels of the present. "We are a rebellious nation," said Theodore Parker, known in his day as the Great American Preacher, and went on:

Our whole history is treason; our blood was attainted before we were born; our creeds are infidelity to the mother church; our constitution, treason to our fatherland. What of that? Though all the governors in the world bid us commit treason against man, and set the example, let us never submit.

Those who would impose upon us a new concept of loyalty not only assume that this is possible, but have the presumption to believe that they are competent to write the definition. We are reminded of Whitman's defiance of the "never-ending audacity of elected persons." Who are those who would set the standards of loyalty? They are Rankins and Bilbos, officials of the D.A.R. and the Legion and the NAM, Hearsts and McCormicks. May we not say of Rankin's harangues on loyalty what Emerson said of Webster at the time of the Seventh of

March speech: "The word honor in the mouth of Mr. Webster is like the word love in the mouth of a whore."

What do men know of loyalty who make a mockery of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, whose energies are dedicated to stirring up race and class hatreds, who would straitjacket the American spirit? What indeed do they know of America—the America of Sam Adams and Tom Paine, of Jackson's defiance of the Court and Lincoln's celebration of labor, of Thoreau's essay on Civil Disobedience and Emerson's championship of John Brown, of the America of the Fourierists and the Come-Outers, of cranks and fanatics, of socialists and anarchists? Who among American heroes could meet their tests, who would be cleared by their commitments? Not Washington, who was a rebel. Not Jefferson, who wrote that all men are created equal and whose motto was "rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God." Not Garrison, who publicly burned the Constitution; or Wendell Phillips, who spoke for the underprivileged everywhere and counted himself a philosophical anarchist; not Seward of the Higher Law or Sumner of racial equality. Not Lincoln, who admonished us to have malice toward none, charity for all; or Wilson, who warned that our flag was "a flag of liberty of opinion as well as of political liberty"; or Justice Holmes, who said that our Constitution is an experiment, that while that experiment is being made "we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death."

III

There are further and more practical objections against the imposition of fixed concepts of loyalty or tests of disloyalty. The effort is itself a confession of fear, a declaration of insolvency. Those who

are sure of themselves do not need reassurance, and those who have confidence in the strength and the virtue of America do not need to fear either criticism or competition. The effort is bound to miscarry. It will not apprehend those who are really disloyal, it will not even frighten them; it will affect only those who can be labeled "radical." It is sobering to recall that though the Japanese relocation program, carried through at such incalculable cost in misery and tragedy, was justified to us on the ground that the Japanese were potentially disloyal, the record does not disclose a single case of Japanese disloyalty or sabotage during the whole war. The warning sounded by the Supreme Court in the Barnette flag-salute case is a timely one:

Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel obedience is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of pagan unity, the Inquisition as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast-failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.

Nor are we left to idle conjecture in this matter; we have had experience enough. Let us limit ourselves to a single example, one that is wonderfully relevant. Back in 1943 the House Un-American Activities Committee, deeply disturbed by alleged disloyalty among government employees, wrote a definition of subversive activities and proceeded to apply it. The definition was admirable, and no one could challenge its logic or its symmetry:

Subversive activity derives from conduct intentionally destructive of or inimical to the Government of the United States—that which seeks to undermine its institutions, or to distort its functions, or to impede its projects, or to lessen its efforts, the ultimate end being to overturn it all.

Surely anyone guilty of activities so defined deserved not only dismissal but punishment. But how was the test applied? It was applied to two distinguished scholars, Robert Morss Lovett and Goodwin Watson, and to one able young historian, William E. Dodd, Jr., son of our former Ambassador to Germany. Of almost three million persons employed by the government, these were the three whose subversive activities were deemed the most pernicious, and the House cut them off the payroll. The sequel is familiar. The Senate concurred only to save a wartime appropriation; the President signed the bill under protest for the same reason. The Supreme Court declared the whole business a "bill of attainder" and therefore unconstitutional. Who was it, in the end, who engaged in "subversive activities"—Lovett, Dodd, and Watson, or the Congress which flagrantly violated Article One of the Constitution?

Finally, disloyalty tests are not only futile in application, they are pernicious in their consequences. They distract attention from activities that are really disloyal, and silence criticism inspired by true loyalty. That there are disloyal elements in America will not be denied, but there is no reason to suppose that any of the tests now formulated will ever be applied to them. It is relevant to remember that when Rankin was asked why his Committee did not investigate the Ku Klux Klan he replied that the Klan was not un-American, it was American!

Who are those who are really disloyal? Those who inflame racial hatreds, who sow religious and class dissensions. Those who subvert the Constitution by violating the freedom of the ballot box. Those who make a mockery of majority rule by the use of the filibuster. Those who impair democracy by denying equal educational facilities. Those who frustrate justice by lynch law or by making a farce of jury trials. Those who deny freedom of speech

and of the press and of assembly. Those who press for special favors against the interest of the commonwealth. Those who regard public office as a source of private gain. Those who would exalt the military over the civil. Those who for selfish and private purposes stir up national antagonisms and expose the world to the ruin of war.

Will the House Committee on Un-American Activities interfere with the activities of these? Will Mr. Truman's disloyalty proclamation reach these? Will the current campaigns for Americanism convert these? If past experience is any guide, they will not. What they will do, if they are successful, is to silence criticism, stamp out dissent—or drive it underground. But if our democracy is to flourish it must have criticism, if our government is to function it must have dissent. Only totalitarian governments insist upon conformity and they—as we know—do so at their peril. Without criticism abuses will go unrebuked; without dissent our dynamic system will become static. The American people have a stake in the maintenance of the most thorough-going inquisition into American institutions. They have a stake in nonconformity, for they know that the American genius is nonconformist. They have a stake in experimentation of the most radical character, for they know that only those who prove all things can hold fast that which is good.

IV

It is easier to say what loyalty is not than to say what it is. It is not conformity. It is not passive acquiescence in the status quo. It is not preference for everything American over everything foreign. It is not an ostrich-like ignorance of other countries and other institutions. It is not the indulgence in ceremony—a flag salute, an oath of allegiance, a fervid verbal

declaration. It is not a particular creed, a particular version of history, a particular body of economic practices, a particular philosophy.

It is a tradition, an ideal, and a principle. It is a willingness to subordinate every private advantage for the larger good. It is an appreciation of the rich and diverse contributions that can come from the most varied sources. It is allegiance to the traditions that have guided our greatest statesmen and inspired our most eloquent poets—the traditions of freedom, equality, democracy, tolerance, the tradition of the higher law, of experimentation, co-operation, and pluralism. It is a realization that America was born of revolt, flourished on dissent, became great through experimentation.

Independence was an act of revolution; republicanism was something new under the sun; the federal system was a vast experimental laboratory. Physically Americans were pioneers; in the realm of social and economic institutions, too, their tradition has been one of pioneering. From the beginning, intellectual and spiritual diversity have been as characteristic of America as racial and linguistic. The most distinctively American philosophies have been transcendentalism—which is the philosophy of the Higher Law—and pragmatism—which is the philosophy of experimentation and pluralism. These two principles are the very core of Americanism: the principle of the Higher Law, or of obedience to the dictates of conscience rather than of statutes, and the principle of pragmatism, or the rejection of a single good and of the notion of a finished universe. From the beginning Americans have known that there were new worlds to conquer, new truths to be discovered. Every effort to confine Americanism to a single pattern, to constrain it to a single formula, is disloyalty to everything that is valid in Americanism.

On Certain Characteristics of American Democracy

Frank Tannenbaum, author and economist, poses questions the United States needs to ponder in these days when ideological competition is a commonplace. "Is democracy something that can be taught? Or is it something that can be learned only by practice, and is the practice itself conditioned by a historical process that cannot be repeated on order for any other people?" It is important for students to realize that every society produces institutions and ideas as a result of a particular set of historical experiences set in a particular environment. Even where institutions or laws are transplanted they invariably develop uniquely so that in operation they hardly resemble the parent institutions. In a generally optimistic view of the operation of American democracy, Mr. Tannenbaum insists that differences within it are only "about details and program." In the light of developments in our economic structure some may ask whether a process of compromise and persuasion can survive.

In a world barely rid of the threat of Nazi dictatorship in which the American people seem girded for the herculean task of spreading democracy across the face of the globe, it is important to ask, what is this American faith with which we would endow the people of the earth? Can it be described so as to make it acceptable to folk steeped in other traditions, and, if made acceptable, can it also be accepted? Is democracy a doctrine written in a book that may be learned by heart, or is it something that cannot be encompassed in any theory, incarnated in any constitution, or detailed in any system of law? Is democracy something that can be taught? Or is it something that can be learned only by practice, and is the practice itself conditioned by a historical process that cannot be repeated on order for any other people? It is really a question raised in response to the present effort to create

democratic régimes in other parts of the world—by order from above, by laws copied from the experience of other peoples, by ideas that have their roots in a specialized historical experience. Can the lessons of one culture be passed to another without losing the very essence of the lesson they would teach, the very meanings that give them substance?

The ethos that pervades any social system is a very private, a very unique, multiple of values. It is a summary—an unwritten summary—of all the efforts, strivings, success and failures of all the past that makes the present what it is. The ethos cannot be passed on. The practices which the ethos dictates have special meaning only in the setting where they have arisen. No formal declaratory statement of how democracy is practiced can make any other nation democratic. No machinery of election to office, no given

system of law is adequate for the purpose. Democracy is a function of the past experience of a people and will differ as the ethos of the people differs. It may be true that there are democratic elements in any society, and that a certain genus of education might in time nourish and cultivate a democratic way of life even in a nominally nondemocratic community, but the emerging pattern of government would in some measure be encompassed by the traditional mores of the people who were being educated in the democratic way of life. If the new way of government proved incompatible with the peculiar ethos of the society where it was being developed, it would in the long run prove intolerable and unacceptable. Democracy beyond all other forms of government belongs to the people and must in some way fit in with a native slant and a native meaning, or it can have no meaning.

This is not an argument that no new lesson can be learned from a new experience; but, if the new lesson is not to prove ephemeral, then in some subtle measure it must be a continuation of the older lessons learned long since and embedded within the system of values that the people already have. If we would teach democracy to the peoples of the world, we must teach it on local rather than foreign foundations. The way of life must in the long run prove consistent with their inner sense of values. It must, in fact, by some magic appear to be and, in fact, be a continuation of their own past. The problem is subtle, difficult, and may prove beyond the competence of mere mortal men. But the lesson is clear—as clear as crystal. You cannot give peoples a set of permanent values which do not fit in with what they have already learned from their own old and painful history. Perhaps you can give a new slant to an old meaning, but no nation can be given a new set of values, new mores, a new ethos. If our task is not to prove futile, if our good

intentions are not to turn to bitterness and taunt us with our failure, then we must seek in the basic experience of the peoples themselves the lesson of democracy we would teach them. Their history is as peculiar to them as our history is peculiar to us, and we cannot improvise a new system of values for other peoples, just as no one could improvise a new system of values for us.

American democracy is what it is. It is not commensurable with other democracies, and it is largely immune from exterior currents of thought and action. Much has been said about the easy spread of autocratic ideas and ideals. What has not been said is that autocratic practices came to the surface and achieved implicit consent only in those parts of Europe where democracy had not prevailed before. As a simple statement of fact, totalitarian theories found substantial root only in countries where democratic habits did not exist before; for democracy is a habit, a way of life, a process of social relationship. It is not fundamentally a theory of government; it is a method of government that derives its consent from each person governed—even from those who oppose the specific things that the government may do. One may in a democracy oppose all of the actual policies of the administration and yet believe in democracy, because the methods of achieving the defeat of the present administration are also democratic. In a democracy, he who has a concern has a voice; and the voice of each counts for one—and only for one. The rest is a matter of counting. The right to a voice, the personal conscience in expressing it, the freedom to utter an opinion—even a wrong one—and the honesty of the count are all essential elements of any democratic society. Underlying it is the belief that the experience of the many is more inclusive than the experience of the few; that the voice of

the people is the voice of God; that what the people want is what they need. There is the further belief that no one knows better than the people themselves what they need at the moment. In a democratic society it is just as important to possess the right to be wrong as the right to be right; for in any society where a wrong opinion cannot be uttered it is not possible for long to utter a right opinion. In the long run, wisdom is tested by experience. No one can be sure that his own judgment is not in error, and he who has not the right to be wrong cannot long possess the right to be right. All of these elemental facts are true of every society where democracy is a habit, but American society contains elements that give the above special poignancy.

Ours is a social democracy. Neither class nor caste, nor special families dominate American life. We have no aristocracy. Those of our families that would draw an aristocratic mantle over them were born yesterday, and will have disappeared tomorrow. A list of the prominent leaders in American life would reveal that their fathers or grandfathers were farmers, peddlers, laborers, skilled mechanics, or lawyers' clerks who starved in boyhood, and achieved standing by the grace of good fortune, personal ability, and the wealth of a growing industrial society. The record will also show that many of the aristocrats of yesterday have today shrunk back into the mass and are indistinguishable from them; for in American social life the test of status is a test of immediate achievement. He who survives must do so by his own works. No one in America can long live on his past, or on the past of his fathers. What you do—that is the fundamental test of American life. There is a vertical flow in the United States that works both ways, and the movement upward of new elements is compensated for by a movement downward. While wealth may be impor-

tant, it too is temporary. Many a wealthy family of yesterday is in poverty today, and the papers record, almost daily, the death in poverty of the scion of a wealthy father of a generation or two ago.

With the absence of class and social stratification goes an almost complete racial democracy. In the last century we have absorbed some thirty million foreigners, who came from all parts of the world. Literally every racial element in the world has gone into the making of the American community. Into the make-up of the American population have gone many thousands of English, Irish, Scotch, Italians, Poles, Russians, Danes, Swedes, Finns, Bulgarians, Turks, Armenians, Spaniards, Jews, Greeks, Germans, Chinese, Negroes, Mexicans, and representatives of every other racial and linguistic group in the world. In the same community, often in the same industrial establishment, there have been, and there are, representatives of twenty different racial elements. After the first generation they are all Americans—a curious kind of cultural absorption has pervaded the atmosphere, and has bred a new race out of the diverse elements of the world. While it is true that some elements have been more recalcitrant to absorption than others, it is also true that all elements have been proud of becoming Americans, and almost pathetically insistent in shedding the evidence of their origin. Inter-marriage and a common public school system have done their work so well that in the United States, for more than fifty years, the source of origin has almost completely evaporated as a cause of separateness. While it is true that special elements can be pointed as a contradiction of what has been said, it is still true, however, that the process of absorption has been infinitely more rapid than the process of stratification. At the present rate of integration an American will, in the near future, have elements of so diverse a racial

basis that separate identification will become meaningless. The Negroes have for obvious reasons been less readily subject to this process of physical incorporation, but anyone who would deny that it goes on, and at an increasing rate, is not really aware of the social process in American life.

Social democracy and racial democracy have gone hand in hand with religious democracy. There is more than religious freedom in the United States. There is almost a kind of religious inventiveness in the American community. Not only have the broad religious beliefs, brought over from the old world, had complete freedom to develop as they could, but an incredible number of American-born credos have risen and flourished. American ground seems to be specially favorable to new forms of faith—and, some of these new forms have become large and influential institutional groups. One need but mention the Mormon and Christian Science churches to make the point. There are, however, innumerable small sects. The city of Los Angeles is famous for the variety and the number of religious faiths that are to be found there. Not only has every religion been free to flourish and grow but every new religious form has found fertile ground. The conflict between the churches has taken the form of a competition for adherents. The denial of the completest freedom of worship is practically nonexistent, and the few voices of opposition have been lost in the general indifference to the issue raised. In the United States the worship of God is so varied that men profess their faith in every kind of temple, in every tongue, and in every form. The semihysterical public baptisms among Southern Negroes, on one hand, and the stately formal ritualism of the Greek Church on the other, are but bare elements of a scale that runs as wide as the human imagination.

Ours, too, is a political democracy in

the specific sense of political organization. Foreign observers are often misled when they note the preponderance of two political parties. They should note that in both the Democratic and the Republican parties there are elements so diverse that under different conditions a great variety of parties could be constructed out of them. That they have not been is due to two very distinctive elements in American life. The first is the fact that local issues can be fought out locally, the party label being significant only in its national aspects. A conservative Democrat from Mississippi and a radical Democrat from New York meet only on the national issues. The second is that third parties in the United States have been fluid and temporary. They have lasted long enough to demonstrate that they really represented a considerable element in the voting population. As soon as that became evident, the larger and older parties have tended to absorb them by taking over their programs. That happened with the granger movement, with the prohibition movement, with the movement for old-age pensions; and these are but samples of a wide political process. The large parties, in spite of their seeming narrowness and definiteness, have really survived only because in the long run they have been open to groups as soon as these groups show sufficient importance to become a factor in winning an election. It is for that reason, in part, that in the United States there are at times numerous political parties. Our political parties are, in spite of their appearance historically, responsive to public demands—that has been their price for survival.

Part of this process is a kind of fluid economic democracy which has long pervaded American life. No one can understand the United States who does not understand that there is a persistent process of distribution of income that affects all groups. There is no economic interest

that is not organized. There are large and frequently conflicting organizations of labor and innumerable organizations of capital, each seeking, and at times each in its turn successfully, to influence public opinion in its favor. There are groups in favor of the tariff and groups opposed to it; importers oppose the manufacturers; water transportation interests are in conflict with the railways; the railways oppose road transportation; and all of these may object to air transport subsidies. Agricultural interests are frequently in opposition to manufacturing interests, and agricultural groups may be sharply divided among themselves. The cane sugar growers are in conflict with the beet sugar growers, and both of these oppose the sugar importers. The fact is that there is a kind of divergence of interest in American life that is all-pervasive. Each of these interests has its own organization; each in its turn influences and on occasion secures public favor and governmental aid; and each in turn affects the distribution of income of the American people. No one person, no one group, completely dominates the scene, and each group must be constantly on the watch to maintain its position. The effect of this upon the making of American democracy, a sensitive and responsive instrument of public policy, is great, indeed. It makes for lack of consistency in politics, but it also makes for freedom and for a shift of power as immediate needs, immediate pressure, and political acumen seem to require.

These various factors demand a kind of equality before the law, and a kind of weighing of the place of public interest as against purely private interest that gives the American judicial system and the American Supreme Court, in particular, a place in the scheme of American life that is difficult for strangers to understand. It also calls for a complete freedom of the expression of opinion. No such complex

economic and social structure could survive unless each interest could make itself heard, unless each grievance found a voice, unless each group could influence public opinion and public policy. Without freedom of speech, press, assemblage and organization, American democracy could not function. It can be said that freedom in that sense is as available in the American community as can be expected in a social structure as large, varied and sectional as ours is. Occasionally and locally an attempted stratification of opinion takes place, but it has always been temporary and always localized. Freedom is essential to the American economic and public life, and both the conservatives and radicals believe in it for themselves, and, therefore, for others. But such great divergence can survive only upon an assumption that the end in government is not victory but compromise. That explains the good fellowship that follows a heated campaign for office, that is why no one assumes that defeat in a political campaign is the end of his program, that is why the day after election the preparation for the next election may be said to begin. With us democracy is a method. The end, if one may be said to exist, is to persuade the majority to our point of view, and if we fail today, we may succeed tomorrow. With us the majority is right, but only temporarily. We will be right tomorrow, for the time being, as long as we have enough voters. The American way is by compromise in little bits, by persuasion, by much talk and little bitterness; and if the next fellow is wrong today, we were wrong yesterday, though it is hard to admit. With us all political bargains are temporary, and all programs are for the day. No great battle is ever lost, and no great victory is ever won. When the day is over, and the new party comes to office, it continues the program that it denounced yesterday, largely because it would lose its adherents if it changed it.

Our differences are about details of method and program; the basic ends are a good life and freedom of method in

achieving it. These are so deeply ingrained as to be descriptive of what we call the American democracy.

Democracy in the American Tradition

T. Swann Harding is that unusual individual, a research chemist who has also achieved stature as a social scientist. A career civil servant in the Department of Agriculture, Mr. Harding has devoted thirty years to enlightening Americans about scientific development and in protecting them against frauds. In this article he has sought to examine our heritage of political philosophy. What were the things feared by the Founding Fathers? Mr. Harding suggests four: monarchy, monopolies, legalism, and the common people. But in addition to these negative aspects, they affirmed belief in the right and duty of revolution, of resistance to bad government, and in an unqualified freedom of expression. It is appropriate in a period when loyalty is coming to be interpreted as conformity that we should re-examine our great tradition with its emphasis upon individual integrity.

Of the many who discuss the subject, it is a rare few, indeed, who ever bother to scrutinize what we are wont to call Democracy. *What is the essential American tradition insofar as it can be discerned intellectually?*

The answer to that question requires a look into history. What were the basic trends of thought of the oft-quoted and frequently misinterpreted Founding Fathers, as expressed in their speeches and writings? Can the thread of this thought be discerned as it comes on down to our own time?

A little study reveals that this thought had half a dozen or so outstanding characteristics. Naturally things have changed. Some of the matters that so deeply interested or disturbed the Founding Fathers have lost significance. Some problems have disappeared.

Nevertheless it is remarkable that so many questions which agitated them assume importance today. This is given added emphasis when we consider that our country stands in a chaotic world and is itself beaten by many diverse winds of strange and, it seems, alien doctrines.

Distrust of monarchy was powerful among early Americans. This was perhaps not so characteristic of Alexander Hamilton as of Thomas Jefferson. George Washington distrusted monarchy rather less because he appears to have anticipated its inevitable return in America. Nevertheless, there was much outcry against forms and ceremonies that were regarded as monarchical.

Great fear was also expressed about continued re-election of Presidents. Jefferson especially considered this a most dangerous precedent. While it is a fact of

From "Democracy in the American Tradition," by T. Swann Harding, *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, January, 1947.

historical record that Washington retired from the Presidency as a matter of expediency, and because his estates urgently needed his personal attention, Jefferson retired after his second term as a matter of sacred principle and sought to establish a precedent. There is no evidence that Washington sought to establish such a precedent.

Writing to James Madison, Jefferson said, in criticism of the newly-proposed Constitution:

The second feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Reason and experience tell us, that the first magistrate will always be re-elected if he may be re-elected. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations, to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs, that they will interfere with money and with arms.

In a letter to David Humphreys, Jefferson was still of the same opinion. He still thought that the President should be perpetually ineligible instead of perpetually re-eligible for election. However, three states out of eleven had declared against his theory, so he reluctantly said "we must suppose we are wrong," since the majority should rule.

Secondly, the Founding Fathers greatly feared monopolies, though many leading citizens, who form the nucleus around which organizations of superpatriots elaborate themselves, have viewed them with such sympathy as deeply to revile any who would regulate them. Yet Washington so hated monopolists, and what he regarded as privileged classes, that he once angrily exclaimed:

It is much to be lamented that each state, long ere this, has not hunted them down as the pests of society and the greatest enemies we have to the happiness of America. I would to God that one of the most atrocious in each state were hung in gibbets upon a gal-

lows five times as high as the one prepared by Haman.

Washington's friend Jefferson was somewhat milder and somewhat less in favor of lynchings. But he wrote Elbridge Gerry:

I sincerely believe, with you, the banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies.

Writing Madison regarding the new Constitution, Jefferson said:

The saying that there shall be no monopolies, lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of fourteen years; but the benefit of even limited monopolies is too doubtful, to be opposed to that of their general suppression.

Obviously if the mere monopoly a patent gave an individual aroused Jefferson's apprehension he would have opposed the great unregulated monopolies of later times. Daniel Webster carried this philosophy a little further when he said:

The freest government cannot long endure when the tendency of the law is to create a rapid accumulation of property in the hands of a few and to render the masses poor and dependent.

The late Calvin Coolidge restated this tradition when he held that

The Government of the United States is a device for maintaining in perpetuity the rights of the people, with the ultimate extinction of all privileged classes.

Third, distrust of law was a fundamental part of early governmental theory in the United States. Disrespect for law was not only countenanced; it was advocated. The broad form of this doctrine occurs in Thoreau's words:

It is not desirable to cultivate respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think right.

Surely the vigilantes would also have deported Thoreau.

Writing on law to William Johnson, Jefferson said:

Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding, and should, therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may make anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure. It should be left to sophisms of advocates, whose trade it is, to prove that a defendant is a plaintiff. . . .

Naturally Jefferson feared and distrusted the Supreme Court. Yet he wrote the following to Madison:

The instability of our laws is really an immense evil. I think it would be well to provide in our constitutions, that there shall always be a twelve-month between the engrossing a bill and passing it; that it should then be offered to its passage without changing a word; and that if circumstances should be thought to require a speedier passage, it should take two-thirds of both Houses, instead of a bare majority.

Jefferson and his followers felt that there was great danger in usurpation of power by the Supreme Court and its ultimate dictatorship. Writing to William Johnson, the aged statesman said:

... There is no danger I apprehend so much as the consolidation of our government by the noiseless, and therefore unalarming, instrumentality of the Supreme Court... I must comfort myself with the hope that the judges will see the importance and duty of giving their country the only evidence they can give of fidelity to its Constitution and integrity in the administration of its laws; that is to say, by every one's giving his opinion *seriatim* and publicly on the case he decides. . . . The very idea of cooking up opinions in conclave, begets suspicions that something passes which fears the public ear, and this, spreading by degrees, must produce at some time abridgement of tenure, facility of removal, or some other modification which may promise a remedy.

It will be remembered that Jefferson was President when the famous *Marbury v. Madison* decision was rendered by John

Marshall. Writing to William Johnson about three years before his death, Jefferson reviewed this case, though his aged memory tricked him once or twice. He was still concerned about the manner in which justices of the Supreme Court blandly "advanced beyond its constitutional limits." He accused John Marshall of making many extrajudicial statements in his opinions and then went on:

This practice of John Marshall, of traveling out of his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the court, is very irregular and very censurable. I recollect another instance, and the most particularly, perhaps, because it in some measure bore on myself. Among the midnight appointments of Mr. Adams, were commissions to some federal justices of the peace for Alexandria. [District of Columbia?] These were signed and sealed by him, but not delivered. I found them on the table of the Department of State, on my entrance into office, and I forebade their delivery. Marbury, named in one of them, [and several others?] applied to the Supreme Court for a mandamus to the Secretary of State, Mr. Madison, to deliver the commission intended for him. The Court determined at once, that being an original process, they had no cognizance of it; and therefore the question before them was ended. But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law would be, had they jurisdiction of the case, to wit: that they should command the delivery. The object was clearly to instruct any other court having the jurisdiction, what they should do if Marbury should apply to them. Besides the impropriety of this gratuitous interference, could anything exceed the perversion of law? For if there is any principle of law never yet contradicted, it is that delivery is one of the essentials to the validity of a deed. Although signed and sealed, yet as long as it remains in the hands of the party himself, it is *in fieri* only, it is not a deed, and can be made so only by its delivery. In the hands of a third person it may be made an escrow. But whatever is in the hands of the executive offices is certainly deemed to be in the hands of the President; and in this case, was actually in my hands, because, when I

countermanded them, there was as yet no Secretary of State. Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is continually cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law, without any animadversion on its being merely an *obiter* dissertation of the Chief Justice.

This ancient brand of Americanism discouraged rather than inculcated respect for law, as evidenced by Thoreau above. Emerson not only wrote that "hence, the less government we have the better—the fewer laws, the less confided power," but also: "Every actual State is corrupt. Good men must not obey the law too well." During the Mexican War it was Theodore Parker, no less, who declared:

I think lightly of what is called treason against a government. That may be your duty today, or mine.

Fourth, John Adams as well as Founding Fathers Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson vastly distrusted the common people. When they spoke of democracy, they did not, any of them, mean the "rabble." Writing to John Melish, Jefferson said that George Washington was neither Federalist, separatist, Angloman, nor monarchist. "He sincerely wished the people to have as much self-government as they were competent to exercise themselves." But Washington differed strongly with Jefferson on only one point:

I had more confidence than he had in the natural integrity and discretion of the people, and in the safety and extent to which they might trust themselves with a control over their government.

Washington, therefore, was not especially democratic. Jefferson, in turn, was distrustful of all who worked in manufacturing. While he would have been willing to extend the power of the vote to many agriculturalists who would have been denied this by others, he felt manufacturing so degrading to man that workers in factories could scarcely be regarded as competent human beings.

Yet Jefferson held property sacred, though he did change the expression to "pursuit of happiness," in writing the Declaration of Independence. The ideas of the American Revolution centered around property as the key to happiness. Locke and Rousseau were its apostles. As William Kay Wallace puts it:

Locke's principle that government exists to secure property, and Rousseau's doctrine that men are born equal in the sense of being endowed with equal rights to "life and liberty," were combined in the popular mind so as to form a single principle, tersely expressed in the American Declaration of Independence as the "pursuit of happiness."

Adams held to the philosophy of "natural aristocracy." Those mentally equipped to rise would become leaders in any society no matter what its restraints. Oddly enough, modern biology and genetics confirm the half-truths behind this dogma. Children of different genetic heritage are known to react utterly differently to the same training, environment, and opportunities. It is known also that the inherent intellectual capacity of an individual cannot be very greatly increased by any known means of mental training at any period of mental development.

Differences in school children are now known to be due to a greater extent to differences in inherited nature than to differences in environment and educational opportunity. Some will achieve under the same circumstances which leave others in doltage. It goes against the grain to believe that all men are not born equal, but it is genetically true nevertheless. Of course, personality is the result of the interaction of heredity and environment.

Possibly Washington also had an inkling of the fact that there would be many more dolts than persons of achievement. In any case, he was himself singularly distrustful of democracy. We have

Jefferson's word for this and Jefferson knew Washington as well as any man. Writing to one Walter Jones, Jefferson gave a resume of George Washington's character as he understood it. The following words are extremely important:

He has often declared to me that he considered our new Constitution as an *experiment* on the practicability of republican government, and with *what dose of liberty man could be trusted for his own good*; that he was determined *the experiment should have a fair trial*, and would lose the last drop of his blood in support of it. And these declarations *he repeated to me oftener and more pointedly*, because he knew my suspicions of Colonel Hamilton's views, and probably had heard from him the same declarations which I had, to wit, "that the British constitution, with its unequal representation, corruption and other existing abuses, was the most perfect government which had ever been established on earth, and that a reformation of those abuses would make it impracticable government." *I do believe that George Washington had not a firm confidence in the durability of our government.* He was naturally distrustful of men, and inclined to gloomy apprehensions; and I was ever persuaded that a belief that we must at length end in something like a British constitution, had some weight in his adoption of the ceremonies of levees, birthdays, pompous meetings with Congress, and other forms of the same character, calculated to prepare us gradually for a change which he believed possible, and to let it come on with as little shock as might be to the public mind.

Note the words *italicized* by the present writer. George Washington was far from democratic. He looked with much distrust upon democratic processes. Only in later days did he come around to sound Americanism. In his Farewell Address he said:

The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their Constitutions of Government. . . . If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by

an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates.

Obviously it would be difficult to define either the government or the constitution in static terms. Vigilante oaths are hence absurd insofar as they pretend to bind anyone to past beliefs about such instruments. Indeed no less a dignitary than Washington expressed great distrust of government, a fifth doctrine of the Founding Fathers, saying, in 1785:

Government is not reason, it is not eloquence, it is force! Like fire it is a dangerous servant and a fearful master; never for a moment should it be left to irresponsible action!

Thoreau naturally would go further for he was an anarchist. He it was who declared:

I heartily accept the motto—"That government is best which governs least"; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which I also believe—"That government is best which governs not at all"; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments sometimes, expedient.

Woodrow Wilson adhered strictly to this basic philosophy when, in an address to the foreign-born in Philadelphia, he said:

You have just taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. Of allegiance to whom? Of allegiance to no one unless it be God. Certainly not of allegiance to those who temporarily represent the Great Government.

In another address, he said:

Liberty has never come from government. Liberty has always come from the subjects of it. The history of liberty is a history of the limitations of government power, not the increase of it.

Hence, from the standpoint of super-patriotism, such persons as Washington, Thoreau, Emerson, and Wilson should

have had their treatment with traditional tar and feathers, and then should have been beaten, jailed, and, if possible, deported. But worse is yet to come. The "Essential American Tradition"—the phrase was once used by Jesse Lee Bennett as a book title—not only countenanced, but advocated, open rebellion. Citizens were encouraged to rebel against what they regarded as bad government, even to destroy it by violent revolution if that seemed necessary.

In 1774 Samuel Adams declared that when the people thought their rulers had prostituted the power entrusted to them, and were oppressive and subversive, instead of supporting a free constitution, "they are no longer to be deemed magistrates vested with a sacred character, but become public enemies and ought to be resisted." Thomas Jefferson, writing to David Hartley in 1787, greeted news of a recent insurrection in Massachusetts with such satisfaction.

Writing Madison the same year, Jefferson said:

I own, I am not a friend to a very energetic government. It is always oppressive. It places the governors indeed more at their ease, at the expense of the people. The late rebellion in Massachusetts has given more alarm, than I think it should have done. Calculate that one rebellion in thirteen states in the course of eleven years, is but one for each state in a century and a half. No country should be long without one. Nor will any degree of power in the hands of government, prevent insurrections.

This close friend and confidant of George Washington wrote even more emphatically to Judge Tyler in 1804:

God forbid we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. The people cannot be all, and always, informed. The part which is wrong will be discontented in proportion to the importance of the facts they misconceive. If they remain quiet under such circumstances, it is a lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty.

The Constitution of the State of Maryland (1776) actually advocates armed revolt against bad government in these words:

The doctrine of no-resistance, against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.

William Ellery Channing in 1812 declared:

So far is the existing government from being clothed with an inviolable sanctity, that the citizen, in particular circumstances, acquires the right, not only of remonstrating, but of employing force for its destruction.

Abraham Lincoln, addressing the first Republican convention in Illinois in 1865, said:

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people that inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember and overthrow it.

How did we attain today's effete condition in which we regard a constitutional amendment as in bad taste, affect to look up to the Supreme Court as infallible, and view armed rebellion against bad government with horror?

Superpatriotism as well as adoration of the existing Constitution were always suspect. Curiously enough, those arch enemies, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, were in closer agreement about such matters than most people today are aware. Hamilton held that "people have the right to alter or to abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness." Jefferson declared that "no society can make a perpetual constitution or even a perpetual law." He went on that any law or constitution expired naturally in about thirty-four years; its enforcement thereafter amounted to an unjustifiable act of force.

In denouncing alien and sedition acts

Madison made it plain also that, had sedition acts forbidden attacks upon the existing government in the days of the Confederation, the United States might still have languished under that inept form of government. Webster not only said "Repression is the seed of revolution," but also tolerantly held that quite other forms of government than ours might exist elsewhere, and that preference should be enjoyed by other peoples free from molestation.

According to Merle Curti, conservative elements among the Founding Fathers also believed in the revolutionary principle. This belief had an English background. The doctrine of the necessary overthrow of tyrannical kings and governments formed part of the philosophy of Natural Rights. Hamilton declared that the people, if betrayed by their representatives should exert their original rights and overthrow the usurpers.

John Adams confided in his diary in the year of Dan Shays' rebellion that a revolution is one of the strongest proofs of the virtue and good sense of a people though he later qualified this by saying that revolutions must never be undertaken rashly or without deliberate consideration and sober reflection. Madison, another leader of reactionary or conservative forces against attacks on property interests during the post-Revolutionary period, declared that the people "have an indubitable, inalienable and infeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it may be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution."

Jefferson's views are indicated above. Daniel Webster held that the people may overthrow their government if they choose to do so. In debate with Hayne he said that while civil institutions were established by peoples for public benefit, "when they cease to answer the ends of their existence, they should be changed."

Lincoln declared that people every-

where had the right to rise up and shake off existing government and form a new one if it suited them better. Indeed, he remarked that "any portion of such people that can, may revolutionize and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit."

Presidents McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Taft did not follow this traditional attitude, however. Its last statement was made by President Woodrow Wilson when he upheld the right of revolution at San Francisco in 1919. By 1921, thirty-four States had made advocacy of violent overturn in government a penal offense, and so passed another fundamental doctrine of the revered Founding Fathers. Today "The Revolution" is something long past to which even venerable members of the Daughters of the American Revolution may refer with pious and devotional sanctimony. It has no place in our current thinking as it had in that of our forefathers.

We live in a country whose tradition also favors unqualified freedom of expression, unlimited respect for free inquiry and liberal education, and absolute tolerance for opposing opinion. Only thus can the democratic process function. Evidence for this tradition is so overwhelming and prolific that here we can do no more than skim it.

We might begin with Thomas Paine's aphorism:

He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent which will reach himself.

Jefferson, writing to William Charles Jarvis, held:

I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education.

J. A. Andrews, an early governor of Massachusetts, said:

I care not for the truth or error of the opinions held or uttered, nor for the wisdom of the words or time of their attempted expression, when I consider this great question of fundamental significance, this great right [of free expression] which must be secure before free society can be said to stand on any foundation, but only on temporary and capricious props.

In his first inaugural address Lincoln voiced his own Americanism by saying:

A government had better go to the very extreme in toleration than to do aught that could be construed into an interference with or to jeopardize in any degree the common rights of citizens.

The early American scientist, Thomas Cooper, who died in 1839, held that:

No doctrine, of whatever nature it be, or whatever its tendency, ought to be suppressed. For it is either manifestly false, or its truth is dubious.

If true it must be made operative. If false it convicts itself without suppression. But if dubious then only the freest possible discussion can establish its true value.

Channing held:

The progress of society depends on nothing more than on the exposure of time-sanctioned abuses which cannot be touched without offending multitudes, and on the promulgation of principles which are in advance of public sentiment and practice and which are, consequently, at war with the habits, prejudices, and immediate interests of large classes of the community.

To this sentiment Wendell Phillips added his voice:

How shall we ever learn toleration for what we do not believe? The last lesson a man ever learns is that liberty of thought and speech is the right for all mankind; that the man who denies every article of our creed is to be allowed to preach just as often and just as loud as we ourselves.

We detect here an echo of the doctrine so long attributed to Voltaire but so far not found in his writings: I disagree absolutely with what you have to say but shall defend to the death your right to say it freely. In modern times this classic doctrine has often been embodied in the opinions of leading American jurists. Judge Augustus Hand, in the case of Max Eastman, held it the right of every citizen freely to express his opinions about the Great War, about this country's participation therein, about the desirability of making peace, the demerits of conscription, or the claims made by conscientious objectors to war.

This held true, Judge Hand said, even when these opinions "are opposed to the opinions and policies of the Administration; and even though the expression of such opinion may unintentionally and indirectly discourage recruiting and enlistment." Judge Pound, in a "Red" case, used the doctrine, saying:

Although the defendant may be the worst of men; although Left Wing Socialism is a menace to organized government; the rights of the best of men are secure only as the rights of the vilest and most abhorrent are protected.

Charles Evans Hughes, speaking of the ouster of the Socialist assemblymen from Albany in 1920, said:

It is the essence of the institutions of liberty that it be recognized that guilt is personal and cannot be attributed to the holding of opinion nor to mere intent in the absence of overt acts.

We should expect Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to espouse the doctrine with his own tincture of wit, which he did, saying:

With effervescing opinions, as with the not yet forgotten champagne, the quickest way to let them get flat is to let them get exposed to air.

In many opinions, of course, he advocated freedom of expression.

What then are the essentials of traditional Americanism, if we may presume to judge it as expounded by leading American citizens from the time of the Revolution on? They appear to be somewhat as follows.

There was strong distrust of monarchy and it was rather generally felt that Presidents should not be re-elected. Monopolies and privileged classes should be abolished. There should be as little government as we can possibly get along with, and as little respect for law as can be contrived without relapse into open anarchy. The common people were not to be trusted; rule should really be in the hands of a sort of intellectual aristocracy.

It would not be a bad thing at all if the people rebelled against government by force every now and then, staged a new revolution as needed by new generations, and set up a government more pleasing to them. This involved the aforesaid distrust of government generally. In fact it was suggested that the Constitution be constantly readapted to new needs, and

be completely revised by each new generation which felt that necessary.

Finally, it was held that there should always be unqualified and unlimited freedom in the expression of opinion by every means, and regardless of its character. This involved extension of the most liberal education possible, and the establishment, preservation, and utilization of the spirit of free inquiry, which were thought to be the sole agents capable of promoting proper functioning of the democratic process.

Is this something to tie to? It is about what we get when we consider the deliberate opinions of those who best represent the essential American tradition. Is this sufficient bulwark against the incursions of communistic or totalitarian ideals of government? How many good average Americans are really acquainted with the basic philosophic beliefs and traditions underlying their system of government? Familiar and unfamiliar statements of great Americans have been given here to acquaint them with this tradition.

The Military and Civil Liberty

Robert E. Cushman is Goldwin Smith Professor of Government at Cornell University, and director of Cornell Research in Civil Liberties. In this selection from his article, "Civil Liberties in the Atomic Age," Mr. Cushman seeks to present a realistic appraisal of the dangers involved in expanding the range and scope of military activity and influence in the United States. The real issue at stake is not one involving any criticism of motives, but rather a recognition that the nature of military organization and its purpose conflicts with democratic procedures. The Army and Navy "cannot afford the luxury of the deliberate procedures, open discussion, and meticulous concern for minority rights which should characterize the functioning of a democratic state in dealing with questions of public policy." Therefore, Americans need to ponder the implications of an expanding reliance upon professional military men in key policy determining posts of the government.

The suggestion that military domination over the atomic bomb is likely to endanger civil liberty is not an attack upon the Army and Navy. No rational person can withhold his admiration of the magnificent achievements of our armed forces, or his gratitude for their services to the Nation during the war just ended. To see a threat to civil liberty in any broadening of the area of military control is merely to be realistic about the essential purposes, nature, and methods of military power. The job of the Army is to fight and to be at all times in readiness to defend the national security. To be able to do this, it must be so organized and disciplined that it can move fast. It must make quick and final decisions grounded upon military considerations and usually surrounded by complete secrecy. It cannot afford the luxury of the deliberate procedures, open discussion, and meticulous concern for minority rights which should characterize the functioning of a democratic state in

dealing with questions of public policy.

Because the Army is the kind of organization it is, because it has the kind of job it has, and because it must use the kind of methods it does, we have wisely built a fence around it, both in our thinking and in our constitutional provisions, to keep it from moving into areas in which there is no fighting to be done, to prevent it from supplanting the normal deliberative processes of civil government, and to prevent it from overriding civil liberty. To take these precautions is not to cast doubt upon the efficiency or the patriotism of our military leaders, but merely to recognize that it is not the job of the policeman to run the public schools or enact the city ordinances.

BULWARK AGAINST MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The student of history will recall that our strict subordination of military to

From "Civil Liberties in the Atomic Age," by Robert E. Cushman, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1947.

civil authority stems, not from the arguments of political philosophers, but from the bitter struggles in England and America by which the people won their freedom from arbitrary and self-sustaining military power. The British Bill of Rights of 1789 contained a clause which placed the British Army squarely under the control of Parliament, and ever since that time the civil control of military power in England has been kept alive by the process of doling out for one year at a time, under the provisions of the Mutiny Act, the money necessary to keep the Army going.

When we came to establish our own National Government, the recollection was fresh in the minds of American leaders that England had sought to impose military government upon at least some of its recalcitrant American colonies. In spite of the fact that we came perilously near losing our War for Independence because our Army was dependent for support upon an inept and inefficient Continental Congress, the men who framed our Constitution made sure that the military power of the new government was safely subordinated to civilian control. A civilian officer, the President of the United States, was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. Congress was given the sole power to declare war. Congress was also given the power "to raise and support armies," but with the express stipulation that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years."

These constitutional clauses have been supplemented by long-established governmental and political usage. Thus, with two or three exceptions in our long history, all of our Secretaries of War and Navy have been civilians. Congress, in appropriating money for the Army and Navy, has exercised important powers over military organization and policy, and every commission conferred on officers of

the Army and Navy from ensigns and second lieutenants up to generals and admirals must be confirmed by the Senate.

Recent experience confirms the wisdom of this historic policy of keeping the military arm of the Government under civilian control. It shows that such control is necessary both for a sound management of public policy and for an adequate protection for the civil liberties of our people. It is a significant fact that during World War II, a war in which our national security was imperiled as it had never been before, the only major sacrifices of civil liberty which occurred resulted from military action. We have every right to feel pride and satisfaction in the generally wise and tolerant manner in which the Government dealt with the wartime problems of freedom of speech and press, the treatment of enemy aliens, and, with some qualifications, the handling of conscientious objectors. But few thoughtful people who know the facts will be able to escape a sense of national humiliation mixed with deep concern at the military evacuation of American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the west coast, and the long-continued military suppression of civilian government in Hawaii. I should like to comment briefly on these two violations of basic civil liberties, because in so far as they are typical instances of Army behavior they become gravely relevant to the question of what role the Army is to play in dealing with the new and more far-reaching problems created by the atomic bomb.

EVACUATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS

The main facts regarding the Japanese evacuation are now well known. Within a day or so after Pearl Harbor all Japanese and other enemy aliens previously ticketed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as potentially dangerous were in custody.

Full information about them had long been in the official files. Under authority of Executive Order No. 9066, of February 1942, General De Witt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, established Military Area No. 1, to comprise the entire west coast from Canada to Mexico to an average depth of about forty miles. Some 112,000 Japanese, 70,000 of whom were American citizens by reason of their birth in the United States, were compulsorily transferred from this area to relocation centers set up under the newly created War Relocation Authority, and detained there until the revocation of the exclusion orders in December 1944.

What this boils down to is the shocking fact that the Army took 70,000 American citizens, against no one of whom were any charges made of disloyalty or subversive activity, and locked them up in concentration camps for the virtual duration of the war.

The Army vigorously defended the evacuation program on the following grounds: Responsible military leaders believed that "the gravest imminent danger" to the public safety existed and that the exclusion of American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the defense zones was necessary both for their own protection against possible mob violence and in order to prevent espionage and sabotage. They reasoned that in so large a number of people of Japanese ancestry there must surely be some who were disloyal and dangerous, and that there was not time to try to separate the disloyal from the loyal. They denied that the evacuees were being punished, and insisted that the whole enterprise was a gigantic quarantine proceeding. Later, they made much of the fact that some American citizens of Japanese origin refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and several thousand requested repatriation to Japan. They did not point out that these evidences of dis-

loyalty cropped up *after* the compulsory evacuation, and at a time, therefore, when it must have been pretty hard for any of these 70,000 American citizens to feel any strong sense of patriotic devotion to a government which had deprived them of nearly every constitutional right which American citizens can claim.

It is true that the Supreme Court of the United States in 1944 held, six to three, that the evacuation program was constitutional. But the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black does little more than declare that the evacuation was, in 1944, a *fait accompli*, and that it was too late to do anything about it. His argument, in substance, is this: The military authorities believed that there was grave danger to the public security. They believed that the evacuation of the Japanese-Americans was necessary to abate that danger. They believed that "the need for action was great and the time was short." In time of war we have to trust our military commanders. He concluded, "We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified."

PREJUDICE AT THE ROOT

But in "the calm perspective of hindsight" certain facts stand out which neither the Army nor the Court has explained away and which mark the entire proceeding as an abuse of power and an appalling violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. First, there is more than a little evidence that the long-standing racial antagonism against the west coast Japanese played its part in the drive to evacuate these American citizens. General De Witt, who ordered the evacuation, observed before a committee of the House of Representatives:

A Jap's a Jap and it makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not ... I don't want any of them. We got them

out. They were a dangerous element. The West Coast is too vital and too vulnerable to take chances. . . . You can't change [a Jap] by giving him a piece of paper.

Second, it is a matter of record that no instance of espionage, sabotage, or other disloyal conduct was discovered on the part of any Japanese-American, either on the west coast or in the Hawaiian Islands, during the war.

Third, the Army's contention that the mass evacuation was necessary because there was no time to determine which of the Japanese-Americans were loyal and which were disloyal will not bear scrutiny. The facts are that the first evacuation order was not issued until four months after Pearl Harbor, the last one not until eight months had elapsed, while the evacuation was not completed for eleven months. As Mr. Justice Murphy remarked in his dissenting opinion in the *Korematsu case*, "It seems incredible that under these circumstances it would have been impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the mere 112,000 persons involved—or at least the 70,000 American citizens—especially when a large part of this number represented children and elderly men and women."

MILITARY SUPPRESSIONS IN HAWAII

The second instance of military overriding of civil liberties during World War II occurred in the Hawaiian Islands. On the day after Pearl Harbor the Army set up military government in the Islands and took over all legislative, executive, and judicial functions. This affected not only the Japanese but all of the 460,000 people who live in Hawaii. The administration of criminal justice by the civil courts was completely blacked out.

Responsible military leaders argued that this drastic subordination of civilian affairs to Army control was necessary to

the public security, but to the civil officers and people of the Territory it seemed a wanton and unnecessary denial of constitutionally protected civil liberties. It is now admitted that any active danger of the invasion of the Islands was effectively ended by the Battle of Midway in June 1942. It has already been stated that there were no known acts of sabotage, espionage, or other disloyal conduct by the Japanese or anybody else in Hawaii, either at the time of or after the Pearl Harbor attack. The civil courts of the Territory were ready at all times to perform their normal duties had they been allowed to do so, and experienced Federal judges testified that there was no good reason why any of the civilian criminal cases handled by the Army courts could not have been just as well or better handled by the courts of the Territory.

The bitter resentment engendered by this complete military suppression of civil government finally flared into a dramatic conflict between Federal District Judge Delbert E. Metzger and Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Commanding General of the Central Pacific Area. Judge Metzger issued a writ of habeas corpus in the case of two American citizens of German origin who had been interned by summary military action. General Richardson disobeyed the writ and replied with an order specifically forbidding any judge in the Territory to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Judge Metzger thereupon fined General Richardson \$5,000 for contempt of court.

At this juncture an emissary was sent from the Department of Justice in Washington to try to break the deadlock. A compromise was reached by which the President remitted the fine imposed on General Richardson, and General Richardson withdrew his order against Judge Metzger. It was agreed that writs of habeas corpus might be issued but that no prisoners would be released unless higher

courts, on appeal, so ordered. This made it possible for a case to be started in the district court to test the validity of the military government. When this case came to the Supreme Court for review in February 1946, that Court ruled that the Army had exceeded its authority in suppressing civil government in the Islands. As a result, several military commanders are right now in the uncomfortable position of defending suits for damages brought against them for unlawful imprisonment.

While the Army was judicially spanked for its usurpation of power, the spanking came after the war was over and after basic civil liberties had been overridden for two years. The lesson from this is that while public danger can be real, it can also be a hue and cry under cover of which military government mows down the normal civil rights of the people.

CUSTODY OF ATOMIC RESEARCH

This all has a bearing on the problems we now face arising out of the atomic bomb. It is natural that military men should regard these as military problems, just as the development of a new type of submarine or airplane would create military problems. New scientific discoveries, especially in the field of destructive weapons, vitally concern the public security of this Nation as well as every other nation. Heavy responsibilities in connection with the atomic bomb must and should rest with our military leaders. We shall need to depend upon them for expert advice as never before. On every question which concerns the national security they must be consulted and their judgment must carry the greatest weight.

If study of this problem, however, has made anything clear, I should say that it is that the atomic bomb, with the whole scientific development of which it is a part, presents very much more than a

military problem. It has presented a challenge to virtually every field of human thought and activity, and it calls for statesmanship of the highest order to deal wisely with the new problems which it has created. This is why the responsible leaders of the Government—the President, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, and many others—have demanded that the control of atomic energy be placed in the hands of a civilian commission with power to write the basic policy for its use and development.

There is a strong counterdrive in progress, however, which seeks to turn the whole matter over to the Army and Navy on the ground that only the military branch of the Government can safely be trusted with problems so vitally affecting the national security. I have already mentioned Congressman Rankin as one of the spokesmen for this other school of thought. He is joined by members of the Committee on Un-American Activities, the House Committee on Military Affairs, as well as other members of Congress, and many officers of the Army and Navy.

CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY CONTROL

I shall not comment on the success with which the military would be likely to deal with the broad issues of domestic and foreign policy which the development of the atomic bomb has created, although such a prospect is not reassuring. I do wish to suggest, however, that to the extent to which we leave the military in control in this vitally important area, to that extent we may reasonably expect the following restrictions upon civil liberty.

First, the military is of necessity the great apostle of the doctrine of secrecy. But from the military point of view, to be sure of secrecy means—don't tell anything. With the Army in control of the atomic energy question, any free flow of

information in that field will end. No one will deny that secrecy is essential in handling security problems, and no one desires irresponsible gossiping about matters which concern the national safety. But neither reason nor experience indicates that military judgment on the sound limits of secrecy in the field of scientific investigation is likely to be as trustworthy as that of a responsible civilian group. It would be calamitous to shut off the broad and free discussion of the basic points involved, since it is only by such free discussion that we can hope to increase our wisdom and inform public opinion with respect to the vital questions of policy facing us.

A colleague of mine in a great university whose scientists had been actively concerned with the work on the atomic bomb related this incident: One of these scientists, a man of national repute, accepted an invitation to give a popular talk on uranium to a Rotary Club or chamber of commerce, or some such group. Now uranium was discovered in 1789 and there is no chemist in the world who is not familiar with it, although many laymen would now be glad to know some of the general facts about it. Suddenly, this scientist received a message the essence of which was, "The War Department does not wish any public talk about uranium." The scientist explained that he was planning no disclosure of any atomic bomb secrets, or anything else except the most obvious and innocuous information. The response was, "The War Department does not wish any public talk about uranium." And that was that. Can there be any doubt that this attitude is what we must expect if the Army is put in control of atomic developments? And secrecy and censorship are archenemies of civil liberty.

Second, military control of atomic energy development would mean that our scientists would have to work under restrictions imposed by military authority. Perhaps the scientists would not mind.

Perhaps the restrictions would be wholly reasonable. Perhaps there would be no restrictions. But experience points in the other direction. Professor Harold C. Urey, of the University of Chicago, a Nobel Prize winner and one of the key men in the development of the atom bomb, has made entirely plain his own attitude toward this situation, and he speaks for many of his colleagues. He asserts that at present the top-flight men in the field of science are not working on the atomic bomb, because "good men simply will not work on the atom bomb the way the Army wants them to." He added, "At least a civilian commission wouldn't throw out a competent scientist just because it didn't like him, which is what the military did." Complete freedom of scientific research is a national asset which must be guarded and nurtured if we are to retain our position of world leadership, and that sort of freedom apparently does not flourish under Army supervision.

Third, the Army insists that those under its authority in positions of responsibility pass the most rigid scrutiny of their loyalty to this country. This is of course necessary and desirable. We cannot allow spies, traitors, or others of dubious reliability and patriotism to occupy these key posts, or any others. But unfortunately the Army has complicated this problem by including in its examination of a man's loyalty a scrutiny of his political and economic views and his social philosophy. I do not mean that it distinguishes between Republicans and Democrats, but it appears to be generally guided by the standards set up by the Dies Committee... in determining whether a man ought to be regarded as a dangerous radical, and therefore subversive. The commission of a former student of mine, specially trained for intelligence work in the Army, was held up for months because after painstaking scrutiny it was discovered that he had married a girl who,

while in college, had belonged to the American Student Union.

It is quite clear that Army authorities intend to exclude from participation in atomic energy work scientists whose liberal social and economic views might lead the Army mind to regard them as either suspect or actually dangerous. If one of our nuclear physicists is found to have expressed sympathy with the Spanish Loyalists back in 1939 or 1940, there is every indication at present that the military authorities, were they in full control,

would bar him from participation in atomic research.

It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that if the atomic bomb and its aftermath lead us, on grounds of national security, to vest control and responsibility in the hands of the Army, then we are inviting a substantial and continuing curtailment of freedom of thought, freedom of discussion, and freedom of scientific investigation. Military control and civil liberty do not live comfortably together in the same house.

Civil Power Supreme

Dwight D. Eisenhower, former U. S. Army Chief of Staff, and Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in World War II, is now President of Columbia University. In this letter to Leonard V. Finder, publisher of *The Manchester (N. H.) Evening Leader*, General Eisenhower removed himself from consideration as a Presidential candidate in the 1948 campaign. With this inspiring statement, written at a time when he was leading all other potential Republican candidates, General Eisenhower reaffirms a vital article of democratic doctrine: the necessity for having military power at all times subordinate to civil power. This end can best be achieved by professional military men remaining out of politics.

22 January 1948

Dear Mr. Finder:

Your letter and editorial have been on my desk for more than a week while I pondered the reply merited by your obvious concern for the nation's welfare, and from a personal standpoint, by the honor you had done me. Months ago I thought that unqualified denial of political ambition would eliminate me from consideration in the coming campaign for the Presidency, because that office has, since the days of Washington historically and properly fallen only to aspirants.

That some few would misinterpret or look for hidden meanings in my past ex-

pressions was expected and discounted, but my failure to convince thoughtful and earnest men, such as yourself, proves that I must make some amplification. This will necessarily partake of the laborious, due to the complexity of the factors that have influenced me to say no more than I have, but which dictate my decision that I am not available for and could not accept nomination to high political office.

I have heretofore refrained from making the bald statement that I would not accept nomination, although this has been my intention since the subject was first mentioned to me.

This omission seems to have been a mis-

take, since it has inadvertently misled sincere and disinterested Americans. But my reticence stemmed from cogent reasons. The first was that such an expression would smack of effrontery. I had and I have no desire to appear either as assuming that significant numbers of our people would actively interest themselves in me as a possible candidate, or to appear as lacking in respect and regard for the highest honor American citizens can confer upon one of their own body.

A second and even deeper reason was a persistent doubt that I could phrase a flat refusal without appearing to violate that concept of duty to country which calls upon every good citizen to place no limitations upon his readiness to serve in any designated capacity. On this point is my conviction, that, unless an individual feels some inner compulsion and special qualifications to enter the political arena, which I do not, a refusal to do so involves no violation of the highest standards of devotion to duty.

It was only the possible misinterpretation of my attitude that caused me concern and so long as I could believe that mere denial of political ambition would prevent serious misunderstanding and misdirected effort, I was reluctant to say more. It would seem almost superfluous for me to add that as long as I live I shall hold myself in instant readiness to respond to any call by the Government to military duty.

In full awareness, then, and not in violation of my own sense of duty, I have developed the following conclusions, which are responsible for my negative decision.

It is my conviction that the necessary and wise subordination of the military to civil power will be best sustained and our people will have greater confidence that it is so sustained when lifelong professional soldiers in the absence of some obvious and overriding reasons, abstain from seek-

ing high political office. This truth has a possible inverse application. I would regard it as unalloyed tragedy for our country if ever should come the day when military commanders might be selected with an eye to their future potentialities in the political field rather than exclusively upon judgment as to their military abilities.

Politics is a profession; a serious, complicated and, in its true sense, a noble one.

In the American scene I see no dearth of men fitted by training, talent, and integrity for national leadership. On the other hand, nothing in the international or domestic situation especially qualifies for the most important office in the world a man whose adult years have been spent in the country's military forces. At least this is true in my case.

I am deeply regretful if a too simple faith in the effectiveness of a plain denial has misled any considerable number concerning my intentions and so allowed them to spend time and effort under erroneous impressions. At the risk of appearing pompous, I must say that the honor paid me cannot fail to spur me, in future years, to work the more diligently for America, her youth, her veterans and all her citizens, and for the continuance of peace.

I trust that this rather lengthy explanation will convince you that my conclusions are not only sound but have been arrived at objectively and have not been unduly influenced by my own desires and convenience. In any event, my decision to remove myself completely from the political scene is definite and positive. I know you will not object to my making this letter public to inform all interested persons that I could not accept nomination even under the remote circumstances that it were tendered me.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower

To Secure These Rights

To Secure These Rights is one of the great public documents of our times. A distinguished committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Charles E. Wilson, was appointed by President Truman to conduct a survey of civil rights in the United States. This report, which was written under the direction of Professor Robert Carr of Dartmouth College, constitutes an impressive documentation of the extent to which Americans live up to their great tradition, or fail to do so. In the selection here presented there is a restatement of our heritage and a report on "the condition of our rights."

In the time that it takes to read this report, 1,000 Americans will be born. These new Americans will come into families whose religious faiths are a roster of all those which men hold sacred. Their names will be strange and varied, echoes from every corner of the world. Their skins will range in color from black to white. A few will be born to riches, more to average comfort, and too many to poverty. All of them will be Americans.

These new Americans, drawn from all of the races of mankind, provide a challenge to our American democracy. We have a great heritage of freedom and equality for all men, sometimes called "the American way." Yet we cannot avoid the knowledge that the American ideal still awaits complete realization.

It was this knowledge which led the President to create this Committee; and the Committee's assignment has been primarily to discover wherein and to what extent we are presently failing to live up to that ideal. As we have said, this has meant that in its deliberations, and in this report, the Committee has focused its attention, not upon our achievements in protecting our heritage of civil liberties, but upon our shortcomings and our mistakes. These the Committee has not minimized nor has it evaded the responsibility

of recommending remedial action. A later section of this report summarizes some of the concrete gains which we have made in the more secure protection of freedom and equality. Further evidence of our adherence to our great heritage in this field is the desire of our government to have our national record carefully scrutinized in an effort to expose our shortcomings and to find ways of correcting them.

If we are to judge with accuracy how far short we have fallen in living up to the ideals which comprise our American heritage of freedom and equality, we must first make it clear what that heritage is.

The central theme in our American heritage is the importance of the individual person. From the earliest moment of our history we have believed that every human being has an essential dignity and integrity which must be respected and safeguarded. Moreover, we believe that the welfare of the individual is the final goal of group life. Our American heritage further teaches that to be secure in the rights he wishes for himself, each man must be willing to respect the rights of other men. This is the conscious recognition of a basic moral principle: that all men are created equal as well as free. Stemming from this principle is the obli-

gation to build social institutions that will guarantee equality of opportunity to all men. Without this equality freedom becomes an illusion. Thus the only aristocracy that is consistent with the free way of life is an aristocracy of talent and achievement. The grounds on which our society accords respect, influence or reward to each of its citizens must be limited to the quality of his personal character and of his social contribution.

This concept of equality which is so vital a part of the American heritage knows no kinship with notions of human uniformity or regimentation. We abhor the totalitarian arrogance which makes one man say that he will respect another man as his equal only if he has "*my* race, *my* religion, *my* political views, *my* social position." In our land men are equal, but they are free to be different. From these very differences among our people has come the great human and national strength of America.

Thus, the aspirations and achievements of each member of our society are to be limited only by the skills and energies he brings to the opportunities equally offered to all Americans. We can tolerate no restrictions upon the individual which depend upon irrelevant factors such as his race, his color, his religion or the social position to which he is born.

The men who founded our Republic, as those who have built any constitutional democracy, faced the task of reconciling personal liberty and group authority, or of establishing an equilibrium between them. In a democratic state we recognize that the common interests of the people must be managed by laws and procedures established by majority rule. But a democratic majority, left unrestrained, may be as ruthless and tyrannical as were the earlier absolute monarchs. Seeing this clearly, and fearing it greatly, our forefathers built a constitutional system in which valued personal liberties, carefully

enumerated in a Bill of Rights, were placed beyond the reach of popular majorities. Thus the people permanently denied the federal government power to interfere with certain personal rights and freedoms.

Freedom, however, as we now use the term, means even more than the traditional "freedoms" listed in our Bill of Rights—important as they are. Freedom has come to mean the right of a man to manage his own affairs as he sees fit up to the point where what he does interferes with the equal rights of others in the community to manage their affairs—or up to the point where he begins to injure the welfare of the whole group. It is clear that in modern democratic society a man's freedom in this broader sense is not and cannot be absolute—nor does it exist in a vacuum—but instead is hedged about by the competing rights of others and the demands of the social welfare. In this context it is government which must referee the clashes which arise among the freedoms of citizens, and protect each citizen in the enjoyment of the maximum freedom to which he is entitled.

There is no essential conflict between freedom and government. Bills of rights restrain government from abridging individual civil liberties, while government itself by sound legislative policies protects citizens against the aggressions of others seeking to push their freedoms too far. Thus in the words of the Declaration of Independence: "Man is endowed by his Creator with certain inalienable rights. Among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights, *governments are instituted among men.*"

The rights essential to the citizen in a free society can be described in different words and in varying orders. The three great rights of the Declaration of Independence have just been mentioned. Another noble statement is made in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. A more

recent formulation is found in the Four Freedoms.

Four basic rights have seemed important to this Committee and have influenced its labors. We believe that each of these rights is essential to the well-being of the individual and to the progress of society.

I. THE RIGHT TO SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON

Freedom can exist only where the citizen is assured that his person is secure against bondage, lawless violence, and arbitrary arrest and punishment. Freedom from slavery in all its forms is clearly necessary if all men are to have equal opportunity to use their talents and to lead worthwhile lives. Moreover, to be free, men must be subject to discipline by society only for commission of offenses clearly defined by law and only after trial by due process of law. Where the administration of justice is discriminatory, no man can be sure of security. Where the threat of violence by private persons or mobs exist, a cruel inhibition of the sense of freedom of activity and security of the person inevitably results. Where a society permits private and arbitrary violence to be done to its members, its own integrity is inevitably corrupted. It cannot permit human beings to be imprisoned or killed in the absence of due process of law without degrading its entire fabric.

2. THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS PRIVILEGES

Since it is a purpose of government in a democracy to regulate the activity of each man in the interest of all men, it follows that every mature and responsible person must be able to enjoy full citizenship and have an equal voice in his government. Because the right to participate

in the political process is customarily limited to citizens there can be no denial of access to citizenship based upon race, color, creed, or national origin. Denial of citizenship for these reasons cheapens the personality of those who are confined to this inferior status and endangers the whole concept of a democratic society.

To deny qualified citizens the right to vote while others exercise it is to do violence to the principle of freedom and equality. Without the right to vote, the individual loses his voice in the group effort and is subjected to rule by a body from which he has been excluded. Likewise, the right of the individual to vote is important to the group itself. Democracy assumes that the majority is more likely as a general rule to make decisions which are wise and desirable from the point of view of the interests of the whole society than is any minority. Every time a qualified person is denied a voice in public affairs, one of the components of a potential majority is lost, and the formation of a sound public policy is endangered.

To the citizen in a democracy, freedom is a precious possession. Accordingly, all able-bodied citizens must enjoy the right to serve the nation and the cause of freedom in time of war. Any attempt to curb the right to fight in its defense can only lead the citizen to question the worth of the society in which he lives. A sense of frustration is created which is wholly alien to the normal emotions of a free man. In particular, any discrimination which, while imposing an obligation, prevents members of minority groups from rendering full military service in defense of their country is for them a peculiarly humiliating badge of inferiority. The nation also suffers a loss of manpower and is unable to marshal maximum strength at a moment when such strength is most needed.

3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND EXPRESSION

In a free society there is faith in the ability of the people to make sound, rational judgments. But such judgments are possible only where the people have access to all relevant facts and to all prevailing interpretations of the facts. How can such judgments be formed on a sound basis if arguments, viewpoints, or opinions are arbitrarily suppressed? How can the concept of the marketplace of thought in which truth ultimately prevails retain its validity if the thought of certain individuals is denied the right of circulation? The Committee reaffirms our tradition that freedom of expression may be curbed by law only where the danger to the well-being of society is clear and present.

Religious Freedom.

Our forefathers fought bloody wars and suffered torture and death for the right to worship God according to the varied dictates of conscience. Complete religious liberty has been accepted as an unquestioned personal freedom since our Bill of Rights was adopted. We have insisted only that religious freedom may not be pleaded as an excuse for criminal or clearly antisocial conduct.

4. THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

It is not enough that full and equal membership in society entitles the individual to an equal voice in the control of his government; it must also give him the right to enjoy the benefits of society and to contribute to its progress. The opportunity of each individual to obtain useful employment, and to have access to services in the fields of education, housing,

health, recreation, and transportation whether available free or at a price, must be provided with complete disregard for race, color, creed, and national origin. Without this equality of opportunity the individual is deprived of the chance to develop his potentialities and to share the fruits of society. The group also suffers through the loss of the contributions which might have been made by persons excluded from the main channels of social and economic activity.

Our American heritage of freedom and equality has given us prestige among the nations of the world and a strong feeling of national pride at home. There is much reason for that pride. But pride is no substitute for steady and honest performance, and the record shows that at varying times in American history the gulf between ideals and practice has been wide. We have had human slavery. We have had religious persecution. We have had mob rule. We still have their ideological remnants in the unwarrantable "pride and prejudice" of some of our people and practices.

From our work as a Committee, we have learned much that has shocked us, and much that has made us ashamed. But we have seen nothing to shake our conviction that the civil rights of the American people—all of them—can be strengthened quickly and effectively by the normal processes of democratic, constitutional government. That strengthening, we believe, will make our daily life more and more consonant with the spirit of the American heritage of freedom. But it will require as much courage, as much imagination, as much perseverance as anything which we have ever done together. The members of this Committee reaffirm their faith in the American heritage and in its promise.

THE CONDITION OF OUR RIGHTS

I. THE RIGHT TO SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON

Vital to the integrity of the individual and to the stability of a democratic society is the right of each individual to physical freedom, to security against illegal violence, and to fair, orderly legal process. Most Americans enjoy this right, but it is not yet secure for all. Too many of our people still live under the harrowing fear of violence or death at the hands of a mob or of brutal treatment by police officers. Many fear entanglement with the law because of the knowledge that the justice rendered in some courts is not equal for all persons. In a few areas the freedom to move about and choose one's job is endangered by attempts to hold workers in peonage or other forms of involuntary servitude.

Lynching.

In 1946 at least six persons in the United States were lynched by mobs. Three of them had not been charged, either by the police or anyone else, with an offense. Of the three that had been charged, one had been accused of stealing a saddle. (The real thieves were discovered after the lynching.) Another was said to have broken into a house. A third was charged with stabbing a man. All were Negroes. During the same year, mobs were prevented from lynching 22 persons, of whom 21 were Negroes, 1 white.

On July 20, 1946, a white farmer, Loy Harrison, posted bond for the release of Roger Malcolm from the jail at Monroe, Georgia. Malcolm, a young Negro, had been involved in a fight with his white employer during the course of which the latter had been stabbed. It is reported that there was talk of lynching Malcolm at the time of the incident and while he

was in jail. Upon Malcolm's release, Harrison started to drive Malcolm, Malcolm's wife, and a Negro overseas veteran, George Dorsey, and his wife, out of Monroe. At a bridge along the way a large group of unmasked white men, armed with pistols and shotguns, was waiting. They stopped Harrison's car and removed Malcolm and Dorsey.

As they were leading the two men away, Harrison later stated, one of the women called out the name of a member of the mob. Thereupon the lynchers returned and removed the two women from the car. Three volleys of shots were fired as if by a squad of professional executioners. The coroner's report said that at least 60 bullets were found in the scarcely recognizable bodies. Harrison consistently denied that he could identify any of the unmasked murderers. State and federal grand juries reviewed the evidence in the case, but no person has yet been indicted for the crime.

Later that summer, in Minden, Louisiana, a young Negro named John Jones was arrested on suspicion of housebreaking. Another Negro youth, Albert Harris, was arrested at about the same time, and beaten in an effort to implicate Jones. He was then released, only to be rearrested after a few days. On August 6th, early in the evening, and before there had been any trial of the charges against them, Jones and Harris were released by a deputy sheriff. Waiting in the jail yard was a group of white men. There was evidence that, with the aid of the deputy sheriff, the young men were put into a car. They were then driven into the country. Jones was beaten to death. Harris, left for dead, revived and escaped. Five persons, including two deputy sheriffs, were indicted and brought to trial in a federal court for this crime. All were acquitted.

These are two of the less brutal lynchings of the past years. The victims in these cases were not mutilated or burned.

The record for 1947 is incomplete. There has been one lynching, one case in which the victim escaped, and other instances where mobs have been unable to accomplish their purpose. On February 17, 1947, a Negro youth named Willie Earle, accused of fatally stabbing a taxi driver in the small city of Greenville, South Carolina, was removed from jail by a mob, viciously beaten, and finally shot to death. In an unusual and impressive instance of state prosecution, 31 men were tried for this crime. All were acquitted on the evening of May 21, 1947.

Early the next morning, in Jackson, North Carolina, another Negro youth, Godwin Bush, arrested on a charge of approaching a white woman, was removed from a local jail by a mob, after having been exhibited through the town by the sheriff. Bush succeeded in escaping from his abductors, and, after hiding for two days in nearby woods, was able to surrender himself safely into the custody of FBI agents and officers of the state. The Committee finds it encouraging to note that the Governor of North Carolina has made vigorous efforts to bring to justice those responsible for this attempted lynching.

While available statistics show that, decade by decade, lynchings have decreased, this Committee has found that in the year 1947 lynching remains one of the most serious threats to the civil rights of Americans. It is still possible for a mob to abduct and murder a person in some sections of the country with almost certain assurance of escaping punishment for the crime. The decade from 1936 through 1946 saw at least 43 lynchings. No person received the death penalty, and the majority of the guilty persons were not even prosecuted.

The communities in which lynchings occur tend to condone the crime. Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility of state or local govern-

ments in these communities. Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or passively. Federal efforts to punish the crime are resisted. Condonation of lynching is indicated by the failure of some local law enforcement officials to make adequate efforts to break up a mob. It is further shown by failure in most cases to make any real effort to apprehend or try those guilty. If the federal government enters a case, local officials sometimes actively resist the federal investigation. Local citizens often combine to impede the effort to apprehend the criminals by convenient "loss of memory"; grand juries refuse to indict; trial juries acquit in the face of overwhelming proof of guilt.

The large number of attempted lynchings highlights, even more than those which have succeeded, the widespread readiness of many communities to resort to mob violence. Thus, for seven of the years from 1937 to 1946 for which statistics are reported, the conservative estimates of the Tuskegee Institute show that 226 persons were rescued from threatened lynching. Over 200 of these were Negroes.

Most rescues from lynchings are made by local officials. There is heartening evidence that an ever-increasing number of these officers have the will and the courage to defend their prisoners against mob action. But this reflects only partial progress toward adequate law enforcement. In some instances lynchers are dissuaded by promises that the desired result will be accomplished "legally" and the machinery of justice is sometimes sensitive to the demands of such implied bargains. In some communities there is more official zeal to avoid mob violence which will injure the reputation of the community than there is to protect innocent persons.

The devastating consequences of lynchings go far beyond what is shown by counting the victims. When a person is lynched and the lynchers go unpunished,

thousands wonder where the evil will appear again and what mischance may produce another victim. And every time lynchers go unpunished, Negroes have learned to expect other forms of violence at the hands of private citizens or public officials. In describing the thwarted efforts of the Department of Justice to identify those responsible for one lynching, J. Edgar Hoover stated to the Committee: "The arrogance of most of the white population of that county was unbelievable, and the fear of the Negroes was almost unbelievable."

The almost complete immunity from punishment enjoyed by lynchers is merely a striking form of the broad and general immunity from punishment enjoyed by whites in many communities for less extreme offenses against Negroes. Moreover, lynching is the ultimate threat by which his inferior status is driven home to the Negro. As a terrorist device, it reinforces all the other disabilities placed upon him. That threat of lynching always hangs over the head of the southern Negro; the knowledge that a misinterpreted word or action can lead to his death is a dreadful burden.

Police Brutality.

We have reported the failure of some public officials to fulfill their most elementary duty—the protection of persons against mob violence. We must also report more widespread and varied forms of official misconduct. These include violent physical attacks by police officers on members of minority groups, the use of third degree methods to extort confessions, and brutality against prisoners. Civil rights violations of this kind are by no means universal and many law enforcement agencies have gone far in recent years toward stamping out these evils.

In various localities, scattered throughout the country, unprofessional or undisciplined police, while avoiding brutality,

fail to recognize and to safeguard the civil rights of citizenry. Insensitive to the necessary limits of police authority, untrained officers frequently overstep the bounds of their proper duties. At times this appears in unwarranted arrests, unduly prolonged detention before arraignment, and abuse of the search and seizure power. Cases involving these branches of civil rights constantly come before the courts.

The frequency with which such cases arise is proof that improper police conduct is still widespread, for it must be assumed that there are many instances of the abuse of police power which do not reach the courts. Most of the victims of such abuse are ignorant, friendless persons, unaware of their rights, and without the means of challenging those who have violated those rights.

Where lawless police forces exist, their activities may impair the civil rights of any citizen. In one place the brunt of illegal police activity may fall on suspected vagrants, in another on union organizers, and in another on unpopular racial or religious minorities, such as Negroes, Mexicans, or Jehovah's Witnesses. But wherever unfettered police lawlessness exists, civil rights may be vulnerable to the prejudices of the region or of dominant local groups, and to the caprice of individual policemen. Unpopular, weak, or defenseless groups are most apt to suffer.

Considerable evidence in the files of the Department of Justice supports this assertion. For example, in one case in 1945 a group of white juvenile offenders made an abortive effort to escape from a mid-western prison. The attempt was quickly and fairly easily subdued. In the course of the attempt a trusty was injured. The prison officials, after rounding up the boys, allowed other trusties to vent their anger at the injury to their comrade by physically attacking the defenseless prisoners. After this had occurred the boys

were then severely beaten, one by one, by the prison officials.

Much of the illegal official action which has been brought to the attention of the Committee is centered in the South. There is evidence of lawless police action against whites and Negroes alike, but the dominant pattern is that of race prejudice. J. Edgar Hoover referred, in his testimony before the Committee, to a particular jail where "it was seldom that a Negro man or woman was incarcerated who was not given a severe beating, which started off with a pistol whipping and ended with a rubber hose."

The files of the Department abound with evidence of illegal official action in southern states. In one case, the victim was arrested on a charge of stealing a tire, taken to the courthouse, beaten by three officers with a blackjack until his head was a bloody pulp, and then dragged unconscious through the streets to the jail where he was thrown, dying, onto the floor.

In another case, a constable arrested a Negro, against whom he bore a personal grudge, beat him brutally with a bullwhip and then forced his victim, in spite of his protestations of being unable to swim, to jump into a river where he drowned. In a third case, there was evidence that officers arrested a Negro maid on a charge of stealing jewelry from her employer, took her to jail and severely beat and whipped her in an unsuccessful effort to extort a confession. All of these cases occurred within the last five years.

There are other cases in the files of the Department of Justice of officers who seemed "trigger-happy" where weak or poor persons are concerned. In a number of instances, Negroes have been shot, supposedly in self-defense, under circumstances indicating, at best, unsatisfactory police work in the handling of criminals, and, at worst, a callous willingness to kill.

Toward the end of the work of this

Committee a particularly shocking instance of this occurred. On July 11, 1947, eight Negro prisoners in the State highway prison camp in Glynn County, Georgia, were killed by their white guards as they allegedly attempted to escape. The Glynn County grand jury exonerated the warden of the camp and four guards of all charges. At later hearings on the highway prison camp system held by the State Board of Corrections, conflicting evidence was presented. But one witness testified that there was no evidence that the prisoners were trying to escape. In any case, he said it was not necessary to use guns on them in the circumstances. "There was no justification for the killing. I saw the Negroes where they fell. Two were killed where they crawled under the bunkhouse and two others as they ran under their cells. The only thing they were trying to escape was death. Only one tried to get over the fence." The warden and four guards were indicted by a federal grand jury on October 1, 1947.

It is difficult to accept at face value police claims in cases of this type that action has been taken against prisoners in "self-defense" or to "prevent escape." Even if these protestations are accepted, the incidence of shooting in the ordinary course of law enforcement in some sections of the country is a serious reflection on these police forces. Other officers in other places seem able to enforce the law and to guard prisoners without resort to violent means.

The total picture—adding the connivance of some police officials in lynchings to their record of brutality against Negroes in other situations—is, in the opinion of this Committee, a serious reflection on American justice. We know that Americans everywhere deplore this violence. We recognize further that there are many law enforcement officers in the South and the North who do not commit violent acts against Negroes or other friendless cul-

prits. We are convinced, however, that the incidence of police brutality against Negroes is disturbingly high.

In addition to the treatment experienced by the weak and friendless person at the hands of police officers, he sometimes finds that the judicial process itself does not give him full and equal justice. This may appear in unfair and perfunctory trials, or in fines and prison sentences that are heavier than those imposed on other members of the community guilty of the same offenses.

In part, the inability of the Negro, Mexican, or Indian to obtain equal justice may be attributed to extrajudicial factors. The low income of a member of any one of these minorities may prevent him from securing competent counsel to defend his rights. It may prevent him from posting bail or bond to secure his release from jail during trial. It may predetermine his choice upon conviction, of paying a fine or going to jail. But these facts should not obscure or condone the extent to which the judicial system itself is responsible for the less than equal justice meted out to members of certain minority groups.

The United States Supreme Court in a number of recent decisions has censured state courts for accepting evidence procured by third-degree methods, for failing to provide accused persons with adequate legal counsel, and for excluding Negroes from jury lists. For example, in one of these cases, *Chambers v. Florida*, the Supreme Court, in 1940, set aside the conviction by the state court of four young Negroes on the ground that it should have rejected confessions extorted from the accused by the use of third degree methods. The Court referred to the basic principle that "all people must stand on an equality before the bar of justice in each American court." It added:

Today, as in ages past, we are not without tragic proof that the exalted power of some

governments to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is the handmaid of tyranny. Under our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. Due process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death. No higher duty, no more solemn responsibility, rests upon this Court, than that of translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution—of whatever race, creed, or persuasion.

It is particularly unfortunate that the jury system has not always served to protect the right of the minority member to a fair trial. All too frequently trial by a jury of one's peers has no meaning for these persons because of the complete absence of people of their own kind from jury lists. While the Supreme Court and other appellate tribunals have reversed convictions made by juries selected from lists from which whole minority groups have been excluded, techniques of exclusion continue to be employed. For example, Pauline Kibbe, in her 1946 study of Latin Americans in Texas, states:

In an estimated 50 counties where the Latin American population ranges from 15 to 40 per cent, persons of Mexican descent have never been known to be called for jury service, even in the trial of civil suits.

The use of the fee system in many communities—where court officials are paid in whole or in part from the fines levied—also sometimes stimulates arbitrary arrests and encourages unjust convictions. It is the unpopular minorities again that suffer most from this system, since it is relatively easy for unscrupulous, fee-seeking officers to "railroad" such persons to jail. The existence of the fee system and the frontier conditions in certain

areas of Alaska contribute to discrimination against Indians and Eskimos in the administration of justice there. The situation is such that federal officials are seriously considering a proposal made by the Governor of Alaska to appoint a public defender for those groups.

The different standards of justice which we have allowed to exist in our country have had further repercussions. In certain states the white population can threaten and do violence to the minority member with little or no fear of legal reprisal. Minority groups are sometimes convinced that they cannot expect fair treatment from the legal machinery. Because of this belief they may harbor and protect any of their members accused of crime. Their experience does not lead them to look upon the courts as "havens of refuge" for the victims of prejudice and public excitement.

Involuntary Servitude.

Slavery was abolished in this country nearly a century ago, and in its traditional form has disappeared. But the temptation to force poor and defenseless persons, by one device or another, into a condition of virtual slavery, still exists. As recently as 1944, in the case of *Pollock v. Williams*, the Supreme Court struck down as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution an Alabama statute which enabled employers to force employees, in debt on account of advanced wage payments, to continue to work for them under threat of criminal punishment. This is one of the more subtle devices for securing forced labor. More direct is the practice whereby sheriffs in some areas free prisoners into the custody of local entrepreneurs who pay fines or post bonds. The prisoners then work for their "benefactors" under threat of returning to jail. Sometimes the original charge against the prisoners is trumped up for the purpose of securing labor by this means. In still other instances persons

have been held in peonage by sheer force or by threats of prosecution for debt.

Threat of Peonage.

Since the Civil Rights Section was established in 1939, a widespread decline in peonage and involuntary servitude has occurred. However, the threat has not entirely disappeared. In 1945, the Department of Justice prosecuted a case in which a Negro woman and her ten year old son had been held in captivity by a Mississippi farmer. Forced to work on a farm by day, they were locked in a crude, windowless, chimneyless cabin by night. The mother had made three unsuccessful efforts to escape before federal authorities were informed of the situation. And as recently as 1947, an involuntary servitude case was successfully prosecuted by the federal government in California.

Where large numbers of people are frightened, uneducated, and underprivileged, the dangers of involuntary servitude remain. If economic conditions deteriorate, a more general recurrence of peonage may be anticipated.

The Wartime Evacuation of Japanese-Americans.

The most striking mass interference since slavery with the right to physical freedom was the evacuation and exclusion of persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast during the past war. The evacuation of 110,000 men, women and children, two-thirds of whom were United States citizens, was made without a trial or any sort of hearing, at a time when the courts were functioning. These people were ordered out of a large section of the country and detained in "relocation centers." This evacuation program was carried out at the direction of the Commanding General of the West Coast Command, who acted under an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War and the military commanders to prescribe military

areas from which any person or group could be excluded.

The ground given for the evacuation was that the military security of the nation demanded the exclusion of potentially disloyal people from the West Coast. We have not felt that it would be proper or feasible for this Committee to try to review all of the facts of the evacuation program. We remember well the doubts and fears of the early months of the war and we recognize that the evacuation policy seemed a necessary precaution to many at the time. But we are disturbed by the implications of this episode as far as the future of American civil rights is concerned. Fundamental to our whole system of law is the belief that guilt is personal and not a matter of heredity or association.

Yet in this instance no specific evacuees were charged with disloyalty, espionage or sedition. The evacuation, in short, was not a criminal proceeding involving individuals, but a sort of mass quarantine measure. This Committee believes that further study should be given to this problem. Admittedly in time of modern total warfare much discretion must be given to the military to act in situations where civilian rights are concerned. Yet the Committee believes that ways and means can be found of safeguarding people against mass accusations and discriminatory treatment.

Finally it should be noted that hundreds of evacuees suffered serious property and business losses because of governmental action and through no fault of their own. The War Relocation Authority, charged with the administration of the evacuation program, recommended in its final report that some provision be made in federal law that claims for evacuation-caused property losses be "considered promptly and settled with a minimum of delay and inconvenience." Over a year has passed since then.

Also disturbing, though less spectacular, was the issuance by military authority during the recent war of individual orders of exclusion against citizens scattered widely throughout the "defense zones" established by the Army. These orders rested on the same Executive Order as did the mass evacuation of Japanese-Americans. In the case of these individual orders a citizen living perhaps in Philadelphia, Boston, or San Francisco was ordered by the Army to move. He was not imprisoned, for he could go to any inland area. He was not accused of criminal or subversive conduct. He was merely held to be an "unsafe" person to have around. Fortunately these violations of civil rights were not very numerous. Moreover, the Army lost confidence in the exclusion orders as effective security measures and abandoned them—but not until more than 200 citizens had moved under military compulsion.

2. THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS PRIVILEGES

The status of citizenship is basic to the enjoyment of many of the rights discussed in this report. First of all one must be a citizen in order to participate fully in the political process of the United States. Only *citizens* of the United States are accorded the right to vote. Only *citizens* may hold public office. Only *citizens*, for these reasons have an effective voice in our nation's affairs. Second, those barred from citizenship are thereby barred from many avenues of economic and social advancement open to American citizens.

All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. These are the words of the Constitution. They set an ideal of native citizenship by which all persons born in this country are citizens without regard to race, color, creed, or

ancestry. They also describe our practice, for we have in fact followed the ideal very closely. American-born children of aliens have encountered no barriers to citizenship.

In granting citizenship by naturalization, a democracy may establish reasonable tests of the individual alien's eligibility for citizenship. But some of the standards of eligibility in our naturalization laws have nothing to do with a person's fitness to become a citizen. These standards are based solely on race or national origin, and penalize some residents who may otherwise have all the attributes necessary for American citizenship. The largest group of American residents presently subject to this discrimination are those born in Japan. Residents of Korean origin, as well as persons born in certain other Asiatic countries and Pacific Island areas, are also denied citizenship status. Although many of these people have lived in this country for decades, will probably remain here until they die, have raised families of native-born American citizens, and are devoted to American principles, they are forbidden an opportunity to attain the citizenship status to which their children are born.

We have recently removed many of these citizenship barriers. Until World War II, the Chinese had been specifically barred from immigration and from naturalization by the Chinese exclusion laws. Other groups, such as the Filipinos, Western Hemisphere Indians, and people indigenous to India, were denied citizenship through interpretation of the naturalization laws which limited eligibility to "whites" or "persons of African nativity or descent." We have made eligible for naturalization the "races of the Western Hemisphere;" we have made special provision to permit the naturalization of Chinese, Filipinos, and persons indigenous to India.

In addition to the disabilities suffered

by ineligible aliens at the hands of private persons—in employment, housing, etc.—they are singled out for additional discrimination under the law. Arizona, California, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, and Oregon forbid or severely restrict land ownership by ineligible aliens. California also forbids ineligible aliens to engage in commercial fishing and excludes them from equal benefits of old age pensions and other state relief. Many states admit only citizens to the bar and to the medical teaching, and other professions, which means that the ineligible alien is permanently barred from these fields.

The bar to land holding—the "alien land law"—most seriously impairs the alien's economic opportunities. The first of the alien land laws, enacted by California in 1913, made it illegal for aliens ineligible for citizenship either to buy agricultural land or to lease it for a period exceeding three years. Other western states passed similar laws. However, the alien land laws were not rigidly enforced, partly because it was often advantageous to lease or sell land to the Japanese and partly because of loopholes in the laws. During the second World War the California laws were made much more stringent.

California is now vigorously enforcing its amended alien land law. This law goes much further than to forbid ineligible aliens to own land. In effect, it forbids American citizens of Japanese ancestry to support their ineligible alien parents with money derived from the beneficial use of land. It has put in jeopardy the legal title of land purchased for American-born children by alien Japanese parents. Two examples of the effects of this law were cited before the Committee by a Japanese-American veteran.

In one instance, Japanese-American soldiers killed overseas made battlefield wills deeding their land to their parents. The parents could not, under the law,

receive the land. Accordingly, it escheated to the state. The other involved two Japanese-American brothers who returned from overseas service to find that California had attacked the validity of the title of land purchased for them as children by their parents, and which they had cultivated as their own before entering the service.

These land laws and other manifestations of discrimination against ineligible aliens have been made possible by the discriminatory provisions of our naturalization laws. The moral impact of this situation is indicated by the words of the Japanese-American veteran already referred to:

... I would like to say that I believe most of us fought as we did because we felt that, in spite of the way we had been kicked around, America was still the land of opportunity for all of us. I know my mother sent five of her sons. Every one volunteered for combat. One was killed. The rest of us were wounded. We have over thirty individual decorations and medals among us. Well, my mother wants to become a citizen. It is for people like my mother and for a lot of Americans of good will throughout the United States who have a lot of confidence in us and our loyalty that we did the job we did.

The Special Problem of Citizenship in Guam and American Samoa.

The peoples of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are American citizens, either by birth or by naturalization, as are people in the 48 states. But the 35,000 inhabitants of Guam and American Samoa are in the anomalous position of being neither citizens nor aliens, but nationals of the United States. They have none of the rights of citizenship, yet owe allegiance to the United States. They do not have an organic act establishing a local government and guaranteeing civil liberties, but are ruled by naval administrators who issue decrees, administer the laws, and sit as judges. At

the request of the President, the present Congress is considering legislation giving citizenship to these people, providing them with a local government guaranteeing basic civil rights, and transferring the administration of the islands from the Navy to a civilian agency.

The Right to Vote.

The right of all qualified citizens to vote is today considered axiomatic by most Americans. To achieve universal adult suffrage we have carried on vigorous political crusades since the earliest days of the Republic. In theory the aim has been achieved, but in fact there are many backwaters in our political life where the right to vote is not assured to every qualified citizen. The franchise is barred to some citizens because of race; to others by institutions or procedures which impede free access to the polls. Still other Americans are in substance disfranchised whenever electoral irregularities or corrupt practices dissipate their votes or distort their intended purpose. Some citizens—permanent residents of the District of Columbia—are excluded from political representation and the right to vote as a result of outmoded national traditions. As a result of such restrictions, all of these citizens are limited, in varying degrees, in their opportunities to seek office and to influence the conduct of government on an equal plane with other American citizens.

The denial of the suffrage on account of race is the most serious present interference with the right to vote. Until very recently, American Negro citizens in most southern states found it difficult to vote. Some Negroes have voted in parts of the upper South for the last twenty years. In recent years the situation in the deep South has changed to the point where it can be said that Negroes are beginning to exercise the political rights of free Americans. In the light of history, this represents

progress, limited and precarious, but nevertheless progress.

This report cannot adequately describe the history of Negro disfranchisement. At different times, different methods have been employed. As legal devices for disfranchising the Negro have been held unconstitutional, new methods have been improvised to take their places. Intimidation and the threat of intimidation have always loomed behind these legal devices to make sure that the desired result is achieved.

Until 1944, the white primary, by which participation in the Democratic primary is limited to white citizens, was used in Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi as the most effective modern "legal" device for disfranchising Negroes. While some southern Negroes succeeded in spite of various obstacles in voting in general elections, almost none voted in the Democratic primaries. Since the Democratic primary is the only election of any significance, the device of the white primary resulted in exclusion of Negroes from government in these states.

Over a period of time, advocates of white supremacy had refined this device to the point where it seemed to be constitutionally foolproof. The command of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting states from abridging suffrage because of race or color, was circumvented by purporting to vest the power to exclude Negroes in the political party rather than in the state.

But in 1944, the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Smith v. Allwright* overruled an earlier decision and held the Texas white primary illegal. It declared that the exclusion rules of the Texas Democratic Party were in effect the rules of the state and were therefore forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment.

Some states adapted their primary laws to the Supreme Court ruling, others re-

sisted, first, by refusing to open white primaries to Negroes until further litigation made the Texas ruling applicable to them, then by devising other methods of depriving Negroes of the ballot. Today the effort to preserve the pure white electoral system in these states is continuing.

Two states, Louisiana and Texas, repealed white primary provisions immediately after the Supreme Court decision: Florida, Alabama, and Georgia were forced to do so by further court rulings. South Carolina called a special session of the state legislature at which all state laws in any way regulating primaries were repealed. The theory governing this action was that by placing the primaries entirely outside the law and the structure of government the ruling in *Smith v. Allwright* would be rendered inapplicable. In a message to the special session of the general assembly, the Governor of the State said:

After these statutes are repealed, in my opinion, we will have done everything within our power to guarantee white supremacy in our primaries of our State insofar as legislation is concerned. Should this prove inadequate, we South Carolinians will use the necessary methods to retain white supremacy in our primaries and to safeguard the homes and happiness of our people.

White supremacy will be maintained in our primaries; let the chips fall where they may.

In 1947 the white primary in South Carolina, resting on its new foundation, was held invalid by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina in the case of *Elmore v. Harris*. In its opinion the Court said:

Racial distinctions cannot exist in the machinery that selects the officers and lawmakers of the United States; and all citizens of this State and Country are entitled to cast a free and untrammelled ballot in our elections, and if the only material and realistic elections are clothed with the name "primary," they are equally entitled to vote there.

The case will undoubtedly be carried

to the Supreme Court for a final decision.

Alabama took a different course from South Carolina. Instead of repealing the primary laws it sought to continue disfranchisement by establishing "qualifications" standards under which Negroes could be barred by administrative action. The "Boswell amendment" adopted by this state in November, 1946, set up a provision under which voters would be required "to understand and explain" provisions of the state constitution. Exclusion by this kind of device is a familiar Southern phenomenon. The tradition is to ignore such tests with respect to white voters but to apply them to Negroes—literally, where there is any possibility of eliminating them under the test; fraudulently, where they meet the test.

In a recent case in the Department of Justice files, a Negro school teacher was disqualified under a North Carolina provision requiring an ability to read and interpret the Constitution. The registrar refused to register him on the ground that he had not read the federal Constitution in a satisfactory manner. However, in a statement to the FBI the registrar declared, "my decision not to register him was based solely on the disfranchisement of the colored people in this country rather than on his ability to read, to write, and to explain the Constitution." This case was subsequently prosecuted by the Department of Justice and resulted in the conviction of the registrar.

The poll tax—another important legal obstacle to full suffrage in some southern states—limits white as well as Negro suffrage. The poll tax has frequently had an unequal racial effect, since, like the "understand and explain" clauses, it has been administered in a discriminatory manner. It has been very effective as an anti-Negro device. A poll tax simply places the payment of a fee between the voter and the ballot box. In some states it is cumulative; taxes not paid in years

when the voter does not go to the polls pile up and he must pay more than one year's tax before he can vote.

The poll tax has curtailed the size of the entire electorate, white and Negro. Seven states—Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—still maintain this tax as a prerequisite to voting. Since 1921 four other states have abandoned the poll tax. These are North Carolina, Louisiana, Florida, and Georgia.

It was estimated on the floor of the House of Representatives on July 21, 1947, that:

In the Presidential elections of 1944, 10 per cent of the potential voters voted in the seven poll-tax states, as against 49 per cent in the free-vote states. In the congressional elections of 1946, the figures are 5 per cent for the poll-tax states as compared with 33 per cent for the free-voting states.

It has frequently been pointed out that the congressional representation of poll tax states is based on proportionately fewer voters than the representation of other jurisdictions. It has also been urged that the poll tax is in reality a tax levied by the state upon the citizen's federal right to vote for members of Congress. In recent years there has been a strong drive for federal legislation forbidding the requirement of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in federal elections. The House of Representatives passed an antipoll tax bill for the fourth time in July of 1947. The three previous bills passed by the House were killed in the Senate.

In addition to formal, legal methods of disfranchisement, there are the long-standing techniques of terror and intimidation, in the face of which great courage is required of the Negro who tries to vote. In the regions most characterized by generalized violence against Negroes, little more than "advice" is often necessary to frighten them away from the polls. They

have learned, through the years, to discover threats in mood and atmosphere.

In one case in a deep southern state, a middle-class Negro who had courageously attempted to vote and to complain to the Department of Justice when he was refused access to the polls, subsequently became so afraid of reprisal that he indicated uncertainty whether he would be willing to testify in court. He asked, if he should decide to testify, to be given ample notice of the date so that he could first move his family out of the region.

In past years, American Indians have also been denied the right to vote and other political rights in a number of states. Most of these restrictions have been abandoned, but in two states, New Mexico and Arizona, Indians continue to be disfranchised. The constitution of New Mexico withholds suffrage from "Indians not taxed." In Arizona the state constitution has been interpreted to deny the vote to Indians as being "persons under guardianship." Protests against these legal bans on Indian suffrage in the Southwest have gained force with the return of Indian veterans to those states.

The constitutionality of these laws is presently being tested. It has been pointed out that the concept of "Indians not taxed" is no longer meaningful; it is a vestige of the days when most Indians were not citizens and had not become part of the community of people of the United States. Indians are now citizens and subject to federal taxation. They are also subject to state taxes, except for lands held in trust for them by the United States Government. There is therefore little justification for denying them the franchise on the assumption that they are excused from the burdens of other citizens.

The Right to Bear Arms.

Underlying the theory of compulsory wartime military service in a democratic

state is the principle that every citizen, regardless of his station in life, must assist in the defense of the nation when its security is threatened. Despite the discrimination which they encounter in so many fields, minority group members have time and again met this responsibility. Moreover, since equality in military service assumes great importance as a symbol of democratic goals, minorities have regarded it not only as a duty but as a right.

Yet the record shows that the members of several minorities, fighting and dying for the survival of the nation in which they met bitter prejudice, found that there was discrimination against them even as they fell in battle. Prejudice in any area is an ugly, undemocratic phenomenon; in the armed services, where all men run the risk of death, it is particularly repugnant.

All of the armed forces have recently adopted policies which set as explicit objectives the achievement of equality of opportunity. The War Department has declared that it "intends to continue its efforts to make the best possible use of available personnel resources in the post-war Army and in any future emergency, without distinction as to race, religion, color, or other nonmilitary considerations."

The Navy Department, speaking for both the Navy and the Marine Corps, has stated that "No distinction is made between individuals wearing a naval uniform because of race or color. The Navy accepts no theory of racial differences in inborn ability, but expects that every man wearing its uniform be trained and used in accordance with his maximum individual capacity determined on the basis of individual performance."

The Coast Guard has stressed "the importance of selecting men for what they are, for what they are capable of doing, and insisting on good conduct, good behavior, and good qualities of

leadership for all hands... As a matter of policy Negro recruits receive the same consideration as all others."

However, despite the lessons of the war and the recent announcement of these policies, the records of the military forces disclose many areas in which there is a great need for further remedial action. Although generally speaking, the basis of recruitment has been somewhat broadened, Negroes, for example, are faced by an absolute bar against enlistment in any branch of the Marine Corps other than the steward's branch, and the Army cleaves to a ceiling Negro personnel of about ten per cent of the total strength of the service.

There are no official discriminatory requirements for entrance into the Navy and the Coast Guard, but the fact that Negroes constitute a disproportionately small part of the total strength of each of these branches of service (4.4 and 4.2 per cent, respectively) may indicate the existence of discrimination in recruiting practices.

Within the services, studies made within the last year disclose that actual experience has been out of keeping with the declaration of policy on discrimination. In the Army, less than one Negro in 70 is commissioned, while there is one white officer for approximately every seven white enlisted men. In the Navy, there are only two Negro officers in a ratio of less than one to 10,000 Negro enlisted men; there are 58,571 white officers, or one for every seven enlisted whites.

The Marine Corps has 7,798 officers, none of whom is a Negro, though there are 2,100 Negro enlisted men. Out of 2,981 Coast Guard officers, one is a Negro; there are 910 Negro enlisted men. The ratio of white Coast Guard commissioned to enlisted personnel is approximately one to six.

Similarly, in the enlisted grades, there

is an exceedingly high concentration of Negroes in the lowest ratings, particularly in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Almost 80 per cent of the Negro sailors are serving as cooks, stewards, and steward's mates; less than two per cent of the whites are assigned to duty in the same capacity. Almost 15 per cent of all white enlisted marines are in the three highest grades; less than 2½ per cent of the Negro marines fall in the same category. The disparities in the Coast Guard are similarly great. The difference in the Army is somewhat smaller, but still significant: Less than nine per cent of the Negro personnel are in the first three grades, while almost 16 per cent of the whites hold these ranks.

Many factors other than discrimination contribute to this result. However, it is clear that discrimination is one of the major elements which keeps the services from attaining the objectives which they have set for themselves.

The admission of minorities to the service academies and other service schools is another area in which the armed forces have enjoyed relatively little success in their efforts to eliminate discrimination. With regard to schools within the services, the disparities indicate that selection for advanced training is doubtless often made on a color basis. As for the service academies, in the course of the last seventy-five years the Military Academy at West Point admitted a total of only thirty-seven Negro cadets, while the Naval Academy at Annapolis admitted only six.

The Coast Guard Academy, while it selects applicants on the basis of open competitive examinations without regard to color, has no knowledge of any Negro ever having been accepted. The absence of Negroes from the service academies is unfortunate because it means that our officers are trained in an undemocratic

environment and are denied the opportunity to learn at an early stage in their service careers that men of different races can work and fight together harmoniously.

State authorities promulgate the regulations concerning enlistment of Negroes and the formation of Negro units in the National Guard. Most states do not have Negro units; of those that do, all but three require segregation by regulation. Of thirty-four states answering an inquiry made by the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, only two permit the integration of Negroes with white units.

The Commission, commenting on discrimination, observed that it "considers harmful the policies of the states that exclude Negroes from their National Guard units. The civilian components should be expanded to include all segments of our population without segregation or discrimination. Total defense requires the participation of all citizens in our defense forces."

Looking to the future, the Commission also found that some of the present practices of the armed forces would negate many of the benefits of the proposed universal training program. Speaking of this program, it said:

... it must provide equality of privilege and opportunity for all those upon whom this obligation rests. Neither in the training itself, nor in the organization of any phase of this program, should there be discrimination for or against any person or group because of his race, class, national origin, or religion. Segregation or special privilege in any form should have no place in the program. To permit them would nullify the important living lesson in citizenship which such training can give. Nothing could be more tragic for the future attitude of our people, and for the unity of our nation, than a program in which our Federal Government forced our young manhood to live for a period of time in an atmosphere which emphasized or bred class or racial differences.

When an individual enters the service of the country, he necessarily surrenders some of the rights and privileges which inhere in American citizenship. The government in return undertakes to protect his integrity as an individual and the dignity of his profession. He is entitled to enjoy the respect which should be shown the uniform of the armed services of the United States by all persons. Unfortunately, however, the uniform is not always accorded the esteem it warrants.

Some of our servicemen are all too often treated with rudeness and discourtesy by civil authorities and the public. There are numerous instances in which they have been forced to move to segregated cars on public carriers. They have been denied access to places of public accommodation and recreation. When they attempt to assert their rights, they are sometimes met with threats and even outright attack. Federal officials find they have no present authority to intervene directly to protect men in uniform against such abuses.

The record is not without its brighter side. A start has been made toward eliminating differentials in opportunity and treatment of minorities in the armed forces. The Army is making experimental use of small all-Negro units as organic parts of large white organizations. Significantly, of the thirty-seven Negroes admitted to the Academy at West Point since 1870, twenty-one were accepted in the last ten years. In 1947, five Negroes were accepted, the largest enrollment of Negro cadets for a single year in the last seventy-five years.

The Navy has adopted a policy of non-segregation and has officially opened all branches to all personnel. The Coast Guard has abandoned, as a matter of policy, the restriction of Negro guardsmen to duty as cooks, stewards, and bakers. Training courses, indoctrination

programs, pamphlets, and films have been provided for officers and enlisted men in the Army and Navy to promote understanding between groups and to facilitate the use of minority personnel.

But the evidence leaves no doubt that we have a long way to go. The armed forces, in actual practice, still maintain many barriers to equal treatment for all their members. In many cases, state and local agencies and private persons disregard the dignity of the uniform. There is much that remains to be done, much that can be done at once. Morally, the failure to act is indefensible. Practically, it costs lives and money in the inefficient use of human resources. Perhaps most important of all, we are not making use of one of the most effective techniques for educating the public to the practicability of American ideals as a way of life.

During the last war we and our Allies, with varying but undeniable success, found that the military services can be used to educate citizens on a broad range of social and political problems. The war experience brought to our attention a laboratory in which we may prove that the majority and minorities of our population can train and work and fight side by side in co-operation and harmony. We should not hesitate to take full advantage of this opportunity.

3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND EXPRESSION

This right is an expression of confidence in the ability of freemen to learn the truth through the unhampered interplay by competing ideas. Where the right is generally exercised, the public benefits from the selective process of winnowing truth from falsehood, desirable ideas from evil ones. If the people are to govern themselves, their only hope of doing so wisely lies in the collective wisdom de-

rived from the fullest possible information, and in the fair presentation of differing opinions. The right is also necessary to permit each man to find his way to the religious and political beliefs which suit his private needs.

This committee has made no extensive study of our record under the great freedoms which comprise this right: religion, speech, press, and assembly. To have done so would have meant making this vast field the dominant part of our inquiry. We were not prepared to do this, partly because it has been and is being well studied by others. What finally determined us was the conviction that this right is relatively secure.

Americans worship as they choose. Our press is freer from government restraints than any the world has seen. Our citizens are normally free to exercise their right to speak without fear of retribution, and to assemble for unlimited public discussions. There still are, however, communities in which sporadic interferences with the rights of unpopular religious, political, and economic groups take place. The steady flow of federal court cases in recent years involving groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses proves that.

At the present time, in our opinion, the most immediate threat to the right to freedom of opinion and expression is indirect. It comes from efforts to deal with those few people in our midst who would destroy democracy. There are two groups whose refusal to accept and abide by the democratic process is all too clear. The first are the Communists whose counterparts in many countries have proved, by their treatment of those with whom they disagree, that their ideology does not include a belief in universal civil rights. The second are the native Fascists. Their statements and their actions—as well as those of their foreign counterparts—prove them to be equally hostile

to the American heritage of freedom and equality.

It is natural and proper for good citizens to worry about the activities of these groups. Every member of this Committee shares that concern. Communists and Fascists may assert different objectives. This does not obscure the identity of the means which both are willing to use to further themselves. Both often use the words and symbols of democracy to mask their totalitarian tactics. But their concern for civil rights is always limited to themselves. Both are willing to lie about their political views when it is convenient. They feel no obligation to come before the public openly and say who they are and what they really want.

This Committee unqualifiedly opposes any attempt to impose *special* limitations on the rights of these people to speak and assemble. Our national past offers us two great touchstones to resolve the dilemma of maintaining the right to free expression and yet protecting our democracy against its enemies. One was offered by Jefferson in his first inaugural address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve the Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."

The second is the doctrine of "clear and present danger." This was laid down as a working principle by the Supreme Court in 1919 in *Schenck v. United States* in an opinion written by Justice Holmes. It says that no limitation of freedom of expression shall be made unless "the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." The next year in a dissenting opinion in *Schaefer v. United States* Justice Brandeis added this invaluable word of advice about the application

of the doctrine: "Like many other rules for human conduct, it can be applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment, and in the exercise of good judgment, calmness is, in time of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and honesty."

It is our feeling that the present threat to freedom of opinion grows out of the failure of some private and public persons to apply these standards. Specifically, public excitement about "Communists" has gone far beyond the dictates of the "good judgment" and "calmness" of which Holmes and Brandeis spoke. A state of near-hysteria now threatens to inhibit the freedom of genuine democrats.

At the same time we are afraid that the "reason" upon which Jefferson relied to combat error is hampered by the successful effort of some totalitarians to conceal their true nature. To expect people to reject totalitarians, when we do not provide mechanisms to guarantee that essential information is available, is foolhardy. These two concerns go together. If we fall back upon hysteria and repression as our weapons against totalitarians, we will defeat ourselves. Communists want nothing more than to be lumped with freedom-loving non-Communists. This simply makes it easier for them to conceal their true nature and to allege that the term "Communist" is meaningless.

Irresponsible opportunists who make it a practice to attack every person or group with whom they disagree as "Communist" have thereby actually aided their supposed "enemies." At the same time we cannot let these abuses deter us from the legitimate exposing of real Communists and real Fascists. Moreover, the same zeal must be shown in defending our democracy against one group as against the other.

Civil Servants.

Efforts to protect the government against disloyal employees may lead to dangerous "Red hunting." We firmly believe that the government has the obligation to have in its employ only citizens of unquestioned loyalty. We are, moreover, aware of the disclosures made in the Canadian espionage trials which reveal concerted attempts by Communists to procure secret government information either directly or through dupes. We also know that Communists feel no obligation to identify themselves as members of their party, and have completely divided loyalties, which make them dangerous in posts of government responsibility. We are further aware that there are certain governmental agencies which because of the confidential and highly secret character of their work must have absolute assurance of the complete loyalty of all their employees.

All of these factors make it difficult to maintain effective security. Several statutes now on the books make it possible to prosecute any federal employee who reveals restricted information. Those dissatisfied with these safeguards argue that the concealment by Communists and other subversives of their affiliations makes it impossible to weed them out until they have done serious damage. Therefore, they contend, it is necessary to have the loyalty of all federal employees checked by security police agencies. This Committee recognizes the need for some such protective measures. Yet our whole civil liberties history provides us with a clear warning against the possible misuse of loyalty checks and to inhibit freedom of opinion and expression.

There are two possible dangers. In the first place, the standards by which the loyalty of an individual or an organization is to be determined may not be clearly defined. This is particularly true

of any standard which permits condemnation of persons or groups because of "association." The character, the policies and the leadership of many organizations change.

Individuals, too, change their opinions. The greatest care must be taken to avoid the misinterpretation of affiliation. Individuals may be members of suspect organizations out of ignorance. Before such affiliations may even be considered as relevant, the motive of the individual should be clearly established. The determination of the suspect character of organizations is complex and must be handled with the greatest care. For the individual the ultimate test must always be his own trustworthiness. Affiliation with a dubious organization is, by itself, not necessarily proof of untrustworthiness.

A second danger is that the procedure by which the loyalty of accused federal employees is determined may not accord with our traditions of due process of law. An employee whose loyalty is questioned is not charged with a crime. But loss of job and inability to obtain another one is a severe punishment to impose on any man. Accordingly, provision should be made for such traditional procedural safeguards as the right to a bill of particular accusations, the right to subpoena witnesses and documents where genuine security considerations permit, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to a stenographic report of proceedings, the right to a written decision, and the right of appeal.

More than the civil rights of our two million federal workers—important as they are—is involved here. All federal government must maintain a loyalty program which adequately protects the civil rights of its employees. Otherwise private employers and state and local governments may not protect the rights of *their* personnel, and in fact they may

actually be encouraged to infringe these rights. It is a severe punishment to be discharged from the government for disloyalty, as the Supreme Court pointed out in 1946 in *United States v. Lovett*. Our system of democratic justice has proved again and again its ability to protect us in peace and in war. To make a conspicuous departure from it against government workers would surely weaken the safeguards of the right of all citizens to speak freely and to organize in furtherance of their opinions. Here as elsewhere, the federal government must set an example for the rest of the country by being uncommonly scrupulous in its respect for the civil rights of all citizens.

Enemies of Democracies.

As we have said, one of the things which totalitarians of both left and right have in common is a reluctance to come before the people honestly and say who they are, what they work for and who supports them. Those persons in our own country who try to stir up religious and racial hatreds are no exceptions. They understand that the vicious doctrines which they advocate have been morally outlawed in America for more than a century and a half. This Committee is as eager to guarantee their civil rights as those of the people they attack. But we do not believe in a definition of civil rights which includes freedom to avoid all responsibility for one's opinions.

This would be an unwise and disastrous weakening of the democratic process. If these people wish to influence the public in our national forum of opinion they should be free to do so, regardless of how distasteful their views are to us. But the public must be able to evaluate these views. Exactly how much anonymous, hate-mongering or other subversive literature there is we do not know. The amount of such matter fluctuates greatly from time to time. At the present, according

to several witnesses who appeared before the Committee, many of those who spread racial and religious prejudices have "gone underground."

As recently as 1940, however, a study by the staff of the Senate Committee on Campaign Expenditures revealed that one-third of the election propaganda in the campaign of that year was completely anonymous and that one-half was partially and inadequately identified as to source and sponsorship. Moreover, the Committee reported that the anonymous material included "the most virulent, dishonest and defamatory propaganda." Congress has already taken the first step to remedy this inadequacy by amending the election laws to forbid the distribution of anonymous campaign literature.

The principle of disclosure is, we believe, the appropriate way to deal with those who would subvert our democracy by revolution or by encouraging disunity and destroying the civil rights of some groups. We have considered and rejected proposals which have been made to us for censoring or prohibiting material which defames religious or racial minority groups. Our purpose is not to constrict anyone's freedom to speak; it is rather to enable the people better to judge the true motives of those who try to sway them.

Congress has already made use of the principle of disclosure in both the economic and political spheres. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the Pure Food and Drug Administration make available to the public information about sponsors of economic wares. In the political realm, the Federal Communications Commission, the Post Office Department, the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of the Senate—all of these under various statutes—are required to collect information about those who attempt to influence public opinion.

Thousands of statements disclosing the

ownership and control of newspapers using the second-class mailing privilege are filed annually with the Post Office Department. Hundreds of statements disclosing the ownership and control of radio stations are filed with the Federal Communications Commission. Hundreds of lobbyists are now required to disclose their efforts to influence Congress under the Congressional Reorganization Act. In 1938, Congress found it necessary to pass the Foreign Agents Registration Act which forced certain citizens and aliens alike to register with the Department of Justice the facts about their sponsorship and activities. The effectiveness of these efforts has varied. We believe, however, that they have been sufficiently successful to warrant their further extension to all of those who attempt to influence public opinion.

The ultimate responsibility for countering totalitarians of all kinds rests, as always, with the mass of good, democratic Americans, their organizations and their leaders. The federal government must set an example of careful adherence to the highest standards in guaranteeing freedom of opinion and expression to its employees. Beyond that it ought to provide a source of reference where private citizens and groups may find accurate information about the activities, sponsorship, and background of those who are active in the market place of public opinion.

4. THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

The Right of Employment.

A man's right to an equal chance to utilize fully his skills and knowledge is essential. The meaning of a job goes far beyond the paycheck. Good workers have a pride in the organization for which they work and feel satisfaction in the jobs they are doing. A witness before a congressional committee has recently said:

Discrimination in employment damages lives, both the bodies and the minds, of those discriminated against and those who discriminate. It blights and perverts that healthy ambition to improve one's standard of living which we like to say is peculiarly American. It generates insecurity, fear, resentment, division and tension in our society.

In private business, in government, and in labor unions, the war years saw a marked advance both in hiring policies and in the removal of on-the-job discriminatory practices. Several factors contributed to this progress. The short labor market, the sense of unity among the people, and the leadership provided by the government all helped bring about a lessening of unfair employment practices. Yet we did not eliminate discrimination in employment. The Final Report of the federal Fair Employment Practice Committee, established in 1941 by President Roosevelt to eliminate discrimination in both government and private employment related to the war effort, makes this clear.

Four out of five cases which arose during the life of the Committee, concerned Negroes. However, many other minorities have suffered from discriminatory employment practices. The FEPC reports show that eight percent of the Committee's docket involved complaints of discrimination because of creed, and 70 per cent of these concerned Jews. It should be noted that FEPC jurisdiction did not extend to financial institutions and the professions, where discrimination against Jews is especially prevalent. Witnesses before this Committee, representing still other minority groups, testified as follows:

The Japanese-Americans: "We know, too, what discrimination in employment is. We know what it means to be unacceptable to union membership; what it means to be the last hired and first fired; what it means to have to work harder and longer for less wages. We know these

things because we have been forced to experience them."

The Mexican-Americans: "We opened an employment bureau (to help Mexican-Americans) in our office last year for San Antonio. We wrote to business firms throughout the city, most of whom didn't answer. We would call certain firms and say that we heard they had an opening for a person in a stock room or some other type of work; or I would go myself. But thinking I was the same in prejudice as they, they would say 'You know we never hire Mexicans.'"

The American Indians: "As with the Negroes, Indians are employed readily when there is a shortage of labor and they can't get anyone else. When times get better, they are the first ones to be released."

Discriminatory hiring practices. Discrimination is most acutely felt by minority group members in their inability to get a job suited to their qualifications. Exclusions of Negroes, Jews, or Mexicans in the process of hiring is effected in various ways—by newspaper advertisements requesting only whites or gentiles to apply, by registration or application blanks on which a space is reserved for "race" or "religion," by discriminatory job orders placed with employment agencies, or by the arbitrary policy of a company official in charge of hiring.

A survey conducted by the United States Employment Service and contained in the Final Report of the Fair Employment Practice Committee reveals that of the total job orders received by USES offices in 11 selected areas during the period of February 1-15, 1946, 24 per cent of the orders were discriminatory. Of 38,195 orders received, 9,171 included specifications with regard to race, citizenship, religion, or some combination of these factors.

The National Community Relations

Advisory Council has studied hiring practices since V-J Day. A 1946 survey of the practices of 134 private employment agencies in 10 cities (Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco) disclosed that 89 per cent of these agencies included questions covering religion on their registration forms. In Chicago, a statistical count of discriminatory job orders was made by one of the largest commercial agencies in the city. This revealed that 60 per cent of the executive jobs, 50 per cent of the sales executive jobs, and 41 per cent of the male clerical openings, and 24 per cent of the female clerical openings were closed to Jews. Fully 83 per cent of all orders placed with the agency carried discriminatory specifications.

A companion study of the help-wanted ads conducted in eight major cities during corresponding weeks in 1945 and 1946 showed that while the total volume of help-wanted advertising had declined, there was an over-all increase of 195 per cent in discriminatory ads for 1946 over 1945.

The minority job seeker often finds that there are fields of employment where application is futile no matter how able or well-trained he is. Many northern business concerns have an unwritten rule against appointing Jews to executive positions; railroad management and unions discourage the employment of Negroes as engineers or conductors.

In some of our territories which are fairly free from other discrimination, unfair employment practices occur. Some of the larger business firms in Hawaii will not hire clerical or stenographic workers of Japanese ancestry where the public can see the worker. In Puerto Rico, with its large Negro population, generally only white people or very light colored persons are employed by banks, sugar corporations, airlines, shipping companies, and

large department stores in clerical and executive positions.

Discrimination in hiring has forced many minority workers into low-paying and often menial jobs such as common laborer and domestic servant. This has done much to bring about the situation reported by the Bureau of the Census in 1940—

Striking differences between the occupations of whites and Negroes were shown in 1940 census statistics. Farmers, farm laborers, and other laborers constituted 62.2 per cent of all employed Negro men and only 28.5 per cent of all employed white men. Only about 5 per cent of all employed Negro men, compared with approximately 30 per cent of employed white men, were engaged in professional, semi-professional, proprietary, managerial, and clerical or sales occupations. Skilled craftsmen represented 15.6 per cent of employed white men and only 4.4 per cent of employed Negro men. More than half of the Negro craftsmen were mechanics, carpenters, painters, plasterers and cement finishers, and masons.

On-the-job discrimination.—If he can get himself hired, the minority worker often finds that he is being paid less than other workers. This wage discrimination is sharply evident in studies made of individual cities and is especially exaggerated in the South. A survey, conducted by the Research and Information Department of the American Federation of Labor shows that the average weekly income of white veterans ranges from 30 to 78 per cent above the average weekly income of Negro veterans in 26 communities, 25 of them in the South.

In Houston, for example, 36,000 white veterans had a weekly income of \$49 and 4,000 Negro veterans had average incomes of \$30—a difference of 63 per cent. These differences are not caused solely by the relegation of the Negroes to lower types of work, but reflect wage discriminations between whites and Negroes for the same type of work. The Final Report of the FEPC states that the hourly wage

rates for Negro common laborers averaged 47.4 cents in July, 1942, as compared with 65.3 cents for white laborers.

Nor can the disparity be blamed entirely on differences in education and training. The 1940 census reveals that the median annual income of Negro high school graduates was only \$775 as compared with \$1454 for the white high school graduate; that the median Negro college graduate received \$1074 while his white counterpart was earning \$2046; that while 23.3 per cent of white high school graduates had wage or salary incomes over \$2000, but four per cent of Negro graduates achieved that level.

In presenting this evidence, the Committee is not ignoring the fact that an individual Negro worker may be less efficient than an individual white worker or vice versa. Nor does it suggest that wage differences which reflect actual differences in the competence of workers are unjustifiable. What is indefensible is a wage discrimination based, not on the worker's ability, but on his race.

While private business provided almost 70 per cent of all cases docketed by the FEPC for the fiscal year 1943-44, about a fourth of the complaints were against the federal government itself. This at once calls to question the effectiveness of the Civil Service Commission rules against such discrimination, and the various departments' directives and executive orders that have restated this policy of nondiscrimination from time to time.

A case study, conducted in one government agency by the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital, demonstrates a pattern of discrimination existing in government service. Samples of Negro and white workers in this agency were matched for the variables of age, sex, marital status, educational level, length of service, division in which inducted, and job title and grade at which inducted. Out of 503 whites and 292

Negroes inducted into the agency in the fiscal year 1946, 40 pairs were perfectly matched for these variables. A few more Negroes than whites had veteran status, but the average efficiency ratings for the two groups were exactly the same.

A check on promotion and resignation for the sample was made in April, 1947. It was found that the whites had received 12 grade promotions in a total service of 22 years. This was an average of one promotion for each two man-years of service. The Negroes had received two grade promotions in a total service of 28 man-years. This was one promotion for each 14 man-years. In other words, it took the average Negro seven times as long as the average white to get a promotion, in spite of the fact that almost all of the variables which could affect promotion were exactly the same.

Finally, labor unions are guilty of discriminatory labor practices. Six per cent of the complaints received by the FEPC were made against unions, and the FEPC states that when challenged, private industry eliminated discrimination much more readily than did unions. On the other hand, it should be noted that great strides have been made in the admission of minorities to unions. Both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations have repeatedly condemned discriminatory union practices. But the national organizations have not yet fully attained their goals. Some railway unions have "Jim Crow" auxiliaries into which Negroes, Mexicans, or Orientals are shunted, with little or no voice in union affairs. Furthermore, there is a rigid upper limit on the type of job on which these members can be employed.

There is a danger that some of our wartime gains in the elimination of unfair employment practices will be lost unless prompt action is taken to preserve them. In the federal government, the employ-

ment of Negroes jumped from 40,000 before the war to 300,000 in 1944. And while only 10 per cent of all Negroes employed in government held jobs other than custodial in 1938, 60 per cent of the Negroes in 1944 were employed in clerical and professional categories. The chief danger at present looms in the form of discriminatory cut-backs of Negro personnel who were hired very largely by wartime agencies, and in the refusal by other agencies in the government to hire these "displaced employees."

In private industry, minority workers were heavily concentrated in war industries, which since the end of the war have suffered drastic cut-backs. In other industries the termination of manpower controls has encouraged some employers to resume prewar policies of exclusion or discriminatory treatment of minority workers. The first sentence in the summary of the FEPC Final Report bluntly observes that "the wartime gains of Negro, Mexican American, and Jewish workers are being lost through an unchecked revival of discriminatory practices."

Such postwar economic retrenchment as has occurred has disproportionately hit the minority groups. A United States Census Bureau survey, bearing out the adage that minority workers are "the last hired, first fired," discloses that from July, 1945, to April, 1946, unemployment among whites increased about one and one-half times while unemployment among nonwhites more than tripled. The situation has of course been aggravated by the accelerated migration of Negroes from the South to northern industrial areas during the war.

Efforts to improve the situation. Reference has already been made to the Fair Employment Practice Committee. This Committee was established by President Roosevelt in an Executive Order dated

June 25, 1941. Its mandate was to eliminate discriminatory employment practices within the federal government and in companies and unions which had contracts with the government or which were engaged in the production of materials necessary to the war effort. The FEPC, as a practical matter, served as a clearing house for complaints alleging various types of employment discrimination. It had no enforcement powers of its own; and no recourse to the courts.

The effectiveness of the FEPC was due almost entirely to its success as a mediation body in persuading a union or employer to revise the particular policy or practice complained of. During its most active two years, FEPC closed an average of 250 cases a month, about 100 of which were satisfactorily adjusted. The Committee's work ended in June, 1946, when Congress failed to appropriate funds for the ensuing fiscal year. In a letter of June 28, 1946, to the Committee accepting the resignation of its members, President Truman said:

The degree of effectiveness which the Fair Employment Practice Committee was able to attain has shown once and for all that it is possible to equalize job opportunity by governmental action, and thus eventually to eliminate the influence of prejudice in the field of employment.

There are six states which have laws directed against discrimination in private employment. The New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Connecticut statutes have strong enforcement provisions. In general, the statutes in these four states make it unlawful for employers to discriminate in hiring, firing, or conditions of employment, or for labor unions to exclude, expel, or discriminate, because of race, color, creed, or national origin. They also prohibit the use of discriminatory help-wanted ads and job applications by employers and employment agencies. State commissions are empowered to investigate

complaints, to hold hearings, to attempt to conciliate, to issue cease-and-desist orders, and finally, to seek court enforcement of these orders. Indiana and Wisconsin have antidiscrimination statutes without enforcement provisions. The commissions in these two states serve therefore as educational and advisory agencies.

The progress that has been made in New York State under its fair employment practice act is suggested by the first annual report (for the year 1946) of the State Commission Against Discrimination. In its introduction the Report states: "The operation of the law has definitely resulted in progress in the elimination of illegal discriminatory practices. The testimony of people actually engaged in job-placement activities reveals that fields of opportunity previously closed to certain groups are now open to all, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin. Resistance to the law has lessened as demonstrated by the fact that employees of all groups are being hired and upgraded into new occupational categories. Preemployment discriminatory inquiries are now the rarity, rather than the rule."

A few scattered cities, among them Chicago, Minneapolis, New York, and Cincinnati, have enacted ordinances designed to prevent discrimination in employment practices. These vary greatly in scope. Some are directed solely at municipal employment; others apply to private employers having contracts with the city; and at least one covers labor unions in addition to public and private employers. Some carry fines and imprisonment for violators, while others, with no sanctions or enforcement provisions, are little more than policy statements.

The Right to Education.

The United States has made remarkable progress toward the goal of universal education for its people. The number and

variety of its schools and colleges are greater than ever before. Student bodies have become increasingly representative of all the different peoples who make up our population. Yet we have not finally eliminated prejudice and discrimination from the operation of either our public or our private schools and colleges. Two inadequacies are extremely serious. We have failed to provide Negroes and, to a lesser extent, other minority group members with equality of educational opportunities in our public institutions, particularly at the elementary and secondary school levels. We have allowed discrimination in the operation of many of our private institutions of higher education, particularly in the North with respect to Jewish students.

Discrimination in public schools. The failure to give Negroes equal education opportunities is naturally most acute in the South, where approximately 10 million Negroes live. The South is one of the poorer sections of the country and has at best only limited funds to spend on its schools. With 34.5 per cent of the country's population, 17 southern states and the District of Columbia have 39.4 per cent of our school children. Yet the South has only one-fifth of the taxpaying wealth of the nation.

Actually, on a percentage basis, the South spends a greater share of its income on education than do the wealthier states in other parts of the country. For example, Mississippi, which has the lowest expenditure per school child of any state, is ninth in percentage of income devoted to education. A recent study showed Mississippi spending 3.41 per cent of its income for education as against New York's figure of only 2.61 per cent. But this meant \$400 per classroom unit in Mississippi, and \$4100 in New York. Negro and white school children both suffer because of the South's basic inability to

match the level of educational opportunity provided in other sections of the nation.

But it is the South's segregated school system which most directly discriminates against the Negro. This segregation is found today in 17 southern states and the District of Columbia. Poverty-stricken though it was after the close of the Civil War, the South chose to maintain two sets of public schools, one for whites and one for Negroes. With respect to education, as well as to other public services, the Committee believes that the "separate but equal" rule has not been obeyed in practice.

There is a marked difference in quality between the educational opportunities offered white children and Negro children in the separate schools. Whatever test is used—expenditure per pupil, teachers' salaries, the number of pupils per teacher, transportation of students, adequacy of school buildings and educational equipment, length of school term, extent of curriculum—Negro students are invariably at a disadvantage. Opportunities for Negroes in public institutions of higher education in the South—particularly at the professional graduate school level—are severely limited.

Statistics in support of these conclusions are available. Figures provided by the United States Office of Education for the school year, 1943-44, show that the average length of the school term in the areas having separate schools was 173.5 days for whites, and 164 for Negroes; the number of pupils per teacher was 28 for white and 34 for Negroes; and the average annual salary for Negro teachers was lower than that for white teachers in all but three of the 18 areas. Salary figures are in the following table (page 637).

The South has made considerable progress in the last decade in narrowing the gap between educational opportunities afforded the white children and that

State or District of Columbia	Average annual salary of principals, super- visors, and teachers, in schools for—	
	Whites	Negroes
Alabama	\$1,158	\$ 661
Arkansas	924	555
Delaware	1,953	1,814
Florida	1,530	970
Georgia	1,123	515
Louisiana	1,683	828
Maryland	2,085	2,002
Mississippi	1,107	342
Missouri	1,397	¹ 1,590
North Carolina	1,380	1,249
Oklahoma	1,428	1,438
South Carolina	1,203	615
Tennessee	1,071	1,010
Texas	1,395	946
Virginia	1,364	1,129
Dist. of Col.	2,610	2,610

¹ Higher salaries due to the fact that most Negro schools are located in cities where all salaries are higher.

afforded Negro children. For example, the gap between the length of the school year for whites and the shorter one for Negroes has been narrowed from 14.8 days in 1939-40 to 9.5 days in 1943-44. Similarly, the gap in student load per teacher in white and Negro schools has dropped from 8.5 students in 1939-40 to six students in 1943-44.

In spite of the improvement which is undoubtedly taking place, the Committee is convinced that the gap between white and Negro schools can never be completely eliminated by means of state funds alone. The cost of maintaining separate, but truly equal, school systems would seem to be utterly prohibitive in many of the southern states. It seems probable that the only means by which such a goal can finally be won will be through federal financial assistance. The extension of the federal grant-in-aid for educational purposes... seems to the Committee both imminent and desirable.

Whether the federal grant-in-aid should

be used to support the maintenance of separate schools is an issue that the country must soon face.

In the North, segregation in education is not formal, and in some states is prohibited. Nevertheless, the existence of residential restrictions in many northern cities has had discriminatory effects on Negro education. In Chicago, for example, the schools which are most crowded and employ double shift schedules are practically all in Negro neighborhoods.

Other minorities encounter discrimination. Occasionally Indian children attending public schools in the western states are assigned to separate classrooms. Many Texas schools segregate Mexican-American children in separate schools. In California segregation of Mexican-American children was also practiced until recently. The combined effect of a federal court ruling and legislative action repealing the statute under which school boards claimed authority to segregate seems to have ended this pattern of discrimination in California schools.

Discrimination in private schools. The second inadequacy in our present educational practices in America is the religious and racial discrimination that exists in the operation of some private educational institutions, both with respect to the admission of students and the treatment of them after admission.

The Committee is absolutely convinced of the importance of the private educational institution to a free society. It does not question the right of groups of private citizens to establish such institutions, determine their character and policies, and operate them. But it does believe that such schools immediately acquire a public character and importance. Invariably they enjoy government support, if only in the form of exemption from taxation and in the privilege of income-tax deduction extended to their benefactors. Inevitably,

they render public service by training our young people for life in a democratic society. Consequently, they are possessed of a public responsibility from which there is no escape.

Leading educators assert that a careful selection in admissions practices may be necessary to insure a representative and diversified student body. Liberal arts colleges, in particular, have used this reasoning to limit the number of students enrolled from any one race or religion, as well as from any geographical section, preparatory school, or socio-economic background.

Nevertheless it is clear that there is much discrimination, based on prejudice, in admission of students to private colleges, vocational schools, and graduate schools. Since accurate statistical data is almost impossible to obtain, this is difficult to prove. But competent observers are agreed that existence of this condition is widespread. Application blanks of many American colleges and universities include questions pertaining to the candidate's racial origin, religious preference, parents' birthplace, etc. In many of our modern educational institutions enrollment of Jewish students seems never to exceed certain fixed points and there is never more than a token enrollment of Negroes.

The impact of discriminatory practices in private education is illustrated by the situation in New York City. The students of the city colleges of New York are predominantly Jewish, resulting in part from the discrimination practiced by some local private institutions. These colleges have high academic standards, but graduates from them with excellent records have been repeatedly denied admission to private and nonsectarian professional schools. A Special Investigating Committee of the Council of the City of New York, recently established to examine this situation, found convincing

evidence of discrimination against graduates of the city colleges by the medical schools in the city in violation of the Civil Rights Act of New York.

The Investigating Committee, after questioning witnesses and examining application blanks, concluded that various professional schools tried to get information about applicants which would indicate their race, religion, or national origin for "a purpose other than judging their qualifications for admission." Jews are not alone in being affected by these practices. One witness, a member of a medical school's admission committee, admitted to a prejudice against Irish Catholics which affected his judgment. The number of Negroes attending these medical schools has been extremely low; less than 50 have been graduated from them in 25 years.

Certainly the public cannot long tolerate practices by private educational institutions which are in serious conflict with patterns of democratic life, sanctioned by the overwhelming majority of our people. By the closing of the door through bigotry and prejudice to equality of educational opportunity, the public is denied the manifold social and economic benefits that the talented individual might otherwise contribute to our society.

The Right to Housing.

Equality of opportunity to rent or buy a home should exist for every American. Today, many of our citizens face a double barrier when they try to satisfy their housing needs. They first encounter a general housing shortage which makes it difficult for any family without a home to find one. They then encounter prejudice and discrimination based upon race, color, religion or national origin, which places them at a disadvantage in competing for the limited housing that is available. The fact that many of those who face this double barrier are war veterans

only underlines the inadequacy of our housing record.

Discrimination in housing results primarily from business practices. These practices may arise from special interests of business groups, such as the profits to be derived from confining minorities to slum areas, or they may reflect community prejudice. One of the most common practices is the policy of landlords and real estate agents to prevent Negroes from renting outside of designated areas. Again, it is "good business" to develop exclusive "restricted" suburban developments which are barred to all but white gentiles.

When Negro veterans seek "GI" loans in order to build homes, they are likely to find that credit from private banks, without whose services there is no possibility of taking advantage of the GI Bill of Rights, is less freely available to members of their race. Private builders show a tendency not to construct new homes except for white occupancy. These interlocking business customs and devices form the core of our discriminatory policy. But community prejudice also finds expression in open public agitation against construction of public housing projects for Negroes, and by violence against Negroes who seek to occupy public housing projects or to build in "white" sections.

The restrictive covenant. Under rulings of the Supreme Court, it is legally impossible to segregate housing on racial or religious bases by zoning ordinance. Accordingly, the restrictive covenant has become the most effective modern method of accomplishing such segregation. Restrictive covenants generally take the form of agreements written into deeds of sale by which property owners mutually bind themselves not to sell or lease to an "undesirable." These agreements have thus far been enforceable by court

action. Through these covenants large areas of land are barred against use by various classes of American citizens. Some are directed against only one minority group, others against a list of minorities. These have included Armenians, Jews, Negroes, Mexicans, Syrians, Japanese, Chinese and Indians.

While we do not know how much land in the country is subject to such restrictions, we do know that many areas, particularly large cities in the North and West, such as Chicago, Cleveland, Washington, D. C., and Los Angeles, are widely affected. The amount of land covered by racial restrictions in Chicago has been estimated at 80 per cent. Students of the subject state that virtually all new subdivisions are blanketed by these covenants. Land immediately surrounding ghetto areas is frequently restricted in order to prevent any expansion in the ghetto. Thus, where old ghettos are surrounded by restrictions, and new subdivisions are also encumbered by them, there is practically no place for the people against whom the restrictions are directed to go. Since minorities have been forced into crowded slum areas, and must ultimately have access to larger living areas, the restrictive covenant is providing our democratic society with one of its most challenging problems.

The constitutional and legal validity of this device has been tested in few states. Where there has been litigation, the appellate courts have up to this time uniformly upheld restrictions against use by barred groups and in most instances have also upheld restriction against ownership. While a case in the United States Supreme Court in 1926 was long believed to uphold the constitutional validity of restrictive covenants under the federal Constitution, this case has recently been challenged as a binding authority. Litigation is now pending testing the validity of restrictive covenants directed against

Jews, American Indians and Negroes. The Supreme Court, apparently willing to re-examine the issue, has currently accepted two restrictive covenant cases for review and a more definite ruling may be expected shortly.

The purpose of the restrictive covenant can only effectively be achieved in the final analysis by obtaining court orders putting the power of the state behind the enforcement of the private agreement. While our American courts thus far have permitted judicial power to be utilized for these ends, the Supreme Court of Ontario has refused recently to follow this course. The Ontario judge, calling attention to the policy of the United Nations against racial or religious discrimination, said:

In my opinion, nothing could be more calculated to create or deepen divisions between existing religious and ethnic groups in this province...than the sanction of a method of land transfer which would permit the segregation and confinement of particular groups to particular business or residential areas, or conversely, would exclude particular groups from particular business or residential areas.

There is eminent judicial and professional opinion in this country that our courts cannot constitutionally enforce racial restrictive covenants. In a recent California case a lower court judge held that the courts could not enforce such an agreement. And in a strong dissenting opinion in a recent covenant case Justice Edgerton, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, said:

Suits like these and the ghetto system they enforce are among our conspicuous failures to live together in peace.... The question in these cases is not whether law should punish racial discrimination, or even whether law should try to prevent racial discrimination, or even whether law should interfere with it in any way. The question is whether law

should affirmatively support and enforce racial discrimination.

Public Housing. The federal government has been closely concerned with minority housing problems in recent years through its aid to local public housing authorities, through its insurance of loans to private builders and through its war and veterans' programs. Much of the improvement in the housing conditions of minorities in recent years has resulted from public building. The Federal Public Housing Authority has tried to allocate public housing fairly, and to make certain that equal standards are maintained. Many housing projects with mixed racial occupancy have been operated with great success.

The Committee is glad to note that the Federal Housing Agency, which guarantees loans for certain types of private building, has recently abandoned the policy by which it encouraged the placing of racial restrictive covenants on projects supported by government guarantees.

It must be noted, however, that even if government, local or federal, does not encourage racial restrictions, private interests may put discriminatory practices into effect if proper safeguards are not devised. The experience of Stuyvesant Town in New York City is a case in point. There the city made great financial concessions to a private corporation, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, to induce construction of a large housing project, which was to be subject to a variety of restrictions designed to make it serve community housing needs. But, in the absence of any direct requirement of equitable distribution of the benefits of the project, the Company barred Negroes from occupancy in Stuyvesant Town. Yet New York is a city in which mixed public housing projects have been maintained for many years.

The Right to Health Service.

Increased attention is being given throughout the United States to the health needs of our people. Minority groups are sharing in the improvements which are taking place. But there is serious discrimination in the availability of medical care, and many segments of our population do not measure up to the standards of health which have been attained by our people as a whole.

For example, the death rate from all causes for the entire country in 1945 was 10.5 per thousand of estimated population. The Chinese, however, had a rate of 12.8; the Negroes, 12.0; the Indians, 12.0; and the Japanese, 11.5. Similarly, many diseases strike minorities much harder than the majority groups. Tuberculosis accounts for the death of more than twice as many Negroes as whites. Among Indians in rural United States, the death rate from tuberculosis is more than 10 times as high as that for whites; in Alaska, the native deaths from this cause are over 30 times greater. In Texas, seven Latin-Americans died of tuberculosis for every Anglo-American.

Infant deaths furnish another example of this pattern. On a nation-wide basis, the infant mortality rate was more than half again as high for Negroes as for whites. In Texas, it was almost three times as high for Latin as for Anglo infants. Maternal deaths show like disproportions. In New York City, where the vast majority of the Puerto Ricans in this country are located, reports from social workers and city health authorities indicate that the frequency of illness among the Puerto Ricans is much higher than among other groups.

There are many factors which contribute to the discrepancies between the health of the majority and the minorities. As has already been noted, our minorities are seriously handicapped by their eco-

nomic status. Frequently, because of poverty, they are unable to afford even the minimum of medical care or a diet adequate to build up resistance to disease. The depressed economic status of many of our minorities combined with restrictive covenants in housing prevents them from living in a sanitary, health-giving environment. Children who are not admitted to clean, healthful playgrounds must find their fun in the crowded, dirty areas in which they are allowed. Discrimination in education withholds from many people the basic information and knowledge so essential to good health.

A more direct cause of unequal opportunity in the field of health is the discriminatory pattern that prevails with respect to medical facilities and personnel. Many hospitals will not admit Negro patients. The United States Public Health Service estimates on the basis of a preliminary survey that only approximately 15,000 hospital beds out of a total of one and one-half million beds are presently available to Negroes. Thus, though Negroes constitute about ten per cent of the population, only one per cent of the hospital beds are open to them. In Chicago, a study by the Mayor's Commission on Human Relations in 1946 disclosed that "although most hospital officials denied the existence of a discriminatory admission policy, Negroes represented a negligible percentage of patients admitted."

The situation is further complicated by the shortage of medical personnel available for the treatment of patients from minority groups. This is particularly evident among the Negroes; in 1937, only 35 percent of southern Negro babies were delivered by doctors, as compared to 90 percent of northern babies of both races. There were in 1940 only 3530 Negro physicians and surgeons; 7192 trained and student Negro nurses; and

1471 Negro dentists in a total Negro population of 13,000,000.

The ratio of Negro physicians to the total Negro population was about one to 3377, while that of the total number of physicians to the general population of the country was one to 750. Moreover, a high proportion of these were employed in the North. In the South, with a Negro population of almost 10,000,000, there were in 1940 about 2000 Negro doctors, or only one to every 4900 colored persons.

One important reason for this acute shortage of skilled medical men is the discriminatory policy of our medical schools in admitting minority students. Medical schools graduate approximately 5000 students a year, but only about 145 of these are Negro. And of these 145, 130 are from two Negro schools; thus, only about fifteen Negroes are graduated from all the other medical schools of the country each year.

To these handicaps must be added the refusal of some medical societies and many hospitals to admit Negro physicians and internes for practice. Denied the facilities and training which are available to other doctors, Negro members of the profession are often unable to keep abreast of developments in medicine and to qualify as specialists. This discrimination contributes to the state of Negro health.

Though the expectation of life at birth is still lower for nonwhites than whites,

the relative increase in life expectancy between 1930 and 1940 was nearly twice as great for nonwhites as whites. The life expectancy of Negro males in this period increased 9.9 percent; of Negro females, 11.5 percent; of white males and females, 6.0 percent and 7.0 percent respectively. However, the figure for white persons is still appreciably higher than for nonwhite persons; white males can expect to live sixty-three years as compared with fifty-two for Negro males, and white females sixty-seven years compared with fifty-five years for Negro females.

Progress has been made in reducing Negro deaths due to tuberculosis, diphtheria, whooping cough, diarrhea, enteritis, and syphilis. Among the Mexicans in Texas, vigorous programs have been undertaken by federal and local officials. Baby clinics, home nursing classes, family life courses, maternity clinics and other measures have been established.

The Indian Service now operates 69 hospitals and sanatoria in the United States, 7 in Alaska; 14 school health centers; and 100 field dispensaries. Special efforts are being made to combat tuberculosis, a leading cause of illness and death among Indians. Another sign of progress is the decision of the American Nurses Association, in 1946, to accept all qualified applicants as members of the national organization, even when they cannot, for local reasons, enter county societies.

12

THE AMERICAN CHARACTER

I

In the first chapter attention was focused upon the raw material of politics in the belief that only by understanding something of human nature could we comprehend the reactions and responses of men in a political environment. This chapter deals with another aspect of this problem. It is here suggested that a *national character* is evolved in every nation, that men living in particular cultures acquire certain traits and habits which serve to differentiate them from men living in other cultures, and that this national character influences the kinds of policy a country develops and the attitude of its peoples toward other countries.

Nevertheless one needs to be on guard in applying this conception, for it is generally true, as cultural anthropologists have demonstrated, that "man, as a species, is essentially alike everywhere." All men seek to solve the same problems involved in securing food, shelter, security, and some sort of institutional structure to direct group life. Thus, out of the necessity of meeting these problems common to all men, cultures are created which reflect certain assumptions and beliefs. Therefore, while it is true that wide differences exist between various cultures, the basic problems of individual and community life which men must solve are the same.

We have learned through bitter experience that extreme nationalism is a destructive force in a world in which technology has made obsolete a purely national approach to the solution of mass unemployment, distribution of resources, or population pressure. Yet in recent years unscrupulous demagogues have identified the concept of national character with a fanatic *racialistic* doctrine and a chauvinistic nationalism. Because of this fact, students of international affairs urge caution in applying the concept of national character. The danger of slovenly thinking is further intensified because we commonly tend to personify countries, to talk of "Uncle Sam" and of "John Bull," and to attribute a permanent and unchanging character to them. Human nature is not a fixed and permanent thing, but it is to a considerable degree subject to change as environment undergoes alteration. That this development also

occurs in regard to national character is revealed below in Ernest Barker's discussion. He has suggested that a nation has a material basis—race, environment, population—upon which is erected a spiritual superstructure. This superstructure includes religion, law and government, language and literature, and education. These things, according to Professor Barker, produce "a mental organization connecting the minds of all the members of a national community by ties and connections as fine as silk and as firm as steel." Because this superstructure is modified by changes in its material foundation, national character is in process of being constantly modified and developed. Therefore "it matters very greatly to the character of a country whether it is moderately populated, agricultural and rural, or is densely populated, industrial and urban. A nation may almost revolutionize its character... if it quadruples its population by industrializing its occupation." For example, prior to 1917 it was common to talk about the "mystical" Russian who lacked any appreciation for mechanical or technical skill. Today it is unlikely that people think of Russian character as typically impractical and mystical, nor would they be likely to concur with Samuel Harper's 1906 evaluation that "these blamed Russians lack backbone and stamina. They can't stand a little punishment. . . ."

This approach implies a denial that "blood" determines national character, as the Nazis maintained, and asserts that it is formed by common traditions and experiences. Since the character of a people is acquired, it is therefore subject to modification as the conditions change within a given society. While there *probably* are some relatively fixed aspects of national character because of historical experience and environment, historical evidence seems to offer conclusive proof that basic changes do occur. One may also recognize the fundamental similarities between peoples in different countries which stem from their efforts to solve similar problems, and because, at least in the case of Western peoples, a common cultural tradition is shared. When it is recognized that differences between people do exist and that different peoples have different outlooks and attitudes, explanations for these variations can then be sought in the culture, history and contemporary setting. Such a rational approach demands the rejection of a racialistic doctrine: not blood stream, but environment is the distinctive element. Similarly this constitutes a denial of the existence of an innate, immutable national character.

National character is not something which may be delineated with precision. All that can be maintained is that a considerable number of people within a given society commonly react in a certain way and that "these patterns of behavior have been the most influential in molding the institutions in which the whole society lives." Furthermore, strangers coming to a country recognize these characteristic ways of doing and thinking as peculiar to that society. It does not mean that every individual in any society invariably believes, thinks, and acts in accord with the national character. Commonly the differences within a national group are so great as to render absurd any attempt to delineate an all-inclusive national character. In the United States, for example, the steel

worker of Slavic origin and a "proper Bostonian" reveal little in the way of characteristic responses. This, in effect, is to suggest that within a single country there may be quite different cultures—and it is the particular culture which produces a typical character.

Nonetheless, "a European landing in the United States," writes Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "realizes at once that he is outside his family circle. An American returning after years of absence is equally aware of the change. It is not essentially a matter of different externals or even physique. The fact is that there is something in the national personality which differentiates us from the rest of the world."

However, when one attempts to depict this national personality, pitfalls become all too obvious. So long as one attempts no definition, it is possible to make use of more or less accurate generalizations about Americans to explain certain traits and conduct; but as soon as an attempt is made to give precision to the delineation of national character, contradictions loom large. Nevertheless, an effort to understand our political society makes it imperative that some comprehension of the American character be attained. This summary appraisal may be interpreted as tentative and suggestive, rather than final and definitive.

II

The distinguished historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn, has said that the American nation "was formed by an idea, a universal idea." It is perhaps for that reason that there is in the American character a strong sense of mission, a conviction that the United States has attained a perfection of ideology and institutions, and that these are universally suitable and applicable. Therefore, Americans commonly desire to spread democracy, defined as a government based upon equality, individual liberty, and the rule of law. But we have often seemed to think that this messianic mission could be implemented by example, while we maintained a self-righteous isolationism. Nevertheless, there has been a strong element of internationalism, of universalism, which is also shared by all Western religions, including Marxism. However, the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, is developing doubts, perhaps because of a growing awareness of the danger involved in tying the democratic ideal to a particular system of property relations.

Typically American has been the distrust of a theoretical approach accompanied by a counter emphasis upon the practical. It is not mere coincidence that pragmatism is primarily the contribution of philosophers living and working in the United States. We have been a pragmatic and experimental people, though once again there looms the contradiction: we have also been addicted to panaceas and slogans, e.g., initiative, referendum and recall, short ballot, a government of laws and not of men, states rights, and the separation of powers. The Founding Fathers were convinced of the experimental nature of our institutions. Jefferson wrote to Governor Plumer that "the idea that institutions

established for the use of the nation cannot be touched or modified, even to make them answer their end... is most absurd..." And Madison thought it "the glory of the people of America, that, while they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own enterprise." But the more recent tendency has been to place undue reliance upon institutions and especially upon the Constitution. This has led us to avoid a power analysis in human relations, to assume that the balancing of interest groups will continue to operate in domestic affairs, and to adopt an unreal approach to international politics. It is also reflected in the bankruptcy of both conservative and progressive thought. There is a slowly dawning awareness of the inadequacy of the classical economic analysis, but very little in the way of systematic analysis of possible developments. There are no American theorists comparable to Marx or Keynes, and it is certainly apparent that the high water mark in political speculation was achieved with the publication of the Federalist papers. It is significant that in economics "institutionalism" should be an American development and the contribution of John R. Commons in the Midwest. Thorstein Veblen is the closest American approach to a creative theorist. He did provide fruitful leads for further analysis of American society, especially with his note on the contrast between business and industry, and the conflict of bankers versus production men, which was reflected in the Technocracy movement of the 1930's.

The astute de Tocqueville sensed this failure to articulate an adequate political and social doctrine when he wrote "that it is extremely difficult to excite the enthusiasm of a democratic people for any theory which has not a palpable, direct, and immediate connection with the daily occupations of life... Thus great democratic nations have neither time nor taste to go in search of novel opinions. Even when those they possess become doubtful, they still retain them because it would take too much time and inquiry to change them; they retain them, not as certain, but as established."

It also seems to be an aspect of the American character to be addicted to contradictions and extremes notwithstanding the existence of a political system and a philosophy which emphasizes the existence of a consensus before any action can be taken. We manage, for instance, to combine lawlessness with the passive acceptance of all kinds of petty restraints in what Muirhead has called "the retail traffic of life." We persist in expressing a belief in the innate worth of the individual, while tolerating the Ku Klux Klan, quasi-fascist groups, and such Congressional committees as the Dies-Thomas Un-American Committee. "We sometimes act as if the growth among us of organizations like the Christian Front, the Ku Klux Klan, the Anglo-Saxon League, the Silver Shirts, and other virulent tribal clubs is mysteriously due to enemy propaganda. The inference is unwarranted. Like seed in the parable, propaganda falls upon rocky ground and upon fruitful soil alike, but it flourishes only where the earth is

ready to receive it. Unfortunately, the ground has been prepared among us by very respectable gardeners."

We manage to combine generosity with indifference, as revealed in our administration of possessions like Puerto Rico, or in our callous treatment of the Navaho Indians. In both instances disaster experienced by these groups has brought forth a flood of charity, only to be followed by a return to the conditions which breed further catastrophes for the peoples involved.

We are accused of boastfulness and extreme self-satisfaction, but "no people are so thoroughly prepared to think ill of themselves as Americans."

A trait that many foreigners find particularly exasperating is the common American conviction that we are right, morally correct, and the corollary that other nations or peoples are grasping, unscrupulous, and wrong. Woodrow Wilson gave clear expression to this trait when he said, "Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealist nation in the world." That this character trait may complicate our dealings with other countries is revealed in former Secretary of State James Byrnes' book, *Speaking Frankly*.

Another facet of American character frequently commented upon is the speculative, "something-for-nothing" attitude. Thorstein Veblen suggested that this was a product of the country town environment and its opportunities for speculating in farm lands, gambling, that is, on the future of the country. In that setting, wrote Veblen, the "failure to bargain shrewdly or to accumulate more goods than one has produced by the work of one's own hands is looked upon with a feeling of annoyance, as a neglect, not only of opportunity, but of duty." In contrast there is the instinctive generosity of Americans, a fact noted by almost all observers. Ilya Ehrenburg, in writing of his tour of America, comments on the "cult of the dollar" and then adds, "but in America there are also people who deny themselves a pair of shoes and tickets to the cinema in order to send gifts to Yugoslav children." Recently the small New York state town of Dunkirk displayed this characteristic generosity. Before Thanksgiving Day, 1947, the population of this community, 85 per cent steel workers, fishermen, and textile mill operators, collected \$100,000 worth of gifts for devastated Dunkerque, France.

The American is inclined to accept a simple, highly individualistic morality with little reference to social responsibility. This is reflected in the tendency to confuse individual success with the good of society. Possibly this may be a by-product of Christian religion's serious error in accepting a distinction between an individual's public conduct and his personal life. This was an attitude common to those who accepted the Gospel of Wealth, as enunciated by Andrew Carnegie, Russell H. Conwell, or Bishop William Lawrence. It seemed to accept the notion that "success" indicated a sufficient adherence to ethical concepts. Does this partially explain why Americans tend to "forgive" the corrupt politician, or the ruthless economic exploiter, if he is a "good family man"? There is also the failure to recognize the co-existence in men and their institutions of

both good and evil. Further, this simple morality has led us to expect that nations and corporate bodies, like individuals, are capable of moral responses. Thus we anticipate that France, or Greece, or China will have great love for the United States because of material aid extended. Woodrow Wilson, for example, seems to have been inclined to give humanity and its governments credit for conscience and intelligence in their collective response.

Many students, and particularly those applying a psychocultural approach, have indicated that a key to understanding the American character is the prevalence of the competitive spirit. The spirit of competition is not limited merely to economic activity, but is displayed in every aspect of life. It has had a profound effect upon the individuals living in American society. "In a competitive society," writes Lawrence K. Frank, "the individual is from early years taught that his value to society and his worth to himself are to be judged by the measure of his achievements, not merely as his temperament and gifts may direct them, but as set by the prevailing patterns of the society." This means that the individual in the United States must measure his "success" not by attaining his conception of the good life, but by attaining a standard in relation to others. A conflict is thus produced since a majority of Americans cannot "succeed" by the prevailing standards of an industrial, capitalistic society. That is, the majority cannot become owners of independent enterprises, or even high-powered corporation managers. If psychiatrists are correct, this contrast between prevailing standards and ideals and reality produces neurotic individuals, those who fail to adjust to reality. Our American ideology insists that we are economically free agents while more than 85 per cent of us are wage and salary earners, subject to industrial discipline; that we enjoy equality of opportunity, but property and resources are increasingly retained in the control of the few; that hard work produces "success," although most of the factors in achieving that success are beyond the control of the individual. The source of this dichotomy between ideas and reality is summarized by Professor H. B. Parkes: "The character of a people always changes more slowly than their institutions, and the Americans carried over into the more static and regimented society of the big corporations the attitudes they had acquired while they were still pioneers with all the vast resources of an empty wilderness to conquer and exploit." Evidence of the serious psychological conflict produced by this failure to adjust to new conditions was provided by the prolonged depression of the 1930's. Far too many men were "failures" judged by the standards of a competitive, individualistic society. The corrosive effect upon human personality was traceable to the emphasis placed upon initiative, hard work, and energy as the keys to success, with the result that failure to attain contemporary standards was interpreted—even by the individuals involved—as a reflection of personal inadequacy.

Traditionally, Americans have been an optimistic people who have accepted the doctrine of progress as inevitable and looked to the future with confidence. As Professor Brogan has commented, an optimistic outlook was an imperative

for a frontier people, since life was frequently harsh in the present. As Jefferson expressed it: "I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past." In recent times there has been a growth of pessimism (though as a people we remain primarily optimistic) perhaps as a realization that a highly organized, corporate society might prove to be too much for the individual to control. In clearest form this pessimism and disillusion is revealed in the work of our novelists, like Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, Sherwood Anderson, and Thomas Wolfe. But, as Lloyd Morris suggests, "on whatever level one explored the vital culture of the United States during the period from 1896 to 1946, one was likely to find it recording an increasing disillusion."

Finally, it may be suggested that political immaturity constitutes one of the basic attributes of Americans and provides an insight into the many contradictory elements in the national character. That this should be cited as typifying a people living in a political democracy may come as a surprise to Americans, but there seems to be considerable evidence to sustain it. What are the characteristics of immaturity? A few attributes may be suggested: intolerance of nonconformity, shortness of memory, addiction to self-deception, avoidance of factual analysis, short-lived curiosity, dislike for responsibility, reliance upon respected authority as a substitute for thinking, demand for simple explanations, attachment to habit and dislike for change. That these elements of immaturity are present in American political life may be verified by examining our contemporary practices. Our political party platforms deal in platitudes and generalities to such an extent that it is virtually impossible to make a rational choice between the two major parties on the basis of these alleged programs. The result has been to stimulate cynicism, on the part of both politicians and voters, and to divert public attention to "personalities." So long as a presidential candidate is generally against "sin," we are not disturbed by his failure to present a realistic analysis of problems facing the country nor by his skill in tailoring his proclamations to suit the sectional or economic prejudices of a particular audience. Since we distrust innovation, we place a high premium upon conformity and tend to reward those candidates who reenforce the current prejudices. Factual analysis might serve to disrupt comforting assumptions and make self-deception impossible, so we prefer well-polished slogans which provide a pervasive euphoria. Because we don't care to assume continuous responsibility for the operation of our government, we take refuge in believing that the innate superiority of our institutions enables them to operate by themselves. The facts of American life since 1929 deny this assumption, but our memories are short. We seem to rely upon catastrophe to stir us into action, but after venting a childish rage on those leaders who have, after all, merely adapted themselves to our political mores we disdain any interest in evolving permanent preventives against recurring disaster. With no adequate conception of the role of responsible leadership in a democratic society, we are inclined to take refuge in the expressed belief that a crisis in the United States will always bring forth a great leader. Finally, this political immaturity is re-

vealed in our failure to develop a rational theory of politics and society. Even conservative thought, in a society become fundamentally conservative, reveals an utter bankruptcy. It should be noted that the people are willing to go along with this conservative approach because they assume that the struggle for political democracy has been won, leaving them free to pursue individual interests. The result is that whenever a crisis develops conservatism abjectly fails, and we enter upon a period of improvisation, of patching and tinkering.

In the selection included below, William G. Carleton contrasts American power today with our political thinking and points out that when Great Britain and France were at the height of their power their philosophers were world leaders in political thought. Merle Curti, University of Wisconsin historian reporting on his experience as visiting lecturer in India, emphasized the unfortunate fact that the Indians lack respect for American leadership in fields other than the purely technical. They do not look to us for stimulating counsel in the political and social realm, presumably because we have never moved beyond the institutions and practices evolved by a group of able men living in a simple agrarian 18th century society. Instead of adapting the spirit and the method of analysis provided by these shrewd and realistic men, we have sought to deify their words and to make a fetish of the Constitution they designed as a useful device.

National Character

Ernest Barker is a well-known British author, lecturer, and was Professor of Political Science at Cambridge University from 1928 to 1939. In this selection Sir Ernest provides a useful discussion of the origin of national character, which he defines as "the sum of acquired tendencies which a national society has built on the native basis of its racial blend, its territory, and the mass and social variety of its population—the house of thought which men have made that their minds may dwell there together." *National Character* is based on the Stevenson Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the winter of 1925-26.

...What is national character, and how shall we define its nature? Is it a natural and inherent datum, which falls within the sphere of what Aristotle calls "things that cannot be otherwise than as they are"? Or is it a growing product, like clay on the potter's wheel, which is being

shaped by historic revolutions and the urging and pressing mind of man? If it has within itself both of these elements, how, and by what combination of nature and human art, has it been made? By what influences, and in what direction, is it now being shaped? What forecast shall

From Sir Ernest Barker, *National Character*. By permission of the author. (Methuen and Company Ltd., 1948.) (Footnotes omitted.)

we make of its future turn and trend? Is the accumulated mass of the past so great that, though we may expect modifications, we cannot expect a revolution? Or may the character of a nation undergo a complete and general conversion? If we can answer, however imperfectly, some of these questions, we shall be able in some measure to judge where we stand and to calculate where we are going. Nor is this all. The better understanding of anything which lies, to any degree, in the sphere of human control, means the possibility of an increase and an improvement in such control. So far, therefore, as the formation of national character lies in that sphere (and we shall see, as the argument proceeds, that it has always done so in part, and is coming to do so more and more), we may render practical service in our generation to the greatest process in our national life by attempting to understand and explain the conditions under which the character of a nation is formed, and the methods by which it is shaped.

The theme and the plan of this work may be simply stated. We shall assume, in a provisional and preliminary way, that a nation is a material basis with a spiritual superstructure. The material basis consists of three elements. The first of these is Race. Under this head we are concerned with the physical bodies of the members of a nation, considered as belonging to this or that physical breed or breeds, and distinguished as such by the physical or anthropological criteria of stature, formation of skull, and coloring. The racial blend which we find in a nation, and the relative proportions of the different races which constitute the blend, are an original and primary stuff or "matter" on which the "form" of a national character is subsequently imposed by the human spirit. The second element in the material basis of any nation is Environment. Under this head we have to consider the

physical territory on which the physical bodies of the members of a nation move and have their being—its size and shape and external outline, and more particularly its coasts and frontiers; its internal structure, or, in other words, the sum and distribution of its resources; its skies above, its atmosphere, and its climate. These are all factors which play on the racial blend and affect the formation of national character—not, indeed, in the way of determining the character by a sort of fatality, but rather in the way of providing possibilities of development, among which the members of a nation must make their choice, and by their choice of which they determine themselves in this direction or that, according as they prefer the possibilities of the sea to those of the land, or this possibility of the land to that, or one combination of possibilities to another. The last of the three elements which constitute the material basis of national character is Population—population considered primarily in terms of mass or density, according as it is sown thickly or thinly on the soil, but secondarily, and in consequence, considered also in terms of occupation; and this for the simple reason that the mass of a nation's population varies directly with its occupation, so that pastoral occupation accompanies one degree of density, agricultural another, and industrial another still. Population and Occupation go so closely together that either word may designate the element we seek to express. Whichever word we choose, we are really concerned with the economic factor; and what we have to examine is the influence of that factor—as expressed in the density, the distribution, and the occupations of a nation—on the type of its character. That influence is profound. It matters very greatly to the character of a country whether it is moderately populated, agricultural, and rural, or is densely populated, industrial,

and urban. A nation may almost revolutionize its character, as we did ours in the nineteenth century, if it quadruples its population by industrializing its occupation. A dense population engaged in industrial pursuits in great urban areas will develop a new type, or, to speak more exactly, it will write a new and bold script on the ancient palimpsest of the national character.

It is not possible, at any rate in this matter, to draw any clear demarcation between the material and the spiritual. The material basis of national character is not a given and inevitable datum distinct from the spiritual forces of human thought and human will which play upon it. We can modify the material basis, within certain limits, by the course of our thoughts and the acts of our will. A nation, by taking thought, may modify the racial blend which is one of its bases; it may seek, by immigration laws, or by other measures of eugenic policy, to mold the blend to its liking. A nation, again, is not only free to choose among the existing geographical possibilities of its territory: it may also modify its territory, and create new possibilities, by driving channels of irrigation or spreading tracts of afforestation. In the same way, too, nations have sought to regulate population, and governments have attempted to control the course of national occupations, throughout the course of recorded history. But, in spite of this interplay, by which the spiritual is infused into the material, we may nonetheless distinguish, and separate for the purposes of inquiry, the material basis, or "stuff," and the spiritual superstructure—the moral design or "form"—of nations and national characters. That superstructure, as we may now proceed to note, is a mental organization connecting the minds of all the members of a national community by ties and connections as fine as silk and as firm as steel. It is a subtle

spiritual cobweb of threads which are spun from mind to mind. If we seek to analyze these threads, we may distinguish four main kinds. There is the thread of Law and Government—the thread of legal and political organization, which regulates social action in the light, and as the expression, of a common set of ideas concerning the proper nature of social cohesion and conduct. There is the thread of Religion—a community of religious ideas and emotions, which may be compatible, as it is in our country to-day, with an actual division of creeds and churches, but which, during the early ages of the formation of nations and their characters, was a catholic organization of one creed and a single church as well as a community of ideas and emotions. There is the thread of Language, and of that child of language, Literature, which expresses a nation's sense of beauty and approach to truth, and which, if it expresses a nation, also impresses itself in turn upon it, and helps to form its genius and character. There is finally the thread of Education—a common system of training, which unites the minds of the members of a nation; a system at first practised under the authority of the Church, and then under that of the State, but in either form serving not merely to imbue intelligences with a common content of ideas, but also to quicken characters toward the pursuit of common ideals. Of each of these four—Law and Government, Religion, Language and Literature, Education—we say that it is the creation of a nation, and at the same time its creator. Men make these great and august things, and these great and august things in turn make men. We are made by what we have made. We project our ideas into the world of reality, and when they have taken shape and form, they shape and form us in turn by their reaction upon us. A nation makes a system of law and government; and that system, in its meas-

ure, makes the character of that nation. We build more greatly than we know; and our acts have consequences beyond our intentions.

The character of a nation, in its formation and its manifestation, has its analogies with the character of an individual man. Each of us, in his moral growth, starts from a raw stuff of original nature, which is partly a matter of temperament, as determined by bodily structure and its peculiarities, and partly a matter both of inherited instincts common to our general kind and of inherited predispositions common to our immediate stock of family. We shape that raw stuff into a settled form, partly by submission to social discipline in all its phases, and partly by repeated exercise of moral choice along lines which gradually become definite and marked. That settled form is character—"the sum of acquired tendencies built upon native bases"; and when it is achieved we have attained both unity of self and permanence of behavior—we have built an identity which is constant and expresses itself in what we may call "expectable" action. In much the same way a nation starts from the raw stuff of its material basis; in much the same way it builds upon it a sum of acquired tendencies; in much the same way it settles into the unity and permanence of form which we call by the name of national character.

There are indeed differences between the nation and the individual. In the first place, we can see the individual as a single physical body, whose character goes, as it were, with his gait and face, and is expressed in obvious and visible actions, which are his and his alone. We cannot see a nation. It has many members, divided by an infinity of differences; and the unity of its character must be a matter rather of faith than of sight. Yet we can experience it if we cannot see; and we somehow know, as Eduard Meyer

has said, that "in seizing or despising the possibilities given in each moment a people reveals its individuality, or, in a word, what we call its character." "It is," he adds, "something which we can never explain scientifically in detail, but must accept as a thing which is simply given; and yet it is just this individual and particular element which determines the peculiarity and innermost essence of every historical process."

In the second place, the formation of national character is less a matter of conscious effort and will than the making of individual character. The individual is a single will, acting in the space of a lifetime. The nation is a congeries of wills, acting through centuries. Even an individual, in his measure, moves unconsciously toward the settled form which is his character. He does things for a low purpose which come to serve a higher; and he climbs without conscious knowledge of the steps and stages of his ascent. "Man, like Saul the son of Kish, goes out to find his father's asses, and finds a kingdom." This is even more true of nations than it is of the individual man. They move, as it were, in a mist on the mountains, and grope their way upwards. They do this or that immediate thing, and it enures to purposes which they have not guessed. For long centuries of a nation's history its character is engaged in a process of development which is mainly unconscious. In our age of democratic self-determination, and in an epoch of national systems of education, growth may be different; and nations at the long last may perhaps "see and choose" their way. From the stage of the making of national character by race and environment, by population and occupation; through the stage in which they made themselves what they were by the reaction upon them of the institutions (political and ecclesiastical) and of the literature which they had made for themselves; they

may now have moved to a stage at which they make themselves freely by their own free choice of ideals (ideals consciously framed and consciously pursued) in the fields both of social organization and of national education. If it be so, it is a great and solemn thing. But if it be so now, it was not so in the centuries of the past. And as we look at those centuries, we must allow a large area for the working of man's unconscious mind.

"Unconscious," we have said. But even so, and nonetheless, it is mind which is at work:

totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore
miscet.

Fundamentally, a nation makes its character by the minds and the wills of its members, as an individual makes his character by the operation of his mind and his will. This is an assumption which many, and more particularly many men of science, may feel disposed to challenge. There is a familiar distinction between nature and nurture—between the innate and persistent basis, which is given, and the acquired and variable superstructure, which is not given, but made, and made by mental processes. Look at the two in the broadest sense, and you will say that nature is inherent and inevitable, and nurture is made and modifiable. Look at them in their bearing on human life, and you will say that nature is biologically inherited in the body through the protoplasm, and nurture is socially transmitted from mind to mind by a process which we may call, in the widest sense of the word, the process of education. The distinction between the two is clear; but what is the relative weight of the two? The answer to that question will depend, in the last resort, on the training and experience of the life of the answerer. Has he been trained in natural science, or devoted himself to the study of eugenics, or come from a family stock with

persistent qualities which he has himself inherited and maintained? He will emphasize nature—persistent and ineluctable nature; and he may be skeptical about the modifications and the progress which may be achieved by any process of nurture. Has he been trained in the record of human thought and human art and human action, or does he come from a stock from which he has varied and departed in the course of his own development? He will emphasize the indomitable initiative of the human mind—the triumphs which it can win, and the progress which it can achieve, even in the face of natural handicaps. I must confess that my own bias lies in this latter direction; and I would ask the reader to allow for that bias as he follows the course and the run of my argument. I shall not forget that there are natural elements of breed and environment and occupation which condition the development of national character. But I shall assume that the character of a nation belongs mainly, if not entirely, to the sphere of nurture, and that it is therefore made and is also modifiable by the creative mind of man.

It is possible to make this assumption the more readily because (as the subsequent argument may serve to show) a nation is essentially the unity which it is in virtue of that "spiritual superstructure" which it has built with its own hands for its own dwelling. It is not one by virtue of the natural fact of race; for it generally contains different races. It is not one by virtue of the natural factor of territory or environment; for that may be very diverse and various. It is not one by virtue of its population, which as such is only a heap or quantity of different units, or again of its occupations, which are in themselves variegated and manifold. It is one, and has a character of its own, by virtue of the unity of its tradition, which is the deposit and crystallization, in an objective form, of the seething

and moving thought of human minds. That is a matter to which we shall necessarily return. For the moment we may turn to consider the implications of two words which have just been used—the word “made” and the word “modifiable.”

If national character is, on the whole and in the main, something which is made, it follows that there is no such thing as a given and ineluctable national character, which stamps and makes the members of a nation, and is their individual and collective destiny. Character is not a destiny to each nation. Each nation makes its character and its destiny. We cannot therefore draw up an indictment against a whole nation as eternally cursed, or sing pæans in its praise as eternally blessed, by the destiny of an inevitable character suspended above it for ever. Let us rather believe (for we shall be nearer the truth) that a nation is engaged in an eternal turbulence of generation and regeneration, and let us assign to it, in each age, the burden of responsibility for what it makes of itself—in each age, and most of all in our own, in which, through a national franchise and a national system of education, we have a greater power than ever we had before of making ourselves more nearly into what we would have ourselves be.

Not only is national character made; it continues to be made and remade. It is not made once and for all: it always remains, in its measure, modifiable. A nation may alter its character in the course of its history to suit new conditions or to fit new purposes. The change may be gradual, like that from “the English people of merry England, full of mirth and game,” in the fourteenth century, to the stern, struggling Samson of Milton’s day; or it may be sudden, and almost of the nature of a conversion, like the change in Scottish national character

under the influence of Calvinism. Writers of different periods will give you very different pictures of a nation’s character. Pope Eugenius III, about 1140, said that “the English nation was fit to be set to anything it would handle, and one to be preferred to others, were it not for the impediment of levity”; Wycliffe, in the time of Richard II, wrote that “the English have properly the moon for their planet, by reason of their inconstancy”; and Torcy, about the time of Charles II, could still celebrate their fickle nature. A writer of the Napoleonic period, or of the generation of the two wars of this century, would more naturally speak of fixed ideas and bulldog tenacity. The North Germans of the days of the Hanseatic League were full of spirit of voluntary enterprise and free association; the North Germans under the rule of the later Hohenzollerns ran into a pattern of rigorous discipline and State-regimentation. Remembering these things, we may learn not to judge the present of a nation by the characteristics of its past: we may be ready to see and to forecast change in a nation, and even to give it our sympathy, if it brings the nation nearer to our own ideals; above all, we may beware of facile generalizations about immutable national traits. Yet it remains true that there are profound and abiding permanences in a nation’s character; and the heaving of the surface must not blind us to the stillness of the depths. Puritanism, for example, was nothing absolutely new in English life. There is a settled and reflective melancholy in much of Anglo-Saxon literature. It might go underground for a time: it emerged again in its season. What seems a modification may only be the coming again into light of a facet which was always there; and even if the modification be something entirely new, it may be but a little thing, however it may dazzle us at the moment, in comparison with the accumulated fund

of general disposition. Just because national character is tradition—socially created and socially transmitted tradition—we must believe that it is something which our minds have made and may change. But just for the same reason, because it is tradition, we must also believe that what has been made through the centuries is strong and endures, and that the weight of the past is heavier in the balance than that of the present.

It is easy to distinguish past and present; but there is a point of view from which the distinction seems almost to vanish. The past that matters is still alive in the present, and makes us, in very large measure, what we now are. It is a living past, walking among us, and part of our life. All real history, Croce has said, is contemporary history; it is a history of the present regarded as containing the past, or, if you will, of the past regarded as constituting the present. Eduard Meyer has said much of the same, in very similar words. "History selects for its study, as really historic, those events of the past which did not exhaust their activity in the moment of their happening, but continued to operate and were productive of new events in succeeding ages"; and therefore, he adds, it "seeks to comprehend the being of the present by regarding it as a becoming out of the past."

It is in that sense that the argument of this book is conceived. It is a study of the process of "becoming" of national character, intended to elucidate its present nature and thereby to make it, so far as may be, more readily controllable in its future growth. And here it is important to appreciate fully the volume and the extent of the past which lives in the present. We must beware of any narrowness of nationalist prepossession; nor must we regard our creative past as simply the separate past of our own nation. Each national character is a microcosm of

humanity at large, presented from a particular angle; each national tradition is a deposit containing not only indigenous stuff, but also the contributions of general humanity. We are what we are in our country not only because of what happened in London and Edinburgh, but also because of what happened in Jerusalem and Athens and Rome. Rome influenced the organization of the Church in England, the shaping of English law (and, still more, that of the law of Scotland), and the very vocabulary of our language. We cannot forget Jerusalem so long as we read and recite the Psalms; we are the heirs of Greece so long as we love ordered beauty in art and literature. It is not merely that these things entered into our beginnings. There is something deeper. In each age they may enter again and anew; and some element of a distant past, acquiring a new vitality from a new congruity with our present life, may become once more a creative force. It is almost as if the past swung in an elliptical orbit, and at some point in its orbit, coming into closer juxtaposition, warmed us, vivified us, regenerated us. The Greek past came into such juxtaposition in the days of the Renaissance in England; and we know the fruits of its working. The Jewish past came into such juxtaposition in the Puritan age of the seventeenth century; and again we know the fruits of its working. The past, as it affects the present, is not a constant or static thing. It waxes and wanes, approaches and recedes. But it is a constant force, if it is not a constant quantity; and in the development of our theme we must do obeisance to its majesty, remembering that there lives, moves, and has its being among us a past which is not only the past of ourselves, but also that of other peoples—a past which does not die, but, if it sometimes wanes, may also sometimes wax, and shining with a new lustre exercise a new and deep influence on our life.

II

An attempt has been made, in these preliminary observations, to explain the theme, to indicate the nature of the approach, and to state some of the pre-suppositions on which the argument will proceed. In the rest of this chapter we have to consider the conception of nation in its various implications, and to define it in relation to a number of conceptions—those of race, of language, of religion, of territory, and of State—with which it is, in its nature, closely connected.

NATION AND RACE

A nation is not a race or single stock. Etymologically, it is true, the word nation, connected as it is with words such as "cognate," suggests the idea of birth, and seems to indicate a group of kinsmen. In medieval records you may find the phrase *natio villæ*—the kin-group of the village—a phrase reminiscent of the old Teutonic village which was a family as well as a village; and it seems a natural extension of such language when the Barons at Oxford, in 1258, begin to speak of the *natio regni Angliæ*—"the kin-group of the kingdom of England"—in contradistinction to the foreign following of Henry III. Men readily thought of greater groups in terms of the smaller group of the family, and regarded them as the same in kind, if greater in degree. It was in this way, indeed, that the patriarchal theory of the origin of the State arose, as you find it in Sir Robert Filmer or Sir Henry Maine: the family begets the clan, the clan the tribe, and the tribe the nation or State. But difficulties confront such a theory of the nation, nor can nations readily be regarded as enlarged but homogeneous and interrelated groups of kinsmen.

In the first place, you will find that the greater group—the people or nation, gen-

erally organized as a State—historically precedes and begets the family, the clan, and the tribe. Each of these lesser groups is a juridical unit—a complex of rights and duties; and you cannot have a juridical unit, which as such is a vehicle of rights and duties, unless you postulate, as a prior condition, the existence of a larger law-making group which creates and sustains such units. You cannot explain the nation by the family, because you have to explain the family by the nation.

In the second place, it is universally true—at any rate in Europe—that every nation contains different racial elements, and is therefore mixed of different kins or breeds or stocks. You know a race—and this is its essence—by the common physical attributes of its members. It is a physical fact determined by physical factors of height and shape and coloring. If you adopt this zoological conception of race, you must recognize that each nation contains different races—long-heads as well as round-heads, and, again, tall and fair long-heads as well as long-heads who are short and dark. The soil of each country has been washed over again and again by different human species, which have left their representatives in its living population. France is the most homogeneous of nations; but in point of race, as we shall see, France is perhaps more composite than any other. It is indeed arguable, and it has been argued by Professor MacDougall, that the cross-breeding and blending of the different races of a given nation in the course of history may possibly produce a new "subrace," fertile in reproduction and full of the fresh variations which the blending of different races makes possible. To admit such a possibility is, however, to open the door to confusion; and we shall only darken counsel by talk of a French or English subrace. A race is a physical fact marked by physical features; and we cannot find any physical features which make the

French as a single and united subrace distinct from the English. On the contrary, the persistence of several different races alike in France and in England is an obvious fact; and the length of time that would be necessary to blend the different races of either country into a new unity which abolished the old diversities (even if we assume for the moment that such a thing is now possible) is vastly greater than the period during which cross-breeding has been at work in any of the nations of Europe.

We must abandon, therefore, any conception of the nation as a physical unity. The conception of the nation as "an ideal unit founded on the race" is ascribed by Acton, in a profound essay on Nationality, to the French Revolution, and criticized by him as not only fictitious, but subversive of traditional rights, local autonomies, and religious liberties. The sovereign people which professes to be a race as well as a people may well be a dangerous monster of centralizing tyranny, so sternly resolved on the unity inculcated in its new gospel that it defies both the history of the past and the local feelings and religious associations of the present;* but whatever the origin, and whatever the results of such a conception, we may be content with dismissing it as a fiction. A nation is not the physical fact of one blood, but the mental fact of one tradition. A gulf is fixed between the race and the nation. The one is a common physical type: the other is a common mental content. The one is a natural fact which is already given at the dawn of history: the other is an artificial structure added by the thinking, feeling, and willing of human minds in the course of

history. That it is artificial is no condemnation of its quality. It is artificial just because it is spiritual, and because men are not born with the spiritual in their blood, but win it through effort in the slow course of time. This spiritual fact of national unity may be dramatized, or mythically expressed, in the fiction of common blood; the result is only a drama, even though the drama may become, as Acton feared, a tragedy of pity and terror. A nation remains in its essence a fund of common thoughts and common sentiments, acquired by historic effort, and backed by a common will to love resolutely in their strength. "A nation," said Renan, "is a spiritual principle, made by two things—the one in the present, the other in the past: the one the possession in common of a rich bequest of memories; the other a present sense of agreement, a desire to live together, a will to continue to make effective the heritage received as an undivided unity."

NATION AND LANGUAGE

A nation is not a race; but we should naturally expect that it would be co-extensive with a language. Common feelings and common thoughts would seem to imply a common and single language, in which they can be expressed and by which they can be communicated. Yet we have to note two things which seem to show the contrary. On the one hand, a group may form a nation without possessing a common language. Switzerland is a nation: but there are three, if not four, languages in Switzerland. There is, too, a British nation; but there are three languages spoken in Great Britain. Again, and on the other hand, a group may speak one language and yet form several nations. The group which speaks the English language now constitutes separate nations in various continents. Movements may indeed arise, like the Pan German or the

* The words in the text were written in 1926. They have been illustrated since by the movement of German history, but the author has not felt it necessary to add in this new edition any account of the Nazi theory and practice of a new racial gospel. It has come—and it has gone. The facts of race remain what they were.

Pan Slav, which would fain make language and nation co-extensive. They beat in vain against the dikes and embankments of a national tradition which defies linguistic claims. Nonetheless, and just because a nation is a tradition of thought and sentiment, and thought and sentiment have deep congruities with speech, there is the closest of affinities between nation and language. Language is not mere words. Each word is charged with associations that touch feelings and evoke thoughts. You cannot share these feelings and thoughts unless you can unlock their association by having the key of language. You cannot enter the heart and know the mind of a nation unless you know its speech. Conversely, once you have learned that speech, you find that with it and by it you imbibe a deep and pervasive spiritual force. The fact that Christianity was expressed and preached in Greek carried much of the content of Greek thought into Christianity. The fact that the vocabulary of our own language is so largely Latin has carried into our own thought more than we readily recognize of the Latin tradition and quality. The close and subtle ties which connect language with thought and feeling explain the importance of language in the history of national development. On the one hand, national movements begin with an effort to resuscitate an old national language, and to make it a literary vehicle. Hence the revival of Czech in Bohemia during the first half of the nineteenth century; hence the cultivation of Erse in Ireland from the days of the Gaelic League onwards. It is not mere perversity: it is an effort to recapture, as it were, an old soul or spiritual principle which lies deep down in speech. On the other hand, a nation sown with minorities which speak another language will often be found attempting to enforce the general use of its own. This was the policy followed before 1914 by the Germans in Schleswig, Prussian Po-

land, and Alsace-Lorraine, and again by the Magyars in Transylvania: it was the policy adopted after 1918 by some of the new nations in Central Europe. This again is not mere perversity, though it is not exactly wisdom: it is an effort to impose a new and uniform spiritual principle by the stamp and the suggestion of language. All in all, and with due allowance for instances which seem to show the contrary, we may say that as it was common speech which, as we shall see, went mainly to make the earliest nations of history, so it is common speech which is still a main cohesive bond of nations and a generally necessary basis for the formation of a homogeneous national character. All who speak the same language do not necessarily tend to form a single nation, and policies based on a supposition of that tendency achieve no success; but all who belong to one nation tend to speak the same language, and a common language becomes the more necessary to the spiritual unity of a nation, as the spirit of a nation plumbs greater depths.

NATION AND RELIGION

Is a common religion also a necessary basis of a common national character? It was long a common opinion; and Queen Elizabeth still held in her day that citizenship involved churchmanship, and that men could not be full members of the nation unless they also belonged to the national church. It is true that to-day there are nations—for example, Germany—which partly belong to the Roman and partly to Protestant churches. Where this is the case, it is *pro tanto* a division of the nation; but even where it is the case, such division may still be compatible with a large common basis of Christian thought and feeling. Yet we cannot but admit that in our days the policy of a whole nation may be set toward secularism; and we must confess that Burke's philosophy of

the consecration and dedication of the nation by the State-establishment of a church is passing or past. Nonetheless, if we take any large view of history, we must also recognize that nations long drew for their national unity on some common fund of religious ideas; and even to-day we may felicitate those nations which still can draw on such a fund. These are the fundamental ideas which affect conduct and social life, and thereby determine national character in noble ways and to noble issues. The tradition even of a secularist nation can never entirely lack the presence of such ideas, which have largely shaped its character in the past, and are not entirely gone from it in its present. And in a nation which still makes religious instruction a part of its national system of education, the shaping force of those ideas may still remain largely intact, and in their measure they may still be agents in the formation of national character. May we not say, on a general view, that a nation is no longer a church, but at the best a number of cognate churches; that it may even, in its public life, be purely secular, but that nations were cradled in religious unity in the past, and owe much of their common character in the present to religious influence?

NATION AND TERRITORY

A nation needs a territory as much as a man needs a home. The Jews, indeed, as a whole, have no common territory; but the Jews are not a nation, any more than they are a race: they are a church and a culture. The true nation has a home; and it is by their possession of such a home, and in its shelter, that all true nations have developed tradition and character. If I had to invent a formula for the making of a nation, I should say: "Take first a territory: add some form of organization (or State) to hold its in-

habitants together; let one language, if it was not there in the beginning, gradually prevail by its weight; let some community of belief and worship unite the spirits of men—and then from the crucible of time and the fermentation of the centuries a nation will emerge." A territory comes first for a nation, just as a home comes first for a man. And as you judge a man by his home, or identify him with it, so you may do with a nation and its territory. An epigrammatic French writer, of the monarchist school, makes "Germany a race; Egypt a river; Judæa a religion; Great Britain an island; Austria-Hungary a policy; Italy a language; France a dynasty, a tradition, a territory." "Egypt a river . . . Great Britain an island . . . France a territory." There are nations so linked with their home that it colors and almost makes men's ideas of those nations. This is perhaps specially true of France. The unity of the French nation has its roots in the unity, the harmony, the symphony of French territory. "France is a person," said Michelet. "Dear soil of France"—so French writers have said and Frenchmen have always felt, clinging to that dear soil with invincible tenacity.

NATION AND STATE

A nation, then, is not a race: it is not always, if it is generally, a language: it is not generally now, if once it generally was, a church; but it is always a territory. Is it always also a State? Must a nation be a State, and conversely a State a nation? Historically, the State precedes the nation. It is not nations which make States; it is States which make nations. At some nucleus in a territory there arises a person or body of persons possessed of standing and authority—or, in other words, vested with *status*—who gradually organize the territory and come to be called "the State," which is as much as to say, "the person or persons of standing

and authority which are prerogative and unique." This "State," or government, by making and administering law, by spreading the language of its court and chancery, by co-operating (or it may be competing) with the clergy, and by waging wars to defend or extend its territory, is the principal agent in the accumulation of that tradition which ultimately constitutes a nation. So it was with the Plantagenets, so it was with the Capetians. In this sense, and from this point of view, there were States which existed before nations, but which in their nature, and by their work, could not but beget nations. Where, as in France, States begat nations that were co-extensive with themselves, so that the State was a nation and nation a State, we may say that history seems justified of its works. It was not always so. States in their wars of extension might seek to incorporate populations of inveterately separate speech, different faiths, and independent traditions. Where this happened, you might have a nation, like the Polish nation in the nineteenth century, which ceased to be a State, and was dismembered and divided among three other States; and you might have a State, like the Austro-Hungarian State, which was not a nation, but a congeries of nations. Here history left us with no justification of its works, but rather as it were with a note of interrogation and a baffling riddle of the Sphinx. What is there to be said of the nation that is not a State, and the State that is not a nation?

Lord Acton, in the essay on Nationality which has already been mentioned, defended the ideal value of the multinational State. The State which is also a single nation (he thought) may be a tyrant exalting its supreme and absolute law of life: the State which is multinational may be limited and checked by the play and interplay of its contained

nations. Lord Acton's argument is abstract, and it is contradicted by facts. He advanced it over eighty years ago; but even in 1860 it might have been perceived that in a multinational State the government either pits each nation against the rest to secure its own absolutism, or allows itself to become the organ of one of the nations for the suppression or oppression of others. Apart from considerations such as these, there is further difficulty in Lord Acton's arguments. He assumed that the quality of nationality might exist in two degrees. In the first, nationality is only a social fact. It expresses itself in common thoughts and feelings, customs and dress, language and possibly literature; but it has no political expression, and at the best it only serves, in the sphere of politics, to constitute a social group which intervenes between the government and its subjects, and limits and checks the State by its intervention. In the second degree, nationality is a political as well as a social fact: it issues in a common organization, possessed of authority, which expresses a common and independent will. There is indeed a truth in this distinction of the two degrees of nationality—a truth which has been emphasized in Sir Alfred Zimmern's essays on *Nationality and Government*. There is a sense in which the Scottish and the Welsh peoples are nations of the first degree, content with the social expression of their quality. On the other hand, the members of these peoples are also members of a nation—the British nation—which is a nation of the second degree; they are heirs of its past traditions and joint masters by their voice and vote of its future destinies; nor would they be content with nationhood in the first degree unless, in another form, they also possessed it in the second. The history of the century since 1815, and of the generation since 1914, will teach us that in some form a nation must be a

State, and a State a nation. And after all, if a nation be thought, sentiment, will—thought vivified by sentiment and backed by will—we must expect a nation to issue in a State, which in our democratic days is simply an organization for the free play and expression of collective thought or (as philosophers call it) “the general will.” That word “democratic” is perhaps a key to the whole question. An autocratic State might in the past be multinational, uniting by the one will of the autocrat a number of nations that were merely social groups. A democratic State which is multinational will fall asunder into as many democracies as there are nationalities, dissolved by the very fact of will which is the basis of its life—unless indeed, as we have somehow managed in our island, such a State can be both multinational and a single nation, and can teach its citizens at one and the same time to glory both in the name of Scotsmen or Welshmen or Englishmen and in the name of Britons.

We may end by attempting a definition

of a nation in the light of the previous argument. Shall we say that a nation is a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history; who on the whole and in the main, though more in the past than the present, include in that common stock a common religious belief; who generally and as a rule use a common language as the vehicle of their thoughts and feelings; and who, besides common thoughts and feelings, also cherish a common will, and accordingly form, or tend to form, a separate State for the expression and realization of that will? If we so define a nation, we may further define national character as the sum of acquired tendencies which a national society has built on the native basis of its racial blend, its territory, and the mass and social variety of its population—the house of thought which men have made that their minds may dwell there together.

What Is American?

Lee Coleman, a career civil servant in the United States Department of Agriculture, has examined the principal books dealing with American civilization. He has found that practically every trait listed as characteristically American is opposed by another trait also asserted to be distinctively American. Therefore Mr. Coleman suggests “that this very diversity can be shown to be the most fundamental of all American characteristics.” But is it “the most valuable trait Americans possess”? This is his warning against a too facile definition of “Americanism.”

Few people in America today can escape an awareness of the terms “Americanism” and the “American Way.” “American” and “un-American” are on the tongues of all, but few can define what they mean

by the terms. It is certain, however, that they are being used to blanket widely divergent concepts.

This paper summarizes some of the data and conclusions of a study intended as a

From “What Is American?” by Lee Coleman, *Social Forces*, May, 1941. (Footnotes omitted.)

first step toward a more adequate definition of the term "American." The study, made under the auspices of the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina, is described as a "lexicographic analysis" of alleged American characteristics, ideals, and principles. It represents but one approach to a large problem and a vast literature, and it was not anticipated that the product would be a definitive answer to the question "What is American?"

The data were obtained by collecting, from a large number of books dealing with "Americanism" or "the American Way," and from incidental discussions in other books and periodicals, all statements that some characteristic or principle is distinctively American, together with the author's evidence for such an assertion. Statements collected were limited to those alleging some trait to be American in the sense that it is characteristic of the country as a whole. The books and authors included in the survey were chosen at random and represent a wide variety of viewpoints. Both contemporary and earlier commentators are included.

When the traits were grouped according to subject matter, it was immediately apparent that there is far from complete agreement as to what is or is not American. In the case of practically every trait which one or more authors allege to be characteristically American, an opposing trait is by other authors asserted to be distinctively American, or evidence is advanced in contradiction of the alleged trait. The extent of this contrast and contradiction in the use of "American" is indicated by the illustrations which follow.

A large number of the authors, as might be expected, assert that democracy is an American institution and a characteristically American way of life. In addition to democracy as such, the alleged American traits centering around this idea

range from "a republican form of government" to specific types of democracy—Jeffersonianism, economic democracy, political democracy—and special manifestations of democracy, such as lack of class, lack of aloofness on the part of the wealthy, absence of a servile manner on the part of servants, hatred of social distinctions, universal suffrage, sovereignty of the people, freedom of women, equality of all, and representation on the basis of numbers.

By no means all of the observers, however, are willing unqualifiedly to list "democracy" as an American trait. It is asserted, for example, that the Founding Fathers were almost unanimously followers of the aristocratic ideal, that the American people have always been fascinated by aristocracy, that our business and economic life is one of complete autocracy, that we are exclusive as a people, that we have, if not class, an occupational stratification by nationality group—and finally that democracy itself is "un-American."

This contrast in opinion is well summed up in the words of Dr. George S. Counts, "The authenticity of American democracy cannot be successfully challenged. Whatever may have been its defects and limitations . . . it was and is one of the realities of history," as against those of Mr. Gerald Johnson, "Heretical as it may sound, I do not believe that either democracy or liberty is a fundamental part of Americanism, much less that 'equality of opportunity' which is supplanting universal suffrage as the theoretical expression of liberty."

In the matter of obedience to law, a striking contrast of opinion appears. While one group of observers assert that Americans have a feeling of personal interest in the law and a consequent disposition to obey it, another group points out a strong tradition of "direct action," mob violence, and complete disregard of

the law when it gets in one's way. The one group picture America as "a government of laws and not of men," whose citizens accomplish needed reforms by use of the ballot and are characterized by deference to law as final authority. The other group assert that our laws are poor, that they are unstable, and that we are extremely lax in enforcing them. One author combines the two points of view in his statement that we have "an outward respect for law and order combined with a secret itch for violence and direct action."

The observers find much in American life to justify the widespread conception of America as a land of education. They profess to see an almost blind worship of schooling, a belief that knowledge is power, and an intense desire to gain that power on a national scale. In the words of Nicholas Murray Butler, we have

a never-failing faith in the power of education to promote both individual and national happiness, efficiency, and virtue.... The American people are almost Socratic in their acceptance of the principle that knowledge will lead to right and useful action and conduct.... The American people have an almost fanatical belief in education because of the practical results which they feel certain will flow from it.

Even as early as 1835 we find de Tocqueville asserting that

... it is by the attention it [the law] pays to Public Education that the original character of American civilization is at once placed in the clearest light.

But some of the observers see another side of the picture. These charge that we believe the principal value of schooling is a money value, and that we go to school only for financial gain. Others assert that we do not know why we go to school, and that we have more respect for the correspondence school than for the university. A number mention the strong frontier tradition which scorns "book learning," "culture," and the expert. It

is charged further that we still have a low regard for intellectual achievement, that our standards of scholarship are low and our teachers poorly-trained, that we lack respect for teachers, that our thinking is external, that we seek information instead of knowledge, that our glorified "education for the masses" is superficial, that our business world looks with disdain on academic theory.

Both native and foreign critics, though more particularly the latter, devote page after page to discussions of our "worship of money," our "dedication to profit," our commercialism and materialism. There are those who see desire for economic advancement as the central, almost exclusive, motivation in American society, and some go so far as to assert that we have elevated money-making to the status of virtue and patriotic duty. Our highly commercialized crime and our professionalized and commercialized sport are pointed out as examples of the all-pervasiveness of this motivation.

But there are others, and they are not confined to the native critics, who present strong evidence in refutation, or partial refutation of these alleged traits. Especially emphasized is a strong current of idealism which many observers believe runs through our history down to the present time. Another group of authors stress, as further evidence against the purely materialistic concept of the American, the things that Americans do with their money. They assert that philanthropy has reached its highest development in America and that our schools and churches are the world's best supported. Still other elements in American life which are seen by some observers as modifying or raising some doubts about our materialism include the doctrine of "service" which pervades the business world, the attitude that money-making is a "game," the wide-spread distribution of wealth, the

relatively high standards of business honor, and the efforts through governmental action to curb the undue amassing of wealth and the growth of monopolies.

Most of the critics who see America as dominated by the profit motive see a consequent neglect of the "spiritual" side of life, including religion, literature, and the arts. It is claimed by some that our religion, however conspicuous it may be in national life, is chiefly a "Sunday religion," which can be conveniently forgotten during the business week. Other alleged American characteristics which are purported to illustrate the relative unimportance of religion in American life are the separation of the church and state and the distinctness of the sphere of religion, the emphasis on commercial buildings instead of cathedrals, secularized education, the individualistic religion, the belief that one religion is as good as another, and the belief that religion should not be discussed in public.

Against these alleged traits stands the evidence presented by other observers to show the great influence of religion in our national life—especially the intermingling of religious issues in political and economic life, the importance of church membership in individual success, the large element of a religious motivation in our history, our evangelism, and the fervor and the vividness of our religious emotion.

Here the contrast in opinion can be summed up in the question whether, with Alexis de Tocqueville, we can still say that "there is no country in the whole world in which the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men than in America," and with James Bryce that the Americans are "on the whole, a religious people," and that in America "Christianity influences conduct, not indeed half as much as in theory it ought, but probably more than it does in any other modern country," or whether

we must conclude that these comments are no longer applicable, and agree with a more modern observer that

We will let all Christian and even non-Christian religions—provided they are "moral"—strictly alone . . . with the understanding that religions let us strictly alone, too, in our everyday secular and political life. That is, with us Americans religion—as far as we have any—is a strictly Sunday or festival . . . affair. And even on the Sabbath it must not any longer deprive us (and no longer does it, in the majority of States) of Sunday "movies" or baseball and football games, of Sunday automobile rides, or even of a Sunday glass of beer.

There is a sharp division of opinion among the authors concerning the American citizen's participation in governmental affairs. While some see as characteristic of Americans an aptitude for politics, a passion for politics and political debates, widespread interest in and knowledge of politics, incessant political activity, and a universal indulgence in "playing politics," the same or other authors point out an indifference to political life on the part of the educated and wealthy, the absence of the most able men from politics, the poor quality of our politicians as contrasted with the high quality of the people in general, the general distrust of politicians, lack of interest in the business of the state, a remoteness and abstractness of government for the average citizen, the poor government of our cities, and the evils of the spoils system and the political boss.

Even the much-vaunted "American freedom" does not escape the doubters. There is of course strong support for liberty as an American trait, both as ideal and as fact, and many observers stress the specific liberties of speech, the press, religion, and association for political purposes. Others assert that we possess a large measure of personal freedom, that we not only believe in liberty but in equal liberty, and that we have faith in free inquiry

and discussion for the solution of our problems. But there are also those who find in America a continual interference with personal liberty, a complete lack of independence in politics, a considerable degree of religious intolerance, and a lack of real freedom of discussion and independence of spirit. In support of their position these observers point to our censorship of books and movies, our straight-party voting, our high regard for convention and conformity, and the great power of the partisan press.

Contrast, then, the point of view of Alexander Meiklejohn:

America has an ideal. It is Liberty. That is, I am sure, our deepest commitment. No one who reads our national literature, who listens to our daily speech, who mingles in the common course of our living, can fail to hear the note rising above all the others in which we express ourselves. The man who fails to find in us a deep, consuming passion for freedom does not know what we are.

with that of Alexis de Tocqueville, who, although he wrote more than a hundred years ago, best expresses what many of the observers are still saying today:

I know no country where there obtains, in general, less independence of spirit and true freedom of discussion than in America. The majority sets a formidable wall around thought. Within these limits, the writer is free, but unfortunate is he if he dares to go outside them . . . he is the butt of all kinds of aversions and persecutions every day. A political career is closed to him; he has offended the only power that has the capacity for opening it. He is refused everything, even glory.

Some of the commentators have another way of looking at "American freedom." They see in it a strong tendency toward anarchy. They claim that we are so jealous of our liberties that we will accept only the most limited conception of the function of government, and that we place all kinds of limitations on the agents of government. They assert that we are quick to protect the "rights of men

against government," and that we are ashamed to accept governmental employment. They point to our constant criticism of government and our humor at its expense. Their summaries of our supposed point of view range from "belief that regulation is the limit of governmental function" to "negative conception of government."

But here again the critics are by no means unanimous. Others are just as emphatic that ours is the positive conception of government. They find support for this position in the Declaration of Independence itself, pointing out that in this document we go so far as to accept as a responsibility of government the happiness of the citizen. They point to a long tradition of "reform by use of the ballot," and many acts of government, throughout our history, which they believe demonstrate that we long ago accepted the protection and security of the economic rights of the people as a governmental function.

Illustrations of contrast and contradicting opinion among the authors included in the study might be continued indefinitely. In some cases an alleged characteristic is directly contradicted by another alleged trait, both traits being supported by reputable writers who present evidence from observable fact or established sources. More often, however, the "opposing trait" does not represent a complete contradiction of the other trait, but rather the interpretation of the same set of facts from a different point of view, or the emphasizing of another set of facts. For example, our "government of checks and balances" to one observer may mean a carefully-worked-out "division of responsibility," while to another it may mean "lack of unity in government" and undue limitation on the agents of government. To one critic our idealism may be the predominant and

significant fact, while to another our "flagrant disregard and defilement of our ideals" may be the important fact.

The illustrations given above will suffice to show the wide divergence of opinion as to what is "American." It is not meant, however, to convey the impression that the evidence was found to be equal on both sides of each disputed trait or group of traits. Despite opposing evidence and diverging opinion, it was possible to make up a list of traits which were so often mentioned and so little contradicted that they may safely be assumed to constitute at least a preliminary list of important American characteristics.

LIST OF AMERICAN TRAITS UPON WHICH
THERE IS RELATIVE AGREEMENT AMONG
THE AUTHORS USED IN THE STUDY

Sovereignty of the people, characteristically exercised through *public opinion* (a manifestation of democracy that receives such emphasis as to necessitate separate mention).

Equality of all, a fundamental belief and in large degree a fact.

Individualism, rugged or otherwise, in all realms of life, but especially in the economic.

Worship of schooling, and universal public education—this whether the motivation be materialistic or idealistic, and despite superficiality of the schooling and a distrust of academic theory in practical life.

Distrust of strong government, especially as expressed in an over-emphasis on division of responsibility and "checks and balances."

Love of size and bigness, based on an actual fact of bigness everywhere.

Adaptability and freedom from the past; openness to change, and fact of constant change and revolution.

Associational activity, an aptitude for organization that makes Americans the world's greatest organizers and joiners, and the doing by means of such voluntary organizations of many things that elsewhere would be done by governmental action or not at all.

Optimism, especially as expressed in a belief in progress and a faith in the perfectability of man.

Opportunity, especially the belief in equal op-

portunity for all and the fact of much greater opportunity than in most other countries.

Constitutional government and the great power of the judiciary—limitation on the immediate will of the majority and the presence of a power higher than the legislature, plus the position of the judges as arbiters of the validity of laws.

"Localism"—local government, local patriotism, local initiative and responsibility.

"Missionary Spirit"—reforming others, interfering with their lives, making over the world.

Humanitarianism and philanthropy, sympathy for the "under-dog"—this more than in any other country in the world.

Spirit of the pioneer and tradition of the frontier—the strong influence of the "great open spaces" and the pioneer way.

National self-consciousness and conceit, incessant bragging and boasting, sensitiveness to criticism.

Mobility, migration, restlessness—the world's most mobile people.

Liberty, freedom, independence—all-important ideals and to a large extent actualities, except for some notable exceptions.

Emphasis on money-making, and belief that it is duty and virtue—but not money-making to the exclusion of idealism, philanthropy, and "service."

Desire for peace and disbelief in war, especially as expressed in pacifism, and a belief in arbitration and the rights of neutrals.

Political isolationism, "freedom from entangling alliances."

Practicality, absence of theories and philosophizing, and disbelief in them.

Dominance of women, their freedom and high status.

Party government and party loyalty, straight-party voting.

Widespread popular knowledge and education—this despite credulousness and a "passion for humbug."

Glorification of the "common man" at the expense of the "expert" and the intellectual.

Ingenuity and invention, high level of initiative and research.

It is difficult to set lines of demarcation between degrees of importance or the degrees to which the various traits are "proved" or "disproved." The following traits, however, seem to be mentioned less often or to attract less unanimity of sup-

port, though among the authors studied there is nevertheless considerably more support for them than dissent from them.

Idealism, despite widespread and flagrant disregard and defilement of ideals.

Prosperity and high standard of living, widespread distribution of wealth.

Energy, alertness, incessant activity, love of action, craving for excitement.

Dominance of the machine and of applied and mechanistic science.

Trial and error experimentation, belief in evolutionary progress.

Emphasis on youth, special interest in the welfare of children.

Gambling, speculation, chance-taking.

"Mass" activity—mass production, mass education, mass entertainment.

Protestantism, Puritanism, Calvinism.

"Property-ism"—excessive emphasis on the accumulation and protection of property.

Glorification of labor and belief that work is a virtue.

Emphasis on efficiency, and fact of very high degree of efficiency.

Freedom of relationships, candor, openness, casualness.

The preceding list of "largely-agreed-upon" American traits does not take into consideration whether the support for a given trait came from authors who were merely describing contemporary characteristics or whether a part of it came from authors writing in each of the various periods of our history. Since some definitions of "American" exclude all traits but those which can be shown to have been consistently predominant throughout our history as a people, a separate analysis of the traits by dates of allegation was made. American history was divided somewhat arbitrarily into four periods, Pre-Civil War (to 1865), Civil War to World War (1866-1917), World War to Depression (1918-1929), and Depression to present (1930-1940). The decreasing length of the periods was determined partly by the fact that the great majority of the authors used in the study were relatively modern, but it is believed that the events and dates selected as dividing lines between periods

do represent significant turning points in American history.

For each of these periods a list was made of all the traits alleged by one or more persons writing or speaking during that period. From these lists, another list which includes all the traits mentioned in each of the four periods or in as many as three of them was made. This list differs from the preceding list of "largely-agreed-upon" American traits in that the present list utilizes the original headings under which the quotations were grouped, whereas the former list was made up of generalized statements covering a number of similar traits. It will be observed, however, that the content of the two lists is almost identical. Furthermore, when the lists for each of the four time periods were compared, no important difference between the traits mentioned by modern observers and those of the earlier periods of American history was discovered.

TRAITS MENTIONED IN ALL FOUR PERIODS:

Associational activity
 "Democracy," and belief and faith in it
 Belief in the equality of all as a fact and as a right
 Freedom of the individual: an ideal and a fact
 Disregard of law—"direct action"
 Local government
 Practicality
 Prosperity and general material well-being
 Puritanism
 Emphasis on religion, and its great influence in national life
 Uniformity and conformity

TRAITS MENTIONED IN THREE OF THE FOUR PERIODS

Ceaseless activity and agitation
 Braggery and boasting
 Precedence of business over politics and religion
 Openness to change and love of it
 Changeability
 Separation of church and state—distinctness of the sphere of religion
 Absence of class and class-consciousness
 Commercialism

Faith in the common man—"the people"
 Domination of economic motivation
 Public education
 Belief and faith in education and schooling,
 and devotion to them
 Exaggeration
 Disdain and distrust of foreigners, and feeling
 of superiority over them
 Friendliness and sociability
 Love of gain and pursuit of wealth
 Good humor and kindness
 Gregariousness
 Haste
 Idealism
 Ingenuity and inventiveness
 Political isolationism
 Laissez-fairism
 Liberty, a fact and an ideal—devotion to it
 and faith in it
 Materialism
 Monotony
 National conceit—desire for praise and unwill-
 ingness to stand criticism
 Opportunity
 Optimism
 Instinct and aptitude for organization, and
 love of it
 Interference with other people's affairs
 Desire for peace and belief in it; disbelief in
 war
 Absolute sovereignty of the people
 Belief in the perfectability of man and the
 possibilities of human achievement
 Periodical literature
 Widespread interest in and knowledge of
 politics
 Belief in private property and respect for it
 The protective tariff
 Racial heterogeneity—the "melting pot"
 Restlessness
 Sectionalism
 Size and bigness
 Universal suffrage
 Tolerance
 Variety, diversity, and contrasts
 Dominance of women

Admittedly this study has made no startling revelations. It should, however, place renewed emphasis on the amazing diversity of American life and character, and consequently show the hazard involved in asserting that any trait is unqualifiedly American, to the exclusion of all opposing or modifying traits. With traditions as diverse as the races and nationalities that have made America, and with the accomplishment in a little more than a hundred years of a revolution so complete as the change from a pioneer farming country to the highly industrialized nation of today, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is a listing of whatever principles and tendencies can be found to run fairly consistently through the successive periods of American development, largely disregarding the contradictions which may be found to exist between concurrent principles and traits. Certainly there is ground for a wide divergence of opinion as to which are and which are not the essential American principles and characteristics.

Indeed, it may be that this very diversity can be shown to be the most fundamental of all American characteristics. Perhaps this is the reason that totalitarian theories have made so little progress in America. It may be that this explains why an American can still see a place for difference of opinion on all questions. Perhaps in today's world it is the most valuable trait Americans possess.

What Makes an American?

D. W. Brogan was born in Glasgow and studied at Glasgow University, Oxford, and Harvard. Presently a professor of political science at Cambridge University, he formerly taught American history and government at the University of London. Mr. Brogan is one of those comparatively rare scholars who manage to acquire a mastery of more than one field of interest. Mr. Brogan has written authoritatively on French, American, and British society. His book, *The American Character*, from which this selection is taken is a sympathetic but searching examination of characteristic American ways of thinking and acting. He observes the impact of the frontier tradition and traces its influences throughout American life. And he notes the sharp contradictions that exist between professed ideals and practices.

In the course of conquering America and so making Americans, habits were adopted out of urgent necessity which may have survived that necessity. There was, for example, the need for overstatement. To get settlers to move to America it was necessary to paint "America the golden" in very golden colors indeed. Very skilled hands undertook this necessary task: good prose writers like Richard Hakluyt; good or goodish poets like Michael Drayton; good storytellers of the "when I was in Transylvania" school like Captain John Smith.

And once the voyage was made, the hazard of new fortunes undertaken, pride, exultation at one's own daring, recurrent optimism as new dreams replaced the old, led to the constant "sale" of America to the old world. For the genuinely adventurous type, for the man and woman whom nature had made ready for America, the exultation and the pride were genuine. Those who did not share in this pride and exultation were probably ill adapted anyway; they died or returned home or kept quiet. They had

better, for from the beginning the settlers had no use for "knockers," for anybody who committed the crime of what was to be described in a later age as "selling America short."

The pioneer American had a real economic as well as emotional interest in growth, in encouraging the booster spirit. If he wanted to stay in the new settlement which he had chosen, he had an interest in other people's staying too. Only so could the profitable rise in values which he counted on be realized. Only so could money be borrowed on the future prosperity of the settlement. If the town refused to grow, if it, in fact, was written off as a failure and abandoned by any serious number of its residents, not only were the anticipated gains lost but real losses were suffered, especially after the Supreme Court put the federal government's power behind the claims of the buyers of municipal and county securities. It mattered little or nothing whether the loans had been prudently or even legally contracted; the Supreme Court, over the protests of that great Iowa jur-

ist, Mr. Justice Miller, insisted on collection from the remaining inhabitants. And while the ingenious borrowers might be enjoying their capital gains in the interesting little town of Los Angeles, the less foresighted inhabitants of a town or county on the prairie were forced to pay or be sold up. They were in the position of a Russian village community under the Tsar from which a number of freed serfs had vanished, refusing to pay their share of the redemption price. Pessimism in such a world was treason. And as long as this boom spirit was flourishing, treason it remained. Thus, in a later age when the Florida land boom was collapsing, many communities made desperate, indeed magical efforts to persuade themselves and the world that values were holding up. And on July 4th, 1926, the city of St. Augustine, the oldest settlement in the United States, formally buried as an embodiment of that treasonable pessimism, "J. Fuller Gloom," with a funeral ceremony conducted according to the rites of the Chamber of Commerce.

But magic notwithstanding, land booms always burst. There have been few American cities in the last twenty years that have not had on their outskirts ambitious "developments" that have not come off at all, or have come off only after a long period of holding on. Sometimes, the holding on was no great strain. It may be assumed that the losses incurred during the period when only handsome street lamps and magnificent pavements marked most of the development of the old Rockefeller farm in Shaker Heights on the outskirts of Cleveland were no great strain on the Rockefeller fortune. But for less well-financed speculations, the period of holding on might be fatal. The first speculator has so often taken the rap. How few American railroads, how few New York hotels have not gone through the wringer! How profitable has been the job of receiver! Indeed, there

have been times when the innocent investors have been forced to wonder whether "receiver"—meaning the recipient of stolen goods—was not merely a special case of "receiver" meaning the officer appointed by a complaisant court to take over and administer the bankrupt assets of great and small concerns alike. It would be unkind to say on what American railroad this incident occurred, but when I complimented a friend of mine on the improved service on his local railroad, he replied, with no conscious irony: "Oh, service has been swell since it went into receivership; the management can afford to spend money now that it hasn't got to worry about the stockholders." This was a commuter's view, not a stockholder's, but there has always been among Americans, including the luckless investors themselves, a philosophical acceptance of the fact that somebody must hold the bag for the great economic improvements of modern America.

The American farmer is perhaps rather less philosophical than the urban investor. He thinks he has a right to expect not a good living or a good cash income but a permanent and certain increase in the selling value of his land. It is this expectation that makes him hold on through drought and storm flood and tornado. On this expectation he borrows money and, as a permanent borrower, he has no fear of inflation; like the small boy in the story, far from being troubled by the thought he simply loves it. He knows, in a general, intellectual way, that somebody will have to be the last buyer, but he hopes and trusts that it won't be he. He will be living off the profits, perhaps invested in new lands, perhaps taken out in mortgages or in a rent that takes full account of the presumed value of the land, future as well as present. And the American absentee owner is not necessarily somebody like the late Lord Clanricarde, celebrated miser, tyrant, and last

chief of the elder line of the Burkes, but a mild, modest ex-farmer living in decent comfort in the neighborhood of Los Angeles, raising the moral tone of the neighborhood and swelling the crowds at Iowa picnics. He may be simply a resident in a small Iowa town, able to afford a trip to St. Petersburg to pitch horseshoes in the winter sun of Florida. Or he may be like the Vermont farmer who, when asked by a scornful Midwestern visitor what crops were raised on those stony hills, replied: "The chief crop is those good five per cent Iowa mortgages we hold." The web of speculation, of optimism, of boosting is cast over all the nation.

But, of course, there was a real interest in persuading people to stay. The local banker made his money by backing rising values; he lost if they *all* fell. The local doctor who, like John Hay's father, chose the wrong town to settle in, paid for it in a life of comparative shallows and miseries. Hence the importance of prophetic statistics. "Albuquerque 40,000 by 1930." "Hamlet is a fine town, population 800." I don't think Albuquerque made it by 1930, and I suspect that Hamlet had slightly inflated its figures. But editors of encyclopedias and guide-books have got to accept the necessity of printing not only the federal census figures, but the local estimate—which is always larger; millions of Americans appear to sleep out of town on census day.

One way of anchoring a settler is to get him married and settled down to raising a family. Hence the emphasis on good schools; lavish expenditure on school buildings is not necessarily a totally disinterested tribute to education; it is a bribe to wandering parents. But of course it would not be a bribe to parents who had not the inherited or acquired New England belief in education as a good thing. Even more affective anchorage was

investment in a house—or, as the Americans say, a home. And expensive, highly ornamental homes were proof that the settlement was taking root. As Mark Twain put it long ago (in *Life on the Mississippi*); "Every town and village along that vast stretch of double river frontage had a best dwelling, finest dwelling, mansion—the home of its wealthiest and most conspicuous citizen." They still have, although today one would hardly expect to be believed if he asserted what Mark Twain asserted with no apparent fear of contradiction: "Not a bathroom in the house; and no visitor likely to come along who has ever seen one."

These optimistic exhibitions of civic pride have long been a British jest, a jest which sophisticated Americans have more recently joined in. But most Americans are still touchy on the subject of local improvements, as I discovered when I made an innocent joke about the Chicago drainage canal in a London paper. The European visitor lacks the eye of faith. Thus Dickens made Cairo, Illinois, the butt of his angry wit in his picture of "Eden" in *Martin Chuzzlewit*; but twenty years later, Anthony Trollope found that picture too flattering. "I doubt whether that author ever visited Cairo in midwinter, and I am sure he never visited Cairo when Cairo was the seat of an American army. Had he done so, his love of truth would have forbidden him to presume that even Mark Tapley could have enjoyed himself in such an Eden." But only a quarter of a century after Trollope played the sourpuss, Cairo was given a big hand by a local resident. "Three years ago people said all the hateful things they could about Cairo. Now they are lavish in their praises. The paper says we'll monopolize all the trade of the Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers. Our new grain elevator is one of the largest in the world, new railroads are constantly striking us. We've

the most magnificent hotel (run on the grandest scale) in this part of the country, telephone system, new Opera House, elegant one, going up, street-cars soon to be running, and we are altogether civilized." So wrote a very bright, very nice local girl, a girl nicer and certainly much brighter than any Dickens or Trollope heroine I can remember. Cairo did not become a new St. Louis or Chicago, but "Maud" liked it and believed in it and what was good enough for her should have been good enough for any reasonable body.

This conception of growth as everybody's business, everybody's interest, is deep-rooted in the American national psychology. The bulky real estate supplements of the Sunday papers are no doubt largely kept going as an advertising revenue producer, but they would produce no advertising and no revenue if no one read them. The Englishman, hidden behind his hedge or wall, is not interested in his neighbor's house, and the idea of wanting to read about houses bought, sold, or built by total strangers is not even funny; it is merely absurd. But to an American, it is not only important, it is comforting, it is gratifying to know that other people are improving your home town; even people who have no personal economic stake in the rise of real estate values feel the same kind of interest that makes a motherly woman smile with genuine amiability on the children of total strangers. The very linguistic difference between "house" and "home" is significant. All Americans who live in houses, not apartments, live in homes; the Englishman lives in *his* home, but all his neighbors live in houses or flats.

The interest of the American in community growth is not confined to homes. He is far more aware of the size and importance of public and business buildings than anybody in England is. To the

inhabitants of Minneapolis, the Foshay Tower was a symbol of growth, of maturity, that did not lose its value when the too enterprising *entrepreneur* went to jail. But in London, people do not long notice what new buildings have gone up and, after a month or two, find it hard to remember what stood on the site cleared by a German bomb. The idle, the curious are no more numerous in America than elsewhere, but those gazers on men-at-work on a new building whom the Americans call "sidewalk superintendents" are a more representative class of citizen than their English fellows. When John D. Rockefeller, Jr., built a covered-in observation post for the comfort of these spectators during the winter when Rockefeller Center was being built, he was not only acting with genuine American hospitality, he was recognizing a genuine and generous American interest in building as such. It is not at all unlikely that, among the spectators who watched with approving interest the new buildings which were rising with a speed that, by our standards, is really not very much slower than the speed with which Aladdin built his palace for the Princess, were stockholders in the Empire State Building. And they had nothing but a truly American tradition to encourage them to cheer the progress of a rival monument to the passion for the bigger and better—or, at any rate, bigger.

In pioneering conditions, personal credit—credit for courage, for competence, for industry, for economic promise—was all important. A pioneering community was composed of people all of whom were extending credit to each other as well as to the locality. When conditions were a little better, a little more settled, credit in the ordinary sense became important, but it was personal, too. The village banker in America was not in the position of the village usurer in Europe. His debtors could walk out on him; they

were not anchored to the spot by tradition, by hereditary investment in land and family pride, by the difficulty of finding any place to go—except America. Indeed in Ireland, classic land of the village usurer, lending money to pay fares to America was one of the chief business opportunities—and risks. So there was a mutual assessment of need and greed. But the village banker, unlike the European village moneylender, was himself living on credit; and when it failed him, he might be the sudden migrant, leaving his debtors legally tied to his creditors, while he sought fresh woods and pastures new. Altogether, moneylending and borrowing was more of a sport in America than it was in Europe, and banking, in the West at any rate, called for rather different qualities from what it demands from a citizen of London or a financier of Wall Street. Mr. Ogden Nash's gloomy reflections on the parentage of great American bankers are not, as far as I know, borne out by the facts, but they fit the national tradition of classing bankers with the other robber barons—though it must be remembered that these robber barons were highly popular as long as they shared or were believed to be sharing the spoil.

But one result of this necessity for and acceptance of the conditions of credit is that publicity must be accepted. If you want (as most American women do want) to have a charge account or a series of charge accounts, you must submit your husband's credit rating to professional and competent investigation. It is of little use for the American husband to try to obey the old maxim of folk-wisdom that bids a husband keep secret from his wife the amount of money he has, if she can, in effect, make a pretty good guess by trying to stretch his credit at a department store. The general acceptance of debt, however disguised, as a normal state of existence for many

worthy people no doubt leads to ostentatious expenditure, to conspicuous waste, as it leads to nonfunctional automobile design and other specimens of art for show's sake. But it also leads to a fish-bowl existence in which the English passion for privacy would offend public opinion and constitute a luxury that only a very large independent income could support. What I have been told of life in official circles in India—that the public knowledge of the incomes of all the nice people cuts out certain kinds of ostentatious expenditure—applies to many American communities, too. They all try to keep up with the Joneses, but they are local Joneses, with accounts at local banks and stores. The attempt to keep up with remote Joneses, to ape the manners and expenditure of remote social circles, and the refusal to admit that there is in that community anybody with whom it is really possible to associate on terms of equality—this is more common in Streat-ham than in Bronxville. American life imposes respect for the human interest of the community in your private affairs; a refusal to conform at that level is, in fact, a vote of censure on the community which it has no intention of submitting to. You can defy it, but at the cost of being laughed at, not admired—and possibly at the cost of having the local bank wonder if anybody so high hat can be a good risk.

It has to be admitted that this national spirit was often hard on dissenters—dissenters, that is, from the religion of economic and political optimism. A pioneer community could afford to house very hard citizens; it often benefited by the energies of persons who, to use modern terms, "cut their ethical corners rather fine." Courage, enterprise, ingenuity—these were qualities from which everybody benefited, or nearly everybody. So, in many ways, the frontier settlement was very tolerant. But it was not tolerant

of the man whose arrogance or pride or morbid pessimism made him a nuisance in a society where all had to hang together if they were not to starve or be scalped separately. Pennsylvania could afford some Quakers, but not too many, in a great crisis like the French and Indian War; but the Revolutionary party in 1776 could not afford to be tolerant of too many Tories (i.e. Loyalists), since it was by no means certain how the majority would react to a strong lead. It was necessary, therefore, by legal or illegal violence, to give them a strong lead—and on one side only.

Religious dissent was more tolerable—as long as it was not dissent from the social creed of the growing nation, or disbelief in economic prosperity, or objection to military service, or real belief in the imminent end of the world. And dissenters or even "atheists" or "deists" were often very energetic and valuable citizens, promoters, and fighters. Indeed, it is possible that as things settled down, as communities acquired more coherence, the role of the religious or political dissenter got harder, since his other qualities became less necessary. But there remained legitimate grounds of dissent. After the Civil War any well-established village in New England or the northern Middle West could afford a town drunkard, a town atheist, and a few Democrats.

But a habit grew up in which it was necessary to call on some courage and perhaps on some independent economic resources before defying the local folkways. The very friendliness of American life made the dissenter more conspicuous. In a country where minding your own business is *de rigueur*, nobody need care what that business is. But in a country where all life is or should be lived pretty publicly, there is more intolerance of an individual eccentricity which is being continually thrust under the eyes of your neighbors. The high degree of social

integration of a small American city (above a certain income level) plays its part, too. The tragedy of Mr. John O'Hara's *Appointment in Samarra* involves more than the weakness of the hero; it involves a life made intolerable if the country club and the local business community are mobilized against you. The highly individual character is a misfit in a community in any country, whether his weakness is genius or madness. If he has a private income like Cézanne, he may pursue his vision unmolested. But what Cézanne called "*les graphins*" are more tenaciously extended in America than elsewhere; they put out their tentacles more determinedly and a persistent evasion of their embraces is more offensive than it would be in a French or English town with no common social life anyway....

And since the common interest of the community is still assumed to be economic growth, attained by the "American way," the dissenter from the end, or the means, is especially open to suspicion. But 1929 wrought a great change, probably a permanent one. The sponsors of the old programs have not quite the same confident ring in their voices; too many things have been tried and have failed; the "American way" has been found to be a term less precise than it seemed in the presidential election of 1928 when the problem of poverty was solved and when the good citizens should have been busily expanding their garages to take the second car that was coming along with tomorrow's sunrise. Senator Robert Taft can, with a clear conscience, advocate the putting of the fiscal policy of the nation in the hands of practical men, since the last two Republican Secretaries of the Treasury are dead, but the memory of 1929-33 is a ghost that still walks. New Mellons and new Millses are ready in the wings, but the call has not yet come.

Nevertheless, the strident tone of American controversy, though not unparalleled in modern British history, is a reminder of a national tradition, pragmatically justified, in which dissent, especially continuous pessimistic crabbing,

was near to treason. So the High School of Muncie teaches loyalty to Muncie as well as to the United States, and in less straightforward communities something of the same spirit prevails in more sophisticated forms.

Sources of Political Immaturity

William G. Carleton is a professor of political science at the University of Florida. In this article Mr. Carleton has presented an extremely provocative discussion of one aspect of the American character. He suggests that our lag in political thinking stems from the impact of evangelical religion, the reliance upon eighteenth century political conceptions, and the relative simplicity, until recently, of the domestic and foreign problems confronting us. What constitutes political immaturity? How would our domestic and foreign policies change were we to acquire a mature point of view?

It is not easy to call one's own countrymen politically naïve, especially when one's country has just won two major wars in a single generation and attained a position of outstanding leadership in the world. A person who publicly makes such an observation exposes himself to the charge of being one who likes to startle, to say glib and smart things. However, the evidence that we *are* a superficial and an adolescent people politically continues to mount.

The striking contrast between our power and political immaturity represents a unique situation. When in the eighteenth century France was the first power in the world; when in the nineteenth century Britain was the first power—the thinkers and peoples of these countries were in the forefront of the political thought of their time. Today the United States is the first power in the world, but her thinkers and her people have not kept pace with the

best political and social thought of our time. Nathaniel Peffer has reported how even educated Chinese, Hindus, and Koreans, while marveling at America's technical achievements, observe in a patronizing way the backwardness of American social and political thought.

There are some very definite reasons for this lag in American political thinking. Among these are: the influence of evangelical religion on our political mores; the persistence of eighteenth-century political conceptions; the simplicity of America's relations to the rest of the world until very recently, the relative ease of American economic and social situations throughout most of American history.

I

Religion in America has for the most part been evangelical, hortatory, apocalyptic. This religious attitude has car-

From "Are We Politically Adolescent?" by William G. Carleton, *The American Scholar*, Winter, 1946-47.

ried over to temporal affairs and invested politics with an aura of superstition, mysticism, and uplift. Political issues are dealt with in terms of "the higher law." In every political campaign, big and little, politicians "stand at Armageddon and battle for the Lord."

No one familiar with public speaking and the conduct of Americans in the mass can be unaware of the moralistic attitude of American audiences. American speakers, especially in the South and West, even if their subjects be zoning ordinances, milk inspection or street cleaning, are expected to deliver "a message." Even today it is a common experience of speakers on social, economic, and political subjects to be admonished by dissatisfied listeners for having left God out of the picture.

This carrying over of religious fervor to politics has tended to make American political thinking romantic and unrealistic. It has tended to create a political world dominated by vague sentiments, wishes, dreams and make-believe—a world divorced from actual conditions.

For example, take the American lawyer turned politician. As a lawyer he has become accustomed to taking infinite pains in negotiating contracts, making abstracts, drawing wills and constructing his pleadings. There is no soft thinking here. But let that same lawyer enter the political arena and be called upon to deal with broad economic and political questions, and his thinking and pronouncements degenerate into a strange compound of moral platitudes, empty stereotypes, and romantic sentimentalities. If he "lawed" as shoddily as he "politiked," he would not last two days as a practicing attorney. In most cases, however, he suffers no harm as a result of his loose political thinking, because his constituents, reared in the tradition of the frontier pulpit pounder, expect their politicians to deliver themselves of "messages" in

which evil is put to rout by the forces of righteousness.

This supernaturalistic approach to politics often leads to a curious kind of passivity. Local and state campaigns are frequently waged on the issue of "turning the rascals out," and specific criminal charges of the most serious kind are leveled at the "ins." But when the "ins" are defeated and the "outs" come to power, almost never is anything done about these campaign charges, even though there be real substance behind them. It is enough that good has triumphed over wickedness.

Again, many of our politicians develop the notion that it is sufficient to expose an evil by making a speech; the speech is a kind of vicarious atonement for lack of action. The late Senator William E. Borah, it seems to me, suffered from this political affliction. And from passivity it is but a step to pessimistic fatalism, to the idea that this world is so hopelessly evil that nothing at all can be done by society to better things. Out of this mood springs the conviction that all politics and all politicians are dirty and immoral, a view held by too many Americans today. (This is the very antithesis of the far sounder view which has it that man is a political animal and that there is no morality outside of politics.) Today hundreds of thousands of Americans belong to primitive religious sects which deny the validity of political authority altogether and speak of all government as "a great beast" and a world association of nations as "a harlot." And incidentally, most modern Americans have only to be scratched slightly to expose a lingering half-belief that public affairs are but a working out of divine revelation.

Even our religious modernists are guilty of an extreme and a one-sided view of politics. According to Reinhold Niebuhr, American modernists grossly underrate the pressure of vested economic interests

and the part played by man's irrational impulses when they naïvely believe that the mere dissemination of political and economic information and the spread of education will solve our social problems. They make of man a too rational being. Thus the religious modernist becomes as politically immature as the religious fundamentalist, but for different reasons.

II

American political thinking is still essentially of the eighteenth century. We are still thinking in terms of the compact theory and of natural rights. We have a written constitution, and this has been the most important political fact in our historical experience. Debate on public questions has largely revolved about questions of constitutionality rather than questions of social desirability. Our approach to politics is still in great part legal, formal, structural and mechanical. We still resist the functional approach; we still resent economic and social realism. We are Newtonian rather than Darwinian; we still think on the side of fixity rather than on the side of relativity and evolutionary change. We have made great strides toward political and social realism since the Great Depression, but the substratum of our political thinking continues to be that of the eighteenth century.

A striking example of our faith in political mechanics occurs almost every time we have a change in the presidency. Almost invariably a new president announces that he believes in separation of powers, and that he will keep "hands off" Congress. This announcement is always welcomed by the people and applauded by the politicians and the press. But within a few months the new president learns, the hard way, about the facts of political life; it is not long before the inescapable realities of social politics beat about his

head and force him into dynamic leadership.

At the opening of the twentieth century, when the economic and social problems of an industrial society had become so cumulative and acute that they could no longer be ignored, our first impulse was not to solve those problems in terms of their economic and social content, but to alter the mechanics of our mechanical structure. Hence the emphasis of the progressive movement on direct primaries, the popular election of United States senators, the initiative, the referendum, the recall. Lincoln Steffens has pointed out how our big cities persistently put their faith in repeated "reform" techniques, which invariably miscarry, while the fundamental economic and social conditions that produce the boss and city machine are ignored.

Another example of our faith in political mechanisms may be found in the great pother raised by civil service reform back in the 1880's. There was an almost child-like belief that civil service reform would solve our pressing public questions. This belief was held not only by the rank and file of our people, but also by men like E. L. Godkin and Andrew D. White, who should have known better.

From faith in civil service reform it was not a long jump to faith in the administrative "expert." Faith in the administrative expert was to the 1920's and 1930's what faith in civil service reform had once been. The high priests of this new dispensation were the political scientists themselves. It was much easier and much more in line with our political thinking to ignore social forces and to call in the administrative experts, than to face squarely the pressing problems of American industrial society. And from faith in the administrative expert it is but a very short step to a belief that people can be maneuvered and manipulated by propaganda techniques—regardless of the

fundamental economic and social forces at work.

That we still emphasize the legal approach to politics is attested by the fact that the great bulk of our politicians are lawyers. Constituencies in foreign countries elect to public office far more than we do manufacturers, bankers, labor leaders, physicians, editors, teachers and college professors—men who spend their lives living or thinking about social or economic realities rather than legal forms. Regular readers of the *Congressional Record* doubtless have been amused by the way our lawmakers pounce upon a little legal point and pick it to pieces, while leaving the larger economic implications of legislation to perfunctory and unrealistic examination. And only a people with a rather pathetic faith in legal forms could have in all seriousness voted in the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act!

The persistence of the compact theory of government is evident today in our faith in the United Nations, based as it is on the contractual concept. On the other hand, Americans seriously underrate the functional approach to world organization, such as the Communist International, which still exists in fact if not in form. We Americans are likely to think of this as a mere instrument of Soviet imperialism, rather than as the possible nucleus of a future federated world state. In this connection it would be well for us to recall the making of national states: how the *bourgeoisie* in the various communes and feudal provinces joined hands to create the national states of Western Europe; how the business men and big planters of our own thirteen original states joined hands to create and ratify the Constitution of 1787, and to make possible its successful operation during the critical first decade of its existence. Legal forms were not enough; behind those legal forms there had to be co-

ordinated social and economic drives to stimulate effective functional development. We would be discussing American foreign policy more realistically today if we examined the kind of class support we are getting or are likely to get in the various countries of the world.

Indeed, the naïve faith of Americans in mere political machinery is best illustrated today by the enormous interest Americans take in the mechanical structure of the United Nations—while taking almost none in such questions as how power politics would operate inside a successful world organization (as it now operates inside national governments); how ideological differences could be composed; how such an organization could keep the peace, and still not become an instrument for freezing the status quo and preventing necessary change.

III

If there ever existed that "happy land without a foreign policy," it was the United States during the major part of its history. Of course, the United States had a definite foreign policy from the time of Washington's administration down to the Spanish-American War—a policy of isolation or American continentalism—but, except for the very early years of the Republic and for the Civil War period, this policy required of our people and our leaders little of the intelligence, information, astuteness, and agility required of European powers in the conduct of their foreign relations. Favorable conditions and circumstances over a long period of time allowed the United States to pursue so simple and easy-going a policy. No North American balance of power developed because the United States came to dominate the continent. And it so happened, as Parker Thomas Moon has pointed out, that the early and middle history of the Republic coincided with the period of

European nonaggression and nonexpansion in Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere—the relatively quiet period *after* mercantilistic imperialism and *before* the rise of industrial or finance imperialism.

With few exceptions, then, we have never until recently had to face really difficult long-term questions of foreign policy. This freedom from vital worry about our foreign policy has been responsible for our adolescent notions about international relations. Except for an occasional glimpse of reality (for instance, "God takes care of children, fools, drunkards, and the United States of America") we came to ascribe our security and freedom from wars to our own strength and wisdom, to our own intellectual and moral superiority. Even today we do not understand the nature of the European or world balance of power, and naïvely believe that a world organization to keep the peace will somehow banish this wicked system, rather than canalize it into political and legal channels. Jacques Barzun has told us how once upon a time he innocently asked a group of Americans what politics could be about if not power, and how, as a result, he was stared at as if he had proposed polygamy.

Misunderstanding the nature of power politics, we have now entered actively upon the world scene with mellifluous platitudes, sermonic exhortations, and cosmic creeds. And we do little to bring these high-sounding generalizations down to earth and give them concrete applications. The Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter are cases in point. Then when these necessarily fail in the practical world of affairs we recoil into a kind of hurt self-righteousness.

More recently we have been guilty of an equally adolescent trait. In the Pacific our people have demanded a unilateral policy favorable to us, but in Poland and the Balkans our people have demanded of Russia a policy of universalism. In our

sphere we favored nationalism; in the Russian sphere we favored internationalism.

IV

Throughout most of our history, America's internal problems have been relatively simple. We have been free of the complex and pressing situations confronting Europe. Here was a vast continent rich in natural resources, with abundant land, with a small population. Few feudal left-overs complicated life. No dead hand reached out from the past to perpetuate parasitic vested interests and embitter social relations—at least not to the degree common to Europe. Class lines were fluid and blurred. The ever-present frontier provided a safety valve and a way of escape from the serious problems that did arise. Men too often did not have to sit down and think their own way through difficulties; instead, they could simply evade them.

We know now that the differences between Europe and America were never differences in kind; they were only differences in degree. We know also that the differences between Europe and America are getting narrower all the time and that today the problems of an industrial society are much the same on both sides of the Atlantic. The days of immunity from hard problems and tough thinking are gone forever. But the heritage of easy-going political thinking, inherited from the days when Americans could afford to wage a heated presidential election on the question of whether or not the tariff should be raised or lowered a few notches, survives to this day.

The democratic tradition, too, has been responsible in part for our reluctance to discuss political questions in realistic terms. Back in the early days of the Republic, before universal suffrage and the democratic dogma, our statesmen debated questions in a way that aided one's

understanding of society. Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, John Adams, John Taylor of Carolina spoke in terms of political actualities; they discussed the real nature and basis of political power; they publicly acknowledged the decisive importance in politics of property interests, economic interests, group interests, and class interests. But by about 1840 the methods of Jacksonian democracy had progressed so far in politics that the Whigs, representatives of the conservative interests, dared not say in public what they actually thought—that property should rule in society. Where the Federalists dealt in actualities and candidly asserted their convictions, the Whigs were compelled to employ subterfuges and to talk as if they loved the common man. When the conservative party of the country thus dispensed with actual analysis and hard thinking, and no longer challenged the liberal party of the country to meet it on real grounds, political thinking in both parties became flabby and sentimental. Platitudes, stereotypes and wise-cracks took the place of realistic thinking. The hoop-la election of 1840 set the pattern of all subsequent political campaigning in this country.

The relative simplicity of our problems, then, and the necessity of couching even these in easily acceptable and superficial terms, have produced a naïve political faith. The essence of this faith is a belief in the identity of group interests and the American conception of the general welfare or the common good. In America "the general welfare" becomes a mystical concept. It is thought of as having a distinct and independent existence, rather than as the end result of a rough compromising of group interests. Once in a while, of course, devils in the form of "Wall Street" or "economic royalists" or labor unions arise to endanger "the general welfare." But in the end these devils are exorcised.

Democracy is thought of as ministering directly to "the general welfare," not as the mediating process whereby all group interests are balanced. Pressure groups are thought to be threats to "the general welfare," rather than the normal and natural way people have always expressed themselves in politics. A sure bet to win applause from an American audience is to assail "pressure groups." It scarcely ever occurs to an American that the difference between democracy and dictatorship consists in this: in a democracy all groups are invited to become articulate and active, and a method is provided for balancing their differences; in a dictatorship a few pressure groups capture the government, and ignore, silence and even persecute other pressure groups. The idea that that society is most democratic which has the greatest number of articulate and active pressure groups usually comes as a distinct surprise to Americans.

Out of this mystical notion of "the general welfare" has come a rejection not only of Marxism, but of that whole concept of the class and group struggle which most of the founding fathers (particularly James Madison) understood so well. Perhaps it is more correct to say that Americans ignore Marxism than that they reject it. One cannot reject something unless he has thought about it, and most Americans have simply never given Marxism a passing thought. The average American even shies away from using the term "socialist." Out of this ignorance of Marxism comes the greatest danger to American co-operation and leadership in the world today. It is now plain for all to see that the twentieth century is the century of the socialist revolution. But Americans do not yet see this, because for them Marxism is something that either does not exist or must be ignored, or, at the least, played down.

Out of this basic misunderstanding

comes a whole host of misconceptions. Fascism is thought of as an aberration, not as a counter-revolution to socialism. Socialists and Communists are put in the same boat and equally damned. The triumph of middle-class democracy in Europe is still believed possible. The political conflict in Europe today is believed to be between middle-class democracy and socialism, rather than between moderate socialism and extreme socialism or communism. It is actually believed that socialism can be checked by America's refusal of loans and credits to socialist governments, whereas such a course is more likely to drive the peoples of Europe toward communism. Harry Truman and Jimmy Byrnes have every day to do business with foreign statesmen whose basic political philosophy is either "revisionist" or "orthodox" Marxism, but it is doubtful if either Truman or Byrnes has ever in his life given one serious thought to the Marxian philosophy. The Marxists understand our basic point of view, which they characterize as "bourgeois," but we do not understand theirs. This is not to say that all American statesmen should embrace Marxism, but it is to say that American statesmen of the mid-twentieth century who fail to understand Marxism do so at their own and their country's peril.

V

America today has no first class theoretical thinkers in politics. Even the learned journals have until recently dealt almost exclusively with the legalistic, the scholastic, the structural approach to politics; they have resisted the dynamic, the social, the functional approach to political theory.

Even now, in the midst of a decided trend toward collectivism, at about the dead center of a century which will be known as the century of the socialist revolution, America has no socialist

thinkers of first rank—one is tempted to say that America has no socialist thinkers at all. For a half century the British Fabian intellectuals have been preparing for the present by anticipating and rationalizing the future, but we have in America no comparable group of thinkers. Our political intellectuals have simply abdicated their chief function. For what in the name of heaven is a political intellectual good for, if not to anticipate and rationalize the future?

If we Americans want to learn about the revolution of our day, we may, to be sure, read something about it in American periodicals, but the articles are invariably written by Europeans—a Francis Williams, a G. D. H. Cole, a Julian Huxley or a Harold Laski. And it is significant that the most pretentious book by America's most famous publicist of the mid-twentieth century, *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society* by Walter Lippmann, is an anachronistic and indefensible identification of freedom with the free market, long since departed from large parts of the world and certainly from many areas of American economic life.

American political thought, saturated as it is with eighteenth century rationales and formalisms, has done next to nothing in exploring the part played by the irrational in politics and human conduct. This has been a field left almost entirely to the Europeans—to Stendhal, Dostoevski, Nietzsche, Bergson, Freud, Pareto, Sorel, Thomas Mann and a host of others. Now as Max Lerner has pointed out, there is an enormous difference between the recognition of the role of the irrational and the glorification of it. And if, as Lerner believes, the necessary task of our age is to discover a resolution between the role of the irrational and the demands of social rationality, then we Americans have certainly shirked our intellectual responsibilities.

VI

We are, to be sure, on our way to greater political maturity. Our scholarly journals in political science contain more and more articles that integrate politics with business, agriculture, labor. In the field of history, disciples of Frederick J. Turner and Charles A. Beard are busy analyzing the bases of sectional and class conflict.

We must, however, be careful not to over-emphasize these gains. Our political scientists and their learned journals still stress constitutional, legal, structural, administrative problems. Most of our historians still refuse to act on the Turner or Beard concepts, however much they may accept them in theory. A glance at a list of American historical publications in any given year will show that Americans who write history still prefer political narrative, personal history, biography. As Manning J. Dauer has pointed out, so little actual spade work has been done—there has been in fact so little collecting of election returns down through townships, wards, and precincts, and so little analyzing of these against economic and social backgrounds—that when young Arthur M. Schlesinger announced that Jacksonian democracy was primarily Eastern, urban, and proletarian rather than the product of the frontier, Ameri-

can historians did not know whether Schlesinger was right or wrong!

Now if this confusion exists among the scholars, what shall we say of the laity? For the laity, these functional ideas have scarcely penetrated at all. The great majority of our practical politicians and ordinary citizens still operate within a framework of political mores utterly separated from today's economic and social realities. For instance, the stock in trade of a political conservative consists of moth-eaten stereotypes like "eternal verities"; "the sanctity of the Constitution"; "that government is best which governs least"; "you cannot by legislation repeal the law of supply and demand"; and so forth. The stock in trade of a political liberal continues to be humanitarian uplift.

We are, of course, being educated—scholars and laity alike—by the inexorable flow of events: two world wars and their consequences; the Great Depression of the 1930's; the hard realities of contemporary foreign politics; the tide of anti-imperialist revolt and socialist revolution in Asia and Europe. But are we being educated rapidly enough to deal intelligently with the world in which we are now a leader?

The most important race in the world today is the race between American political education and catastrophe.

The American Type: Strengths and Weaknesses

Bruce Bliven, editorial director of the *New Republic*, has spent a lifetime studying the United States and writing about Americans. In this present essay Mr. Bliven points out that the canard about the degeneration of the "younger generation" was emphatically refuted by the conduct of American soldiers in the war. Furthermore, he believes that the general public responded to wartime demands with a remarkable unanimity. At the same time he is disturbed by developing class antagonism and our inability to eliminate racial tension.

The war, which has produced so many things either good or bad, has had one result that can only be called good. It has put an end to an anxious debate, which had lasted for several decades, about the American character. We forget this sort of thing rather easily, and so it is hard now to recall that for a good many years before 1941, many of our supposedly best thinkers had been busy telling us that the American character, unfortunately, had decayed.

For this, they explained, several things were responsible. For one, we had been made soft, spiritually and physically, by too much easy living—the automobile was ruining our legs, and canned food our teeth. The prohibition experiment had destroyed our respect for law and order, or what there was left of it. The automobile, furthermore, in conjunction with other causes, had ruined our morals and contributed to the unfortunate phenomenon that the younger generation had lost all respect for its elders. The discipline of the home had collapsed. The authoritarian father had gone to join the dodo. The American, we were told, was now a materialist to the last degree. He

was devoted to gadgets of all kinds, at the expense of his soul. Magazines were filled with beautiful advertisements praising Things and in the effort to acquire Things we had lost all sight of ultimate values. In short, we were in a Bad Way.

This was a sobering indictment, except that it has turned out, pretty largely, to be false. American soldiers have now proved on the battlefield beyond any question, just as they did a quarter of a century ago, that they are as brave as the soldiers of any other country in the world or any of past history. Indeed, one can argue that our soldiers are braver, in a special sense, than those of some other countries, for they have not been indoctrinated with some particular point of view until they have become unthinking automats. A German soldier who has been trained out of all common sense until it is his dearest wish to die for Hitler can hardly be said to show as much courage as an American soldier who has not been propagandized for anything in particular but knows it is his job to go out and take a risk of losing his life. To say this does not mean, of course, that the American soldier doesn't

know he is fighting for democracy against its enemies. He does know it, but not because it has been parroted to him until all his power of judgment has been lost. Speaking as one who has often urged greater political indoctrination by the American army, and still believes it would be desirable, I should like to go on record as feeling that if we have to choose between the comprehensive tutelage of the Nazis and the American disregard of political education, I should prefer the latter.

At any rate, the American soldier is all right. He is, in a famous phrase, "just sort of automatically wonderful." He is resourceful, courageous, possessed of a high degree of initiative, the best mechanic in the world, and his actions are founded on a solid core of common sense which sets him off from the hysteria so often found, for example, in the Nazi army.

But the soldiers, after all, constitute a special group in the community. They consist for the most part of young men, in sound physical health, men who might reasonably be expected to represent the best and most altruistic elements in the community. What about the rest of us?

Any candid appraisal of the American character must list a series of faults as well as of virtues. As a people we are volatile, mercurial, short-tempered, selfish, self-indulgent. We are also—and this is no contradiction—generous, sympathetic, practical, resourceful, persistent. Naturally, among 135,000,000 people there are all possible attributes, and some of these are more conspicuous at certain times and places than others.

This is noticeably true of civilians in wartime. There is no doubt that some of us are behaving very badly. When the government has rationed such things as food and gasoline, black markets have promptly sprung up. (Probably the experiment with prohibition has helped to

make us somewhat less law-abiding than we would otherwise have been.) Many of us have been terribly slow to realize the mortal danger in which this country was placed by Hitler's attempt to conquer the whole world, an attempt that came within a hair's breadth of succeeding; only a few months before Pearl Harbor, the House of Representatives failed by a single vote to disband the American army. In spite of government admonitions to buy nothing if we can possibly avoid it, department-store sales have recently soared to an all-time high. Some of us have not hesitated to play partisan politics even at the considerable risk of interfering with the war effort. Both workers and employers have on occasion thought more of their selfish advantage than of speeding up production of war materials. Many people continue to travel unnecessarily even after the government has asked them to stay at home.

Yet I cannot help feeling that, on the whole, this is the dark side of a picture that is predominantly bright. I should be surprised if throughout the entire country the gasoline chiselers and the conscious patrons of other black markets constitute more than ten or fifteen per cent of the total population. All over the country, war bonds have been bought in amounts exceeding the quotas set. Compulsory military service has been resisted only by a minute percentage of the individuals called. In almost all cases, a conscientious scruple against bearing arms has been alleged as a reason, and there is no doubt that in a majority of instances this has been a genuine factor. In no part of the country has there been even the possibility of draft riots such as were seen during the American Civil War. In fact, the more one studies the past history of this nation, the more one is impressed by our present degree of unanimity.

The average comfortable middle-class person who has stayed at home during

this war has little conception of the hardships that have been endured by large numbers of people who are more directly concerned with war problems. Millions of farmers are working desperately from early dawn until late into the night trying to maintain production with less help than ever before. Factory workers travel long distances to and from work in overcrowded vehicles, spend many hours on the job, and come home to inadequate housing and shortages of food and all types of equipment. To be sure, the farmer is getting better prices, and the worker higher wages, than in the recent past; but even so the average man on the farm or in the factory has a total annual income at which most well-educated middle-class citizens would turn up their noses. One of the disturbing things about America in wartime is the developing class hostility which seems to be creating a gulf between trade-union members and their families, on one hand, and the rest of the community on the other. Trade unions certainly have their faults, but usually these faults are by no means so serious, or so important in relation to the whole trade-union movement, as the anti-union propaganda would indicate. There is a failure of information here—a failure of the unions to manage somehow to tell their story to the middle class and a failure of the middle class to realize that the workers on the whole are loyal American citizens, with substantially the same outlook and ambitions as themselves.

Another disturbing fact about our character in wartime is our inability to do away with race prejudice even in the midst of a war for democracy, a war against Nazi ideas, of which the superiority of one race is the foremost. Some people believe that in recent times racial tension in America has actually increased. I am not aware of any reliable evidence that this is true; but whether increasing or not, race prejudice, founded on com-

plete voodoo without the slightest basis in scientific fact, continues to be shockingly large. On the other hand, there is perhaps ground for optimism in the fact that a more determined fight against this prejudice is being made than ever before. For the first time we have federal laws and regulations on this subject; and even though they are widely nullified in practice, it is a gain that they have been put on the statute books.

What are the chief facts about the American character as distinct from those of other nationalities? Obviously, any generalization will be too sweeping. Not all the people in any country are alike. There are Americans who have what are commonly called British or Greek or Swedish characteristics, without having a drop of the blood of those races, and there are people in England, Greece or Sweden who would fit the description of a typical American. It is in the light of such reservations that the following remarks must be read.

First of all, of course, comes our famous national sense of humor, that characteristic which every nation in the world claims for itself and is inclined to deny to the citizens of all other countries. It is a truism to say that our humor consists of exaggeration whereas that of the British consists of depreciation, of understatement. This comparison should not be pressed too far, however; nowadays the sort of American humor developed by our radio comedians, for instance, would seem to be a polyglot affair, drawing on the resources of all the European cultures but imparting to them an authentic, unmistakable American flavor. With the international circulation of American movies, radio programs and magazines (the *Reader's Digest* for example is now published in six or seven languages including, I believe, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and Chinese) it is quite possible

that the world's humor may eventually be internationalized, with a flavor more predominantly American than any other.

Our people are incurably optimistic. This fact is neither to our credit nor discredit; it has grown out of our occupying an empty continent in which, naturally, nearly all human institutions have grown bigger—and sometimes better—with the passage of years. This is perhaps why almost nobody in America took seriously the plain fact that at one time we were in extremely serious danger of losing the war, so that during the first two years of the struggle our complacency was one of the great handicaps to our military operations. Every time we won a success on the battlefield many hundreds of persons called up and canceled their Red Cross appointments as blood donors, apparently in the belief that the war was all over. Any sort of pessimistic attitude about the future of Western civilization is looked upon by the average American as a sort of intellectual exercise, with no conceivable reality behind it. I know a public lecturer who now and then goes about the country speaking before women's clubs on the future of civilization. He takes a gloomy view of it, and he regularly has the experience, after telling several hundred Helen Hokinson ladies that the future of the human race is dark, of having twenty or thirty of them come up and tell him that they "enjoyed your message so much." One wonders what "message" he could possibly bring them that they wouldn't enjoy.

Another truism about the Americans is that we are highly opportunistic and practical. Citizens of other countries—Great Britain for example—are forever being horrified by our impatience with tradition and with all precedents, whether legal or cultural. There are certain people—good examples are sometimes found among the Latin Americans—who feel that once you have written a beautiful

paper program looking toward future improvement, you have accomplished something of importance. Americans care little for paper programs and are satisfied to work on an *ad hoc* basis. I suggest that this may have had something to do with the quarrel between the United States and the rest of the world during the twenty years when America was not a member of the League of Nations. In part, this was of course the result of isolationism on our part, and an isolationism which has had unhappy consequences for ourselves and for the world. But it may also have been in part the result of a feeling that when the United States was really needed to help solve the affairs of the world, we would respond to the call regardless of whether or not we had definite legal commitments to do so. We had done this before in 1917, and quite possibly many practical Americans felt there was no reason to worry about our doing it again. It is not at all surprising that the most characteristic American philosophy, and the only formal one toward which we have made any serious contribution, is pragmatism. More than any other people in the world, the Americans are inclined to feel that truth is relative, that whatever works is true, and (this is not of course a part of pragmatism) the end justifies the means. I am not now saying that such a philosophy is a desirable one, but only that it exists, in the United States.

I find that many of my intellectual friends are horrified by certain aspects of the war. They are shocked for one thing, by the commercial advertising which seeks to wave the flag, or to claim that the products of the advertiser are playing an important part in winning the war—a claim which, unhappily, has in some cases been proved to be false by government investigations which were simultaneous with, or even preceded, the advertising in question. My friends also are

shocked by the exploitation of the war in Hollywood publicity, as for example in the case of the movie starlet who undertook to kiss every soldier in an army camp, and only gave up the endeavor after having embraced almost 800 of them.

I also deplore these things. It is easy to imagine the capital that is made of incidents like this in the propaganda activities of our enemies in Germany and Japan. One thing to say to my intellectual friends is that perhaps they were self-deceived, earlier, about the cultural level of the country as a whole. Perhaps they have been trying to apply to all Americans standards that have never been reached, except by a minute minority, in any country.

The boastfulness of Americans has become a byword around the world. I am not sure that it is as serious as it is often described, but in so far as it does exist, I think there is a logical and not discreditable reason. No doubt it is a mistake to push too hard the influence of the frontier and the pioneer aspect of American life, yet they are important. In the frontier community, people are judged by their appearance or what they say of themselves; everyone is a stranger; no one knows how rich, well-bred, or important your ancestors were, unless you tell it yourself. Moreover, in a world where towns are constantly growing, new land is being taken up, and a continent is being put under cultivation, there are important reasons for emphasizing the fact that your country and your town are a success, and that you yourself are by no means a nonentity. Some things in American life which seem otherwise inexplicable, and are disagreeable to the more sensitive souls, can, I think, be explained on this basis.

I mentioned earlier the fact that many people, before the war, expressed deep apprehension regarding the moral fiber of

America. In one special aspect, public expression of this attitude continues, though how sincerely, it is impossible to say. There are those who express the fear that our old spirit of self-reliance is dead, that we have learned to turn to Washington for everything, and that Washington itself has suffered a partial moral paralysis, in that it is filled with thousands of "bureaucrats" more concerned that the red tape is properly wound and unwound than that things get done. The more pessimistic of these critics would have you believe that the American character, and the American institutions with it, are now in the process of breaking down.

This picture seems to me enormously exaggerated. I do not doubt that many things have been and are seriously wrong in Washington, but this is a picture which requires correction from another point of view. In the first place, most of the leading newspapers of the United States are hostile to the present administration in Washington and are looking for every opportunity to exaggerate the weaknesses and mistakes there, while they say little or nothing about the numerous good jobs that are done. They talk about "long-haired professors" who are trying to run the United States, overlooking the fact that many hundreds of leading businessmen of the country have patriotically gone to Washington and at heavy personal sacrifice are doing many of the things of which the press complains as being the product of crackbrained theorists who "never met a payroll." The press moreover disregards the fact which Mr. A. G. Mezerik pointed out not long ago, that very frequently, when one of the "long-haired professors" gives up his position in Washington, he is immediately deluged with offers of jobs, at \$25,000 or \$50,000 a year, in that very realm of private business which is supposed to scorn so deeply the incompetence of the academic mind.

Another point to remember is that if

public business is sometimes wasteful and inefficient, the same indictment is true of private business. I could recite, if anybody wanted to hear it, a long list of occasions on which some of the largest and most important business firms in the country have made ridiculous blunders—blunders quite as serious as those attributed to the bureaucracy in Washington.

In summary, if the American character is far from being as perfect as our Fourth-of-July orators have pretended, it is also very much better than is suggested by the harsh things said about it by its detractors. The war has proved that the anxious fears about us expressed a few years ago

were, in the main, false; when it comes to the final values of courageous and devoted manhood and womanhood, the Americans of this day are the equal of any other people throughout all history. Moreover, the American character is malleable in the extreme. Perhaps the most important lesson the world has learned in the past fifty years is that it is not true that "human nature is unchangeable." Human nature, on the contrary, can be changed with the greatest ease and to the utmost possible extent. If in this lies huge potential danger, it also contains some of the brightest hopes that we have for the future of mankind.

Freedom and Responsibility

Carl Becker in this selection from *Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life* provides historical background for understanding the influences which have shaped the American character. It is significant that this eminent historian should couple the words "freedom" and "responsibility." There is little doubt that in the future, if we desire to maintain individual freedoms, we shall have to assume individual responsibility for their survival. "Hitherto our freedoms have been the lavish gift of the country we inhabit; we can preserve them only by our own effort. . . ." From now on to remain a political democracy and to achieve a democratic society Americans will have to make a conscious choice and a deliberate effort.

When I had the signal honor of being invited to give these lectures, I was informed that the terms of Mr. Cook's bequest permitted me to choose any subject within the general field of "American institutions and their preservation." This opened to me a sufficiently wide field, but it seemed to me that the first series of lectures, instead of dealing with any particular American institution, might properly be devoted to those broad

general rights or freedoms upon which our system of government rests, and which, according to the Declaration of Independence, all just governments exist to secure. This subject seemed all the more appropriate in view of the fact that for some years now half the world has been engaged in the desperate task of combating an alien system that in theory denies, and in practice would destroy, all of the rights and freedoms which are es-

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sential, not only to the democratic way of life, but to any way of life that can rightly be called civilized. It seemed, therefore, both timely in itself and suited to this occasion to devote these lectures to the general subject of "Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life."

But, it may be asked, why not confine the discussion to Freedom in the American Way of Life? "Freedom" is an attractive word, and freedom itself is a fine thing. We all love our freedoms. Why, then, inject into the discussion the tiresome word "responsibility"? No doubt some people welcome responsibility, but most of us would perhaps just as soon not be burdened with it. In any case, our rights and freedoms are enumerated in the Federal and state constitutions, but do the constitutions enumerate our duties and responsibilities? Well, there is, to be sure, no Bill of Responsibilities in our constitutions, but a careful reading of them will disclose the annoying fact that for every right or freedom that they confer they impose, implicitly if not explicitly, a corresponding obligation or responsibility.

Two examples will suffice to make this clear. The Connecticut Constitution of 1818 contains this statement: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Here a freedom is defined and conferred—freedom of speech and of the press; but it is conjoined with a responsibility—responsibility for the abuse of that freedom. Again, the Federal Constitution contains this statement: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." Here an obli-

gation is imposed—the obligation to be loyal to the United States; but it is conjoined with a right—the right of not being punished for disloyalty except in a court of law and on specific evidence. If, then, we examine our constitutions looking for our rights, we shall find them; but we shall also find, in the case of each right, some responsibility inconveniently intruding to limit it.

I have therefore united freedom and responsibility in this discussion because they are united in our constitutions and laws; but also for another and more fundamental reason—because the nature of freedom and responsibility is such that they cannot be discussed, still less dealt with, to any good purpose separately. Freedom unrestrained by responsibility becomes mere license; responsibility unchecked by freedom becomes mere arbitrary power. The question, then, is not whether freedom and responsibility shall be united, but how they can be united and reconciled to the best advantage. This is indeed the central problem of all political philosophy and practice, the problem of the one and the many—the difficulty being to reconcile the desirable liberties of the individual with the necessary power of government in such a way as to do justice as well as may be to the desires and the interests of all individuals and classes in society.

There is, needless to say, no universally valid rule for solving this fundamental problem; or rather, the only universally valid rule does not help us much in solving it in particular cases. "Liberty," says the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, "consists in the power to do whatever does not injure others." Very true. But the essential question, always difficult and sometimes impossible to answer, is: What action by what person or persons under what specific circumstances does injure others, or

so far and so persistently injure others that it needs to be restricted or forbidden? Liberty is a variable thing, appearing in different guises at different times and to different people. One man's liberty may easily be another man's bondage. The French nobles in the eighteenth century spoke of their liberties, but for the French peasants these liberties were oppressions, and to us they have all the appearance of unjust privileges. For the owners of English cotton mills in the 1830's freedom of contract was a cherished liberty, but for the anemic women and children who contracted to work in the mills because the alternative was starvation, it was a species of wage slavery. Freedom of the press is a valuable liberty to those who publish books and newspapers, but it has by no means the same value to those who rarely take their pen in hand and find it rather heavier than the sword when they do. Freedom of speech is a capital asset to the vendors of patent medicines and the corporations offering air-blown stocks to the public, but such vendors and corporations have at different times been so far unable to distinguish freedom of speech from freedom of lying that their freedom had to be curbed.

Liberty is likewise differently regarded by different nations. The pre-Hitler Germans were free to do many things, but they were content, indeed happy, to have many actions *verboten* that we think harmless and even desirable; and, whereas we are apt to think the Russians enslaved, the Russians themselves appear to feel that they are freer than we are. Not long since, a Russian scholar said to me that the liberties that Americans prize so highly seem to the Russians too negative to be of much use. "Your American freedoms," he said, "are mostly *freedoms from something*, whereas the Russian freedoms are *freedoms to do something*." The distinction seemed to me a superficial one, since any liberty to do something implies

a freedom from interference with that doing, and any freedom from something implies a liberty to do what the doer might otherwise be prevented from doing. But what my Russian acquaintance meant, I suppose, is that the freedoms enumerated in our constitutions are mostly defined as freedoms from governmental interference with the activities of the individual, so that the American form of government guarantees the freedom of the individual, as one may say, by letting him alone; whereas in Russia the government guarantees the freedom of the individual, not by letting him alone, but by seeing to it that he has a job, a place to live, an education, medical care, and other similar good things. "The real difference," my Russian acquaintance said, "is that in Russia we regard the government as our friend, whereas you Americans seem to feel that the government is your enemy."

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The explanation of this traditional attitude toward the function of government and the liberty of the citizen is not to be found in any inherent virtues or defects of the Americans themselves. It is to be found, first, in the circumstances of their history, which have enabled them, until comparatively recent times at least, to get on very well with a minimum of governmental regulation; and, secondly, in their traditional democratic political philosophy, which, as formulated in the eighteenth century, was based on the assumption, among others, that the best form of government is the one that governs least. What, then, were these peculiar circumstances of American history, and how was this historical experience rationalized in the traditional democratic political philosophy?

On certain conventional occasions we rise and sing to the land of the free and the home of the brave, land of the Pil-

grim's pride, land where our fathers died. No doubt there is as much symbolic truth in these phrases as one can reasonably expect to find in a patriotic hymn. But it is worth noting that in all the stages of our history our fathers, if we go back a few generations, mostly died somewhere else. We are a collection of people from all the nations of Europe, and even of the world—people who have in successive generations come here in order to escape oppression or to improve the material conditions of life. Goethe expressed this general feeling when he exclaimed: "America, you have it better!" I once asked a Greek who had recently come to this country how he liked it here. He agreed with Goethe. "I like it fine," he said. "I am a Greek Jew. So what? No one asks am I a Greek Jew. In America is everything better for poor people like me." This is the essential fact: in America everything has always been better for poor people. It is this conviction, no doubt, that makes us a united nation, although by all the rules known to an Adolf Hitler we should be neither united nor a nation. Native- and foreign-born alike are united by the profound conviction that America has the best of it. We are attached to the U.S.A. less for what it is than for what it has to offer, less because of its sacred rills and templed hills than because it is the place in the world where all comers can find the best opportunity to do what they like and get what they want. In this sense it has always been, and has always been thought by the peoples of Europe to be, the land of the free because it is the land of opportunity.

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In a famous passage of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* Edward Gibbon said that the second century A.D. was "the period in the history of the world, during which the condition of the

human race was most happy and prosperous." It may now be said that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the people of the United States enjoyed a greater degree of political liberty, social equality, and widely based material prosperity than has ever fallen to the lot of any other people. This happy state was won, not by desperate struggles against the oppressions of men, but by unremitting effort to appropriate the rich resources of a great and undeveloped country. That task could be accomplished with a minimum of governmental control and a maximum of individual freedom of thought and enterprise. It may be said, therefore, that our political freedom and social equality were the casual and lavish gift of nature rather than anything won by war or revolution or devised to conform with a reasoned theory of politics and society. We are not on that account any the less attached to our form of government and to the freedoms associated with it. On the contrary, we are profoundly attached to them. We are attached to them for many reasons, no doubt—because they have emerged so naturally from the everyday experience of living and making a living, because they have for so long a time worked so well, because they are sustained by instinctive emotional responses and unconscious habitual ways of behaving, and because nothing in our history or tradition provides us with a model of any other political or social system. But we are also attached to them because of a profound conviction, of which we are perhaps not often aware, that the republican form of government is, as Jefferson said, the only one that is not eternally at open or secret war with the natural rights of mankind, or at all events with those familiar rights and privileges which we regard as in some sense natural because by long habituation they seem to us so imprescriptibly American.

We are much attached to our government and to our freedoms, but we have often taken them a little too much for granted as familiar and replaceable possessions which we may use or abuse as the occasion demands. We have been so rich in freedoms that they have seemed to us expendable; we have so much the sense of liberty unrestrained that it often seems permissible to take liberties with our liberty. Our sense of freedom and of self-direction are ingrained, but so is our impulse to direct action: naturally enough, perhaps, since both derive from the same experience—the experience of a people who for three centuries have been mainly engaged in the practical task of subduing a virgin continent to human use and habitation with a minimum of governmental authority either to assist or to restrain them. To get the immediate practical task done with a minimum of palaver, a minimum of attention to red tape or strict rule of law or rights abstractly defined, is apt to seem to us the obvious because it has so often been the necessary procedure. Whether it has been a matter of clearing the forest or exterminating the redskins, organizing a government or exploiting it for private advantage, building railroads for the public good or rigging the market in order to milk them for private profit, establishing free schools by law or placing illegal restraints on the freedom of teaching, conferring on Negroes their God-given constitutional rights or making sure they do not vote, applauding the value of temperance or perceiving the convenience of bootlegging—whatever the immediate task may be, the short one, the ready-made device for dealing with it, is apt to seem to us good enough so long as it gets the business done. Throughout our history ruthlessness and humane dealing, respect for law and right and disregard of them, have run side by side: in almost equal degree we have exhibited

the temper of conformity and of revolt, the disposition to submit voluntarily to law and custom when they serve our purposes and to ignore them when they cease to do so.

Until comparatively recently all this has served us well enough. We were so rich that we could afford to be careless and extravagant. We could afford to exploit our natural resources with a maximum of waste for immediate ends and with a minimum of care for their long-time uses. We could afford to regard liberty and equality as complementary terms indicating identical values on the opposite sides of the same coin. We could assume that unrestrained individual enterprise would result in the maximum production of wealth and in as equitable a distribution of it as the natural qualities and defects of men permitted. We could afford, in normal times at least, to regard international affairs as a formality to be attended to by the Secretary of State; and in normal times we could afford to take domestic politics casually, even cynically, as a diverting game played according to understood rules of rhetoric and melodrama—played with gusto, indeed, but for low stakes that, however it came out and whoever won, would not seriously injure business or interfere with any man's chance for getting his own back. We could afford, in short, to let the public business ride, trusting that if every man got what he could and spent it as he liked, the total assets and liabilities, with a generous margin left for profit and loss, would balance well enough in the final accounting.

Although all of this has served us well enough in the past, unfortunately that happy time of universal prosperity, of careers open to talent, of the maximum of freedom of enterprise conjoined with a minimum of responsibility, is now passed beyond recovery.

In the final revision of *The American Commonwealth* James Bryce, a good friend and great admirer of Americans and their institutions, ventured to make a prophecy:

There is a part of the Atlantic where the westward-speeding steam-vessel always expects to encounter fogs. On the fourth or fifth day of the voyage while still in bright sunlight, one sees at a distance a long, low, dark gray line across the bows, and is told that this is the first of the fog banks that have to be traversed. Presently the vessel is upon the cloud, and rushes into its chilling embrace, not knowing what perils of icebergs may be shrouded within its encompassing gloom.

So America, in her swift onward progress, sees, looming on the horizon and now no longer distant, a time of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may be concealed whose form and magnitude she can scarcely yet conjecture. As she fills up her Western regions with inhabitants, she sees the time approach when all of the best land . . . will have been occupied, and when the land now under cultivation will have been so far exhausted as to yield scantier crops even to more expensive culture. Although transportation may also have become cheaper, the price of food will rise; farms will be less easily obtained and will need more capital to work them with profit: the struggle for existence will become more severe. And while the outlet which the West now provides for the overflow of the great cities will have become less available, the cities will have grown immensely more populous; pauperism . . . may be more widely spread; and even if wages do not sink, work may be less abundant. In fact, the chronic evils and problems of old societies and crowded countries, such as we see them today in Europe, will have reappeared in this new soil, while the demand of the multitude to have a larger share in the nation's collective wealth may well have grown more insistent.

High economic authorities pronounce that the beginnings of this time of pressure lie not more than twenty years ahead. . . . It may be the time of trial for democratic institutions.*

This was in 1914. Fifteen years later the United States rushed into the encompassing gloom of the great depression;

and it is obvious that the problems that now confront us, apart from the additional problems created by the war, are in essentials those that Bryce foresaw. Land is no longer to be had for the taking. The necessary job is no longer ready and waiting for the young man who needs it. Our potential wealth is still immense, but we can no longer count on unrestrained individual enterprise to make it fully available or to get it properly distributed. So long as mass unemployment is a major social disaster we cannot afford to take domestic politics as a diverting game played for low stakes; nor can we, at a time when men can fly bombing planes from New York to Hong Kong in less time than it took Ben Franklin to travel from Philadelphia to New York, afford to ignore international politics in the hope of living securely in isolation from other nations.

We are living in the time of pressure that Bryce foretold, and the pressure appears to take the form of a profoundly disturbing paradox. We seem to be offered a choice between depression and mass unemployment as the price of peace, and total war as the price of expansion and general prosperity. Are we, then, limited to this choice? Can we cure one serious evil only by embracing another and worse one? This paradox, unless it be resolved, will surely wreck our institutions and destroy our freedoms, and we cannot resolve it by letting things ride. Hitherto our freedoms have been the lavish gift of the country we inhabit; we can preserve them only by our own effort—only by a far more serious and intelligent attention to public affairs than we have hitherto been willing or found it necessary to give to them. If we do that, we shall find, I think, that it is necessary for us to insist somewhat less stubbornly upon our individual freedoms, and to recognize somewhat less grudgingly our communal responsibilities.

* From Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*. Vol. 2. Copyright, 1893 by Macmillan and Co., 1919 & 1914 by The Macmillan Company, 1922 by Rt. Hon. Viscount Bryce.

